Text

Amends 196 & 206 to Licenses DPR-51 & NPF-6,respectively, Revising TSs Associated with ANO-1 & ANO-2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys
	ML20207B684
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	05/19/1999
From:	Gramm R; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	; Entergy Operations
Shared Package
ML20207B691	List: ML20207B684; ML20207B707;
References
	DPR-51-A-196, NPF-06-A-206 NUDOCS 9906020064
	Download: ML20207B684 (29)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. - *1 g

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ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-313 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.196 License No. DPR-51 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated December 19,1996, as supplemented August 6 and December 3,1998, I

complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; l

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the i

Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; l

l C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Acccrdingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-51 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 1%, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k

ven Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of lasuance:

May 19, 1999 i

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.1%

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-51 DOCKET NO. 50-313 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

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il li 42b 42b 43c 43c 45d1 45d1 45f 45f 59a 59a 60 60 61 61 107 107 108 108

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.

DEFINITIONS 1

1.1 RATED POWER 1

.1. 2 REACTOR OPERATING CONDITION 1

1.3 OPERABLE 2

1.4 PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC 2

1.5 INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILIANCE 3

1.6 POWER DISTRIBUTION 4

1.7 REACTOR BUILDING 5

1.8 FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM 5

1.9 STAGGERED TEST BASIS 5

'1.10 DOSE EQUIVALEFT I-131 6

1.11 LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM 6

1.12 PURGE-PURGING 6

1.13 MEMBER (S) OF THE PUBLIC 6

1.14 EXCLUSION AREA 6

1.15 UNRESTRICTED AREA 6

1.16 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT 6

2.

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 7

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS REACTOR CORE 7

2.2 SAFETY LIMITS, REACTOR SYSTEM PRESSURE 10 2.3 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS, PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 11 3.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 16 3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16 3.1.1 Operational Components-16

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3.1.2 Pressurization, Heatup and Cooldown Limitations 18

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3.1.3 Minimum Conditions for criticality 21 3.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Activity 23 3.1.5 Chemistry 25 3.1.6 Leakage 27 3.1.7 Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity 30 3.1.8 Low Power Physics Testing Restrictions 31 3.1.9 Control Rod Operation 32 3.2 MAKEUP AND CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEMS 34 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING COOLING, AND REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTEMS 36 3.4 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 40 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS 42 3.5.1 Operational Safety Instrumentation 42 3.5.2 Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Lindts 46 3.5.3 Safety Features Actuation System Setpoints 49 3.5.4 Incore Instrumentation 51 3.6 REACTOR BUILDING 54 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 56 1

3.8 FUEL LOADING AND REFUELING 58 1.9 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM 60 3.10 SECONDARY SYSTEM ACTIVITY 66 66a 3.11 D(ERGENCY COOLING POND 3.12 MISCELLANEOUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SOURCES 66b 3.13 PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM 66c Amendment No. M,48,M9,MS,1%

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SECTION TITLE PAGE 3.14 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS 66e 3.15 FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTIIATION SYSTEM 66g 3.16 SHOCX SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) 661 3.17 FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM 66m 3.18 FIRE SUPPRESSION SPRINXLER SYSTEMS 66n 3.19 CONTROL ROOM AND AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM HALC' SYSTEMS 66o 3.20 FIRE HOSE STATIONS 66p 3.21 FIRE BARRIERS 66q 3.22 REACTOR BUILDING PURGE FILTRATION SYSTEM C6r 3.23 REACTOR BUILDING PURGE VALVES 66t 3.24.

EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE 66u 3.25 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 66v 3.25.1 Radioactive Liquid Holdup Tanks 66v 3.25.2 Radioactive Gas Storage Tanks 66w 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 67 4.1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY ITEMS 67 4.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILIANCE 76 4.3 TESTING FOLLONING OPENING OF SYSTEM 78 4.4 REACTOR BUILDING 79 4.4.1 Reactor Building Leakuge Tests 79 4.4.2 Structural Integrity 85 4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AND REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING 92 4.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems 92 4.5.2 Reactor Building Cooling Systems 95 4.6 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TESTS 100 4.7 REACTOR CONTROL ROD SYSTEM TESTS 102 4.7.1 Control Rod Drive System Functional Tests 102 4.7.2 control Rod Program Verification 104 4.8 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP TESTING 105 4.9 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES 106 4.10 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE 107 4.11 PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE 109 4.12 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS SURVEILLANCE 109b 4.13 EMERGENCY COOLING POND 110a 4.14 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SOURCES SURVEILLANCE 110b 4.15 AUGMENTED INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR HIGH ENERGY LINES OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT 110c Amendment No. M,M,M,M 4,H,M, ii c 0 M, M, M, M, MG, H4, M3, 1 6

3,5.1.13 Two contral rcom v2ntilcticn r:dicticn monitoring ch nn21s ch211 b3 cp:reblo whcn: var th3 roccter escient cystem is cbsv2 tha c 1d shutdown condition or during handling of irradiated fuel.

3.5.1.14 The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation shall be operable with a minimum measureuent range from 10-1 to 104 mR/hr, whenever the reactor i'4 above the cold shutdown condition.

3.5.1.15 Initiate functions of the EFIC system which are bypassed at cold shutdown conditions shall have the following minimum operability conditions:

a. " low steam generator presAure" initiate shall be operable when the main steam pressure exceeds 750 psig.

b. aloss of 4 RC pumps" initiate shall be operable when neutron flux exceeds 10% power.

c. "nain feedwater pumps tripped" initiate shall be operable when neutron flux exceeds lot power.

3.5.1.16 The automatic steam generator isolation system within ErIC shall be operable when main steam pressure is greater than 750 psig.

42b gndment No. 4M,MG,MS,4M,4M,

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Th2 principal function of the Ccntrol Room Isolatien-High Radiatien is to provida an enclosed environment from which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

Due to the unique arrangement of the shared control room envelope, one control room isolation channel receives a high radiation signal from the ANO-1 control room ventilation intake duct monitor and the redundant channel receives a high radiation signal from the ANO-2 control room ventilation intake duct monitor. With no channel of the control room radiation monitoring system operable, the CREVS must be placed in a condition that does not require the isolation to occur (i.e., one operable train of CREVS is placed in the amergency recirculation mode of operation). Reactor operation may continue indefinitely in this state.

To support loss of main feedwater analyses, steam line/feedwater line break analyses, SBLOCA analyses, and NUREG-0737 requirements, the EFIC system is designed to automatically initiate ErW when:

1.

all four RC pumps are tripped 2.

both main feedwater pumps are tripped 3.

the level of either steam generator is low 4.

either steam generator pressure is low 5.

ESAS ECCS actuation (high RB pressure or aw RCS pressure)

The EFIC system is also designed to isolate the affected steam generator on a steam line/feedwater line break and supply ErW to the intact generator according to the following logic If both SG's are above 600 psig, supply EFW to both SG's.

If one SG is below 600 psig, supply EFW to the other SG.

If both SG's are below 600 psig, but the pressure difference between the two SG's exceeds 100 psig, supply EFW only to the SG with the higher pressure.

If both SG's are below 600 psig and the pressure difference is less than 100 psig, supply ErW to both SG's.

At cold shutdown conditions all EFIC initiate and isolate functions are bypassed except low steam generator level initiate. The bypassed functions will be automatically reset at the values or plant conditions identified in Specification 3.5.1.15.

" Loss of 4 RC pumps" initiate and " low steam generator pressure" initiate are the only shutdown bypasses to be manually initiated during cooldown. If reset is not done manually, they will automatically reset. Main feedwater pump trip bypass is automatically removed above 100 power.

REFERENCE FSAR, Section 7.1 Amendment No. W, W, W, 196 43c w-m.'s

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e 3.8.15 Storeg2 in tha spsnt fusi pool chall b3 rostricted to fual asstablics having initini cnrichment loss than or equal to 4.1 w/o U-235.

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, provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.16 Storage in Region 2 (as shown on Figure 3.8.1) of the spent fuel pool shall be further restricted by burnup and enrichment limits specified in Figure 3.8.2.

In the event a checkerboard storage configuration is deemed necessary for a portion of Region 2, vacant spaces adjacent to l'.. faces of any fuel assembly which does not meet the Region 2 burnup criteria (non-restricted) shall be physically blocked before any such fuel assembly may be placed in Region 2.

This will prevent inadvertent fuel assembly insertion into two adjacent storage locations. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

3.8.17 The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained (at all times) at greater than 1600 parts per adllion.

3.8.18 During the handling of irradiated fuel, the control room emergency air conditioning system and the control room emergency ventilation system shall be operable as required by Specification 3.9.

Basss Detailed written procedures will be available for use by refueling personnel.

These procedures, the above specifications, and the design of the fuel handling equipment as described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety. If no change is being made in core geometry, one flux monitor is sufficient. This perndts maintenance on the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition.

The requirement that at least one decay heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel at the refueling temperature (normally 140*F), and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilucion incident and prevent boron stratification. (5)

The requirement to have two decay heat removal loops operable when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core, ensures that a single failure of the operating decay heat removal loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a. failure of the operating decay heat removal loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

The shutdown margin indicated in Specification 3.8.4 will keep the core suberitical, even with all control rods withdrawn from the core. (8) Although the refueling boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the core keff 5 0.99 if all the control rods were removed from,the core, only a few control rods will be removed at any one time during fuel shuffling and Amendment No. M,M,H,M,MG,MS, 59a m, m, 196 j

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" 3.9 CONTROL ROOM DERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS l

Applicability Applies to the operability of the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning systems.

Obiective To ensure that the control room emergency, ventilation and air conditioning systems will perform within acceptable levels of efficiency and reliability.

specification 3.9.1 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System 3.9.1.1 Two independent trains of the control room emergency air conditioning system shall be operable whenever the reactor coolant system is above the cold shutdown condition or during handling of irradiated fuel.

3.9.1.2 With one train of control room emergency air conditioning inoperable, restore the inoperable train to Operable status within 30 days or be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

3.9.2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 3.9.2.1 Two independent trains of the control room emergency ventilation system shall be operable whenever the reactor coolant system is above the cold shutdown condition or during handling of irradiated fuel.

3.9.2.2 With one train of control room emergency ventilation inoperable, restore the inoperable train to operable status within */ days or be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

t Amendment No. 44,44, 196 60 l

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Bases The control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning system is designed to isolate the combined control rooms to ensure that the control rooms will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions and to ensure that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable tarperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. The design configuration of the system is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 REM or less whole body, or its equivalent, in accordance with the requirements of General Design criteria 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR 50.

Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms are a single environment for emergency ventilation and air conditioning concerns.

Since the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning equipment is shared between units, the plant status of both units must be considered when determining applicability of the specification.

Due to the unique situation of the shared emergency ventilation and air conditioning equipment, the components may be cross fed from the opposite unit per predetermined contingency actions / procedures. Unit 1 may take credit for operability of these systems when configured to achieve separation and independence regardless of normal power and/or service water configuration.

This will be in accordance with pre-determined contingency actions / procedures.

The control room emergency ventilation system consists of two independent filter and fan trains, two independent actuation channels and the Control Room isolation dampers. The control room dampers isolate the control room within 10 seconds of receipt of a high radiation signal.

If the actuation signal can not start the emergency ventilation recirculation fan, operating the affected fan in the manual recirculation mode and isolating the control room isolation dampers provides the required design function of the control room emergency ventilation system to isolate the combined control rooms to ensure that the control rooms will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following accident conditions. This contingency action should be put in place immediately (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) to fully satisfy the design functions of the control room emergency ventilation system.

The control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS) provides temperature control for the control room following isolation of the control room.

It is manually started from the Unit 2 Control Room. The CREACS consists of two independent and redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control room air. A cooling coil and a water cooled condensing unit are provided for each system to provide suitable temperature conditions in the control room for operating' personnel and safety related control equipment.

With both trains of the control room emergency ventilation and/or emergency air conditioning inoperable, the function of the control room emergency air systems have been lost, requiring immediate action to place the reactor in a condition where the specification does not apply.

Amendment No. 44,GG, 196 61 (next page is 66)

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4.10 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM l

SURVEILLANCE Applicability Applies to the surveillance of the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning systems.

Objective To verify an acceptable level of efficiency and operability of the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning systems.

l Specification 4.10.1 Each train of control room emergency air conditioning shall be demonstrated Operable:

a. At least once per 31 days on a staggered test basis by:

1. Starting each unit and

2. Verifying that each unit operates for at least I hour j

and maintains the control room air temperature 584*F D.B.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying a systen flow rate of 9900 cfm 1106.

4.10.2 Each train of control room emergency ventilation shall be demonstrated Operable a.

At least once per 31 days on a Staggered Test Basis by initiating, from the Control Room, flow through the HEFA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

j b.

At least once per 18 months or 1)after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or 2) following significant painting, fire, or chemical releas.e in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1.

Verifying that rhe cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.S.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 2000 c2n i106.

l 2.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 when tested at 30*C and 95% relative humidity for a methyl iodide penetration of:

a.

s2.5% for 2 inch charcoal adsorber beds, or b.

50.5% for 4 inch charcoal adsorber beds.

3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 2000 cfm 110% during system opsration when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

Amendment No. M,M,M, 1%

107

-aw-=,no

.s-m.,.m.memM a+eyaigiig me-me-e+nw.

l e

a c.

Aftsr cvsry 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcos1 edsorbar cpar tien by varifying within 31 drya eftor removal that a leborctory cnslysis of e j

representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 when tested at 30'C and 95% relative humidity for a methyl iodide penetration of:

1.

5 2.5% for 2 inch charcoal adsorber beds, or 2.

s 0.5% for 4 inch charcoal adsorber beds.

I

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 6 inches of water while operating at a flowrate of 2000 cfm i 10%.

2. Verifying that on a Control Roma ventilation high radiation test signal, the system automatically isolates the control Room within 10 seconds and switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove 2 99.95% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%.

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 2 99.95% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%.

Bases The' purpose of the control room energency ventilation system is -to limit the l

particulate and gaseous fission products to which the control area would be subjected during an accidental radioactive release in or near the Auxiliary Building. The system is designed with 100 percent capacity filter trains which consist of a prefilter, high efficiency particulate filters, charcoal adsorbers and a fan.

Since the emergency ventilation system is not normally operated, a periodic test l is required to insure operability when needed. During this test the system will be inspected for such things as water, oil, or other foreign materiali gasket deterioration, adhesive deterioration in the HEPA units; and unusual or excessive noise or vibration when the fan motor is running. Pressure drop across the l

combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 6 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

Pressure drop should be i

determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

los Amendment No. 196

i '.

Bases (C?ntinu-d) l The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance with ANSI NS10 (1975)

" Standard for Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems." Any HEPA filtura found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified according to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. If laboratory test results l

are unacceptable, all charcoal adsorbents in the system shall be replaced with charcoal adsorbent qualified according to Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The operability of the control room emergency air conditioning systems ensure that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and the Control Room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

Operation of the systems for 15 minutes every month will demonstrate operability of the emergency ventilation and emergency air conditioning systems. All dampers and other mechanical and isolation systems will be shown to be operable.

If significant painting fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significant shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident. Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

l l

Amendment No.196 losa l

- - - - - -.= =

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n y..yk UNITED STATES fp j

P; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

e WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000HOO1 I

ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-368 l

i ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE. UNIT NO. 2 i

t AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l

Amendment No. 206 License No. NPF-6 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

1 A.

The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated

)

December 19,1996, as supplemented August 6 and December 3,1998, complies

]

with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as l

amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act,

)

and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compt.ance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

,__%d.,%..

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Soecifications q

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 206, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hAb Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:

May 19, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 205 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO, NPF-6 DOCKET NO. 50-368 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

)

Remove instri Vill Vill Xill Xill 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27 3/4 7-17 3/4 7-17 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18 B 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 3-2 8 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-6 B 3/4 7-6 B 3/4 7-7 B 3/4 7-7 4

a INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILIANCE I

REQUIREMENTS

]

SECTION PAGE i

3/4.7 PIANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves...........................................

3/4 7-1 Emergency Feedwater System..............................,

3/4 7-5

)

Condensate Storage Tank.................................

3/4 7-7

~

Activity................................................

3/4 7-8 Main Steam Isolation Va1ves.............................

3/4 7-10 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION..........

3/4 7-14 3/4.7.3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM....................................

3/4 7-15 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY COOLING POND..................................

3/4 7-16 3/4.7.5 rLOOD PROTECTION........................................

3/4 7-16a 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTIIATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM.................................. 3/ 4 7-17 3/4.7.8 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)............................

3/4 7-22 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................

3/4 7-27 3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESION SYSTEMS Fire Suppressior. Water System...........................

3/4 7-29 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems..........................

3/4 7-33

~

Fire Hose Stations......................................

3/4 7-35 3/4.7.11 FI RE BARRI ERS...........................................

3/4 7-37 3/4.7.12 SPENT FUEL POOL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY....................

3/4 7-38 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES Operating...............................................

3/4 8-1 Shutdown...............................................

3/4 8-5 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 VIII Amendment No. M,49,4G,99, 206

INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE...........................................

B 3/4 7-1

'3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.........

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM....................................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY COOLING POND..................................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM..................................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)............................

B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................

B 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.73 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS................................

B 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.11 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS...............................

B 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.12 SPENT FUEL POOL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY....................

B 3/4 7-7 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS...................................

B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION......................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.........................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME..............................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS................................

B 3/4 9-1 r

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 XIII Amendment No. 44,45, 206

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TABLE 3.3-6 (Centinu-d)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 13 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 14 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 16 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, complete the followings

a. If performing CORE ALTERATIONS or moving irradiated fuel within the reactor building, secure the containment purge system or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the reactor building.

b. If a containment PURGE is in progress, secure the containment purge system.

c. If continuously ventilating, verify the SPING monitor operable or perform the ACTIONS of 3.3.3.9, or secure the containment purge system.

ACTION 17 -

With no channels OPERABLE, within I hour initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation.

ACTION 18 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, (1) either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or (2) prepare and submit a special Report to the f

Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause l

of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for j

restoring the system to OPERABLE status. With both channels inoperable, initiate alternate methods of monitoring the containment radiation level within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in addition to the actions described above.

ACTION 19 -

With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, initiate the

)3 preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s), within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and:

1) either restore the inoperable Channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2) prepare and submit a Special Report to the Cammission i

pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE stutus.

ACTION 20 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by j

the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months initiate and maintain the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. M,H9,44, 206 j

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PIANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTIIATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6.1 -Two independent control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and during handling of irradiated fuel.

l

-ACTION:

a.

With one control room emergency air conditioning system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one control room emergency ventilation system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT' STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one control room emergency air conditioning system and one control room emergency ventilation system inoperable, restore the inoperable control room emergency ventilation system to OPERABLE status within 7 days and restore the inoperable control room emergency air conditioning system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

4.7.6.1.1 Each control room emergency air conditioning system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1.

Starting each unit from the control room, and 2.

Verifying that each unit operates for at least I hour and i

maintains the control room air tesqperature 5 84*F D.B.

j b.

At least once per 18 months by verifying a system flow rate of 9900 cfm i 104.

4.7.6.1.2 Each control room emergency air filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

j b.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone consnunicating with the system by:

1 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 7-17 Amendment No. 206

m. ; _. =. -

,m

l I

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 2000 cfm i 104.

)

2.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 when tested at 30*C and 956 relative humidity for a methyl iodide penetration ofs a.

5 2.5% for 2 inch chtreoal adsorber beds, or b.

5 0.5% for 4 inch tum2 oii adsorber beds.

3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

c.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulstory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 when tested at 30*C and 954 relative humidity for a methyl iodide penetration of:

1.

K 2.5% for 2 inch charcoal adsorber beds, or 2.

s 0.5% for 4 inch charcoal adsorber beds.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 6 inches Water 1

, Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 104.

2.

Verifying that on a control room high radiation test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 10 seconds and switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow i

through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

e.

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove 2 99.95% of the DOP l

when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 104.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 7-18 Amendment No. 4M,206

.. = = :=. =: =:= _ _= =

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually naasured in the areas served by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or' automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

The PURGE as defined in the definitions section is a release under a purge permit, whereas continuous ventilation is defined as operation of the purge system after the requirements of the purge permit have been satisfied.

When securing the containment purge system to meet the ACTION requirements of this Specification, at least one supply valve and one exhaust valve is to be closed, and the supply and exhaust fans secured.

The principal function of the control room intake duct monitors is to provide an enclosed environment from which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity..Due to the unique arrangement of the shared control room envelope, one control room isolation channel receives a t

high radiation signal from the ANO-1 control roan ventilation intake ddet I

monitor and the redundant channel receives a high radiation signal from the ANO-2 control room ventilation intake duct monitor. With neither channel of

)

the control room radiation monitoring system operable, the CREVS must be placed in a condition that does not require the isolation to occur (i.e., ~ one operable train of CREVS is placed in the emergency recirculation mode of operation).

Reactor operation may continue indefinitely in this state.

3/4.3.3.2 DELETED 3/4.3.3.3 DELETED 3/4.3.3.4 DELETED 3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This, capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.

t G

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 5 3/4 3-2 gndment No. M,4M,MG,M8,4M

= = _

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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM l

The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR 50.

Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms are a single environment for emergency ventilation and air conditioning concerns.

Since the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning equipment is shared Letween units, the plant status of both units must be considered when determining applicability of the specification.

Due to the unique situation of the shared emergency ventilation and air conditioning equipment, the components may be cross fed from the opposite unit per predetermined contingency actions / procedures. Unit 1 may take credit for operability of these systems when configured to achieve separation and independence regardless of normal power and/or service water configuration.

This will be in accordance with pre-determined contingency actions / procedures.

The control room emergency ventilation system consists of two independent filter and fan trains, two independent actuation channels and the Control Room isolation dampers. The control room dampers isolate the control room within 10 seconds of receipt of a high radiation signal.

If the actuation signal can not start the emergency ventilation recirculation fan, operating the affected fan in the manual recirculation mode and isolating the control room isolation dampers provides the required design function of the control room emergency ventilation system to isolate the combined control rooms to ensure that the control rooms will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following accident conditions. This contingency action should be put in place immediately (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) to fully satisfy the design functions of the control room emergency ventilation system.

The control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS) provides temperature control for'the control room following isolation of the control room.

It is manually started from the Unit 2 Control Room. The CREACS consists of two independent and redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated control room air. A cooling coil and a water cooled condensing unit are provided for each system to provide suitable temperature conditions in the control room for operating personnel and safety related control equipment.

With both trains of the control room emergency ventilation and/or emergency air conditioning inoperable, the function of the control room emergency air systems have been lost, requiring immediate action to place the reactor in a condition where the specification does not apply.

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment nw. % up, 206 n:ri::d by 1:tt:: ;_ted 0/9/05

e PLANT SYSTEM 3 BASES 3/4.7.8 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies based upon the number of INOPERABLE snubbers found during the previous inspection in proportion to the sizes of the various snubber populations or categories and the previous inspection interval as specified in NRC Generic Letter 90-09, " Alternative Requirements For Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions". Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the result of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25$) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval..Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override

. the previous schedule.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible and verified by' inservice functional testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation and vibration.

When a anubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on'the supported component or system.

If a review and evaluation of an INOPERABLE anubber is performed and documented to justify continued operation and provided that all design criteria are met with the INOPERABLE snubber, then the INOPERABLE anubber would not need to be restored or replaced.

To provide further assurance of snubber reliability, a representa-tive sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at 18 month intervals. These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper piston movement, lock-up and bleed. Observed failures of these sample snubbers will require functional testing of additional uhits. To minimise personnel exposures, snubbers installed in areas which have high radiation fields during shutdown or in

-j especially difficult to remove locations may be exempted from these functional' testing requirements provided the OPERABILITY of these snubbers

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was demonstrated during functional testing at either the completion of 1

their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

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l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3 3/4 7-6 Amendment No. 448, 206 l

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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leaksge from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS DELETED 3/4.7.11 FIRE BARRIERS DELETED 3/4.7.12 SPENT FUEL POOL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The reinforcing steel in the walls of the spent fuel pool was erroneously terminated into the front face instead of the rear face of the adjoining walls during construction of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the specified structural integrity inspections of the spent fuel pool are required to be performed to ensure that the pool remains safe for use and that it will adequately resist the imposed loadings. If no abnormal degradation is observed during the first five inspections, the inspection interval for subsequent routine inspections may be extended to at least once per 18 months or longer if justified by observed performance of the pool.

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l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 5 3/4 7-7 Amendment No, 99,443, 206

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ML20207B684

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