Text

Forwards Summary of Meeting with Risk-Informed TS Task Force in Rockville,Md on 990323-24.List of Attendees, Meeting Presentations & Draft Action Plan Encl
	ML20206N653
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/11/1999
From:	Beckner W; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Byrd K, Hackerott A, Krueger G; CENTERIOR ENERGY, OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
References
	NUDOCS 9905180026
	Download: ML20206N653 (77)
	v • d • e

r:

May 11, 1999 I

Mr. Alan Hackerott Mr. Greg Krueger Omaha Public Power District PECO Energy Company Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station Mail Code 63A-3 P.O. Box 399 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Ft. Calhoun, NE 68023-0399- Wayne, PA 19087 Mr. Kendall Byrd Mr. Xavier Polanski First Energy Corporation Commonwealth Edison Company )

Mail Stop 3105 Nuclear Engineering Services J 300 Madison Avenue 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 '

Toledo, OH 43652 Downers Grove,IL 60515 Gentlemen:

The purpose of this letter is to transmit the summary of a meeting with the Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Task Force held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters offices in Rockville, Maryland, on March 23-24,1999.

Sincerely, Original Signed _ By

70102 William D. Beckner, Chief 'l/ l Technical Specifications Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Meetings Summary

2. Attendance List

3. Meeting Presentations -

4. Draft Action Plan "#

cc: See attached list -

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ff0 DISTRIBUTION: See attached.

j DOCUMFNT NAME: G:\NVG\MTGS323.W8tII -

l OFFICE NRR/ DRIP /RTSB NRR/bMP/MB NRR/ DRIP /RTSB l NAME NVGillesl@ RLDirho ' WDBeckner Lv 06 I

DATE' 5/ll /99 5/ '99

/ 5/ ll /99 OMICIAL RECORD COPY O bh 9905100026 990511 PDR ORG MIRA PDR

neu p 4 UNITED STATES

<- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, o.C. 30000 eom e.... May 11, 1999 Mr. Alan Hackerott Mr. Greg Krueger Omaha Public Power District PECO Energy Company Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station Mail Code 63A-3 P.O. Box 399 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Ft. Calhoun, NE 68023-0399 Wayne, PA 19087 Mr. Kendall Byrd .

Mr. Xavier Polanski First Energy Corporation Commonwealth Edison Company l Mail Stop 3105 Nuclear Engineering Services l 300 Madison Avenue 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Toledo, OH 43652 Downers Grove,IL 60515 l

Gentlemen:

The purpose of this letter is to transmit the summary of a meeting with the Risk Informed Technical Specifications Task Force held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NPC) Headquarters offices in Rockville, Maryland, on March 23 24,1999.

Sincerely, g Dh William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Division of Regulatory improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Meeting Summary 1

2. Attendance List

3. Meeting Presentations

4. Draft Action Plan ec: See attached list I

w e ence *

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f

)

Multiple Addressees May 11, 1999 E

I l

Mr. Biff Bradley Mr. Thomas Hook Nuclear Energy Institute San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Suite 400 Southern California Edison j 1776 l Street, NW 5000 Pacific Coast Highway 4

- Washington, DC 20006 3708 San Clemente, California 92674-0128 j Mr. Bryan Ford Mr. Duncan Brewer Entergy Services, Inc. Duke Power Company 1340 Echelon Parkway Mail Code EC081 ,

M-ECH 660 526 South Church Street i Jackson, MS 39213 8298 P. O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201 l:

Mr. Rick Grantom South Texas Project Electric Generating Mr. Frank Rahn ;

Station Electric Power Research Institute !

STP Nuclear Operating Company P. O. Box 10412 Mail Code N5010 Palo Alto, CA 94303

)

i P. O. Box 289 i Wadsworth, TX 77483 Mr. Donald Hoffman !

EXCEL Services Corporat' n

, Mr. Jack Stringfellow 11921 Rockville Pike, Suite 100 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Rockville, MD 20852 P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

, pi,... a ..

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NRC/ INDUSTRY MEETING ON RISK-INFORMED STS MEETING

SUMMARY

MARCH 23-24,1999 A meeting between the NRC management and staff and industry representatives known as the Risk Informed Technical Specifications Task Force (RITSTF) was held on March 23-24, 1999. The attendees are listed in Enclosure 2. The meeting was a continuation of earlier meetings held on December 8,1998, and January 14,1999, where the main topic of discussion was the creation of a fully risk-informed set of standard technical specifications (RI-STS).

At the March meeting, several presentations were made by the NRC staff, representatives from the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG), the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), the BWR Owners Group (BWROG), Southern Califomia Edison (SCE), South Texas Project (STP), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Copies of the presentation materials are provided in Enclosure 3.

In his presentation, Alan Hackerott, Chairman of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Probabilistic Safety Assessment Committee (PSAC) discussed a proposed industry strawman for developing risk informed technical specifications. Mr. Hackerott's presentation was supplemented by a presentation from Thomas Hook of SCE. Mr. Hook outlined an SCE plan to pursue several risk informed technical specification improvements for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) and offered to have SONGS be a lead plant for many of the suggested improvements.

Mark Rubin of the NRC staff then discussed the status of activities to risk inform 10 CFR Part 50. This topic is relevant to the RI STS effort because some of the long term goals the group has discussed may require revision of the technical specifications rule (10 CFR 50.36).

Wayne Harrison of STP discussed the WOG risk-informed technical specifications (Rl TS) program, including those improvements that the WOG intends to pursue and the review process WOG intends to use in developing their RI-TS submittals. Rick Grantom from STP continued the WOG presentation and discussed a proposed version of future Rl-TS.

Frank Rahn from EPRI prssented some thoughts related to the six issues identified for early i action by the RITSTF and also outlined some of the problems with current technical l specifications.

Bryan Ford from Entergy representing the BWROG and Donald Hoffman from EXCEL Services concluded the presentations with a discussion of several of the risk-informed improvements being considered by the group. Mr. Hoffman told the staff that all of the NEl Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Owners Groups members supported this risk informed effort.

Following the presentations the group adjourned for the day and retumed on March 24 to discuss how to proceed with the identified improvements. The industry proposed a draft 1 Enclosure 1

. . . - - .-. ~ . -. .

1 action plan which was subsequently updated following the meeting to incorporate staff !

comments (Enclosure 4). The staff identified some issues for the RITSTF to consider in j refining their action plan, including the need to pull all of the various related industry >

efforts together under this group. The staff also requested that the RITSTF make an attempt to define the burden reduction and other benefits associated with the proposed technical specification improvements.

j

\

Finally, members of NRC management representing the two NRR Divisions that will be involved in the review of the proposed risk-informed submittals told the group that they fully support the efforts of the RITSTF. The group agreed to meet again on May 14, 1999.

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2 Enclosurs 1 l

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Meeting Attendosa March 23 24,1999 HamB Affiliation Thomas Hook Southern California Edison Brian Woods Southern California Edison Ray Schneider ABS-CE Alan Hackerott Omaha Public Power District Frank Rahn Electric Power Research Institute Biff Bradley Nuclear Energy instituto Greg Krueger PECO Energy Bryan Ford Entergy Jim Andrachek Westinghouse Jeffrey Lietzow Westinghouse J.D. Carlson Westinghouse Jerry Andrd Westinghouse Bob Christie Performance Technology Gene Eckholt Notrhorn States Power Duncan Brewer Duke Power Noel Clarkson Duke Powe-N. V. Stringfellow Southern Nuclear Rick Grantom South Texas Project Wayne Harrison South Texas Project Donald Hoffman EXCEL Services Rick Hill General Electric Thomas Mo'ganr Scientech NUS Theresa Sutter Bechtel Jerry Well McGraw Hill David Matthews NRC/NRR/ DRIP Tim Collins NRC/NRR/DSSA Mark Reinhart NRC/NRR/SPSR Adel El-Bassioni NRC/NRR/SPSB Millard Wohl NRC/NRR/SPSB Bob Dennig NRC/NRR/TSB Nanette Gilles NRC/NRR/TSB Enclosure 2

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OVERVIEW Risk. Informed Technical . nu.wn,w , .wa .,wn e.

SpeciGcations

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I Risk. Informed Regulation Benefits of RITS

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.w. s Tech. Spec. Pilot History Lessons Imrned e CEOG initistive started in 1996 with a goal to globally risk inform TS ACT extension

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s'** wee presses 8., pa.'t. a s.ve= t.ini activities became the T8 Puot .a,"'..'.'.<...."'.'*=r."..'*."'"-

e CEOG Plot for TS RGe and SRPe umas eas eae .mme) ==ve nosess pmm.ww.y =

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PSA approach within a Joird submttel format merum n e ser inemey one .,mi.,, n

Pfot review emolerd but focused on one ACT et a time. ,,U",**.*'.'..,,,,

m. ,m ne w.n e AOT extensions included SITE, LPSle, EDGE, 'M**" T@"",,,",", ,",'*L*"*",",*,,,,

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PREREQUISITES FOR OBJECTIVE OF RITS EFFORT SUCCESS: Industry e EstabEsh the fremework for en environmort e For RITS to become a reality early where operatore can make prudert risk.

% ,%; m gg sucmsses are important pient esfoty using risk-insormed knie and = ladu*y en0i neerin0 judgment - h N8"*d's.nWow mto

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- Define espeeletione olestir and up front issue s s: Modify 3.03 Actione and Timins

- Umit detailed review to erase neeseeery to the deciolon procese leeue s4 beeed on January id meeting CEOG RI-TS ACTIVITIES #1: Hot Shutdown End State e CEOG has funded support for y end Wok gumWu ehrmd

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Sirawman Tasks # 1,3 and 6. , , e .me,. , e, e Long Term support for item 4 and others is expected

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uillilies with no tangible rtok honet to puhts into 3mJ. uey rwust in addition er other elsk e CEOO Ptot hoe been leonNRed (SCE) sienfluent 3.0.3 enby sonelone trie CIDAP) e apart buswa usen esa and desenwasses e minirnwn ohuideen uma smiled to 34] hours ;

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( e CECG examined 3.0J estension for several j -J_ inchaling EDO,LPSi, HPSI and CSS

4: R-I AOTs

4: R-I AOTs (cont'd) o Short Term Objective le to integrete the CAMP e Extended AOTe should be restricted to into the LCO sotion statement in order to sRow conditions which soeure current TS plant for extending the bees ACT when noosesery. defense in depth is maintained (redundant Backstop wiu consider need, defense and depth. system or capabilty avoilable)

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CRMP d e e implementation of R-l AOTe may be phemed

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l Summary i

e Proposed progrom ino oeses plant esfoty and reduces potettiel for unnecessary plant shutdowns and inappropriate violatione e Phased and graded espects of relef provides timely benefit for the entire. Industry e Program le Win-Win Utitty peybeck is large, reduces unnecessary regulation and enhances put$c esfoty, s

RISK. INFORMED IMPROVED STATUS OF ACTIVITES STANDARDIZED TECHNICAL . sw w a ,s,,,,, sis a w,d ,ime SPECIFICATIONS

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Only make chosess where risk maarel er risk hansassel

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FUTURE RISKINFORMED TECH SPECS FUTURE RISKINFORMED TECH SPECS

Scope would be only those functions within

A risk informed appmach would identdy scope ofPRA systems and equipment based ce their l

Functions would be based on high level function (s) relative to the detection or safety significant functione diagnosis ofinitiators or their ability to Prevent ormitigate accidents a Emphasis on Functionality for equip and systems including Reasonable and Customary Operator Actiore FUTURE RISKINFORMED TECH SPECS FUTURE RISKINFORMED TECH SPECS

Translation Matrix from cument Tech Spec

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Safety Injection ihnetion fw PWRs)

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. . _ . .... . _-. . . b N Cheletle Leonard 03/12/99 02:50 PM

ufsici: ghEM.1-mmqMigy).y;gsmsg .;.;g:.:

To: franh@epr!.com, hooktg@ songs.sce.com, hhockerott@oppd.com, crgrantom@stpegs.com, reb @nel.org, bford@entergy.com, dbuschb1@tuelectric.com, tweber01@apsc.com,

, ntclerks@ duke. energy.com, jvg@ net.org, dwden$ men.com ,

cc: Donald Hoffman/ Employees / Corporate / EXCEL *

Subject:

Risk informed Technical Specification Committee Strawman Development leeues

~~~

Attached are first drafts for discussion and comment of the six (6) Issues for Strawman Development from the Industry /NRC Risk Informed Committee meeting on January 14,1999. .

I have attached the draft by Bryan Ford for issue #1 and my drafts for issues #2, #3, #4, #5 and #6. These drafts are to establish dialogue and to assist in refining our direction. Any _

comments before the March 23 and 24,1999 meeting with the NRC would be welcome. lf .

you could send any positions you may have developed to address these six (6) issues to us, we could review and provide comment to establish consistency in the industry position on

' these issues. In this way we could be speaking from essentially the same position with the NRC. .

I plan to have TSTF endorsement of these concepts prior to the March 23 & 24,1999 meeting. !

I If you have any questions on this or any other matter, please call Bryan Ford at (601)368 5792 or myself at (3011984-4400. 1 Sincerely, 1

Donald R. Hoffman !

EXCEL Services Corporation i

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bford@entergy.osm en 02/2559 03:5024'PGA ~i~ ~~

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To: Donald Hoffman/Employses/ Corporate / EXCEL, crgrantom@stpegs.com, reb @nes.org, i hooktg@ songs.sce.com, hhscherott@oppd.com, franh@epri.com. -

skrueger@peco energy.com .

oc: .

Subject Risk

based' Tech Specs -

Attached and below are some of my thoughts'on application of the items-from the inst risk based Ts meeting. Comments would be welcome.

Bryan Ford 601-368-5792

1. A cut at the change in BWR LCO Action End states is attached.

2. One of the action items from the meeting was to identify surveillance Requirements in which failure inappropriately results in the equipment being declared inoperable and thereby causes inappropriate plant transients (e.g., LCO 3.0.3). This item was also connected to declaring equipment inoperable for qualification issues when the safety function could still be performed.

Maybe the right way to address this item is with a new motherhood statement. Changing the definition of OPERABILITY or SR 3.0.1 could be painful. Below is my suggestion.

LCO 3.0.X When an LCO is not met, entry into the Required Action (s)of the associated Condition (s) may be delayed for up to [30]

days provided the safety function of the associated fission product barriers is maintained.

The following is an attached File item from cc: Mail. It contains information that had to be encoded to ensure successful transmission through various mail systems. To decode the file use the UUDECODE program.

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8WR 6 Technical Spec.fi tions With MODE 4 RA Which should Change and Allow Mode 3 end state End Stats Modification Review LCO Trio 3.0.37 Comments 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment and Shutdowns required for various Instrumentation inoperabinies.

Drywellisolation

. . Instrumentation Previous generic PSA work (Appendix J) has shown that containment leakage is not risk significant. Only a small number of the lines isolated provide a risk significant impact. .

. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #sedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay followin0 unit shutdown.

3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System Mode 3 to Mode 4 change is to protect containment isolation (RPS) Electric Power , equiprnent.

Monitoring Previous generic PSA work (Appendix J) has shown that containment leakage is not risk significant. My a smal number of the lines isolated provide a risk significant impact.

Isolation will not necessary fail due to EPM failure. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and reqalres putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.4.8 RCS Specific Activity Controls source term modeled in Main Steam Line break.

Actions require depressurizing (MODE 4) or isolating the main steam lines. Elther action removes the availability of the condensate #eedwater system. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and requires putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.5.1 ECCS-Operating Yes With ECCS inoperable RCIC and condensate /feedwater system would still be available. For the BWR 6s no steam driven systems are in this LCO. But for losses of ability to depressurize, depressurizing should still be required. Going to .

MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice.

3.6.1.1 Primary Containment Previous generic PSA work (Appendix J) has shown that containment leakage is not risk significant. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay ,

following unit shutdown.

May want to break into two conditions with one for leakage and one *other".

3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Previous generic PSA work (Appendix J) has shown that Locks containment leakage is not risk significant. Going' to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown. -

3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Previous generic PSA wott (Appendix J) has shown that isolation Valves (PCfVS) containment leakage is not risk significant. Only a small m .-. .._.. ..m

8WR 6 Technical Specifications With MaDE 4 RA Which Should Change and Allow Mode 3 end state .

End State Modification Review LCO Title 3.0.37 Comments number of the lines isolated provide a risk significiant impaa.

Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availabliity of the condensate #ecdwater system and requires putting RHR !

Inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay {

following unit shutdown I

Additionally, actions which require valves to be closed in essential (e.g., ECCS) or beneficial (e.g., instrument air) system increase probabilltv of events occurring.

3.6.1.4 Primary Containment LERF is. driven by loss of injection capability. Going to MODE Pressure 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Decay heat is mitigated by radioactive decay '

following unit shutdown.

3.6.1.5 Primary Containment Air LERF is driven by loss of injection capability. Going to MODE Temperature 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR l Inservice. Decay heat is mitigated by radioactive decay I following unit shutdown l

3.6.1.7 Residual Heat Removal LERF is driven by loss of injection capability. Going to MODE (RHR) Containment Spray 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the System condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Decay heat 4 mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.6.1.6 Feedwater Leakage Control Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the System (FWLCS) condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR Inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown. Additionally, the condensate #eedwater system provides a sealing mechanism for these lines when power is available.

3.6.1.g Main Steam Isolation Valve Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the (MSIV) Leakage Control condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR System (LCS) inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal LERF is driven by loss of decay heat removal and injection (RHR) Suppression Pool capability. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the Cooling availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Decay heat is mitigated by radioactive-decay following unit shutdown. Generally, this system is only lost when the associated ECCS is inoperable 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR

. Inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the Isolation Valves (SCIVS) condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay -

following unit shutdown.

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SWR 6 Technical Specifications With MODE 4 RA Which Should Change and Allow Mode 3 end state End State Modification Review . _ . . . . . . .

l.CO Title 3.0.37 Comments Additionally, actions which require valves to be closed in -

beneficial (e.g., instrument air) system increase probability of events occurrino.

, 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment Yes Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the (SGT) System condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR -

Inservice. Source term is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

3.6.6.3 Drywellisolation Valves Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR .

inservice. Source term and decay heat is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

Additionally, actions which require valves to be closed in essential (e.g., ECCS) or beneficial (e.g., instrument air) system increase probabliity of events occurrino.

3.7.1 Standby Service Water Loss of SSW/ UHS potentially only leaves the plant with the (SSW) System and Ultimate steam driven systems, the condenser and fire water as heat Heat Sink (UHS) sinks. Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice (which may be unavailable because of the SSW/ UHS inoperability). Decay heat is mitigated by radioactive decay following unit shutdown.

High Pressure Core Spray With HPCS SSW inoperable RCIC and condensate /feedwater I 3.7.2 (HPCS) Service Water system would still be available. Going to MODE 4 removes !

System (SWS) RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires puttina RHR inservice. l 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air Yes Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the !

(CRFA) System condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice.

3.7.4 Control Room Air Yes Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the l Conditioning (AC) System condensate #eedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice.

3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice.

3.8.4 DC Sources. Operating Yes Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availability of the condensate /feedwater system and requires putting RHR inservice. ,

Maybe split out inoperabilities affecting RCIC and HPCI (BWR/4).

3.8.7 Distribution Systems- Yes Going to MODE 4 removes RCIC and the availabiN of the Operating condensate /feedwater system and requires putting ed !R inservice.

MayDe split out inoperabilities affecting RCIC and HPCI (BWR/4).

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SWR 6 Technical Specifications With MODE 4 RA But Should NOT change '

End State Modification Review LCO Title 3.0.37 Comments 3.3.6.5 Relief and Loh Set (LL8) instrumentation The purpose of LLS is to reduce loads on -

containment during overpressurization events. Going to Mode 4 seems like the

- appropriate thing.

3.4.4 Safety / Relief Valves (8/RVs) The purpose of the S/RVs is during overpressurization events. Going to Mode 4 seems like the appropriate thino.

3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE The purpose of the LCO is to address items-which are effectively mitigated by reducing s pressure 3.4.6 . RCS Pressure isolation Valve (PlV) Leakage The IPEs demonstrated that intersystem LOCAs are not a significant contributorto , j

~

CDF or LERF for BWRs. This conclusion is consistent with GE NEDC-31339 which identifies that ECCS rupture probability is <

3E 5 during a pressurization event. Isolating ECCS systems when a single isolation valve is inoperable does not seem appropriate.

3.4.7 RCS Leakage Detection instrumentation The purpose of the LCO is to address items which are effectively mitigated by reducing pressure 3.4.11 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits Without vessel integrity depressuzing seems !

appropriate. !

3.6.5.1 Drywell Directly relates to LERF for extreme failures. ,

3.6.5.2 Drywell Air Lock Directly relates to LERF. 4 3.5.3 RCIC System The only true steam driven system for the .j BWR/6s. -

l 3.6.1.6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves The purpose of LLS is to reduce loads on containment during overpressurization events. Going to Mode 4 seems like the i appropriate thing. ~~

3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature Directly relates to LERF. ;

Suppression PoolWater Level Directly relates to LERF. j

. 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) System Yes Directly relates to LERF. ,

3.6.5.4 Drywell Pressure Directly relates to LERF.

3.6.5.5 Drywell AirTemperature Directly relates to LERF. !

3.6.5.6 Drywell Vacuum Relief System Directly relates to LERF. ;

3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas The purpose of the LCO is to address items l which are effectively mitigated shutting down. ,

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l NRC/ INDUSTRY RISK INFORMED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMMITTEE STRAWMAN DEVELOPMENT , .

ISSUE #2: MISSED SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SRs)

S ITS SR 3.0.3 ' allows that, at the time it is discovered that the Surveillance has not bem performed, the requirement to declare the equipment inoperable (LCO not met) may be delayed .

for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This is based on NRC Generic Letter 87-09 which states,"It is overly conservative to assume that systems or components are inoperable when a Surveillance has not been performed. 'Ibe opposite is in fact the case, the vast majority of Surveillances demonstrate that systems or components in fact are OPERABLE. When a Surveillance is mhed it is primarily a question of operability that has not been verified by the performance of the required Surveillance." !

o l l

Based on consideration ofplant conditions, adequate planning, availability ofpersonnel, the time !

required to perform the Surveillance and the safety significance of the delay in completing the Surveillance, the NRC concluded in the Generic Letter 87-09 that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is an acceptable time limit for completing a missed Surveillance when the allowable outage times of the ACTIONS are less than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit or a shutdown is required to comply with ACTIONS.

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1 Rev.0 3/11/99

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It was determined later during the development oflTS that, if a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months delay can be safely .

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applied to a Required Action with a short (e.g.,2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) Completion Time, there should be less o'f l

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- a safety impact when a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months delay is applied to a Required Action with a long (e.g.,7 day) !

Comrletion Time. Thus, the ITS eliminated the restriction that the extension only apply to !

outage times less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Since 1992, the NRC and Industry have been working together to establish good maintenance practices. With the issuance of the Maintenance Rule, the revisions thereto and other NRC and l Industry initiatives, there are even better Surveillance practices in place. Still, Surveillances may be missed for a variety of reasons. When this occurs, the current ITS SR 3.0.3 permits 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to perform the Surveillance. However, there are Surveillances that cannot be adequately 3

performed in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and still others that require a change in the state or MODE of the facility j 4

to perform the Surveillance. I Since the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements, it is proposed that the delay be extended from the current 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to the specific Frequency of the Surveillance. This extension is acceptable provided there are no reasons to believe the Surveillance would not be met ifperformed. This delay is to provide adequate time to perform the mined Surveillance or to place the plant in a MODE or other condition necessary to perform the Surveillance. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals or to delay perfonnance of Surveillances where the outcome is in question.

2 Rw.0 3/11/99

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The associated risks with allowing the performance cf the missed Surveillance to be delayed up to the limit of the specified Frequency have been evaluated. He results of the evaluation 1

(indicates the extension is acceptable because the greatest likeihood is that the performance of

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, the Surveillance will confirm the OPERABILITY of the tested equipment). 3 8

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i 3 Rev.0 3/11/99

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,'SR Applicability ~-

B 3.0 BASES

... . h. ..

SR 3.0.2 transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance (continued) maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degr e the l reliability that results from performing th urveillance at l its specified Frequency. This is based c he recognition i that the most probable result of any par cular Surveillance l being performed is the verification of onformance with the i SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are ose Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the int val specified in the Frequency does not apply. These xceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. n example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveill ce with a Frequency of "in accordance with 10 CFR 50, pendix J, as modified by approved exemptions." T requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interva specified in the regulations.

Therefore, there is Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not plicable."

As stated in 5 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply .

to the initi portion of a periodic Completion Time that i requires p formance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%

extensio applies to each performance after the initial perfo ca. The initial performance of the Required Actio , whether it is a particular Surveillance or some oth remedial action, is considered a single action with a s gle Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

tension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

i The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used j repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend j Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with i refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals *'

beyond those specified. i SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not !

been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay -

(continued)

BWR/4STS B 3.0-12 Rev 1, 04/07/95 )

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~ SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES

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- 1 SR 3.0.3 period of u 1 [^4_h::cr: t the limit of the specified (continued) Frequency, MeyerTf46M: a'pp ies from the point in time vered that the Surveillance has not been

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that it is performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time ,

that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete {

Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period .

permits the completion of a Surveillance before complying I with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might j preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of

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unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. ,

When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions or operational situations, is discovered not to have been performed,.wh specified, SR 3.0.3 allows the full delay period ofW 5::r:

to perform the Surveillance. ,p.e /ra-s O A r,.,As.t % suey o

SR 3.0.3 also provides a time limit for completion of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals.

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon e'xpiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the 4

(continued)

B 3.0-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS

.M .-

l 83.0 BASES

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SR 3.0.3 Required Actions for the applicable LC0 Conditions begin :

(continued) immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance. I completion of the Surveillance within the delay period -

allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time '

of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

i SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the

. Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE -

status before entering an associated MODE or other specified .

condition in the Applicability.

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable

. equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance (s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES j or other specified conditions of the Applicability. .

I However, since the LC0 is not met in this instance, LC0 l 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes.

1 The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in i MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability I that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the !

provisions of LC0 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES l

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.0-14 Rev1,04/07/95

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....... . ., 2 SR Applicability -

3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY . h e..

l SR 3.0.1 the MODES or other specified - I SRs shallinbe conditions themet Appdurinkcability 1 for individual LCOs, unless l otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a Surveillance, I whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCo. Failure to.

perform a surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LC0 except as provided in SR 3.0.3.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits. '

l SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous i performance or as measured from the time a specified '

condition of the Frequency is set.

For Fre'quencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ." basis, the above Frequency extension ,

applies to each performance after the initial performance. -

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the -

requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LC0 must imediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition (s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LC0 must immediately be (continued)

BWR/4STS 3.0-4 Rev1,04/07/95

SR Applicability - s

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3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY .: _ .

SR 3.0.3 declared not set. and the applicable Condition (s) must be - - . ,

(continued) entered. : . .- . .:

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the -

l Applicability of an LC0 shall not be made unless the LCO's I Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into

. MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with Actions or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other l specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, l and 3. !

l Reviewer's Note: SR 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be l prevented. In addition, SR 3.0.4 has been revised so that. )

it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The MODE change restrictions in SR 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. Before this version of SR 3.0.4 can be implamented on a plant-specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or -

Required Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS.

6 BWR/4 STS 3.0-5 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

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NRC/ INDUSTRY RISKINFORMED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMMITTEE ._. .. -

STRAWMAN DEVELOPMENT . .. . . . . .

ISSUE #3: INCREASE FLEXIBILITY IN MODE RESTRAINTS

. %:e LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the .

Applicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing the unit in a MODE or other

. .- a .

specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., ATPlicability desired to be entered) when

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the following exist:

a. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered; and

b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements, if the Applicability were entered, would result in the unit being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.

In other words, when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered pennit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an

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unlimited period of time Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE chr.nge. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions.

I Rev.0 3/1U99

. .i ; .

This acceptability is based on the premise that the remedial or -: +i=- etg actions of the . .

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Required Actions are adequate to provide an acceptance level of safety of the plant while not meeting the provisions of the LCO. i ;

In the ITS, many improvements were made to LCO 3.0.4 including clarification ofits applicability regarding normal shutdown and Required Action shutdowns and MODE changes during Cold Shutdown and Refbeling Operations. During ITS, almost all the LCOs with --

Allowed Outage Times / Completion Times (AOTs/ cts) greater than or equal to 30 days and . . . . . _

many of the LCOs with AOTs/ cts greater than or equal to 7 days were individually developed with LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. During many plant specific ITS conversions, individual plants providedjustifications for other LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. The Industry has been evaluating a threshold AOT/CT for LCO 3.0.4 exception and had come to the conclusion that the threshold AOT/CT was at the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months timeframe.

Since the licensee is responsible for maintaining overall plant configuration and safety and the fact that the Maintenance Rule and other Industry /NRC initiatives to maintain plant i 1

configurations that support safe operation of the facility are being developed and implemented, it I l

is proposed that when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made without appropriate license management review and approval. -

This review may consider a variety of factors, but will focus on minimizing risk to continued safe plant operations. Consideration would be given to the probability ofcompleting restoration i

such that the requirements of the LCO would be rQrior to entering ACTIONS that would i

require exiting'the Applicability. 'Ibe revinv and approval may also establish appropriate

-- , 2 Rev.0 34 U99 j

.- - 3 = ~ ~ = ::- -

i cesr==9ry measures to enhance safe and effective operati:ns until restoration cf compliance with the LCO can be completed. This would provide the flexibility of not restricting which AOTs/ cts have LCO 3.0.4 exceptions while providing for .yywydate license management ,

i reviews and approval ofall LCO 3.0.4 exceptions.

This change in bCO 3.0.4 philosophy would require a change in SR 3.0.4 but no changes t I

SR 3.0.4 Bases. The change to SR 3.0.4 is to provide consistency with the new philosophy of j LCO 3.0.4 regarding MODE changes.

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l 3- Rev.0 3/11/99

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LCO Applicability l

3.0 {

. i t' 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY '

t V v A . T ."

LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall =' h ne - r'r .

IMGE!TG E M' hen the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit

. continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period i of tim @

l BTMArtet2.Pooroerinte t aanagementaevsewanciapocovad 1

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ALL STSs 3.0 1 (INSERTS)

LCOApplicab1Iity

3.0 t, 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLIChBILITY

V v A . . . T ."

LC0 3.0.4 When an LC0 is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall .:t h - r r' ~ . l

@,1% MIG I 1

1 Egghen the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit i

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ALL STSs 3.0 1 (INSERTS)

v'+ -=9pem=.aa4-e.y

LCO Applicability * )

Bj3.0

' 1 1

( ',i B30 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY '

i bases k LC0 3.0.4 - LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or..

other specified conditions in the A)plicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing tie unit in a H00E or other specified condition stated in that Applicability - -

(e.g.,-Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist: ,

s. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of tile LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to l be entered; and !

b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements. If the Applicability were entered, would result in the unit seing required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.

~ l- ;

Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a

- H0DE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without; regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions.

~

t mm consi ~Ug

' ii G& Ehu con nue m ~

dbb B h r d ih 5 M u n

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- (Continued) !

ALL STS 8 3.0 1 (INSERTS) .

l i

l

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'~

.[ _~.,~ I. E

C ' ~ ~

LC0 Applicabijity ~

B, 3.0 BASES I

LCO 3.0.4 (continued) The provisions of this Specification should not be i interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the @cid practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABlE !

status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

J.

A re dat,e, n y - tv eff F mea w

.o-.,ae... men.HODE5d,, ogo,.n. y .

U.n.*appw %ther> ro v 3 x Jon anqesgm uspecifie thaw

.eBiipli'cabWthhisin!LC05fh6t9mettfoRt; o1MW sets -

QgThe provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in H) DES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.

B2ygne provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. i e . .. .... a 4.

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, (continued)

ALL STS B 3.0 11 (INSERTS)

. . - = .

LCO Applicab lity B 3.0 BASES L ! ,

's . , .

.i -

LCO 3.0.4 i .

.(continued) Surve111ances do not have to be performed on the associtted cified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. inoperable Therefore, c equipment (or on MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, either in compliance with LCO 3.0.4 or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surve111ances that do not,:

have to be performed due to the associated inoperable ?

equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILrrY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or, variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO. j

-l 1 l l l

i l

i

)'

(

ALL STS B 3.0 111 (INSERTS)

= .... . . - - . . _

I SR Applicabi lity .

-3.0 i

d i 4

8.

3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ,

I a

.g

% 1' ,

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j Min ~

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. heir specified Frequency r-M EXE6TRIB1IMGTIDlf5?MSsintefbMIOTieTEITeM l ORLC013?QbppTieat \

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s ALLSTSs 3.0 2 (INSERTS) e ene

/ .

NRC/ INDUSTRY RISK INFORMED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMMITTEE .

STRAWMAN DEVELOPMENT -

ISSUE M: 1 -'

RISK INFORMED ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (AOTS)

The Industry Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) is working to establish extended AOT: -" -~-

' based on engineering, technical and operational information and risk insights. Here is a longer tenn generic effort to adjust all AOTs to a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The major AOTs being evaluated for extensioninclude:

I. Shutdown Margin (SDM) - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months -

2. Leakage Limit-4 hours to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

3. ECCS subsystems - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days l

4. Establish an AOT of 8 tol2 hours for several systems when both subsystems are inoperable such as: SGTS, Control Room Ventilation System

5. Diesel Generator /Offsite Circuits - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days in all cases and 14 to 21 days for i

Diesel Generators when technicallyjustified

6. - Battery /DC subsystem - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

7. Inverters - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

8. Distribution systems - AC - 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; DC - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months e

8 Rev.0 3/11/99

. = . . ..

3

NRC/ INDUSTRY RISK INFORMED TTCMCAL SPECIFICATION COMMITTEE .

STRAWFM N 'tLOPMENT .

ISSUE #5: . OPTIMIZE AND MOVE K3F4 LANCE REQUIREMENTS (SRs),

During the development oflTS, a number o.'3meuce Requirements (SRs) were either technically improved or deleted to ensure they were appropriate for addressing the OPERADILITY (capability to perform the intended safety fbaction) of the respective systems in the Technical Specifications. There was also an effort to establish more reasonable frequencies for performance for a number of the SRs. In addition, the ITS included the Generic Letter 91-04 allowance of" Changes in Technical Specifications Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate A 24 Month Fuel Cycle". In the implementation of the new Appendix J, Option B for Containment Testing, the ITS put the details of the testing requirements in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program which was referenced in the SRs and outlined in the Administrative Controls.

This process of having the pregram outlined in the Administrative Controls contain the detail of the testing requirements was also used for the requirements for testing ventilation systems in the Ventilation Filter Testing Program and the requirement for testing diesel fuel oil in the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. This concept has worked well, but needs to be expanded. In addition

. to continuing to technically enhance the SRs in the Technical Specifications, it is proposed that the Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) be optimized and that some individual SRs and smups of SRs be moved to licensee controlled programs. There are Owners Group Topicals based on engineering and risk information to extend the selected groups of STIs and other generic efforts underway to extend other specific STIs. The Industry believes several groups of Technical Specification SRs should be relocated to licensec~ controlled programs.

Rev.0 3/11/99 p -m w meme e es me -p.e +<s =

RPS Instrumentation.

3.3.1.1 .

y SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (continued) : , -

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY .

s .

SR 3.3.1.1.11 ------------------NOTES------------------

1.

M1 ***M* 2.. i Neutron detectors are excluded. 0 .

2. For Function 2.a. not required to be WO St. Lskmk arformed when entering MODE 2 from "Y :P At CmM ODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after 93% er-entering MODE 2. f_

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 184 days]

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. (18] months

_ 'm-SR 3.3.1.1.13 ------------------NOTES------------------ I L ac.c c 6

1. Neutron detectors are excluded. Aggg

2. For Function 1. not required to be Sdp;d 0 dcel arformed when entering MODE 2 from ODE 1 unti.1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering ~

p"B* *" l MODE 2. !

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. (18] months i I

SR 3.3.1.1.14 Verify the APRM Flow Biased Simulated (18] months Thermal Power-High time constant is s(7] seconds.

SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. (18] months (continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.3-5 Rev 1. 04/07/95

. . . . .:.- ==. - . .. - - =. n : . . - -

1

. RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE the containment by minimizing the energy that must be SAFETY ANALYSES. absorbed following a LOCA.

LCO. and APPLICABILITY RPS instrumentation satisfies Criterlon 3 of the NRC Policy (continued) Statement. Functions not specifically credited in the .

accident analysis-are retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved iicensing basis.

The OPERABILITY of the RPS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions '

specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per RPS trip system.

"as gw.Q .

'.M with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value.

where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated 08 'Iddemed consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumption sitp.'.40*H Each channel must also respond within its assumed response Pr r a (ss d.o* / time.

- / Allowable Values are specified for each RPS Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the actual setpoints

/ . m do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL 04 he. Sem.1.swct. ' ._CALIBRATIONL Operation with a trip setpoint less ;

% ,, p e,, L, ,2g :,3,W f conservative than the nominal trip setpoint. but within its I

. s t. - - Allowable Value. is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if 1

'r. W # o w ".1 50

- its actual trip setpoint is not within its required l n4. Lsfru. ment Allowable Value.

Tri setpoints are those redetermined values of output at ft1* .- I whikh an action should take place. The setpoints are

~/ /vessel compared to the actual process parameter (e.g.. reactor water level), and when the measured output value of I

s the process device (e.g. parameter

. trip exceeds unit) changes state.the setpoint. the associatedT are derived from the limiting values of the process -

parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable C values are derived from the analytic limits corrected for calibration process. and'some of the instrument errors.

/ b hW.yJues i: 1 The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the Vo M *k4 remainino instrument errors (e.o.. drift)d The trip

.setpoints derived in this manner provice adequate protection ee, da.cdedi m.g a.A paved .because instrumentation uncertainties. process effects.

calibration tolerances. instrument drift, and severe .

Lot.gp.ar Tot. %Wws t l

' hed CM95 k (continued) hw. -, - - -

L._ . . -

)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-3 Rev 1. 04/07/95

- .- ..: - - = - .. . : -.:. - i

=.7......'-.

RPS Instrumentation

~

P B 3.3.1.1 .

.. l

,r, /'. . BASES .

SURVEILLANCE SR 331110 (continued) .

REQUIREMENTS ._.... ....'

readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability . l analysis of Reference 9. -

SR 3 3 1 1.11 and SR 3.31113 -

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instr.nnent loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices. With minimal drift. and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity

- are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 MWD /T LPRM calibration against the TIPS (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second Note is provided that requires the APRM and IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumcers lifted leads, or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from ~

MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR. _ ,

The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.11 is based uoon the assumption-of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

- ' The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.13 is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

x\

~.DJScQ f rne 8 .

SUM 6LLAt4CE *

(REGut&D.EMP-j, (continued) .

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-30 Rev 1. 04/07/95

l

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....__._.__ VL. . . . . . . _ _ . . . _ . ._.

Programs and Manuals -

5.5

,.c 5.5 Programs and Manuals -

5.5.12 Safety Function Determination Procram (SFDP)

(continued)

. 1.

b. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable: .or

c. " A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b).above is also inoperable. '

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the .C0 ini which the loss of safety function exists are required to'be entered. .

Y yy '

73 - 4 h ly 1

1 1

I

. l 1

BWR/a STS 5.0-17 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l l

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3 NRC/ INDUSTRY RISK INFORMED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMMrITEE .I STRAWMAN DEVELOPMENT c.

, .~. .

ISSUE W: MODIFY LCO 3.0.3 ACTIONS AND TIMING I c LCO 3.0.3. establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and: .

a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or ,

b. The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of the Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.

This means there are essentially two routes to enter LCO 3.0.3. The first being when the associated Required Action and Completion time have not been met such that the restoration time and the shutdown track time have expired. The second being that the level of degradation existing in not meeting the requirements of the LCO have no specific Condition (s) corresponding to the level of degradation. In the fint route, LCO 3.0.3 is entered after some defined timeframe of the restoration time and shutdown track time having expired and in the second route, LCO 3.0.3 is entered upon discovery of a level of degradation with no corresponding Condition (s) in the affected LCO.

1 Rev.0 3/11/99

~ ~ ~'

-- ~ T ~.- 2: _ _. 21 _. . ._ ~ ~

~

LCO 3.0.3 delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other speci5ed . I .3 '

condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by .

the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that ! --

permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or compon.ents from service in lieu of other altematives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable. .

The NRC stated in correspondence that the intended purpose of LCO 3.0.3 is "to provide guidance on the time limits for an " orderly" shutdown when the individual Limiting Conditions for Operation or ACTION statements in other specifications sanaat be complied with. Voluntary entry into LCO 3.0.3 deliberately removes the last echelon of defense against deleterious events by allowing removal of a system from service when its redundant counterpart is already out of service or inoperable. An action such as this would show a significant disregard for plant safety and is unacceptable. It should also be emphasized that removal of a system from service is justified only for test, maintenance, or repair purposes." l l

Currently, upon entering LCO 3.0.3, I hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before 1

initiating a chang !Ymit op-Aion. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the l

reduction in electrical generation vith the load dispatcher to i.nsure the stability and availability i of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified ,

maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies.

2 Rev.0 341/99

, ,4-+ eee essuems 1_eD =a + +gesse, e asem m e

-. _amo ame. < es.a.gi+ es

m - ;

There is general Industry and NRC agreement that conditions requiring entry into LCO 3.03 5: :

should not all require plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.03 but rather, ifit is determined .

compliance with the as,sociated LCO or its Required Actions that caused the entry into LCO 3.03 can be restored, some limited time should be provided to restore this compliance. . .

However, this additional time should only apply to the entry route into LCO 3.03 that has not' already been preceded by an expired restoration time and shutdown track time. Additionally, there are some defense in depth and single failure concerns that may require individual LCO evaluation. In addition to this individual LCO evaluation, it is proposed that LCO 3.0.3 be modified to allow up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to prepare for an orderly shutdown when LCO 3.03 is entered.

from an LCO where a level of degradation with no corresponding Condition exists. The entry into LCO 3.0.3 from a condition of an expired restoration time and shutdown track time would remain at one hour. ' Ibis is appropriate since in the latter condition the restoration time and shutdown track time have already expired and in the former condition little or no time or advance notice may have been available. This additional time when LCO 3.0.3 is unexpectedly entered will prevent unnecessary plant shutdowns and allow the plant time to evaluate the most appropriate course of action.

e 3 Rev.0 3/11/99

LC0 Applicabil'ity .

3.0 -

..n.,

'd* .,,

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY .

LC0 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified' ,

conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in

' I LC0 3.0.2 and LC0 3.0.7.

LC0 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required '

Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LC0 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LC0 is met or is no longer applicable rior to expiration of the specified Completion Time (s , completion of the Required Action (s) is not required, un ess othenvise stated.

LC0 3.0.3 When an LC0 is not met and the associated ACTIONS are nos by# &Wy a *] met, an,,

theassociated ACTION associated ACTIONS, isshall the unit notbeprovided, or if directed b placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not g, y, o , y J app 1 cable.*

edue.8 " gea place the un/ction shall bein:

it, as applicable, initiated within I hour to Mat me.t & & a. MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ; 1 Attaad*A A,wr MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and p., ne P *8 f 8# ).

[4 8"##~' c MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

0,.g., ere+p & W#r .. c h .r e e r >

"" Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LC0 or ACTIONS, completion

'of the actions required by LC0 3.0.3 is not required. ,

LCO 3.0.3 is only appliceble in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

LCD 3.0.4 When an LC0 is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when

the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This (continued) 3.0-1 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS

= .==~~.7 x__

r, l

l.

INSERT TO LCO 3.0.3 -

l . .

If entry into LCO 3.0.3 is due to an LCO not met and an associated ACTION is not provided, ,

action shall be initiated within 24 liours to place the unit, as applicable, in: ,

s. MODE 2 within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ;

b. MODE 3 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months ; and .

c.- MODE 4 within 50 hours5.787037e-4 days 0.0139 hours 8.267196e-5 weeks 1.9025e-5 months .

4 l

i l

4 e

,.e 4 s e- - -- , ... .

LCO Applicability. -

B 3.0 -

e .

- E BASES (continued)

LCO 3.0.3 LC0 3.0.3 when an LCOestablishes the is not met and: actions that must be implemented r . l.

a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or The condition of the unit is not specifically b.

addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that -

no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corres sonding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 se entered immediately. .

This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LC0 and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational ~ convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that of,s oW 8- would not result in redundant systems or components being g c , .,e e *

inoperable.

M b# Upon entering LCO 3.0.3) I hour is allowed to prepare for an guy cs4 ** I ' orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit

, operation. aThis includes time to permit the operator to ynM! pr M M p gpoordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the j load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of 4 .s " # ^* # u g s ,J f the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach -

/ lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a Juf controlled and orderly manner that is well within the L

F

'/ specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities ;

of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required <.

equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on W9 99%]; components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential

{VP jj 4,4,.o F 8 J p

,, for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of

% A, y g f LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section I.3, p f e d.~85 ^ L completion Times.

--m g )$eneob f prov Y / p.bly.s"A h " f ?

// 4//wMI,so% M N N6 mt, m _ y s.a. c.4* r.f e. d # (continued) w__ r A .=2. scam 4' W " #

M[/f d

1 4 #A /4,4 pj.:::sk,;.,oJa " / br4 ,

Rev1,04/07/95 I* BWR/4 STS 4B 3.0-3 7'u 4 Ce M I,

, g g p w.s.4 fl.4 .:: Way --

M _ . . . ,

~C.* T ~~. . .*~~ r '_~ _

LCO Applicability 2- l B 3.0 -

l

1 BASES '

h;-

l LC0 3.0.3 A unit shutdown required in accordance with LC0 3.0.3 may be: .

(continued) terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following h.

occurs:

a. The LC0 is now met. ,

b. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have -

now been performed. .

c. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LC0 3.0.3 is exited. ,

The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months for the unit to be in MODE 4 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is reached in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to reach MODE 4, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 2 is reached in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , "

then the time allowed for reaching MODE 3 is the next

11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months , because the total time for reaching MODE 3 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months . Therefore, if -

remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, LC0 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of

- LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the o-remedial measures to be taken.

Exceptions to LCD 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LC0 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.8, " Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level.' LCO 3.7.8 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel 4

- (continued)

B 3.0-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4STS

= = - - = = = - . .

LCO Applicability' '

B 3.0 h . s BASES

~ '

. LC0 3.0.3 assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool." Therefore, this' (continued) LC0 can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LC0 and '. .

the Required Actions of LC0 3.7.8 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required -

Action of LCO 3.7.8 of " Suspend movement of irradiated fuel j assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool" is the 1 appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the .

)

actions of LC0 3.0.3. These exceptions are ' addressed in the !

individual Specifications. ;

i LC0 3.0.4 LC0 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO ,

I is not met. It precludes placing tie unit in a MODE or .

other specified condition stated in that Applicability ,

(e.g., Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist:

a. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered; and i

b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements, if the Applicability were entered, would result in the i unit being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.

Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a >

MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without ,

regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. .,.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

i The provisions of LC0 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or o'ther specified conditions in the Applicability (continued)

B 3.0-5 Rev1,04/07/95 BWR/4 STS

i l

i RISK INFORMED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (Rl TS) TASK FORCE l I

STRAWMAN ISSUES DRAFf PHASE I ACTION PLAN l

l. ISSUE #1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ACTIONS END STATES l A. ' Short Description of The Proposed Change Define the appropriate end state for the Technical Specifications Actions B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change i l

Plant safety and efficiency will be enhanced by not requiring plants to l

extend shutdowns to an and state not commensurate with the safety I significance of the plant condition or level of degradation

2. Level of Risk Information Required for The Proposed Change

a. For each and state option considered, an evaluation of the risk associated 'with the following will be performed:

(1) MODE transition to the proposed new and state with the failed component unavailable (2) Component repair in the proposed new and state (3) MODE transition return to power from the proposed new end state

3. Justification Versus Need of The Proposed Change

a. A risk comparison between and state options will be performed considering the risk and economic benefits of the Rev. 2, 5/7/99 1 Enclosure 4 i

p. s +-em. .me+* w a e- , 6 4

proposed new and state C. Actions and Schedule 3

1. Bryan Ford will provide the methodology for the BWROG qualitative review and determination of the appropriate LCO end states to all OGs by 3/31/99

2. Each Owners Group (OG) will perform a qualitative review of and develop a matrix report of their respective affected LCOs and distribute their OG specific evaluations to the RI-TS Task Force by 5/17/99

3. Each OG will review the other OG evaluation and matrix report and provide comments by 5/24/99

4. The RI TS Task Force will resolve all comments (via telecon and email) by 5/31/99

5. The RI TS will provide the individual OGs qualitative assetsments and matrix report to the NRC by 6/7/99

6. The NRC will perform an initial acceptability review and provide any comments or feedback to the RI TS Task Force by 6/25/99

7. NRC and RI TS Task Force will finalize acceptability of qualitative assessments and matrix report at the proposed 7/99 meeting

8. Industry will develop detailed technical justifications and risk informed Justifications (if necessary) and will provide a TSTF to NRC by 8/30/99

9. NRC will review and approve by 10/29/99 D. Other Corresponding information Rev. 2, 5/7/99 2 Enclosure 4

p II. ISSUE #2 MISSED SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SRS)

A. Short Description of The Proposed Change

1. Extend the delay for declaring equipment inoperable and entering the Required Actions

2. Extend the time to perform a missed SR from the current 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to the specific Frequency of the Surveillance B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change Plant safety and efficiency will be enhanced by providing a more reasonable time to perform the missed SR. This willin many cases preclude a change in the MODE or condition of the plant to perform the SR 1

2. Level of Risk information Required for Proposed Change

a. Assess the incremental risk of continuing to operate the plant without testing the affected component. Compare the incremental risk of continuing to operate without testing the affected component versus the risk of shutting down, testing the affected component in the shutdown state and restarting the plant

3. Justification Versus Need of Proposed Change

a. Perform a risk comparison between current Technical Specification requirements and the economics and risk of remaining at power Rev. 2, 5/7/99 3 Enclosure 4

p ,. ,

C. Actions and Schedule

1. Donald Hoffman develop a draft by 5/11/99 and distribute to RI-TS Task Force

2. RI-TS Task Force will review and provide comments by 5/15/99

3. The RI-TS Task Force will resolve all comments Nia telecon and email) by 5/30/99

4. The RI TS Task Force will provide the draft to the NRC by 6/7/99

5. The NRC will perform an initial acceptability review and provide any comments or feedback to the RI TS Task Force by 6/25/99

6. NRC and Rl-TS Task Force will finalize the acceptability of the Missed SR draft at the proposed 7/99 meeting

7. Industry will develop detailed technical justifications and risk informed justifications (if necessary) and will provide a TSTF to NRC by 8/30/99

8. NRC will review and approve by 10/29/99 D. Other Corresponding Information Ill. ISSUE #3 INCREASE FLEXIEliJTY IN MODE RESTRAINTS A. Short Description of The Troposed Change increase flexibility in MODE restraints by allowing MODE changes to be made while relying on ACTION statements to satisfy the requirements of the LCO for all LCOs. This flexibility would apply generically to all tn.1COs instead of being allowed individual LCO by LCO based on the length or requirement of the Required Action and Completion Time. The basis for this i flexibility is an appropriate licensee management review and approval being Rev. 2, 5/7/99 - 4 Enclosure 4

l performed for each MODE change while relying on ACTIONS to satisfy the requirements of the LCO B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change improve plant safety and efficiency by allowing the licenses the flexibility of determining the acceptability of the MODE change based on consideration of all of the plant conditions

2. Level of Risk Information Required for Proposed Change l

a. Provide qualitative justifications that demonstrate the risk of MODE changes with equipment inoperable or unavailable is j equivalent to the risk of at-power operation with these !

l equipment inoperable or unavailable. Consideration needs to be given to additional startup events

3. Justification Versus Need of Proposed Change

a. Economic benefits plus justification of low risk impact C. Actions and Schedule

1. Donald Hoffman will develop a draft by 5/11/99 and distribute to RI-TS Task Force

2. RI-TS Task Force will review and provide comments by 5/15/99

3. The RI-TS Task Force will resolve all comments (via telecon and email) by 5/30/99

4. The RI-TS Task Force will provide the draft to the NRC by 6/7/99

5. The NRC will perform an initial acceptability review and provide any comments or feedback to the RI TS Task Force by 6/25/99 Rev. 2, 5/7/99 5 Enclosure 4

6. NRC and RI TS Task Force will finalize the acceptability of the Flexibility in Mode Restraint draft at the proposed 7/99 meeting

7. Industry will develop detailed technical justifications and risk informed justifications (if necessary) and will provide a TSTF to NRC by 8/30/99

8. NRC will review and approve by 10/29/99 D. Other Corresponding Information IV. ISSUE #4 RISK INFORMED ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (AOTS)

A. Short Description of The Proposed Change Develop extended AOTs based on engineering, technical and operational inforrr ' ton and risk insights B. Reasons /Justif: cun for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change Enhance plant safety and efficiency by providing AOTs that are commensurate with the risk of the equipment inoperability

2. Level of Risk Information Required for Proposed Change

a. Risk information provided will meet the requirements of Reg Guides 1.174&1.177. Impact on CDF, LERF, ICCDP, and IC'LERP will be provided. Plant specific vs generic will be determined on item-by item basis

3. Justification Versus Need of Proposed Change

s. The need will be developed from utility specific and generic information regarding impact, frequency and consequence of problems created by the current AOT l

~

Rev. 2, 5/7/99 6 Enclosure 4 l um g.-. mu.l i m gy g - e. .

.a , .

C. Actions and Schedule

1. The OGs will coordinate OG specific ACT extension submittals (specifically CEOG and WOG; there is currently no generic BWROG or BWOG AOT extension effort)

2. TSTF will continue to pursue individual generic AOT extensions in coordination with the OGs and the RI-TS Task Force with appropriate risk informed support as required

3. The ultimate goal of issue #4 is to:

a. In the short term develop a risk informed process for optimizing selected AOTs

b. In the longer term establishing backstop AOTs for all Technical Specification AOTs (1) The schedule for this effort is early 2000 D. Other Corresponding information V. ISSUE #5 OPTIMl2E AND MOVE SRS A. Short Description of The Proposed Change

1. Relocate / delete SRs from the Technical Specifications that do not demonstrate safety function OPERABILITY

2. Optimize the Surveillance Test intervals (STI) for the retained SRs

3. Move selected SRs or groups of SRs to a licensee controlled program B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change Enhance plant safety and efficiency by: @ relocating or deleting SRs that do not demonstrate safety functions OPERABILITY @ optimizing 4

Rev. 2, 5/7/99 7 Enclosure 4

.~ -. . . . . . = - - - . . . . . . - - -

Wed.958-?$4*hg- ,w,.e.wie

the STI for retained SRs based on risk insights of the STI commensurate with the risk importance of the safety function being tested and @ moving seier.ted SRs or groups of SRs to a licenses controlled program

2. Level of Risk Information Required for Proposed Change

e. Risk information provided will be consistent with R1 IST approach described in Reg Guide 1.175. Required risk information will be developed on a plant specific basis

3. Justification Versus Need of Proposed Change

a. Consistent with that required for moving requirements to licensee controlled programs and that required by the RI IST Reg Guide C. Actions and Schedule

1. TSTF will pursue relocation of all SRs not related to the verification of safety function OPERABILITY in a TSTF to be submitted to NRC by 10/30/99 and NRC will review and approve this TSTF by 3/30/00

2. TSTF will pursue relocation of all Surveillance Test Intervalc (STis) to a Licensee Controlled Program in a TSTF to be submitted to the NRC by 11/30/99 and NRC will review and approve this TSTF by 4/30/00

3. The RI TS Task Force will pursue optimization of all SR Frequencies by late 2000 D. Other Corresponding information l

Rev. 2, 5/7/99 8 Enclosure 4

VI. ISSUE #6 MODIFY LCO 3.0.3 ACTIONS AND TIMING A. Short Description of The Proposed Change Extend the current time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to initiate plant shutdown upon entry into LCO 3.0.3 commensurate with the level of degradation and associated plant conditions and reason for entering LCO 3.0.3 B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change Enhance plant safety and efficiency by not requiring unnecessary plant shutdowns and by providing reasonable time to determine the appropriate course of action given the level of safety function degradation and associated plant conditions

2. Level of Risk information Reouired for Proposed Change

a. Develop the approach for assessing the risk associated with the situation leading to LCO 3.0.3. Develop the approach for assessing alternate actions, including continued plant operation. Develop approach for evaluating incremental risk and assessing an acceptable time to restore OPERABILITY while at-power

3. Justification Versus Need of Proposed Change l

a. Economic benefits of eliminating plant shutdowns vs incremental risk of taking alternate action C. Actions and Schedule i

1. Donald Hoffman will enhance the technical presentation by 5/15/99 l

2. CEOG Lead Plant will provide the risk insights to support this change Rev. 2, 5/7/99 9 Enclosure 4 l

._s.o .m n ,m-, o

1 to Donald Hoffman by 5/15/99

3. Donald Hoffman will merge the technical and risk insights and provide the draft change to the RI TS Task Force by 6/7/99

4. The RI-TS Task Force will review and provide comments by 6/15/99

5. The Rl-TS Task Force will provide a draft to the NRC by 6/22/99

6. The NRC will perform an initial acceptability review and provide any l l

comments or feedback to the RI-TS Task Force by 7/5/99

7. NRC and RI-TS will finalize acceptability of the draft change at the proposed 7/99 meeting l 1

8. The Industry will develop detailed technical justifications and risk informed justifications (if necessary) and will provide a TSTF to the NRC by 8/30/99

9. The NRC will review and approve by 11/29/99 D. Other Corresponding Information Vll. NEW ISSUE #7 - DEFINE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN EQUIPMENT IS NOT OPERABLE BUT IS STILL FUNCTIONAL A. Short Description of The Proposed Change Provide appropriate actions for equipment that is not OPERABLE (inoperable) but is still functional B. Reasons / Justification for The Proposed Change

1. Benefit of The Proposed Change Enhance plant safety and efficiency by ensuring appropriate compensatory actions are taken based on the actual level of degradatio'n~of the safety functions Rev. 2, 5/7/99 10 Enclosure 4

2. Level of Risk Information Required for Proposed Change

s. No quantitative risk information required. Will need to determine equipment functional requirements from risk /PRA modeling

3. Justif.ication Versus Need of Proposed Change l

a. Evaluate incremental risk of having functional but not

{

(

OPERABLE equipment for specified periad cf time to satisfy LCO requirements versus economic considerations of dorating or shutting the plant down C. Actions and Schedule

1. RI-TS Task Force will define appropriate actions for inoperable but l

functional equipment

2. Intent is to not change the definition of OPERABILITY j

3. Bryan Ford / Donald Hoffman will develop proposed change and provide to RI TS Task Force by 6/16/99

4. The RI TS Task Force will review and provide comments by 6/21/99 l

1

5. The RI TS Task Force will provide a draft to.NRC by 6/28/99

6. The NRC will perform an initial acceptability review and provide any comments or feedback to the RI TS Task Force by 7/5/99

7. NRC and RI TS will finalize acceptability of the draft change at the proposed 7/99 meeting

8. The Industry will develop detailed technical justifications and risk informed justifications (if necessary) and will provide a TSTF to the

~

NRC by 10/30/99 Rev. 2, 50/99 11 Enclosure 4

-w.m =

l

(

9. The NRC will review and approve by 12/30/99 l

D. Other Corresponding information Vill. GENERIC PROCESS ISSUES A. The RI TS Task Force proposes to have a one day industry premeeting and then a one day meeting with the NRC the week of 7/12/99 (possibly a 7/13 premoeting and a 7/14 meeting with NRC) to allow discussion of the draft issues provided to the NRC B. The intent is to continue meeting routinely as necessary to maintain the progress desired by NRC and Industry C. The RI TS Task Force will attempt to generally follow a process of:

1. Identify issue

2. Draft change

3. Provide draft to NRC and get NRC acceptability review

4. Develop TSTF and provide to NRC .

5. Support Timely NRC review and Approval i

i Rev. 2, 5/7/90 12 Enclosure 4

f:-]

' Multiple Addressees May 11, 1999 DISTRIBUTION:

E-Mail w/o Enclosure 3

! SCollins/RPZimmerman l- WFKane l

! BWSheron l DBMatthews ' l

GHolahan WDBeckner !

RJBarrett TSB Staff JAZwolinski SARich:rds {

SMagruder I

- MACunningham, RES -

j HARD COPY

! \ ILEF CENTER PUBLIC l RLDennig FMReinhart l AAEl-Bassioni MLWohl TSB R/F l NVGilles l

l l

i_

ML20206N653

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