ML20206N589

Statement of Matl Facts in Dispute Re Contention C.*

ML20206N589
Person / Time
Site:	07200022
Issue date:	05/01/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20206M879	List: ML20206M874 ML20206N589 ML20206N597
References
97-732-02-ISFSI, 97-732-2-ISFSI, ISFSI, NUDOCS 9905180004
Download: ML20206N589 (4)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of: ) Docket No.~72-22-ISFSI

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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC ) ASLBP No. 97 732-02-ISFSI

. (Independent Spent Fuel )

Storage Installation) ) May 1,1999 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE REGARDING CONTENTION C

1. The dose analysis contained in PFS's Safety Analysis Report ("SAR") makes selective and inappropriate use of data from NUREG-1536 for the fission product release fraction.

2. The dose analysis in PFS's SAR makes selective and inappropriate use of data from SAND 80-2124 for the respirable particulate fraction.

3. The dose analysis in PFS's License Application only considers dose due solely to inhalation of the passing cloud. Direct radiation and ingestion of food and water are not considered in the analysis.

4. The basis for Contention C asserts that PFS inappropriately relies on NUREG-1536, Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems (January 1997), in assuming that 90% of the volatile fission products that would be released from the spent fuel in a postulated loss of containment accident would not be released to the environment. State of Utah's Contentions at 19-20 (November 23,1997). This

assumption is inconsistent with SAND 80 2124, Transportation Accident Scenarios for Commercial Spent Fuel (Sandia National Laboratories: 1981), which assumes an initial release fraction 200 times greater. The assumption is also based on a transportation accident scenario, in which the cask is breached through a high-velocity impact, which is inconsistent with the scenario evaluated in the SAR of an accident during onsite storage.

5. The basis for Contention C also asserts that PFS incorrectly or selectively interprets SAND-80 2124,in assuming that only 5% of the release fraction of Co-60 f 9905190004 990511 F i

PDR ADOCK 07200022 c

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c and Sr 90 will be respirable. PFS does not explain why it is appropriate to use this i particular assumption from the Sandia Report, but not the assumption regarding the initial release to the plenum, which would have yielded a higher dose than calculated by PFS. Moreover, Sandia's assumption of a 5% respirable release fraction is based on a transportation accident involving impact and fire, in which some irradiated fuel will flake offin large pieces and not be respirable. While this may be an appropriate assumption for a transportation accident, PFS provides no evidence that it is an appropriate assumption for the fuel failure accident evaluated in the SAR. In fact, it is reasonable to anticipate that in an onsite accident not involving a high-velocity impact that breaks fuel into large chunks, particulates in the gap between the canister and the cask will be of a smaller size, and therefore a greater percentage will be respirable.

State's Contentions at 19-20.

6. The basis of Contention C also explains that the SAR repons dose calculations only for inhalation from the passing cloud, and fails to consider other relevant pathways, j such as direct radiation from cesium deposited on the ground, and ingestion of food j and water or incidental soil ingestion. State's Contentions at 21. This violates 10 C.F.R. $ 72.24(m).

7. PFS has not altered the dose analysis in its License Application or SAR with respect to any.of the representations challenged in the subparts of Cortention C that are summarized in paragraphs 1 through 3 above.

8. PFS has not altered the dose analysis its License Application or SAR with respect to any of the representations challenged in the basis of Contention C, as summarized in paragraphs 4 through 6 above.

9. PFS has provided no information that would justify the SAR's reliance on NUREG-1536 or SAND-80-2124, nor has it provided any information that would justify its failure to consider groundshine and ingestion doses in the SAR.  ;

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10. PFS's assumptions regarding the particulate release fraction and the respirable l particulate fraction are based on the behavior of the materials under predicted accident i conditions. . State of Utah's Contentions at 19-20 (November 23,1997). In its SAR, PFS assumes that the lid is removed from the cask and that 100% of the cladding is

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i exposed to the environment. Then, PFS asserts specific fractions of particulates are considered respirable. In its most recent RAI calculations, PFS assumes only that the cask has a minor leak. The basis for the assumption is unexplained. Thus, PFS's RAI Response does not resolve the State's concern regarding the inconsistency of PFS's assumptions, but rather amplifies it. ,

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b 11. PFS's affiant', Mr. Hennessey, asserts in paragraph 8 that PFS has done a "new calculation" which " includes direct exposure to contaminated ground, inhalation of resuspended radioactive material, ingestion of milk and beef following grazing, and ingestion of soil." The information provided in PFS's RAI Response, however, does not demonstrate that PFS's calculations have taken direct radiation and ingestion pathways into account in a reasonable and thorough fashion. PFS's calculations

- regarding groundshine and ingestion of radionuclides are based on a number of questionable assumptions.

_12. First, PFS assumes, apparently based on ISG-5, that the release lasts for only 30 days. Neither PFS nor the NRC Staff has provided any rationale for this assumption, and the State has submitted discovery requests to PFS seeking an explanation. These discovery requests are the subject of the State's pending Motion to Compel, which explains the relevance of the information requested. The State also plans to submit l similar discovery requests to the NRC Staff. Moreover, the assumption is inconsistent

with the fact that there is no required offsite emergency response for the PFS facility.

Under the circumstances, it is inappropriate to assume that any radioactive release will be cleaned up after 30 days.

13. Second, and again apparently based on ISG-5, PFS assumes that the person receiving the dose is located at the fence line (500 m) fer only 2,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> / year. The reason for this assumption is unclear. Perhaps PFS assumes that the person will not stay at the fenceline all year because someone will warn him or her away. Perhaps PFS assumes that the person is a worker. Again, the State has submitted discovery requests to PFS and intends to make similar discovery requests to the NRC Staff regarding this issue. In any event, either assumption would be unreasonable. The maximally exposed individual would be a resident near the fence post, because by definition, the Applicant has no control over an uncontrolled area. Inybody could go and live there.

The question is not who is there now, but who might be there later. Moreover, in the absence of any offsite emergency response measures that would provide for a warning to the neighbor, it must be assumed that the neQhbor remains there throughout the duration of the release.

14. In addition, while the new dose calculations consider the dose to the thyroid from iodine-129, they do not consider the thyroid dose from chlorine-36. It is common knowledge that chlorine-36 is also present in irradiated fuel, and yet it is not included in PFS's calculations.

15. Finally, PFS assumes, based on an unexplained assumption in ISG-5, that the deposited material is mixed with the top 1 cm of soil. The State has inquired regarding 3

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the basis for the assumption in its discovery requests to PFS. This assumption is also e

unreasonable, because deposited material, in an arid region, may remain on the surface and therefore produce a stronger gamma dose.

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