ML20206C957
| ML20206C957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206C894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-15, 50-414-86-16, NUDOCS 8606190609 | |
| Download: ML20206C957 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986015
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/86-15 and 50-414/86-16
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
F bruary 26 - March 25, 1986
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Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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V.~L. Bdownlee, Section Chtef
D~ ate Signed
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted at the site in the
areas of review of licensee event reports (Units 1 and 2); review of inspector
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identified items (Units 1 and 2); plant operations licensee identified items-
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(Unit' 2); preparation for refueling (Unit 1); surveillance observation (Units 1
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and 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 and 2); preoperational test ' program
implementation (Unit 2); and observation of initial fuel loading (Unit 2),
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Results: Of the ten areas inspected, two apparent violations were identified in
two areas (Failure to follow Technical Specification 3.2.1.,
paragraph-5.g;
Failure to document required details for . safety evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59
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requirements, paragraph 7e).
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8606190609 860606
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ADOCK 05000413
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
- H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer
W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance
- A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager
- S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services
T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
- B. East, I&E Engineer
J. R. Ferguson, Assistant Operating Engineer
- C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
R. A. Jones, Test Engineer
J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
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- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechnical Maintenance Supervisor
W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
- K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance
F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Tower, Operating Engineer
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J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, segurity force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 25, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action
on
Previous Enforcement Matters
(Units 1 & 2)
(92701 and 92702)
a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 414/85-56-02: Evaluation of Cold Spring in
Safety Related Piping.
This item involves allegations of cold
springing made to licensee personnel.
The technical aspects of this
issue had been previously reviewed.
The inspector reviewed the
licensee's final report of the investigation which included affidavits
of feedback interviews.
No additional concerns were expressed by the
employees which had expressed concerns relative to cold soring. This
item remains open pending the licensee's personnel action.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 413/85-43-03: Correction and Investigation of
problems Associated with Locking Methods for Plant Valves. Guidance
and training has now been provided to operators on proper methods for
locking valves. This is covered by Operations Management Procedures
2-33, Valve and Breaker Position Verification and Valve Operation and
had been incorporated into the training curriculum for nuclear
equipment operators.
c.
(Closed) Violation 413/85-43-01:
Failure to Follow QA Procedure for
Control of Nonconforming Items.
The response for this item was
submitted on December 6,1985.
The inspector verified completion of
corrective actions described in the response and considers licensee
actions to be acceptable.
d.
(Closed) Violation 414/85-56-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure for
Nonconforming Items - Water Hammer in Containment Spray System. The
responses for this item were submitted on January 10, 1986 and
February 24, 1986.
The Inspector verified completion of corrective
actions identified in the responses and considers licensee actions to
be acceptable.
e.
(Closed) Violation 413/85-48-01:
Entry Into an Operational Mode with
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Outstanding Work Open. The licensee's response to this violation was
contained in Duke Power Company letter to Region II dated January 10,
1986. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions identified in this
letter and considers the actions to be acceptable.
4.
Unresolved Items *
New unresolved items are identified in paragraph 5.e, 5.f, 7.c, and 7.d.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirew its. Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.
Cci.. ol room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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remov'al and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures.
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The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that the
measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met
current requirements.
Areas
inspected
included the
security
organization, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and
isolation zones that access control and badging were proper and
procedures were followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were
observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included
such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems
and materials,
and fire protection associated with maintenance
activities.
b.
On March 10, 1986, the licensee requested a 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> extension to the
time allowed under the Action statement of TS 3/4.7.7 for the Auxiliary
Building Filtered Exhaust System.
This request was made due to
required replacement of the carbon bed.
The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by the
Action statement was not sufficient to replace the carbon and also
perform the required testing. Relief of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was granted based on
discussions between NRR, Region II, the Resident Inspectors and the
licensee.
The licensee has addressed this issue in a letter to
Region II dated March 10, 1986.
c.
The inspector observed cable pulling of a Unit 2 electrical cable for
conformance to procedural requirements.
The cable specifically
observed was No. 2KC804 for the Component Cooling System to the
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.
The inspector observed a craftsman
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carelessly stepping on small diameter piping and insulation during this
operation. Although no damage occurred, the inspector cautioned the
leading man for this activity and mentioned this problem to licensee
management.
d.
During a review of the operation of Diesel Generator IB conducted in
January 1986 (See inspection report 50-413/85-55, 50-414/85-68), the
inspector identified to the licensee a diesel start attempt that
appeared to be a valid failure but was identified as an invalid test.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee confirmed that this was a
valid failure and in addition the diesel had been left in an inoperable
status without taking compensatory actions required by TS.
This had
been documented with corrective actions in Licensee Event Report 86-10.
Since this finding occurred as part of the investigation begun in
January, the inspector has requested the licensee address this valid
failure and the failure to take compensatory action for the out of
service condition as part of the response to violation 50-413/85-55-04.
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e.
On March 10, 1986, the licensee identified that one channel of
Automatic Turbine Trip on Reactor Trip had been inoperable since
December 20, 1985. This was identified by a reactor engineer as a
result of re-reviews of past reactor trip reports.
The inspector
discussed the process of the initial reviews required by station
directives and the guidance provided therein with licensee management.
Although the present procedures appear to be adequate for an experi-
enced individual, the procedure may not adequately cover required
details for an individual that is less experienced.
The licensee is
committed to reviewing this procedure and the training provided to
personnel that conduct these reviews to determine if additional
training and guidance should be provided.
Pending completion of this
determination and review of the results by the inspector, this is
identified as a Unresolved Item 413/86-15-04:
Review of Training and
Guidance for Performing Reactcr Trip Reviews.
f.
During general plant observations in Unit 2 on March 14, 1986, the
inspector noted two (2) electrays which appear to be overfilled with
electrical cables.
These electrays are above the Ventilation
Condensate Drain Tank in the Auxiliary Feedwater pump room.
The
licensee was asked to evaluate this problem. Nonconforming Item Report
CN-399 was written to track this item.
This item remains unresolved
pending further licensee and NRC review.
This is Unresolved Item
414/85-16-03:
Evaluation of Apparent Electrical Cable Overfill in
Electray in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room.
g.
On March 17, 1986, the licensee identified that ten (10) bellows type
penetrations had not been tested within twenty-four (24) months as
required by TS 4.6.1.2h.
As a result of this, at 3:10 p.m.,
the unit
commenced reducing power at a rate of 10*4 per hour.
Axial Flux
Difference (AFD) went outside the TS operating limits at 3:25 p.m. but,
this was not recognized due to a malfunction of the Operator Aid
Computer (OAC).
Although other instrumentation existed to identify
that AFD was not within prescribed requirements, the operators,
including performance engineering personnel, continued to monitor the
OAC.
At 6:19
p.m.,
the reactor operator noticed that the AFD
instrumentation, which is on the panel' adjacent to the OAC, were pegged
low. Power was reduced to less than 50*4 as required by TS at 6:25 p.m.
At 6:40 p.m.,
the bellows testing was completed and the unit exited the
TS action that initiated the reduction in power.
A<., a result of this
AFD problem, the licensee violated the Action requirements of TS 3.2.1.
as follows:
(1) Action item a. requires that with the indicated AFD outside of the
target band and thermal power greater than or equal to 90*4 of
rated thermal power, within fifteen (15) minutes either restore
the indicated AFD to within the target band limits or reduce
thermal power to less than 90%. Since it was not recognized that
AFD was outside the target band power was not reduced to less than
90% until about 4:15 p.m.
This exceeded the TS requirement by
approximately forty-five (45) minutes.
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(2) Action item b. requires that with the indicated AFD outside the
acceptable operation limit of Figure 3.2-1 and with thermal power
less than 90% but equal to or greater than 50% of rated thermal
power, reduce power to less than 50% of rated thermal power within
thirty (30) minutes and set the Power Range Neutron Flux-High
Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of rated thermal power
within the next four (4) hours. Since the AFD indication was not
identified, power was not reduced to less than 50% within thirty
(30) minutes. In addition, the power range instruments were not
reset to less than or equal to 55% as specified within the
required four (4) hours.
The above event is identified as a Violation 413/85-15-02:
Failure to
follow required actions of TS 3.2.1.
No violations or deviations were identified except as noted above.
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6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2) (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these
requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,
safety
injection,
emergency
safeguards
systems,
control
room
ventilation, and direct current electrical
power sources.
The
inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in
accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation
was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate
removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished test
results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
Typical of the surveillance items that were witnessed in part or in
full were various calibrations of the nuclear instrumentation,
auxiliary feedwater system testing, turbine stop valve testing, and
residual heat removal system testing.
b.
The inspector received a copy of a memorandum to R. W. Starostecki,
Region I from W. T.
Russell, ONRR, dated March 7,
1986, subject:
Technical Specification Interpretation Concerning Surveillance Testing
Methods for Diesel Generator Lockout Features. The conclusions reached
in this memo as to the proper method to conduct surveillance testing of
these features were reviewed against the methods provided in
PT/1/A/4350/15A and ISB, Diesel Generator 1A (18) Periodic Test. This
review indicated that the method used by these procedures do perform
this testing as detailed in the above memo.
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c.
During a routine review of TS the inspector noted a typographical error
in Table 3.6-2.a and 3.6-2.b.
In these tables under column 3 valve
SA-1# is. identified as SM-1#. This was discussed with the licensee and
with the Catawba licensing project manager in NRR. The licensee has
included a correction for this error in a letter to NRR dated March 7,
1986, containing amendments to Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1 and 2) (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance
with requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the
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requirements in the following areas of inspection: the activities were
accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or
calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed
were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were
properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status
of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to
safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system perfor-
mance,
b.
The inspector requested the licensee to determine whether updated
information relative to Woodward Governors has been specifically
requested from appropriate vendors. This request is based on recent
NRC information indicating that the manufacturer only supplies this
information if specifically requested. The licensee is reviewing this
matter.
This is Inspector Followup Item 413/85-15-01, 414/85-16-01:
Verification that Licensee is Obtaining Updated Information Relative to
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Woodward Governors.
c.
On January 3, 1986, the licensee identified four pipe supports that
were pulled loose from their structural attachments on the steam line
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(SA) to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine (CAPT).
A regional
specialist inspector investigated this occurrence (see Inspection
Report 50-413/86-06 and 50-414/86-08).
Several Duke Power Company
memoranda were written in regard to the investigation of this
occurrence.
The inspector reviewed these memos and has requested the
licensee address several areas that do not appear to have been
included. The areas that are questioned are as follows:
(1) One memo states that the steam lines are heat traced to prevent
steam from condensing.
It also says that the system will be
declared inoperable if the temperature drops below 220 F.
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10.3.2-2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Note 15 states
that the heat tracing is to maintain the temperature of the line -
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at 2550 F.
There appears to be an inconsistency between these two
doce ents.
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(2) All the memoranda that were reviewed by the inspector addressed
damage due to water hammer or steam hammer.
If this line is
allowed to cool to approximately 220 F and the steam valves
suddenly opened, it appears that there could be damage due to
thermal shock in addition to water / steam hammer.
(3) One of the memo's address actions to be taken if the temperature
in the pipe decreases to less than 220 F.
Discussions with
operations personnel on shift indicate a lack of guidance or
awareness that design has specified actions to be taken for this
problem.
The above items are identified as Unresolved 413/86-15-03; Questions
Concerning Engineering Analysis of SA Support / Restraint Failures,
pending additional review and discussion by the inspector with licensee
personnel,
d.
The FSAR, Sections 15.1.4.1 and 15.1.5.1 state that part of the
protection provided for the accidents, associated with these sections,
is a feedwater isolation signal that will rapidly close all feedwater
control valves and backup feedwater isolation valves, trip the main
feedwater pumps, and close the feedwater pump discharge valves. The
inspector reviewed various documentation to determine the method used
to perform these functions.
The licensee identified that during the
construction period, the feedwater pump discharge valves had been
removed.
This was accomplished by Variation Notice (VN) #50047. This
finding is being identified as an Unresolved Item 414/86-16-04: Review
of design change VN50047, Removal of Automatic Closure of 2 CF-10 and 2
CF-17, pending additional review by the inspector.
e.
In addition to the removal of the Automatic Closure of the feedwater
pump discharge valves as discussed in 7d above, the feedwater pump
turbine trip feature was also removed on Unit 2.
This change was
performed in accordance with Nuclear Station Modification (NSM)
CN20084. The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation associated with
the NSM which is required by 10 CFR 50.59. This safety evaluation
stated no unreviewed safety question was judged to be involved or
created by this modification.
In addition, it referenced only
Chapter 7.0 of the FSAR as being reviewed.
10 CFR 50.59 (b) requires
that the records of changes to the facility include a written safety
evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the
change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. There was no
bases provided in this NSM safety evaluation and no reference to the
accidents described in Section 15.1.4.1 and 15.1.5.1 for which these
features were identified to provide protection. This is identified as
a Violation 414/86-16-02: Failure to provide the bases for determining
that a change to the facility does not involve an unreviewed safety
question.
No violations or deviations were identified except as noted above.
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8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 and 2) (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifi-
cations and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of
potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the
relative safety significance of each event. Additional implant reviews and
discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those
reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
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LER 413/84-03 and
Control Rod Drive Assemblies Removed
413/84-03 Rev 1
Improperly
Comparison of Digital Rod Position to
Demand Position Not Performed
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Auto-Start of Auxiliary Feedwater
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During Testing of Reactor Trip Breakers
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Mode Changes Made With Inoperable
Equipment Due to Mishandling Work
Requests
Reactor Trip on Loss of Main Feedwater
Pump Due to Design Deficiency
No violations of deviations were identified.
9.
Information Meetings with Local Officials (Units 1 and 2) (94600)
A meeting was held with local Rock Hill city government officials on
March 4,
1986.
This meeting was conducted to familiarize the local
officials with the mission of the NRC, to introduce key NRC personnel
associated with Catawba, to discuss lines of communications available
between local officials and the NRC, and to discuss the status of the
facility and related community concerns with these local officials. A copy
of general information was provided to the mayor and council members.
The
following local officials were present:
Betty J. Rhea, Mayor
Bidwell Ivey, Councilman
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Henry T. Wood, Councilman
10.
Preparation for Refueling (Unit 1) (60705)
The inspector reviewed preparations for refueling of Unit 1 presently
scheduled to commence in August 1986.
This review was concerned only with
the receipt, inspection and storage of new fuel in the fuel storage area.
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This process was performed in accordance with approved procedures and used
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instrumentation that had been recently calibrated in accordance with
calibration requirements.
In addition, the inspector reviewed training
records of various personnel handling the new fuel and crane operations.
Four fuel assemblies were observed (D-04, 0-19, D-26 and D-34).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Inspector Witnessing of Initial Fuel Loading (Unit 2) (72524)
The inspectors witnessed fuel loading operations to verify that a well
coordinated effort was conducted in accordance with procedure and - TS
Requirements. The inspectors witnessed the installation of the first five
bundles, the last 13 bundles and additional bundles on an intermittent
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basis.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (Unit 2) (71302)
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The inspector witnessed operational aspects of portions of selected tests
associated with the preoperation program to verify that activities were well
controlled, coordinated and performed in accordance with applicable
procedures. Included in this review were thermocouple calibrations and
running of Diesel Generator 2A for governor trouble shooting.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13.
Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e) (Unit 2) (W3)
(Closed) CDR 414/86-02: Diesel Generawor Valve Spring Failures. The report
for this item was submitted on January 16, 1986.
The inspector verified
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that the licensee has performed appropriate inspections of the affected
springs and has a long term plan to provide replacement springs. Licensee
actions are acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Previously Identified Inspector Findings (Units 1 and 2) (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/85-52-01, 414/85-62-01: Revision
of OMP 3-1 for Senior Operator License Applications. The licensee has
implemented a procedure change correcting the subject procedure. This
action is acceptable.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 414/84-42-02: Downgrading Operator
Candidate Exam Results.
This item is closed based on previous
inspections described in NRC Report No. 50-413/85-12.
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c.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 414/84-42-04: Need to Improve NED Qual
Checklist Record Keeping.
This item is closed based on previous
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inspections described in NRC Report No. 50-413/85-12.
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d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/84-93-05, 414/84-42-05: Review
Catawba Requalification Program to Ensure it Meets Requirements of
The
inspector
reviewed
the
licensees
operator
requalification program entitled Requalification Program for NRC
Licensed Personnel Revision 1, dated November 27, 1984.
This review
indicates that the requalification program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 55. This item.is closed.
e.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/84-93-03, 414/84-42-03: Develop
Program to Ensure Licensed Personnel Periodically Perform Licensed
Duties. Operations Manaaement Procedure 3-5, Revision 3, Maintenance
of Operating Experience for NRC License (R0/SRO) Renewal contains
guidance and documentation requirements for maintenance of licensed
personnel . This identifies the frequency at which a person must stand
a prescribed duty in order to maintain his licensed position. Based on
the inspectors review of this procedure this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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