ML20203L939
| ML20203L939 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1986 |
| From: | Bechhaefer C, Bechhoefer C, John Lamb, Shan F, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| CON-#386-521 79-421-07-OL, 79-421-7-OL, LBP-86-29, OL, NUDOCS 8609020070 | |
| Download: ML20203L939 (41) | |
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LBP-86-29 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFILE OF n .at i Ar 1 ATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGBOARg0migCk Before Administrative Judges Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman VED AUG 291986 Dr. James C. Lamb Frederick J. Shon In the Matter of ASLBP No. 79-421-07 OL
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l Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, ET AL. STN 50-499 OL h
l (South Texas Project } August 29, 1986 Units 1 and 2) l)/
PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (Authorizing Operating Licenses)
Appearances Alvin H. Gutterman, Esq., Washington, D.C., for Houston Lighting and Power Co. (HL&P), el al., Applicants Lanny Alan Sinkin, Esq., Washington, D.C., for Citizens Concerned About
' Nuclear Power, Inc. (CCANP), Intervenor Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq., for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Connission Staff 8609020070 86002(?
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS P,,ajle 2
0 PINION..........................................................
2 I. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
4 II. CONTENTION 4: HURRICANE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION.......
4 A. Introduction......................................
B. Clarification of Record on Probability 6
Calculations......................................
C. Legal Questions Raised by CCANP and Discussed 10 by the Applicants.................................
19 III. UNCONTESTED MATTERS....................................
21 IV. CONCLUSION.............................................
24 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW...........................
24 I. FINDINGS OF FACT.......................................
Procedural Backg round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 A.
Probability Calculations.......................... 26 B.
Conclusion With Respect to Contention 4........... 35 C.
36 II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.....................................
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37 t 0RDER............................................................
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OPINION I. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
(Findings 316-19)
This is our third Partial Initial Decision (PID-III) in this operating license proceeding involving the South Texas Project. Units 1 and 2 (STP), two pressurized water reactors located approximately 12 miles south-southwest of Bay City, Matagorda County, Texas. Each plant is designed for a rated electrical output of 1250 megawatts.
The Applicants for operating licenses are Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), the project manager; the City of San Antonio, Texas; Central Power and Light Company; and the City of Austin, Texas j (hereinafter referred to collectively as the Applicants). Other i
participants in this portion of the proceeding are Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc. (CCANP), the only remaining Intervenor, and i
the NRC Staff. (The State of Texas, an interested State, did not
. . participate in the issues covered by this decision.)
The procedural background of this proceeding is set forth extensively in our earlier two decisions and will not be repeated here.
We need only reiterate that, in those decisions, we resolved all contested issues except for two aspects of one contention (dealing generally with the adequacy of the design and co,nstruction of the STP to withstandhurricanesandhurricanemissiles). LBP-84-13, 19 NRC 659 (1984) (PID-I), affirmed in part, ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360 (1985), review
3 declined by Commission, letter dated July 30,1985; L8P-86-15, 23 NRC 595 (June 13, 1986) (PID-II). In this decision, we are granting the 1
Applicants' motion for summary disposition with respect to the unresolved design questions--finding that, with respect to portions of 4
three structures which are not designed to withstand wind-driven missiles, the risk of severe damage is so low that the failure to satisfy otherwise applicable design standards may be regarded as de minimis. Accordingly, we are concluding that the STP has been adequately designed to withstand hurricanes and hurricane missiles. We P
are also dismissing that portion of the contention which questions whether the STP has been adequately constructed to withstand hurricanes.
Finally, we have completed the review which we must give to uncontested matters. We posed questions regarding one aspect of the emergency plan, and the Applicants have provided a satisfactory 4
response. We accordingly have found no matter warranting our further consideration pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 9 2.760a.
Having concluded our review of all matters before us, we are authorizing the Staff (upon completion of those aspects of review within ,
its responsibilities) to issue licenses permitting fuel loading and low
- power operations and thereafter (subject to Commission "inmediate I
effectiveness" review)fullpoweroperations. Such licenses are subject to conditions previously imposed by us in our earlier decisions.
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4 II. CONTENTION 4: HURRICANE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION A. Introduction (Findings 819-21)
CCANP Contention 4 questions whether Category I structures at the STP have been adequately " designed and constructed" to withstand hurricanes, including hurricane-generated missiles. In dealing with this contention in PID-II, we granted the Applicants' motion for summary disposition insofar as it related to the design of the STP to withstand hurricane winds. We also detemined that all but designated portions of three Category I structures were adequately designed to withstand hurricane-generated missiles. But we also found the record inadequate to permit us to grant summary disposition with respect to the design of those portions of three structures to withstand hurricane missiles. In addition, we noted that CCANP had a further opportunity to raise questions concerning the adequacy of STP construction to withstand hprricanes, and we declined to rule on that issue at that time. PID-II, supra, 23 NRC at 646-57 and Findings 763-93, f_d. at 769 79.
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CCANP was pennitted to raise hurricane-related construction questions by June 9,1986 (PID-II, 23 NRC at 657, n.14). It has not sought to do so. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issue, we are dismissing the construction allegations of Contention 4.
The portions of three Category I structures with respect to which
! we declined to grant sumary disposition in PID-II were the roof areas of the isolation valve cubicles (IVC), certain Mechanical Electrical i
}
5 Auxiliary Building (MEAB) HVAC openings, and the diesel generator exhaust stack openings (hereinafter referred to collectively as
" nonconforming structures") (Finding 825). These nonconforming structures were concededly not designed t: withstand hurricane-generated missiles, as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4. Instead, the Applicants (supported by the Staff) sought to i establish the licenseability of these structures on the basis that the probability of severe damage from hurricane (or tornado) mitsiles was so low that the structures were not required to be equipped with protective features to resist such missiles. Specifically,theApplicants(and l Staff) asserted that the probability of a missile strike was less than 1 X 10-7 annually and hence that a long-standing Staff acceptance criterion was satisfied.
l CCANP opposed this approach on the ground that licensing through a I probability approach is not permissible and that the nonconforming structures did not meet governing regulatory requirements. We concurred in part with that view, expressing our opinion that it was perhaps not f '
l permissible (as the Staff had argued) to accumulate nonprotected Category I structures until the 1 X 10-7 criterion was reached.
However, we also concluded that, if the probability of a missile strike on the nonconforming structures were as low as suggested by the l
Applicants or Staff, the failure to satisfy detenninistic licensing requirements with respect to those structures could be regarded as d_e minimis and acceptable on that basis. We express some additional views on this subject latu in this Opinion.
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1 We declined to grant sunmary disposition in PID-II with respect to the nonconforming structures.because the record did not appear to supportsthe probability calculations which were before us. We indicated that we wculd pose certain questions to the parties concerning, inter alia, the probability calculations and the missile resistance of the nonconfoming structures, to determine whether sunmary disposition cocid be granted. We set forth such questions in our Memorandum and Order l
(Boaro Questions Concerning Design of Nonconforining Structures to WithstandHurricanesandTornados),datedJune 23,1986(unpublished).
The Applicants and Staff each filed responses, dated July 14, 1986.
1
! (The Staff filed a corrected response on July 22, 1986 .) CCANP filed a
- statement of its views on July 17, 1986.
B. Clarification of Record on Probability Calculations (Findings 82Z-39)
The long-standing Staff acceptance criterion to which = have ,
referred provides, in effect, that Category I structures must be ,
.. protected from offsite hazards (such as tornados'or hurricanes) where
)
"the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of the 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines is estimated to exceed the NRC Sttff objective of approximately 10-7 per year" (Standard Review Plan, l 1 The Staff moved for leave to file a supplemental affidavit to correct certain errors in the affidavit upon which its earlier response was based. Absent any opposition, we accept the supplemental affidavit.
b.
7
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' NUREG-0800, Rev. 2. July 1981 (SRP), 9 2.2.3). This criterion, which is derived from Regulatory Guide 1.70, Rev. 3. November 1978, 9 2.2.3.1, D6 termination of Design Basis Events, is applicable to the assessment of !
l possible hazards due to missties generated by such natural phenomena l
\
(SRP, 6 3.5.1.4; Regulatory Guide 1.117. Rev.1, April 1978). 1 As we discussed in PID-II, the Applicants and Staff each attempted i to demonstrat'e that the probability of a missile striking the ;
nonconforming structures as a result of a hurricane or tornado was less than 1 X 10-7 annually and, accordingly, that the structures need not be 1
- designed to withstand such externally-generated missiles. The l
- Applicants had claimed that this probability (summed for the three structures) was approximately 6 X 10-10 annually (PID-II, 23 NRC at 652 and Finding 785, M., at 777); the Staff concluded that it was approximately 4.5 X 10~9 annually (M.,at652). Both of these calculated probabilities are orders of magnitude less than the 1 X 10-7 acceptance criterion. For that reason, the Applicants (supported by the
)
Staff) sought summary disposition of the design aspects of Contention 4,
' including the design of the nonconforming structures, claiming that there wes no outstanding issue of material fact with respect thereto.
Although CCANP did not file affidavits raising questions as to l l
these probabilities, we were unable to accept the Applicants' or Staff's i
)
I probability calculations at face value. In our view, the record was not clear as to whether an appropriate spectrum of missiles had been used to determine the probability of a missile strike. Hence, we determined that, with respect to the taree nonconfonning structures (or portions l
~. .. .
1 i
8 thereof), there was an unresolved material issue of fact that precluded our granting summary disposition of that portion of Contention 4 dweling with the design of thost structures.
As we explained (PID-II, supra, 23 NRC at 653-55), it appeared to us (mostly from language in the Staff's safety evaluation of this issue) that one of the spectra of design basis missiles set forth in SRP E 3.5.1.4 had been utilized. Such a spectrum is appropriate for evaluating the design of Category I structures, since it envelopes missiles of less severity (although possibly greater frequency). But where, as here, structures are concededly not designed to resist missiles, missiles which might cause damage to nonconforming structures, or to the safety-related equipment protected thereby, might have been improperly omitted from the spectrum employed to ascertain the probabilities in question. As examples, we mentioned missiles such as pieces of sheet metal, tree limbs, small fence rails, pieces of wood, or even chickens or birds (PID-II, supra, 23 NRC at 655).
The affidavits submitted by the Applicants and Staff in response to i our questions have clarified the record and dispelled our reservations as to the adequacy of the calculated probabilities previously submitted to us in support of summary disposition. Each of the affiants is 1
' technically qualified to address the questions to which he responds (Findings 823,824). The affidavits identify three categories of externally generated missile spectra which must be considered in l
ascertaining the necessity for missile protection of Category I l
9 structures. As designated by the Applicants, they are (Findings 827, 831):
- 1. Substantive Missiles. Missiles of moderate to heavy weight, such as large pieces of lumber and pipes. The Board perceives these missiles as being encompassed by the various spectra of design-basis missiles identified in SRP f 3.5.1.4.
- 2. L.ight Missiles. Objects such as pieces of wood, sheet metal, plywood and tree limbs, which are comprehended by the results of on-site surveys of potential missiles at seven nuclear power plants in various stages of construction and operation.
- 3. Debris. Small lightweight objects which, in general, do not have sufficient energy to caus: significant damage to safety-related equipment.
As explained in our Findings, the Applicants and Staff utilized a
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" standard" missile for their PRA missile spectrum, comprised of missiles in the first and second categories. Although the third category was not enco:npassed within the missile spectrum used for the probability calculations, the Applicants and Staff have each demonstrated that the likelihood of excessive releases of radiation caused by a missile strike of the third category of missiles is virtually non-existent.
Furthermore, numerous conservatisms have been employed by the Applicants and Staff in utilizing their " standard" spectrum of missiles. For example, damage in excess of Part 100 guidelines was presumed for every missile strike, even though that result would clearly not occur with many missile strikes. For that reason, we are able to accept the
10 probability calculations employed by the Applicants or Staff in support of our granting sumary disposition of the remainder of the design aspects of Contention 4. See' Findings 827-35.
CCANP has not furnished any affidavits in responding to those submitted by the Applicants and Staff. In effect, it challenges the legal adequacy of using probabilities as a basis for licensing--not one of the questions left open by PID-II. For their part, the Applicants have commented on the reservations which we earlier expressed concerning use of probabilities in licensing decisions (although they expressly refrain from seeking reconsideration of our ruling in PID-II). For reasons set forth in Part I.C of this decision, we are explaining in greater detail and reaffirming the v Rws which we expressed in PID-II.
On the basis of the entire record before us, including the enhanced record on probability calculations which we now view as adequate for resolving the material factual issue upon which our ruling in PID-II was predicated, we are granting the Applicants' motion for sumary
. disposition of the design aspects of Contention 4.
C. l.egal Questions Raised by CCANP and Discussed by the Applicants Both CCANP and the Applicants have provided comments concerning our Opinion in PID-II that interpreted the Commission's rules as permitting, to a limited degree, and on the basis of a lack of significant probability of damage, a facility's failure to conform to deterministic standards otherwise applicable to it. CCANP views that approach as impermissible; the Applicants view it as overly restrictive (although
11 i
they recognize that the approach would permit the licensing of STP and hence do not seek reconsideration of any of our rulings). On the basis of these comments, we believe that a greater explication of our legal rulings--to which we adhere--is warranted.
- 1. In its statement of views, CCANP opposes our granting summary disposition of the design aspects of Contention 4 (to the extent it relates to the nonconforming structures) on essentially two grounds.
First, CCANP asserts that the use of a probability approach amounts to a license (construction permit) amendment without following prescribed i procedures. Second, assuming arguendo that use of probabilities does not constitute a license amendment, CCANP asserts that probabilistic risk assessment is an " inherently unreliable methodology"; that the determinations made with respect to the nonconforming structures rely on l
sparse data obtained from studies not performed by NRC but rather oy industry; and that, since it would be feasible to modify the nonconforming structures to comply with applicable regulatory requirements, we should require the Applicants to do so.
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We need devote little analysis to the first of CCANP's claims.
i When a construction permit is issued, it does not normally include I
details of the design of each structure. Although it requires that I
applicable regulatory requirements be satisfied, it does not specify the l precise manner in which that objective must be achieved. Here, the Applicants are asserting that certain requirements need not be construed to govern the protection of the nonconforming structures from external missiles. If they prevail, the applicable regulatory requirements will l
4 12 have been satisfied, and no license amendment is involved. If they were not to prevail, they would be required to design the nonconfoming structures to provide adequate protection against missfies. Thus, we do not perceive that the Applicants are seeking an amendment to their construction permits.
CCANP's second claint warrants some further comment. It asserts, in effect, that probability analyses should never be used to analyze compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, at least where (as here) there are significant uncertainties in the data utilized. It also questions the use of data from studies not perfomed by NRC.
In our view.,the Commission has sanctioned to some degree the use of probability analyses in conducting its regulatory reviews: the only question is the extent to which such use is permissible--a topic to which we will turn in discussing the Applicants' comments (Part I.C.2, infra). As for uncertainties, the Staff's acceptance criterion envisions the presence of certain uncertainties. Where calaculations are demonstrably conservative, the probability of exceeding 10 C.F.R.
' Part 100 guidelines may be as high as 1 X 10-6 (SRP, 9 2.2.3. at p.
2.2.3.-2). The Applicants and Staff, in performing the probability analyses with respect to the susceptibility of the nonconforming structures to strikes from externally generated missiles, have incorporated a number of conservative assumptions into their calculations (Finding 830). Nonetheless, they have utilized the 1 X 10~7 acceptance criterion. That being so, we believe that the calculations before us adequately take into account the uncertainties to
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13 which CCANP refers. Moreover, CCANP has provided us no ground for questioning the adequacy of the studies not perfonned by NRC, and we perceive no such ground. Both the Applicants and the NRC Staff relied on those studies, which were undertaken by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). That they were not performed by NRC does not g se_
undennine their acceptability. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.,
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALA8-841, 24 NRC ,_
(July 25,1986)(slipop.,pp.29-30).
- 2. In PID-II, we were unwilling to accept in its entirety the Staff's position that the 1 X 10-7 acceptance criterion should be applied irrespective of the number of safety structures which do not meet deterministic standards and are added together to ascertain whether
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the probability of damage exceeds 1 X 10-7 annually. We reasoned that this position amounted to regulation by probability or safety goal--a
- position which we viewed as barred by a then-applicable Comission Policy Statement.
The Applicants do not formally seek reconsideration of this position. But they state that they agree with the Staff's position that an unlimited number of safety structures may fail to confonn to regulatcry requirements, as long as the annual probability of being adversely affected by a natural phenomeron (or natural phenomena) is less than 1 X 10-7 . The Applicants cite several decisions that assertedly support this view.
In the interim, since the issuance of PID-II, the Comission has issued a new Policy Statement to replace the Statement on which we had
i 14 relied in PID-II. Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants; Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 28044 (August 4,1986). That Policy Statement, which became effective upon publication, defines certain safety goals which are fundamentally probabilistic in nature and which nuclear pawer plants must satisfy. With respect to regulation by probability or safety goal, the new Policy Statement states, in pertinent part:
These safety goals and these implementation guidelines are not meant as a substitute for NRC's regulations and do not relieve nuclear power plan permittees and licensees from complying with regulations. Nor arc the safety goals and these implementation guidelines in and of themselves meant to serve as a sole basis for licensing decisions. However, if pursuant -
to these guidelines, information is developed that is applicable to a particular licensing decision, it may be considered as one factor in the licensing decision. ,
51 Fed. Reg. at 28047.2 -
In declining to accept potential damage to an unlimited rumber of structures in determining whether the 1 X 10~7 acceptance criterion has been satisfied, we were motivated by language in the Commission's interim draft safety goal Policy Statement which appeared to preclude
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that result (PID-II, supra, 23 NRC at 652-53). The new final Policy Statement, as quoted above, seems somewhat more pemissive in allowing l
probabilities or safety goals to serve as at least a partial basis for 2 In their comments, the Applicants cite a discussion draft of this Policy Statenant that included (at p.13) the foregoing language but differed in other respects from the final statement.
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licensing decisions. Nonetheless, like the earlier s.tatement, it provides that deterministic licensing criteria are to be observed as the primary basis for regulation.' .
To recognize the 1 X 10-7 acceptance criterion as applicable to an f unlimited number of structures (as asserted by the Applicants and Staff)
I could elevate that acceptance criterion to the status of a regulation and permit it to override the requirements of NRC deterministic rules and regulations. To permit that result would undemine the fundamental ~
thrust of the new (as well as the former) Policy Statement. It would in effect provide that, as long as the probability of damage from a given hazard or hazards (s., hurricanes and tornados) were less than 1 X 10-7, portions of every safety structure on site could fail to meet regulatory design standards. We cannot envision such a result being H
permissible under the regulatory regimen now in effect, even though the probabilities were to be computed as acceptably low.
We nonetheless believe that the de minimis approach we outlined in l
[
PID-II is a permissible interpretation of governing regulatory I requirements. We accordingly are adhering to the views expressed in PID-II and are noting that this approach is more clearly pemitted by the new Policy Statement than by the old (which at least explicitly gave no sanctiion at all to the use of probabilities in licensing decisions).
We cannot, and need not, define with precision the numbers of safety ,
structures which can fail to meet deterministic requirements under this .
approach. It would depend in part on balancing the severity of damage
16 which could result from an accicent produced by the nazard in questfon with the calculated probability of the damage occurring.
The auth~orities cited by the Applicants (July 14, 1986 response, pp. 2-3, n.1.) are not inconsistent with the result we are reaching.
Offshore Power S.ystems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-82-49, 15 NRC 1658, 1722-23 (1982) involved whether the 1 X 10-7 acceptance criterion was applicable to floating as well as land-based plants, for evaluating protection against turbine missiles.
The probability discussion related to the existence of the hazard (turbine missiles), not the effects of the hazard on individual structures failing to adhere to design standards.3 Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant). LBP-78-32, 8 NRC 413, 429-33 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 276-77 (1979), similarly dealt with the likelihood of damage to one structure--the spent fuel pool--from several hazards (each of which was analyzed sepsrately).4 3 To the same effect, see Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-46, 18 NRG 218 (1983),
also cited by the Applicants.
4 We presume the Applicants had in mind the tornado-missile hazard, as to which the evidence demonstrated that tornado missiles vould not cause damage beyond the design basis fuel-handling accident.
As a conservatism, the Board noted that at 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown (minimum decay time before fuel could be transferred to
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the spent fuel pool) at least 10 fuel assemblies could be damaged
' without exceeding 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines. All of those fuel assemblies were in the same structure. Thus, although the Board (as a conservatism) referred to the probability of tornado-missile damage to more than 10 fuel assemblies, the decision did not find (FootnoteContinued)
l 1
a 17 Florida Power & Light . (St. Lucie Nuclear Pover Plant, Unit No.
j 2,\ CLI-81-12, 13 NRC 838, 843-44 (1981) is, if anything, contrary to the Applicants' and Staff's position here, for it stresses the plant specific analysis which must be factored into any reliance on probabilities; it specifically disapproved any single numerical threshold for the mandatory consideration of accident sequences, concluding that "the probability values calculated for [a] particular event should not be interpreted as establishing a generic numerical threshold to be used for future consideration of accident sequences" (id,.at843). To the same effect, see Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-11, 20 NRC 1, 9-10 (1984).-
We interpret those opinions as equally adverse to the unquestioned use of a generic rumerical threshold to exclude the need to consider otherwise applicable licensing requirements in evaluating design acceptability.
For these reasons, we do not believe that the Comission has enshrined the 1 X 10-7 numerical threshold acceptance criterion as a licensing standard to be used in all cases where the threshold is satisfied. Discretion in the use of such a threshold must be observed.
There must be a consideration of, inter alia, the number of structures (FootnoteContinued) permissible a hazard which could impact more than one structure.
8 NRC at 430-31.
_ ~ . - - . - . . - ,,. . . - . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . -
18 affected, the extent of damage which might result, the uncertainties attendant to detennining whether the 1 X 10-7 threshold has been satisfied and the degree by which the likelihood of damage is less than the 1 X 10-7 acceptance criterion.
Here, we are crnvinced that the failure of three nonconforming structures to meet deterministic standards coupled with a likelihood of missile impact orders of magnitude less than the acceptance criterion, and a likely lack of severe damage even if a missile strike were to occur, falls well within the category of risk which the acceptance criterion deems acceptable. Even though it would have been preferable.
for the Applicants to have properly designed the concenforming ,
structures to resist hurricane and tornado missiles, we view the failure to meet deterministic requirements here as g minimis and not sufficient to warrant redesign to accord with the deterministic requirements.5
' We note that, in the new Policy Statement, two Commissioners express the view that significant damage should be equated to a radiation release in excess of EPA standards (which are somewhat lower than Part 100 standards) (51 Fed. Reg. at 28048). Resolution of possible differences with the acceptance criterion which we are relying on here is not necessary or relevant, inasmuch as the Applicants and Staff are ccnservatively relying on probabilities of missile strikes, not damage caused from a strike. They each presume unacceptable damage in the event of a strike (Findings 830, 835), clearly a very pessimistic assumption.
19 III. UNCONTESTED MATTERS We have reviewd various unresolved generic issues applicable to STP, as well as other uncontested safety and environmental matters, as required for operating-license applications by Louisiana Power and Light Q. (Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076, 1110-12(1983), and by Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978). Wt. posed questions to the Applicants regarding one matter, concerning the alert and I notification system of the emergency plan. See our letter dated July 25, 1986, to the Applicants' counsel.
The unresolved generic issues applicable to STP are set forth in Appendix C of the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 1986 (NUREG-0781). Taking into account the scope of review appropriate for an uncontested issue in an operating license proceeding, we have J
examined wnether the generic safety issues have been taken into account I in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to be of
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substance, would be adequate to justify operation. North Anna, We are satisfied that the ALAB-491, supra, 8 NRC at 248-49, n. 7.
l-Staff's review has met that standard and, accordingly, that further i
examination of any generic safety issue pursuant to our authority under 10 C.F.R. 9 2.760a would not be warranted.
We have reached a similar conclusion with respect to other uncontested n:atters. With respect to the emergency planning matter referenced above, the Applicants provided responses to our questions, by
20 letter dated August 14, 1986.6 (CCANP did not offer any comments cn the Applicants' response; the Staff (which could file comments as late as l today), advised us by telephone that it did not intend to do so.) Our questions had been motivated by our belief that the clerting and notification provisions of the emergency plan (which relied on a combination of sirens and tone-alert radios in some residences) might -
not have been adequate to provide effective nighttime alerting in sumer (when windows are likely to be closed and. air conditioning equipment in operation). In response, the Applicants expressed their belief that the emergen:y plan satisfied all governing requirements, but they 6 In that letter (at p. 4, n. 7), the Applicants raised a question I about our continuing jurisdiction to raise issues pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.760a. They cite the Appeal Board Order of July 10, 1986, which stated that the Appeal Board would review PID-II sua sponte (no appeals having been filed), together with cur statements I in PID-II which expressly reserved jurisdiction only with respect to Contention 4. They rely on several decisions involving motions to reopen a record or to admit new contentions.
In our view, since we are required in an operating license proceeding to review unresolved generic issues and other uncontested safety and environmental questions, under standards spelled out in Waterford, ALAB-732, supra, and North Anna, ALAB-491, supra, we need not expressly reserve jurisdiction to do so. In any event, the Appeal Board Order indicated only that that Board was reviewing sua sponte PID-II. Its quotation from PID-II of our description oTunresolved contested issues did not purport to, and did not, deprive us of jurisdiction to review uncontested issues pursuant to the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. 6 2.760s.
Unlike the cases cited by the Applicants, we are not involved in reopening the record or admitting a new contention. We are merely carrying out a duty that we are obliged to undertake and have not yet completed.
21 volunteered to amend their emergency plan to include tone-alert radios in every residence within the portions of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) within a ten-mile radius of the plant. Without reaching any conclusion as to the adequacy of the earlier version of the emergency plan, we are satisfied that, with the described amendment, the emergency plan adequately resolves the Board's concerns in this matter. We now find no warrant for raising this issue pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.760a.
We comend the Applicants for the responsible manner in which they have responded to the questions we raised.7 IV. CCNCLUSION With this decision, we are concluding our consideration of all matters raised by CCANP in this proceeding. Our earlier decisions considered other questions raised by the Intervenors, as well as issues derived from the Commission's decision in CLI-80-32, 12 NRC 281 (1980).
In reaching this decision on the single contention left open by
~
PID-II, we have reviewed all of CCANP's claims with great care, including the entire record of the proceeding. On the basis of the record as supplemented by affidavits of the Applicants and Staff filed subsequent to PID-II, we have concluded that there is no genuine issue 7 Nothing we say here should be construed as depriving the Staff r f any authority it has to require other changes in the emergency plan ,
which is before it for review. l
)
S 1
22
' as to any material fact bearing on the claims of CCANP Contention 4 with !
respect to the design of the nonconforming structures to withr.tand hurricane-generated missiles, and that the Appifcants are entitled to a decision as a matter of law on this aspect of Contention 4. Further, because CCANP has not pursued its claims concerning the ccnstruction of the STP to withstand hurricanes and hurricane missiles, we are 1
dismissing those clain.s. (We granted sunmary disposition of the remainderofContention4inPID-II.) We now have reasanable assurance that safety structures at the STP have been adequately designed to ;
withstand hurricanes and hurricane missiles.
Finally, because we have completed our review of all issues before us (either contested or uncontested), we are authorizing the Staff, upon completion of its cwn review (which covers many more aspects of the facility then have been litigated before us), to authorize operations initially for fuel loading and low-power operations Lid thereafter (subject to Commission consideration pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.764(f))
full power operations. This authorization is subject to the terms and
' conditions previcusly imposed by us.8 l
8 Since we have not formally raised pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.760a the emergency planning matter dealt with in our letter to the Applicants' counsel dated July 25, 1986, we are not imposing as a )
license condition the improvements to the emergency plan to which the Applicants committed themselves in their August 14, 1986 resconse. Nonetheless, we fully expect the Applicants to adhere to their commitment to provide tone-alert radics to all households in ,
l the portion of the EPZ within a ten-mile radius of the plant l (Footnote Continued) \
l 1 i
.- .. ~ - . - - - _ _ . . - - - _ . - . . , - . ,--- - - - - - - - - - - , - . _ - . - - - - - - - - _ . . . . _ - - - _ - - . _ _ - - -
23 In examining the various issues before us on which we ruled either in our earlier decisions or in this decision, we have not found safety 3 or environmental issues arising under applicable Commission regulations and policies which we beliava present serious, close quastions which are crucial to whether the authorized licenses should become effective
. before full appellate review is completed, or on which prompt Commission policy guidance is called for, within the meaning of 10 C.F.R.
I 2.764(f)(1)(ii). We note, however, that we have used a probability approach in resolving a portion of Contention 4 (hurricane design) and that, if that approach were to be found impermissible, substantial design changes to three Category I structures might be required.
This Opinion is based upon, and incorporates, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that follow. Any statements or filings on the issues considered herein submitted by the parties that are not dealt with directly or inferentially in this Partial Initial Decision are rejected as being unsupportable in law or in fact or as being
'l unnecessary to the rendering of this decision.
l .. _
(FootnoteContinued)
(Affidavit of Warren H. Kinsey, STP Plant Manager, provided by Applicants' letter dated August 14,1986,A.3).
i 1
i 24 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
\
I. FINDINGS OF FACT A. Procedural Background 816.9 The procedural background of this proceeding is set forth in 1
the Licensing Board's two earlier partial initial decisions and will not generally be repeated here. LBP-84-13,19NRC659(1984)(PID-I),at 723-26 (Findings 1-12): LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595 (1966) (PID-II), at 678-83 (Findings 426-45).
817. The parties participating in the resolution of the issues dealt with by this decision are the Applicants (Houston Lighting and Power Co. (HL&P), the profer.t manager; the City of San Antonio; Central Power and Light Co.; and the City of Austin), the Intervenor (Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc. (CCANP)) and the NRC Staff.
818. The Licensing Board presiding over this portion of the proceeding is the same as that which presided over the Phase II hearings l
and issued PID-II. See PID-II, finding 439, 23 NRC at 681.
819. The only contested issue remaining unresolved after PID-II is CCANP Corstention 4,, concerning the adequacy of the design and 9 Fincings 1-425 appear in PID-I, and Findings 426-815 appear in PID-II. We are utilizing consecutive numbering of findings to avoid potential confusion stemming from the consideration of different aspects of issues or contentions in more than one PID.
See PID .II, 23 NRC at 678, n. 39.
._, .. .., _ . , . - - - _ . , . . . __ _-._.,_.-_.,--,..-------.---~~...,,r - . - , . . _ . - . . . , -
25 i
s construction of the STP to withstand hurricanes and hurricane-generated missiles. See PID-II, Finding 763, 23 NRC at 769. We granted sunnary disposition of this contention insofar as it questioned the design of 4
STP Category I structures to withstand hurricanes and (except with respect to portions of three structures) hurricane-generated missiles.
With respect to the missile protection of the three "nonconfaming structures," however, we found the record inadequate to pemit us to grant sunnary disposition, as requested by the Applicants and supported by the NRC Staff. PID-II, supra, Findings 778, 780, 784-86, and 788-90, 23 NRC at 774-78.
820. To rectify the record deficiencies which we perceived with regard to the missile protection of the three nonconforming structures,
' we stated that in the near future we would issue questions to the parties and that, after receiving responses, we would evaluate whether sunnary disposition might then be granted or whether further hearings may be required. PID-II, supra, 23 NRC at 655-56. We issued those questions through our Memorandum and Order (Board Questions Concerning Design of Nonconfaming Structures to Withstand Hurricanes and i
Tornados),datedJune 23, 1986 (unpublished).
821. The Applicants and Staff each filed responses to our questions, supported by affidavits, on July 14, 1986. Our Order dated July 17,1986, established a schedule for respo.ses by all parties.
I CCANP filed a statement of its views on July 17, 1986. No supporting affidavits were included with this response. No other party filed any response. On July 22, 1986, the Staff moved for leave to file a
26 supplemental (corrected) affidavit. Absent any response, we are ,
grar. ting the Staff's motion (see n.1, supra) and are considering the
~
Staff's affidavit as corrected by the supplemental affidavit.
- 8. Probability Calculations 822. In response to our questions, the Applicants submitted affidavits by Messrs. R. Bruce Linderman (App. Aff. (Linderman III)) 10 Donald H. Ashton (App. Aff. (Ashton)), and Dr. Ant.hony J. Mark (App.
Aff. (Mark)). The Stafff.ubmitted an affidavit of Mr. Jerry N. Wilson (Wilson,Aff.III).11 823. Messrs. Linderman and Wolfe have been previously found by us to be professionally qualified in the areas covered by their affidavits (PID-II, supra, Findings 765 and 767, 23 NRC at 769-71). They are similarly qualified to address the questions dealt with in their most recent affidavits.
824. Mr. Donald H. Ashton has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Connecticut, and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from Purdue University. He is currently employed by Bechtel Energy Corp. as Project Engineer for the STP. He previously has served, inter alia, as Chief Nuclear / Environmental Engineer for Bechtel's Houston Area Office, l
f 10 Mr.
and LindermanLindermanSupp. previously)
Aff. (see PID-II, submitted two Findings affidavits 765 and 785).(Linderman Aff.
11 Mr. Wilson previously submitted two affidavits (Wilson Aff. and l
Wilson Supp. Aff.) (see PID-II, Findings 767 and 786).
I
27 i
i and as Assistant Chief Nuclear Engineer in Bechtel's Gaithersburg, Maryland office (where he was also designated t'o coordinate the program for Reliability Analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment). Dr.
Anthony J. Mark has a B.S. in Biological Sciences and a Ph.D. in Cellular and Molecular Biology, both degrees from the University of Southern California. He has taken cdditional coursework in, inter alia, reliability and risk assessment engineering. He currently serves as Engineering Supervisor for the Reliability and Risk Assessment Group of Bechtel Western Power Corp. He previously served as a Senior Engineer for the same Group. App. Aff. (Ashton), Summary of Education and 1 Professional Experience; App. Aff. (Mark), Summary ef Education and Professional Experience. Mr. Ashton and Dr. Mark are each professionally qualified in the areas covered by their affidavits.
825. The three " nonconforming structures" which have not been designed to withstand hurricane missiles are:
- 1. TheroofareaoftheIsolationValveCubicles(IVC),ofwhich there is one for each unit, divided into four compartments that are separated from each other by reinforced concrete walls capable of withstanding the design-basis tornado missiles;
- 2. Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB) HVAC openings l
foreachunit,asdescribedinApp.Aff.(Ashton),A.1,and Wilson, Aff. III, A.1 and Attachment 1.
- 3. Three diesel generator exhaust stack openings.
._ _ -- - . _ . _ . .-- - =__ . . - _ . .-.
t 28 App. Aff. (Ashton), A.1, A.2, A.3.C; Wi.lson, Aff. III (corrected), A.1, A.2.
826. The Board declined to grant suneary disposition of the design aspects of Contention 4 (insofar as it questioned the missile resistance of the three nonconfoming structures) because the record was not clear as to what spectrum of missiles had been used to detemine the It probability of missile strike on the three nonconforming structures.
appeared that a spectrum of design-basis missiles, as set forth in SRP 5 3.5.1.4, had been utilized. We observed that such spectra are appropriate for evaluating the missile resistance of Category I structures but may be unsuitable for calculating the likelihood of missile damage to Category I structures not appropriately designed to withstand missiles. PID-II, supra, Finding 790, 23 NRC at 778; to the same effect, see Wilson, Aff. III, A.4.
827. As explained by the affiants, the spectrum of missiles used in the probabilistic risk assessment'(PRA) of a tornado or hurricane missile strike on the three nonconforming structures was not limited to one of the spectra of design-basis missiles set forth in SRP i 3.'i.1.4.
The Applicants identified three categories of missiles: substantrive l missiles, light missiles, and debris. The Applicants' PRA utilized a
" standard" missile the characteristics of which were based bcth upon the SRP spectrum (including substantive missiles) and upon the results of
' on-site surveys of potential missiles at seven nuclear power plants in ,
various stages of construction and operation, as set forth in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reports NP-768 and NP-769 (Twisdale,
29 g al., " Tornado Missile Risk Analysis" (May 1978)). The objects counted as potential missiles in the EPRI survey included not only construction materials and objects found about the plant sites but also missiles which could originate from failures of structures (both
~
temporary ccnstruction buildings and permanent facilities) not designed
- to wit'hstand tornados. The EPRI spectrum of missiles was broader than the spectrum of design-basis missiles included in SRP i 3.5.1.4.
Missiles t1at could be generated from non-Cateogry I structures (and which are mentioned in the allegations of Contention 4) are included in the spectrum of missiles utilized by the Applicants and Staff. This spectrum included all of the " substantive" and " light" missiles as
~ identified by the Applicants. These potential missiles were grouped into 26 categories, depending on their material and shape. App. Aff.
(Mark, Ashton) A.4; App. Aff. (Mark), A.9; Wilson, Aff. III, A.4, 9.
828. The " standard" missile used in the STP PRA included assumptions about missile density derived from EPRI survey results for a three-unit plant with all units in operation and a one unit operating plant. (The other plants surveyed by EPRI had one or more units under construction and had many construction materials which would not be present on the STP site during plant operation. The Applicants regarded differences in missile density due to continued construction at Unit 2 to be insignificant, since Unit 2 is anticipated to load fuel l' approximataly 18 months after Unit 1 and, during this period, will be undergoing startup testing, not major construction.) To account for i
local variations in missile densities and plant-to-plant differences, l
l l
30 the STP analysis increased the missile density by a factor of approximately 2.5. App.Aff.(Mark,Ashton),A.4; App.Aff.(Mark),
A.6; Wilson, Aff. III, A.5, item 7(b)(corrected).
829. The methodology and assumptions used in the STP probability calculations are sumarized and referenced in App. Aff. (Mark), A.5, and Wilson,Aff.III,A.5(ascorrected). We accept the described methodology and assumptions as adequate for the purposes for which utilized. A number of conservative assumptions, as set forth in Finding 830, were utilized.
830. The Applicants' PRA included the following conservatisms:
- 1. The IVC roof area was assumed to be transparent to missiles--
i.e., open and without missile protection of any kind. In fact, the IVCs will have a roof, although it will blow off as a result of a 2 p.s.i. increase in internal pressure. As described in Finding 832, the steel portions of the roof are
, designed to withstand hurricane, although not tornado, winds.
Although the roof is assumed not to resist the spectrum of
~
missiles utilized in the PRA, it may provide protection against debris.
- 2. A tornado missile strike in the open top of any one IVC compartment represents failure.
- 3. The comparison of the strike probability to the activity release frequency acceptance criteria assumes (a) missile-4 inflicted damage is certain and total, and (b) damage leads
.___._-...___,,.7.._-._.,_.-_,__ __ - - -,.
31 ,
i i
l directly to activity releases in excess of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines.
- 4. The potential missile model assumes (a) a missile density
~ upper limit increased by a factor of 2.5 (see Finding 828);
(b) one half of the potential missiles are distributed up to 20 feet above grade, with the remainde: at grade; and (c) the number of unrestrained potential missiles is conservatively chosen to be 10% of al? potential missiles.
- 5. The tornado frequency is based on a 30-year historical record fitted with a more conservative lognormal distribution having a larger mear. and spread than the empirical distribution.
- 6. Geometric factors that result in further conservatisms are (a) the neglect of sheltering by other structures; (b) the I
failure assumed for a missile strike in any IVC opening (to the extent that no credit is taken for the existence of redundant components or for separation between safety-related trains); and (c) safety-related target areas are less than the IVC open area utilized in the PRA computation.
Wilson, Aff. III A.5 (corrected); App. Aff. (Mark), A.5; App. Aff.
(Ashton, Lindeman III), A.7.
831. Excluded from the spectrum of missiles utilized for the STP PRA was a category of missiles characterized as " debris * (Applicants) or
" light debris" (Staff). These missiles are smaller than the spectrum considered in the EPRI study. (They would include the birds and chickens referenced in PID-II.) The Applicants and Staff excluded these
h 32 4
I missiles from their PRA calculations because they believed that in l l
general they do not have sufficient energy to cause damage of any significance, and that the potential for damage from debris is negligible and other assumptions in the analyses were sufficiently conservative so that.their ultimate conclusions would not be changed.
l App. Aff. (Marks), A.6; App. Aff. (Ashton, Linderman III), A.7(1); ,
i Wilson, Aff. III A.6, A.8, A.10.
' 832. With respect to the IVCs, each of the four compartments j
contains equipment associated with an individual steam generator, including a portion of a main steam and a feedwater line, and the main steam and feedwater isolation valves and main steam safety and relief valves associated with the steam and feedwater lines. The safety-related equipment which could be impacted by a missile is described in detail in App. Aff. (Ashton), A.3.C, and Wilsor, Aff. III,
- A.3 and Attachment 2, at 2. Although the PRA assumed no roof on the IVCs, each IVC compartment has a roof made of 18 gauge steel with a i small portion constructed of reinforced concrete. The steel portions of
~~
the roof will withstand hurricane winds but could be removed by a tornado. If not removed or significantly damaged, the roof will effectively protect the equipment within the IVC from debris (as well as somelightmissiles). In addition, most of the safety-related equipment in the IVCs is located below one or more levels of grating, which will withstand the impact of debris and most light missiles. The only i safety-related equipment in the IVC which could be affected by debris or light missiles are the fans and power supply cables and salve control ,
33 systems associated with the main steam and feedwater isolation and bypass valves and the PORV. Failure of power supply cables or control to any of the valves will result in that valve failing closed (safe position). Failure of the IVC HVAC fans would not affect the ability to shut down the plant safely. App. Aff. (Ashton, Linderman III), A.7.A.
833. The only safety-related equipment which could be struck by a missile entering the MEAS HVAC openings are tornado dampers, on the interior face of each opening. The tornado damper blades are of sufficient strength to withstand debris. Failure of only a small section would not significantly reduce the effectiveness of the large dampers. Debris and light missiles would thus not significantly reduce the effectiveness of the large dampers. But even were the dampers to ,
fall completely, no adverse effects would be expected. The internal walls in the vicinity of the various openings would maintain their structural integrity'in the event of full depressurization (3 psi). No anticipated effects of depressurization on safety-related equipment in the adjoining rooms would adversely affect the ability to shut down the ,
plant safely. App. Aff. (Ashton, Linderman III), A.3.A and 7.B; Wilson, Aff. III. A.10.
834. The only safety-related equipment which could be damaged by a missile striking a DGB exhaust stack opening is the DGF, exhaust stack.
A missile strike in an exhaust stack would only interfere with diesel operation if it resulted in blockage of approximately 40 percent or more of the 32 inch diameter exhaust stack opening. Even in that circumstance, only the diesel associated with that specific exhaust
34 stack would be affected. Only one of the three diesels would be required to snut down the plant safely, in the event of a loss of offsite power (the only occasion when diesels are required to function).
App. Aff. (Ashton, Lindeman III), A.7 C; Wilson, Aff. III, A.10.
835. The Applicants and Staff have not calculated the probability of a release of radiation in excess of the limits in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, assuming a missile strike on a nonconforming structure. They each express the belief that it would be " extremely small" (Applicants) or "de minimis" (Staff), inasmuch as the damage which might reasonably be postulated to result from a missile will not prevent the plant from being shut down safely or prevent successful mitigation of resulting transients and accidents (which are bounded by FSAR analyses). App.
Aff. ( Ashton, Lindeman III), A.11; Wilson, Aff. III, A.11.
836. It would be feasible, although quite costly and ,
time-consuming, to provide missile protection for each of the nonconforming structures. The Staff has expressed the view that the significant expense would be unjustified in light of the low probability of externally generated missiles striking the nonconforming structures.
App. Aff. (Linderman III), A.12; Wilson, Aff. III, A.12.
837. On the basis of Findings 827-36, we conclude that the missile spectrum utiliaed by the Applicants ard Staff for their PRA calculations ,
is adequate and conservative, notwithstanding that it omits debris. We have reasonable assurance that a strike of debris would not likely significantly affect the nonconforming structures and that the lack of inclusion of debris in the missile spectrum used for the probability
-, , , - - - , , _ . - - , . - - , - - - - - .-,-,,-,,km.
35
, calculations is offset by other conservatisms in those calculations, as described in Finding 830.
838. The Applicants have computed the colle tive probability of a missile strike cn the nonconforming structures resulting from a tornado or hurricane-generated missile as approximately 6 X 10-10 per year. The Staff has computed the probability as approximately 5 X 10-9 . App. Aff.
(Mark, Ashton, Linderman III), A.8; Wilson, Aff. III. A.8; see also PID-II., 23 NRC at 652, and Finding 785, id, at 777. Each of these probabilities is orders of magnitude lower than the Staff acceptance criterion of 1 X 10-7 . Taking into account the low likelihood of a strike, the significant conservatisms incorporated into the PRAs, ano the low likelihood of significant damage should a strike occur, we agree with the Applicants and Staff that such protection need not be provided.
C. Conclusion With Respect to Contention 4 839. We conclude, cre the basis of the record as enhanced by the July 14, 1986 submissions of the Applicants and Staff, and our discussion of CCANP's views, that there is no genuine issue as to any ,
material fact concerning the design of STP safety structures to withstand hurricanes and hurricane missiles, and that the Applicants are entitled to a decision on this issue as a matter of law.
__ . . . _ _ _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ , , _ _ . . _ _ _ , . _ . . _ , , _ . , = , _ . . . , . _ _ _ . , _ . . _ _ _ _ , . _ . . _ _ _ . . , _ _ , _ , _ . , _ . . . . _ _
36 II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW f
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and upon consideration of the entire record in this proceeding, the Board makes the following )
conclusions of law, which supplement the conclusions of law reached in I
our earlier Partial Initial Decisions: I
- 1. The risk of a hurricane (or tornado) missile strike on Category i I structures not designed to withstand such missiles (i.e., the IVC roof area, certain MEA 8 HVAC openings, and the diesel exhaust stack openings, as identifiec in Finding 825) is orders of magnitude less than the Staff's acceptance criterion of 1 X 10-7 . The probability of damage from a hurricane (or tornado) missile strike in excess of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines is much lower. Accordingly, the failure of the IVC roof l
< area, the described MEA 8 HVAC openings and diesel exhaust stack openings to meet tha othemise applicable requirements of General Design l Criterion 4 is a de minimis departure from those requirements. On the f I
record before us, thesa nonconforming structuras need not be redesigned to resist hurricane (or tornado) missiles.
- 2. The Applicar.ts are entitled to a decision as a matter of law on CCANP Contention 4.
- 3. Structures, systems and components important'to safety have been adequately designed to withstand hurricanes and hurricane-generated missiles, to the' extent required by General Design Critericn 4 (and taking into account the above conclusions). ,
1 l
l l
37 f
- 4. On the basis only of the contentions considered by us, we have
' reasonable assurance that, if operating licenses are subsequently granted for the STP, the activities authorized thereby can be conducted without endangering the 'nealth or safety of the public tnd that such activities can and will be conducted in compliance with applicable NRC regulations.
ORDER On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Opinion, and the entire record, it is, this 29th day of August, 1986.
ORDERED:
- 1. The Staff's Motion for Leave to File Supplenwntal Affidavit in Response to Licensing Board's Questions Concerning Design of Nonconforming Structures to Withstand Hurricanes and Tornados, dated July 22, 1986, is hereby granted, j l
- 2. The Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of CCANP j Contention 4, dated March 12, 1985, to the extent it relates to the l adequacy of design to withstand hurricane missiles of the IVC roof,
~
certain MEAB HVAC openings and the diesel generator exhaust stack openings, is hereby granted. (Sumary disposition of the other design aspects of the contention was granted in PID-II.)
J
_ _ . _ , _ _ . . _ . - . - _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ~ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - _ _ _
38
- 3. CCAMP Contention 4 to the extent it questions the construction L of safety structures to withstand hurricanes and hurricane missiles, is hereby dismissed.
- 4. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized, upon making the findings on all applicable matters specified in 10 C.F.R. 5 50.57(a), and subject to conditions previously imposed by this Board, to issue to the Applicants Houston Lighting & Power Company, the City of San Antonio, Texas, Central Power and Light Company and the City of Austin, Texas, licenses to authorize fuel loading and low-power operations (up to 5% of rated power) and, upon completion of requisite
. testing (andsubjecttoCommissionreviewpursuantto10C.F.R.
I 2.764(f)), licenses to authorize full-power operation of the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2.
- 5. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. El 2.760, 2.762, 2.764', 2.785, 2.786 and 2.788, and subject to paragraph 4 of this Order, this Partial i
Initial Decision shall become effective ininediately. It will constitute
~~
- t he final action of the Connission forty-five (45) days after the date of its issuance, unless (1) review is sought or conducted pursuant to l
the above-cited Rules of Practice, (2) a stay is obtained pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.788 or (3) the Consission directs that the record be certified to it for final decision. Any party may take an appeal from this Partial Initial Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within ten (10)daysafterserviceofthisDecision. Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within thirty (30) days after
- _ _ _ .- _ _- _ . _ ___.._. _ __- __ -___2 _ ._ _ .. - - _ . - _ _ . . _ . ,
l 39 i
b i
filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staff is the appellant). Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a A
brief in support of, or in opposition to, any such apppal(s).
responding party shall file a single, responsive brief o_nly, regardless of the number of appellants' briefs filed.
Please be advised that, in addition to the appeal and stay remedies mentioned above..the Commission will be conducting an "insnediate effectiveness" review of this and our earlier Partial Initial Decisions pursuantto10C.F.R.I2.764(f)(2). As to timing, that provision states in pertinent part:
(ii) For operating license decisions other than those authorizing only fuel loading and low power testirg consistent with the target schedule set forth below, the parties naty file brief
- comments with the Commission pointing out matters which, in their view, pertain to the insnediate effectiveness issue. To be considered, such cocinents must be received within 10 days of the Board decision. However, the Cossaission may dispense with comments by so advising the parties. No extensive stay shall be issued without giving the affected parties an opportunity to be heard.
(iii) The Commission intends to issue a stay decision within 30 days of receipt of the Licensing Board's decision. The Licensing Board's initial decision will be considered stayed
' pending the Connission's decision insofar as it may authorize i
l i
40 operations other than fuel loading and low power (up to 5 percent of rated power) testing.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 8+ cAE a./
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairytn ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE M f '
. ames C: Lamb
~
A NISTRATIVE JUDGE
$ b j Frederick J. Sh .
ADMINISTRATIVE E Dated at Dethesda, Maryland, this 29th day of August, 1986.
? .
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