ML20199J862

Requests Assistance in Assessing Significance & Acceptability of Licensee Proposed Movement of Spent Fuel Assemblies within Spent Fuel Pool Utilizing Reactor Bldg Auxiliary Hoist in Lieu of Normal Fuel Handling Methods

ML20199J862
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	01/29/1998
From:	Hehl C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Boger B NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9802060053
Download: ML20199J862 (5)

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[<f***Guq kg UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5- :j REGION i 5 4 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRUsstA, PENNSYLVANtA 19406 1415 1

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January 29, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Bruce E. Boger, Ditector Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Charles W. Hehl, Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region 1

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT REGARDING SPENT FUEL MOVEMENT USING THE BUILDING CRANE AT THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR PLANT

Reference:

(1i JAF-SE 97 003,Rev.1, Use of the Reactor Building Crane to Move Irradiated Fuel Assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool (2) RAP 7.1.05E, Rev 1, Transfer of Fuel to Peripheral Spent Fuel Storage Locations in the Spent Fuel Pool Your assistance is requested in assessing the significance and acceptability of the licensee's proposed movement of spent fuel assemblies withia the spent fual pool utilizing the reactor building auxiliary hoist in lieu of the normal fuel handling methods.

Currently the spent fuel pool at the James A. FitzPatrick plant does not contain a sufficient number of empty cells to allow the reactor core to be completely off-loaded during the next refueling outage. To remedy this problam, the licensee plans to install an additional spent fuel rack and utilize spent fuel re cells that are presently inaccessible with the normal fuel servicing equipment. Ther; are 113 spent fuel rack cells on the north, soisth, and east sides of the spent fuel pool that are inaccessible by the main hoist on the refuel bridge.

The licensee prepared a 10 CFR 50,51 nuclear safety evaluation, JAF-SE-97-003, Rev.1, "Use of the Reactor Building Crane to Move Irradiated Fuel Assemblies in the Spent Fuel Poo;," (Reference 1), and irradicted fuel handling procedure, RAP 7.1.0EE, Rev 1, Transfer of Fuel to Peripheral Spent Fuel Storage Locations in the Spent Fuel Pool, (Reference 2), to h demenstrate that irradiated fuel assemblies can be moved within the spent fuel poci to the inaccessible location: using the 1000lb. hoist on the reactor uullding crane.

The proposed spent fuel movement activities have been reviewed by the resident staff and 7 '

their initial findings are discussed in NRC inspection report 50-333/97-007.The issue was determined to be unresolved pending further NRC review. We believe that there are sufficient differences between the normal refueling practices and the proposed method to move spent fuel that the licensee should seek a review of this procedure and its safety implications by NRR.

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o Bruce E. Boger 2 Ar&gringM olease determine if nrior NRC anorovalis reauired for the in:ensee to use the tractor buildina auxiliary hoist to move scent fuel as described, by March 1,1998.

Should NRR determine that prior NRC approval is needed, it is requested that the licensee be promptly informed by the PM. The region would later issue a violation against 50.59 for an inadequate determination based on your written response to the TIA. Otherwise, the region will close the unresolved item and follow the licensee modification under normal inspection effort.

Based on regional review of the safety evaluation and the reactor analyst procedure for the fuel moves, we provide the following for your consideration:

1. Disc:apancies With the Previous Spent Fuel Rerack Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

A previous safety evaluation report (SER), Docket No. 50 333, Amendment No. 55 for a technical specification change which increased the capacity of the spent fuel pool, documented and concurred with the installation of additional spent fuel storage racks. In section 3.3, installation of Racks and Fuel Handling, the staff's evaluation included the statement, "af ter the racks are installed in the pool, the fuel handling procedures m, and around, the pool will be the rame as those procedures that were in effect prior to the proposed modifications." We believe that, had the licensee made it apparent at that time that some cells were inaccessible and different procedures would be utilized to load fuel, the staff would have reviewed this issue. By virtue of the lack of this information, we believ; the staff assumed normal fuel handling procedures were going to be used for filling the racks, utilizing existing refueling service equipment. The licensee should have realized that the peripharal cells were inaccessible at that time so it could bo included as part of their TS chango submittal and the NRC's SER.

2. Structural Differences Between the Reactor Building Crane and the Existing Fuel Handling Equipment Which Permit a Potential Fuel Handling Accident The licensee's safety evaluation (Reference 1) states, rigging of proper length will be installed on the 1000 lb. hoist cable to prevent raising the fuel assembly out of, or to close to, the water surf ace in the srent fuel pool. Normally, by virtue of the physical structure, the spent fuelis prevented from being raised out of the water because of the refuel main hoist / mast design. The reactor building erane has no such structural restrictions.

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Bruce E. Bogs 3 In addition, the safety evaluation (Reference 1) stater, travellimits of the bridp and trolley of the reacter basilding crane extend beyond the wall boundaries of the gent fuel pool. Consequently, there is a remote possibi!4y that a fuel assembly loaded on the 1000 lb. hoist could be pulled against the wall of the spent fuel poolif some form of failure in the control circuit of the crane should occur such that the lateral motion of the bridge or trolley could not be stopped by We remote controls, manned by the crane operator.

The licensee states that this is unlikely and has put into place similar actions taken for refueling bridge mas' metions. Refueling procedures direct the operator to push a system stop button, located on the operator's control console, and turn the bridge raain power disconnect switch off, in the event of a bridge malfunction where the bridge cannot be stopped. For the proposed activity the Fcensee is going to station a separate operator at the reactor building crane disconnect switch, at the far end of the refuel floor, to open the power switch in the event of a problem (Reference 2). While the controls may be adequate, they introduce a second operator into the evolution that originally involved a single fuel handler. Additionally, the design and construction of the refueling platform make it less likely that a bundle will be pulled against (or up)the wall of the spant fuel pool because of the mechanicalinterference of the refueling mast with the wall of the spent fuel pool.

The safety evaluation addresses a different accident scenario than that described in the FSAR, that is, irradiated fuel being out of or close to tae surface of the spent fuel pool. We helieve this is due to the inherent design of the refueling bridge and mast ensuring there is enough shielding above the spent fuel and that the assembly cannot physically travel past the mast structure, thus ensuring adequate shielding.

Moving the spent fuel out of the water is not addressed in the FSAR. However,

v. out the physical restraint provided by the refuel bridae, use of the reactor building hoist may introduce a new accident scenario, thus constituting a USC.

Use of Radio vice Hard Wire Controls for Fuel Movement Safetv Features The safety evaluation (Reference 1) states that a temporary modification w.il be utilized to stop the lift of the 1000 lb. hoist if a tensile load of 800 lb. is reached and wnl preclude any damage to a fuel assembly due to an excessive tension load.

This provides similar protection as the refuel bridge main hit; however, the proposed modification uses radio controlled circuitry vice hard wire controls found in the refueling bridge circuitry. Although these controls may be adequate, the use of radio controlled safety features in the handling of spent fuelis not addressed in the FSA.R.

Installation of An Additional Soent Fuel Storaae Rack Without Prior NRC Anoroval Due to a shortage of storage cell locetions, JAF intends to install an additionst spent fuel storage rack in the spent fuel poolin the near future. However, the use of this new rack will be administratively prohibited until this rack expansion is reviewed and approved by the NRC While we are concerned that the impact of installing an additional rack in the spent fuel pool (i.e. seiimic considerations, impact on the I

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Bruce E. Boger 4 spent fuel poolliner) has not been reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to installation as is typical of other spent fuel pool reacking projects, we think this can be done within the context of 50.59, in addition we have not identified a specific concern why the licensee could not seek approval after installation and prior to use the rack to store fuel.

The DRP contact is Gordon Hunegs, Senior Resident inspector, FitzPatrick (315-342-4907),the NRR contact for this TIA is Dan Dorman, Program Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the ostimated date of completion is March 1,1998.

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, Bruce E. Boger S Distribution w/att:

. C. Hehl, DRP J. Crianjak, DRP J. Wiggins, DRS y L. Nicholson, DRS J. Johnson, DRP, Ril J. Caldwell, DRP, Rill T. Gwynn, DPP, RIV DRP Branch Chiefs G. Hunegs, SRI- FitzPatrick J. Rogge, DRP R. Barkley, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP R. Junod, DiiP Nuclee: Safety information Center (NSIC)

=. PUBLIC Region i Docket Room (w/ concurrences)

DRS File Distribution w/att: (VIA E-MAIL)

8. McCabe, RI EDO Coordinator S. Bajwa, NRR D. Dorman, NRR M. Campion, RI DOCDESK inspection Frogram Branch, NRR (IPAS)

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