ML20199C398
| ML20199C398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1997 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199B255 | List: |
| References | |
| 22S-B-214S-003, 22S-B-214S-003-R00, 22S-B-214S-3, 22S-B-214S-3-R, NUDOCS 9711200006 | |
| Download: ML20199C398 (92) | |
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a ZION CALCULATION COVER SHEET Zion Calculation No.: 22S B 2145 003 DESCRIPTION CODE.: S02 ZION NUCLEAR STATION SYSTEM CODE:
TITLE: _fuhmlion of ContainmtatShtJI for Main Steam Line Brrak (MSLB)
REFERENCE NUMilERS Type Number T 3pe Number
._AEL&' -SED PROJ 09432 838
._b'Dil - ZDE 97-088 _
_DDDR 214 COMPONENT EPN: DOCUMENT NUMBERS:
EPN Comp Type Component Number Doc Type Document Numb.r UFSAR Section 3 P
._ Calculation _Vol 105 REMARKS:
REY. I REVISION APPROVED DATE
~ NO.
O Original Issue g/ g /g gy 4gh
/
En,an.su w PAGE NO.: _L OF ATTACHMENT 9711200006 97110S PDR ADOCK 05000295 P PM
Exhibit C NEP.12 02 Revision 4 COS1510NWEALTil EDISON COS1PANY CALCULATION TITLE PAGE C ALCULATION NO. _225 D 214S.QQ3 PAGE NO.: 2 0F _
@ SAFETY RELATED D REGULATORY RELATED 0 NON. SAFETY RELA FED CALCULATION TITLE: faajyption of Containment Shell for Main Steam Line Break STATION / UNIT: ZION / l&2 SYSTEM ABBREVIATION.
EQUIPh1ENT NO.: in mu PROJECT NO.: ormn 09432 838 REY: 0 STATUS: Approved QA SERIAL NO. OR CilRON NO. N/A DATE:
PREPARED BY: F. Alsabbagh 6 UATE: /0697 REVISION
SUMMARY
- On al Issue Added pages: I to 9 Added for reference only pages: Al to A62 & Bl to B5 ELECTRONIC CALCULATION DATA FILES REVISED: None (Name. ext / size /date/ hour: min / verification method!remarla)
DO ANY ASSUMPTIONS IN TlHS CALCULATION REQUIRE LATER VERIFICATION YES O NO @
REVIEWED BY. A Aldabbagh [. / DATE.IO/P/97 REVIEW MET}l0D: Detailed COMMENTS (C, NC OR Cl): C1 DATE: /@'/7 APPROVED BY: t,N#EgorMar [jf7g
Exhibit C NEPlbQ2 Revision 4 COMMONWEALTil EDISON COMPANY CALCU1ATION REVISION PAGE CALCULATION NO. 22S B 214S 003 PA0E NO.: 3 0F REY: STATUS- QA SERIAL NO. OR CHRON NO. N/A DATE:
PREPARED BY: DATE:
REVISION
SUMMARY
ELECTRONIC CALCULATION DATA FILES REVISED:
(Name ext / size /date/ hour. min / verification method / remarks)
DO ANY ASSUMPTIONS IN1HIS CALCULATION REQUIRE LATER VERIFICATION YES O NO O REVIEWED BY: DATE:
REVIEW METHOD: COMMENTS (C, NC OR Cl):
APPROVED DY: DATE:
REY: STATUS: QA SERIAL NO. OR CHRON NO N/A DATE: _._
PREPARED BY: DATE:
REVISION
SUMMARY
ELECTRONIC CALCULATION DATA FI' ES REVISED:
(Name ext / size /date/ hour: min / verification n. vod/ remarks).
~
DO ANY ASSUMPTIONS IN Tills CALCULATION REQUIRE LATER VERIFICATION YES O NO O REVIEWED BY: DATE:
REVIEW METliOD: COMMENTS (C, NC OR Cl):
APPROVED BY. DATE:
_ ~ .
Exhibit D ;
NEP 12 02 i Revision 4 l COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY CALCULATION TABLE OF CONTENTS PROJECT # 09432 838 CALCULATION NO. 225B2145bO3 REV.No.O PAGE NO. 4 0F DESCRIPTION PAGE NO. SUB PAGE NO.
COVER SitEET 1 TITLE PAGE 2 IGVISION SUbiMARY 3 TABLE 0F CONTENTS 4
- 1. PURPOSE /0BJECTIVE 5
- 2. METil0DOLOGY/ ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 6
- 3. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 7
- 4. DESIGN INPUT 7
- 5. REFERENCES 7
- 6. CALCULATIONS 78
- 7.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS 9 NITACllMENTS:
A. -NDIT ZDE 97 088 A1 A62 B. Pages 49 through 53 of Calculation Vol.105, Job B1 B5 No 3782 for Zion Units 1 & 2.
i ert
. COMMONWEALTH EDISON C@MPANY j CALCULATION NO. 22S D-214S-003 ' l PROJECT NO.09432 838 lPAGE NO 5 REVi$lON NO. l l l l >
PREPARED BY j DATE: //. g, g l REVIEWED BY: //, ATE:
reo.d A p ,, A A6debbe /* /f/9 7 FILE - C Vove(Jeonywessure McD MATHCAD PLus 6 0 s&L PROGRAM No. o3 7.54&6 O f sNL2 (1 SOS 97 )
PURPOSE / OBJECTIVE:
BACKGROUNQ ( From Ref.1 Section 15,1.6.2.7, conclusions)
"The containment response analyses have been performed es part of the SGTP program for Zion Units 1 and 2. The hmiting pressure following a postulated MSLB is 46.33 psig. The limiting LOCA containment peak pressure is 39.24 psig ( see Section 15.6.5.4.2). Thus with respect to containment peak pressure, the containment peak pressure te sponse following a MSLB M&E release will be the limiting DBA. The analyses included both long-term oressure and temperature MSLB transients. As desenbed in the results Section 15.1.6.2.6, all cases resulted in a peak containment pressure less than the containment design hmit of 47 psig. Based on these results, all applicable criteria for SRP 6.2.1.1.A with respect to pressure have been met for Zion Units 1 and 2.
The limiting containment response analysis steam temperature was calculated to be 345.69' F, which evceeds the Zion Station UFSAR Figure 6.21
- Post Accident Environmental Condition for Equipment Design". The Zion Station EQ program is a
- component thermal analysis" based upon wall surface temperature (Reference 10). The EQ thermal analysis performed for Zion resulted in a peak surface temperature of 271.36' F, thus the acceptance criteria (Reference 6) has not been met, This result was evaluated and found to be acceptable by Zion Station EQ (Reference 15)"
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this calculation is to recalculate the maximum strain in the containment liner duu to an "
enveloped surface tamperature of 273' F which is slightly higher than the peak surface temperature of 271.36' F as reported in Reference 1. The other purpose is to address the reported peak Main Steamline Break (MSLB) pressure of 46.33 psig.
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY CALCULATION NO, 22S B 214S-003 l PROJECT NO.09432 838 l PAGE NO 6 REVISION No. 0 l l l l PREPARED BY DATE: /s.3,7) l REVIEWED BY: /;7,[ [ ATE:p FILO C Wowedboncessure MCo MATHCAD PLUS 6 o S&L PROGRAM No. o3 7.s46-6 o / SNL2 (1M8-97 )
METHODOLOGY AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: *
- 1. General During operation, the operating temperature remains at its level for a long period of time. Therefore both the steelliner and the reinforced concrete will be affected by this tr nperature. During an accident, the temperature rise to the accident level takes place in a very short time and lasts for a limited accident time ( under one hour, Seo Figure 15.166 of ref.1 ). Under these conditions the only wall element which is affected by the temperature rise will be the liner. The concrete effects will be very small and limited to only a few inches adjacent to the liner. These effects can be ignored.
The liner temperature rise has two major effects:
a) The rise in temperature willinc: ease the liner strain, and b) The increase in liner strain may affect the amount of pressure induced by the liner on the containment. This effect is valid up to the yield strain level. When the strain is at yield level and below the strain hardening level the pressure on the containment will be governed by the yield stress and the thickness of the liner.
The design basis liner pressure was calculated in ref. 3 based on the assumption that the liner is already yielding therefore, effects due to point b) above are already addressed in the design basis.
Point a) needs to be addressed separately.
- 2. Pressure Comparison of the MSLB maximum pressure to the design basis pressure is made. The fact that the MSLB pressure of 46.33 psig is slightly lower than the design basis pressure of 47 psig results in the validity of existing qualification for the pressure.
' Temperature:
3.
The peak surface temperature of 271.36' F is reported in Reference 1. Based on the UFSAR Section 3.8.1.2.1.5, the design pressure is 47 psig and the design containment temperature is 271* F. Review of Figures 3.8 7 and 3.8-8 of the UFSAR indicates that the design basis surface temperature used to generate these Figures is 234' F. Review of Reference 3 indicates that the liner strains were calculated using ambient temperature of 60' F and accident terr oerature of 250' F. The calculation on pages 1 of 5 through 5 of 5 ( 49 to 53) dated 6/27M8 for Job No. 3782 which is part of Reference 3,is updated in this calculation to envelop the MSLB peak surface temperature of 271.36' F. A temperature of 273' F will be conservatively used to calculate the liner strains, The liner axial strain is acceptable if it meets the Liner Design Criteria described in section 3.8.1.8.1 of the UFSAR.
t
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY CALCULATION NO, 22S B-214S 003 l PROJECT NO,09432 838 l PAGE NO, 7 REVISION NO. 0 l l l l PREPARED BY: 4 DATE: /#. g. 97 l REVIEWED BY: gg G. :
FILt. C wouadLon*< essure i ACD MATHCAD PLus 8 0 S&L PROGRAM No 03 7.546 6 01 sNL2 (1046 97 )
ASSUMPTIONSI ENGINEERING JUDGMENT:
No unverified assumptions are used. All calculation parameters are either obtained from the references or common engineering knewledge.
No engineering judgments are used.
DESIGN INPUT:
- 1. Maximum pressure and peak surface temperature are obtained from Reference 1,
- 2. Liner Design Cnteria is obtained from Reference 2.
- 3. Originalliner strain values are obtained from Reference 3.
REFERENCES:
- 1. DIT No. ZDE 97 088, Dated 9/19/97, issued by Comed (Zion Engineering); Attachment A.
- 2. Zion Station UFSAR Section 3.8.
- 3. Calculation Volume No.105, Job No,3782, for Zion Station Units 1 & 2; Attachment B.
CALCULATIONS:
- 1. The MSLB pressure is 46.33 psig while the design basis pressure is 47 psig as reported in Section 3.8.1.2.1.5 of the UFSAR.
- 2. Upgrade of liner strain level calculation based on the 271.36' F wall temperature.
From Reference 3, the following strains are recorded ( page 49 to 53 dated 6/27/68 of Reference 3) 5 g, , . .s- ,m.---~.- , - --e4- - - - . - . , -, - -w - , - . - _-
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
,, CALCULATION NO. 22S-B-214S-003 l PROJECT NO. 09432-838 l PAGE NO. 8 REVISION NO. 0 l l l l PREPARED BY ,
e DATE: /s.t. j p l REVIEWED BY: //, DATE:
FILE C V9uat2enw5ssure MCD MATHcAD PLUs 6 0 54( PROGRAM No. o3 7.548-6.o / SNL2 ( 1H6-97 )
Wall Hoop Wall Ved! cal . Dome Event ,,,,,,, Strain Strahi Strain Avg. elashc shortening due to DL - 0.00005 -
shrinkage before post tensioning 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 *
. Elastic shortening due to post- 0.00035 0.00016_ 0.00037 tensioning Creep of Concrete 0.00035 0.00016 0.00037 1
Shrinkage after post tensioning 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 Elastic expansion due to pressure 0.00021 0.00010 -0.00019 0.00089 0.00067 0.00095 Calculated strains due to Temp.
nse from ambient of 60' F to the envelop Temp. of 273* F
= 61x10 e(273 - 60) 0.00138 0.00138 0.00138 Total Strain 0.00227 0.00205 ,
0.00233
, All thrt above liner strains are enveloped by the Liner Design Criteria of Section 3.8.1.8.1 of.
the UFSAR which states that the maximum strains in the liner do not exceed 0.0025 in/in.
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- _ _ . - , , _ - - . . ,. ._ y _
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY y
. CALCULATION No. 22S-B 214S-003 l PROJECT NO. 09432-838 l Ptd3E No. 9 (Final)
- REVISION No. 0 l l l l PREPARED BY df 8 Found Anaty DATE: /p, p, cp l REVIEWED BY: //,phg7kDATE'
/0 7
_ A Aldabph FILE: C Wount2mpessure MCD MATHCAD PLUs 6 0 S&L PROGRAM No. 03 7.s48 6 o / SNL2 ( 10-08-97 )
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS:
The LOCA design pressure is t,..ghtly higher than the MSLB pressure reported in Reference 1. The peak maximum surface temperature reported in Reference 1 is 271.36' F.
The liner temperature rise effect on the containment design is detailed in part 1 of the " Methodology and Acesptance Criteria" section. The fact that the MSLB maximum pressure of 16.33 psig is slightly lower than the design basis pressure of 47 psig results in the validity of existing qualification for the pressure.
The liner strains are iecalculated using Reference 3 original calculation and a peak surface temperature of 273* F which is sligh*ly higher than the reported temperature of 271.36' F. The results show that the liner fareins are enveloped by the Uner Design Cnteria of Section 3.8.1.8.1 of the UFSAR, which states that the maximum strains in the liner do not exceed 0.0025 in/in.
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liEP-12-03 kevision o ATTACHMENT E, fJDIT Form, PART 1 COMED NUCLEAR DESIGN INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL OSAFETY RELATED Originating Organization NDIT No. ZDE-97 088 DNON SAFETY-RELATED OComEd (Zion Engineering)
OREGULATORY RELATED DOther (specify) age 1 of M Station Zion Unit (s) 1 & 2 To: Krishnabwamy Design Change Authority No.: N/A Sargent & Lundy System Designation: Containment Subject' Containment Desian Evaluation for LOCA and MSLB Containment Pressure and Temperatt Response Analyses Brian Jelke Desian Enaineer E 9-/f-f.7
- r. :.. .. Poston Aepa*e's Sgaats. -
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CM/: 6.rm i pepian Enaineer M es ss,.:s.
4// t / 'i 7 i
&,,.... po..te, n o.:. ,
Status of Inforr ation: 8 Approved for Use DUnverified OEngineering Judgement Method and Schedule of Venfication for Unverified NDITs:
i Desenption of Information: The purpose of this NDIT is to transmit proposed revisions to the Zion UFSAR for new LOCA and MSLB containment pressure and temperature response analyses. The effect of these new analyses on the containment structural design will be eve'ated by Sargent & Lundy.
The proposed UFSAR revisions are attached. 74 mB wa // : ves t e icy' <3 /src. i s /. .* ,;,
- y . /5. / - f6 ,
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A 1 Page Al of A c.t Purpose of Issuance: For use in evaluating containment design for new accident conditions, Source of Information: Proposed UFSAR update with analyses based on WCAP 14790 Rev.1.
Distnbution: Central File West NDIT File Fife No.:.J,QE 97-088 CHRON No.: N/A
)
Zion Station UFSAR Seetion 15.1.6 New Section
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Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page A2 of A f,E
. _ _. _ _m . _ . . _ _ ._ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ . . . _ . . ... .
ZION STATION UFSAR !
I.
15.1.6-- Main SteamlinE Break fMSLB)Inside Containment' 15.1.6.1L MSLB Mass and Enerov Releases 15.1,6.1.1 Incident Descriotion Steamline ruptures occurring inside a reactor containment structure may result in :
s;gnificant releases of high-energy fluid to the containment environment, possibly resulting in high containment temperatures and pressures. The quantitative nature of the releases following a steamline rupture is dependent upon the many possible configurations of the plant steam system and containment designs as weli as the plant operating conditions, the size of the ' rupture, and the' single failure assumption. The
. postulated break area can have competing effects on blowdown results. Larger break areas will be more likely to result in large amounts of water being entrained in the blowdown. However, larger breaks also result in earlier generation of protective trip signals following the break and a reduction of both the power production by the plant and the amount of high energy fluid available to be released to the containment.
Only the full double-ended rupture (DER) upstream a id downstream of the steamline ,
flow restrictor are considered in this analysis at plant power levels of 102% and 0% of nominal full load power. These cases are the current Zion licensir'g basis related to steamline break mass and energy releases inside containtnent (Reference 6). Note that a DER is defined as a rupture in which the steam pipe is completely severed and the ends of the break displace from each other. All cases were modeled assuming isolation is accomplished by the main steam isolation valves in each intact steamline but no
. . isolation in the faulted steamline.
The Mass & Energy Releases for the hypothetical full double-ended severence of a main steamline are discussed in this section. The mass and energy release data is used as input to the MSLB Containment Respcnse analysis described in Section 15.1.6.2.
Y' 15.1.6.1.2 Inout Parameters and Assumptions
, A total of nine (9) cases of the main steamline M&E break inside containment were analyzed. These cases are described in Section 15.1.6.1.3. All nine (9) cases were analyzed with a 0% steam generator tube plugging level, which is conservative with respect to M&E releases. The important plant conditions and features that were assumed in the analyses are discussed in the following sections.
Calc. No. 22S B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A 15.1 Page A3 of AGI y -s pnev -
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r ZION STAT!ON UFSAR J 15.1.6.1.2.1 - ! Initial Power Level Steamline breaks can be postulated to occur with the plant _in any operating conditioh ranging from hot shutdown to full power. Since the steam generator mass decreases with increasing power level, breaks occurring at lower power levels will generally result in a greator tot $1 mass release to the containment. Howevsr, because 'of increased 1 stored energy in the primary side of the plant,increaseo heat transfer in the steam' !
generators, and additional energy generation in the fuel, the energy release to the ;
containment from breaks postulated to occur during full-power operation may be greater .
than for breaks occurring with the plant in a hot-shutdown condition. Additionally, steam pressure and the dynamic conditions in the steam genera ors change with increasing power und have a significant influence on both the rate of blowdown and the amount of moisture entrained in the fluid leaving the break.
Due to the opposing effects (mass versus energy release) of changing power level on -
steamline break releases, two distinct power levels (full and zero powers) have been investigated for Zion Units 1 and 2. The power levels and steamline break sizes assumed in this analysis are discussed in Section-15.1'.6.1.3.
In general, the plant initial conditions are assumed to be at the nominal value c corresponding to tin initial power for that case, with appropriaL uncertainties included.
Table 15.15 provides the initial values assumed for core power, RCS flow, RCS pressure, RCS vessel average temperature, pressurizer water volume, steam generator water level, and feedwater temperature corresponding to each power level analyzed.
Tables 15.16A and 15.1-6B provide the feedwater flow assumed for each power level analyzed.
15.1 6.1.2.2. Sinole Failure Assumotions The following single failures are postulated single failures for the steamline break mass.
and energy release analysis (discussed in Reference 7).which may significantly affect the containment results. - However, the mass and energy release analysis discussed in
% this section only considers the main steam check valve (MSCV) as a postulated single active failure. For cases in which the MSCV does not fail, the single failure is modeled in the subsequent containment response analysis (Section 15.1.6.2). In addition the
- analysis assumes a consduential failure (see discussion for item a below) ir, steam isolation in the faulted loop, no failure in the steam isolation in the intact loops, and no failure in the feedwater isolation in all loops.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O ;
Attachment A Page A4 of A fo2.
15.1 18
- Cale, No. 22S-B-214S-003 ZION STATI R:v. O Attachment A Page A6 of A 6E
- a. Failure to Completely isolate All the Main Steamlines Both Zion units have a main steamline isolation valve (MSIV) in series with a check valve (MSCV)in each of the four steamlines. On an isolation signal, the MSIV is designed to stop flow only for the forward direction and not in the reverse flow direction.
For the situation in which the MSCV in the f aulted loop f ails (cases 1 through 4), there will be reverse flow in the faulted loop and the MSIV can not be credited to close on an isolation signal. This will create a situation in which the steam generator on the faulted loop cannot be isolated. The contents of this steam generator and any feciwater flow (main and auxiliary feedwater) to it will blow down continually until the feedwater flow is terminated and steam generator dryout occu s. The mass and energy release to containment in this situation will also include the entire steam piping volume downstream of the MSIVs for the other three steam generators, including the steamline header and steam dump piping. The failure of MSIV to close in this situation is therefore considered to be a consequential failure and not a single failure.
For the situation in which there is no failure in the MSCV in the faulted loop (cases 5 through 8) and the break is in between the steam generator and the MSIV, the steam generator on the faulted loop also cannot be isolated and the contents of this steam generator and any feedwater flow (main and auxiliary feedwater) to it will blow down continually until the feedwater flow is terminated and steam generator dryout occurs.
However,in this situation, the M&E release will not include the steamline piping of the intact loops and the steam header volume since these will be isolated by the MSCV.
The MSIV in the faulted loop is not c edited to isolate in these cases.
- b. Failure of the Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV)in the Faulted Loop The FWRV in the feedwater line to the faulted steam generator is assumed to failin the full ope' ption resulting in a higher flow in the faulted loop. The failure of the FWRV to the full-open position is assumed to occur in two (2) seconds af ter the steamline break for both the 102% and 0% power cases. This additional feedwater flow would then be available to feed the break until the feedwater isolation valves (FWlVs) are 1' closed. This analysis assumes a failure in FWRV in the faulted loop for all cases because the FWRVs s,re not safety grade,
- c. Failure of the Steamline Check Valve (MSCV)in the Faulted Loop er r-m -ry The steamline check valve isepassive valahich prevents uncontrolled blowdown from the intact steam generators following a steamline break event. The steamline check valves are located downstream of the MSIVs. As such a failure in steamline check valve in conjunction with the MSIV not being credited to isolate reverse flow in the faulted steam generator will result in substantially higher mass and energy releases to 15.1-19
.- - - --- - - - ~ . .
7 ZION STATION UFSAR !
the containtnent. The MSLB M&E release analysis was performed both with and without .
a failure in the MSCV.
x
- d. ~ _ Auxiliary _Feedwater Runout Protection Failure Failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) runout protection system results in an increased auxiliary feedwater flow rate to the faulted steam generator. The increased ,
- auxiliary feedwater flow rate provides additional steam generator inventory which is available to be released to containment. Additionally, the higher auxiliary flow rate keeps the faulted steam generator pressure high. A higher differential pressure between the faulted steam generator and the containment maximizes the mass and energy release. The auxiliary feedwater flow rate of 100 gpm to each intact loop and a variable auxiliary feedwater flow rate as a function of the steam generator backpressure to the faulted loop was used in the mass and energy release analysis. To maximize the auxiliary feedwater flow to the f aulted loop in the M&E analysis, the steam generator pressure in the faulted loop was assumed to be depressurized to O psig. The variable auxiliary feedwater flow as a function of faulted loop steam generator pressure is given below. The auxiliary feedwater flow rates to both faulted and intact loops were conservatively calculated without crediting auxiliary feedwater system runout protection, and therefore the M&E analysis does not need to consider an AFW runout protection failure.
15.1.6.1.2.3 Loss of Offsite Power fLOOP)
For the circumstance where offsite power is lost, the emergency diesel generators n . (EDGs) are relied upon to supply emergency power to the safeguards equipment, Single failure of one EDG is conservatively assumed to result in failure of one train of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and one train of containment safeguards functions (2 RCFC and 1 CS), in this situation, power will be lost to the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The effect of r ' OOP on the mass and energy releases is the loss of one train, a longer delay until ECCS actuation, and RCP trip. (As discussed below, minimum ECCS flow is assumed for all cases.) The assumption of a trip of all the RCPs ?
% coincident with reactor trip is less limiting than with offsite power available since the mass and energy releases are reduced due to the loss of forced reactor coolant flow, resulting in significantly less primary to secondary heat transfer. Therefore, the M&E analysis generally assumes that offsite power is available. However, a sensitivity case for a LOOP condition was analyzed assuming trip of all RCPs for the mass and energy -
releases to the containment. The containment response analysis for this case also assumed offsite power is lost.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.0
- Attachment A Page A6 of A (o Z.
~15.120
, - - .-, , , , - ~ - - - w -. e , , .-- , -, - w-n -
r-
ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.1.2.4 Main Feedwater System ;
The rapid secondary side depressurization which occurs following a DER in the main steamline results in large amounts of water being added to the steam generators through the main feedwater system. Trip of the main feedwater pumps following a ;
- safety injection signal limits this effect. However, continued feedwater addition is-provided by the condensate booster pumps until feedwater isolation is accomplished via.
the closure of the main feedwater isolation valves.
lThe increased feedwater addition which occurs prior to closing of the f( ! water isolation valves influences the steam generator blowdown in several ways, First, the rapid . :
addition increases the amount of entrained water in large break cases by lowering the bulk quality of the steam exiting the rupture. Secondly, because the water entering the steam generator is initially subcooled, it lowers the steam pressure thereby reducing the flow rate out of the break. As the steam generator pressure decreases, some of the fluid in the feedwater lines downstream of the isolation valves will flash into the steam generators providing additional secondary fluid which may exit out the rupture. Finally, the increased feedwater flow causes an increase in the heat transfer rate from the primary to secondary systems resulting in greater energy being released out the break.
~ Main feedwater was conservatively modeled by assuming sufficient feedwater flow was provided to match the steam flow prior to reactor trip. Af ter reactor trip, the initial increase in feedwater flow (until main feedwater pump trip) is in response to increases in steam flow following initiation of the steamline break. This maximizes the total mass addition prior to main feedwater pump trip. Af ter the main feedwater pump trips, the main feedwater flow was linearly brought to zero in 10 seconds af ter a 2-second delay.
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. . The main feedwater pumps trip on an SI signal. The main feedwater pump trip circuitry at both Zion units is redundant circuitry. As such, the main feedwater pump trip on an Si signal can be credited in the analysis.
J Following the main feedwater pump trip, the feedwater flow is decreased to be equal to the condensate booster pump flow _ The condensate booster pump flow is continued untilit is isolated by closure of the feedwater isolation valves following an Si signal. A 1' total feedwater isolation delay time of 84 seconds was assumed, consisting of 2
_ seconds signal processing delay and 82 seconds feedwater isolation valve closure time.
The feedwater flow assumed in the analysis is summarized in Tables 15.1-6A and 15.1-68.
Caic. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A '
Page A f of A Q
- 15.1-21
ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.1.2.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System Generally, within the first minute following a steamline break, the auxiliary f eedwater (AFW) system will be initiated on any one of several protection system signals. This analysis conservatively assumes that full AFW flow is initiated on an SI signal (within the first 5 seconds of the steamline break event). Addition of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators will increase the secondary mass available for release to containment as well as increase the heat transferred to the secondary fluid. The auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted and intact steam generators is a function of the backpressure in the steam generators. A higher AFW flow rate to the faulted loop steam generator is conservative for the steamline break event; 'herefore, these flows were maximized as a function of backpressure. Conversely, a lower AFW flow rate is conservative for the intact loop steam generators; thus, these flows were minimized as a function of backpressure. The auxiliary feedwater flow rate used in the analysis is given in Table 15.16A and below. The additional auxiliary feedwater system assumptions are also given below.
AFW flow to the intact loops: Constant 100 gpm per steam generator AFW flow to the faulted loops: Varies with faulted loop steam generator pressure as follows:
Faulted SG Pressure fosia) AFW Flow (com) 0 940 100 915 200 891 300 866 400 839 500 813 600 785 700 756 AFW maximum temperature - 120 *F
- AFW purge volume (faulted loop) - 1 ^ Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 AFW delay time - O seconds Rev.O Attachment A Page A6 of A ( C 15.1-22
ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.1.2.5 Steam Generator Reverse Heat Transfer Once the steamhne isolation is complete, those steam generators in the intact steam
-loops become sources of energy which can be transferred to the steam generator with the broken line. This energy transfer occurs via the primary coolant. As the primary system fluid cools, the temperature of the primary coolant flowing in the steam generator tubes drops below the temperature of the secondary fluid in the intact steam generators resulting in energy being returned to the primary coolant. Tt'is energy is then available to be transferred to the faulted steam generator. The effects of reverse steam generator heat transfer are included in the results.
15.1.6.1.2.7 Steam Generator Fluid Mass A maximum initial steam generator mass based on the initial power levelin the faulted ioop steam generator was used in all o' the analyzed cases. The use of a high faulted loop initial steam generator mass maximizes the steam gene:3 tor inventory available for release to containment. Minimum initial steam generator masses in the intact loop steam generators were used in all of the analyzed cases. A teduced initial steam generator mass minimizes the primary heat sink during the initial blowdown for the steam generators on the intact loops and thereby maximizes the primary heat source for the faulted loop. This will maximize the energy release from the faulted loop during the initial part of the event.
15.1.6.1.2.8 Break Flow Model
~
Piping discharge resistances were not included in the calculation of the releases resulting from the steamline ruptures (Moody Curve for an /(//D) = 0 was used).
15.1.6.1.2.9 Steamline Volume Blowdown The contribution to the mass and energy releases from the secondary plant steam piping was included in the mass and energy release calculations. The flow rate was determined using the Moody correlation, the pipe cross-sectional arca, and the initial steam pressure. For steamline break cases with the steamline check valve failure, the unisolable steamline mass is included in the mass exiting the break from the time of steamline isolation until the unisolable mass is completely released to containment. The steam niping volume used in the analysis is 13,205 ft'. For cases with no steamline check valve failure, the unisolable volume is the volume from the faulted steam generator to the check valve. This volume is conservatively assumed to be 1.5 times Calc. No. 225-B-214S-003 Rev.0 15.1 23 Attachment A Page A 9 of A G 2
ZION STATION UFSAR -
the steam piping volume of the faulted steam generator from steam generator to MSIV 1 1which is 1479 I(*
7 1
15.1.6.1.2/10 Main Steamline isolation Steamline isolation in the three intact loops is assumed to terminate the blowdown from those steem generators. A_ delay time of 7 seconds was assumed (2 second signal _ ,
processing,5. seconds valve closure) with full steam flow assumed through the valve during the valve stroke times. The assumption of full steam flow from the intact steam generators for this tirne conservatively accounts for the effects of the unisolable
= steamline volume, which would be released following closure of the main steam isolation ,
valve in each steamline. For the cases with the MSCV failure, the consequential failure of the MSIV will prevent isolation of the steam generator in the faulted loop. For cases Dwith no MSCV failure, the isolation of the steam generator in the faulted loop is notj assumed as to simulate the steamline rupture upstream of the MSIV, between the valve and the steam generator.
15.1.6.1.2.11 Protecthn System Actuations .
- . The protection system functions credited to mitigate the effects of a MSLB accident inside containment include
- reactor trip, ECCS actuation, steamline isolation, and feedwater isolation. The protection system actuatica signals and associated setpoints that were modeled in the analysis are identities;in Tables 15.17A and 15.1-78. The.
setpoints used are conservative values with respect to the Zion plant' specific values
- delineated in the Technical Specifications, 15.1.6.1.2.12- Emeraency Core Coolina System (ECCS)
For a MSLB, the RCS pressure remains above the Si and RHR pumps shutoff head. As
._ such, the ana!ysis conservatively assumed ECCS flow from only one charging (VC)
.w pump. A minimum ECCS flow is conservative as it reduces the boron addition and 1_ maximizes tne return to power resulting from the PCS cooldown. The higher power generation increases heat transfer to the secundary side, maximizing steam flow out of the break.~ The delay time to achieve full ECCS flow was assumed to be 27 seconds.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev. O Attachment A Page A10of A Q 4
'15.124:
ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.1.2.13 Reactor Coolant System Metal Heat Cacacity As the pric,,ary side of the plant cools, the temperature of the reactor coolant drops below the temperature of the reactor coolant piping, the reactor vessel, and the reactor coolant pumps. As this occurs, the heat energy stored in the metal mass is available to be transferred to the steam generator with the broken line. This heat energy stored in the metal mass does not have a major impact on the calculated mass and energy releases. The effects of this RCS metal heat are included in the results using conservative thick metal masses and heat transfer coefficients.
15.1.6.1.2.14 Core Decav Heat Core decay heat generation assumed in calculating the steamline break mass and energy releases is based on the 1979 ANS Decay Heat + 20 model(Reference 8).
15.1.6.1.2.15 Rod Control The rod control system was assumed to be in manual operation for all MSLB Mass and energy release analyses.
15.1.6.1.2.16 Core Reactivity Coefficients
~
Conservative core reactivity coefficir;nts corresponding to end of-cycle conditions, including HZP stuck rod moderator density coefficients, were used to maxirnize the reactivity feedback effects resulting from the steamline break. Use of maximum reactivity feedback results in higher power generation if the reactor returns to critical, thus maximizing heat transfer to the secondary side of the steam generators.
'E -
15.1.6.1.3 Description of Analysis The break flows and enthalpies of the steam release through the steamline break inside containment are calculated with the LOFTRAN , eference 1) computer code. The mass and energy releases are then used as input conditions to the analysis of the containment response to an MSLB (Section 15.1.6.2). The calculated blowdown mass and energy releases include the effects of core power generation, main and auxiliary feedwater additions, engineered safeguards systems, reactor coolant system thick metal heat storage, and reverse steam generator heat transfer.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.0 15.1-25 Attachment A Page All of A GE
Calc. No. 22S.B.214S-003 1
-ZION STATION UFSAR Rev.0
. Attachment A Fage All of A o, t.
- The following MSLB inside containment mass and energy release cases were analyzed:
1.- 4.6 ft' DER at 102% power. The break is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For this case, the single failure assumption is a MSCV.
- 2. 4.6 ft' DER at 0% power. The break is upstream 0f the steamline flow restrictor.
For this case, the single failure assumption is a MSCV.
- 3. 1.4 ft' DER at 102% power. Since the break is downstream of the steamline flow restrictor, the effective break area for this case is 1.4 ft'(flow restrictor area).
The single failure assumption for this case is a MSCV.
- 4. 1.4 ft' DER at 0% power. Since the break is downstream of the steamline flow restrictor, the effective break area for this case is 1.4 ft'(flow restrictor area).
The single failure assumption for this case is a MSCV.
- 5. 4.6 ft' DER at 102% power. The bresh is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For this case, no failure in the M&E analysis wrs assumed.
- 6. 4.6 ft' DER at 0% power. The break is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor.
For this case, r;o failure in the M&E analysis was assumed.
- 7. 1.4 f t' DER at 102% power. Since the break is downstream of the steamline flow restrictor, the effective break area for this case is 1.4 f t' (flow restrictor area).
For this case, no failure in the M&E analysis was assumed.
~
- 8. 1.4 f t' DER at 0% power. Since the break is downstream of the steamline flow restrictor, the effective break area for this case is 1.4 f t* (flow restrictor area).
For this case, no failure in the M&E analysis was assumed.
- 9. A sensitivity case,4.6 ft' DER at 0% power, break upstream of the steamline flow restrictor and f ailure in the steamline check valve, was also analyzed assuming LOOP. Single failure is failure of an EDG.
15.1.6.1.4 Acceptance Criteria The specific criteria applicable to this analysis are related to the assumptions regarding power level, stored energy, the break flow model including entrainment, main and auxiliary feedwater flow, steamline and feedwater isolation, and single failure such that the containment peak pressure and temperature are maximized. These analysis assumptions have been included in this steamline break mass and energy release l
15.126 l
ZlON STATION UFS AR analysis as discussed in Reference 7 and Section 15.1.6.1.2. The tables of mass and energy release for each of the steam!ine break cases are used as input to a containment response calculation to confirm the design parameters of the Zion Units 1 and 2 containment structure. The acceptance criteria associated with the steamline break event resulting in a mass and energy release inside containment is based on an analysis which provides sufficient conservatism to assure that margin to the containment pressure design limit is maintained. In addition, it must be shown that the EQ temperature limits are met to ensure equipment operability.
15.1.6,1.5 Results Using the Reference 7 methodology, the mass and energy release rates were developed to determine the containment pressure and temperature responses for each of the steamline break cases noted in Section 15.1.6.1.3. Tables 15.1-8 and 15.19 provide the sequence of events for typical 102% and 0% power cases (cases 1 and 2).
Tables 15.1 10 and 15.1 11 provide the mass and energy release data for these two wases. Figures 15.1-42 through 15.1-49 show the plant parameter response of these full power and zero power cases The containment pressure and temperature response analysis results are prescnted in section 15.1.6.2. g g g a Q, HT'" g.t-W g g p sbd: da Abd" bCf *Pt" $ "}Pjk suc a.eraa:es 15.1.6.1.6 Conclusions J N U g,c /
pg[
MMdiw,w, /r & MdE 83 *'* g:;f +w+ 1 %
The mass and energy releases from the nine steamline break cases i ified T/ & W " /
previously in Section 15.1.6.1.3 have been analyzed. The assumptions previously +3 dN' "
delineated have been included in the steamline break analysis and the applicable
, Frwu
- '".eUdeo u
acceptance criteria are met. The steam mass and energy releases discussed in this gpfe ,
section provide the basis for the MSLB containment response analysis described in section 15.1.6.2.
15.1.6.2 Main Steamline Break Containment Response Analysis (COCO)
% **'-m as 15.1.6.2.1 Event Definition / Accident Description Steam system piping failures provide paths for the discharge of steam and water from the steam generators into the containment building. The uncontrolled release of high-energy steam and water into the containment will cause the containment temperature, humidity and pressure levels to rise. Sufficiently large discharges of steam and water could pressurize the containment to pressure leuls that challenge the containment pressure design limit.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev. 0 15.1 27 Attachment A Page A!$ of A (pL
ZION STATION UFSAR The 1,1ain Steamline Break Containment Response analysh is performed to demonstrate the acceptability of the containment safeguards systems to mitigate the consequences of a hypothetical rupture of a main steam line pipe, to demonstrate that containment peak pressure remains below the design pressure, and to ensure the environmental quahfication (EO) of equipment to the resultant temperature and pressure excursion. This section details the containment response subsequent to a hypothetical main steamhne break and uses the mass and energy releases described in Saction 15.1.6.1.
15.1.6.2.2 Inout Parameters and Assumptions Numerous design and operational parameters affect the results of the Containment Response Analyses; the more significant parameters are limited by the Technical Specifications. Bounding initial temperatures and pressures for containment response analyses were selected to envelop the limiting conditions for operation. For the analysis of the containment response following a MSLB, the containment model was similar to that used for the Long Term LOCA Containment Response analysis (Section 15.6.5.4.2), with any exceptions discussed below. Table 15.1-12 summarizes the key input parameters.
A series of cases were performed for the MSLB containment response. Section 15.1.6.1 describes the mass and energy released ;o the containment for the MSLB which were used here in the containment response analysis. Section 15.1.6.2.4 lists ,
cases analyzed for the containment response due to a MSLB.
15.1.6.2.2.1 initial Conditions Initial pressure conditions were modeled to maximize both peak pressure and peak temperature containment response transients. Key assumptions in the containment modelinclude the initial conditions for containment pressure and relative humidity. An
_ initial pressure assumption of 15.7 psia (upper Technical Specification limit) was Q modeled to conservatively calculate the maximum containment peak pressure response.
An initial pressure of 13.2 psia (lower Technical Specification limit) was used to maximize the containment response for the peak temperature transient. The initial relative humidity of the containmont atmosphere was specified to be at 20% for the case addressing containment peak pressure. An initial relative humidity of 100% was used for the containment peak temperature case. For all cases a maximum initial containment temnerature of 120 'F was assumed.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page Al{ of A 6t 15.1-28
ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.2.2.2- Sinale Failure Assumptions To avoid unnecessary conservatism, simultaneous failures in the steamline break mass and energy release ana;ysis and containment pressure response analysis were not made for cases 1,2,5 and 6. For cases 3 and 4 multiple failures were rnodeled, that is a failure in the steamline break mass and energy release (failure of steamline check valve) and a failure in the containment analysis (failure of an emergency diesel generator).
For cases 1 and 2, where a failure on the secondarf side is postulated in the mass and energy analysis, full containment safeguards wem modeled in the containment response analysis, consisting of 3 of 3 containment spray pumps (CS) and 4 of 5 reactor containment fan cooler (RCFCs) with no LOOP assumed in the delay times.
Minimum safeguards were addressed for the containment failure cases 5 and 6, and no secondary side failure was assumed. For the containment failure cases, where loss offsite power (LOOP)is addressed, an EDG failure is the limiting failure. The minimum safeguard; equipment amilable in these cases is conservatively assumed to be 2 of 3 CS pumps and 2 of 5 RCFCs.
15.1.6.2.2.3 Pppsive Heat Removal Similar to the LOCA analysis, the heat transfer coefficient to the containment structure is calculated based primarily on the work of Tagami(Reference 9). The Tagami correlation is used for large breaks, where the increased turbulence will cause high heat transfer rates. For the Tagami correlation, the value of the heat transfer coefficient
, increases parabolically to a peak value at the end of steamline isolation (t,) of the intact loops and then decreases exponentially to a stagnant heat transfer coefficient which is a function of the steam to air weight ratio.
Section 15.6.5.4.2.3 of the Long Term LOCA Containment Response (COCO) Analysis describes the passive structural heat sink model which was also used for the MSLB containment response analysis with one exception; a small heat sink was added to the 1~ containment structural heat sink rnodel.
The heat-up (temperature profile) of the small heat sink model will be used to address EO requirements with respect to Appendix B of NUREG-0588, Rev.1 (Reference 10).
The purpose of modeling the small heat sink was to specifically show, via component '
thermal analysis, that the surface temperature of the heat sink will not exceed the EO temperature (271 'F) presented in Figure 6.21. Consistent with Appendix B of NUREG 0588, Rev.1 a condensing heat transfer coefficient equal to 5X Tagami was applied on the small heat sink to calculate the surface temperature heat-up. Table 15.1-13 provides the data for the small heat sink.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214 LOO 3 Rev. 0 15.1 29 Attachment A Page Alf of A 61
-e ZION STATION UFSAR 15.1.6.2.2.4 active Heat Removal For a large MSLB, the engineered safety features are quickly brought into operation.
Operability cf emergency safeguard features (ESF) was based on single failure criteria addre :,od for each specific case. For cases where the limiting single failure is postulated to be on the secondary side (in the steamline mass and energy release analysis), full containment safeguards were modeled: 4 of 5 RCFCs actuate after a 27 second delay from the containment High pressure setpoint, and 3 of 3 CS pumps actuate after a 74.6 second delay from the containment High High pressure setpoint Thts delays are based upon conditions with no loss-of offsite power (LOOP). Note:
These delay times are appropriate for no LOOP only if the High High containment setpoint is reached 214 seconds after the SI signal (which was verified for each of the cases considered here).
For cases assuming the loss of an EDG as the limiting failure (coincident with a LOOP),
2 of 5 fan coolers are modeled to actuate after a 58 second delay from the containment High presst..'e setpoint, and 2 of 3 containment spray pumps were modeled after a 110 second delay from the High-High containment setpoint.
See Section 15.6.5.4.2.3 for a detailed description of the containment fan cooler and containment spray models in COCO. The fan cooler performance data modeled in the MSLB containment response analysis is provided in Table 15.6-23.
15.1.6.2.3 De.Jeriotion of COCO Model The COCO computer code (Reference 11) was used to generate the containment pressure and temperature response to the postulated MSLB. In addition to the description provided in Section 15.6.5.4.2.3 (LOCA Containment Resporne) some elements spec;fic to MSLB analysis are:
- 1) ' The discharge flow separates into steam and water phases at the breakpoint.
The saturated water phase is at the total containment pressure, while the steam phase is at the partial pressure of the steam in the containment. (This point is similar to the blowdown portion of the LOCA analysis.)
- 2) Per Reference 12, the calculation assumes the Tagami condense *. ion heat transfer correlation and 8% condensate revaporization model for full double-ended ruptures consistent with Appendix B of NUREG-0588 Rev.1 (Reference 10).
Calc No. 22S-B 214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page Al(3 of A (.,Z.
15.130
y ZION STATION UFSAR-The COCO code has been benchmarked against the Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor -
Containment (CVTR) tests (Rt ference 13). The CVTR tests were super heated steam.
blowdown tests. The containmant free volume was about one eighth of a typical three loop PWR containment. The blowdown steam enthalpy was 1195 Btullbm, which is ,
about the same as for a postulated steam line break with no rnoicture carry over. The -- 3 COCO calculation showed gaod agreement with the test data when the revaporization rnodel was used. When no ravaporization was assumed, the COCO calculation predicted a much higher temt.orature than the test. in both cases, COCO over.
. predicted the containment atmosphere pressure.
15.1.6.2.4 Deseriotion of' Analysis A series of cases were investigated for the MSLB containment analysis. Section
]
15.1.6.1 documented the M&E basis for eight cases. The eight cases analyzed two power levels Hot Zero Power (HZP), and Hot Full Power (HFP) for breaks upstream and downstream of the flow restrictor. Single failure assumptions of a MSCV or a containment safeguards failure were also addressed. The final set of cases reported in this section contain a subset of the cases in Section 15.1.6.1, which includes those cases that provide the most limiting results.
The following cases for an MSLB inside containment were analyzed. Table 15.1 14 summarizes power, break size, offsite power, and single failure interaction for each Case.
1- . 4.6 ft' DER at 102% power. The break is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For this cacc, the single failure is failure of a MSCV in the M&E release analysis. No failure in the containment response analysis was assumed.
- 2. 4.6 ft: DER at 0% power. The break is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor.
For this case, the single failure is failure of a MSCV in the M&E release analysis.
No failure in the containment response analysis was assun,ed.
1 3. 1.4 f t' DER at 102% power. The break is downstream of the steamline flow
~
-restrictor. The effective break area for this case is 1.4 ft* (flow restrictor area).
For.this case, the single failure is failure of a MSCV in the M&E release analysis.
A singie failure of an EDG was also assumed in the containment response -
analysis. This is a conservative multiple single failure assumption.
- 4.' 1.4 ft* DER at 0% power. The break is downstream of the steamline flow restrictor. The effective break area for this case is 1.4 f t* (flow restrictor area).
For this case, the single failure is failure of a MSCV in the M&E release analysis.
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.0 15.1-31 Attachment A ,
- Page Al} of A & ~2
. . - - - . . - . - . . ~ . - . - . - -. . - - . - . . -- . ~ ~ - . --
7.--.-
>= -
ZION STATION UFSAR.
- w ,
A single failure of an EDG was also assumed in the containment response -
analysis. Tnis is a conservative multiple single failure assumption.
5,L 4.6 ft' DER at 102% power. The break is upstream of the steamline flow -
restrictor. For this case, no failure in the MSCV was assumed. The single failure assumption in the containment response analyses,is failure of an EDG.
- 6. 4.6 ft' DER at 0% power.~ Break is upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For
~
this case, no failure in the steamline check valve was assumed. The single -
failure assumption in the containment response analyses, is failure of an EDG -
Due to the largs break area (4.6 ft' upstream of the flow restrictor), and the long stroke time for the Feedwater isolation valves (84 seconds) at Zion. and the large AFW flow a
- rates provided, the containment peak pressure following a MSLB is more limiting than
- the LOCA peak pressure. (Refer to MSLB M&E release section 15.1.6.i for details pertaining to M&E release assumptions.) Therefore, Cases 1 and 2 will be considered for both peak pressure and temperature. Separate cases were run to maximize each of these results (See Initial Conditions).
- All cases addressed a modified containment spray system reducing the number of containment spray pumps to 1 when/if the containment pressure decreased below 20 psig before the containment spray switchover to recirculation time has been reached (Reference 14, which is based on Emergency Procedure E1, step 4).
15.1.6.2.5 Acceotance Criteria 4 -
The containment response for design-basis containment integrity is an ANS Condition IV event, an infrequent fault. To satisfy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission acceptance -
- criteria presented in the Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.1.1.A for long-term containment esponse,'the relevant requirements are as follows, To satisfy the requirements of GDC 16,38 and 50, the analysis should be based on the 1_* most severe single active failure in the containment heat removal system, or in the secondary side.
In order to satisfp EO limits, the analysis results must be within the EO limits given in
-UFSAR Figure 6.21.
Calc. No. 22S-B 214S-003 a .
- Rev.O Attachment A Page Allof A (,, g.
H 15.1 32 1
-.,e -- . - - , , . + . .,vv yo, ,-y+ .,,._,m, wr-,-,.y.,-m, ---- , -- ,- ,-, , , - ,rg.-- - ,,,
o ZION STATION UFSAR-Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.0-Attachment A-15, .26 Analys.is Results Page Al') of A Gt The assure, steam temperature and water (sump) temperature transients from each of the tv, '.B cases are shown in Figures 15.150 through 15.1-65. Table 15.1 15 lists the calculated containment peak pressure and temperature results for the containment
~
- response analyses. Table 15.1-15 also provides the results for the EO case wall surface heat up for the thermal a. 'ilysis for each respective case. Table 15.1-16 provides the sequence of events for each case. ,
All of these cases show that the containment pressure will remain below design pressure. After the peak pressure is attained, the operation of the safeguards system helps to reduce the containment pressure.
The limiting case with respect to calculated peak containment pressure was the Case 2 run biased for pressure conditions, which produced a peak containment pressure of ,
46.33 p:;iO. Case 2 is the 4.6 ft' DER at 0% power with the break upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For this case, the single failure assumption is failure of a MSCV. No failure in the containment analysis was assumed. The Case 5 run with initial conditions biased to maximize peak temperature resulted in the limiting peak steam temperature of 345.69 'F. Case 5 is the 4.6 ft' DER at 102% power with the break upstream of the steamline flow restrictor. For this case, no failure in the MSCV was ,
assumed. The single failure assumption is failure of an EDG. With respect to Zion Station EO licensing basis, the Case 2 Temperature case for EO is the limiting ccse, with a calculated peak wall surface temperature of 271.36 'F, which exceeds the EO
., . temperature limit by 0.36 degrees. The wall surface temperature heat-up profile is provided in Figure *,5.166.
15.1.6.2.7- Conclusion.s The containment response analyses have been performed as part of the SGTP program for Zion Units 1 and 2. The limiting pressure following a postulated MSLB is 46.33 psig.
The limitintj LOCA containment peak pressure is 39.24 psig (see Section 15.6.5.4.2).
Thus with respect '.o containment peak pressure, the containment peak pressure response following a MSLB M&E release will be the limiting DBA. The analyses included both long-term pressure and temperature MSLB transients. As described in the results Section 15.1.6.2.6, all cases resulted in a peak containment pressure less than the contair. ment design limit of 47 psig. Based on these results, all applicable criteria for SRP 6.2.1.1.A with respect to pressure have been met for Zion Units 1 and 2.
t 15.1 !- 1
t c.
i ZION STATION UFSAR ,
The limiting containment response analysis steam temperature was calculated to be 345.69 'F, which exceeds the Zion Station UFSAR Figure 6.21," Post Accident Environmental Condition for Equipment Design". The Zion Station EO program ~is a
" component thermal analysis" based upon wall surface temperature (Reference 10).
I The EO thermal analysis performed for Zion resulted in a peak surface temperature of 271.36 'F, thus the acceptance criteria (Reference 6) has not been met. This result was <
evaluated by and found to be acceptable by Zion Station EQ (Reference 15).
Calc. No. 22S-B 214S-003 15.1.7 References. Section 15.1 ~ Rev 0
. Attachment A Page A70 of A (, t
- 1. Burnett, T.W.T., et al., "LOFTRAN Code Description," WCAP-7907 P A, April 1984. .
- 2. - Friedland, A.J. and S, Ray, " Revised Thermal Design Procedure," WCAP 11397 P A and WCAP-11398 A, April 1989,
- 3. Friedland, A.J.~ and S. Ray, " Improved THINC IV Modeling for PWR Core Design,"
WCAP 12330 A, September,1991.
- 4. . Moody, F.S., " Transactions of the ASME," Journal of Heat Transfer, Figure 3, Page 134, February 1965.
- 5. - Risher, D.H., Jr.,_"An Evaluation of the Rod Ejection Accident in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors Using Spatial Kinetics Methods," WCAP-7588, Revision 1 A, January 1975.
- 16. Letter from J. J. Harrison of NRC to Cordell Reed of Comed. Transmitting Inspection Report Nos. 50 295/86016 and 50 304/86015, Zion File IR 8616/15, August 7,
. 1986.
s--
- 7. Land, R. E.," Mass and Energy Releases following a Steam Line Rupture", WCAP.
e 8822 (Proprietary) and WCAP 8860 (Nonproprietary), September 1976.
^
- 8. ANSI /ANS 5.1 - 1979,"American National Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light -
- Water Reactors", August 1979.
~
~
- 9. Takashi Tagami," Interim Report on Safety Assessments and Facilities 1 Establishment Project in Japan for Period Ending June 1965", No.1.
10' " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment", NUREG 0588, Rev.1,-July 1981.
~
~(Nonproprietary), June 1974.
12." Zion SGTP Project: MSLB M&E Cases to be Analyzed for Containment Response Plus Heat S!nk Information", NFS:PSA:96-092, December 4, _1996.
4 15.1-34 1 _. . _ . . . . - _ _ _ . _ _ , _- _. - - _. _
o ZION STATION UFSAR C
- 13. Schmitt, R. C., Bingham, G. E., and Norberg, J. A.," Simulated Design Basis Accident Tests of the Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor Containment - Final Repon",
IN 1403, Idaho Nuclear Corporation, December,1970.
- 14. Comed NDIT No. 960096, Rev. No.1, "LOCA Mass and Energy and Containment input Assumptions", October 22,1996.
- 15. Comed Evaluation, EOER-22 96-010/ER #ER9606928,"EO Evaluation of PressureRemperature Increase Inside Containment due to SGTP", December 13, 1996.
1 ""===
Calc. . No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page AU of A (, z.
15.1-35
ZION STATION UFSAR Table 15.15 MSLB M&E Inside Containment Accident Analysis Assumptions Parameters Power Level 102 % 0%
NS$$ Power'", MWt 3270 3270 Core Power, MWt 3315 3250 Reactor Ccolant Pump Heat, MW 20 20 Total Reactor Coolant Thermal Design Flow, gpm 32S,800 328,800 Reactor Coolant Average Temperature, *F 567.7 547 Zero Load Temperature, 'F 547.0 547.0 Pressurizer Pressure, psia 2250 2250 Pressurizer Water Level, % span 44 32.3 Steam Generator Steam Temperature, 'F 507.0 547.0 Steam Generator Steam Pressure, psia 728.0 1020.0 Faulted Steam Generator Water Level, % NRS 54 43 Intact Steam Generators Water Level, % NRS 34 23 Feedwater Temperature, 'F 428.6 100.0 Auxiliary Feedwater Temperature *F 120 120 (a) NSSS Power includes 20 MWt pump heat which conservatively bounds the net RCP
. heat of 12 MWt.
1 Calc. No. 22S-B014S-003 Rev. O Attachment A Page A!Lof A 6?
I
ZION STATION UFSAR Table 15.16A MSLD & M&E Inside Containment Accident Analysis Feedwater Flow Assumptions Feedwater Power Level 102*4 OY.
Faulted Loop Main Initially 102. Increases to 227.3 Initially 17.4. Increases to 227.3 Feedwater Flow"'(% of due to FWRV failure. Rematns due to FWRV failure. Remains loop nominal) constant at 227.3 until MFP trip constant at 227.3 until MFP trip signalis generated by an SI signal. si5nalis generated by an Si signal.
After 2-second signal processing After 2 second signal processing delay, the flow linearly coasts delay, the flow linearly coasts down from 227.3 to zero in 10 down from 227.3 to zero in 10 seconds seconds Intact Loops Main Constant at 102 up to 2 seconds Zero throughout the event Feedwater Flow * (% of then drops to zero in 0.1 second loop nominal)
Faulted Loop Auxiliary Initially zero. Starts to deliver 940 Initially zero. Starts to deliver 940 Feedwater Flow"' gpm on an 51 signal. Remains gpm on an SI signal Remains constant at 940 gpm until constant at 940 gpm until manually terminated in manually terminated in 10 minutes 10 minutes intact Loops Auxiliary Zero initially then starts to dr'iver Zero initially then starts to deliver Feedwater Flow'" 100 gpm on an SI signal. Remains 100 gpm on an 51 signal. Remains constant at 100 gpm until constant at 100 gpm until manually terminated in manually terminated in
~
. 10 minutes 10 minutes Condensate Booster Pump Starts to deliver when the steam Starts to deliver when the steam Flow * (gpm) generator pressure drops below generator pressure drops below the shut off head (500 psia) of the the shut-off head (500 psia) of the pump and MFP started to pump and MFP started to coast coastdown. The pump flow vs down_ The pump flow vs steam steam generator pressure is shown generator pressure is shown in Q in Table 15.16B Table 15.1-6B (a) Depending on the case, the main feedwater pump coastdown starts between 2.6 to 6.2 seconds, (b) Same for allcases.
(c) Depending on the case, the auxiliary feedwater starts to deliver between 0.6 and 4.2 seconds.
(d) The intact loops pressure remains above the condenser booster pump (CDB) shut-off head throughout the event. CDB flow was delivered to the faulted loop only.
Omic. No. 22S-B 214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page AZjof A (,t-l
ZION STATION UFS AR Table 15.16B MSLB M&E Inside Containment Accident Analysis Condenser Booster Pump (CDB) Flow as a Function of Steam Generator Pressure Steam Generator Pressure (psia) CDB Flow (gpm) 15.0 10535.4 49.5 10410.6 100.6 10000.0 250.0 814S.7 380.7 6460.2 401.2 6002.6 422.5 5392.1 444.7 4523.3 467.8 3027.3 500 0.0 Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-005 Rev.O Attachment A
- Page Atpof A 6 t-e
ZION STATION UFSAR Table 15.17A MSLB M&E Inside Containment Accident Analysis Protection System Actuation Signals and Safety Systems Setpoirts Trip Functions Setpoints Delay Time Reactor Trip on Safety Logic Signal 2 seconds Injection (SI) Signal 51 on High Steamline 180 psid 27 seconds Differential Pressure in Two Loops Sl on High Steam Line Flow Flow = See Table 3.6.3-3B St Delay = 27 seconds Coincident with Compensated Pressure = 552 psia Lead / Lag Compensstion =
Low Steam Line Pressure in 10/1.8 Two Loops Steam Line Isolation (SLI) on Flow = See Table 15.1-78 SLI Delay = 7 seconds High Steam Line Flow Pressure = 552 psia Lead / Lag Compensation =
Coincident with Compensated 10/1.8 Low Steam Line Pressure in Two Loops Steam Line Isolation (SLI) on Flow = See Table 15.1-7B 7 seconds High Steam Line Flow Low Low T.., = 535 *F Coincident with Low Low T,,
in Two Loops Feedwater Isolation on SI Logic Signal 84 seconds Signal Main Feedwater Pump Trip Logic Signal Delay = 2 seconds on SI Signal Flow Coastdowns Linearly in 10 seconds Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Logic Signal 0 seconds
-- Actuation on SI Signal Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page Aty of A gg.
4 ZION STATION UFSAR 4
Table 15.17B High Steam Flow Setpoint as a Function of Turbine Load Turbine Load (fraction of nominal) Steam Flow (fraction of nominal) 0.00 0.5600 0.20 0.5600 0.35 0.7420 0.45 0.S436 0.55 0.9330 0.65 1.0150 0.75 1.0900 0.85 1.1600 1.00 1.2600 1.20 1.3S00
~
Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev. O Attachment A Page AS of A G t
'h
ZION STATION UFSAR Table 15,1 S 4.6 f t' MSI.B 102% Power Mass and Energy Releases Break Upstream of Flow Restrictor Sequence of Events Time (sec) Event Description 0.0 Main Stearnline Break Occurs 0.1 High Steam Flow Setpoint Reached in Two loops 2.1 Feedwater Regulating Valve (RVRV) Fail to Full Open Position 2.6 SIS Differential Pressure Setpoint Reached 2.6 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to both !ntact and Faulted Loops 3.1 Low Stearnline Pressure Setpoint Reached in Two Loops 4.6 Rod Motion Occurs (SIS Differential S. tam Pressure which initiates Reactor Trip) 4.6 Mc.in Feedwater Pumps Trip and Start to Coast Down 10.1 Steamline isolation Occurs in Intact Loops 14.6 Main Feedwater Flow Coastdowns to Zero 29.6 ECCS Injection Initiated 86.6 Feedwater (Condensate Booster Flow) Isolation Occurs 156.2 Steam Generator Tube Uncovery in Faulted Loop 602.6 ARV Manual Ternunated 605.2 Mass and Energy Releases Terminate (SG Dryout) f Calc. No. 22S 0 214S 003 Rev.O Attachment A Page Allof A f t 1 *"am.=
ZION STATION UFSAR Table 15.19 4.6 f t'MSLB Hot Zero Power Mass and Energy Releases Dreak Upstream of flow Restrictor Sequence of Events Time (sec) Event Description 0.0 Main Steamline Break Occurs 0.1 High Steam Flow Setpoint Reached in Two loops 1.4 SIS Differential Pressure Setpoint Reached <
2.3 Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Fall to Full Open Position 3,4 Main Feedwater Pumps T.ip and Start to Coast Down 13.4 Main Feedwater Flow Coastdowns to Zero 15.2 Lo Lo Tavg Setpoint Reached in Two Loops 22.2 Steandine Isolation Occur in Intact Loops 28.4 ECCS Injection Initiated 85.4 h water (Condensate Booster Flow) Isolation Occurs 293.2 Steam Generator Tube Uncovery in Faulted Loop 601.5 AFW Manually Terminated 606.2 Mass and Energy Releases Terminate (SG Dryout)
' Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Ftev. 0 Attachment A Page Atl of A 4 L
Calc. No. 22S.B.214S 003 ,
ZION STATION UFSAR A chment A Page A11 of A 6t Table 15.110 Zion Units 1 and 2 4.6 n' MSLB Hot Full Power Mass and Energy '
Releases Time Mass Release Energy Release Integrated Integrated (sec) (!bm/sec) (Blu/see x 10') Mass Energy (lbm x10') (Btu x 10')
0 0 0 0 0 0.2 8940 10.73 1.78S 2.146 0.4 9419 10.51 3.672 4.248 0.6 11403 10.90 5.952 6.428 0.8 12814 11.14 8.515 8.656 1 13133 11.05 11.14 10.87 1.2 13529 11.00 13.85 13.07 1.4 14024 10.99 16.65 15.27 1.6 14627 11.03 19.58 17.47 1.8 14151 10.76 22.41 19.62 2 13615 10.45 25.13 21.71 2.2 13102 10.16 27.75 23.75 2.4 12610 9.877 30.27 25.72 2.6 12144 9.607 32.70 27.64 2.8 11699 9.349 35.04 29.51 3 11276 9.101 37.30 31.33 ,
3.2 10S77 8.869 39.47 33.11 _
3.4 10491 8.639 41.57 34.83 3.6 10126 8.421 43.6 36.52
. 3.8 9785 8.219 45.55 38.16 4 9454 8.018 47.44 39.77 4.2 9146 7.832 49.27 41.33 4.4 8862 7.663 51.05 42.86 4.6 8932 7.908 52.83 44.45 4.8 8675 7.752 54.57 46.00 5 8458 7.636 56.26 47.52 6 7507 7.102 64.13 54.83 7 6779 6.695 71.18 61.68 8 6218 6.385 77.61 68.18 9 5587 6.092 83.49 74.40 10 4970 5.824 88.69 80.32 10.2 4867 5.777 89.66 81.48 10.4 4867 5.846 90.64 82.65 10.6 ~4820 5.790 91.60 83.81 15 3832 4.598 110.6 106.6 20 2696 3.229 126.6 125.8
Calc. No. 220 B.3145 003 ZION STATION UFSAR fttachment A Page A$ of A 6t Table 15.110 Zion Units 1 and 2 4.6 f t' MSLU liot Full Power Mass and Energy (cont.) Releases Time Mass Release Energy Release Integrated Integrated (sec) (lbrn/sec) (Utu/sec x 10') Mass Eng;f (
(lbrn x10') (Utu x 10')
25.2 1859 2.222 138.2 139.7 29.2 1296 1.544 144.3 147.0 29.7 1238 1.475 145.0 147.7 30.2 1228 1.463 145.6 148.5 30.7 1219 1.452 146.2 149.2 40.2 1125 1.339 157.2 162.3 50.2 1095 1.302 168.3 175.5 60.2 1083 1.288 179.2 188.4 70.2 1075 1.279 189.9 201.3 80.2 1070 1.272 200.7 214.0 86.7 1067 1.26S 207.6 222.3 87.2 1069 1.271 208.1 2219 87.7 1095 1.302 208.7 223.5 90.2 1155 1.375 _
211.5 226.9 100.2 1247 1.486 223.7 241.4 110.2 1266 1.509 _ 236.3 256.1 120.2 1269 1.513 249.0 271.5 130.2 126S 1.511 261.6 286.7 140.2 1266 1.509 274.3 301.8 150.2 1264 1.506 287.0 316.8 156.2 1253 1.492 , 294.5 325.9 157.2 1120 1.332 295.6 327.2 160.2 792.7 0.9366 298.4 330.4 168.2 104.0 0.1197 301.1 333.6 169.2 0 0 301.1 333.6 172.2 0 0 301.1 333.6 1' 173.2 124.2 0.1437 301.2 333.8 175.2 242.1 0.1307 301.7 334.3 180.2 104.1 0.1198 302.6 335.3 _
190.2 128.6 0.1481 303.8 336.8 200.2 129.9 0.1496 305.1 338.2 240.2 129.9 0.1496 310.3 344.2 t
265.2 129.8 0.1496 313.6 348.0 603.2 129.8 0.1496 357.5 398.5 604.2 132.3 0.1522 357.6 398.7 605.2 0 0 357.6 398.7 l
. - . _ _ . -- . _ - . . _= . _ _ _ .-
. l l
ZION STATION UFS AR j
- 1 Table 15.1112 ion Units 1 and 2 4.6 f t' MSLB 110t Zero Power Mass and Energy Releases Dreak Upuream of Flow Restrictor Time Mass Release Energy Release Integrated Integrated (sec) (lbm/sec) (Utu/sec x 10') Mass Energy (lbm x10') (Utu x 10')
0 0 0 0 0 0.2 12362 14.75 2.472 2.949 0.4 12978 14.43 5.068 5.836 _
0.6 16326 15.21 8.333 8.878 0.8 19175 15.87 12.17 12.05 1 19752 15.81 16.12 15.21 1.2 20433 15.79 20.21 18.37 1.4 21258 15.82 24.46 21.53 1.6 22321 15.95 28.92 24.72 1.8 22516 15.81 33.42 27.89 2 21694 15.35 37.76 30.96 2.2 _
20832 14.86 41.93 33.93 2.4 20046 14.41 45.94 36.81 2.6 19275 13.97 49.79 39.61 2.8 18531 13.54 53.5 42.32 3 17804 13.13 57.06 44.94 3.2 17111 12.72 60.48 47.49 3.4 16450 12.34 63.77 49.95 3.6 15820 11.97 66.94 52.35 3.8 15218 11.62 69.98 54.67 4 14645 11.28 72.91 56.93 4.2 14100 10.96 75.73 59.12 4.4 13582 10.65 78.45 61.25 4.6 13088 10.36 81.06 63.32 4.8 12617 10.08 83,59 65.33 5 12170 9.808 FoJ2 67.29
~ 6 __
10281 8.671 97.'0T 76.39 1 7 8682 7.751 106.3 84.5 8 7483 7.046 114.2 91.81 9 6596 6.512 121.2 98.52 10 5556 6.003 127 1 104.7 11.6 4542 5.448 134.9 113.8 11.8 4511 5.41 135.8 114.8 15 4024 4.824 149.4 131.1 20 3492 4.184 168.1 153.5 Calc. No. 22S B-214S 003 Rev.O Attachment A Pa0e A3l of A 6 L
O ZlCN STATION UFSAR l
l 4
Table 15.1-11 Zion 11 nits 1 and 2 4.6 f t' M5LB Hot Zero Power Mass and Energy I I
(cont.) Releases Dreak Upstream of Flow Restrictor l
Time Mass Re! case Energy Release Integrated Integrated (sec) (lbrn/sec) (Dtu/sce x 10') Mass Energy j (lbm x10') (Utu x 10')
i 22.2 3332 3.992 175.5 162.4 l 22.7 3332 3.992 177.2 164.4 25.2 2987 3.577 185 173.8 30.2 2360 2.822 198.2 189.6 40.2 1103 1.312 215.1 209.8 42.2 871.9 1.033 217.0 _
212.0 42.7 853.5 1.011 217.5 212.5 43.7 840.6 0.9957 218.3 213.5 50.2 771.4 0.9125 223.5 219.7 ,
60.2 704.4 0.832 230.8 228.4 70.2 667 0.7871 237.7 236.4 80.2 6+1.4 0.7599 244.2 244.1 84.7 636.8 0.7509 247.1 247.5 S5.2 636.0 0.7499 247.4 247.9 85.7 636.1 0.7501 247.7 248.3 90.2 684.9 0.8086 250.7 251.8 100.2 729.2 0.8618 257.9 260.2 110.2 747.4 0.8S36 265.3 269.0 120.2 755.4 0.8932 272.8 277.9
- 127.2 757.2 0.8954 278.1 284.2 129.2 757.3 0.8956 279.6 285.9 130.2 757.3 0.8956 280.3 286.8 132.2 757.2 0.8954 281.9 288.6 140.2 755.8 0.8937 287.9 295.8 150.2 752.5 0.8898 295.5 304.7 170.2 739.4 0.8740 310.4 322.3 k 190.2 210.2 728.4 719.2 0.8608 0.8498
~
325.0 339.5 339.7 356.8 230.2 711.6 0.8406 353.8 373.7 250.2 704.4 0.8319 368.0 390.4 270.2 698.2 0.8245 382.0 406.9 290.2 692.5 0.8177 395.9 423.4 292.2 692.2 0.8173 397.3 425.0 293.2 690.8 0.8155 398.0 425.8 298.2 584.8 0.6882 401.1 429.5 Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A o... st, a s r1
ZION STATION UFSAR
, t Table 15.111 Zion Units I and 2 4.6 f t' MSLU liot Zero Power hiass and Energy (cont.) Releases Break Upstream of Flow Restrictor Time Mass Release Energy Release Integrated Integrated (sec) (lbrn/t ec) (Blu/sec x 10') Mass Energy (lbm x10') (Blu x 10')
310.2 187.0 0.2158 405.6 434.7 314.2 88.35 0.1017 406.0 435.2 315.2 99.60 0.1147 406.1 435.3 317.2 121.6 0.1401 406.3 435.6 ,
321.2 137.1 0.1579 406.9 436.2 l 330.2 130.3 0.1501 40S.1 437.6 f
350.2 130.3 0.1301 410.7 440.6 )
398.2 129.9 0.1497 416.9 447.8 598.2 129.9 0.1496 442.9 477.7 603.2 133.7 0.1538- 443.5 478.5 l 0.0966 443.6 478.6 '
605.2 84.07 606.2 l 0 0 443.6 478.6 Calc. No. 22S.B 214S.003 Rev. 0 Attachment A Page Aof A 6 L 1 % e r,a ,, n-- e-- --- ----s n . , . - - - -- - , . , - - ~ - - - ,-,,-,r
i ZION STATION UFSAR l Table 15.112 MStil Containtnent Response Analysis Parameters initial and floundary Conditions RWST w ster temperature ('F) 100 Initial containment temperature (*F) 120 initial cont,mimerit presswie (psiM Pressure bias cases 15.7 Temperaiure bias cases 13.2 initial relatise humidity (G) Pressure bias cases 20 Temperature bias cases 100 Net free volume (ft') 2.715 x 10' Reactoc Containment fan Coolers Containment high setpoint (psig) 6.0 Total number available 5 hlasimum safeguards 4 Delay tim *; without LOOP (sec) 27.0
$1 nimu.a safeguards (EDO failure) 2 Delay time; with LOOP (see) 58.0 Containment Spray Pumps Containment high high setpoint (psig) 24.8 Total number available 3 blasimum safeguards 3 Delay time, without LOOP (sec) 74.6 hlinim .rEs,ifeguards 2 Delay time, with LOOP (sec) 110 Flow rate (gpm)
Injection phase (per pump) 2599 S.933E Applicability of delay times was verified on a case by case basis with respect to time reaching SI signal, signal delay, and sequencer delay for the cases without LOOP. All but one CS pump was shut off if/when containment pressure decreased below 20 psig (injection phase). Calc. No. 22S B 214S-003 Rev, O Attachment A Page Arf of A (t-
l ZION STATlON UFS AR l e n Table 15.1 13 Additional Containment 11 eat Sink Data for Deternuning Peak Surface Temperature for MStil l'a rameter Surfa:e area. ft 1.0 Thickness, ft 0.020S33 Materal Carbon Steel Thermal Conductivity, Btu /hr.ft*F 26.0 Heat Capacity, Btu /ft'.*F 56 21
~
---- Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev.O Attachmept A Page A B of A G t,
fl
'/.lON STNi1ON UI-Salt Tchte 15.1-14 Containment Response Fo!!owing an MSLIl--Summary of Caws Cese'" Initial Power (%) Dreak Size (It')'" ' M&E Analysis Containment Response M&E Analysis Containment Responw Offsite Power Offsite Power Sing!c Failurt Single Failure i 102 4.6 Available Available MSCV"' None 2 0 4.6 Available Available MSCV None i 3 102 1.4 Available Lost MSCV EDG'"
i 4 0 1.4 Available Lost MSCV EDG , S 102 4.6 Availabic Lost None EDG i l 6 0 4.6 Avaitabt- Lost None EDG Notes: (1) Cases 1 and 2 are analyzed for maximizirg both pressure and temperature. Cases 3 through 6 are analyicd only to numimite temperature. (2) A break upstream of the flow restrictor has an area of 4.6 ft* while a break downstream has an efIcetive area of 1.4 ft'. , (3) Main steam cleet valve:if the MSCV fails, the sicam header am! unisolable stesmlines will blow down. ' (4) F=- - = tWI generator: failure of an EDG is conservatively mmleted (regardless of the availabiliiy of offsite power) as the loss of I CS pump am! 2 RCFCs' i I m>mo . e5 m I "--
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B 5 f, ZION STATION UFSAR Tal:le 15.1 15 Containment Response l'otlowing an Mst,tt-Nunmury of itnults: Peak Prnuire ami Temperature I i t:Q - reak Tweee of 4
- j. % vie of Time of Watt 19 Peak Walt 19 reak Pressere reak Fress. reak Temp. t*cak Temp Pren. Temy. Temp. Temp.
Case (psig) (we) (43 (we) l'altece Aswmp. Ugwee 8 Mgme8 (93 (m) - t - Press. Caw 42.01 863.02 293 59 48.72 sseamtme is.t.50 8 5. t-5 8 261.96 tsi chest wal c I -Tcmp. Case 39.03 162.97 3 I I .6 33 I1 ucamtme 15. t-52 85.I-53 26532 87t l 4 check walw 1 2 - Press. Ca e 46 33 30437 383 3I 3737 ucamtme 15.t.54 85.t.55 269.2 314 stat val.c 2 -Temp. Case 42.9I. 34834 329.52 % t6 sicam!me 15 I 56 I5.I 57 27I36 309 chest watwe i t 3 Temp. Case 40.26 257.84 328 2 199 0 secamtec ' 15.t-5N 15159 26735 274 chesk wat=c am! OX: Im3mc , i 4 - Temp. Ce 38.65 387.76 382.69 6: 68 siemmtme t 5.I-60 t 5.t4I '65.42 399 4 shect valve Il > 3) o .i ami FDG $ $ $ "?. I filme eg" 3,Z yg 3 - Temp. Case 39.26 I58.22 345 61 I53.75 O r, t 5.I 42 15.I 43 262.99 a4 o ' Tmium O -* pa l
*> M l 6 - Temp. Case 3934 290.25 300.49 2240 tDG I5.t-64 15I45 26622 259 9 Isto.c P Y Y $
- i o ,
o 1 2d i 1 i I
i , .s f; , ZION STATION Ul:SAR t L Talife 15.1-16 . Containtnent Response Following an MSI,It-&quence of I' vents
- Time Containnent RCFC CS Time or Peak Time of Peak (EQ) Pressure l
, Actuation Time Actumtion Time of Peak Temperature Watt Temperature < 20 psig -
Case (sec) Time (sec) Pressure (sec) (see) (sec) 1 - Pressure Case - 303 I05.5 163.02 '4I.72. IxI EI3.4 i
! - Tempera ure Case 32.4 124.7 '62.97 33.19 17I 723.6 2 - Pressure Case 29 3 95.0 30437 373' 314 993.5 ;
2 -Temperature Case 30.6 98.8 3GI34 36.16 309 E90.1 l 3 -Temperature Case 62.8 198.E 257.54 199.0 274 112IJ l 4 -Temperature Case 61.5 ISI.6 387.76 61.68 399 I149.2 i '
- 5 -Temperature Case 65.6 195.9 155.22 153.75 iEl 915.5 j 6 - Temperature Cam 62 3 22I.9 290.25 224.0 299 I107.0 ,
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ZION STATION UFS AR rl0N sf(AWLIN( BREAK Wall AND [N(RCY RtL(Asf IN$1CE CONTAINWENT F 1023 Ow f R. .V al P S.T ..R R.E.A e t .l W o wo11af f s.f.R I C 10 R v. 16000 c.> 14000 A w -
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sn - m 12000 co - s 10000 w - n - ct: 8000 w - m . r
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1 0 t t 3 4 10 to 10 to 10 10 TIME (SECONDS) Figure 15.142 4/ OER at 102% Power (Case 1) Mass Release Rate in the Containment Cale, No. 22S B 214S-003 Rev.O At'achment A Page AM of A (, L. l
e
! r I
ZION STATION UFSAR I i. i I
? i Zl0N STEAWLINt BREAK WA55 AND ENERCY RTLIASE INSIDE CoNTAlWWENT .
102 Otn teet,urstatA.u..or y note note rLowvnts1RictoR Time
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' Figure 15.143 ' 4 5 ft' der at 102% Power'(Case 1) Energy Release Rat'e in the Containment t
Calc. No 22S-B 214S-003 } Rev. 0
-r Attachment A -
Page AfD of A (, L-i
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- er vwv +- c se w ww-averty----<t-sm----
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O F ZION STATION UFSAR O 110N $f(AWLIN! 3R(At Wall AWD (N[RCf R(LfA$[ int 80( CONTAINW(NT 10!* O!Ntee,fatAWstee revtied VPS flow R($fRICTOR 0FPresevee ve Time 800 600 m \
\
m - D., v . w 400 cr: o - m W . < w M = (L 200 ~
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0 i e i a s e 10 10 10 10 10 10 TIME (SECON05) Figure 15.144 4.6 ft' DER at 102% Power (Case 1) Faulted Loop Steam Pressure Csic No 22S-D-214S 003 Rev. O Attachment A Page A(lof A (,4
ZION STATION UFSAR riou titAutiwr ent Ar wass Ano turney arttAst :=siot coutAlWW(Ni torspravestaraworrtowassin}ime intest toep si em Pressure v ton 1300 - 1200 -
~,i)on -- .< 7
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10' 1(f 10' id Id ' 10' TIME-(SECONDS) Figure 15.145 4.6 f t' DER at 102% Power (Case 1)lntact Loops Steam Pressere Calc. No. 22S B 214S-003 Rev.O Attachment A Page A'(lof A 6 [
ZION STATION UFSAR Il0N $f(AWLIN( BREAK Will AND [h(RCY R[t[ASE IN$lDE CONTAINW[NT 02 FL 0 W( R. .U.P R l. v.RfR
$ i.R ( A.W. .O E eS tT.O ilm R.IWC T O R 25000
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w 15000 -- M . w - M 10000 w - w _ cc _ m 5000 - . . m - OE _
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***h.m Figure 15.146 4.6 ft' DER at 0% Power (Case 2) Mass Release Rate to the Containment Cale, No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev. O Attachment A Page A1)of A U
ZION STATION UFSAR L 210N $rlAWLlN( BREAK WA$$ AND [N(PCT R[l(A$( INSIDE CONTAINW[NT 02 F R Dt.( R. .U,P y a.l S T R E A.W.i .O.f a .Lr4O.W v .E 314.'.C 10 R to-
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-1 0 1 2 3 4 to 10 10 10 10 10 TIME (SECONDS)
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Figure 15.1-47 4.6 ft' DER at 0% Power (Case 2) Energy Release Rate to the Containment Calc. No. 22S-B-214S-003 Rev, 0 Attachment A Page AWof A 4 L
4 ZION STATION UFSAR e fl0N $1[AWtlN( SRfAK WAS$ AND [N(RCY A(L(AG( IN$10E CONTAINW[NI 05 01R VP i n v i t e d L.S.T,R steem of flow R E A W Pee .,,E$1RICTOR e v. Time 1200 1000
^ _
I 600
- m -
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