ML20198N153

Citizens Awareness Network Contentions.* Submits Stated Contentions Re Yaec License Termination Plan for Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station & Accepts Contentions Advanced by Necnp

ML20198N153
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	01/05/1999
From:	Katz D CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20198N159	List: ML20198N153 ML20198N238 ML20198N269
References
CON-#498-19867 99-754-01-LA-R, 99-754-1-LA-R, LA, NUDOCS 9901060046
Download: ML20198N153 (25)

Text

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[ DOCKETED USNRC ,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

Before the '99 JAN -5 P3 :5I

- ATOMIC SAFETY AND 1.lCENSING BOARD OFF c .

Rui , , di Administrative Judges: ADJUL- ,

g ;F.

Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Dr. Thomas S, Ellman Thomas D. Murphy

. In the Matter of Docket No. 50-029-LA l YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY . ASLBP No. 99-754-01-LA-R (Yankee Nuclear Power Station) l License Termination Plan January 5,1999  ;

. .I CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK'S CONTENTIONS

1. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Memorandum and Order of October 23,1998, CLl 98-21f,3 Fed Reg. 4308-4330, petitioner Citizens r

i . Awareness Network, Inc. (CAN), hereby submits the following contentions regarding the Yankee Atomic Electric Company's (YAEC's) License Termination Plan for the Yankee .

l L Rowe Nuclear Power Station (YRNPS) l In addition, CAN accepts the contentions advanced by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) in this matter; CAN signs on to NECNP's Contentions f

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! and attaches them and includes them as ours.

9901060046 990105 PDR ADOCK 05000029

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A. CAN's identification Of Subject Statter Aspects Of The Proceeding On Amending The Part 50 License For YR To include The Proposed LTP

1. Site release:

The LTP as submitted violates 10 CFR S 20.1101 in that it fails to maintain occupational and public radiation doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and is inadequate to protect the health and safety of our community.' CAN contends that the guideline values ihr soil contamination must be reduced to protect the public health and safety and the environment. In LTP s 2.1, YAEC states that site release criteria is 15 mrem / year above background radiation. However, YAEC's calculations in actuality compute to between 43 and 87m/r per year above background on site. NRC reqairement for 15 1

mrem per year above background posits a family farm with a garden. YAEC's calculations for 15 mrem / year above background require the Family farm to be inhabited no more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> a day by an adult male.

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Although YAEC, NRC StatT and the Commission have stated in their l

234 that YAEC is not required to meet a responses to CAN's request tbr standing l

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" worst case" scenario, CAN is not positing such a case in our community, and the i~

' This contention is supported by the Declaration of Marvin ResnikotT. attached hereto as Exhibit Af6 2

NRC StatT Response to Citizens Awareness Network's Amended Petition to intervene, US NRC ASLB, Docket No 50-029-LA, April 20,1998. pp 7-8

' Yankee Atomic Electric Co Response to Amendments to Petitions to Intersene, US NRC ASt.B. Docket No. 50429-LA, ASLABP No. 98-736-01-LA pp 25-28

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-reactor is located within our community, it is common ibr mothers and young  ;

children to remain at home on their property Ibr 24-hours per day,365 days per -

year. This is also true ihr the elderly in our community, who are frequently .

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' homebound, to remain on site 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day,365 days a year. Both children and  !

the elderly are; in fact, particularly vulnerable to the etTects of radiation exposure -

and this inherent vulnerability must be accounted for in all calculations for  !

A community exposure. In addition, YAEC's model does not account for children l

exposed to ground contamination while playing in the earth or garden outside. It l l

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' does not account for the presence of childbearing-age women and the inevitable i

exposure of unborn' children-both 'of which are common circumstances in our t community. In fact, it does not account health consequences other than cancer. ,

Given the serious and complex consequences of exposure to low-level i

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radiation, cancer incidence, as the sole variable in risk assessment and the limiting l lactor Ibr site remediation, is inetYective, negligent, and unscientith:. It does not account for the exposure of residents through aeration of the soil by plowing and digging. It does n st address the potential uptake of radionuclides by vegetation and subsequent potential thr this pathway of exposure though ingestion and

. inhalation. The LTP.does not address potential exposure for children and the elderly to contamination from well water. The migration of tritium from the ion a

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US NRC Memorandum and Order CLi 98-21, Docket No 50-029-LA October 23,1998 pp 25-26. I 1

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t exchange pit to the Deertield River raises serious concerns about migration of l tritium throughout the groundwater and otT-site. From our understanding of the rule there are in fact no clear guidelines or standards for site remediation. CAN contends that a radiological analysis of the Deerlield River Valley is necessary. j j

My community is sunbring. There are, in fact, serious health problems in l 1

the Deertield River Valley community that must be considered in the remediation l l

of the site. In a health investigation document (February,1997/ drafted by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health's (MDPH), statistical significance was found in Non-Hodgkin's' Lymphoma, near statistical significance in breast cancer, and a four- fold increase in Downs syndrorne. Many case of Multiple Myeloma were found in the DeerGeld River Valley. The only know cause for Multiple Myeloma, as acknowledged by the MDPH, is ionizing radiation.

The BEIR V Report, Health Effects Of Exposure To Low Levels oflonizing Radiation raises concerns about exposure of fetuses in utero. The data implies that "there may be little, if any, threshold for the en'ect when the brain is in its most sensitive stage of development. The risk of this type of injury to the

' licalth Consultation, Cancer Incidence and Down Sy ndrome Pres alence in the Deerfield Riser Valley, Massachusetts, Alassachusetts Department of Pubhc licaith, iluieau of Environmental llcalth Assessment, Community Assessment Unit, Under a Cooperative Agreement with the Agency for Toxic Substances and  ;

Disease Registries, February 1997, Public Comment Release 2/12/97

• Health EtTects of Exposure to Low Levels ofIONIZING RADI ATION, BEIR V, National Academy of l I

- Prest, Washington. DC 19(X) l l

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5 developing embryo must not be overlooked in assessing the health implications of low-level exposure for women of childbearing age."' In addition in BEIR V's recommendations, the Report states that "The carcinogenic and mutagenic effectiseness per Gy of neutrons and other high-l.ET radiations remain constant or may even increase with decreasing dose and dose rate.""; the Repon further states, "The dose-dependent increase in the frequency of mental retardation in prenatally irradiated A-bomb survivors implies the possibility of higher risks to the embryo from low-level irradiation than have been suspected heretofore."" The BEIR V i

Repon then states "Because of the comparatively small magnitude of the average l

irradiation dose to the fetus from diagnostic radiography, which has been estimated as 5-50 mGy, the data imply that the susceptibility to radiation carcinogenisis is relatively rqn during prenatal life."'" The Report further states that "the concordance of the studies of twins with the studies of prenatally irradiated singleton births prompts the tentatise conclusion that susceptibility to the carcinogenic effects of irradiation is high during prenatal life."" Alice Stewart's epidemiological study of twins exposed in utero to 50 millirems of radiation through x-ray found a 50% increase in risk ofleukemia to the prenatally exposed

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l twin.'2 This 50 millirems dose . is within YAEC's, NRC Staft's, and the i Commission's allowable limits. This is an unacceptable risk for my community to bear.

Under :he Final Status Survey Overview, section 3.1, YAEC states that the Total E0'ective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) to the average member of the critical l population groups from residual contamination must be below 15 mrem / year and -

that ALARA principles must be used to reduce the residual levels of radioactivity on-site commensurate with the total risk. CAN believes that the calculatic us YAEC uses to justify limited clean-up would leave this community with a site which has higher levels of radioactivity than allowable under NRC, EPA and State ,

of. Massachusetts standards (maximum site release at 25,15 and 10 mrem /yeer above background, respectively) We beIieve that YAEC's calculations, if accepted, would unnecessarily endanger our community since the calculations are basco .olely on an adult male (Over 200 pounds)" residing" on the site for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per day. We can not believe that the intention of the Commission or the EPA or the J

State of Massachusetts was to allow YAEC to manipulate its figures and undermine the 15 millirems standard. CAN contends that YAEC's calculations for public exposure must be redone to include the exposure of women and children, i

" Stewas A J Webb, and D llewitt,1958 A Sune) of Childhood Malignancies Br Med sournal 1:1495-1508 1

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7 and the elderly or anyone who spends more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per day at home as part of the critied population.

2. Soil remediation"-

Under 4.4.3 in Soil Remediation, YAEC attempts to justify the removal ofless soil based on the benefit gained m the equation of cost versus l

ALARA considerations to meet the 15-mrem / yr. requirement. The licensee uses calculations based on a homogenous concentration v radionuclides (Population) x 5

)

(Initial Dose Rate) x (Mean Life)= Total Collective Dose. The contamination on site is not homogenous. This model does not account for the serious and long standing leaks from the ion exchange pit, which migrated otTsite and contaminated Sherman Pond or other leaks. spills, and dumping of contaminated soil, both documented and undocumented, that comprise the site. Nor does it account for hot particles that contaminated the site from under water cutting of the million curie bame during the Early Component Removal Project.

In addition, YAEC states it will use a mean life of 26 years to bound the actual radionuclide distribution on site. It justilles this on the basis of

Co-60 having a mean life of 8 years and it comprising 75% of the dose. YAEC l attempts a calculation based on 50% Co and 50% Cs . Iloweser Cs-137 has a half-l

j. life of 30 years. YAEC uses this calculation to limit its site remediation because i

8 the costs are higher than the 52,000 per-person-rem value accepted by NRC. Given the health problems in our community, the averaging of halflives of radionuclides or estimating exposure based on a single exposure of one radionuclide rather than i

an assessment factoring the synergist effects of exposure to multiple radionuclides and PCBs" is unscientific and an unreviewed safety issue impacting the health and safety of the Deerfield River community. Nor does YAEC include in its 1

calculations the 500,000 people a year who recreate on the Deerfield, who could in fact traverse the site. l J

In addition, YAEC arbitrarily limits the number of radionuclides calculated i

to limit the clean up of the site. There are other radionuclides with longer half-L lives that may be present on sites that are unaccounted for in YAEC's calculations.

It ' does not address the potential for plutonium or other radionuclides contaminating the site. When YAEC removed the pressure vessel head and sent it

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for analysis to Frank W. Hake Associates on Presidents Island, the head contained -

3% plutonium contamination" This result was surprising and raises concerns about plutonium contamination on site at Rowe. The radionuclides calculated for

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" "This contention is supported by the Declaration of Manin ResnikotT, attached hereto as Exhibit M

" NRC Inspectioa Report No 50-29/98-03, October 1,1998 p 2

" Mancini, A., and Applebaum, R , " Decontamination of Large Components-A l Test Case " presented at American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting. Washington, D C (November 10-14 j 19%).

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l 9 should be expanded to include other potential radionuclide sources of contamination.

Under 4.4.5 YAEC justilies less remediation of the site since further remediation is not proportionate to its costs for soil areas and structural surthces with initial dose levels less than 15 mrem /yr. Ilowever this argument is thulty. Contamination may be greater below the surface as initial and historical surface contamination migrated and accumulated down to groundwater levels.

Contamination in certain test wells increased with depth. Further exploration of these and other wells is warranted. Ilowever the licensee is attempting to justify a lack of thoroughness with a cost-benetit analysis. Ground water contamination of the site and the migration to the Deertield River * ' alley (DRV) are serious issues to us since we will live and sufTer the consequences of what YAEC leaves behind.

Because our community relies on revenue from the tourist trade, we must have  !

surety that the contamination in Sherman Pond and further along the river does not, with certainty, constitute a hazard to the public.

YAEC acknowledges contamination of the river with CO60 and CE 137, as well as with tritium. It maintains that dredging of the river would release more radionuclides in the process; thus, leaving the contamination in the sitt is safer. If it is too dangerous to dredge the Deertield Itiver to clean up the radioactive contamination, then the contamination in the silt poses some threat to the public

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i health and safety, and therefore, YAEC should be required to retain liability for the l contamination it leaves behind. In thet, the corporation should ' remain responsible i for Iluture illness attributed to the continuous 31-year operation of its reactor and CAN also has concerns that the  !

the contamination that it leaves behind.

hydroelectric dam that uses the Deertield River to produce power could, during. l releases of dammed up water, release and aerosolize the radioactive particles in the silt and cause them to be transported down the Deerfield River Valley or be held in 1

the Valley during air inversions that occur over 1/3 of the time '6 This would l l

create other pathways for exposure through inhalation and the uptake of l radior:uclides in the food chain.

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CAN. believes that-an analysis is' warranted, to ascertain the extent of contamination both in the Deerfield River and onsite (for radionuclides having the -

potential to migrate otT site and into the ground water). This analysis should be independent of the utility since YAEC's primary objective appears to entail cost cutting, limitation of the scope of its analysis, and limitation of contaminated soil removal. YAEC's " philosophy"" to limit measurements and investigations of atTected and unalTected areas by averaging readings over a one meter area where contamination is found violates NRC guidelines. CAN contends that YAEC will l l

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Austin, James W, & t.ebourveau, John W. Diffusion in a Deep Riser Valley, Yankee Atomic Electric .j l

Company. YAEC-RD-4 j

[ " NRC Inspection Repon No 50-29/98-03, October 1,1998 p 4  ;

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L l leave behind greater amounts of contaminated soil than would be allowable under ,

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NRC guidelines (if YAEC performed appropriate assessment procedures). YAEC l

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1 should not be allowed to " average" soil samples in a one-meter area.

During the Early Component Removal Project at Rowe, large numbers of l l

" hot" particles'" were released during the underwater cutting of the million curie batlle. Because these " hot" particles contaminated workers (over i10 contaminations)'" and migrated throughout the site, a thorough and independent review of alTected and unalTected areas should be undertaken to ascertain the extent of hot particle contamination on-site and in the surroundings of the YAEC property.

CAN believes that since test wells indicated that contamination increased r

with depth, that further testing is warranted to develop a more accurate picture of on -dte and ofTsite contamination. In addition, CAN contends otT-site independent testing in the community must be undertaken to establish an accurate baseline figure for both naturally occurring background and the atreets of radioactive contamination from bomb testing. This should be accomplished before YAEC's assumptions on which radionuclides are Yankee Rowe Nuclear power station's and which are the DOD's are accepted, since YAEC uses both to justify limited Yankee Atomic Electric Co ALARA Post Job Comments Sheet,93-007, YA 002327, pp 1,3,4,6

" Ibid pp 1-6 i-

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12 soil remediation. Figures relative to bomb test-tall-out must be adjusted for the i years of decay since the test date(s).  ;

1 In NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-03, it states that YAEC will apply "a l

zero Cs-137 background"2" for disturbed soil areas. The report further states "It is expected that this will apply to soil beneath the asphalt in affected areas..,2i CAN 1

requests that this claim, made in the inspection Report, be incorporated into the l LTP for Cs-137 and Co-60 in order to insure that YAEC is committed to following I

this standard.

CAN contends that the site remediation process at Yankee Rowe is an experiment. As noted in the Federal Register / Vol. 63 No. 222, NRC acknowledges that the remediation of Rowe is an untried experiment. The result of i

this experiment could lead to a potential change in the NRC requirements.

"During the two-year interim use period for the dran guidance (DG-4006), NRC plans to continue to refine the screening approach (calculations for screening of concentrations for radionuclides in soil, and screening levels for surface contamination on building surfaces) and to evaluate the extent of conservatism of the results of the DandD code. It may be more appropriate to develop a ditrerent approach for alpha emitters NRC will assess the results of the DandD screening

" NRC Intpection Repon No 50-29/98-03. October 1.1998 p A2-4 l

13 "22 method particularly th'e low screening values tbr alpha emitters. Given the fact that plutonium, an alpha emitter, was thund in the vessel head, CAN believes that a site-specific analysis of long-lived radionuclides is required. The Federal' Register notes that the "DG-0006 clearly encourages the use of site specific dose assessments, whenever needed, and recognizes that the screening ,

values will not be appropriate in all cases "23 In fact in a letter to Jay Thayer, Vice-President of YAEC from Morton .

Fairtile, NRC Project Manager for the Yankee Rowe decommissioning, asks that YAEC allow NRC "to conduct site release research at the Yankee Rowe reactor site. The intent of the NRC is to use (Yankee Rowe) .as tield testing locations for" evaluating and comparing current and proposed site release survey methodologies and proposed statistical analysis of the survey sampling data."24 ]

1 As part of the experiment, the Environmental Survey and Site Assessment l Program (ESSAP) of the Oak Ridge Institute Ihr Science and Education (ORISE) preformed decommissioning inspection activities at Yankee Rowe. In the Summary of a recent NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-03, which included ORISE's lindings, concerns were noted based on the decommissioning inspection: I l

" Ibid.

2 Federal Register / Vol 63, No 222/ WedneWay, November i8,1998/ Notices p 64132

" Ibid

1. 4 Letter from Morton Fairtile to Jay Thayer, August 10,1995 Document u 9809020109,989827,

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"YNPS has not evaluated the scanning sensitivity (1.E. scan MDC) for their field survey instruments. It is recommended that the licensee determine appropriate .. values.. .to demonstrate that an appropriate survey design has been implemented."25 "The determination of soil sampling h> cations is not consistent with the l

guidance contained in NUREG/CR-5849 It is recommended that YNPS follow l

the guidance . . .which states that aner soil samples have been collected and analyzed from locations... systematic samples are collected."2r>

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" Side by Side comparisons of exposure rates measurements continue to indicate a bias between the . measurements preformed by ORISE and the i

... measurements preformed by YNPS."27 l

The same NRC inspection report describes YAEC's process of generating additional readings and diluting evidence of contamination statistically where readings exceed GLV in "unatrected" areas. Rather than investigating the cause or extem " elevated readings, YAEC deals with them through statistical elimination.

Elevated readings in unalTected areas imply a history of undocumented spills, and unrecorded or unexplained movement of contaminated soil, fill, or hot particles.

25 NRC Inspection Repon No 50-29/98-03, October I,1998 p A2-9 2* lbid-27 lbid l'

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15 Since the application of YAEC's " philosophy"2" in site characterization and  :

radiation assessment appears to be on-going, CAN contends that the LTP must be reviewed and altered so that detailed safeguards are implemented that can withstand YAEC's - negligent " philosophy" and create radiation assessment -

procedures that can adequately discover the presence of contamination so that

- etTective remediation of the site is possible.

1 CAN contends that the LTP must be redone to include greater detail of the

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methodologies employed by YAEC to determine the levels of soil contamination l and to incorporate the concerns raised by ORISE; that YAEC evaluate the scan sensitivity for its tield survey instruments, that YAEC collect and evaluate systematically soil samples for alTected and unatTected areas and meet NRC requirements, that YAEC correct the bias in its measurements to comply ALARA requirements and the limits of 15 m/ rem per year,

3. NRC Oversight and abdication of authoritv 2->

The proposed site release plan for YRNPS does not adequately describe YAEC's planned decommissioning activities or its controls and limits on procedures and equipment, in violation of 10 C.F.R. s 50.82 (b)

NRC statT asserts that concerns with accidents, leaks, problems with dry casks, or with the transfer of fuel from the fuel pool to dry cask 2" Ibid p 4

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/ 16-p l storage are the responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE). However, -l

! under NRC regulations, the agency is responsible Ibr the GTCC waste and any ALARA considerations that could result in the unnecessary exposure of workers during transfer and casking of this waste and other irradiated waste in the fuel pool. In section 1.4 YAEC acknowledges that there are 21 canisters of GTCC L waste (at least a million curies) stored in the irradiated fuel pool. This GTCC L waste will require transfer out of the pool. Although there is no current disposition  ;

for the GTCC waste, the LTP does not retlect this. In tact, it assumes that the DOE L will initiate a " pilot project" with YAEC and dispose of the waste in the Nevada i

i Test site. However this " pilot project" is opposed by the state of Nevada and is ,

according to Yankee Vice President William E Riethie " . dead". .and t' caught up  :

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.in the politics" of approving a spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain.""

In addition in section 1.4, YAEC assumes all spent fuel and GTCC will be A i shipped to the DOE in 2018, therefore YAEC is acknowledging that the GTCC may remain on site till 2018. The GTCC will remain NRC responsibility until it is [

transferred from the site. The ion exchange pit remains installed until the removal  ;

j' - of the irradiated fuel and the banle. The removal of the pool and the pit are part of i-decommissioning and the LTP. YAEC addresses both the removal of the ion exchange pit and the pool in both its decommissioning plan and its LTP. In fact the

""This contention is suppor'ed by the Declaration of David Lochbaum, attached hereto as Exhibit 2 "

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17 removal of the pool is an experiment and raises serious ALARA and health and safety issues for workers, the public, and the environment.

The NRC statY and YAEC violated the' National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the creation of the ISFSI under a Pan 72 license.

By pennitting YAEC to dry cask its fuel, potentially remove its fuel pool, and create an ISFSI under a Pan 50 license rather than requiring YAEC to enter a Pan 72 License, NRC statT is not interpreting or applying its regulations adequately and violating the National Environmental Policy Act. In section 1.4 YAEC asserts it will operate a dry cask storage facility under a part 50 license. All fuel will be transferred to the SFP when the dry cask storage facility is completed. The fuel will remain on site for at least 20 years.

All issues related to cask handling and leaking casks remain under the purview of NRC. The removal of the pool is pan of decommissioning since the leaking of the casks containing the GTCC waste remains NRC's responsibility.

4. Security YAEC in section 1.4 states its intention to remain in a Part 50 license to create and oversee an ISFSI. Pan 50 was designed for operating reactors

• The Recorder. Greenfield. MA May 9.1997 No 110 pp I,16 4

18 in which a highly trained and skilled workforce exists and where there is adequate l regulatory oversight with resident inspectors and routine and regular inspections to i

oversee reactor operations. Under Part 72 environmental assessments are required since it is understood that regulatory oversight is curtailed aller the installation of the ISFSt. The LTP does not detail how the licensee intends to protect the public from access to the ISFSI. 'It does not address the establishment of operational l l

restrictions to meet ALARA for radioactive materials in ellluents and direct radiation levels. It does not establish a control area or establish how the licensee  !

intends to protect the public from exposures above 25 mrem to the whole body,75 )

l mrem to the thyroid, and 25 mrem to any other organ. There are no references in the LTP to security of the site or the potential thr a terrorist attack on the ISFSt l

. Therefore surveillance measures for the site are inadequate.

.Under s i A of the LTP, May 1997 YAEC stat - that (although a final decision has not been made on long term storage method), it intends to diy cask its waste. It entered into an agreement with NAC to design multi-purpose canisters, and certitication of dry cask storage is under way. The

- fuel will be transferred with the GTCC waste to a concrete pad. liowever, the

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transfer of YAEC's fuel and the potential removal of its fuel pool, create serious

' health and safety concerns that will occur befbre the completion of the LTP. The choices concerning the interim disposition of the storage of fuel on site will occur 4

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19 in the absence of any public mersight or input unless the ASLAB decides that the public has a right and the agency has a responsibility to provide adequate oversight. .

5. Monetary Security CAN contends that a cost sensitivity analysis is required. By permitting YAEC to create and operate an ISFSI under a Part 50 license YAEC is relieved of the responsibilities for environmental assessments required under Part

72. It is also relieved of the monetary requirement that insures adequate oversight of the ISFSI. Over a 20-year period this requirement of $243,000 per year in oversight revenue amounts (without considering lost interest) to $4,860,000.00 in (present value) revenues lost to the agency. Under 6.3, Decommissioning Funding, YAEC does not provide the cost estimates ihr going into a Part 72 license to create an ISFSI as opposed to remaining under a Part 50 license. YAEC also does not, under " Estimates of Remaining Decommissioning Costs, section 6, provide any comparison in cost estimates between leaving fuel in the pool until the DOE takes possession ofit and the cost of removal of the irradiated fuel from the pool into dry cask storage and removal of the pool itself.

In addition, YAEC's estimates ihr decommissioning are in fact misleading and raise serious questions concerning YAEC's ability to pay for adequate and o a

20 effective remediation of the site. YAEC's estimate of $365 million for decommissioning does not include 535 mill, i ibr site remediation or the $86 million for the installation of the ISFSI. If all estimated costs are added up.

YAEC will require at least a half a billion dollars (5486 million and counting) to create a "greenlield" at Rowe, and even this "greenfield" will be contaminated. In addition YAEC's LTP does not account for the delays in the DOE taking responsibility for the irradiated fuel. Also, the DOE has refused to accept YAEC's greater than class C waste (GTCC) for burial at the Nevada Test Site, leaving YAEC without a solution for the remediation of the GTCC waste. Babysitting all the waste adds up.

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6. Waste Issues The NRC statT violated the National Environmental Policy  !

- ' Act by failing to piepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement ibr the clean up of the site.

CAN contends that an EIS is required due to the existence of  :

both documented and undocumented contamination on the Yankee Rowe site.

The study is necessary to determine the sources, extent and the potential for plumes of contamination (including tritium) under the surface of the soil if the site

" NRC Memorandum from Jahr. W N Hickey, to Seymour 11 weiss, PDR ADOCK 05000029, 9802270178,980212, p 3.

" "This contention is supported by the Declaration of Marvin ResnikotT, attached hereto as Exhibit Prt5

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is to be released for unrestricted use. CAN believe the EIS is necessary given the l L controversial and experimental nature of the project, and the fact that this is the l

tirst decommissioning under the new regulations. Many of these regulations  ;

i remain in "drail form". See footnote on letter from Morton Fairtile to Jay Thayer.

Under 2.4.7 YAEC acknowledges two separate teaching I 1

tields septic solids from the systems serving these fields have been documented to contain low levels of radioactivity. A specific EIS is required to investigate ground water contamination that interfaced with septic systems and the waste water systems since contamination and its sources are likely to be more pervasive than what had been determined in the testing of the septic leach tield. YAEC's investigation appears to be limited to surface contamination rather than a root cause tracking of sources of ground water contamination.

7. Investination ofIllecal llandline of Rad Waste'3 Since an undocumented number of incidents involving soil l 1

contamination have occurred evidenced by the tritium leak under 2.4.5 l

l Groundwater and the radioactive till under 2.4.8 Southeast Construction Fill Area, increased scrutiny of the site should occur to determine the extent of

" "This contention is supported by the Declaration of Manin Resnikotr. attached hereto as Exhibit kti November 16.1959 j l

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22 undocumented leaks and spills. to identify any and all plumes that may exist in the sub soil.-

Descriptions in the LTP appear to describe what would be the illegal handling of radioactive waste in the form of till, including illegal moving and dumping of undocumented radioactive till on the Yankee Rowe site. Such moving and dumping would be illegal. YAEC neither had nor has a license to dump contaminated till on its site. An investigation is required of any instances of waste products being moved and dumped onsite without the use of authorized packaging and/or in the course of authorized shipment of radioactive waste.

Under LTP y 2.4.8 " Southeast Construction Fill Area," YAEC acknowledges that excavated 011 from the Radiation Control Area was dumped in this area. YAEC, however, has no records of the dumping. They had a permit to move fill. YAEC claims that ad!" it found was Cs-137, and attempts to attribute this to radioactive fall out from bomb testing Since YAEC had poor radiological control record, and radioactive Gil was not permitted to be dumped on site, a f thorough environmental assessment is required to determine the extent of j undocumented contamination to protect the health and safety of the public if site is to be released for unrestricted use. Other radionuclides may have decayed out (Co-60 half live 5.5 years), Cesium may be a " foot print" for reactor I

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. j 23 contamination, and indicate the need for a large-scale investigation of ground water contamination and underground contamination.

Moreover, esen if the till was not contaminated, movement of fill may implicate the National Environmental Policy Act, and require a site-specilic EA or EIS be conducted concerning the disposition of the tilled area (s). Issues of drainage, nature of area tilled (e.g. wet lands, animal habitat, etc.) need to be taken into account in making a decision as to whether the area can be led as is.

Depending on the nature and extent of the moving and dumping oflill, it may well be necessary to conduct such environmental studies before site release can be permitted, as remediation of the tilled area couid be required.

8. Waste Contamination Investination Ground 3. vater. Soil. and River Sediment Contamination Although there was a substantial tritium leak (and potentially other radionuclides) from the ion exchange pit in which at least 200 curies of tritium leaked into the ground water in the 1960's, no investigation to determine the potential for a plume of tritium to exist sub surf ace of the ground has been undertaken. The extent (breadth, depth and direction) of a tritium plume has never been assessed notwithstanding existence of a plume is more than like. It is acknowledged that there is residual tritium contamination on site in certain test wells. An investigation must be undertaken to determine an accurate 1

24 environmental impact assessment of the plume and a description of the method used to determine the plume should be clearly identified.

At LTP s 2.4.5. under " Groundwater," seven (7) wells were found to contain tritium. The highest concentration measured was 8,000 pCi/1.

This concentration of tritium is present after approximately 25 years. Tritium has a half-life of 12.5 years. It is likely this means that at the time of the leak the concentrations of tritium were over 20,000 pCi/l. As 20,000 pCi/l is above EPA limits, and raises legitimate concerns that there a wide dispersal along ground water pathways occurred. Many of ground water pathways empty into the Deertield River beyond the site boundary. Such pathways exist in addition to the tritium contamination, which was found to have migrated to Sherman Pond.

Ilence, the LTP should call for investigation of the historic tritium migration pathway to reconstruct the nature and extent of this contamination, and ascertain the existence and extent of any plume of radioactive contamination, which may exist under some large portion of the reactor site.

In table 2-5, the samp!ing done to determine the Radiological Analysis of Sediment does not include tritium. The licensee acknowledges in its 1

Decommissioning Plan that tritium contamination reached the ground water and was identified in Sherman Pond. Sampling lbr tritium contamination in Sediment must be done. Tritium was Ibund in test wells. It is essential that a comparison of

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test wells of YAEC's site and other sites near by be initiated to provide a reference for YAEC's claims for bomb fallout and background.

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Conclusion:

For the foregoing reasons oflaw, regulations, and liict, CAN believes that our contentions should be accepted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and i

a hearing should be held in the community.

Respectfully Submitted, MAa23 /&w Deborah B Katz, pro se hCAN.

Box 3023 l

Charlemont, MA 01339 l

l 413-339-5781 i

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