ML20198N174
| ML20198N174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1999 |
| From: | Block J NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198N186 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#199-19865 99-754-01-LA-R, 99-754-1-LA-R, LA, NUDOCS 9901060050 | |
| Download: ML20198N174 (43) | |
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q ;u v a h[O 00CHETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USHRC
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the
?) JAN -5 P3 :46 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD k
Administrative Judges:
Og, c 7 m
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman ADJil 4 WF Dr. Thomas S. Elleman Thomas D. Murphy In the Matter of Docket No. 50-029-LA YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY ASLBP No. 99-754-01-LA-R (Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
License Termination Plan Served: January 2,1999
~ NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S CONTENTIONS r
Pursuant to Orders of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC]
(October 23, 1998), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board [ASLB] (November 30, 1998), and NRC regulations governing intervention and the filing of contentions at 10 CFR Part 2, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution [NECNP] hereby submits contentions conceming Yankee Atomic Electric Company's [YAEC's] License Termination Plan [LTP] in the above captioned proceeding.
Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, Senior Associate at Radioactive Waste Management Associates, assisted in the preparation of the Contentions and has reviewel them. See Declaration ofDr. Marvin Resnikoff at 13 (December 31,1998), a copy of which accompanies the Contentions. Dr.
Resnikoff states in his declaration that the technical facts presented in the contentions are
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true and correct to the best of his knowledge, and the conclusions drawn from those facts are based upon his best professionaljudgment. Id.
Contention A. YAEC's LTP Does Not Adeaustely Characterize the Site.
Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82, the site characterization data.and methodology YAEC employs in its LTP for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Rowe, Massachusetts [ Yankee Rowe] is not adequate.
In pertinent part, YAEC cannot demonstrate that the LTP will assure the level of protection of public health and safety which the NRC regulations mandate.10 CFR 50.82(a)(9), (10), (11).
Basis:
NRC regulations require, in pertinent part, that YAEC's LTP include a site characterization, identification of remaining dismantlement activities, plans for site remediation, detailed plans for the final radiation survey, a description of the end use of the site, if restricted, an updated site-specific estimate of remaining decommissioning costs, and a supplement to the environmental report, pursuant to 51.53, describing any new information or significant environmental change associated with the licensee's L
proposed termination activities.10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii)(A)-(G). YAEC's LTP must also demonsgate that the remainder of decommissioning activities to be implemented under the plan "will be performed in accordance with NRC regulations, will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, and will not
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e have a significant effect on the quality of the environment." 10 CFR 50.82(aX10).
Contrary to the requirements of {50.82, YAEC employs site characterization t
methodology and presents data in the LTP which are insufficient to demonstrate that the public health and safety will be protected, in the following respects:
1.
YAEC has not detailed the distribution of radionuclides in off-site locations 1
and has not surveyed off-site locations to the same precision as on-site locations; 2.
YAEC cannot show that on-site locations have direct y exposure rates s 5 micro-Roentgens per hour ( R/h) above background; 3.
YAEC has not shown that direct y exposure rates of 5 R/h above background are protective; 4.
YAEC has not shown that direct y exposure rates at I meter above ground are protective; 5.
YAEC has not characterized the full extent of on-site subsurface i
contamination, and 6.
YAEC has ::ot detected all a-emitters likely to be present at the Yankee Rowe site.
Discussion of the above listed issues:
1.
Background radiation In order to determine the contribution of YR nuclear reactor operations to the radioactivity remaining on-site, it is important that YAEC precisely determine the 3
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background radiation levels.
As YAEC must subtract background radiation from radiation readings at the site, the issue of the actual level of background radiation in westem Massachusetts is significant. "Because the background levels will be subtracted from total radiation or radioactivity levels to determine the net residual activity from licensed operations, it is necessary that backgrounds be determined with a. detection sensitivity and accuracy at least equivalent to data from which it will be subtracted."'
Background at YR site has been much higher than the 67 mrem / year background at j
Williamstown, Massachusetts.' It is also higher than at other neighboring properties.'
See Table 1, Appendix to Contentions at APP-1. YAEC maintains, without proof, that j
the high background at the site is due to bomb fallout, specifically cesium-137.4 NECNP contends that YAEC must compare site survey readings to the background radiation levels of neighboring properties in order to arrive at an accurate determination of background radiation. In addition, YAEC must identify gli potential radionuclide contaminants at the site', the relative ratios of these nuclides, and the general extent of contamination. With a ratio of radionuclides, YAEC can evaluate off-site readings and
- compare these to on-site readings. As YAEC readily admits, however, it has not yet J.D. Berger, Manual for Conducting Radiological Surveys in Support of License Termination, NUREG/CR-5849 at 2.6. (June 1992).
R.A. Mellor,YAEC, Response to informal request for information (August 15,1996) at Id.
YAEC, " Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, January-December 1995,"
(April 1996) at Table 5.3.
YAEC, LTP at 2-3.
NUREG/CR-5849 at 2.7.
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y determined background levels.'
2.
On-site direct gamma According to the LTP, YAEC has not yet conducted a complete survey of the YAEC site.
7 Preliminarily, YAEC has taken 400 surface soil samples and detected cesium-137, J
cobalt-60 and silver-108m. NECNP maintains that YAEC needs to conduct a complete I
i survey of the entire site to determine the presence and location of higher than background radiation readings. YAEC has also conducted in situ gamma spec measurements using a j
collimated beam "to reduce on-site background radiation levels."' While these surveys, using a high purity germanium detector, are useful for identifying local areas with higher than background y-emitting radionuclides', NECNP contends that direct gamma readings above background, with a non-shielded detector, are appropriate for determining the L
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likely direct y radiation expocaes to future on-site residents.
In any case, survey i
readings above background cannot be determined unless background is determined.
3.
Direct y exposure rates of 5 R/h are not protective.
Under the LTP's Final Status Smvey Plan [FSSP, located in the Appendix to the o
LTP)), YAEC proposes to locate areas with direct gamma readings greater than 5 R/h l
above natural background.' NECNP contends that this exposure rate is not protective of l
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.YAEC, LTP at 2-4.
l id.
Id.
A.M. Huffert, et al., Background as a Residual Radioactivity Criterion for Decommissioning, NUREG-1501, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1994.
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YAEC, LTP at A-7.
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3 the public health and safety, and will not maintain the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to less than 15 mr/y.
In a " worst case" scenario, if an adult spent 100% of the time outdoors, the camma dose alone would be approximately 37 mrem / year. Other pathways would also contribute.
However, other, non-worst case, scenarios are also possible and credible. A child or care provider might spend nearly 100% time at the site (NUREG-1500 and 5512 scenarios assume an adult male is away 24.7% of the tiene"). The NRC staff (in NUREG 551.2) assume an indoor shielding factor of 0.33.12 A full-time resident, spending time indoors and outdoors, would receive a direct gamma dose of 17 mrem / year; other pathways would also contribute. Thus, for a full-time resident, the TEDE would exceed 15 mrem / year, under the YAEC survey methodology. A dose rate of 5 R/h greater than background is only protective under a residential scenario in which an adult male spends 55% of the time indoors,20% outdoors and 1% gardening. This restricted scenario for direct exposure level, together with other pathways, will maintain TEDE below 15 mrem / year for a hynothetical adult male, according to NUREG-1500, using the DandD Compare generally M.C. Daly, et al, U.S. NRC, " Working Draft Regulatory Guide on Release Criteria for Decommissioning," NUREG-1500 (August 1994) and W.E. Kennedy and D.L. Strenge, Residual Radioactive Contaminationfrom Decommissioning, NUREG/CR-5512, vol. I at 6.36 (October 1992) with Eckerman, K.F., et al, " Health Risks from Low-Level Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides, Federal Guideline Report No.13," EPA,1998 [FRG
- 13], Appendix to Contentions at APP-3 and 4. Table 6.23, NUREG/CR-5512, shows 200 days indoors,70.83 days outdoors,4.17 days in the garden, out of a total 365.25 days in a year. The remaining time,24.7%, is spent away. Regarding the biased use of an adult male standard, one has to compare the ingestion / inhalation rates for an adult male, which are those in NUREG/CR-l 5512, to those for a child which appear in FGR #13, to see how much greater will be a child's exposure (and that of many women, and, generally, all smaller individuals).
W.E. Kennedy and D.L. Strenge, ResidualRadioactive Contaminationfrom Decommission-6 l
software. Yet, a person, such as a child, stay-at-home parent, or home bound individual, would receive a direct gamma dose greater than 15 mr/y. These are likely and credible (not worst case) scemuios.
Failure to iniplement NRC radiation protection standards in a way that equally protects children, women, other small persons, home-bound persons, and persons who may be closer to the ground due to a handicopped condition (e.g., wheelchair bound individuals)is arbitrary, capricious, and a violation of the mandates of the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.S.C.
2011 et seg. (protecting health and safety of all members of the public),
the Administrative Procedure Act,5 U.S.C.
501 et. seg. (barring federal agencies from taking actions which are arbitrary, capricious, abuse discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law), and the Americans with Disabilities Act,42 U.S.C. Q12101 et seq.
(barring discrimination against persons with disabilities). It also violates the provision of the United States Constitution, Amendment V, insofar as it has been interpreted as assuring that agencies of the federal government must apply laws (and regulations) to equally protect similarly situated persons. "[A] law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in operation." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.12,17, n.11 (1956).
Moreover, under the Constitution's protections, people have protected fundamental rights to engage in family life and raising children. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley,482, U.S. 78. 96 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.1 (1967).
Just as the State may not interfere in the exercise of such fundamental rights, the federal ing, NUREG/CR-5512, vol. I at 6.36 (October 1992).
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government may not do so either, nor may it protect only some persons' exercise of such
. right over other similarly situated persons. The NRC's utilization of an adult male tolerance standard for radiation exposure needlessly, arbitrarily, and irrationally exposes children, women, handicapped persons, and other persons to radiation exposures greater than permitted under 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E. Congress cannot empower an agency of the federal govemment to deny citizens equal protection of the laws and regulations of the United States. U.S. Const., Amend V.
Thus, the NRC cannot have discretion to interpret its regulations in a way that affects such a denial. Id. Moreover, such a denial is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of such discretion, and otherwise repugnant to law. Id.
(Amend. V also protects against such gross due process infringement as occurs with an equal protection vioaltion).
4.
Direct y exposure rates at 1 meter above ground will not protect children and other persons.
The standard method of taking radiation surveys, at height of 1 meter above ground, will not protect children. If the dose is due to direct gamma radiation from contaminated land surfaces (groundshine), the direct gamma dose is higher for children than for an adult. That is, a direct gamma dose of 5 R/h at 1 m above ground provides a higher dose for children. This due to the fact that children (and women, and short persons, and many handicapped individuals) are smaller and closer to the radiation source than are adult males. " Limited calculations indicate that the dose to organs of the body 8
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from extemal radiation increases with decreasing body size." This means that children and small adults will receive higher doses than adult males. If YAEC takes radiation measurements at a 1 m height,' NECNP contends that YAEC needs to evaluate the likely radiation dose to a child and consider this infonnation in determining release criteria for the site. ~ NECNP realleges and incorporates by reference herein the legal points raised supra at A.3.
5.
On-site subsurface contamination not characterized.
YAEC has not estimated the full extent of subsurface contamination on the site.
Meter surveys over the site cannot determine the contamination depth. YAEC needs to take core samples, particularly near the Potentially Contaminated Area (PCA), a warehouse used for storage of low-level waste prior to shipment," and the decon pad (which is located in the decon room).is The few preliminary borings YAEC has taken near the PCA warehouse show concentrations of cobalt.-60 and cesium-137 increasing with depth. See Table 2, Appendix to Contentions at APP-2. This means that YAEC has never determined the full extent of soil contamination on the site, and, therefore, cannot accurately determine the full costs for remediating the site. NECNP contends that the YAEC site characterization must determine the full extent of subsurface contamination for the following reasons: i) The computer model DandD, employed in NUREG-1500,
" K.F. Eckerman, et al, " Health Risks from Low-Level Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides, Federal Guideline Report No.13," (EPA 1998) at 88; see also chart from this report, Appendix to Contentions at APP-3 and 4 (" Age-and gender-specific usage rates of environmental media, for selected ages").
" YAEC, Yankee Rowe Final Safety Analysis Report at 252-1.
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J requires as input a total radioactive inventory in order to determine the full extent of ground water contamination; ii) The guidance values YAEC is employing assume no residual radioactivity below 15 cm in soil; NUREG-1500 cautions: " Licensees using these tables should verify that the assumptions of the scenarios are appropriate to the site, including no residual radioactivity below 15 cm in soil."
6.
YAEC has not detected all a-emitters likely to be present at Yankee Rowe.
YAEC has not detected all a-emitters likely to be present at the Yankee Rowe site.
In ordered to maintain the total effective dose equivalents (TEDE) less than 15 mr/y, all radioactive materials, including a-emitters, must be determined. When ingested or inhaled, a-emitters contribute to the TEDE. YAEC is not surveying for a-emitters, such as plutonium isotopes and americium-241. NECNP contends that YAEC should take soil samples and specifically, measure for gross a. Funher, YAEC should conduct an a-spec for all a-emitters on soil samples YAEC takes from over the entire 2000-acre site. A study has revealed that a-emitters, such as plutonium-241, have been detected in Yankee a
Rowe piping" and are, therefore, likely to be present elsewhere on the site.
Additional bases:
7.
YAEC's designation of afected versus non-afected areas of the site is arbitrary.
" LTP, Fig. 2-3.
NUREG-1500 at 17.
" A. Mancini and R. Applebaum, " Decontamination of Large Components - Test Case," paper presented at ANS Winter Meeting, Washington, D.C. (November 10-14,1996).
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Since the number of soil samples and the survey it. tensity is much lower in non-afTected areas of the site (as few as 30 soil samples and 10% scans), major areas of the site may be contaminated above regulatory limits, and YAEC would not detect this condition. Thus, YAEC cannot, therefore, provide the requisite assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected.
According to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, Combined Inspection Reports 50-29/98-01 and 50-29/98-02, conducted January 1,1998-March 31, 1998 (June 24,1998), YAEC reclassified an area from affected to non-affected. YAEC never supported the basis for this reclassification, and it appears to be arbitrary. According to the Inspection Report:
The Northeast Buffers Zone was initially classified as unaffected based on no documented use ofradioactive materials in this area and that it was not used for site operations or decontamination activities.
However, because the characterization data were limited and based on one sample (of nine) exhibiting Co-60 contamination at levels greater than 25% of guideline, the decision was made on 3/5/97 to reclassify the area as affected. Four months later, this decision was reversed with the reasoning being that the threshold for classification as affected is an individual sample exceeding 75% of guideline.
Since this threshold was not met, the survey area was again reclassified as unaffected.
Id at 9. This arbitrary flip-flop of classification indicates that YAEC's sampling is either inadequate, not based on consistent methodology, or both.
" That is to say, the TEDE, calculated as whole body dose plus ingested and inhaled committed doses, may be greater than 15 mrem / year.
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8.
YAEC has averaged out high soil concentrations of radiation.
Rather than investigating the cause of high soil concentrations, YAEC takes the occurrence as reason to take more samples until the average of all samples is below guideline values. "When a reading exceeds the Guideline Value, especWy for an unaffecteJ area, the licensee should investigate to -determme the cause of the instrument reading rather than simply take additional measurements and average the value over a one-taeter area." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, Inspection Report 50-29/98-03, conducted Junel-July 31,1998, at 4 (Cct.1,1998). YAEC's philosophy is not consistent with the guidance in NUREG/CR-5949, which specifies that averaging or systematic samples are collected after soil samples have been collected and analyzed from locations identified by scans. The survey methodology, with which YAEC's method is inconsistent, is shown in Fig. 4-4, NUREG/CR-5949.
9.
YAEC's scan surveys are consistently biased toward low readings.
Side-by-side comparisons between YAEC's energy compensated Geiger Mueller
[GM] detector with Oak Ridge's much more precise Pressurized Ionization Chamber [PIC' showed-a low bias by 10% to 20%. NRC Inspcction Report 50-29/98-03 at A2-8. YAEC employed a conversion factor to correct GM rates. Id Neither YAEC nor NRC inspectors have identified the basis for this discrepancy in measurements. Id 10.
YAEC has not evaluated scanning sensitivity for field survey instruments.
Following NUREG/CR-5849, the minimum detectable concentration for survey instruments should be determined. NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-03 at A2-4.
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q According to the NRC, YAEC has not yet done so. Id. at A2-5. YAEC has conducted a site survey using a sodium iodide detector. Id YAEC has, likewise, not determined the sensitivity of this instrument. Id at A2-4.
Contention B. YAEC's LTP Contains Unreviewed Safety Ouestions Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and 50.82, YAEC has not carried out safety evaluations for unreviewed safety questions involved in the remaining dismantlement activities.
.Bagig a
According to NRC regulations, the LTP must include, in pertinent part,
" identification of remaining dismantlement activities." 10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii). The NRC can only approve the LTP if it demonstrates that "the remainder of decommissioning activities...will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public." 10 CFR 50.82(a)(10). For the reasons stated below, NECNP contends that YAEC has not made the necessary showing and, hence, the Commission cannot approve the remaining dismantlement activities.
Further, the remaining dismantlement activities involve unreviewed safety questions that YAEC must evaluate pursuant la 10 CFR 50.59,50.82 and/or Part 72.
According to YAEC's LTP, the remaining activities include removal of all spent
. fuel and GTCC waste from the spent fuel pool and dismantlement of the SFP and its 13
I supporting systems. One storage alternative which YAEC poses in the LTP is the storage of spent fuel in an on-site dry cask storage facility.20 The location of the ISFSI is not specified in the LTP.
Following removal of spent fuel, the ISFSI will be decommissioned. Following clean-up and a final status survey, the site will be returned to a " green field" condition. If Yankee Rowe is considered an " operating" reactor, under the Part 50 license, unreviewed safety questions must be considered under 50.59. If Yankee Rowe is considered a " decommissioned" reactor, irradiated fuel safety issues must be considered under 50.82 or Part 72.
YAEC must consider the following unreviewed safety issues:
1)
Heavy objects falling into the spent fuel pool; 2)
A tornado strike damaging the spent fuel pool; 3)
Sabotage of the spent fuel pc,ol; 4)
Down-sizing of qualified nuclear personnel.
Discussion of above listed bases:
1)
YAEC has not evaluated the safety of moving very heavy objects near the fuel pool. Under the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Technical Specification 3.2 lists the maximum cask weight that can be moved into the fuel pool as 75 tons.2 But proposed transportation casks, or inner canisters and transfer casks, can exceed 125 tons.
YAEC, LTP at 3-1.
Id at 3-4.
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YAEC, FSAR at 100-3 (amended in 1998 to a 75 ton rating).
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Thus, movement of irradiated fuel [IF] from the storage pool into the NAC-MPC cask is not bounded by the present analysis.
NECNP contends that this is an unreviewed safety question that necessitates a revision to the present FSAR. As the quotation below confirms, YAEC is in apparent agreement, yet the analysis has not yet been canied out. According to YAEC:
Movement of fuel from the Spent Fuel Pit to either an on-site or off-site fuel storage facility is not bounded by this analysis. A separate safety analysis is needed to ensure that there are no unacceptable consequences during movement from the Spent Fuel Pit. This analysis must also include any interactions between fuel movement and decommissioning activities.
The analgsis will be completed before movement of fuel out of the Spent Fuel Pit.
Issues that must be considered include, but are not limited to, the crane capacity.
Accident scenarios should include a 125-ton cask drop directly into the fuel pool, as well as an indirect drop into the fuel pool, where the cask first strikes the edge of the pool.
2)
With removal of surrounding structures, the IF pool becomes vulnerable to a strike by a tornado-generated missile or sabotage. NECNP contends that the fuel pool structure must be fortified by either a concrete structure or earth-mounded berm to withstand a tornado-generated missile or anti-tank missile. This scenario becomes a greater danger as YAEC continues to downsize qualified security and other personnel.
The IF pool building is a mere butler shell, that is, a steel-braced frame and metal sheeting.23 %e structure is easily penetrated by a tomado-generated missile, either a car or a solid metal cylinder.
22 Id at 408-1.
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3)
With removal of surrounding stmetures, the IF pool becomes vulnerable to a car rolling down the hill into the IF pool building, either accidentally or as a malevolent i
act. The IF pool building and the proposed ISFSI are also subject to attack with an anti-tank penetrator, such as a MILAN or TOW 2 missile. NECNP contends that either the IF pool building or the ISFSI must be protected by an earth-mounded berm. The TOW 2 anti-tank missile can penetrate greater than 27 inches of armor and has an effective range of 3.75 km; the MILAN anti-tank missile can penetrate more than 39 inches of armor and has an effective range up to 2 km.24 Each cask holds a large radioactive inventory that could be dispersed into the Deerfield River by a sabotage event.
.NECNP contends that, in addition to sabotage by anti-tank missiles, the IF pool 1
must be ' rotected from rolling vehicles. While utilities running nuclear reactors under 10 p
CFR Part 50 must protect such operating reactors from moving vehicles that might contain explosives, it is not clear the same protections extend to decommissioned
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reactors. NECNP contends that such requirements should apply to decommissioned reactors. NECNP also contends that the roads leading to the plant should be altered so that it is physically impossible for a moving vehicle to approach the IF pool building (and any ISFSI constructed on site).
4)
YAEC's LTP should discuss the potential health and safety effects of downsizing qualified nuclear personnel. As fewer and fewer fully qualified persons are 2'
Id at 246-1 R. Halstead, ad R. Ballard, " Nuclear Waste Transportation Security and Safety Issues; The 24 Risk of Terrorism and Sabotage Against Repository Shipments," Nevada Agency for Nuclear 16 c
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employed in the process of achieving license termination and final site survey, YAEC L
p takes a greater and greater risk that there will not be adequately experienced and qualified persons on hand to respond immediately to an accident, leak, or spill. Such absent persons would be experienced in, e.g., security, emergency response to nuclear accident situations, and radiation protection issues unique to emergency response to radiation-type accidents.
An additional point:
NECNP contends that the Panel should make a specific finding about when NECNP (and/or any other interested persons) will be permitted to address the issue of the YAEC's LTP proposed use of dry storage- (a) as an unreviewed safety issue for an
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- operating reactor under 10 CFR 50.59; (b) as a safety issue for a decommissioned-reactor under 10 CFR 50.82; (c) as a safety issue for a day storage facility under Part 72; or (d) in whatever way it may be addressed. If the Hearing Panel chooses to either not l
address the issue or believes that it -has been excluded from the proceeding by-Commission order, NECNP requests that the matter be submitted to the Commission in l-the context raise'd herein for a complete clarification of the status of such issues. YAEC's Environmental Report and LTP do not address any of NECNP's concerns or issues l
concerning creation, maintenance, monitoring, preparedness, and security provisions for
. an independent dry storage facility.
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-NECNP contends that, by permitting Part 50 licensees to undertake dry storage Projects (October 1997).
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after a shut-down facility has gone through the preliminary stages of decommissioning, panicularly under the recent Pan 50 decommissioning amendments which eliminated the j
d need for prior approval of a complete decommissioning plan and requisite EA and/or EIS i
of the plan, the NRC has impennissibly segmented a major federal action without providing for the environmental considerations mandated by the National Environmental l
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Policy Act,42 U.S.C. { 4321, et. seq. [NEPA] until very, very long after the project is a l
foregone conclusion. See CAN v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284 (1" Cir.1995) (failure to conduct an t
EA and/or EIS prior to approval of decommissioning plan violates NEPA). The NRC's application of its regulations to permit a licensee such as YAEC to constmet an Independent Fuel Storage Facility under a Pan 50 license without the environmental considerations mandated under10 CFR Pan 72 license amounts to impermissible segmentation under NEPA. Under the NRC current application of its regulations to licensees such as YAEC in this matter, NEPA mandated environmental considerations, as I
well as Atomic Energy Act mandated hearings, will be deferred for many years until the licensee is ready to relinquish its Pan 50 license. Only at that point in time would the
' licensee need to convert to a Part 72 license, triggering the hearing opportunities and t
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environmental consideration available under that licensing application process. In this way, the NRC current application ofits regulations under Part 50 violates NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.S.C.
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Hence, if this Hearing Panel does not see fit to take these issues up at this time, it is appropriate to submit them directly to the Commission for clarification pursuant to 10 4
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1 CFR 2.714(c).
- Contention C. VAEC's Site Remediation Plans are Inadeauste.
Contrary to the requirement of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii), YAEC's site remediation y
plans are based upon inadequate data and will not protect public health and safety.
BaliE Except for a few specific, isolated locations, YAEC only plans to conduct surface soil sampling to a depth of 15 cm.
This practice is consistent with YAEC's understanding of the depth of soil contamination: "Results of surface sampling to-date indicate that most contamination is limited to approximately the top 150 mm of soil."25 Such a shallow approach quickly becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. As YAEC will not be testing below 15 cm during site characterization, it will find no contamination below 15 cm. The same holds true for the final status survey: YAEC does not plan to survey soil below 15 cm.26 Thus, the LTP and the Final Site Survey Plan leave open the
- possibility of areas of the site contaminated below the 15 cm depth. Below ground contamination could thereby lead to contaminated ground water under the site, contaminated earth brought to the surface during excavations for completion of decommissioning activities, ISFSI construction, or during some future site construction.
27 In order to properly estimate potential ground water contamination, the DandD computer program model YAEC uses to determine Guideline Values for specific 25 YAEC, LTP at 2-4.
YAEC, LTP Final Site Survey Plan at A-26.
27 DandD, Interim Release 1.0 (July 1996).
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radionuclides requires a complete inventory of the site. YAEC uses NUREG 1500 and
. the DandD computer program. Both rely upon a model which specifically assumes that o
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the licensee has ascertained that p_g contamination is present below 15 cm. In fact, i
NUREG 1500 warns that, " Licensees using these tables should verify that the assumptions of the scenarios are appropriate to the site, including no residual radioactivity below 15 cm in soil..."2s j
As seen in Table 2, Appendix to Contentions at APP-2, the preliminary borings YAEC took nyeral years ago near the PCA Warehouse and the S Decon Pad are far above Guideline Values for cobalt-60 and cesium-137. More troubling yet, the cesium and cobalt concentrations appear to be increasing with depth in boring at SF-3A. This means that YAEC has not determined the full volume extent of radioactive contamination on the site. NECNP contends that NRC regulations require that YAECfully characterize l
l; the site. This means that YAEC cannot be allowed to rely upon what it has done--i.e.,
not rely on just a few samples near these two structures and the fuel pool-but must o
ascertain the full extent of contamination underneath all distinct locations that have any l,)
surface contamination concentrations above Guideline Values. Significantly, in order to L
i make a complete characterization of the site, YAEC must take core borings to a depth where soil concentrations are no greater than background at each and every location that i
has surface contamination concentrations above Guideline Values.
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NUREG-1500 at 17.
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Contention D. Inadecuacy of YAEC's Plans for Final Site Survey.
1)
Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(aX9)(ii) and 50.82(a)(3),
YAEC cannot specify when irradiated fuel [IF], all structures, and contamination will be removed from the site, and when a final site survey will be conducted. Until these details are fmalized, the NRC cannot approve the LTP or the Final Site Survey Plan.
2)
Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and (a)(9)(ii), YAEC has not specified the type ofIF storage casks it proposes to use, whether these casks have been licensed, and how the IF will be moved from these storage casks to the proposed high-level waste repository. Until YAEC finalizes these details, the NRC cannot approve the plan.
_Baj.js; s
1)
According to the LTP, the license termination phase will take place after someone has removed all IF and GTCC waste from the site, either from the fuel pool or from an on-site dry storage facility. The date YAEC has chosen for planning purposes is the year 2018.29 NECNP contends that YAEC's chosen date for removing all irradiated fuel and shipping to a federal repository is not credible.
Various actors in the high level waste removal process have suggested different dates for opening the repository. Because of federal cutbacks, DOE now says it will not have an operational high-level waste repository until the year 2015.3' The GAO stated YAEC, LTP at 6-2.
Hazel O' Leary, Statement before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S.
Senate, December 14,1995.
21
_.~
i-that a high-level waste repository might not be available until the year 2023. It is also possible that the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada, repository will not be licensed, setting off a nationwide search for an alternative. Assuming the earliest date, i.e.,2010, the fact remains that YAEC cannot ship more than 225 out of 533 total IF assemblies (or approximately only 40% of the Yankee Rowe inventory) to the proposed repository during the first decade of operation.32 The Depanment of Energy (DOE) has a queuing system, that is, a prioritization schedule for irradiated fuel acceptance. The schedule for the second decade of repository operation has not yet been established. Every nuclear l.
utility wishes to ship irradiated fuel as soon as possible. In terms of priority of shipments, l
YAEC is in competition with all the other nuclear utilities and the DOE itself. NECNP 1
contends that it is likely that it will be 2050 (i.e., within the full fony years of repository l
l 1
operation) before all IF and GTCC waste is removed from the Yankee Rowe site. Thus, for planning purposes, YAEC's LTP must assume (and adequately plan for security, maintenance, monitoring, and financing) two additional cases: (i) removal of all IF and GTCC waste by the year 2050; and (ii) indefinite, very long-term storage at Yankee Rowe.
The NRC regulations require that deconunissioning be completed "within 60 years of permanent cessation of operations." 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3). YAEC's LTP has not shown that decommissioning-removal of all structures and return to a " green field"
" Statement of Jim Wells in, " Yucca Mountain Project Management and Funding Issues,"
GAO/T-RCED-93-58.
32 U.S. Department of Energy, " Acceptance Prio:ity Ranking and Annual Capacity Report,"
22
condition-will be completed before the year 2052. Therefore, the NRC cannot approve the LTP.
2).
YAEC's plans in this regard are so vague as to be non-existent. The intended transport / storage cask, the NAC-MPC, has not yet been licensed. Hence, the LTP rests upon an immense void. Use of the NAC-MPC will be a daunting venture. The NAC-MPC is heavy, weighing more than 125 tons fully-loaded as a transport cask. At present, the NRC has approved Spent Fuel Pool crane capacity at only ?5 tons. YAEC has not shown that its crane has the requisite strength to handle the casks. Moreover, YAEC has not shown that the heavy-haul trailer (needed to transpon a cask on local roads to the nearest railhead) can actually maneuver local roads because of the large turning radins.
This is a serious consideration given the narrow din roads and narrow paved roads in and about Yankee Rowe. For example, to move a cask similar to the NAC-MPC, the HI-STAR 100, Holtec plans to employ a trailer 150' long, with ten axles, and a weight 8
greater than 225 tons, including the trailer, tie-downs, and the cask itself. Funhermore, YAEC has not shown that the NAC-MPC cask will be acceptable to the DOE at the proposed repository. Thus, in this regard, YAEC has filed an incomplete application, and further consideration of the LTP should be tabled until YAEC submits fimalized plans.
Contention E. Inadeauncy of VAEC's Site Remediation Plans Contrary to NRC requirements, YAEC has not shown that the LTP is adequate and OCRWM (March 1995).
"' Letter from Edward Boon, Aspen Trailer Company, to Wayne Lewis, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (March 25,1997), in Appendix to Contentions at APP-5 and 6.
23
will protect the health and safety of the public in that: (1) the Guideline Values are not protective of full-time residents or children, and (2) the soil concentration release criteria are not supponed by YAEC's analysis and are, in any case, too high.10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii) and (a)(10).
Basis:
1.
YAEC's LTP is designed only to maintain doses to an adult male below 15 mrem per year; doses to children will likely be higher.
34 Based on the DandD computer model and a specific future residential scenario, NRC staff has detennined the allowable soil concentrations or Guideline Values. The scenario takes into account all radiation pathways to an adult male, including inhalation of radioactive particulates, and plant, water and incidental soil ingestion. The results are listed in Table B-2.,
NUREG-1500, which YAEC adopted in the LTP.35 The model, thus, assumes a cenaia i
inhalation rate and food, soil and water ingestion rate, then converts radionuclide intakes into radiation exposures (using dose conversion factors), all for an adult male only. Depending on the age of a child, proper calculations require reducing the inhalation and ingestion rates (but, increase the amount of milk consumption and incidental soil ingestion), and increasing the dose conversion factors, reflecting organ size, age and other parameters. The net effect is an 1
increase in a child's exposure. A spreadsheet calculation that illustrates the point, taking as an
Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, Senior Associate, Radioactive Waste Management Associates, NECNP's expert in preparing and reviewing these contentions and related materials, has both the DandD and RESRAD5.782 computer programs. He did not mn them as pan of his analysis of the LTP. Dr. Resnikoff reviewed YAEC's input and modeling assumptions. He assumed that they were correctly translated into the computer models, and correctly run for the intended scenarios.
YAEC, LTP at Table 2-1.
24
example inhalation ofiodine-131, is attached hereto as Table 3, Appendix to Contentions at
. APP-2. 'As can be seen from the table, for the same I-131 air concentration, the effective dose equivalent'to a 1-year old child can be more than twice as great as that of an adult male. A'
]
similar result holds for other radionuclides and other radiation pathways. Thus, to maintain doses to children below 15 mrem / year, the soil concentrations remaining at the site (hence,
. the Guideline Values) will have to be reduced more than the projections in NUREG-1500 which YAEC adopted for the LTP. The exact amount should be developed in the course of the hearing process.
It is important to note that NECNP's contention in this instance does not challenge the j
NRC's existing 10 CFR Part 20 regulations. Rather, NECNP challenges the way that the NRC is applying (and YAEC proposes to interpret) the existing regulations in this matter.
1 NECNP contends that YAEC's Guideline Values, which maintain adult male doses less than 15 mrem / year, will lead to child doses that exceed regulatory requirements. Moreover, in this j
i regard, the assumption that a child resides at the former Yankee Rowe site 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day is a credible scenario under general release of the site for unrestricted use.36 The basic issue here is that the NRC staff have employed dose conversion factors from ICRP-30, while the ICRP has adopted new dose conversion factors, ICRP-60, that take into account a receptor's age and have an improved lung model. The NRC staff, behind the curve as usual, have not yet come to terms with these new dose conversion factors, though the Federal Register notice promulgating the new radiological criteria for license termination does
NUREG/CR-5512, vol. lat Section 6.7.4.
25
-. - ~ - -. _
- .~
make mention ofICRP-60. In fact, both the initial and final rulemaking for 10 CFR Part 20 i
i_
mention ICRP-60 when discussing the appropriate choice of exposure " scenario" for the average member of the most exposed population. Plainly, NRC staff has read ICRP-60.
Current NRC Part 20 regs are based upon it. The NRC Staffjust don't want to apply it. The ICRP-60 standards have been adopted by regulatory bodies in numerous countries around the l
l world and represent the best scientific judgment on the effective dose due to radionuclide intake. They have been so adopted for good reason. They provide protection standards 1
geared to the most exposed population (without a " worst case scenario"): children, women, shoiter persons, and wheelchair bound persons.
Moreover,.the rulemaking documents
]
l underlying the current Part 20 regulations appear to require that licensees (and, one would l
i think, NRC staff) take ICRP-60 into account in choosing an appropriate scenario for a conservative level of radiation exposure to the average member of the "most exposed" group.
Thus, in this regard, the NRC Staff's has failed to implement NRC radiation protection standards in a way that equally protects children, women, and other persons.
. NECNP realleges and incorporates herein the legal points raised supra at A.3.
2.
YAEC's Guideline Values are not supported and, in any case, are too high:
l (a) Under the residential scenario, specific soil guideline values are set for specific l
l radionuclides. Specifically, cobalt-60 (2.97 pCi/g) and cesium-137 (10.7 pCi/g) (Table B-2, NUREG-1500). YAEC adopts these values for the LTP. YAEC also adopts therein a l
l
YAEC, LTP at Table 2-1.
i 26 l
L l
i
F guideline for silver-108m (3.78 pCi/g).38 YAEC's basis far adopting the soil guidance value for silver-108m does not appear in the LTP. Moreover, YAEC has adopted a guideline value for silver-108m that is not listed in Table B-2, NUREG-1500. In the LTP, YAEC states that the computer model RESRAD will be used if specific radionuclides are not listed in NUREG-1500.3' But, silver-108m is not one of the radionuclides considered by RESRAD either."
Therefore, there is no basis for YAEC's adopting its LTP Guideline Value for silver-108m.
e (b) Each radionuclide standing alone would provide a TEDE of 15 mrem / year. YAEC assumes that each radionuclide is present in isolation, not as a mixture. With a mix of radionuclides, one has to take the sum of the ratios, which must be less than one. For example, considering a single radionuclide, the ratio of cobalt-60 (actually present in surface soil) to the soil guideline must be less than one. Considering a mixture of radionuclides, however, the ratios calculated for each individual radionuclide present in the mixture must then be added together, and the sum must be less than one. Hence, with a mixture, the allowable soil concentrations will be less than the values YAEC cites.
fontention F. Inadeauncy and Insufficiency of VAEC's LTP ALARA Analysis.
Contrary to NRC regulations, the YAEC LTP does not show that the " residual radioactivity has been reduced to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)." 10 CFR 20.1402.
Id.
YAEC, LTP at Table 2-3.
Radioactive Waste Management Associates uses RESRAD program version 5.782. This is a 27
p l
EatiE l
L
. YAEC conducts a mini cost-benefit analysis in Section 4.4 of the LTP. Therein, l
YAEC attempts to prove that removal of contaminated soil to obtain TEDE doses below
.15 mrem / year is not cost effective. NECNP contends that the analysis is entirely ad hoc t
l and flawed.
r YAEC attempts to show that the dollar cost of remediation (cost per rem reduced) is high compared to the NRC calculation of the limits to licensee expenditures to achieve 2
health effects. YAEC estimates the cost of removing 100 m of soil to a depth of 15 cm
-is $61,400 for a benefit of 0.2 rem saved. The NRC quantifies health effects spending at t
$2,000 per rem.d' NECNP contends that YAEC's analysis artificially inflates the cost of soil removal while artificially deflating resultant health effects savings. In particular, l-E I
l YAEC inflates the clean-up costs by assuming that contaminated soil would be buried in Barnwell at a cost of $3,030 per cubic meter. The cost of such disposal would be lower by a factor of 30 if YAEC's calculations were based upon using the Envirocare facility in Utah. Thus, the dollar cost for soil clean-up YAEC cites in the LTP is much too high, skewing the cost-benefit equation.
At the same time, YAEC's calculation of the savings, in terms of reduced ill-health l
effects, is artificially deflated through an assumption that the effective half-life of I
more recent version than the one YAEC uses.
In' 1995, the Commission adopted a conversion factor of $2000 as the monetary value of the t
health conseiuences associated with radiological exposure. NUREG/BR-0058, Regulatory l
l Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission t t 22 (November 1995). See also NUREG-lS30, Reassessment of NRC's Dollar Per Person-Rem Conversion Factor Polict 28 i
1 l
l' i
contaminants is 26 years and takina into consideration only a single half-life. NECNP contends that YAEC should have taken 10 half-lives as tb time for radioactivity to be reduced to de minimus levels.
Fmther, YAEC. does not account for all of the radionuclides that may be present at Yankee Rowe. For example, YAEC should have also considered Silver-108m, Cesium-134 and a-emitters. Finally, YAEC assumes only
% person would be affected by remedial soil removal, when in fact it is credible that an entire family grouping could be exposed to radiation.
Underlying these ALARA considerations is the fact that YAEC has not established an ALARA protocol or methodology for decommissioning and site clean-up. Thus, YAEC is developing an "ad hoc" approach rather than " going by the book." See also, in this regard, Contention H and basis H.5, infra Contention G. Inadeauncy of YAF.C's Remainine Decommissionine Cost Estimate.
Contrary to NRC regulations, YAEC's LTP underestimates the full cost of irradiated fuel [IF] management and license termination, resulting in an inadequate estimation of remaining decommissioning costs as required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii).
Basis:
According to NRC regulations, YAEC must provide "an updated site-specific L
estimate of remaining decommissioning costs." 10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii).
NECNP at 12-14 (December 1995).
29
contends that these costs are underestimated due to YAEC's assumption of an unrealistically optimist:0 date for IF removal from the site, and the fact that the YAEC has not determined the full extent of subsurface contamination.
First, YEAC has underestimated the time required to remove all IF from the site.
YAEC has also, therefore, underestimated the full cost of irradiated fuel management and license termination. As discussed under Contention E, a large number of utilities wish to send their IF to a permanent repository as soon as one is available.
The Department of Energy has established a queuing schedule for the first ten years, during which approximately 40% of the fuel inventory at Yankee Rowe would be removed. The DOE has not issued the remaining repository fuel acceptance. NECNP contends that it is likely that IF will be shipped to the repository over the full 40 years of repository operation, or by the year 2050. It is also possible that IF will remain at the Yankee Rowe site indefinitely. YAEC needs to plan for this contingency. YAEC needs to set aside sufficient funds for irradiated fuel management, monitoring, security, and final decommissioning of the site after the fuel has been removed. Such financial planning YAEC has neither engaged in nor demonstrated to the NRC. Without it, YAEC cannot possibly determine the full deconunissioning cost as required under 10 CFR { 50.82.
Second, YAEC has not estimated the full extent of subsurface contr.mination on the site. Meter surveys over the site cannot determine the contamination depth. NECNP contends that YAEC needs to take core samples, particularly near the PCA warehouse and the decon pad. YAEC's preliminary borings near the PCA warehouse showed 30
-. - _ ~
-. ~..
increasing concentrations of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 with depth.
There is high subsurface contamination near the IX pit and reactor buildings. See Table 2, Appendix to Contentions ut APP-2 Without knowing the full extent of site contamination, 'YAEC cannot determine the full decommissioning cost as required under 10 CFR { 50.82.
Thus, the LTP fails to provide an adequate estimate of the remaining cost of decommissioning and it cannot be approved as submitted.
Contention H. Inadecuacy of YAEC's Final Status Survey Plan Under existing NRC regulations, YAEC's plans for the final status survey are inadequate and will not protect the health and safety of the public.10 CFR 50.82 (a)(9)(ii) and (a)(10)
Basis:
According to NRC regulations, the LTP must include, in pertinent part, " detailed plans
. for the final radiation survey." 10 CFR 50.82(a)(9)(ii). Before the NRC may approve the plan, the final status survey must demonstrate that remaining contamination on the site must not be inimical to the health and safety of the public. Id. at 50.82(a)(9) and (a)(10). NECNP contends that YAEC has not made the requisite showing and, therefore, the NRC cannot approve the plan.
NECNP contends that YAEC's proposed final status survey is inadequate for the following reasons:
1.
YAEC's proposed final status survey would not determine the full extent of 31 4,--
F e
4 on-site subsurface contamination, 2.
YAEC will not have surveyed all a-emitters likely to be present at the Yankee Rowe site,
)
3.
YAEC's methodalogy for determining Guideline Values is vague and in j
any case, leads to Guideline Values that are too high, 4.
The resultant TEDE exposures will be much greater than 15 mr/y, and 5.
The ALARA analysis is completely ad hoc and vague, j
4 Discussion of points listed above 1.
On-site subsurface contamination not surveyed.
YAEC will not survey for the full extent of on-site subsurface contamination under the proposed final status survey plan in the LTP. YAEC cannot be permitted to rely upon meter surveys over the site to determine the contamination depth. YAEC needs to take core samples, particularly near the PCA warehouse and the decon pad.
YAEC's preliminary boring samples near the PCA warehouse show increasing concentrations of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 with increasing depth. See Table 2, Appendix to Contentions at APP-2. YAEC has never determined the full extent of soil contamination on the site.
Under the LTP, YAEC intends to " follow up" its inadequate characterization of the site with final status survey plan soil samples. These, however, will only go to a depth of 15 32
- - - -. _ _ =
_ =. - -
42 cm ). NECNP contends that, in order to comply with NRC regulations, YAEC's final site survey must determine the full extent of subsurface contamination. There are at least two reasons for this requirement: i.) In order to determine the full extent of ground water contamination using the computer model DandD (which the NRC uses in NUREG-1500),
the program must have, as input, a total radioactive inventory; ii.) YAEC cannot use the Guideline Values in NUREG-1500 unless it definitively shows no residual radioA below 15 cm in soil.d' Plainly, the final status survey YAEC has proposed in the LTP fails to take into account these two crucial points.
2.
YAEC must survey all a-emitters likely to be present at Yrakee Rowe site.
The final status survey plan YAEC proposes in the LTP does not include a smvey for the full extent of a-emitters present on the Yankee Rowe site. In order to maintain the total l
effective dose equivalents (TEDE) less than 15 mr/y, YAEC must determine the concentrations of all radioactive materials on the site. That determination must include i
all a-emitters. Significantly, a-emitters contribute to the TEDE when either ingested or inhaled. According to YAEC's LTP and final site survey plan, YAEC does not plan to survey for a-emitters, such as plutonium isotopes and americium-241. NECNP contends that YAEC must take soil samples and specifically measure for gross a. Further, YAEC 1
should cany out an a-spec for all a-emitters on soil samples it takes over the entire
YAEC, Final Status Survey Plan [FSSP] at A-29 (December 1997).
NUREG-1500 at 17. NUREG-1500 cautions, " Licensees using these tables should verify that the assumptions of the scenarios are appropriate to the site, including no residual radioactivity 33
l 2000-acre site. In this regard, it is important to recall that researchers have reported detecting a-emitters, such as plutonium-241, in Yankee Rowe piping.44 Thus, such a-emitters are likely to be present elsewhere on the Yankee Rowe site. According to YAEC's final status survey plan, YAEC will measure soil and water samples solely for y-emitting radionuclides.45 3.
YAEC's FSSP method for determining Guideline Values is vague.
According to YAEC, the Guideline Values (GLVs) are determined by Eq. (3.1).46 YAEC plans to determine the GLVs by using its previously characterized radionuclide distributions in specific areas of the site. In the event that YAEC's final survey finds different concentrations of radionuclides than previously determined, YAEC's FSSP is vague as to how YAEC would consider this information. The plan states, "If new radionuclide distribution data is obtained during the completion of decommissioning, and determined to be more appropriate for use, the GLVs may be re-evaluated and altered during the course of the final status survey."d' NECNP conte:uis that YAEC has not d
defined "more appropriate for use," nor detailed how exactly the GLVs will be "re-evaluated and altered." Without specific criteria, YAEC will make ad hoc decisions that will likely be determined by economics rather than health and safety.
below 15 cm in soil."
" A. Mancini and R. Applebaum, supra, fn.17.
FSSP at A-30.
" FSSP at A-10.
34
4.
YAEC's FSSP permits radiation exposures to exceed 15 mr/y.
Under YAEC's proposed plan, if the direct gamma doses are 5 R/h, likely radiation exposures will exceed 15 mr/yr. YAEC intends to survey the site to ensure that direct y readings are less than 5 R/h above background.d* For a full-time resident, present on the site 365 days a year, the direct gamma doses will already exceed 15 mr/y, not taking into account additional radiation pathways, such as water and incidental soil ingestion, inhalution of radioactive particulates and crops grown in contaminated earth.
This basis was discussed under Contention A above. NECNP realleges and incorporates by reference herein the legal points raised supra at A.3.
5.
YAEC's ALARA analysis in the FSSP is completely ad hoc and vague.
According to YAEC, in pertinent part, the ALARA analysis will take into account:
[r]adiation doses and environmental impacts from the decommissioning process and from the residual radiation remaining on the site after completion of decommissioning, other costs and risks associated with the decontamination and decommissioning of the site.
YAEC's LTP, (Appendix) FSSP at A-46. This i_s YAEC's entire ALARA analysis in the Final Status Survey Plan. NECNP contends that, as such, ALARA analysis in the FSSP l
" Id.
" FSSP at A-33.
35
vague, inadequate, and, essentially, non-existent.
In this regard, YAEC's ALARA statement makes a mockery of the NRC's ALARA regulations and should not be approved as submitted.
Additional Bases:
NECNP contends that the full extent of site contamination has not been determined.
Recent NRC inspection reports provide additional support for this contention:
1.
YAEC halted the removal of contaminated piping from under the primary auxiliary because of the high water table. NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-03 at 2. It is therefore not clear whether YAEC completed this removal later, and took subsurface soil samples for contamination at this location. See generally, id The clear' inference of this revelation is that the below building contaminated piping is sitting within the water table ( and allowing contamination to seep into the water table?).
2.
To detennine background, YAEC prepared a study of background soil at off-site locations to obtain background readings for cesium-137. This report (cited by the Inspector but not publicly available) was supplemented with a technical basis document for Sr-90 (RP 98-72) (which is also cited by the Inspector but not publicly available).
YAEC found the mean Sr-90 concentration to be 0.274 pCi/g, with a standard deviation of 0.310 pCi/g. NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-03 at A2-4. (Note: this includes the value 0 pCi/g; because of the measurement uncertainty, Sr-90 background concentrations 36
)
could also be zero.) For affected areas of the site, YAEC states that it will apply a zero Cs-137 background. NRC Inspection Report 50-29/98-01/02 at 11. This means that no values will be subtracted from measured soil concentrations. NECNP applauds this determination, however, NECNP contends that the estimated background Cs-137 soil concentration of zero pCi/g should be memorialized in the FSSF. Ac it stands, it is nowhere in the FSSP or the LTP.
CONCLUSION l
For the reasons presented above, YAEC's LTP should not be approved, and the j
ASLB Panel in this case should accept NECNP's Contentions as submitted. Moreover, the Panel should schedule a discovery period during which the Panel and Intervenors may '
obtain of NRC and YAEC additional factual material to be used in the Panel's adjudicatory hearing on the matters raised herein and any others the Panel finds germane.
i Respectfully submitted:
l
&&N l
Jonathan M. Block Attomey for NECNP i
i FILEDi January 2,1999 cc:
Service List 37-
NECKP's Contentions-Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-1 Table 1. TLD Measurements 1995 Annual Annual Average Average Fence Off-Site Post Sta. No. '
( R/h)
Sta. No. (pR/h)
GM-01 7
GM-13 11.9 GM-02 6.4 GM-14 9.9 GM-03 5.4 GM-15 9.4 GM-04 5.9 GM-16 9.2 GM-05 7.4 GM-17 10.9 GM-06 6.9 GM-18 14.5 GM-07 7.5 GM-19 17.1 GM-08 6.3 GM-20 13.3 GM-09 6.9 GM-21 16.6 GM-10 6.6 Average 12.53 GM-11 7.4 l
GM-12 8.2 GM-22 7
GM-23 7.7 -
GM-24 7.8 GM-25 6.3 GM-26 6.5 GM-27 6
- GM-28 7
GM-29 5
GM-30 6
GM-31 6.3 GM-32 6.4 GM-33 6.9 GM-34 8.9 GM-35 7.4 GM-36 '.
7.2 GM-37 7.5 GM-3S 8.2
)
GM-39 8.6 GM-40 6.9 Average 6.95 Source: YAEC, " Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, January -
December 1995," April 1996, Table 5.3.
-. ~.. -.
NECNP's Contentions--Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-2 Table 2. Subfoundation Samples Hole Depth Co-60 Cs-137 Dose
- Dose No.
Location Media (inches) (pCilg) (pCl/g) (mR/h) (mrly)
PCA Wareteew SF-3A soil 9-21 695.39 20.67 1.08 9483.69 soil 21 29 917.53 67.97 1.44 12643.22 S Decon Pai SF-SA soil 17-29 271.6 19.4 0.43 3740.25 SF-5H soit 17-25 5700 91 8.85 77485.78 IX Pit soil 24-36 19.18 30.59 0.04 357.47
- Assumes 6 inch depth of contaminated soil and infinite plane surface Source: Memo from P Hollenbeck to K Heider, RP 96-56, August 20,1996 Table 3.1-131 inhalation Dose Dose Conversion Air
- Factors * -
Dose
- 8 Age (m /d)
(Sv/Bq)
(mSv/y) 1 5.2 7.20E-08 0.58 5
8.8 3.70E-08 0.51 10 15.3 1.90E-08 0.45 15 20.1 1.10E-08 0.34 50 22.2 7.40E-09 0.25 Notes:
a Airinhalation rate from table B.16A,ICRP 66.
b Dose conversion fadors from ICRP 72.
c Assumes iodine concentration in air 4.25 Bq/cu m.
NECNP's Contentions--Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-3
. Federal Guldance Report No.13 Part1-Interim Version HEALTH RISKS FROM LOW-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE TO RADIONUCLIDES Radionuclide-Specific Lifetime Radiogenic Cancer Risk Coefficients for the U.S. Population, Based on Age-Dependent Intake, Dosimetry, and Risk Models Keith F. Eckerman Richard W.uggett Christopher B. Nelson Jerome S. Puskin Allan C. B. Richardson Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 Office of Radia.,n and Indoor Air United States Environmenta1 Protection Agency Washington, DC 20460 1998
,;p
NECNP 's Contentions-Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-4 Table 3.1.. Age. and gender-specific usage rates of environmental media, for selected ages."
d Alt Tap watef Food energy
.Cov/s milk' h
(m' d')
(L d')
(kcal d')
(Ld').
Age (y)
M F
M F
M F
M F
0 2.9 2.9 0.191 0.188 478 470 0.339 0.350
^
1 5.2 5.2 0.223 0.216 791 752 0.349 0.358 5
B.8 8.8 0.542 0.499 1566 1431 0.413 0.409 10 15.3 15.3 0.725 0.649 1919 1684 0.486 0.428 15 20.1 '
15.7 0.900 0.712 2425 1828 0.519 0.356 20 22.2 17.7 1.137 0.754 2952 1927 0.414 0.249 f
50 22.2 17.7 1.643 1.119 2570 1758 0.192 0.139 75 22.2 17.7 1.564 1.179 1990 1508 0.192 0.139 Lifetime 19.2 16.5
.1.29 0.93 2418 1695 0.282 0.207 average Combined lifetime 17.8 1.11 2048' O.243 average'
\\
'All values are based on estimated averages for the U.S. population for the indicated age. Ages refer to birthdayst c.g., a given rate at age 5 y indicates the rate on the fifth birthday. Data reported for age intervals were converted to point estimatcs by preserving the total intake in each interval using a cubic spline fitting method (Fritsch and C21 son,1980). Fitted curves were smoothed using a 3-point moving average. Thelisted usage rates are the values used in the calculation and are generally more precise than the data would support.
"From Tables B.16A and B.16B ofICRP Publication 66,1994a.
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'Br. sed on survey data of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Ershow and Cantor,1969). Includes drinking water, water added to beverages, and ws:cr added to foods during preparation, but not water intrinsic in food as purchased.
Based en data from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (hieDowell et al.,1994).
d
'Used in one of two scenarios for ingestion of radioisotopes ofiodine in diet. The other scenario assumes that iodice intake is proportional to food encrgy usa 6e. Milk usage is based on data from EPA report 520/184 021 (1984b).
' Based on the maje-to-female ratio at birth, the gender specific survival function, and the gender specific usage function.
2 8For a typical U.S. diet, equivalent to a lifetime average intake of about 1.2 kg food 6 (sce teit).
49
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NECNP's Contentions-Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-5 LASPEN ASPEN TRAILER COMPA$Y LTD.
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Surrer. Bt3ish Columbss. Canaca V33 SJ9 rw Phone:(604) 533 4711
- Fes:(604) 533 8772
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March 25,1997 I
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Wayne Lewis Stone and Webster Engineenng Corporation P.O. Box 5406 Denver, Colorado. 80217 Dear Wayne.
Drawing 013690S shows a possible combination 1or your requirement and D13691S the turn around at the loading yard. The requirements outlined in your letter introduce restraints that are severe but manageable.
k First the weight, you ask for " Utah legal *. A, normal 18 wheeler in Utah would gross E0000 pounds and have axle loads of 34000 pounds per 8 wheel tancem.
Single axJe loads may be up to 20.000 pounds and these figures are typical for most states. Practically all heavy haul, including on rural roads is at weights higher than that, typically 20000 pounds to 25000 pounds per axle.
Considering the 142 ton payload we would expect a gross of about 450.000 pounds. You have no bridges to cross so we assume that the main requirement veould be to minimize axle load, or more simply tire load. The combination shown, including the tractor steering axje has 94 tires. Assuming 16000 pounds for the steering axle, axle loading would be about 16.782 pounds or 4696 pounds per tire.
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Web Site:Ny#wam..ceortn e.co m/ho me< aspee bc E-Maa Address; Aspen 4enhee.com.
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l NECNP's Contentions-Appendix ofTables and Documents APP-6 i
These are so called 16 vteel groups which are needed at this weight. to keep the lengtn compact. Components shown are pans of our modular design so o
more or less axles and tires are possible although this is one of the optimum combir,1ations. A normal form for this-design is as a ' double lane loader" where the axles can be expanded from 12 ft out to 20 ft to reduce brioge loadings.
With no bridges to cross you would seek permits without this extra complexity, to help minimize tare weight.
Turning in the restricted leading yard is manageable. We have built this class with not only dcuble lane loading but also with-all groups steering. Drawing D13690S shows steenng of the wing dollies (rear of each set) which allows for really tight turning but this also might not be necessary. D13691S Indicates a steady state turn in 150 ft (151 ft at the bumper) without steering the wmg dollies. In practice steering input by the driver is more complex and this particular combination would be able to U-turn in the yard by steering just the lead group of the colly.
The first stage of such a project, would to get an approvalin principle from the state for the axle loadings and configuration type, in the mean time I trust this satisfies your immediate neods. Murray is away at the moment so you may phone me if you have any questions.
Sincerely The Aspen T Group
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s Ed Boon Engineering t
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