ML20168A070

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Industry Presentation (NEI) - Security Oversight for Nuclear Power Plants in Relation to the Covid 19 Public Health Emergency, June 16, 2020
ML20168A070
Person / Time
Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 06/16/2020
From:
Nuclear Energy Institute
To:
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Johnson D
References
Download: ML20168A070 (14)


Text

Security Oversight for Nuclear Power Plants in Relation to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency June 16, 2020

Enforcement Guidance Memorandum, EGM 20-002

  • EGM states, It is expected that licensees will take reasonable actions to prepare for and limit staff exposure to COVID-19.

Conducting training evolutions with multiple personnel may increase the spread of the COVID-19 virus and ultimately have a negative impact on the licensees ability to staff mission-critical positions necessary to successfully implement its protective strategy at the site and,

  • The NRC recognizes that impacts on a licensee could continue after the official termination of the PHE. Consequently, the provisions of this EGM may be applied after termination of the PHE to allow, on a case-by-case basis (not to exceed 1 year from the issuance date of the EGM), appropriate consideration of specific circumstances that arise during the inspection cycle following the PHE recovery.

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 2

NEI Member Perspective on Resumption of FOF Exercises

  • Reasonable assurance of robust security posture is provided through ongoing utility training activities and numerous inspections conducted by the NRC
  • Conduct of a FOF exercise will pose an undue risk of exposure to COVID-19 for security personnel
  • Could negatively impact the licensees ability to implement its NRC-approved security plan
  • Prudent criteria proposed for resumption of FOF exercises

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 3

Unique Characteristics of IP 71130.03

  • The exercise portion of IP 71130.03 poses a risk to a significant number of critical station employees unlike any other inspection:

o Roughly 75% (3 of 4 shifts) of security personnel must be on site at the same time in close proximity to support the exercise o Additional personnel including interstate travelers interface with the security force o Site pandemic protocols (e.g., social distancing) can not be maintained during the exercise o Use of medically qualified face masks and social distancing introduce exercise artificialities o Heat issues restrict officer stay times o Fogging of safety glasses causes sight acquisition issues o Communication between responders and controllers impaired

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 4

Maintaining Reasonable Assurance

  • The 71130 Inspection Series is composed of numerous elements that collectively inform NRCs reasonable assurance determination
  • IP 71130.03 Inspection Procedure, Contingency Response -

Force-on-Force, is just 1 of 10 inspections in the series o Majority of IP can still be performed; just the exercise portion that poses the risk

  • During the PHE, the NRC has been conducting numerous inspections under this series including:

o Access Controls (.02) o Equipment Performance/Maintenance/Testing (.04) o Security Training (.07)

  • 90% of inspection activities are still taking place with some modifications

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 5

Maintaining Reasonable Assurance

  • NRC is conducting the majority of the elements of IP 71130.03, Contingency Response - FOF (Modified Planning (A) Week):

o Plan and procedure reviews o Protective strategy review briefings o Walk downs and interviews with site security personnel o Protective strategic walk downs in the Owner Control, Protected, and Vital Areas o Mission planning and scenario development for exercise o Tabletop protective strategy exercises o Walk down and testing of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

  • Modified Planning A Week evaluates the robustness of the utility security strategies

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 6

Maintaining Reasonable Assurance

  • Capabilities to detect, assess, interdict the DBT are maintained at all times:

o Contingency response tabletop command and control drills demonstrate proficiency in protective strategies:

o Detection and assessment o Patrols o Searches o Defensive operations o On-going weapons training - day/night fire, tactical course of fire while moving, weapons familiarity, tabletops, written exams, physical fitness/agility tests, etc.

  • Defense-in-depth through the integration of systems, technologies, equipment and supporting processes and procedures

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 7

NEI Member Perspective on Resumption of FOF Inspections

  • Conditions for resumption of FOF exercises composed of three parts that must be met to ensure inspection consistency across the fleet:
  • Part 1: Entry Criteria To Resume FOF Exercises
  • Part 2: Conditions Following Entrance Criteria
  • Part 3: Specific Criteria for Conduct of IP 71130.03, Contingency Response - Force on Force Testing

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 8

Part 1: Entry Criteria to Resume FOF Exercises

  • EGM 20-002 Attachment 1 references recommendations to which licensees must conform
  • FOF exercises should not resume until all are met:

o CDC relaxes or rescinds recommendations outlined in the March 28, 2020 Memorandum for prevention of the spread of COVID-19 o Conformance to the U.S. Department of Labor Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, is no longer necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19 o Conforming State and local PHE guidelines are rescinded

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 9

Part 2: Conditions Following Entry Criteria

  • Nuclear power generators are designated by DHS as critical infrastructure o Protective measures imposed to reduce the risk of transmission of the virus o Protective measures will likely be required beyond the PHE
  • FOF exercises must be conducted in accordance with licensee required safety protocol:
  • Facemasks and other PPE
  • Pre-access screening/testing for visitors
  • Quarantining of out-of-state visitors
  • Others

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 10

Part 2: Conditions Following Entry Criteria, contd.

  • Exercise execution should incorporate additional safety controls such as:

o Limit the number of inspectors to enable full complement of participants (e.g. players, controllers, law enforcement, etc.) to conform to social distancing and assembly guidelines o NRC inspectors observe exercise remotely and not in BREs or other posts with limited space

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 11

Part 3: Specific Criteria for Conducting IP 71130.03, Contingency Response - FOF Testing Activities associated with B week may be conducted when:

  • Access to hotels and restaurants within commuting area of site are available
  • Airline travel available (as required)
  • Out-of-state travel guidance lifted (i.e., requirement to self-quarantine upon arrival in state)
  • Travel conditions allow DOE MILES trailer travel to inspection location in reasonable duration
  • Screening requirements are met in accordance with licensee requirements

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 12

Part 3: Specific Criteria for Conducting IP 71130.03, Contingency Response - FOF Testing, contd.

Activities associated with B Week may be conducted when:

  • DOE has a plan in place to sanitize MILES gear after use
  • Responders, adversaries, and their controllers can conduct drill play without donning masks and without practicing social distancing
  • Temporary exemptions for annual FOF exercises have expired

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 13

Conclusions

  • The exercise portion of IP 71130.03 poses a risk to a significant number of critical station employees unlike any other inspection o Maintaining the public, plant and worker health and safety is our number one priority.
  • Temporary suspension of FOF exercises, one element of one inspection procedure, does not impact reasonable assurance.

o 90% of the security physical security inspections are being conducted.

©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 14