ML22102A202

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NEI Presentation Related to the Development of Adversary Timelines NRC Comment Resolution
ML22102A202
Person / Time
Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 04/12/2022
From: Clore A, O'Neill D
Nuclear Energy Institute, Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML22102A202 (12)


Text

NEI White Paper, Development of Adversary Timelines NRC Comment Resolution AJ Clore Nuclear Energy Institute Dustin ONeill Pacific Gas & Electric/Nuclear Energy Institute

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

Purpose This white paper provides guidance for determining performance-based adversary timelines.

The following slides will address how the NRCs comments on this white paper were resolved.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 2

NRC Comment - Overall Numerous comments pertaining to the generic travel speed table that was proposed during the July 2021 public meeting.

  • Given the feedback provided by both NRC and industry, the guidance in the white paper was revised and is solely focused on performance basing adversary timelines, rather than a standard travel speed.
  • This change would allow sites to factor: terrain, cover/concealment, dead space, engagement opportunities, multiple responders/adversaries and various other elements.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 3

NRC Comment Comment - Adversary Timelines developed to meet the physical security design requirements are only considered appropriate when starting from a regulatorily required intrusion detection system. NEIs statement of some detection point should be clarified to the committed intrusion detection system as identified in the NRC-approved site security plan.

Resolution - Agree, addition of recommended language can be found on page 3 of NEI white paper.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 4

NRC Comment Comment - Both active and passive barriers should be included/considered.

Resolution - Agree, described in section 4 on page 4 of white paper.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

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NRC Comment Comment - Consideration that the adversary is well trained and willing to kill or be killed, per 10 CFR 73.1.

Resolution - Agree, 73.1 reference was absent in initial paper.

Description added within Background section on page 2, as well as Reference section on page 5.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

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NRC Comment Comment - Outer edge of a building should be expanded to include a location where adversary operations can be conducted from which a target element may be destroyed or rendered incapable of performing its intended safety function or action.

Resolution - Agree, recommendation included on page 3, under Adversary Pathway Selection.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

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NRC Comment Comment - It would seem appropriate to use the breaching option most advantageous to the adversary. As written, the white paper appears to give sites options to potentially use a breaching methodology that could represent the slowest for an adversary.

Resolution - Agree, added section 4 on page 4 to account for variables associated with breaching and using the most advantageous technique for the adversary.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

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NRC Comment Comment - The methodology does not address changes to plant configurations associated with outages and other evolutions that change plant layout and target sets (mode changes).

Resolution - Agree, addition of section, Plant Configurations can be found on page 5 of white paper.

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

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Path Forward April 21st, 2022 - NEI will be hosting a joint implementation workshop to roll out:

  • White paper on Developing Adversary Timelines
  • Reasonable Assurance of Protection Time (RAPT)

Part of the focus of this workshop will be potential changes to sites security plans. To include:

  • Appropriate guidance to follow
  • Validation exercises to support a change
  • Documentation of exercises (technical basis)
  • Maintaining all documentation for inspection

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute

©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 10

Points of Contact AJ Clore Dustin ONeill Senior Project Manager Principal, Security Strategy 202.285.205 Technical Lead ajc@nei.org 805.503.0785 djo@nei.org or djo9@pge.com

©2022 Nuclear Energy Institute 11

Questions