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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212J9251999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Relief Request IWE-3 for Second 10-year ISI for Plant ML20211N2611999-09-0808 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Irradiation of Fuel Rods Beyond Current Lead Rod Burnup Limit & Clarification of Terminology with Respect to Reconstituted Fuel Assemblies Acceptable ML20211J2421999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Removal of Augmented Insp Program on RCS Bypass Lines from Licensing Basis of North Anna,Units 1 & 2 ML20211J2561999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Elimination of Augmented ISI Program for Pressurizer Spray Lines at North Anna Unit 2 ML18152B3831999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section XI Requirements for Containment Insp ML20210T0791999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Withdrawal Schedules for North Anna Units 1 & 2 Satisfy Requirements of App H to 10CFR50 & Therefore Acceptable ML20206L4831999-05-10010 May 1999 SER Accepting Request to Delay Submitting Plant,Unit 1 Class 1 Piping ISI Program for Third Insp Interval Until 010430, to Permit Development of Risk Informed ISI Program for Class 1 Piping ML20206C0151999-04-22022 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 219 & 200 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20205S0391999-04-21021 April 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief IWE5,per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & Proposed Alternatives for IWE2,IWE4,IWE6 & IWL2 Authorized Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20207H4451999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 218 & 199 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20198H9541998-12-0303 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative for Remainder of Second 10-yr Insp Interval for Plant ML20196G1381998-11-0303 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Rev to Relief Request NDE-32 for Remainder of Second 10-yr Insp Interval for Each Unit ML20155H0351998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 215 & 196 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20237E1871998-08-26026 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 214 & 195 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20236X3811998-08-0303 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 213 & 194 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20236K5531998-07-0707 July 1998 SER Accepting Request for Change in ISI Commitment on Protection Against Pipe Breaks Outside Containment ML20249C1521998-06-23023 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 212 & 193 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20248C8831998-05-29029 May 1998 SER Accepting Alternatives Proposed by Licensee for Use of Code Case N-535,pursuant to 10CFRa(a)(3)(i) in ASME Section XI Inservice Insp Program ML20217E7001998-04-22022 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 211 & 192 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20217B5321998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Plant Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20216G8741998-04-16016 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 210 & 191 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20216F1251998-04-14014 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 209 & 190 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20216E8801998-03-0606 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Code Requirements,Paragraph IWA-2400(c) (Summer Edition W/Summer 1983 Addenda),For Upcoming Naps,Unit 1 Outage,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20199J6431998-02-0202 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Code Class 3 SW Piping for North Anna,Unit 1,as Submitted in ISI Relief Request NDE-46 on 971218 ML20198S7571998-01-15015 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Approval to Repair Flaws IAW GL-90-05 for ASME Code Class 3 Svc Water Piping ML20198H5541997-12-29029 December 1997 SER Accepting Request for Approval of ASME Case N-498,rev 1, as an Alternative to Required Hydrostatic Pressure Test for Plant,Unit 2 ML20197K1541997-12-18018 December 1997 SER Granting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping for North Anna Power Station,Per Util 970919 Submittal ML20203C4191997-12-0404 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 207 & 188 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20202B8751997-11-24024 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for Exemption from Section III.G.2.f of App R to 10CFR50.Staff Concluded That Use of Combustible Radiant Energy Heat Shields Inside Containment at Surry & North Anna Unacceptable ML20199L0501997-11-24024 November 1997 SER Accepting Inservice Insp Program Relief Request NDE-32 ML20199E4971997-11-14014 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative of Licensee Relief Requests NDE-35 & NDE-37,for Plant,Units 1 & 2 During Second 10 Yr Interval ML20217E2411997-09-24024 September 1997 SER Accepting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping,Virginia Electric & Power Co,North Anna Power Station,Unit 1 ML20217E1871997-09-24024 September 1997 SER Approving Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping,Virginia Electric & Power Co,North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217E0701997-09-24024 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee ASME Section XI Relief Request NDE-33 at Plant,Unit 1 ML20149L2001997-07-29029 July 1997 SER Granting Requests for Relief NDE-33,34 & 35 Re ISI Program,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20149F1321997-07-17017 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 205 & 186 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20148H1971997-06-0404 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Relief Request NDE-31 Related to Inservice Insp Program ML20140H8961997-05-0909 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 204 & 185 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20140F4811997-04-30030 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 951207 Proposed Alternative in Request for Relief SPT-16 Re Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for Unit 2 ML20133Q0661997-01-17017 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 203 & 184 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20133G1561997-01-10010 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Second 10-year Relief Requests for Relief Numbers NDE-27,NDE-28 & NDE-29 ML20133G1911997-01-10010 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Plan Relief Request NDE-30 ML20138G1931996-10-16016 October 1996 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Plan Request for Relief SPT-14,rev 1 Virginia Electric & Power Co North Anna Power Station,Unit 2 ML20128P1701996-10-10010 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Requests for Relief NDE-23 Through NDE-30 for Plant Unit 2 ML20128F5981996-10-0101 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Proposed Alternative to Examine Terminal End Welds on Lower Regenerative Heat Exchanger sub-vessels,per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20116B2361996-07-24024 July 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 202 & 183 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20117K4221996-06-0505 June 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 201 & 182 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20101L6861996-04-0101 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 200 & 181 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20100L0031996-02-27027 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 198 & 179 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20097D2491996-02-0808 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 195 & 176 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000339/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990922,containment Liner Through Wall Defect Was Noted.Caused by Corrosion.Pressure Test Was Performed.With1999-10-21021 October 1999
- on 990922,containment Liner Through Wall Defect Was Noted.Caused by Corrosion.Pressure Test Was Performed.With
ML20217N9281999-10-20020 October 1999 Special Rept:On 991003,PZR PORV Actuation Mitigated RCS low- Temp Overpressure Transient.Caused by a RCP Facilitating Sweeping of Entrained Air Out of RCS Loops.Operating Procedure 2-OP-5.1 Will Be Revised ML20217H3631999-10-14014 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR for North Anna 2 Cycle 14 Pattern Su 05000339/LER-1999-001-03, :on 990915,failure to Lock Open Loop SV Breakers as Intended by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Update Operating Procedures.Procedure ARs Were Initiated & Approved for Maint Procedure 1/2-MOP-5.92.With1999-10-12012 October 1999
- on 990915,failure to Lock Open Loop SV Breakers as Intended by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Update Operating Procedures.Procedure ARs Were Initiated & Approved for Maint Procedure 1/2-MOP-5.92.With
ML18152A2811999-10-12012 October 1999 Technical Basis for Elimination of Nozzle Inner Radius Insps (for Nozzles Other than Reactor Vessel),Technical Basis for ASME Section XI Code Case N-619. ML20212J9251999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Relief Request IWE-3 for Second 10-year ISI for Plant ML20217D6851999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000338/LER-1999-006-01, :on 990904,potential for Safegurads Exhaust Flow to Bypass Charcoal Filter,Was Discovered.Caused by Degraded Damper.Plant Issue Rept Submitted for B Train of Savs Flow Rate.With1999-09-28028 September 1999
- on 990904,potential for Safegurads Exhaust Flow to Bypass Charcoal Filter,Was Discovered.Caused by Degraded Damper.Plant Issue Rept Submitted for B Train of Savs Flow Rate.With
05000338/LER-1999-002, :on 990213,unsecured Isolation Valve,Was Discovered.Caused by Valve Configuration.Unsecured Bit Manual Bypass Isolation Valve Was Verified Closed & Chain & Lock Secured Valve Tee Handle.With1999-09-17017 September 1999
- on 990213,unsecured Isolation Valve,Was Discovered.Caused by Valve Configuration.Unsecured Bit Manual Bypass Isolation Valve Was Verified Closed & Chain & Lock Secured Valve Tee Handle.With
ML20211N2611999-09-0808 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Irradiation of Fuel Rods Beyond Current Lead Rod Burnup Limit & Clarification of Terminology with Respect to Reconstituted Fuel Assemblies Acceptable ML20216E5011999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Naps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211J2421999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Removal of Augmented Insp Program on RCS Bypass Lines from Licensing Basis of North Anna,Units 1 & 2 ML20211J2561999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Elimination of Augmented ISI Program for Pressurizer Spray Lines at North Anna Unit 2 ML18152B3831999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section XI Requirements for Containment Insp ML20210T0791999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Withdrawal Schedules for North Anna Units 1 & 2 Satisfy Requirements of App H to 10CFR50 & Therefore Acceptable ML20210Q9931999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to COLR for North Anna Power Station,Unit 2 Cycle 13 Pattern Ud ML20210S1411999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for North Anna Power Station.With ML20209E5641999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for North Anna Power Stations,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195G1901999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for NAPS Units 1 & 2. with 05000338/LER-1999-004, :on 990413,position Switch for Suction Supply Dampers to CR Emergency Fan Was Discovered Out of Position. Cause Could Not Be Determined.Station Entered Action Statement for TS 3.7.7.1.With1999-05-11011 May 1999
- on 990413,position Switch for Suction Supply Dampers to CR Emergency Fan Was Discovered Out of Position. Cause Could Not Be Determined.Station Entered Action Statement for TS 3.7.7.1.With
ML20206L4831999-05-10010 May 1999 SER Accepting Request to Delay Submitting Plant,Unit 1 Class 1 Piping ISI Program for Third Insp Interval Until 010430, to Permit Development of Risk Informed ISI Program for Class 1 Piping ML20206Q6671999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000338/LER-1999-003, :on 990331,potential Loss of HHSI Pumps, Occurred Due to Postulated Main CR Fire.Caused by Incomplete Understanding of Time Sensitivity of Actions Required to Avoid Potential Loss.Procedure Revised.With1999-04-27027 April 1999
- on 990331,potential Loss of HHSI Pumps, Occurred Due to Postulated Main CR Fire.Caused by Incomplete Understanding of Time Sensitivity of Actions Required to Avoid Potential Loss.Procedure Revised.With
ML20206C0151999-04-22022 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 219 & 200 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20205S0391999-04-21021 April 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief IWE5,per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & Proposed Alternatives for IWE2,IWE4,IWE6 & IWL2 Authorized Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20205K3041999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000338/LER-1999-002, :on 990213,isolation Valve Was Unsecured. Caused by Valve Configuration.Unsecured Valve Verified to Be Closed & Chain & Lock Placed in Manner That Would Secure Valve Tee Handle.With1999-03-11011 March 1999
- on 990213,isolation Valve Was Unsecured. Caused by Valve Configuration.Unsecured Valve Verified to Be Closed & Chain & Lock Placed in Manner That Would Secure Valve Tee Handle.With
ML20207H4451999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 218 & 199 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20207K5921999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207E1731999-02-18018 February 1999 Informs Commission of Status of Preparations of IAEA Osart Mission to North Anna Nuclear Power Plant Early Next Year 05000338/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990106,RCS Leak Rate Missed Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Computer Malfunction.Computer Malfunction Affecting VCT & Pzr Level Inputs Was Corrected. with1999-01-22022 January 1999
- on 990106,RCS Leak Rate Missed Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Computer Malfunction.Computer Malfunction Affecting VCT & Pzr Level Inputs Was Corrected. with
ML20205A0241998-12-31031 December 1998 Summary of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of SEs Implemented at Plant During 1998,per 10CFR50.59(b)(2).With ML20199C8781998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20198H9541998-12-0303 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative for Remainder of Second 10-yr Insp Interval for Plant ML20198J5561998-12-0303 December 1998 ISI Summary Rept for North Anna Power Station,Unit 1 1998 Refueling Outage Owner Rept for Inservice Insps ML20197G8551998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000338/LER-1998-007-01, :on 981015,3B Casing Cooling Pump Failed to Develop Discharge Pressure & Recirculation.Caused by Air Binding.Subject Pump Was Vented of Air,Started & Tested Satisfactorily.With1998-11-12012 November 1998
- on 981015,3B Casing Cooling Pump Failed to Develop Discharge Pressure & Recirculation.Caused by Air Binding.Subject Pump Was Vented of Air,Started & Tested Satisfactorily.With
ML20196G1381998-11-0303 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Rev to Relief Request NDE-32 for Remainder of Second 10-yr Insp Interval for Each Unit ML20195D0571998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20155H0351998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 215 & 196 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively ML20154L0691998-10-14014 October 1998 COLR for North Anna Power Station Unit 1 Cycle 14 Pattern Xy ML20155J6911998-10-0909 October 1998 Staff Response to Tasking Memorandum & Stakeholder Concerns 05000338/LER-1998-005-01, :on 980921,safety Valve Setpoints Were Noted Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Variance.Valves Were Disassembled,Inspected,Repaired as necessary,re-assembled & Tested Satisfactory.With1998-10-0707 October 1998
- on 980921,safety Valve Setpoints Were Noted Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Variance.Valves Were Disassembled,Inspected,Repaired as necessary,re-assembled & Tested Satisfactory.With
05000338/LER-1998-006-01, :on 980922,ESFA Occurred.Caused by Human Error. Safety Injection Signal Was Reset & Equipment Was Restored to Normal1998-10-0707 October 1998
- on 980922,ESFA Occurred.Caused by Human Error. Safety Injection Signal Was Reset & Equipment Was Restored to Normal
05000339/LER-1998-004-02, :on 980917,reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Lightning Strike.Operations Emergency Procedure 2-E-0, RT or SI Was Entered1998-10-0606 October 1998
- on 980917,reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Lightning Strike.Operations Emergency Procedure 2-E-0, RT or SI Was Entered
05000339/LER-1998-003-01, :on 980424,multiple Failures Occurred During Functional Testing of RCS Large Bore Snubbers.Cause Unknown. Large Bore Snubbers Replaced.With1998-10-0505 October 1998
- on 980424,multiple Failures Occurred During Functional Testing of RCS Large Bore Snubbers.Cause Unknown. Large Bore Snubbers Replaced.With
ML20154H4001998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000338/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980902,motor Operated Valve Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Entered 24 H Action of TS 4.0.3 & Station Deviation Rept Was Initiated to Document Condition.With1998-09-22022 September 1998
- on 980902,motor Operated Valve Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Entered 24 H Action of TS 4.0.3 & Station Deviation Rept Was Initiated to Document Condition.With
05000338/LER-1998-003, :on 980804,service Water Supports Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Component Supports Were Examined & Found to Be Acceptable.With1998-09-17017 September 1998
- on 980804,service Water Supports Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Component Supports Were Examined & Found to Be Acceptable.With
ML20151X8011998-09-10010 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980622,groundwater Level at Piezometer P-22 Was Again Noted to Be Above Max Water Level by 0.71 Feet. Increased Frequency of Piezometer Monitoring & Installed Addl Piezometers at Toe of Slope Along Southwest Section 1999-09-08
[Table view] |
Text
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W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 l
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 1
I RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 215 AND 196 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-4 AND NPF-7 l
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY l
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. UNIT NO.1 AND NO. 2 l
DOCKET NOS. 50-338 AND 50-339
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l By letter dated November 6,1996 the Virginia Electric and Power Company, the licensee for I
the North Anna Power Station, proposed changes to the plant technical specifications (TS).
Additional information was provided by letters dated April 15, July 14, and October 16,1998.
l The requested changes included: (1) the modification of the existing TS addressing reactor j
coolant system (RCS) loop stop valve operation and (2) adding an additional TS that allows RCS loop stop valve operation with the associated isolated portion of the RCS drained. The existing TS relating to loop stop valve operation prohibits operation of the loop stop valves when the associated loops are not full. The Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications l
do not address or permit this particular evolution. The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) l Section of the Reactor Systems Branch (SRXB), with the help of the Instrumentation and l
Controls Branch (HICB), has reviewed the submittals and the TS changes and concluded that the changes to the TS and licensing basis are acceptable.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The original North Anna design and was intended to allow power operation with one of the reactor coolant loops isolated from the RCS. This configuration has never been permitted at i
North Anna and is now prohibited by the TS. As a result, the TS that currently address loop stop valve operation while at power or in startup (modes 1 and 2) are no longer necessary l
because TS 3.4.1.1 requires all three loops in service and power removed from the open stop valves during these modes. The original design basis requires that a loop be filled with the reactor coolant pump (RCP) having been operated with a flow of greater than 125 gpm for at least 90 minutes prior to opening a loop stop valve. Additionally, the specification requires that the temperature and boron concentration of the isolated portion of the loop be sampled frequently prior to putting an isolated loop into service. These restrictions are necessary to assure there are no boron dilution or temperature excursions when the filled loop is unisolated.
i l
However, if the loops are drained, all of these restrictions are not necessary. A new specification has been added to allow loop stop valve operation with drained loops in cold shutdown and in refueling (modes 5 and 6). With a drained loop, there is no possibility of diluted water from the isolated loop entering the reactor. Additionally, the potential for a volume of cold water from the isolated loop entering the reactor is also not possible. If the loops are not 9911090305 981030 PDR ADOCK 0b000338 P
PDR
2 drained, the modified TS continue to require that all of the same current restrictions are maintained, regardless of the' mode of operation. The new specification does require the removal of some of the loop stop valve interlocks; however, these restrictions will continue to be maintained administratively in the TS.
Although allowing the opening of a loop stop valve with the loop drained and the removal of the interlocks preventing this is not addressed in the Westinghouse standard TS, a simitar specification was approved by the staff in April of 1993 for the Surry Nuclear Power Station.
The benefit of this new specification is that it prevents the necessity of always requiring 90 minutes of relief line flow using the RCPs and reduces the number of RCP starts necessary to unisolate a loop. This increases the usefullife of the RCPs and speeds up the startup process.
3.0 EVALUATION Opening the loop stop valves in a drained loop in modes 5 and 6 is acceptable because the licensee has addressed the safety issues associated with the evolution. The new TS 3.4.1.6 limits the evolution to modes 5 and 6. This bounds the temperaturo extremes where the evolution can occur and requires a minimum amount of shutdown margin. The licensee performed an evaluation to show that, if the evolution occurs at the temperature extremes permitted by the specification, the temperature excursions are acceptable. For a colder secondary side than primary side, the reactivity addition associated with the cooldown was found to be acceptable (see below). Additionally, when the primary system is colder than the secondary system, the heatup was evaluated and verified to be acceptable. The expansion of the RCS due to the heatup will not cause an unacceptable system pressure transient and the expansion rate is well within the capacity of both one pressurizer power-operated relief valve and one residual heat removal (RHR) relief valve.
TS 3.4.1.6.a.1 will require that the loops be drained and verified drained prior to opening a stop valve and this will prevent a boron dilution from occurring and causing a reactivity excursion.
Additionally, a calculation performed by the licensee indicated the worst possible temperature change that could occur as a result of opening the isolation valves will not cause a significant reactivity excursion. The calculated reactivity change caused by the temperature change is less than one half the minimum shutdown margin required by the TS for these modes.
Additionally, TS 3.4.1.6.a.3 requires the source range instrumentation to be operable and monitored to provide some assurance that, even if a reactivity excursion occurs, it will be identified and mitigated.
The controls in TS 3.4.1.6 inc!ude the requirement to maintain a water volume of 450 ft 8 in the pressurizer prior to and during the loop filling. This amount of water is sufficient to maintain an adequate RHR suction source even if all three RCS loops were opened simultaneously. The value of 450 ft
- ensures that there continues to be a good deal of margin if all three loops are opened simultaneously with one of the three loops at a vacuum. The licensee has evaluated the instrument uncertainty associated with the safety-related pressurizer level instnrnentation that will be used to verify that the TS-required volume in the pressurizer is sufficient. The 450 ft 8 in the TS includes sufficient margin to account for the instrument uncertainties associated with the hot-calibrated channel adjusted for cold conditions with
3 considerable margin. The analysis to support volume of 450 ft* is conservative because the TS bases allow the backfill evolution in a controlled manner to one isolated loop at a time, while the analysis is performed assuming that all three loops are fully opened at once. Therefore the volume of 450 ft'is acceptable. The backfill evolution should not reduce inventory sufficiently to challenge RHR cooling and is acceptable.
The portion of the loop isolation valve interlocks that deals with the temperature and relief line flow will be eliminated. These interlocks are not required while operating the isolation valve in a drained loop. However, Specification 3.4.1.5 and the associated operating procedures retain the restrictions previously imposed by the interlocks for the case of restoring a filled and isolated loop in a controlled manner such that the potential for inadvertant criticality during restoration of a filled, isolated loop has not increased.
The requirements in the TS and the administrative controls are acceptable for these applications and the elimination of those portions of the interlocks is acceptable.
4.0 TS Chances Each TS was individually reviewed and found to be acceptable. A summary of the changes and justifications are provided below.
TS 3.4.1.4 The specification has been modified to change the modes of applicability of the isolated loop specification from all modes to modes 3,4,5, and 6. The modes of applicability modification is acceptable because the TS do not permit mode 1 or 2 operation with loops isolated. As a result, the specification is not applicable in modes 1 and 2 and the change is acceptable.
The references to the boron sampling of an isolated loop were modified to require boron 4
sampling of an isolated undrained loop. It is not necessary to sample the boron concentration in a drained loop and, as a resu!t, this change is acceptable.
TS 3.4.1.5 The specification has been modified to change the modes of applicability of the isolated loop specification from all modes to modes 3,4,5, and 6. The modes of applicability modification is acceptable because the TS do not perrnit mode 1 or 2 operation with loops isolated. As a result, the specification is not applicable in modes 1 and 2 and the change is acceptable.
- The specification is also being changed to only apply when the loops are not drained. This is acceptable because a new specification TS 3.4.1.6 is being added to address loop startup while drained. Additionally, the specification is being modified to require that an isolated loop have the A.C. power removed and the breaker locked open for the associated loop stop valves. This prevents inadvertent operation of the isolation valves and is acceptable. A note has been added to allow the valve to be c!osed for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for maintenance or testing without power being removed and the breaker being locked open. Two hours is acceptable to perform maintenance and testing with power to the valves. As a result, the specification is acceptable.
.-.-~ - _ _ - _ - -. _
l TS 3.4.1.6 This specification has been added to allow opening a loop stop valve with the associated loop being drained. The new specification is acceptable because sufficient controls are in place to assure the filling of the isolated loop is performed safely. The controls in TS 3.4.1.6 include the verification of the loop being drained, a pressurizer water volume of 450 ft (includes sufficient margin to account for expected instrument uncertainty), and the source range neutron flux monitor being operable. During the loop filling, the specification requires that pressurizer water 8
volume remain above 450 ft, the source range count rate shall be monitored and not increase by a factor of more than two, and the hot and cold leg stop valves shall be fully opened within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the filling of the drained loop is complete. The licensee has performed conservative analyses to show that the potential temperature and reactivity changes that may occur as a result of the evolution are acceptable. As a result, the staff finds the specification acceptable.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Virginia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comment.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 64396). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
l
7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by l
operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the i
Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
1 Principal Contributor C. Jackson Date: October 30, 1998
.