ML20154H469
| ML20154H469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  (DPR-44-A-225, DPR-56-A-229) |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1998 |
| From: | Capra R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154H466 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810140202 | |
| Download: ML20154H469 (38) | |
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UNITED STATE 8 s
P; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. maa.mq PECO ENERGY COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO, 50-277 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
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Amendment No.225 8
Ucense No. DPR-44 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by PECO Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 20,1998; as revised by letters dated June 26, August 11, and September 14, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1.
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated j
in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating
- License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:
i 9810140202 981005 I
PDR ADOCK 05000277 i
P PDR
f 2-(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 225, are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO Energy Company shall operate the facility in acccidar.ca with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented during October 1998 refueling outa08-FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M Q.-( W Robert A. Capra, Director i
Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Reactor Projects -1/ll Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4
Attachment:
. Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: October 5, 1998
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i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 225 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44 DOCKET NO. 50-277 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised areas are indicated by marginallines.
Remove jns.t.d I
i 1.1-3 1.1-3 3.3-31a 3.3-31b 3.3-31c I
i B 3.3-91a B 3.3-91b l
B 3.3-91c B 3.3-91d B 3.3-91e B 3.3-91f B 3.3 91g B 3.3-91h B 3.3-911 B 3.3-91) h
i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1-1 1.1 Definitionr 1.1-1 i
1.2 Logical Connectors...................
1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times....................
1.3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 i
2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations 2.0-1 j
3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY.... 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS............... 3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 3.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies................ 3.1-5 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY 3.1-7
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3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1-12 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... 3.1-15 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control 3.1-18 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1-20 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves. 3.1-26 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2-1 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) 3.2-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) 3.2-2 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) 3.2-4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3-1 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.3-1
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3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation 3.3-10 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3-16 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Ltvel Trip Instrumentation.... <............ 3.3-22 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation...
3.3-24 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System............... 3.3-27 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation 3.3-29 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation.....
3.3-31a thru 3.3-31c 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3-32 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................. 3.3-44 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-48 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-55 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)
System Instrumentation 3.3-59 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3-61 3.3.8.2 Reacter Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitor 1.1g..................... 3.3-66 (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 i
Amendment No. 222,225
m 0
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)
END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that
-RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shali be:
a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is i
captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All-LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; c.
Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; d.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT. GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod.
It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 1.1-3 Amendment No.2f0,24, 225
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E0C-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.2 a.
Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1.
Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure; and 2.
Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low.
E b.
The following limits are made applicable:
1.
LCO 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR; and 2.
LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"
limits for inoperable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR.
APPLICABILITY:
THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable.
OPERABLE status.
M A.2
NOTE---------
Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.
J Place channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trip.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-31a Amendment No. 225
t EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
One or more Functions B.1 Restore E0C-RPT trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> with EOC-RPT trip capability.
capability not l
maintained.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
. associated Completion recirculation pump Time not met.
from service.
DB C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to < 30% RTP.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE-------------------------------------
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.
l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
92 days (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-31b Amendment No. 225
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2
' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '(continued)
- l-SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 24 months
. Allowable Values'shall be:
TSV-Closure: s 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low:
a 500 psig.
SR 3.3.4.2.3-Perform' LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including breaker actuation.
Verify TSV--Closure and TCV Fast Closure, 24 months Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when -THERMAL. POWER is a 30% RTP.
SR.3.3.4.2.5
NOTE-------------------
Breaker interruption time may be assumed from_the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.
Verify the EOC-RPT' SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a
- is within limits.
STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.4.2.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.
60 months l
PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-31c Amendment No.225
TABLE OF CONTENTS 8 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)
B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs.................
B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7 83.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY...
B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-10 8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS..............
B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)
B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies............... B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1.............
B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22 B 3.l.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators..........
B 3.1-29 B 3.1. S Rod Pattern Control B 3.1-34 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System B 3.1-39 B 3.1.8
. Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
B 3.2-6 B 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)
B 3.2-11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1
- B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1
- B 3.3. L 2 Wide' Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation B 3.3-36 B 3.3.t.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-45 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................
B 3.3-58 8 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation..
B 3.3-65 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System..............
B 3.3-76 B 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation
' Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation B 3.3-83
. 8 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip -
(EOC-RPT) Instrumentation... B 3.3-91a thru 8 3.3-91j B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Instrumentation................
B 3.3-92 B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................
B 3.3-130 8 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-141 8 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-169 B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)
System Instrumentation B 3.3-180 81 3. 3. 8. 1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-187 8 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3-199 (continued)
Revision No.
PBAPS UNIT 2 i
Amendment No. 222,225 I--
l EOC-RPT Instrumentation l
B 3.3.4.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION-I B 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients and to minimize the decrease in core MCPR during these transients.
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The benefit of the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity considerations.
Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods insert only a small amount of negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) -Closure. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.
The EOC-RPT instrumentation, as shown in Reference 1, is composed of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation pump motors. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an EOC-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The EOC-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.
Each EOC-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TSV-Closure or two TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate.
If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip. There are two EOC-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two EOC-RPT breakers for each recirculation (continued)
Revision No.
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91a Amendment No. 225
{
i EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND pump, and the second trip system trips the other EOC-RPT (continued) breaker for each recirculation pump.
APPLICABLE The TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure-Low Functions are designed to trip the LCO, and recirculation pumps in the event of a turbine trip or APPLICABILITY generator load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat flux, and pressurization transients, and to minimize the decrease in MCPR. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that utilize EOC-RPT, are summarized in References 2, 3, and 4.
i To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the EOC-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of closure movement of either the TSVs or the TCVs. The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than a scram alone so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. Alternatively, APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.1,
" AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEC GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPt operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)")
for an inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to allow this LCO to be met. The EOC-RPT function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < 30% RTP.
EOC-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
The OPERABILITY of the EOC-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions, i.e., the TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions.
Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.4.2.3.
Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated EOC-RPT breakers. Each channel (including the associated EOC-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.
Allowable Values are specified for each EOC-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Trip setpoints are specified in the plant design documentation. The trip setpoints are selected (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.3-91b ggN No. 225
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 l
BASES l
APPLICABLE to ensure that the actual setpoints do not exceed the SAFETY ANALYSES, Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
LCO, and Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the APPLICABILITY trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is (continued) acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setting is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip l'
setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which l
an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameters (e.g. TSV position), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., limit switch) changes state.
The analytic limit for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function was determined based on the TCV hydraulic oil circuit design. The Allowable Value is derived from the analytic limit, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoint is determined from the analytical limit corrected for calibration, process, and instrumentation errors, as well as L
instrument drift, as applicable. The Allowable Value and trip setpoint for the TSV-Closure Function was determined by engineering judgment and historically accepted practice for similar trip functions.
The specific Applicable Safety Analysis,.LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
4 Alternatively, since the instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, l
modifications to the APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR i
multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.I, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2, l
" MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to i
allow this LCO to be met. The appropriate MCPR operating limits and power-dependent thermal limit adjustments for the EOC-RPT inoperable condition are specified in the COLR.
Turbine Stoo Valve-Closure Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited.
Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TSV-Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves.
EOC-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.
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(continued) l l
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91c Revision No.
Amendment No. 225 l
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 l
BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Stoo valve-Closure (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSIS, l
LCO, and Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the position l
APPLICABILITY of each valve. There are position switches associated with each stop valve, the signal from each switch being assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TSV-Closure Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first l
stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically l
by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; l
therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect l
this Function.
Four channels of TSV-Closure, with two i
channels in each-trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.
l The TSV-Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure.
This E0C-RPT Function is required, consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and i
the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Scram Clamp Functions of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to i
maintain the necessary safety margins.
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio Oil Pressure-Low Fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection-results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux _ transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure,-Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The EOC-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids I
the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.
l Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure switch associated'with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned l
to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function is such that two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure switch trips)
(continued 1 PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91d Revision No.
Amendment No._.225 i
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j EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-Low SAFETY ANALYSIS, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This.is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.
Four channels of TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to
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ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.
This protection is required consistent with the safety i
analysis whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and the APRM Scram Clamp Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.
ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to 1
EOC-RPT instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion i
Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separat0 inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channel.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2-B 3.3-91e Revision No..
Araendraent No. 225
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E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES' ACTIONS L1 (continued)
With one or more channels inoperable, but with EOC-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases),
the EOC-RPT System is capable of. performing the intended function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the EOC-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the EOC-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore compliance with the LC0.
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities.
affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is
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provided to restore the inoperable channels (Required Action A.1). Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in trip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore j
capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow i
operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open).
If it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an RPT, or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.
)
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Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the EOC-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated EOC-RPT breakers to be OPERABLE.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91f Revision No.
Amendment No. 225 a -.
i EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2
. BASES ACTIONS 3.d (continued)
The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is sufficient time for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the EOC-RPT instrumentation during this period.
It is also consistent with the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provided in LC0 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for Required Action A.1, since this instrumentation's purpose is to preclude a thermal limit violation.
C.1 and C.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 30% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Alternately, for an inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open) the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service, since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 30% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS when a channel is placed in'an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumptibn of the average time required to perform channel Surveil h nce.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91g Revision No.
Amendment No. 225
_ = - -. -
t EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 5.
SR 3.3.4.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.4.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel (s) would also be inoperable.
The 24 month frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91h Revision No.
Amendment No. 225
~*
l
'EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Func'tions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint.
i Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid.
If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are
' bypassed at a 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV-Closure i
and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).
If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.
L The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgement and reliability of the components.
SR 3.3,4.2.5 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 6.
^
A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption L
time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.
This is allowed since the time to open the
-contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.
t (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-911 Revision No.-
Amendment No. 225
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, the 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
SR 3.3.4.2.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc suppression time plus time to open the contacts) is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.
i REFERENCES 1.
UFSAR, Figure 7.9.4A, Sheet 3 of 3 (EOC-RPT logic j
diagram).
2.
UFSAR, Section 7.9.4.4.3.
3.
UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.2.4.
4.
NEDE-240ll-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," latest approved version.
5.
GENE-770-06-1-A, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"
December 1992.
6.
Core Operating Limits Report.
1 d
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91j Revision No.
Amendment No. 225 a
e-f n tie l
>\\
p UNITED STATES s
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
WASHINGTON, D.C. 30seM001 PECO ENERGY COMPANY PUBLIC SuRVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY l
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-278 EEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 3
\\
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 229 License No. DPR-56 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by PECO Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 20,1998; as revised by letters dated June 26, August 11, and September 14, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,-
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such b
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 4
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:
l 2
i i.
J
.,i._.
a i
l
. (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 229. are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented during October 1999 refueling outage.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
'bt+ q. Cw Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/Il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: October 5, 1998 W
L l
l l
o' 4
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. ?>o FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 56 DOCKET NO. 50-278 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Remove lated I
i 1.1-3 1.1-3 1
3.3-31a 3.3-31b 3.3-31c i
i B 3.3-92a B 3.3-92b B 3.3-92c B 3.3-92d B 3.3 92e B 3.3-92f B 3.3-92g B 3.3-92h B 3.3-921 B 3.3-92j
- p1 TABLE.0F CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION...................._ l.1-1 1.1-Definitions'......................
1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors...................
1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times....................
1.3-1 1.4 Frequency _..............-.........
1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs 2.0 2.2' SL Violations
..................... -2.0-1
-3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY....
3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS......._........ 3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 3.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies................
3.1-5 3.1.3-Control Rod OPERABILITY..............
3.1-7
'3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1-12 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators...........
3.1-15 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control
................- 3.1-18 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1-20 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves.
3.1-26 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS............... -3.2-1 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) 3.2-1 9
3.2.2-MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) 3.2-2 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) 3.2-4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
.................... 3.3-1 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation..
3.3-1 3.3.1. 2.
Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrument'Ation 3.3-10 3.3.2.1:
Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3-161
-3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation..................
3.3-22 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation...
3.3-24 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown fystem................
3.3-27 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Tran:1ent Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (A1VS-RPT)-Instrumentation 3.3-29 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation..... 3.3-31a thru 3.3-31c 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3-32 l
3.3.5.2 Reactor. Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System h
Instrumentation...........-...... 3.3-44
.3.3.6.1 Prteary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-48
'3.3.6.2_
SeconAry Containment Isolation ~ Instrumentation 3.3-55 3.3.7.1 Maic Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)
. System Instrumentation 3.3-59
- 3.3.8.1~
Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3-61
- 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System Monitoring'........(RPS) Electric Power 3.3-66 (continued)-
'PBAPS UNIT 3
'i Amendment No. 224, 229
o l
Definitions l-1.1 1.1 Definitions (cont'inued)
END OF CYCLE-The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil 4
control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;,
c.
Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; d.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod.
It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 1.1-3 Amendment No.244, 249, 229 i
i
1 I
]
2 EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 1
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION-3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation LCO.3.3.4.2 a.
Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1.
Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure; and 2.
Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Cil Pressure-Low.
E b.
The following limits are made applicable:
1.
LCO 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR; and 2.
LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"
limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR.
APPLICABILITY:
THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------
1 Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
]
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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable.
OPERABLE status.
E A.2
NOTE---------
Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.
Place channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trip.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-31a Amendment No. 229
~ _ _ _
4 EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 i
ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
'B.
One or more Functions B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> with EOC-RPT trip capability.
. capability not maintained.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> associated Completion ~
recirculation pump Time not met.
from service.
08 C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to < 30% RTP.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE-------------------------------------
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for.up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided.the associated Function maintains
.EOC-RPT trip capability.
l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
92 days t
(continued) t j
PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-31b Amendment No.229
- g.t.
EDC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l
l SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 24 months Allowable Values shall be:
l'
- TSV-Closure: s 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low:
a 500 psig.
i SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months l
including breaker actuation.
SR 3.3.4.2.4 Verify TSV--Closure and TCV Fast Closure, 24 months Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP.
NOTE-------------------
Breaker' interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of l
Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a is within limits.
~
STAGGERED TEST BASIS L
SR 3.3.4.2.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.
60 months l
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4 I
PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-31c Amendment No.229 l
l-r;
.t TABLE OF CONTENTS
{
B 2.0 SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)'
B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs................. B 2.0-1 8 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Pressure SL B 2.0-7
~
.B 3.0
. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT-(SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.(,-10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.............. B 3.1-1 8 3.1.1-SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)
B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies............... B 3.1-8 i
B 3.1.3 -
Control Rod OPERABILITY _............. B 3.1-13 B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22 B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators.......... B 3.1-29 B'3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System B 3.1-34 B 3.1-39 B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
B 3.2-6
.B 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)
B 3.2-11 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.2-Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation B 3.3-37 B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-46 B 3 3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................ B 3.3-59
'B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.. B 3.3-66 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System.............. B 3.3-77 8 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation
. Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation 8 3.3.4.2 -
End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip B 3.3-84 (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation... B 3.3-92a thru B 3.3-92j 8 3.3.5.1,
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Instrumentation................ B 3.3-93 B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................ B 3.3-131 t
B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-142 B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-169 B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)
System Instrumentation B 3.3-180 B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-187 L
B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3-199 t
(continued) 4
.. Revision No.
PBAPS UNIT 3 i
Amendment No.
224, 229
s 4
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients and to minimize the decrease in core MCPR during these transients.
The benefit of the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity. considerations.
Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods insert only a small amount of negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) -Closure. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.
The EOC-RPT instrumentation, as shown in Reference 1, is composed of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation pump motors. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an E0C-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The EOC-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.
i Each EOC-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TSV-Closure or two TCV Fast closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate.
If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip. There are two EOC-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two EOC-RPT breakers for each recirculation (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92a Revision No.
Amendment No. 229
.e_
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND pump, and the second trip system trips the other EOC-RPT 1
(continued) breaker for each recirculation pump.
APPLICABLE The TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure-Low Functions are designed to trip the LCO, and recirculation pumps in the event of a turbine trip or APPLICABILITY generator. load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat flux, and pressurization transients, and to minimize the decrease in MCPR. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that utilize EOC-RPT, are summarized in References 2, 3, and 4.
To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the EOC-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of closure movement of either the TSVs or the TCVs. The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than a scram alone so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. Alternatively, APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC. of LCO 3.2.1,
" AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)")
for an inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to allow this LCO to be met.
The E0C-RPT function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < 30% RTP.
EOC-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
The OPERABILITY of the EOC-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions, i.e., the TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low FunctiNs.
Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of
Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated EOC-RPT breakers. Each channel (including the associated EOC-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.
Allowable Values are specified for each EOC-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Trip setpoints are specified in the plant design documentation. The trip setpoints are selected (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92b Revision No __.
Amendment No. 229
- j s W -RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 i
e BASES i
. APPLICABLE to ensure that the actual setpoints do not exceed the
)
SAFETY ANALYSES, Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
LCO, and Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the APPLICABILITY trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is
-(continued) acceptable.. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setting is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameters (e.g. TSV position), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., limit switch)
}
changes state.
The analytic limit for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function was~ determined based on the j
TCV hydraulic oil circuit design. The Allowable Value is derived from the analytic limit, corrected' for calibration, n
process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoint is determined from the analytical limit corrected for calibration, process, and instrumentation errors, as well as instrument drift, as applicable. The Allowable Value and L
trip setpoint for the TSV-Closure Function was determined by i
engineering judgment and historically accepted practice for i
similar trip functions.
The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and 2
. Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
\\L Alternatively, since the instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, i
modifications to the APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.I, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR i
HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2, j
" MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to
. allow this LCO to be met. The appropriate MCPR operating j
limits and power-dependent thermal limit adjustments for the EOC-RPT inoperable condition are specified in the COLR.
i Turbine Ston Valve-Closure i
I Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited.
4 Therefore, an' RPT is initiated on TSV-Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves.
E0C-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92c Revision No.
3 Amendment No. 229
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE-Turbine Ston Valve-Closure - (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSIS, LCO, and Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the position APPLICABILITY of each valve. There are position switches associated with each stop valve, the signal from each switch being assfgned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TSV-Closure Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to produce an E0C-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function. Four channels of TSV-Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.
The TSV-Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure.
This EOC-RPT Function is required, consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP.
Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Scram Clan Functions of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to j
maintain the necessary safety margins.
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-tow Fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection l
results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux _ transients that must be' limited. Therefore, art RPT is initiated on TCV Fast.
Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The EOC-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.
Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressura switch associated with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function is such that two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure switch trips) 4 l
(continued 1 L
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92d Revision No.
l Amendment No. 229
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation' B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trin Oil Pressure-Low -
SAFETY ANALYSIS, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at
' THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass-valves may affect this Function.
Four channels of TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to.
ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an E0C-RPT from this function on a valid signal. The TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Allowable Value. is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.
This protection is required consistent with the safety analysis whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure--High and the APRM Scram' Clamp Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.
4 ACTIONS
. A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to E0C-RPT instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition cpntinue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable EOC-RPT-instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry'for each inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channel.
j 4
2' (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92e Revision No.
Amendment No. 229 4
- 7. j a E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES ACTIONS
-M (continued)
With one or more channels inoperable, but with E0C-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases),
the EOC-RPT System is capable of performing the intended function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the EOC-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the EOC-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore compliance with the LCO.
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is provided to restore the inoperable channels (Required Action A.1). Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in trip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable ~ channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open). 'If it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an RPT, or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.
M Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the EOC-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated EOC-RPT breakers to be OPERABLE.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92f Revision No..
Amendment No. 229 v
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- . g y EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued)
The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is sufficient time for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the E0C-RPT instrumentation during this period.
It is also consistent with the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provided in LC0 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for Required Action A.1, since this instrumentation's purpose is to preclude a thermal limit violation.
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'C.1 and C.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 30% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Alternately, for an inoperable breaker (e.g., the i
^
breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open) the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service, since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation.
The-allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 30% RTP from full power conditions in-an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
'l SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS
.when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for
. performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />'provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT-trip capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or.
expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> al.lowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the' applicable Condition l
entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the t-recirculation pumps will trip when necessary.
(continued)
PBAPS' UNIT'3 8 3.3-92g Revision No.
Amendment No. 229 i
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..x EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 i
' BASES
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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 5.
SR 3.3.4.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. -This test verifies the channel l
responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
l SR 3.3.4.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the l
associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is i
incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel (s) l-would also be inoperable. -
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the L
Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
4 (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92h Revision No.
Amendment No. 229
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e EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint.
Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid.
If any 6:tpass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the functions are bypassed at a 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV-Closure and-TCV F'50 Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions are cons Me m ' IN perable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can L
.te l ace.: in the conservative condition (nonbypass).
If place 1...ne nonbypass condition, this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.
Tne Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgement and reliability of the components.
SR 3.3.4.2.5 This SR ensures that. the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.
The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 6.
A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.
This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-921 Revision No.
Amendment No. 229 I
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EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES J
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS
?
EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, the 24 month Frequency is 4
consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components that cause i
serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
J This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc
~
suppression time plus time to open the contacts) is provided i
to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.
i REFERENCES 1.
UFSAR, Figure 7.9.4A, Sheet 3 of 3 (EOC-RPT logic diagram).
4 2.
UFSAR, Section 7.9.4.4.3.
3.
UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.2.4.
l 4.
NEDE-240ll-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application 3-for Reactor Fuel," latest approved version.
5.
GENE-770-06-1-A, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"
December 1992.
6.
Core Operating Limits Report.
PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92j Revision No.
Amendment No. 229