ML20153D188
| ML20153D188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1988 |
| From: | Bloch P, Bright G, Paris O Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power, GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| References | |
| CON-#388-6986 87-554-04-OLA, 87-554-4-OLA, OLA, NUDOCS 8809020086 | |
| Download: ML20153D188 (92) | |
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.l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'88 AUG 29 P3 :40 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFH u :
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B0 W % ^ j "60 Before Administrative Judges:
Peter B. Bloch, Chair 0
Dr sca H ris i
)
In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-320-OLA (Disposal of Accident-GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR GeneratedWater) 3 CORPORATION, et al.
(ASLBP No. 87-554-04-0LA)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2)
August 25, 1988 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Rulings on Motions For Sumary Dispositica) 1.
INTRODUCTION The issue be h re us is almost a decade old.
It originated during the frmous Three Mile Island (Unit 2) accident in 1979. As a result of the accident, the reactor building basement was covered with about 250,000 gallons cf accident generated water (AGW). NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, a'. 2.1, 52.1 and Table 2.1.
Since the accident, additional water has dccumulated. Ibidi see, e.g., M. at 2.3, Table 2.2.
Water not present at the time of the accident but which has been used for cleanup following the accident is classified as AGW because it has become l
contaminated. The final volume of AGW at the end of defueling is i
8809020006 080025 9
DR ADOCK 0500 0
L
f,
?
. j expected to be approximately 2.3 million gallons. J,dat2.3(Table 2.2, 4
footnote (c)).
Several alternative methods for disposing of the AGW have been i
considered.
I,ge_, e.g., id,. a t v - v i i, i nc l ud i ng Ta bl e S. I. After considering the scunary disposition papers before us, we have concluded 1
that the principal remaining genuine issue of fact, for which there shall be a hearing, is whether the AGW should be evaporated (and the solidified evaporator bottoms properly buriod), as proposed by General Public Utilities (GPU or Licensee), or whether it should be stored in tanks on-site (the "no action alternative"), perhaps for 30 years, to allow most of the tritium to decay.
We note that the Licensee differs with the NRC Staff (Staff) about the cost of these two alternatives and that the record does not contain detailed information on the cost of on-site storage for 30 years.1 We are not sure why more consideration was not given the no action alternative, but a possibility is that the Staff failed to give it adequate consideration because it believed that Commission policy prohibited it. NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at 3.34, 53.5.1.4 Our reading of l
the Commission policy differs.
The key language in the Comission's policy statement is:
1 1
The Staff estimate of costs appears to include up to $1 million for replacement of tanks, apparently during the 150-year storage period assumed by Staff to allow tritium to dGCay to background level.
Thirty year storage costs appear not to have been considereo by Staff.
l l
l
... [T]he licensee should accelerate the pace of the cleanup to complete expeditiously all decontamination activities consistent with ensuring protection of public health and safety and the environment.
(emphasis a Hed).
(Statement of Policy; Programatic Environmental Impact Statement of the Cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissic.n, 46 FR 24764 (May 1,1961). We do not interpret this language as restricting the search, under NEPA and ALARA policies, for the best way to treat the AGW, whether that entails leaving it on site or disposing of it. We also note the following genuine issues of fact in the record, to be discussed further below:
(1) the amount of tritium now present in each of the separately stored portions of the AGW, and (2) the seriousness of the health effects of the release of tritium through evaporation.
II. BACKGR0llND OF UNDISPUTED FACTS After tho 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, in March 1981, the NRC Staff issued the Final Programatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) on the TMI-2 cleanup.
In the PEIS the Staff addressed, based on the available information, the impacts of future disposal of the AGW. The NRC Comission in an April 27, 1981 Policy Statement (46 Fed. Reg. 24764) accompanying the issuance of the PEIS, stated that any future proposal for disposition of the AGW shall be referred to the Commission for approval.
On July 31, 1986, the Licensee proposed a plan to evaporate the AGW by forced heating at the TMI site over a period of about 21 years. On J
December 29, 1986 the NRC Staff issued for coment an updated Draft Supplement No. 2 to the PEIS on this issue. The draft supplement ds30ssed the environmental consequences of the Licensee's proposed disposhi method as well as a number of alternatives.
Following a 90-day public comment period, the Staff prepared the Ff nal Supplement No. 2 which included consideration of the public coments.
In a letter of February 25, 1987, as revised on April 13, 1987, the Licensee requested an amendment to its operating license for Unit 2, including associated changes in Appendix A Technical Specifications.
The amendment would delete the current prohibition on disposal of AGW imposed by Technical Specifications 1.17, 3.9.13 and 3/4.9.13.
In June 1987, tne 3taff issued Supplement No. 2 to the "Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement related to decontamination and disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from March 28, 1979, accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2,"
On July 31, 1987, the Comission published a notice of this proposed amendment and afforded an opp?.rtunity for a prior hearing.
(52 Fed. Reg. 28626). Petitions for hearing were filed by Three Mile Island Alert, Inc. and Susquehanna Valley Alliance, and by the l
Comonwealth of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, in the Memorandum and Order of January 5, 1988 (unpublished), this Licensing Board admitted as a party SVA/TMIA (Joint Intervenors or JI), admitted the Comonwealth as an interested state, dnd admitted seven J1 contentions, in whole or in part, as issues in controversy.
7 O.
Licensee filed summary disposition motions addressing all of the contentions, as follows: Contentions 4b (in part), 4c and 4d on May 9, 1988; Coatentions 1, 2 3 and 8, 4b (in part) and 6, and 5d. On June 20, JI filed a response opposing each of the. motions, and, on June 23, th. NRC Staff filed a response in support of each of these motions.
III. REGULATIONS AND CASE LAW ABOUT
SUMMARY
DISPOSTION 10 C.F.R. 52.749(c) provides that once a motior for sunrnary dispos'; ion nas been filed. the opposing :: arty, wt th or without af4 davits, may file an answer. Paragraph (a) says that:
...There shall be annexed to any answer opposing the motion a separate, short and concise stetement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue t be heard. All material facts set forth in the statenient required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.
iu C.F.R. 92.749(b) 3ays that:
Affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the uffiant is conipetent to testify to the matters std therein.
...When a motion for sunnary decision is r-and supported as prt.vided in this section, a party opp,.;ing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer; his answer by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set forth specific facts 6 Als th.t there is a genuine issue of fact.
If no such J ;er is ilr1, the uecision sought, if appropriate, shall s rendert-
l l
10 C.F.R. 52.749(d) says that:
The presiding officer shall render the decisinn sought if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law....
The sumary dispcsition procedure should be utilized on issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be heard so that evidentiary hearing time is not wasted on such issues. Statement of Policy On Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1),ALAB-696,16NRC1245,1263(1982); Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Stttion, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550 (1980).
it is the movant, not the opposing party, which has the burden of showing the Ebsence of a genuine issue as to any mat <al fact. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977). Since the moving party has the burden to show initially the absence of a genuine j
issue concerning any material fact, where the evidentiary metter in support of the rotion does not establist, the absence of a genuine issue, sumary judgment must be denied even if no cpposing evidentiary matter j
is presented. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970).
However, if the motion for sumary disposition is properly supported, the opposition may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials"; rather, the answer "must set forth specific facts showing that thee is a
genuine issue of fact,"
Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Nuclear Power Staticn, Units 1 and 2), t. LAB-584,11 NRC 451, 453 (1980).
IV. RULINGS ON CONTENTIONS A. JI Contention 1 JI Contention 1 is:
Neither the Licensee nor the Nuclear Regulatory Comission has shown that the disposal of the accident-generated water by an evaporator method complies with the A.L.A.R.A. principle (as low as reasonably achievable). Other methods of water disposal discussed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)(NUREG 0683 Supplement
- 2, June 1987) would not release all the tritium and a quantity of radionuclides into the envirnoment as the evaporation method would.
For the most part, JI's Response to Licensee's motion for sum.ry disposition consists of legal argument that Licensee must comply with ALARA principles. JI Response at 1-6.
With this assertion, we agree.
Significantly, Licensee also agrees, stating:
Not totally unlike NEPA, the ALARA standard itself under 10 C F.R. l 20.1 reflects a flexible general principle based upon an array of factors. It does not provide an absolutely rigid mandate that releases be kept to the lowest possible extent, but only as I
l low as is reasonably achievable. This flexibility is clearly indicated by the language used in 10 C.:.R. 5 20.1 -- that a licensee "should... make every reasonable effort" to maintain releases as low as is r2asorably achievable. Moreover, a detennination of what is as low as reasonably achievable depeMs on consideration of the "state of technology" and of "economic,"
"societal." and ' socioeconomic" factors.
l Licensee's Motion (Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 8), May 16, 1988 at 13.
l However, Licensee's statement of material facts asserts that "none l
of the alternatives examined is obviously superior to Licensee's i
proposal when all relevant facts are considered." Statement of Material 1
Facts (Cententions 1, 2, 3 and 8), May 16, 1988 at 4.
In the
accompanying affidavit, Licensee's experts--based on an extensive review of options in the earlier pages of the affidavit--state that "[I]t is clear that based on environmentel impacts, transportation requirements, costs, and 1. censing feasibility, GPUN's proposal to evaporate the AGW is superior to the other options."
Joint Affidavit (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8) at 60.
As we have seen, the applicability of ALARA was admitted by the parties. Licensee has revieweu nriou; alternatives, and Licensee has concluded, based on a consideration of alternatives, that it had selec'.ed the preferable alternative. Under the applicable legal standards, it was up to JI to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether some alternetive is obviously superior to the evaporation alternatite that Licensee selected. For the issue to be material, it must create some doubt concerning the ultimate conclusion that there is an obviously superior alternative. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 526 (1977) affirrd sub nom., N,ew England Coalition on Nuclear follution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 1978), Citing Monroe County Conservation Society, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 698 (2d Cir. 1972)(which we apply by analogy to ALARA as well as to IPA).
As we review some of the statercrts made by Joint Intervenors, we find that a few constitute statements of fact. However, we find that all the paragraphs of subhead "A." ara arguments concerning applicable law and therefore do not state genuine issues of fact.
"B.1." also
9 argues the law concerning ALARA and does not state a genuine issue of fact.
In B.1.a., J1 state that "technology offers a variety of alternatives to dispose of the water." That is true but does not raise a genuine issue of fact, as both Licensee and Staff have considered many alternatives. Similarly, B.I.a. relies on Dr. K.Z. Morgan's statement in his affidavit that the evaporation system could be modified "to greatly reduce the radiation hazards at a relatively low cost."
However, Dr. Morgan's affidavit concerns a proposal in his Exhibit B, which was filed as a comment on the draft PEIS, Supplement 2.
Staff and Licensee have already considered and disposed of his proposals
--requiring that JI show in what way the Licensee's statement of material facts and supporting affidavits, which rely on the Staff resolution, are inadequate. Because JI has not shown the nature of the error allegedly made by Staff and Licensee, there is no genuine issde of material fact here.
In B.1.b., JI assert that "The radiation dose and the risks asscciated with other alternatives are less than those associated with the evaporation method..." To the extent that this a rtion refers to the no-action alternative, we declare, below, that this is a genuine issue of fact. However, this general reference to a table is too vague for us to ascertain any other genuine issue of fact to be litigated
- here, in B.1.c., JI allege that the socioeconomic and psychological impact of the evaporation proposal have not been fully considered.
f.
portion of this statement of facts deals with "Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS)", which is an independent program fully explained in NUREG-0683, Supplement no. 3, but that is not relevant here. The remainder of the remarks, concerning socioeconomic and psychological effects, were fully addressed in PEIS Supplement 2, pp. 7.26 and 7.27.
However, they were not required to be addressed because they concern the psychological effects of a perceived risk and therefore do not have a reasonably close relationship to the proposed action. Pane v. NRC 460 US 766 (1983).
In conclusion, we do not find any genuine issues of fact raised by JI's filing concerning Contention 1.
Should JI have any specific arguments concerning ALARA that are applicable to genuine issues admitted below, they may raise those arguments and present relevant evidence at the hearing.
B.
JI Contention 2 In our January 5,1988 "MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Memorializing Special Prehearing Conferenca; Ruling on Contentions; Scheduling)" we admitted as an issue in controversy only that part of Contention 2 which claims that Staff's assessment fails to provide an adequate risk / benefit analysis of the "No Action Alternative" to the forced evaporation proposal. As admitted, Contention 2 states as follows:
The EIS fails to comply with the requirements tne National Environme...al Policy Act (42 USCS 4332, n.29),
t NRC failed to conduct conclusive risk / benefit analysis of the No Action Alternative."
J The following supporting documents were submitted with "Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition on Alternatives (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)":
1.
"Licensee's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Sumary Disposition" dated May 9, 1988; 2.
"Licensee's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine issue to be Heard (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)";
3.
"Joint Affidavit of Dr. Gary G. Baker, David R. Buchanan, James J. Byrne, Thomas A. Grace, James E. Tarpinian, Charles S. Urland, Jr., and William W. Weaver (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)" (Joint Affidavit) with statements setting forth the professional qualifications of the foregoing affiants.
Dr. Baker is an environmental microbiologist and is GPU's t3 nager of Environmental Controls at Three Mile Island. Mr. Buchanan is an engineer and is GPU's Manager of Recovery Engineering for TMI-2.
Mr. Byrne is also an engineer and is GPU's Manager of TMI-2 Licensing and Senior Engineer responsible for coordinating specific TMI-2 recovery activities. Hr. Grace is an environmental engineer and is GPU's Licensing Engineer, Environmental, for TMI Units 1 and 2.
Mr. Tarpinian is a health physicist presently employed by Bechtel National, Inc., who serves as Manager of Radiological Engineering for GPU Nuclear's Radiological Controls Department at THI-2. Mr. Urland is an environmental pollution control engineer employed by Grover Engineering, Inc., and assigned as Staff Radwaste Engineer for GPU Nuclear at TMI-2.
Mr. Weaver is a nuclear engineer serving as an on-site consultant and Member of the Emergency Response Team at TMI who is developing a PRA for Unit 2.
'le are satisfied that these experts are qualified to attest to
r-the matters contained in their joint affidavit, which in each instance identified the expert responsible for specific testimony.
The no-action alternative to forced evaporation of the AGW involves on-site storage in tanks for an indefinite period of time. NUREG-0633, Supp. 2, at 3.32. With respect to this contention Licensee's statement of material facts sets forth the following facts as to which it asserts that there are no issues to be heard:2
- 11. The radiological consequences of disposing of the AGW after 30 years of monitored storage in tanks would be essentially thesameasdisposalnowbe5ausethecriticalorganandisotopeare strontium dose to the bone
- 12. Construction of tanks alone for the 30-year storage would cost $1 million to $1.5 million. Ultima's disposal costs would be added to this.
13.
In the interim, the risks of an accidental release are present.
2 Licensee dealt with Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8 in a single motion and single statement of material facts. Here we shall deal with each of these contentions individually.
In citing Licensee's statements of material facts we shall retain the numbering used by the Licensee.
According to the "NRC Staff Response in Support of the Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition" (Staff Response), the J1 stated in response to an interrogatory that it expected that the water to remain on-site until Unit 1 is decomissioned and for as long as Unit 2 remains in Post-Defueling Monitored Storage. On the basis of this answer the Licensee assumed a storage period of 30 years in its motion for sumary dispo:ition of Contention 2.
Staff Response at 6.
r According to the Joint Affidavit, the "apparent benefit" of the no action alternative is that it would provide time for the radionuclides in the AGW to decay. Over the postulated 30-year storage period, the strontium and cesium curie content would decrease approximately by a factor of 2 and the tritium content would decrease by a factor of approximately 6.
The affiants do not believe that this decrease in tritium would have a s15nificant effect on the dose casessment because they say the critical organ and isotope are strontium dose to the bone.
They say given the curie content of strontium, a decrease by a factor of 2 will not reduce the dose to any significant degree.
Iodine-129, which is included as present at the lower limit of detection and which causes the dose assessment to include a thyroid critical organ dose from I-129, has a half life of sixteen million years and cannot be eliminated by 30 years of storage. Joint Affidavit at 43.
On-site storage of the AGW presents the continued risk of an uncot. trolled release as a result of damage to one or more tanks due to tank failure because of aging or external events such as an airplane crash, tornado, flood, or seismic event. The probability of an uncontrolled release over a 30-year storage period has been estimated to be approximately 3.75%. An average release would result in the maximally exposed individual receiving 7 mrem via tho inhalation pathway and 10 mrem via liquid release pathways.
Id. at 44. The dose to a worker for recovery from the spill would be 36 mrem internal whole body dose from tritium and 0.2 mrem external whole body dose, primarily from Cs-137.
Id. at 44-45.
The NRC Staff in its June 23, 1988 response to Licensee's motion for sumary disposition (Staff Response) supported the motion with respect to all the contentions, including Contention 2.
In support of its esponse, the Staff appended the "Affidavit of Linda Munson", whose qualifications are discussed in our treatment of Contention 5d. With respect to Contention 2, Staff maintains that it "fairly assessed" the no action alternative in the PEIS by providing an analysis of the change in radioisotopes over a long tenn, the financial cost of cnnstruction of additional tanks for water storage, the impact of an accidental tank rupture, and the impact of ultimate disposal of water. Staff Response at 11-12. Staff, in the PEIS discussion of the no action alternative, explained that tritium is the only isotope in the AGW which would be significantly reduced during a prolonged period of storage. To reduce the tritium level in the AGW to the level approved by epa for drinking water, however, would require 150 years of radioactive decay.
Id. at 11; NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at 3.32.
Nevertheless Staff states that except for a small commitment of l
financial resources and a very small land commitment, the environmental impact of the no action alternative would occur only at the ti"* of ultimate water disposal or in the event of a tank failure.
Id. at 3.33.
Further, construction of tanks and continuing surveillance of the tanks l
are not expected to contribute significantly to additional occupational l
radiation exposure, nor are there significant exposure pathways to the pablic unless there is an accident. Only a small additional land comnitment at TMI is anticipated for new tank construction. Staff L
estimates that construction of new tanks, monitoring and surveillance of the stored AGW, and tank replacement would cost a total of $0.1 million to $1.3 million.
Ibid.
The only credible accident identified for this alternative is tank rupture, which in the worst case would result in discharge of the entire contents of a tank in a short period of time.
Ibid. Staff estimated that the 50-year dose to the maximally exposed individual in the event of an accidental spill from an 11,000-gallon storage tank would be 0.015 mrem to the bone and 0.002 mrem to the total body. The collective 50-year dose commitment to the affected population would be 0.7 person-rem to the bone and 0.015 person-rem total body. Id.at3.8-3.9.
For comparison, Staff estimated that dose commitment to the maximally exposed individua. as a result of forced evaporation would be less than 4 mrem to the thyroid, 0.8 mrem to the bone, and 0.7 mrem to the total body. The collective 50-year dose commitment to the population from forced evaporation is estimated to be less than 6 person-rem to the thyroid, 0.2 person-rem to the bone, and 3 person-rem to the total body.
Id. at 3.7.
Thus the dose cannitment resulting from an accidental discharge from a tank :::did be very small, representing a small fraction of the radiation dose that would result from forced evaporation.
Finally, Staff states that the no action alternative would be inconsistent with the Commission's policy that the cleanup, including removal of radioactive waste from the TMI site, be carried out safely and expeditiously. Staff sees no over-riding benefit associated with storing disposable radioactive waste on-site and therefore suppcrts safe
and expeditious removal.
Ibid. As the Joint Affidavit ooints out, the PEIS states that "this alternative is inconsistent with the Comission's policy that the cleanup, including the removal of radioective waste from the site, be carried out safely and expeditiously." NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at 3.34.
Joint Intervenors in "SVA/TMIA's Response to Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition on Cententions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5d, 6 and 8" (JIResponse) began their discussion of Contention 2 by reciting the full statement of the contention as originally submitted.
In its January 5,1988 "Memorandum and Order (Memorializing Special Prehearing Conference; Ruling on Contentions; Scheduling)" (January 5 Order),
however, the Board admitted only that portion of the contention stated, supra, at the beginning of this discussion of Contention 2.
We declined to admit those portions of the contention alleging that the FEIS had failed to show that adverse inpacts of evaporation are outweighed by the benefits and alleging that the benefits of disposal by evaporation can only be analyzed after evaluation of Licensee's plans for post defueling monitored storage. January 5 Order at 9-10.
The JI Response to Licensee's motion for sumary disposition of j
Contention 2 is supportad by an affidavit of Louis J. Kosarek dated June 9, 1988. Unfortunately Mr. Kosarek's affidavit was not accompanied by any biographical information on the basis of which we could determine his qualifications. We have some very brief and sketchy biographical infonnation about Mr. Kosarek in JI's answers to interrogatories about their witnesses, which shows that he has a B.A. and M.A. degree and i,
gives his job titles; the information, however, does not indicate his major field (s) of study nor the subject matter of his work. Although we are unable to accept his qualifications as sufficient to support the admissability of his testimony, we will consider his substantive arguments to determine whether they affect the adequacy of the record.
The JI Response sets forth the following statements which are alleged to be material facts as to which there are genuine issues to be heard with respect to Contention 2:4 I
1.
The NRC is required by NEPA to provide a detailed and informative analysis of all alternatives. NEPA states than an EIS must "provide a detailed thoughtful analysis from adequate data so that a reviewing body can decide on an objective basis."
Pilgrim, Supra, ALAB i
2.
The NRC is required by NEPA in the consideration of alternatives to "go beyond mere assertions and indicate basis of conclusions regarding altarnatives."
3.
The NRC is required by NEPA to "identify costs associated with appropriate actions so as not to prematurely close options which have less detrimental effect."
4 Table 5.1,5 NUREG-0683, Supplement #2, attempts to present a table of comparison of the various alternatives for the disposal 4
Statements 1, 2, and 3 are legal arguments rather than statements of material fact. Therefore we shall not consider them.
5 "SVA/TMIA's Response to Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition
" at page 7 cites Table 5.2 of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at this point. The quotations from the table, however, make it clear that the JI should have cited Table 5.1.
l
of the water. The table however, prevents a careful comparison of the alternatives in light of the following facts:
a) Whereas all the other alternatives are provided a definite figure for long term comitted space, the comitted space for the no action alternative is labelled "small". This provides inadequate infomation upon which to base a decision about the various alternetives, b)
In the column "elapsed time for completion" the time period allotted for each alternative provides a very wide range.
The same column for the "no action alternative" states "0".
Again it is difficult to make a comparison in order to make an informed decision about the alternatives.
5.
The "no action alternative" has always referred to the interim monitored storage of the water.
(NUREG-0683 Supplement
- 2) The period of storage has not been specified. The NRC has assumed that at some time in the future the water would be disposed of in some way. Strictly speaking then this is not the "no action alternative". However, since the NRC believes this to be the "no action alternative", it would have been more conclusive to analyze the dose from radiation exposure and the risks involved at different times in the future, taking into account the possibilities of more advanced technologies and the existence of low level waste sites closer to TMI in Pennsylvania.
6.
The NRC does not provide a detailed analysis of the location of the tanks which would store the water during the storage period.
7.
The NRC did not provide an analysis of radiation exposure to either the workers or the pablic. They did not provide a basis for their findings that worker and public exposure would be zero.
(Table 5.2, NUREG-0683 Supp. 2) The text reads that both 0:cupational and public exposure are not expected to be significant. This is very ambiguous and provides further examples of the NRC's lack of detailed infomation in evaluating i
alternatives.
(NUREG-0683, Supplement #2, p. 3.33, 3.5.1.2) 8.
The NRC did not r,rovide adequate detail of the monitoring which would be carried out during the storage of the AGW.
(NUREG-0683, Supplement #2, Section 3.5) 9.
The NRC dismissed the "no action alternative" because it is against NRC policy to leave waste on site. However, in light of the shortage of space for low level waste in this country, the NRC has made arrangements for utilities to store waste on-site.
(Generic Letter 811-83, November 10,1981) i
- 10. All alternatives for disposal of the water have either regulatory obstacles or strong governmental and public feelings against them (evaporation and releasing the wat2r into the Susquehanna). Therefore, it is not logical for the "no-action alternative" to be dismissed by the NRC.
- 11. The NRC is required by NEPA to mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed project. The "no-action alternative" mitigates the adverse impacts of the evaporation of the AGW.
(NEPA 42 USCS, 4321-4347)
- 12. The benefits derived from the "no-action alternative" must be seen in light of the costs and risks of taking action. As will be shown throughout SVA/TMIA s response to Licensee's request for sumary disposition, the costs and risks of taking action have been underestimated.
(Affidavits A, B, C, D, E)
In light of the inadequacy of the data, the NRC's consideration of the "no action alternative" cannot be considered conclusive.
- 13. The NRC failed to give adequate discussion and evaluation to Boron as recomended by EPA. Presently the Licensee does not have a pennit which limits the amount of boron to be released into the river.
In light cf the possible adverse effects on crops caused by use of the water from the Susquehanna for irrigation, and the possible adverse effects from drinking the borated water from the Susquehanna River the State of Pennsylvania could conceivably restrict the release of boron to levels not achievable by the Licensee. This fact may limit the Licen:;ee's options for dispot al alternatives and heightens the need for full consideration of tha "no-action alternative".
Studies showing the adverse effects of boron include:
a) "Uptake and Distribution of Boron in Rats: Interaction with Ethanol and Hexobarbital in the Brain", Magour, S. et al.
Environ.
-~
Contam. & Toxicology 11: 01-525.
b) "Boron Deficiency and Toxicity Symptoms for Several Crops as related to Tissue Baron Levels", Gupta. V. C.
Journal of Plant Nutrition 6(5): 387-395(*.983).
c) "Boron Toxicity and Deficiency: A Review", Gupta, U. C. et a l..
Canadian Journal of Soil Science, August 1985, Vol. 65, #3 ~~
In s
.nent 12 the JI cite not only the affidavit of Mr. Kosarek but also the affidavit of Dr. Huyer and coments of Dr. Morgan. Neither Dr. Huver's affidavit nor Dr. Morgan's coments address Contention 2,
however. Mr. Kosarek's affidavit does not explicitly address Contention 2.
It does discuss the alternative means of disposing of the AGW which were considered in NUREG-0732, issued in September of 1980. One of these alternatives t".- 'widing the AGW in tanks for about 60 years.
Exnibit C Korasek Affidavit at 2-3.
As we have indicated, supra, Staff considers the alternative proposed in Contention 2 to be inconsistent with Connission policy.
NUREG-0683, at 3.34, 13.5.1.4 The Connission's policy with regard to the clean-up of TMI-2 was set forth in "Statement of Policy; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement of the Cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2".
46FR24764(5/1/81). There the Connission said, "...
the Comnission believes that the licensee should acceltrate the pace of the cleanup to complete expeditiously all decontamination activities consistent with ensuring protection, g public health and sr.fety and the environment."(emphasisadded). According to the Staff, forced evaporation would release most of the tritium to the atsnosphere and i
concentrate the remsining radioactivity in the evaporator bottoms.
NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 at 3.3, 63.1.1. We therefore find that it is not f
f clear that the radiological consequences of disposing of the AGW after l
thirty years would be essentially the same as disposal now, assertedly l
because the "critical organ and isotope" are strantium dose to bone.
There would be only 1/6 as rach tritium released to the etmosphere 30 I
l years from now, and there would be 1/2 as much strontium. If evaporation were the method of disposal at that time, the strontium would not be released but would be concentrated in the evaporator bottoms.
l i
i
Therefore, in light of the available alternatives and their effect ca radiation levels, there is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the radioisotope of critical concern is strontium or tritium.
According to the Staff the no-action altern6tive would require a small comitment of financial resources ($0.1 million to $1.3 million,6 in contrast to Licensee's claim of $1 million to $1.5 million) and a very small land conmitrient. Id.at3.33.
In addition, construction of tanks and continuing surveillance of the tanks are not expected to contribute significantly to additional occupational radiation exposure, nor are there significant exposure pathways to the public other than accidental tank rupture.
Id,. at 3.33-3.34. As JI point out, the 30 years of storage may permit new technology to develop or new storage sites to open, further reducing costs. JI Response at 8.
Conclusion We are not convinced, at this stage of the proceeding, that forced evaporation meets the Commission's policy of providing expeditious decontamination "consistent with ensuring protection of public health and safety and the environment."
Indeed, there is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the no action alternative may be obviously 0
Staff estimates the cost of construction of new tanks to be $0.1 million, while cost of tank replacement could be as much as $1.0 million. Staff considered a storage period of up to 150 years, however, so presumably this high figure is based on a storage period of that length. NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at 3.33. Table 3.14.
Tank replacement costs should be much less for a storage period of 30 years.
L
superior to forced evaporation. Therefore we conclude that the portion of Contention 2 relating to the no action alternative must be litigated.
Licensee's motion for sumary disposition of Contention 2, to that extent, is denied.
C.
JI Contention 3 JI Contention 3 is:
The EIS fails to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The EIS has not demonstrated that the benefits of the evaporation process will exceed the costs and risks to the public. The benefits are unclear whereas the risks include the following:
a.
The release of radioactivity into the air, where it can enter the food chain, water, humans, and the entire ecosystem; b.
As much as 88,000 cubic feet of solidified radioactive waste will be created. This waste must be trucked to a low-level waste disposal site.
Memorandun and Order (Memorializing Special Prehearing Conference; Ruling on Contentions; Scheduling) (January 5, 1988) at 10-12.
The supporting documents submitted with "Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition on Alternatives (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)" which were listeo in our discussion of Contention 2 are also applicable to Contention 3.
Licensee's statermat of material facts as to which it asserts that there are no issues to be heard sets forth the following statements which appear to be applicable to Contention 3:
2.
Radiologi al releases from the evaporation method would be well within the simits sec by the NRC in the THI-2 Technical Specification and in Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.
3.
Licensee estimates that the average radiological exposure to a member of the 50-mile radius population from the evaporation proposal will be 0.008 mrem to the total body, while the annual backcround ocse is about 300 mrem.
6 In order to d Lpose of the evaporator bottom waste, a burial volume of approximately 4,425 ft3 is required, and 8 truck shipments (with a practically zero probability of a traffic accident or fatality) would be necessary.
- 15. While the evaporation option does not result in the lowest doses to the public, the doses to the public from all of these options are so low as to be insignificant.
According to the Licensee's affiants the highest average annual doses to the maximally exposed hypothetical off-site individual are 2.7 mrem to the bone and 1.25 mrem total body. These dose levels are only 20% of the annual limit of 15 mrem and 25% of the annual limit of 5 mrem, respectively, given in 10 CFR 50, Appendix I for exposure from airborne releases. Joint Affidavit at 13. To estimate the pcpulation dose, Licensee's effiants considered the affected population to be the population surrounding TMI-2 out to a dis.tance of 50 miles, 2.2 million people. The dose pathways included inhalation; consumption of milk, meat, and vegetables; plume exposure; and direct dose frf.m ground deposition. Estimateo doses were 25 person-rem to the bone and 18 person-rem total body. Licensee cor,siders these insignificant compared to the background radiation dose of approximately 300 mrem received each year by a member of the public.7 Id. at 14 7
Staff's affiant Ms. Munson attested tr.at whereas NUREG-0683, Supp.
- 2. u:ed a background radiation cose of 87 mrem /yr, recent eva'inations c. background radiation tended to be in the 300 mrun/yNr range. Munson Affidavit at 4.
Licensee estimates that the evaporator bottom waste from the evaporation option will weigh oppcoximately 165 tons. When packed for shipment this waste will fill approximately 590 55-gallon drums at 560 lbs. per drum. These drums, at 7.5 ft3 each, represent a burial volume of approximately 4,425 ft). Based on truck capacity, the total estimated transportation requirement is 8 truck shipments.
Id. at 15-16. Assuming the shipments travel along the least risk route (in terms of population density) from TMI to Hanford, Washington, the estimated incident free population dose from the 8 shipments would be 6.9 person-rem., and the estimated dose o the driver per shipment is 95 mrem.
Id. at 17.
In addition the reproces';ing of 31% of the AGW will produce approximately 40 liners which will require 20 to 40 shipments for disposal and require a disposal volume of 6,200 ft1 The expected dose t
to each driver would average approximately 15 mrem per shipment, and the f
incident free dose to the general population is 4.8 person-rem.
The NRC Staff prints out that the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act is to insure that agencies of the United States give appropriate consideration to environmental values in decistonmaking along with economic and technical considerations. Pubife Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
CLI-77-8,5NPC503,528(1977l, affirmed sub nom., New Enoland
_ Coalition on Nuclear pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st cir.1978).
In Seabrook the Comission adopted the test of "obvious superiority" in assessing alternatives, on the grounds that the cost / benefit analysis is 1
- 2S -
inherently imprecise, and while the proposed action will have been intensively studied by the applicant, the NRC Staff, and the intervenors, the alternatives will not have undergone a comparable study; consequently more adverse information will have been developed concerning the proposal than any alternative. M. at 528-29; Staff Response at 10-11.
The litmus test concerning an adequate consideration of alternetives which the courts apply is whether the environrental consequences of each reasonable alternative have been accorded a "hard look".
Boston Edison Company (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, "nit 2), ALAB-479, 7NRC774, 779 (1978), citing i
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, fn. 21 (1976). Thus, for g
example, one must determine whether the alternative of no action was given a "hard look" and whether no action is "obviously superior" to the proposed evaporation. Staff Response at 10-11.
In discussing the no action alternative. Staff explained that because the AGW contains relatively long-lived radioisotopes such as cesium, strontium, and carbon, the environmental impacts from disposal after long-tem storage onsite would not differ significantly from those impacts identified for near-term disposal options. Tritium is the only isotope that would be significantly reduced during a prolonged storage period.
In addition to providing an analysis of the change ii.
radioisotopes over a long term, Staff analyzed the financial cost of construction of additional tanks to store the AGW, the impact of an accidental tank rupture, and the impact of ultimately disposing of the water. This is, ac ording to the Staff, an example of the "hard look"
(
y Staff gave to the alternathes to evaporation, as a result of which the PEIS meets the requirements of NEPA. M.at11-12.
Staff argues that the assertion in Contention 3 that the benefits of evaporation have not been shcwn to exceed the risks to the public is without legal basis and mischaracterizes NEPA. NEPA requires an assessment of environmental impacts and a balancing of environmental costs with the benefit of the action including technical and economic factors.
It does not require a showing that the benefit to the public of the proposed action exceeds the environmental cost. As stated in the PEIS, there is little difference in the environmental impact of near-term evaporation or long term storage with ultimate disposal of the AGW.
In dddition the er <ironmental impact from evaporation will be minimal. M.at12-13.
The JI Response sets forth the following statements which are alleged to be material facts as to which there are no genuine issues to hear with respect to Contention 3:0 l
1.
NEPA states that, "EIS is to provide decision maker with detailed and careful f
dnalysis of relative environmental merits and demerits of proposed action. Britt v USA Army Corps of Engineers 1985 CA 2 NY 769 F 2d C4.
2.
NEPA places obligation on the NRC to provide the public with "infonnation; on environmental impact of proposed project as well as encourage public participation in development of that information." Trout Unlimited v Morton 1974 CA 9 Idaho F 2d 1276.
8 Statements 1, 2, and 3 are legal arguments rather than staterrents (FootnoteContinued)
3.
In order to understand the benefits of an action the public must be provided with:
a)aclearstatementofthemeritsoftheaction b) a clear statement of the demerits of the action.
These provisions are recognized by NEPA as stated above.
4.
The NRC has not provided a clear statement of the costs and risks of the evaporation of the AGW. The reasons are as follows:
(1) The efficiency of the evaporator to decontaminate the water to acceptable environmental levels and compliance with the Licensee's Technical Specifications is dependent on a decontamination factor of 1000. (NRC Responses to Interrogatories.
2-22-88, Interrogatory 22) (Preliminary System Description 2.16.88 P18 Table 3-2).
(ii) The NRC has not provided an independent and objective characterization of the AGW. The NRC analyzed a 4 liter sample drawn from one of the 25 locations for the storage of the AGW. The tank from which the sample was drawn contains one fifth of the total inventory of water.
(Letter D. J. Collins to W. Travers, 7-21-88).
(iii)The11RCrespondedinInterrogatory 2,2.22.88 that the sample procedure followed the procedures outlined in 4212-CHM-3011.05, Revision 0, 5.23.84. The NRC did not indicate that sampling procedures were in accordance with ASTH Hethod 3370, which is a national standard stipulating procedures for testing nuclear materials.
(iv) The radioisotope nitst abundant in the water is tritium.
However, in procuring and preparing their sample the NRC did not follow procedures outlined in Procedures 4212-CHM-3013,81-P 5.0, 6.1.7.
These are more recent procedures (10.27.87) for the "Determination of Tritium by Liquid Scintillation Counting" (documentprovidedinDissovery). The difficulties in acquiring an accurate assessment of tritium concentration are outlined in the document referred to in (iv) and also in "A Radiation Monitoring System for Nuclear Power Plants" Appendix F (A study undertaken by Dr. Ruth Patrick and associates and funded by the Public Heelth Fund and referenced)
{
(FootnoteContinued) of genuine issues of material fact which must be heard. Therefore we shall not ccnsider them.
2
(v) Document 4212-CHM-3013,81-P 5.0,6.1.7 also outlines the amount of sample required for an accurate count of tritium. The sample analyzed by RESL for NRC was 10 ml, an amount far in excess of that recocinended.
(RESL Sample Record Sheet. Serial #142668)
(vi) The analysis of the PWST 2 sample by RESL for the NRC shows major differences with the results of analysis of the same sample undertaken by the Licensee. These differences are heightened by the fact that the AGW amounts to 2.3 millicn gallons.
Licensee analysis RESL analysis uC1/ml uC1/mi Co-60 2.8 E-7 3.2 E-7 Cs-137 7.0 E-6 8.0 E-6 Sr-90 5.8 E-5 2.55 E-5 (vii) The analysis of the PWST sample by RESL and the Licensee did not detect C-14. However, this radioisotope was detected by the Westinghouse analysis. (Harner Affidavit P. 4)
C-14 was found at a concentration of 3.0 E-4.
This should be compared with NUREG-0683, Supplement #2. Table 2.2 where the average concentration is 1.0 E-4.
C-14 was also found in samples of the reactor coolant (TP0/RMI-122 "Reactor Coolant System Sample Rt.sults,P.63)
(viii) The NRC assumes that the average concentrations of radionuclides as shown in Table 2.2, NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 can be reasonably considered a maximum.
(Response to Interrogatory 12,2.22.88) This is an inaccurate assumption.
It is upon this assumption that the NRC bases its dose calculations to the public.
(ix) The Epicor/SDS precessing systems do not provide a unifom concentration of each radionuclide for each storage location. This is shown clearly "SDS Processing Batch Data" and "Epicor Processing Sunnaries" provided in Discovery.
Furthemore the Epicor/SDS systems do not have an infinite decontamination factor.
Mr. Hofstetter: That basically scdium borate tends to minimize the infinite DF of that, (Epicor), that you might get if you were processing out of demineralized water.
(Transcript Citizens Advisory Panel for the Cecontamination of L' nit 2.
2.26.87)
(x) The NRC's assumption that the average concentration of radier.uclides shown in Table 2.2, NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 is
inaccurate. For example, while the average concentration of Tritium in the Table 2.2 is 1.3 E-1, the concentration of tritjum in the storage location, PWST 2, as of 11-07-86 is 2.1 Ci/ml.
(Technical Specification for Processed Water Disposal 12.2.86.
P.43(7.3)
(xi) The total inventory of radionuclides in the AGW has continued to change since submittal of the GPU Proposal. The pdssage of time does not mean a reduction in the source term for the AGW, (Reactor Ccolant Sample Results TP0/TMI-122 P. 31 which shows the source term for AGW on 3.7.86 (date sample drawn for GPU Proposal, Table 2-3) and on days following this sample procurement Although the radionuclide concentration in Table 2-3 accurately depicts the total radioactivity in the AGW the specific source location for this inventory at a particular point in time is dependent on plant operations and does not alter the actual source tem.
(Licensee Response to Interrogatories, 3.30.88 #10)
Since the Epicor/SDS do not provide unifom concentrations of radionuclides i.. each source, this is not an accurate statement.
Furthera,vre, as will be shown in discussion of Contention 4 and 6, the efficiency of these two processing systems is not guaranteed as the chemistry of the water changes.
(xii) The changing source term of the AGW is particularly relevant to tritium. The data upon which the NRC relied to calculate the scarce term of tritium was PEIS, March 1981, RESL 9
By letter to the Board dated July 20, 1983 counsel for GPU Nuclear advised that while the 2.1 pCi/ml value reported here by JI was obtained from a GPU Nuclear document provided during discovery, that value has been determined to be a typographical ertor. In an affidavit accompanying GPU's letter, affiant Harner attested that the actual data for the sample show a tritium concentration of 0.23 uCi/ml.
In a July 28, 1988 "SVA/TMIA Response to Licensee's Notif t:ation of Typographical Error in Bid Procurement Document" the JI challenge the proposed change in concentration of tritium, on the grounds that an entry of 2.1 Ci/mi which should have read 2.3 E-1 pCi/ml is not a believable "typograrhical error". They argue that this issue shoulo be litigated at the Adjudicatory Hea ing. We agree that a sufficient explanation for the "typographical error" has not been advanced by GPU and that an issue of this nature should not be decided at the sumary disposition stage of the proceeding.
l
i
. 9 sample analysis of a 4 liter sample and data from the Licensee.
(NRC Interrogatory Response 13,2.22.88) The source term data upon which the Licensee relied to make calculations for tritium include PEIS,1981, EGG-P85-6798 (3161 ano 4231 Curies respectively)
(Licensee's Response to Interrogatory 27,2.19.88) GPU Proposal July 1986, P. 10) They also used sample analysis.
(Harner Affidavit, Contention 5d) Nevertheless, a document provided as a reference to NUREG-0683, Supplement 3, shows that the core inventory of tritium at the time of the accident was 8,794 curies.
(TP0/THI-043 Rev. 6, 1986 "Radioactive Waste Management Sumary Review") Since tritium is both a fission product and an activation production and because the fuel rods ruptured during the accident releasing the tritium, and because such a large percentage of the tritium is created in the coolant, the source tenn for tritium in the AGW has not been conclusively addressed.
(Wash 1250, Wash. DC U.S.A.E.C. (1968)
(xiii) The source terms of the AGW is even more relevant in light of the fact that the water going into the evaporator in Batch Cycle would deviate even more from the concentrations listed in Table 2.2 NUREG-0683.
(SystemDescriptionP.21)(Licensee Response, Interrogatory 18,3.30.88) All of the above demonstrate that the NRC has based dose calculations on inadequate data. This is supported by the accompanying affidavits.
5.
EPA letter at A.51, NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 recomended that the hRC revise Appendix B so that a lay person might readily understand how the calculations
..t dose were made. Such an understanding is essential in evaluating the merits and demerits of any action which serves to impact an individual. The NRC did not revise Appendix 8 (now C) in the final draft.
6.
The volume of radioactive waste created by the evaporation method is unclear.
If the evaporator is used to decontaminate the water, the amount of waste created by that method needs to te compared with that created by the Epicor/SDS. This amount needs to be specified.
(Licensee Response to Interrogatory #18, 3.30.68) 7.10 There is no basis provided for Classification of the waste from the evaporator. The evaporator bottoms will contain those radionuclides and other chemicals not released through the 10 In JI's Response on p. 15 this statement was numbered 6 following statement 6 on p. 14. Statement 7 was labeled "Deleted". We have assigned the number 7 to the Statement numbered 6 on p. 15 of JI's Respcnse.
vaporizer. The NRC did not include all radioisotopes in the characterization of the water. Examples are:
Actinium-227 Americium-242 Californium-249, 250, 252 Curium-243, 244, 245, 246 Neptunium-237 Protactinium-231 Plutonium-242 Thorium-228, 230 Uranium-232 8.
The NRC failed to calculate the cumulative risk of the evaporation proposal and other environmental sources of risk for the public within a 50 mile radius of the TMI site.
(Response to Interrogatory 8,2.22.88) This is required by NEPA. This infonnation would assist in an informed decision by the public on the evaporation proposal.
9.
The NRC did not undertake its own analysis of the microorganisms in the AGW, (NRC Response to Interrogatory 7, 2.22.88) This response indicates that water boiling at 212' F would kill the microorganisms. However, the evaporator will operate at a temperature of 131 F.
(System Description 2.16.88)
A quantity of the microorganisms will be contained in the water droplets to be released to the environment.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 7(e) 2.22.88) Their release must be evaluated because of possible pathogen problems and the presence of those materials which would result from virus organisms. Furthennore, because of the ability to plug columns, they may affect the efficiency of Epicor/SDS and the evaporator.
(NRCResponseto Interrogatory 7(g) 2.22.8S)
- 10. The NRC assumed that the dose from the transuranics would be delivered by the lower level of detectability (all of which are not included--see #7) NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 P. 2.4: 2.2)
Since the transuranics are in 25 storage locations it is incorrect to assume that the total inventory of the transuranics is at the lower level of detectability.
- 11. The NRC Assumes that there are biological mechanisms that Cdn repair damage Caused by radiation at low doses.
(NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 P. 5.4: 5.2). This is not a fact but rather an opinion shared by some and not all. The public in making their detennination of the benefits and risks must bo made aware of the difference of cpinion surrounding this issue. Especially when one considers the paucity of data on people who have experienced i
prolonged impact from sources of low levels of radiation. The American Physical Society states, Among the harmful biological impacts that may occur as a result of even low level e.xposures are neoplastic (carcinogenic) and hereditary (mutagenic) effects.
(Review of Modern Physics, Vol. 57(3), Part 2, 7/85)
- 12. The NRC misiv. c1e public by making the AGW seem innocuous. Their calculations of the dose to the public by drin'.ing the water had many flaws.
(NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 P.7.4) 13.
In calculating the dose to the public from evaporation, the NRC ignored the more recent findings about dose and risk derived from data on the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They used models which tend to underestimate the risk to the public.
(Affidavit of Dr. K. Z. Morgan, Exhibit A) 14 The safety of the evaporator for the workers has not been analyzed.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 33,2.22.88) The dose to the population of a leakage of one of the storage tanks, which is considered to be bounding for any accidents involving the workers, appears to be inadequate in light of the fact that evaporators are prone to hose ruptures and pump failure.
(A discussion of evaporators and their deficiencies is found in NUREG-0591)
JI's Response advances a number of statements of material facts which raise genuine issues to be heard. To begin with, Statements 4 (ii),(iii),(iv),(vi),(vii),(viii),(x),(xii),and(xiii) cite material facts which suggest that thare is a basis for the allegation that the NRC may not have accurately characterized the AGW with respect to radioisotope content. Therefore its assumption that dose calculations can be based on the average concentrations of radionuclides given in Table 2.2 af NUREG-0663, Supp. 2, may be invalid. The facts which we consider relevant genuine issues are the following: Statement (ii) that the NRC analyzed a single 4 liter sample drawn from only one of 25 locations of the storage of the AGW, which is an inadequate
sampling of the AGW;Il Statements (ii) and (iii) that the NRC sampling procedure followed procedures outlined in 4212-CHM-3011.05, Rev. 0 (5/23/84), whereas updated procedures for sampling tritium, in particular, are set forth in 4212-CHM-3013, 81-P 5.0, 6.1.7 (10/27/87);
Statements (vi) and (vii) that the anelyses of the PWST 2 samples by the RESL for the NRC and by Licensee gave differing results for Co-60, Cs-137, and Sr-90, and neither detected C-14 whereas an analysis by Westinghouse found C-14 at a concentration of 3.0 E-4, greater than the average concentration listed in Table 2.2 of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 by a factor of 3; Statement (viii) declares that the NRC assumas that the concentrations of radionuclides as shown in Table 2.2, NUREG-0683, Supplement #2 can reasonably be considered a maximum and upon this assumption based its dose calculations to the public, but JI contends this assumption is invalid cn the basis of facts set forth, infra, in other statements; Statement (x) and n. 3 which indicate that the average tritium concentration presented in Table 2.2 of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, is 0.13 Ci/ml, whereas the actuhl data show a tritium concentration of 0.23 Ci/ml; Statement (xii) indicating tnat the ?;RC relied on a RESL sample analysis which gave 3161 Curies while Licensee relied on data from PEIS,1981, EGG-PBS-6798 to get 4231 Curies, whereas 11 Indeed, in NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at p. A.22 there is a table taken from a 1986 GPU Report which lists 25 sources of waste water in storage at TMI with the total radioactivity in each. The concentration of tritium in the different sources was highly variable.
TP0/TMI-043 Rev. 6 (1986) shows that the cover inventory of tritium at the time of the accident was 8,794 Curies, which together show that no conclusion can be drawn with respect to the tritium source tenn; Statement (xiii) that the NRC has based its dose calculations on inadequate data because of the foregoing facts plus the fact that water going into the evaporator in Batch Cycle will deviate from the concentrations listed in Table 2.2 of NUREG-0683. Supp. 2.
Therefore there is a genuine issue of fact that the PEIS has not adequately demonstrated the comparative costs and risks of evaporation of the AGW because the NRC's assumptions with regard to the concentrations of radionuclides in the AGW niay be invalid. The facts presentedinStatements4(ii),(iii),(iv),(vi),(vii),(viii),(x),
(xii),and(xiii)maybelitigated.
We do not find that Statements 4 (i), (v), (ix), and (xi) warrant being litigated. Statement 4 (i) challenges nothing. Statement 4(v) alleges that sample of water analyzed by RESL was larger than that recourended by 4212-CHM-3013,81-P 5.0,6.1.7, which seems to us to err on the conservative side. Statement 4 (ix) alleges that the Epicor/SDA processing systems do not have an infinite decontamination factor (which is certainly not surprising) but fails to indicate the significance of this fact. Statement 4 (xi) alleges that the passage of time does not mean a reduction in the source term for the AGW, and quotes Licensee's response to an interrogatory in which Licensee acknowledges that the inventory at a specific source location depends on operations (as AGW is moved from one storage site to another, etc.) but does nct Liter the
actual source term. No significant litigable issue is raised by this statement.
Statement 7 alleges that there is no basis for characterizing the bottom wastes from the evaporator, which will contain those radionuclides and chemicals not released through the vaporizer, because the NRC did not include all of the radioisotopes present in the AGW in its characterization of the water. Examples of radicisotopes which were omitteo are:
Actinium-227 Americium-242 Californium-249, 250, 252 Curium-243, 244, 245, 246 Neptunium-237 Protactinium-231 Plutonium-242 Thorium-228, 230 Uranium-232.
Licensee's affiant Harner, however, attested that in addition to having Westinghouse perfurm an analysis AGW on samples taken under strict procedural controls in 1985, GPUN undertook a review of radionuclides potentially present la the wattr and developed a list of radionuclides that might be present. This list included radionuclides that comprised greater than 0.1% of the core transuranic inventory. GPUN used the actual measured activities for detected radicnuclides or, for radionuclides that might be present but had not been detected, GPUN used the lower level of detectability. Harner also attested that the transuranics not listed, which include most of those above (the Westinghouse analysis detected curium-243/244), were not determined to be in the water because they are not produced by a reactor to an
appreciable extent. We find, therefore, that Statement 7 fails to raise a genuine issue of fact.
Stateraant 9 indicates that the NRC did not undertake its own analysis of the microorganisms in the AGW and, in its response to an interrogatory regarding this matter, stated that water boiling at 212" F would kill the microorganisms. JI point out, however, that according ',o the System Description of the evaporator, it will operate at a temperature of 131' F.
Ji alleges that their release must be evaluated because of possible pathogenic organisms that might be present in the AGW. Moreover, because they could plug columns, the microorganisms could affect the efficiency of the Epicor/SDS and the evaporator. The evaluation of microorganisms in the AGW is a genuine issue which must be heard.
Statement 10 says that the NRC assumed that the dose from transuranics in the AGE would result from the lower level of detectability and suggests that because the transuranics are in 25 storage locations, it is incorrect to assume that the total inventory of transuranics is at the lower level of detectability. As we found in our consideration, supra, of Statement 7 affiant Harner attested that GPUN, in developing a list of radionuclides in the AGW, used the measured activitites for detected tranuranics and the lower level of detectability for the other transuranics that might be present but were not detected. Thus Licensee has adequately accounted for transuranics in the AGW and it is of no consequence that Staff assumed all
transuranics to be at the lower level of detectibility. Thus Statement 10 does not raise a genuine issue of fact.
Finally, Statement 13 alleges that in calculating the dose to the public from evaporation of the AGW, the NRC used out-dated models which underestimate the risk to the public and ignored the recent findings on dose and risk resulting from the reanalysis of the data on the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This matter is a genuine and important issue which must be heard.
The remaining statements of material fact with respect to Contention 3 fail to raise genuine issues to be heard. Those include Statements 1, 2, 3 those parts of 4 already listed, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14. Statement 5 alleges that EPA recommended that the NRC edit Appendix B to NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, but the NRC did not do so; the fact that the NRC did not take the EPA's advice in this regard does not raise a litigable issue. Statement 6 alleges that the volume of waste from evaporation is unclear, and states that the amount of waste created by evaporation "needs to be compared with that created by the Epicor/SDS system." In fact, that waste from the evaporator bottoms is estimated to have a volume of 4,425 ft3 Munson Affadavit at 5-6.
JI provides no reason as to why the evaporator waste needs to be compared to the Epicor/SDA waste. Statement 8 alleges that the NRC failed to calculate the cumulative risk of the evaporation proposal and other environmental sources of risk to the public within a 50 mile radius of the THI site.
In fact, the collective 50-year dose committment to the people within a 3
50-mile radius is estimated in NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 at 3.7, 53.1.1.2.
JI l
e.
failed to specify the "other environmental sources of risk" which it thinks Staff s buld have taken into account; hence we find no genuine issue has been raised by Statement 8.
Statem2nt 10 faults the Staff for assuming that transuranics in the AGW were present at lower levels of detectability. Licensee, however, listed all transuranics that might be in the AGW, using Westinghouse's measured levels of those detected and the lower level of detectability for those not detected. Statement 11 alleges that tbc NRC Staff "assumes that there are biological mechanisms that can repair damage cuased by radiation at low doses."
In the section of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 cited by the JI. the Staff says that "there my be biological mechanisms that can repair damage caused by radiation at low doses and/or dose rates." (emphasis added) Clearly Staff did not assume that such mechanisms exist and acknowledged the uncertainty about the matter. Thus we find that Statement 11 fails to raise a genuine issue to be litigated. Statement 12 alleges that the Staff misled the public by making the AGW seem innocuous and that Staff's calculations of the dose to the public from drinking water had many flaws. J1 fails to specify what any of the alleged flaws might be, however. Therefore we find that Statement 12 fails to raise a genuine issue of fact. Statement 14 alleges that the Staff has not analyzed the safety of the evaporator for the workers and criticizes Staff's assumption that leakage of AGW from a storage tank would be a bounding accident for the workers because of the possibility that a hose might rupture or a pump fail on the evaporator. However, either of these two events woulo be unlikely to release as much AGW as would be released by
a tank Npture. Consequently we find that no genuine issua has been raised by Statement 14 Licensee's motion for sumary disposition is granted with respect to the matters contained in Staterrents 1,2,3, parts of 4 listed above, 5, 6, 8,11,12, and 14 and is denied witt. respect to the matters dealt with in the other statements as indicated above.
D.
Contention -:
Contention 4 is as follows:
b) Sufficient evidence has not been provided to ensure that the evaporator can filter out transuranics, other radionuclides as well as chemicals to protect the public health and safety.
c) the monitoring and safety systems have not been shown to provide the safeguards needed to protect the public health and sdfety.
d)
It has not been demonstrated that the evaporator influent can be varied from processing 3 gallons per minute to 20 gallons per minute without jeopardizing the public health and safety.
In suppcrt of its Motion for Summary Disposition the Licensee presented the Affidavit of David R. Buchanan, Manager, Recovery Engineering, Three Mile Island. We find that he is qualified to testify on the matters discussed in his Affidavit.
The Staff submitted no material facts as to which there is no issue to be heard, but suppo'.ed the Licensee's Statement of Material Facts by the Affidavit of Linda F. Munson, foncerly a Senior Research Scientist with Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories and presently President, Evergreen Innovations, Richland, Washington. We find Ms. Munson to be qualified to testify on the matters contained in her Affidavit.
. \\
i The Licensee's statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be heard based on the Buchanan Affidavit is as follows:
1 1.
The AGW disposal system proposed includes a dual closed-cycle evaporator system and an electric-powered vaporizer designed to raise the evaporator distillate temperature and to release the resultant steam to the atmosphere via a flash tank and exhaust stack.
2.
The main evaporator is a vapor recompression type unit with the designed flexibility to be configured as a spraying film or climbing film evaporator.
3.
Prior to processing in the disposal system, the AGW will be and/or will have been pretreated by other systems to whatever extent is necessary to be at or below the levels of radionuclide concentrations identified as influent criteria for the evaporatoe disposal system.
be 0.1% or less (y-over fraction for this disposal system is expected to 4.
The carra decontamination factor of at least 1,000), based upon routine performance experience with typical and similar evaporator systems.
5.
Conductivity monitors will be provided at the main evaporator feed, the evaporator effluent (distillate) and the vaporizer influent.
6.
Five sample point stations will be provided for the extraction of process fluids for radiochemical analysis-7.
The vaporizer section of the system, which releases the vaporizer distillate into the atmosphere, will be monitored and controlled by a gama radiation detector, with pre-determined set points based on insuring the TMI-2 Technical Specification instantaneous release limit will not be exceeded.
8.
Measurement of Cs-137 by the in-line radiation detector provides a bounding determination of compliance with Technical Specification limits. Therefore, it is not necessary to measure tritium and strontium at the release.
9.
Tritium and the beta-emitting isotopes will be determined by sampling and radioanalytical methods.
- 10. The in-line radiation detector will sound an audible alarm and tenninate atmospheric release if its setpoint is reached.
11.
the instrumentation and safety systems, along with the process control plan, will assure that radiological releases do not exceed those estimated by the NRC Staff in PE15 Supp. No. 2.
- 12. The disposal system is designed to operate at an evaporator feed rate of 5 gallons pr minute, and by design that feed rate cannot be exceeded.
12 Joint Intervenors (J1) sutoitted seven statements supporting their argument that there are material facts in Contention 4 wMch should be litigated. Wediscussthem,seriath,below.
1.
Those issues identified in "Contention 3" P 10-17 concerning the inadequacy of the data related to the characterization of tSe water are also relevant to this response for Conter tion 4 because the chemistry of the water may Mf2ct the efficiency of the evaporator.
The Contention 3 issues are discussed in the Board's consideration of Contention 3.
Our decisions on those statements will not be repeated here.
2.
A decontamination factor of 1000 has been assumed by the NRC and the Licensee. This fact,,r is based on the premise that this water resembles the water for which a decontamination factor of 1000 right be expected. However,this water has a different characterization because of the addition of ce: tain chemicals notably Triton X.
This detergent would affect the efficiency of the evaporator to decontaminate the Wator.
(Licensee's Response Interrogatory S 522.19.88)
(Licensee's Response Interrogatory 6,3.30.88)
(Affadavit[ sic],LouisKosarek,ExhibitC) 3.
If the decontamination factor of 1000 is not achieved the effluent froin the vaporizer may exceed the Maxir un Pennissible Concentratior, for releases into the air. The health of the public will be jeopardized.
12 Those statements submitted by JI which pertain to the chemical effects of the AGW on the evaporator systen are discu: sed in Contention 4b in part and 6.
)
L
The twc Licensee discovery responses state that Triton-X was added to the AGW. The Kosarek Affidavit contained remarks about the effect of Triton-X on the operation of the evaporator system. However, he presents little infornation on the effects of detergent concentration on the evaporator, and we therefore are left principally with the fact that there are 350 gallons of Triton-X in the system.13 JI's concern in it 2 and 3 is the stitement that the DF nf the evaporator is exoected to be 1000, that because of the effect of the Triton-X it will fall below that, and that the public health will therefore be jeopardized. However, the vaporizer will not be operated at all until after it has been determined by physical analysis that the influent to the vaporizer meets the appropriate criteria so that release to the atmosphere will be acceptable. Buchanan Affidavit 1 21, p. 8.
We therefore find that no litigable issue exists here.
4 The evaporation has no effect on the concentration of tritium in the effluent.
If the water contains a concentration of 2. uCi/ml (Tcchnical Specificatiores for Processed Water Disposal P43 (7.3) the Licensee will exceed its pennissible continuous release rates which is 570uti/sec(releaselimitof3 gal / min.
F (GPU Proposal 1986 P.41)
The thrust of Statement 4 hinges upon the concentration of Tritium in the influent to the evaporator. The value of 2.1 uCi/m1 cited by JI I
We note that the average air.ount of Triton-X (350 gal.) in the total AGW to be treated (2.3 million gallons) is 0.00013 of the total, a very dilute solution.
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would exceed the pemissible limits of release of gaseous effluents for THI-2.
Licensee's letter to the Botrd dated July 20, 1988 transmitted an affidavit of Kerry L. Harner dated July 19, 1988 which explains that the value in JI's statement was a typographical error, and that a review of 4
the actual analysis showed +6at it should have been 2.3E-1, which is within allowable limits.
.ogust 10, 1988 the Board received "SVA/TMIA Response to Licensee's Notification of Typographical Error in Bfd Procurement Document" dated July 28, 1988.
In this document JI challenges Licensee's statement on a number of bases. We have looked at all the analysis numbers which have been provided us, and it does appear that the higher value is an anomaly. However, it is our view that we do not have sufficient evidence in the record to rule for or against either party at the suninary disposition stage of the proceeding. We therefore admit JI's Statement 4 insofar as the true value of the Tritium concentration in Processed Water Storage Tank #2 is concerned.
i Sa. The Licensee states that the allowable gaseous rate was Cdlculated assuming that only tritium Would be released as a Vapor.
(Licensee's Response Interrogatory 2/3.30.88)
Radionuclides which may also escape include 1-129 (Ngg0683,gplement#2P3.9,(3.1.2)
Cs and Cs may also escape in the vapor as they are both soluble in water and somewhat volatile.
K-85 which was present in the water,but not listed as a characteristic of the water by either the NRC or GPU, could escape as a gas.
Chrbon 14 could escape as a gas.
The Licensee claims that there is evidence at PWRs that None of the Carbon 14 released was associated with CO '
2 (Licensee response Interrogatory 14,3.30.88) t l
This is contradicted by the following cbservation.
Carbon 14 is not measured routinely in the sampling and analysis programs of most nuclear power plants in the United States, but several independent measurement projects have made estimates of the activities released annually (............. theKunz 1985) is that bo conclusion of that research PWRs and BWRs release in gaseous effluents approximately 10 Curies of Carbon 14 per 1000 MWe-yr of routine operation.
Appendix A,P A-47 "A Radiation Monitoring System for Nuclear Power Plants" (funded by the Public Health Fund and undertaken by Dr. Ruth Patrick and Assoc.)
JI's response is difficult for us to follcw.
In any event, we will separate the somewhat lengthy statement into manageable parts in our discussions.
In JI's first statement, the observation is made that the Licensee calculated the allowable release rate of gases considering only tritium.
That is true, Licensee considered other radionuclides which would be released as particulates, which are calculated differently. Licensee's Discovery Response 2, pp. 2-4, 3/30/88. We find no litigable matter here, nor dces JI explicitly propose one.
J1's second statement observes that I-129 may also escape in the vaporizer effluent. However, assuming this to be true, the amount of I-129 in the AGW is below the detectable limit, which leads us to believe that it will have no significant impact on health and safety or the environment. See NUREG-0683 Supp. No. 2. Table 2.2, p. 2.3.
We find no litigable matter here.
JI's next two sentences concern the possible escape of Cs-137, Cs-134 and K-85.
No authority was cited for these statements, and the
Board cannot adequately evaluate these unsupported statements. We therefore find no basis for litigation here.14 JI's final statement concerns the release of C-14 in the form of C0.
In support of their statement they quote a part from a document 2
which is purported to be a study funded by an organization called the "Public Pealth Fund" and perfomed by a Dr. Ruth Patrick and Associates.
We have not been given enough infomation to be able to detemine whether this is an acceptable reference. The quoted research "Kunz 1985" is not known to us, and we have no knowledge of where or if it was published. However, assuming, for the purpose of argument, that there is some technical backing of the Kunz gaseous release figure of 10 Ci of Carbon-14 per 1000 megawatt-years of operation, we note that the TMI-2 system was only at high power for approximately three calendar months, with numerous shutdowns because of operational difficulties. Any C0 I"
2 the offgas releases was vented continuously during this period of time, which would leave only a small amount in the system at the time of shutdown. Furthermore, we accept Licensee's uncontradicted assertion that the concentration of Carbon-14 in the storage tanks would not be 14 We do note that Licensee has taken notice of the presence of Cs-137 and Cs-134 in the influent to the vaporizer. Harner Affidavit 'A 22, 33, pp. 8, 12.
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significantly greater than the naturally occurring Carbon-14 in the atmosphere, since the tanks are vented to the atmosphere. Licensee's Answers to SVIA/TMIA's Second Set of Interrogatories, Int. 14, p. 13, 3/30/88. We find no fact herein to litigate.
for tritium as listed in 10 C.F.R 20, App B, Table ti,Coluran 1 (2x10')C 6.
If more than one gas is released by evaporation,then the ME
)
and used in calculations by the Licensee must be different.
(10 C.F.R.20 App 8, footnotes.)
This is a true statement. However, the only gas expected to be released in any significar.t quantity is tritium. Licensee's Discovery Response 2, pp. 2-4, 3/30/88. We have no reason to disagree with the Licensee's calculation methods, and find no material fact which needs to be litigated in JI's statement.
- 14. The vaporizer section of the system will be monitored and controlled by a gama radiation detector. More than 50% of the releases from the vaporizer are beta emitters. Cs-137 is a gama emitter.
It will be used for calibrations and alarm set-point determination (Buchanan Affidavit. This type of monitoring assumes a constant relationship between Cs-137 and Sr-90 or H-3.
This assumption may be inaccurate for the AGW. The Licensee had been found to maintain a policy to systematically falsify critical safety data and destroy documents for months leading to the 1979 accident.(2/84) The Licensee has more recently been found to mismanage waste (10-23-87)(3-11-88).
These facts put more emphasis on not just the ability of the monitoring and safety systems to work,but also the ability of the Licensee to perform its work properly.
Before any batch of AGW is processed in the evaporator it will be subjected to radiochemical analysis, which will establish the 'fritium level and the Cs-137 to Sr-90 ratio. From this, the Sr-90 activity level of the influent to the vaporizer can be inferred by measuring only the gamma radiation level from Cs-137. Thus, all three of the principal
radioactive components is known. Further n,easures are made by the conductivity monitor, to protect against unexpected deviation in the composition of the influent. Harner Affidavit, 11 37, 39, pp. 13, 14, See Harner Affidavit, f 40, pp.14,15. We find no material fact herein which should be litigated.I
- 16. It is well documented in Appendix A and F,"A Radiation Monitoring System for Nuclear Power Plants" that monitoring of radionuclide 1s an extremely difficult task and one which is fraught witherrors.l6 In Harner Affadavit for Contention 5d, it is stated that The nuclear process involved in a reactor produces predictable fission products, activation products, and transuranics, and the rates of decay and decay products are also known. Thus the isotopic inventory can be calculated; and radienuclide constituents of any significance and their relative abundance can be determined. (p.5)
This is not entirely accurate in light of the fact that a variety of models may be used in calculations,and the calculations are only as good as the input of data. Futhermore,the accident at TMI created a scenario i
not experienced before and during which the fission products and activation products were distributed throughout Unit 2 by way of the atmosphere and the water. This is well documented in the research of i
the accident. (This discussion is relevant to Contentions 3 & 5)
The Harner statement is true, insofar as the fission process is concerned. Measurenunts are, of courst, subject to error depending upon 15 The Board's jurisdiction is to detemine whether the preposed system can work to ensure that there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. As to the question of whether the system will be operated in such manner as to achieve this goal, we must depend upon the Licensee and its employees. The License to operate is not Lt issue.
16 We reiterate our objections to the use of this citation. See JI's 5 Sa), supra.
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ti.s accuracy of the input data. The context in which the Harner statement was made was that of being able to determine if any gross errors would be made in their proposed radiochemical analyses to determine the evaporator and vaporizer influents. The results of the CaICulations, radiochemical analysis of the contents of four storage tanks by Westinghouse and identical samples from the processed water storage tank by GPUN and RESL Laboratories agreed within acceptable limits. Harner Affidavit (contention 5d), 11 4-12, pp. 3-9.
We therefore agree that there is a reasonable expectation that the radiochemical analysis proposed by GPUN will be adequate for the purpose intended. We find no issue of material fact in JI's statement.
Conclusion The Board finds no merit in JI's responses to Licensce's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 4b in part 4c and 4d, except Statement 4, as described herein. The Motion is therefore granted in part and denied in part.
E.
JI Contention 5d JI Contention 5d is:
[LicenseeandtheNRCStaff]haveunderestimatedtheeffectsof tritium and alpha emitting radionuclides on human beings. The alpha emitters such as plutonium 238 and other transuranic elements which are present in the water were virtually ignored in the 1987 EIS. They were not examined for their chemical and biological characteristics in spite of their well-known toxicity.
The following supporting documents were submitted with "Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 5d":
1.
"Licensee's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Sumary Disposition" dated May 9, 1988; 2.
"Licensee's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There ic No Genuine Issue to be Heard (Contention 5d)";
3.
"AffidavitofKerryL.Harner(Contention 5d)",theTMI-2 Radiological Chemistry Manager, and his professiorial qualifications; 4.
"Affidavit of Dr. Gary G. Baker (Contention 5d)", GPU's V nager of Environmental Controls, and his professional
,ualifications; and 5.
"Affidavit of Dr. Hans Behling (Contention 5d)", GPU's Manager of Radiological Health at Three Mile Island, and his professional qualifications.
We are satisfied that Mr. Harner, Dr. Baker, and Dr. Behling are qualified to attest to the matters in their respective affidavits.
Licensee's statement of material facts, based on the three affidavits, sets forth the following facts as to which it asserts that there are no genuine issues to be heard:
1.
BothLicenseeandtheNRC(throughtheU.S.Departmentof Energy's Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory) have analyzed processed accident generated water to detemine its radionuclide constituents, including alpha emitters such as transuranics.
2.
Licensee has also performed a technical evaluation of accident generated water and, using the ORIGEN Code, has calculated the radionuclides (including tritium and alpha emitters such as transuranics) of any significance potentially present in the water.
3.
There are transuranics on the Periodic Table other than those identified as present in the accident generated water, since not every transuranic is produced by a reactor to an appreciable extent.
4 Licensee has calculated individual and population deses due to evaporation using the Meteorological Infomation and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS), a code which has been approved by the NRC and which is based on methodology in the NRC's Regulatory Guides 1.109 and 1.111.
5.
Licensee calculates that the dose to the maxinally exposed individual from evaporation is 2.0 mrom to the total bcdy and 3.6 mrem to the bone; and of these doses, 1.4 mrom to the total body is attributable to tritium, and essentially all of the 3.6 mrem to the bone is attributable to Sr-90.
6.
Licenste has assessed the contribution of uraniums and transuranics identified as potentially present in evaporator effluent and has detennined that none contribute even as much as 1%
of the dose attributable to strontium.
7.
The NRC has independently calculated doses to the maximally exposed individual and to the population from evaporation, and has assumed for purposes of these calculations that uraniums and transuranics are present at the lower limit of detection.
8.
The NRC calculates that the maximally exposed individual will receive 0.7 mrem to the total body; 0.8 mrem to the bone, and a arem to the thyroid.
n 9.
Tritium has been extensively studied, is the subject of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurenents (NCRP) Report No. 62 and NCRP Report No. 63, and is addressed in the 1980 Report of the National Academy of Science's Comittee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR !!!).
... it is reasonably conservative to assume, for the purpose of practical hazards considerations, that there is no significant transmutation effect for tritium incorporated in DNA, and that one may estimate hazards solely on the basis of absorbed beta dose... There is, at present no reason to conside,' the RBE for chromosome aberraticn production by beta rays from incorporated tritium to be different frein ee."
(NCRP Report No. 63)
- 11. Applying the conservative risk estimators from the BEIR III Report to the population dose calculated by Licensee and to the population dose calculated by the NRC, the risk from evaporation of a single fatal cancer among the 2.2 million peuple residing within 50 miles of TMI ranges from 0.0003 to 0.005.
- 12. The risk of a Senetic effect or fetal injury is considerably smaller, f
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- 13. The contribution to risk from transuranics, due cither to chemical toxicity cr to radiotoxicity, is inconsequential.
- 14. Thus, tritium and alpha emitters such as trenturanics have been fully evaluated in connection with the proposed evaporation of accident generated water.
The NRC Staff in its June 23, 1988 response to Licensee's motion for sunnary disposition (Staff Response) supported the trotion with respect to all the contentions, including Contention 5d.
In support of its response, the Staff appended the "Affidavit of Linda Munson",
President of Evergreen Innovations, Inc., and consultant in health physics and radioactive waste management to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Prior to January 1988, Ms. Hunson was Senior Research Scientist, Project Manager and Associate Section Manager of the Dosimetry Technology Section of Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories. While in that position she managed a project to assist the NRC in its regulation of the cleanup of TH:-2. She was also project manager and an author of the Draft and Final Supplements Nos.1 and 2 to the PEIS governing cleanup of the THI-2 reactor. We are satisfied that Ms. Hunson is qualified to attest to the matters set forth in her affidavit.
Staff points out that Table 2.2 in NUREG-0638, Supp. 2 lists three uranium isotopes and six transuranics; the transuranics were conservatively assumed to be present in the AGd, even though their concentrations were below detectable levels. The health effect for the general population from evaporation of the AGW was calculated by Staff to be a 4 in 10,000 chance of a single fatal cancer and 2 chances in I
i
1000 of a single genetic disorder. Munson Affidavit 11 38, 39; NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, p. 5.6.
Staff states that its estimates are substantiated by a study of the effect of the tritium releases performed by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurenents (NCRP).
Staff Response at 15; NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, pp. A.13-23. The NCRP estimated in that report that the release of tritium to the atmosphere will result in a lifetime cancer plus severe genetic risk to the most highly exposed hypothetical individual of approximately 1 chance in 10 million.
Id. at A.20. The report contains a caveat with respect to its risk estimates, however, by stating that the risk values reflect current estimates of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)publishedin1377;theriskvaluesdonotaccountforpotential changes that may resu,4 from the re-evaluation of the Japanese atomic bumb survivor data, nor do they account for the fact that the quality factor of 1 for tritium beta radiation is under review.17 ! bid.
Thus the NRC Staff disagrees with the Licensee and the NCRP. Staff estimates a higher probability of a genetic defect than a fatal cancer, whereas Licensee states in Material Fact No.12 that the risk of a genetic effect is "considerably smaller" than the risk of a fatal II The quality factor is the value b which the absorbed dose is multipliedtotakeintoaccounttkerelativebiological effectiveness (RBE) of a given fonn of radiation. Differences in RBE for varius fonns of radiation is detennined largely by the lineer energy transfer (LET) value of the radiation. LET refers to the rate at which energy is deposited in the tissue by the radiation.
cancer; and according to Licensee's Material Fact No.10 NRCP Report r
No. 63 states that "... one u.ay estimate hazards solely on the basis of absorbed beta dose...There is, at present no reason to consider the RBE for chromosome aberratiore production by beta rays from incorporated tritium to be different from cne."
The Joint Intervenors filed a response (JI Response) to Licensee's motion for sumary disposition of Contention 5d which was supported by two sets of coments by Dr. K. Z. Morgan, currently a health physics consultant and forner director of the Health Physics Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.I8 Prior to that position, Dr. Morgan was
. employed by the University of Chicago where he collaborated with others in developing and establishing the new science and profession of health physics. He has also served as professor of physics at a number of other institutions of higher learning and has conducted research on, among other things, dosimetry of alpha and neutron irradiation, plutonium distribution in bone, and carcinogenesis of X, gama and 10 JI refers to Dr. Morgan's coments as "afficavits," when in fact they are not affidavits occause they have not been duly notarized.
In a telephone conference on Au1ust 15,1988, the parties agreed to waive the affidavit requirement for Dr. Morgan. Exhibit B containing Dr. Morgan's coments dated March 19, 1987, was directed toward the draf t PEIS Suppluent No. 2 (hUREG-0683). The Staff, in the final NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, considered and discussed Dr.
Morgan's coments at Sections 7.1.11, 7.2.14, 7.2.15, 7.3.3.3, and 7.5.15.
Therefore, we have no basis or reason to consider his coments on the draf t of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2.
Exhibit A does contain a response to criticism directed toward Dr. Morgan's coments on the draft PEIS plus up-dated coments on the proposal to evaporate the AGW; therefore Exhibit A will be considered by us.
neutron radiation.
Finally, for 20 years he was Chairman of the ICRP.
In addition to the affidavits of Dr. Morgan, the JI Response was supported by an affidavit of Dr. Charles V. Huyer, Research Director of Environmental Concerns, Twin Cities, ano Adjunct Professor at the Graduate Center of Saint Mary's College, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Dr. Huve' has also taught and conducted research, primarily in the field of aquatic biology, at a number of universitiest he has also published several papers and testified before a Congressional Hearing on the biological effects of radioactive effluents, particularly tritium.
Finally, an afficavit of Louis Kosarek was submitted in support of the JI Response, but as we noted in our discussion of Contention 2, we lack sufficient information about his qualifications.19 We are satisfied that Dr. Morgan and Dr. Huver are qualified to attest to the matters contained in their affidavits. With regard to affiant Kosarek, we shall proceed here as we did in considering Contention 2; namely, we shall r
consider his substantive arguments to determine whether they raise issues that we need to consider for an adequate record.
OnthesecondunrumberedpakeoftheJIResponsealistofaffiants 19 is set forth and includes, n addition to tiose already rentioned here. Dr. Richard Piccioni. A note states that JI had not received i
Dr. Piccioni's affidavit but expected it to arrive within the next
[
i few days, at which time, accordinging to JI the affidavit would promptly be mailed to all parties. By letter to the Board dated July 7, 1988, however, the J1 advised that the Piccioni affidavit l
i would not be submitted.
I h
JI's response with regard to Contention Ed sets forth the following statements of material facts as to which they allege there are genuine issues to be heard:20 1.
Those issues raised in responses fur Contention 3" are pertinent to the issues raised in thi, issue, since the dose from either Tritium or transuranics is cependent en the characteristics of the ACW, and vapcr from the evaporating process. The efficiency of the evaporator, addressed under "Contention 4" is also pertinent to this issue.
2.
It should be noted that this contention t efers to the NRC's deficient discussion of tha effects of tritium and the alpha emitters, and their assumptions about the lack of effect on the population. Therefore, the Licensee's attempt to provide more infomation on tritium and the alpha emitters does not alleviate the NRC from their responsibilities to the public.
3.
In determining the expcsure and dose to a member of the population, it is stated that, The chenical and physical forms of the aerosols and isotopes would determine the biological uptake and excrution rates and sc influence the effecthe time of exposure for various bodily orgens (Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 57, Number 3 Part 11 July 1985) Report to APS The NRC did not determine tne physical and chemical fom of the radionuclides in the AGW, with the exception of tritium.
(NRC Re.sponse Interrogatory 4, 4.4.88) l 20 Statements number 1, 2, and 15 balow are merely argunnts rather than statements of genuine issues of material facts which must be heard. Therefore we shall not ccrsider them.
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4 In its discussion of tritium la NUREG-0603, Supplement s'2, the NRC ignored some of the data provided in NCRP f 62. Some I
examples are as follows:
a) The NRC discussion of tritium assumes that the effects of tritium are well known and understood (Behling Affidavit exprwsses same). The NCRP report hcwever states.
There have been many studies of the metabolism of tritium in animals and humans with somewhat loss attention given to radiatior e te?ts.
5.
NCRP report c M t sates that following uptake of tritium Within minutes i' can be found in varying cencentrations in the various crgans, fluids and tissues of the body.
6.
The rate of elimination from the bcdy is dependent on where the tritium is incorporated.
if it is ir,t J O ated in organically bound pools it will be retained in de b ly longer.
The NRC recognized this but failed throughout the s...iG-0638 to relate it to the release of tritium upon the population around TMI which would occur as a result of the evaporation of the AGW.
7.
As recognized by NCRP # 62, the arcunt of tritium incorporated into the DNA is most important. NCRP quote: two studies which report the labelling of DNA by tritium.
In one study all DNA were labelled with tritium in various amounts. In another study by Mewinaen and Rust, it was found that incorporation into RNA was five-fold greater than in DNA. The NRC neglected this vital information in its determination of the effects of tritium.
(AffidavitDr.C.W.Huver,ExhibitD)
C.
There is evidance of the concentration of tritium in vegetation.
(Affidavit Dr. C. W. Huver, Exhibit D) 9.
Assessment of the Relative Biological Effectiveness of tritium is difficult. Dose calculations vary greatly with the use of different values.
In view of NCRP's statement which documents the difficulties ir. assessing the RBE it is pruoent tu err on the side of caution in determining the dose to the population exposed to tritiuni.
(Affidavit Dr. K. Z. Morgan, Exhibit A)
NCRP t 62 states that the difficulties are confounded by the following:
a) the metabolic ar.d physiologic processes controlling the distribution and therefore the dose due to tc) tium are poorly)known (this is especially incortant in extended exposure situations (enphasis added);
i eu
b) tritium incorporation into organic molecules and structures as well as the differential distribution of tritiated water result in inhomogeneous dose distributions; c) dose estimates are based on secondary measurements; d) disruption of tissue structures by the initial dose fraction of a total dose delivered over an extended period of time wili result in a non-homogeneous dose distribution; e) the reproductivity of low dose experiments relative to high dose experiments is low; In its evaluation of dose from tritium the NRC does not evaluate this infomation and as a result virtually ignores the effects of tritium;
- 10. NCRP # 62 states that available data support the general ccnclusion that slow uptake is logically associated with long retention. This infomation is particularly relevant to assessing the dose frcm tritium incurred over a twu year period by evaporation. The NRC did not utilize this infomation in its discussion or calculations in hUREG-0683, Supp. 2,;
- 11. It has been found that tritium releases to the environment have some ecological and biological consequences when evaluated in tenns of food chain effects (Affidavit, Dr. C. W. Huver, Exhibit 0);
13.21 The NRC did not take into account the already existing impact frca the dose delivered to that part of the population which also receives a dose from the tritium in their drinking water, such as those who live in the City of Lancaster (NRC Response to Interrogatory 8,2.22.88);
14.
In considering the effects of transuranics on the dose delivered to the oopulation, the NRC assumed that these transuranics were present at the lower levels of detectability.
Having made this assumption, the NRC continued to ignore the effects of any amount of transuranics by not providing infortnation on the chemical and radiological characteristics of these alpha emitters.
In light of their extreme toxicity, more consideration was warranted (NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, Section 2.2);
21 There was no statement number 12 in the JI Respense.
~ _ _.
- 15. By virtually ignoring the effects of tritium and the transuranics, the EIS does not provide adequate data to the public for making an informed decision about the disposal of the AGW.
Tritium In Exhibit A Dr. Morgan stated that the only criticism that he had seen of his March 19, 1987 report on the Draft PEIS criticized his report because ' is calculations of dose were based on values of body uptake, distribution, retention and energy distribution given in ICRP-2 (1959) rather than data given in ICRP-30 (1981). He stated that while it was true that the earlier report led to higher estimates for some radiunuclides, such as Sr-90, it had little effect for H-3.
The reason Dr. Morgan used ICRP-2, he said, was because he believes the data in it are (1) more representative of the average person in the connunity and (2) the data in ICRP-30 were selected by current members of the ICRP wno have a conflict of intarest because of their asscciation in the nuclear industry. He points cut that that early data made use of information from children and females as well as from males, whereas the ICRP-30 data apply more strongly to the adult working male. Exhibit A at 1-2.
In addition, he states that whereas today the ICRP sets the Q=20 fer alpha and neutrcn radiation but has dropped the Q for low energy beta to 1.0 from the Q=1.8 used in ICRP-2. Dr. Morgan argues further that "Some of us had gathered biological data indicating the value of Q should be no lower than five... " ano went on to state that he had physical data indicating the stopping power dE/dx of iow energy betas was similar to that of alpha radiation.
Id. at 2-3.
1
l l
Dr. Morgan also pointed out that tritiated thymidine in the DNA can create a problem in two ways when the hydrogen atun gives off a beta
~
particle. First, the recoil energy could break or rearrange chromosomes in the cell nucleus, and second, when the hydrogen atom gives off a beta particle it is transmuted to a helium atom. He believes that these events could occur in the human ovum or spenn cell prior to or shortly 3
after meiosis.
Id. at 3.
He also states that g 0, which is how 2
tritium will be released in the steam and water droplets released during 3
evaporation, is considered to be 100 times more hazardous than H.
Id.
2 dt 4.
Dr. Morgan also believes that the cancer risk estimate of 10 cancer deaths per person rem (cd/pr) is too low and argues that it should be not less than 10-3 cd/pr.
Further, he points out that the lower value is based on early data from survivors of the dtomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the publication in 1987 of the reassessment of the Japanese data led the ICRP to state that the cancer risk estimate would need to be increased by a factor of 2.8.
According l
to Morgan the ICRP also predicted that risk estimates of cancer induction would be increased by the change from the use of an absolute risk model to a relative risk model and by the change in the shape of the dose response curve.
Ibid.
Cr. Huver, a biologist, argues in his affidavit that most of the literature on the biological hazards of tritium were omitted and ignored in PEIS Supplement No. 2.
(Huver Affidavit at 1). He cites and l
discusses numerous publications demonstrating biological uptake of and damage by tritium.
Application of tritiatea water to a corn plot resulted in 1.1% of the applied tritium being present in the corn crop at harvest. Corn ears which had not been formed at the time of tritium application showed critium levels of 500 pCi/g which correlated closely with the concentration of tritium in the soil water.
Id. at 3.
When vegetation is exposed to tritium vapor or liquid, rapidly growing herbaceous crops produced greater tritium fixation than that found in mature forest vegetation. Tritiated water spray on a cow pasture resulted in uptake of tritium in forage vegetation and transfer through the food chain to cow's milk. When cows ate tritium-contaminated forage, they developed higher levels of organically-bound tritium in milk than they did when they drank tritiated water. According to Dr. Huver, these types of results led Korand, Martin, and Anspaugh of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory to conclude in a 1971 report "that tritium releases to the environment, even those of short-livec nature, have some ecological and biological consequence when evaluated in tenns of human food chain effects." Id. at 3-4.
l With respect to genetic mutation and chromosomal damage caused by tritium incorporated into DNA molecules, Dr. Huver cites several scientific papers.
For instant he cites one paper in which it was shown that beta radiation having an energy similar to tritium was abcut 2.5 1
times as effective in producing chromosome breaks as gama radiaticn.
i
[
On basis of the assumpticn that chromosome breakage is one of the main i
I l
l i
causes of cell lethality, Dr. Huver suggests that beta radiation would be about 2.5 times as lethal per unit dose as gamma radiation.
Id. at 4.
Further, because it has been proposed that chromosome breakage is produced mainly by oensely ionizing electrons as they near the end of their tracks, Dr. Huver argues that the 5.7 key betd radiation from tritium should be about three times more likely than X or gamna radiation to produce chromosome breaks per unit dose, because the secondary electrons yielded by X and gamma rays have energies of about 20 key. He claims that there are data which are in fairly good agreement with this hypothesis.
Id. at 4-5.
Licensee's Affiant Dr. Sehling, on the other hand, cites a study which he says shows tritium incorporated into DNA is not noticeably more detrimental than an equivalent dose of external exposure froin gamma or X-rays. Behling Affidavit at 19.
Experimental work on the internal toxicity of tritium in mice has shown tritium beta radiation to be about 1.7 times as effective as gamma radiation in causing mortality. Also, tritium beta radiation has been shown to be more effective thar, gamma radiation in prcducing thymic and splenic atrophy in the mouse. Moreover, tritium beta radiation has been demonstrated to be more effective than gamma radiation in causing bone marrow d&nage in rats. Huver Affidavit at 5.
Tritium can also increase l
t
22 tumor fornation in mice. When a 1 pCi/gm dose of tritiated thymidine was injected into mice, significantly more of these animals died from tumors than did the controls.
Further, a single injection of tritiated water (0.27 mci tritium /g) caused an ovarian tumor incidence in exposed offspring 5-fold over controls.
Ibid.
The rapidly proliferating germ line cells in n.cuse testes have been demonstrated to have a high radiosensitivity to tritium. The incorporation of tritiated thymidine from doses as low as 1 uCi/gm had produced damage to spermatogonia and spermatocytes when examined 4 days after injection. Female mice when exposed from conception to relatively low levels of tritiated water (0.085 pC1/ml) produced significantly less primary occytes as compared to untreated offspring.
Id. at 5-6.
Human leucocytes have been chronically exposed to tritiated water and tritiated thymidine using e. wide range of tritium doses. At higher dose levels the frcquency of chromatid breaks increased linearly with dose, while at lower dose levels the frequency of breaks was significantly higher than would be predicted by a downward extrapolation of the linear model, according to Dr. Huver.
Id. at 6.
According to Licensee's affiant Dr. Behling, on the other hand, a study of the induction of chromosomal aberrations in leukocytes in vitro following 22 i
In Dr. Huver's afficavit this dose symbol was written "uc/gm".
This notation has no meaning for us, but we assume that it should be written "uCi/gm".
exposure to tritiated thymidine revealed no correlation between the site of labelling and the site of breakage. Behling Affidavit at 18-19.
The incorporation of tritiated compounds into DNA causes an increase in mutation rate. Tritiated nucleosides administered to the fruit-fly, Drosophila melanogaster, have induced sex-linked lethal mutations. Tritiated thymidine administered to adult mice has resulted in a 30% reduction in the reproductive rate of their offspring. When tritiated thymidine was injected into the testes of male mice, dominant lethal mutations were produced in the sperm which resulted in an increase in abortions. Huver Affidavit at 7; Behling Affidavit at 18.
Dr. Huver believes that the most serious type of biological damage that has been demonstrated for tritium is that of genetic mutations.
Huver Affidavit at 6.
Dr. Behling, on the other hand, believes that the distribution of tritium within the nucleus "seems to be relatively unimportant." Behling Affidavit at 19. Recall that the NRC Staff estimated a higher probability of a genetic defect than a fatal cancer from exposure to tritium, whereas the Licensee concluded that the risk of a genetic defect from tritium exposure was considerably smaller than the risk of a fatal cancer.
Thus Licensee is in disagreement with both the Staff and the JI.
In conclusion, there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the health and genetic effects of tritium.
The motion for summary disposition is denied with respect to this part of Contention 5d.
Transuranics The thrust of Contention 5d with regard to transuranics focuses on the treatment given them by the Staff in NUREG-0683, Supp. 2.
The JI claim that the transuranics in the AGW were virtually ignored in the PEIS Supplement No. 2.
Staff's affiant Ms. Munson and Licensee's affiants Dr. Behling, Dr. Baker, and Mr. Harner all addressed the dllegation about transuranics. Neither JI's affiant Dr. Morgan in Exhibit A, nor Dr. Huver in his affidavit, on the other hand, addressed the allegation that transuranics had been virtually ignored.
Ms. Munson points out that Table 2.2 of NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, lists three uranium isotopes and six transuranics. Munson Affidavit at 16.
Indeed, NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, lists the principal contaminants which were identified as contributors to potential environmental impacts estimated in the supplement. The environmental impact of the other radionuclides in the AGW, which includes uranium and the transuranics, was determined to be insignificant (less than 1%) relative to the principal radionuclides.
Id.; NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at 2.4.
Based on the Lower Limits of Detection (LLDs) of the water volumes analyzed, Dr. Baker estimated that no more than about 7 microcuries of transuranics can be present, consisting of no more than 5.7 microcuries of plutonium-241 and no more than 1.3 microcuries of other transuranics. Baker Affidavit at 17-18.
Dr. Behling attested that the chemistry of plutonium and other transuranic elements have been extensively researched. The two aspects of their chemistry which are relevant to consideration of their health
e#fects resulting from the proposed evaporation of the AGW are their degree of solubility and the particle size in which they may exist.
Behling Affidavit at 55. Plutonium and other transuranics exhibit multiple oxidation states, and the oxidation state affects their solubility. Transuranic oxides formed at high temperatures are very insoluble in water, whereas oxides formed at low temperatures are relatively soluble in water.
Id. at 56; Baker Affidavit at 18.
Moreover, transurenic oxides formed at temperatures above 350 C are kncwn to form molecular aggregates resulting in particles having diameters that range in size from nanometers to micrometers.
It can be assumed that the plutonium and other transuranics present in the AGW were produced at high temperatures during the operationa6 period of the TMI-2 reactor. Consequently they should occur in the AGW as insoluble micro-particulates. Behling Affidavit at 56.
The transuranic elements under consiceration here are all alpha emitters.
It is generally assumed that the quality factor for alpha radiation is twenty (20) when the reference radiation is 200 kev X-radiation.
Id. at 57-58. According to NCRP Report No. 46, a plutonium-239 alpha particle has a total range in tissue of 40 pm.
Consequently it would not penetrate the exterior surface layer of skin.
Therefore, for any alpha emitting nuclide to be of concern it must be internal to the body. Thus transuranics must be either ingested in contaminated food or water or they must be directly inhaled.
Id. at 59-60. AGW in the Processed Water Storage Tank (PWST) #2, which had been processed by SDS and EPICOR II, was sampled in early 1987. The
sample was split so that it could be analyzed independently by GPUN and for the NRC by D0E's Radiological and Environmental Science Laboratory (RESL) at Idaho Falls. Harner Affidavit at 2 & 8.
GPUN's alpha spectroscopy analytical technique was unable to detect the transuranics because of their low concentrations.
Id. at 5; Baker Affidavit at 13.
Therefore GPUN conservatively assumed that the expected uraniums and transuranics were present at their Lower Limit of Detection (LLD).
Ibid. RESL, on the other hand, had the capability to detect uraniums and transuranics in the processed water; for each uranium and transuranic detected by RESL, the concentration was well below the LLD levels conservatively established by GPUN. Harner Affidavit at 9.
With regard to their chemical toxicity, at the levels at which transuranics will be released by evaporation of the processed AGW the chemical toxicity will be negligible. Behling Affidavit at 70-71; Munson Affidavit at 18.
As we found in the case of Contention 3, transuranics not detected and not expected to be present in the AGW are those that are not produced to an appreciable extent by reactors. The affidavits of Licensee's and Staff's experts make it clear that there is no genuine issue to be heard with respect to the allegations about the inadequate assessment of transuranics in thc AGW.
Conclusions Licensee's Motion for Sunnary Disposition of Contention 5d is granted to the extant that the centention alleges that the effects of
r alpha emitting transuranic elements on human beings has been underestimated or ignored. To the extent that Contention 5d alleges that the effects of tritium on human beings has been underestimated, however, Licensee's Motion is denied.
F.
Contentions 4b in part and 6 4b. Sufficient evidence has not been provided to ensure that aschamicalstoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.gnuclidesaswell the evaporator can filter out transuranics, other rad 6.
An amendment to the license is premature because this water is presently covering the melted fuel, which melted at 5,100 degrees Fahrenheit, and will be used in decontamination activities with the potential for the addition of more chemicals. The licensee has added more chenicals since the submittal of its proposal in July,1986.
The effects of these chemicals on the capabilities of the EPICOR II, SDS and evaporator systems must be evaluated.
In support of its Motion for Sumary Disposition the Licensee presented the Affidavits of Dr. Ga y G. Baker, Manager of Environmental Controls - Three Mile Island, David R. Buchanan, Manager, Recovery Engineering - Three Mile Island and Kerry L. Harner, Radiological Chemistry Manager - Three Mile Island.
In view of their training and This motion addresses the portion of Contention 4b which concerns the removal of chemicals. The removal of transuranics and other radionuclides is addressed in a separate motion which also includes 4c and 4d. Staff also presented their arguments on the ability of the evaporator to function properly with chemicals in the AGW in this particular motion in order to avoid repetition between their motions on Contention 4~ and Contention 6.
The Board chose to o
follow their presentation. The Intervenors have submitted separate responses to both 4b (chemical and radionuclide removal) and 6.
We accordingly discuss those Intervenor non-redundant responses in 4b concerning chemical removal herein.
r
-.--.--g
background we are satisfied that they are qualified to testify on the mdtters Contained in their Affidavits.
The Staff did not submit a statement of material facts as to which there is no issue to be heard, but supported the Licensee's Statement of Material Facts by an affidavit of Linda F. Munson, fonnerly a Senior Research Scientist with Battelle Pacific Ncrthwest Laboratories and presently President, Evergreen Innovations, Richland, Washington. We find that Ms. Munson is cualified to attest to those matters contained in her affidavit.
The Licensee's stetement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be heard based on the above affidavits, is as follows:
1.
The use of chemicals at THI-2 is controlled by the TMI-2 "Chemical Control Procedure" and implementing procedures.
2.
These procedures require that before a new chemical substance may be used at THI-2 for a particular use, an engineering evaluation must be performed, and one of the particular factors that must be considered is the protection of ion exchange media used in the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) and EPICOR II.
3.
Pursuant to these procedures, chemicals introduced into accident generated water have been evaluated for their effects on the SDS and EPICOR II systems, and the introduction of substances that could impair the SDS and EPICOR II systems has been minimal.
4.
The compatibility of the accident generated water chemistry with the EPICOR II and SDS systems is also demonstrated by the observed performance of these systems, which are frequently operated, continually monitored, and consistently achieve a substantial oecontami1ation notwithstanding the chemical constituents of the accident generated water.
5.
The accident generated water processing systems at THI-2 remove chemical as well as radiochemical constituents from the water, with the result that levels of chemicals other than baron and sodium in processed water ere low.
6.
Certain batches of accident generated water will be used for futare cleanup activities, which could increase the level of chemicals in such batches, but reprocessing to the extent necessary will reduce chemical constituents to desired levels. Licensee periodically performs chemical analyses to keep track of the water chemistry of accident generated sources.
7.
Evaporator and vaporizer influent criteria have been established for radionuclides, boron, and sodium, snd vaporization of distillate will not be permitted until it has been detennined analytically that the constituents of the distillate are below the established concentrations.
8.
If a batch of accident generated water needs further processing to satisfy the influent criteria, it can be reprocessed until the influent criteria are achieved.
9.
The evaporator itself 1. being designed to be compatible with the water chemistry of the accident generated water.
- 10. The evaporator design includes features that negate potential adverse effects of chemicals on evaporatcr performance.
- 11. If a chemial constituent in the evaporator influent did reduce the efficiency of the evaporator to a significant extent, monitors on the evaporation system would trigger an alann; and if radioactivity release limits were eneeded, the radiation monitor on the evaporatcr would terminate the evaporation process.
- 12. The evapurator will reduce by over 1,000 the levels of chemicals released to the environment.
- 13. The deposition of chemical substances, principally sodium borate, attributable to evaporation will be orders of magnitude below the levels of salt deposition that have been detennined to be innocuous, and therefore the chemical constituents in evaporator effluent will have no significant impact on the environment.
In its response to the motion for sunmary disposition, Joint 24 Intervenors (JI) submitted seven statements in support of Contention 6 and eight in support of those parts of Contention 4 which are relevant There are two #6s in JI's list. We treat them separately.
to the effects of chemicals in the processing of the AGW.
The statements taken from Contention 4 are identified by (4) after the number assigned by JI. JI's statements, and our discussion thereof, are as foli ws:
1.
The Licensee states that the use of chemicals at THI-2 is strictly controlled by the TMI-2 "Chemical Controls Procedure" (Harner Affadavit [ sic])
Nevertheless, vendor product 1192 was added to the system in 12.8.86 (LicenseeResponseInterrogatory 5,3.30.88)
Vendor Product 1192 was shown in tests to reduce ion removal efficiency of the resins. Their effect on the evaporator has not been demonstrated.
(NRC Response Interrogatory 13(b),2.22.88)
Joint Intervenors's statements are true, but irrelevant. The total dmount of vendor (Betz) 1192 added to the system was 0.75 gallons, and that was in a test conductad under the Chemical Controls Procedure. It did, indeed have a slight effect on the ion-exchange system, and thus was never used in the decontamination process. Harner Affidavit, 1 13,
- p. 7.
We therefore find that this statement does not raise an issue of materici fact which must be resolved at a hearing.
2.
350 gallons of Triton-X were added to the AGW. This is a detergent and as such changes tha characterization of the water.
It affects the effiency of the evaporator. This has received no evaluation by NRC.
(Affidavit Louis Kosarek, Exhibit C).
Licensee is aware of the potential problem. The use of Triton-X has been kept below levels where it might be expected to present a foaming problem, and has not been used since 1985. Harner Affidavit, t 16, p. 8; Buchanan Affidavit, ! 12e, p. 8.
Excessive foaming would be readily detected, and it is expected that, if necessary, the use of
antifoaming agents would be effective, ld.;Id.,113,p.9. Thus, JI's statement does not raise a genuine issue of material fact to be hearo.
3.
The NRC states that additional chemicals will be added.
Evaluation is needed.
After defueling soae additional decontamination of the reactor coolant system would probably be required before the completion of clean-up.
Decontamination of the reactor coolant system is expected to involve additional mechanical decontamination techniques as well.
Nureg 0683,Supplenent #3 Draft Supplement Dealing with Post Defueling Monitored Storage Subsequent Clean-up. P 2.16,(2.1.3 Actually, the NRC statement quoted is that future decontamination efforts mag involve some chemical decontamination. Regardless of this, Licensee states without contradiction that the influent to the evaporator will conform to the standards which have been set forth, as it will be pretreated either with the ion-exchange system or by batch cycle operations in the evaporator to the extent necessary. See suchanan Affidavit.17
- p. 4; Harner Affidavit 15 21-26, pp. 5-9.
JI's statement does not raise a genuine issue of material fact which must be heard.
4.
Licensee states that The effects of the substances have beer, evaluated and for the most part have no significant effect on the ion exchangers (emphasis added)
Licensee's Request for Summary Disposition of Contentions 4b in part and 6. P.5
4.
Licensee further states, Very limited amounts of a few substances that could adversely affect ion exchange media have been introduced into batches of cccident generated water but they2gere subsequently removed by processing.
Id 10-19 However, Licensee contradicts this by stating, This processing removes not only radionuclides but chemical constituents as well with the result that levels of chemicals other than boron and sodium in processed water ere low.
Id 6 Obviously then all the chemicals are not removed from the AGW, and their effect on the processing systems has relevancy to these proceedings.
The above statement ignores important facts contained in the motion. The EPICOR and SD3 systems will not totally remove some contaminants in the AGW, They will, however, remove contaminants to levels which meet the standards set forth for the evaporator influent.
Buchanan Affidavit il 5, 7, 9, pp. 3-4, 6.
Because these further material statements are not controverted, there is no genuine issue of material fact to be litigated.
5.
See #8, P.20 of this response.
8.(4) NRC's response to Interrogatory 20,2.22.88 concerning chemicals in the AGW and their presence in the evaporator does not inspire confidence about the likelihood that they may vaporize. Factual basis should be provided showing that chemicals will not be released to the environment in any appreciable amounts to jeopardize the public health and safety. NRC states, From my current knowledge of the chemicals that are likely to reach the evaporator, I do not believe 0
This citation should be Id. p. 5.
The Id.10-19 apparently refers
~~
~~
to Harner's Affidavit.
that any contaminant which would reach the evaporotor would vaporize into the envi;,,nment with the possible exception of trace amounts of amonia and other amines.
JI failed to complete the statement made by the Staff.
It should have added, "... fonned by the hydrogen peroxide oxidation of protein molecules. The quantity of these compounds will be strail and they are not generally considered pollutants at the possible concentration."
NRC's response to Interrogatory 20 datad 2/02/88. This is important additional information to which JI has not responded. Similiarly, it has been stated that other chemicals found in the evaporator influent are in trace amounts, except for sodium and boron.
In addition, there is no trace constituent in the processed AGW which is a hazardous or toxic waste. Baker Affidavit 14, pp. 2-3.
We therefore find no genuine issue concerning the release of any of these chemicals posing a hazard to public health and safety.
The statement does not present a Senuine issue of material fact which must be heard.
6.
In Buchanan affidavit P. 8 it states that foaming agents may be added to the AGW. This is additional chemical pollutants which need to be evaluated.
This is a misstatement. Tile Buchanan affidavit states that, if unexpected foaming should occur, an antifoaming agent could be added to the AGW.
It is not expected that this will be necessary, as the level of phosphates and organic materials is low. Buchanan Afficavit i 12e, l
- p. 8.
The Board believes that under the present circumstances JI's l
l i
i
l statement fails to respond completely to the Buchanan Affidavit. The statement does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
6.
[ sic] In Buchanan Affadavit P.13, recognition is made that there may be a chemical contaminant which might affect the efficiency of the evaporator. The discussion goes on to say how it will be detected.
However, the discussion does not provide solutions to the problem.
Again, we find JI's statement to ignore important facts. We have been told that the composition of the AGW is well-known through the Chemical Controls Procedures and that if, however, it is assumed hypothetically, some chemical constituent in the AGW lessened the efficiency of the ion exchange system, at worst it could only require repeated processing before the water would meet the evaporator influent standards. Buchanan Affidavit 1 9, p. 6.
The statement does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
7(4). NUREG/CR 2206 (11,6,81,P F-9) states that Possible explosion conditions due to unstable organics (e.g amines) or c m bustible gases e.g hydrogen must be covered.
(in reference to evaporators)
NRC's Respanse to Interrogatory'20, 2.22.88 indicates that amines are present i-the AGW and would vaporize into the environment. This issue needs to evaluated.
JI's statement is not relevant to the contention. Neither combustion nor explosior in the evaporator would affect its decontamination factor.
(See JI statement 9(4) herein). We find no material fact to ce in issue here.
9(4). The decontamination factor of an evaporator is affected by the chemistry of the water which can effect the followir.g factors a) salting, b) scaling, c) fouling b) entrainment c) splashover d) foaming e) volatilization of solute.
.I.
The NRC has failed to evaluate these in light of the characterization of the AGW.
(Affidavit Louis Kosarek, Exhibit C)
(Nureg 0683 Supplement #2, 3.1.1)
Mr. Kosarek fails to acknowledge that the Licensee states that it has considered essentially all the effects of chemicals present in the AGW (Buchanan Affidavit 1 11, p. 7) and has set forth the means to be used to control thun. Buchanan Affidavit 1 12 b-f, pp. 7-9.26 It should be noted that JI does not assert that the Licensee's evaluations were faulty. The Staff has reviewed the Licensee's affidavits and agrees that Licensee's proposal should avoid potential operational difficulties. Munson Affidavit 1 27, p. 13. Under these circumstances, we find that the Staff has adequately evaluated the factors which affect the efficiency and thus the decontamination factor of the evaporator.
10(4). The corrosive effects of this water upon the evaporator and the impact this might have upon the efficiency of the evaporator to operate has not been undertaken by the NRC. This is recomended by Nureg CR 2206 (11.6.81)
This statement ignores Licensee's assertion that it has taken special care that the evaporator material will be compatible with the chemicals in the AGW. The evaporator influent will also be neutralized by pH adjustment and thus will not be corrosive.
Buchanan Affidavit i 10, p. 7, 1 12 a, p. 8.
(
26 Scaling was the only one of the factors presented by JI but not discussed by the Licensee. However, scaling affects only the heat transfer efficiency of the evaporator and thus would have much the same effect as foaming.
4.
The Staff has reviewed the Licensee's Affidavit, and agrees that there should be no problem in construction of the evaporator. Munsor Affidavit 1 27, p. 13. The Board finds the Staff has adequately evaluated this matter, and thus there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried.
10(4).[ sic] The NRC declined to respond when asked to identify tests performed to show the efficiency of moisture separators and vapor superheaters which would be used on evaporators to ensure that liquid dropiets and dissolved components are not discharged with the vapor.
(NRC Response Interrogatory 31.(11) P. 22.88 This information is needed to determine the effectiveness of evaporators. A non response leaves JI to wonder if no such information is available.
The party which submitted the discovery request may, within 10 days after the date of the response, move the Board to compel the party (who has failed to respond) to respond.
In this instance, we have reviewed the cited interrogatory. The Staf f did not "decline" to respond.
It made no objection to answering the interrogatory, so we think it is fair to conclude that the failure to respond was due to oversight. In any case, it Was JI's responsibility to file such motion to compel. No genuinc issue of material fact has been raised. However, the Board will request the Staff and/or Licensee to provide such infonnation in writing
(
before the hearing.
I 11(4). NRC and the Licensee have assumed that an evaporator is suitable for disposal of the AGW even though Nureg CR 2206 P.F-2 states Evaporation is most suitable for processing liquid waste which has a high total solids concentration and which requires a high degree of decontamination from its radio-nuclide content. The volumes of such wastes are normally low in comparison to those of lower activity wastes from nuclear power plants.
l l
(Nureg CR 2206 P.F-2)
We find that JI's statement is irrelevant.
Its contention concerns the effects of chemicals on the operation of the evaporator, not whether the evaporator is suitable or "most suitable" for the intended result.
12(4). The NRC's experience with evaporators and a vaporizer is limited.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 21,2-22-88) 13(4). Licon Inc, installer of the evaporator has had little experience with evaporators.
(Licensee Response Interrogatory 16,3.30.88) See 2-19-88/
These statements are not relevant to the admitted contention. The plain statements of Contention 4b in part and 6 merely allege that the effect of chemicals in the AGW on the SDS, EPICOR II and evaporator systems must be evaluated. The experience or non-experience of the NRC and/or Licon Inc. has no bearing on those effects.
15(4). The NRC has assumed that the maximum evaporator influent will be 20 gallons / minute.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 22,2.22.88)
However,the Licensee assumes a maximum feed-rate of 5 gallons / minute.
S 17, p.15 2-19-88. Variations in the feed rate will affect the Licensee's ability to comply with its Technical Specifications related to permissible release rates for gases and particulates. The Technical Specifications are a means to protect the public health and safety.
Licensees' final decision was that the evaporator would have a design feed rate of a maximum of 5 gpm. The technical specifications will be based on this rate. JI apparently misunderstood Licensee's response to their discovery request. By design, the evaporator cannot process a feed rate greater than 5 gpm. There is no intention, during normal operation, to vary the 5 gpm rate. Licensee will, at times, shut the unit down for maintenance, malfunction, etc., as with any machine.
We find that the JI statement presents no genuine issue of material fact to be litigated. Licensee's Response to SVA/TMIA Interrogatories, S 17,
- p. 15, 2/19/88.
Conclusio_n_
The Board finds no merit in JI's responses to Licensee's Motica for Summary Disposition of Contention 4b in part and 6.
Since Licensee's Motion contains grounds for summary disposition the Motion is granted.
G.
JI Contention 8 JI Contention 8 is:
The PEIS fails to give reasonable consideration to two disposal methods, viz., closed cycle evaporation with solidification and shipment to a low level waste site of the bottoms and condensate, and storage of the water in tanks within the containment building.
Memorandum and Order (Memorializing Special Prehearing Conference; RulingonContentions; Scheduling)(January 5,1988),at19.
The supporting documents submitted with "Licensee's Motion for Sunt.ary Disposition on Alternatives (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)" which were listed in our discussion of Contention 2 are also applicable to Contention 8.
Licensee's statement of material facts as to which it asserts that there are no issues to be heard sets forth the following statenients which are applicable to Contention 8:
7.
The suggested alternative of on-site solidification of the AGW in cement, with off-site burial would require 467,000 ft3 of burial volume (58% of the Nation's "unusual volume" allocation for 1986 through 1992),1,200 shipments from THI to Hanford (with an expected 4.9 traffic accidents and 0.2 fatalities), and would cost t
i
$40.7 million (roughly 10 times the cost of the evaporation option).
9.
The alternative of distillation (closed cycle evaporation) of the AGW followed by cn-sita solidification and burial of the captured distillate is not feasible because of space limitations at TMI and the site's location within the 100-year flood plain, and would cost about $3 million more than Licensee's proposal.
- 10. If the captured and solidified distillate (from Fact No. 9) is taken off-site for burial, the alternative has the same disadvantages stated above in Fact No. 7 for solidification of the AGW in cerrsnt and off-site burial.
- 14. Pennanent in-containment storage of the AGW would result in an occupational dose estimated at 4,070 to 5,106 person-ren (compared to 23 person-rem for the evaporation proposal), would require exemptions to NRC's site suitability regulations under Part 61, and wculd exceed, in the long term, the cost of Licensee's proposal.
According to Licensee's affiants the disposal system for the closed cycle evaporation and solidification would consist of (1) a closed cycle evaporator system, (2) an evaporator bottoms processing and packaging system, and (3) a distillate disposal systun. Tna evaporator used in this option would be similar to the one described in the System Description and would consist of dual evaporators. The main evaporator would distill the AGW by changing it into steam and separating the entrained solids from the rising vapors. The vapors would be condensed into cleaner water, the distillate, and collected in the distillate tank. Joint Affidavit at 30-31.
The evaporator bottoms would be packaged for disposal consistent with commercial low-level waste transportation and disposal regulations.
The waste would be packaged into 55-gallon containers, each of which would hold 560 lbs of evaporator bottoms. As many as 389 Class A drums
and 292 Class B high integrity containers (HICs) would ba generated, with a total packaged volume estimated to be 5,200 ft3 The Class A drums wculd be shipped to a low-level waste disposal facility in a standard van truck. The activity of the Class B HICs, however, is such that they would exceed low specific activity (LSA) criteria. Therefore the Class B HICs would have to be shipped tc the low-level waste facility in Class B shipping casks.
It is estimated that 6 truck shipments would be required to dispose of the Class A drums and 37 cask shipments would be required to dispose of the Class B HICs.
I_d,. at 31.
In orcer to solidify the distillate a system for producing a grout mixture would have to be constructed. The grouting system would be trailer mounted and located near the Interim Solid Waste Staging Ficility (ISWSF). Evaporator distillate would be transferred to a grouting system feed tank located within the system trailer. Cement would be fed from storage silos and mixed with the water within a screw mixer.
For on-site storage, the distillate would be mixed with the ground and placed in an engineered pit that is located within a dike to ld,at31-32.
the North and hortheast of the ISWSF.
d A pit approximately 260' x 190' x 15' deep with a cement slab about 10' deep would be required. A 2-foot-thick layer of compacted clay and u 36-mil Hypalen liner would be installed to provide groundwater protection. Monitoring wells would be installed for groundwater monitoring, with at least one well up-gradient of the groundwater flow paths, and the other would be down-gradient. Leachate collection laterals would be placed on the synthetic liner in the bottom of the pit c
and covered with gravel. The collected leachate would be held in a sump located at the landfill site. The leachate would be monitored and pumped to the industrial waste treatment system.
Id. at 32.
The solidificaticn and on-site disposal of the distillate would cause the release of radioactive material to the environment. Tritium would be released to the atmosphere in the form of water vapor because of the heat of hydration during the mixing and curing in the solidification process. Pricr to closure of the landfill, small quantities of radioactive material may be released to the river due to release of leachate.
Id. at 33.
To estimate the continuous tritium release rate to the atmosphere the Licensee's affiants made the folicwing assunptions:
' the average tritium concentration in the AGW is 0.12 pC1/cc;
- a release fraction of 50% for tritium;
- a continuous release rate of 10 GPM; and
- a solidification process rate of 10 GPM (631 cc/sec).
The furegoing assumptions yield a tritium release rate of 38 pCi/sec.
This is approximately 7% of the allowable continuous tritium release rate limit permitted by the THI-2 Environmental Technical Specifications when averaged over any calendar quarter.
Id. at 10, 33.
Two release pathways exist for the solidification and burial on-site scenario:
atmospheric release of half of the tritium during curing of the slab, and river release of a fraction of the particulate activity through leaching into rainwater in contact with the slab.
Id.
at 33-34. One percent of the activity in the slab was conservatively 1
1 1.
\\
assumed to be leached from the concrete mass each year during the contact time prior to closure and isolation of the landfill.
Id_ at 34.
Three pathways to humans were considered from the liquid release:
drinking water, consumption of fish caught near the plant discharge, and direct radiation exposure from shoreline sediments. The maximally exposed individual was assumed to obtain drinking water from downstream of the plant, to eat fish from downstream of the plant, and to spend recreational time on the shoreline downstream of the plant. Based on this methodology, the maximally exposed individual from solidification prior to closure of the landfill was estinated to receive about 0.7 mrem total body from the atmospheric tritium and 0.3 mrem to the bone from dissolved particulates released to the river as leachate. Ibid.
The airborne population dose was estimated to be 7.5 person-rem total body. Liquid population ooses were evaluated by including the entire population which might use Susquehanna River water for drinking purposes, including Chester County and the City of Baltimore. This includes about 6 million people, and the liquid pathways population dose to them was estimated to be about 4 Dersun-rem. Ibid.
Integrating the liquid pathway dose for a 50 year exposure, accounting for the decreasing source because of decay and leaching loss, would yield a dose coninitment to the niaximally uposed individual of about 7.2 mrem to the bene and about 100 person-rem to the bcne total population dose. Ld.at35.
In addition the dose to an intruder who somehow was exposed to the slab after decccmissioning of the THI site was estimated. For this
scenario, it was assumed that the island had become a park, that individuals had caused the isolation of the landfill to fail, and that they would spend 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year above the slab in some hypothetical cccupational capacity.
In estimating the dose to such individuals, an account was taken for 30 years of decay and leaching prior to intruder contact. The maximally exposed individual, assuming a 50 year exposure to the slab, would receive about 14 mrem.
Ibid. Because the actual number of people who could be exposed in this manner to the slab is quite small, the population dose is expected to be less than 1 person-rem.
Id. at 35-36.
The occupational dose from the solidification process has been estimated to be approximately 15 person-rem. This estimate was based on approximately 16,000 person-hours for the sclidification and transfer of the grout and 5 person-rem from the processing of the water. This dose is a very small percentage of the total exposure of the work force estimated in the original PEIS (2,000 to 8,000 person-ren).
Id. at 36.
In addition an occupational dose will result from the packaging and shipment of the Class A drums and Class B HICs. The wurker dose was estimated to be 570 mrem for each driver, and the incident free population dose from the shipments was estimated to be 5.2 person-rem.
Based on the assumption of 6 truck shipments and 37 cask shipments, the expected number of traffic accidents and fatalities for these shipments is 0.175 and 0.007, respectively.
Ibid.
There are regulatory and practical obstacles to burial of solidified distillata en-site. To begin with, there is no suitable
space within the nuclear station's diked area for a large waste disposal site. Outside of the diked area most of the available land is on the 100-year flood plain. Pennsylvania law prohibits the licensing of a landfill on a flocd plain.
Ir. addition, pennsylvania's current policy is to limit issuance of landfill disposal permits to only those that are absolutely necessary.
Id. at 37.
An alte native to burial on-site would be solidification of the evaporation distillate into large blocks for disposal at a low-level waste burial ground.
Id. at 38-39.
In developing this scenario Licensee's affiants assumed that the evaporator distillate would be solidified into 8' x 8' x 3' cement blocks. The average activity of each block would be 2.14 E-1 C1. To make the blocks a temporary batch mixing plant similar to that already described would be required. The solidification of 2.3 million gallons of distillate would yield 2,400 blocks, having a disposal volume of 460,000 ft.
If the blocks were 3
shipped to the low-level waste disposal site at Hanford, Washington, a total of 1,200 shipments would be required.
In addition there would be 5,200 ft3 of evaporator bottoms to be disposed of in the manner already described.
Id. at 39.
The dose to the maximally exposed individual off-site from the release of tritium during the curing of the blocks was estimated to be 0.7 mrem, and the population dose was estimated to be 7.5 person-rem to total body. The transportation of the blocks under this option would result in an incident free general population dose of 9.1 E-2 person-rem, and the incident free general population dose from the
transportation of the bottoms was estimated to be 5.2 person-rem.
1,d.
at 40.
The expected number of accidents and fatalities from treisportation of the blocks was estimated to be 4.9 and 0.2, respectively. The accident and fatality estimates for the transportation of the bottoms are 0.175 and 0.007, respectively. The release of radionuclides resulting from an accident would yield a dose of 6.3 E-6 oerson-rem expected from the shipments of the blocks and 0.304 person-rem from the shipments of the bottoms.
Id. at 41.
Occupational dose during the evaporation process of this option is expected to be 9 person-rem.
Production and handling the blocks was estimated to taken 20,000 person-hours and produce a dose of 24 person-rem. Processing and packaging of the evaporator bottoms was estimated to take 3,500 person-hours and produce a dose of 9 person-rem.
M.at40.
Finally, Licensee estineted that the construction of the batch mixing plant, solidification operations, shipment and disposal of the blocks, and shipment and disposal of the bottoms would cost a total of
$41.9 million. M.at41-42.
With regard to the alternative of storing the AGW within the TMI-2 containment building, Licensee's affients attest that to store the 2.3 million gallons cf water, 307,500 ft3 of storage space is required.
This volume of space does not exist in the containment building. M.
=
at 45. However, 2 million gallons could be stored in the containment
building and the remaining 300,000 gallons could be stored in the Refueling Canal.
Id. at 46.
The most intensive labor effort involved in this option would be fabrication of the storage tanks. To keep radiation as low is j
reasonably achievable, the tanks should be fabricated outside the reactor building. The prefabricated component parts of the tanks would be limited in size to 20 feet in diameter and 50 feet in length due to the dimensional limitations of the equipment hatch through which the components must be passed into the building. Id. at 46-47.
Licensee estimates that the construction of tanks inside the containment building would require 130,000 person hours. The current dose ratios in the reactor building are typically 50-75 person-rem / hour at the 305' elevation and 40-50 person-rem / hour at the 347' elevation.
Assuming that the work in the reactor building is divided between these two locations, Licensee estimates that the total dose received during the construction of the tanks would range from 4,070 to 5,106 person-rem, id.at48-49.
If the AGW is stored on-site for an indefinite period of time as a means of disposal, the TMI site would require either a license under 10 CFR 61.3 or an exemption under 10 CFR 61.6 for waste disposal. Among the technical requirements for land disposal facilities are that the site (1) not be located on a 100-year ficod plain (10 CFR 61.50(a)(5))
and (2) have sufficient depth to the water table so thdt ground water intrusion will not occur (10 CFR 61.50(a)(7)). Further, liquid waste must be either solidified or packed in sufficient absorbent material to
absorbtwiceitsvolume(10CFR61.56(a)(2)). The TM1 site does not meet the two siting criteria because TMI is in a 100-year flood plain, so that the disposal site would have to be within the diked area of the island, and the ground water level is only about 20 feet below ground level.
In addition, bulk storage in tanks would not meet the absorbancy criteriaof10CFR61.56(a)(2). Therefore, Licensee considers it doubtful that a license or exemption could be obtained to store AGW indefinitely at TMI. M.at53.
The NRC Staff states in its June 23, 1988 response to Licensee's motion for sunnary disposition that the closed cycle evaporation with solittification of the distillate is given a "hard look" in NUREG-0683, Supp. 2, at pp. 3.15-3.18. Staff Response at 13. The sections of NUREG-0683 cn those pages, however, deal with closed cycle evaporation followed by river discharge of the distil4te rather than solidification of the distillate. NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 at 3.15, 63.1.3. Solidification is discussed in NUREG-0683, Supp. 2 at pp. 3.21-3.26, but with the water being reprocessed by the SDS and/or the EPICOR 11 system prior to solidification rather than being evaporated and distilled. M.at3.21, 13.3.1.1. Distillation and solidification of the distillate is j
discussed briefly in the PEIS in 53.6.4 but is rejected on the grounds f
that while the environmental impact of solidification following either l
closed cycle evaporation or SDS/EPICOR reprocessing would not be i
significantly different, evaporation wculd cost $6.2 to $12 million
)
whereas SDS/EPICOR reprocessing would cost only $2.3 million. Staff acknowledges, however, that evaporation is a more effective means cf
. o particulate removal than reprocessing by the SDS/EPICOR system. M. at 3.35-3.36. Staff's estimates of radiaticn doses from evaporation and release of the distillate to the river and from solidification following reprocessing the AGW with the SDS/EPICOR system cannot be compared with Licensee's estimates of doses from closed cycle evaporation followed by solidification, because of radiation dose resulting from release of distillate to the river and because the SDS/EPICOR system does not remove the same amount of radionuclides from the AGW as does the evaporation process. Finally, the Staff has not addressed the alternative of storing the water in tanks in the containment building in either huREG-0683, Supp. 2 nor in its response to Licensee's motion for sunnary disposition.
In the J1 Response the intervenors state that "All those material facts raised in ' Contention 2' concerning the NRC's treatment of the "no-action alternative" will apply to this Contention since the NRC treats these two alternative in cr.e section in NUREG-0683 [Supp. 2] 3.5 P.3.32 and in Table 5.1. P.5.2.
J! Response at 29. Our reading of those pages of NUREG-C683 Supp. 2, however, does not lead us to believe that the Staff was addressing the alternative of storing the A,GW in tanks within the containment building. Rather, Staff is addressing only the no action alternative, which involycs storing the AGW in tanks on the site located outside the TMI-2 reactor building. Therefore we do not consioer the statements of material facts raised by JI in Contention 2 to be applicable to Contention 8, except for the legal conclusions l$
e advanced by Statements 1, 2, and 3, which address NEPA's general position with regard to consideration of alternatives.
With regard to Contention 8's claim that the PEIS fails to give "reasonable consideration" to closed cycle evaporation, followed by solidification of the distillate and evaporator bottoms, and shipment of the solidified waste to a low level waste site, the Staff did consider this alternative but rejected it on the grounds that reprocessing the AGW in the SDS/EPICOR system before solidification would cost much less than evaporating it and solidifying the distillate, while the environmental impact of the two procedures would not differ significantly. NOREG-0683 at 3.35-3.36, $3.6.4. We find that this constitutes reasonable consideration of the closed cycle evaporation with solidification alternative.
In addition, JI did not challence Licensce's Statement of Material Facts No. 7, which states that off-site burial of the solidified waste wrold require 467,000 ft3 of burial volume, which is 58% of the Nation's "unusual volume" allocation for 1986 through 1992. That fact, plus the financial cost of closed cycle evaporation followed by solidification, make it clear that JI have not raised a genuine issue of fact that this is an "obviously superior" alternative.
With regard tu storing the water indefinitely in tanks within the THI-2 containment building, the JI have not challenged Licensee's Statement No.14, which indicates that constructing plants within the contaminated containment building would result an occupational dose
4 4 estimated to be between 4,070 and 5,106 person-rem. This extreniely high occupational dose clearly outweighs any advantages associated with storing the AGW in tanks within the THI-2 containment. While it appears to be true that the Staff did not consider this alternative, the occupational dose that the alternative entails clearly make it an obviously inferior alternative, and therefore there is no genuine issue i
of material fact to litigate.
Conclusion He conclude that the dl have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Contention 8.
Therefore Licensee's motion is granted with regard to Contention 8 and the contention is dismissed.
ORDER For all the foregoing reasons and based on consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is this 25th day of August 1988 ORDERED:
Contentions 1, 3 in part 4b in part, a, 4d, 6, and 8 fail to c
raise genuine issues of material fact. Therefore with respect to them Licensee's notion for summary disposition is granted.
Contentions 2, 3 in part, 4b in port, and 5d raise genuine issues of material fact and therefore shall be litigated to the extent indicated in the accompanying memorandum. Under Contention 3 JI's statements of material fact 1, 2, 3, 4 (1), (v), (ix), and (xi), E, 6, i
4 e 7, 8,10,11,12, and 14 fail to raise genuine issues and therefore will not be litigated.
Statements 4(ii),(iii),(iv),(vii),(viii),(x),(xii),and (xiii) do raise genuine issues and will be litigated. Under Contention 4b, JI's statement of material f4ct 4 will be litigated. The remaining statements do not raise genuine issues and will not be litigated.
The Staff is hereby requested to respond to SVA/TMIA Interrogatory 31(11)2.22.88 concerning efficiency of demisters prior to the hearing scheduled for October 31, 1988.
The primary issue to be heard is whether the no action alternative is obviously superior to the forced evaporation proposal because the latter method will release all of the tritium in the AGW to the atmosphere without any prior period of natural radioactive decay.
Related sub-issues to be heard are: whether the tritium content of the AGW has been accurately determined; whether tritium is of more critical concern with respect to our determination than strontium-90; and whether the risk to the public health from tritium released by forced evaporation is greater than Licensee and Staff have acknowledged.
The Licensing Board, or its Chair, is prepared to facilitate settlement of the proceeding pursuant to 10 CFP, 5 2.759.
4 This is an interim decision of the Licensing Board and is not subject to appeal.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
/
r eter B. E40ch, Chair ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE e
Glenn O. Bright g
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE C<caH,% (s Dr. 0~ scar F. Paris' ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Bethesda, Maryland h
__]