ML20151W437

Reg Guide 5.63, Physical Protection for Transient Shipments

ML20151W437
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/31/1982
From:	NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:
References
TASK-OS, TASK-SG-126-4 REGGD-05.063, REGGD-5.063, NUDOCS 8808240145
Download: ML20151W437 (12)

Text

_

x

.. t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION July 1982 e Q[g$iREGULATORY GUIDE

,.... OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGUL ATORY GUIDE 5.63 (Talk SG 1264)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR TRANSIENT SHIPMENTS A. INTRODUCTION B. DISCUSSION Section 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70,"Domestic Licensing 1. BACKGROUND of Special Nuclear Material," provides for general licensing of any person to possess transient shipments of formula General licensees under { 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70 are quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).* required to provide physical protection for transient j A transient shipment is a shipment of nuclear material shipmeats of foimula quantities of SSNM in accordance originating and terminating in foreign countries on a vessel with or equivalent to the physical protection requirements or aircraft that stops at a United States port. Persons for similar types and quantities of material in domestic 1 carrying transient shipments are required under the general shiprnents. These requirements are stated in 10 CFR license to provide physical protection, including the use of Part 73 in terms of general performance objective and armed guards, for transient shipments while the shipment requirements (paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b)] and perform-remains in a U.S. port. The physical protection system ance capabilities [ { 73.251.

provided must be in accordance with or equivalent to that required for U.S. domestic shipments of formula quantities The general performance objective and requirements of SSNM under the applicable provisions of parrgraphs indicate the level of protection to be provided by the 73.20(a) and (b)and @ 73.25 of 10 CFR Part 73,"Physical licensee's physical protection system relative to the design

) Protection of Plants and Materials." basis threat (defined in s 73.1). The performance capabil- l ities define in a systematic way the capabilities the physical protection system must have in order to meet the general A general licensee for a transient shiprnent (e.g., a performance requirements. In addition, 73.26 describes cartic) is not required to submit applications or security a "reference system" containing brief descriptions of l

plans for prior approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Com- systems, subsystems, and procedures the NRC believes )

mission (NRC) as are licensees for domestic shipments of v,ould generally be part of a physical protection system formula quantities of SSNM. Ikwever, the licensee is that achieves the objective and meets the requirements of required to prepare such plans and to implement them 7.' 20 and 73.25 for domestic shipments, llowever, the l during stops at U.S. ports, reference system does not necessarily describe a complete l system that would meet all the physical protection require- l ments for U.S. domestic or transient shipments. Additional l This guide describes measuns acceptable to the NRC or alternative measures may be needed depending on the staff that can be taken by the licensee to provide the particular circumstances under which protection is to be physical protection for scheduled and unscheduled tran- provided. I sient shipments required by 10 CFR Part 70.

l The level of protection to be prosided would be equiva- I

_. lent to that afforded formula quantities of SSNMin domestic

_e"lormula qnnuty" means stratesk special nuclear materialin l quantity or $ '.ro grams or more computed by the tormula: stama shipments but may differ in detail dependmg on the circum- I I

r.n[srsms

= contali 4 U 2 35) + 2.s(grams U.23 3 + grams plutonium). stances peculiar to a given transient shipment. That is, the i astrate c speck nuclear matettat" means ursnium 235 (contained '

in uranpum ent hed to 20 percent or more in the U.23s botore), physical protection afforded a transient shipment would i uraniu m.2 33, or r4utonium, have to satisfy :he general performance objective and  !

8800240145 020731 06 PDR h bW USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commissnon.

U . S. Nuclear R egula t ory C ommiss6on Re9ulatory Guldes are issued to describe and make asaltable to the At t en t 6on Dochetang and Service 15tanch, Wasp,lagton, Q,C, 20$$$,

pub 4M m et h ods acceptab6e to the NRC st a f f of 6m ple men ting speNf ac parts of the CommissJon's regulat6ons, to delineate tech. The guides are issued M the following ten broad d6 visions:

nieues used Dy the staff an evaluatmo specaf6c problems or postu-trted ac c 6 dents or to prov63e gu6dence to appiecents. Regulatory 1. Power Reactors 6. Products Guiaes are nof substitutes for reputations, and comellance with 2. Research and Test Reactors 7. T ransportation them is not teoutred. Methods and solut6ons different ttom those set 3. Fuets and Materials F acitet6es a. Occupat6onal Health out in the gu6 des *60 be acceptable 6f they provide a bases for the 4. Invironmentat and Siting 9, Antitrust and Financial Review tend 6ngs rooi esate to the issuarKe or contmuance of a s'ermat or s. Materlats and Rent Pec,tection 10. General license t>y tne Commiss6on.

Coones of assued gulden may DJ purchased at thicurrent Government This guloe was assued af ter considerat6on of comments received from Pisntmg Of f 6ce pr6ce. # subscription serv 6ce for future guldes 6n we.

the putM6C. Comments and suggestions f or 6mprovements 6m these cif e dav6sions is availates through the Governtrent Print 6ng OffKo, pdes are encouraged at all times. and guides will be revised, as 66 formation on the subscription serv 6ce and current GPO pr6ces may appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new enforme. be obtemed Dr writene the U.S. Nuclear Re9ulatory Commastoon, t6on er emperience. W a shingt on, D.C. 20sss, Attent6cna Publ+ cat 6ons $4les Manager.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U

requirements of paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b) and the The regulatory position of this guide d:senbes the performance capability requirem:nts of 73.25 but may measures that may be employed in meeting the phydcal be less complex because (1) the stopover times for transient protection requirements for transient shipments. Sections shipments are short, (2) there is no need to offload the 1 through 7 apply equally to scheduled and unscheduled shipment from the transport, and(3)the number of persons, transient shipments. Section 8 discusses the special con.

if any, required to have access to the shipment is limited, siderations applicable to the physical protection require-ments for unscheduled transient shipments and notes

2. ALTERNATIVE APPROACilES FOR MEETING exceptions and attemative procedures for meeting such REQUIREMENTS requirements. Sections 1 through 7 provide an outline acceptable to the NRC staff for use by the licensee in General licensees for transient shipments of formula developing the required physical protection plan, although quantities of strategic special nuclear material may meet the no specific format l required for such plans.

physical protection requirements for such shipments in one

, of two ways: The bracketed references following eac'.i heading in the regulatory position denote the portions of the regulation

1. The licensee may contract for physical protection applicable to the physical protection measures discussed services from a person (or organization) already authorized under that heading.

by the NRC to protect formula quantities of SSNM in transit, or 4. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF PLANS AND NOTICES

2. The licensee may undertake to directly provide the required physical protection in accordance with the provi. The NRC hu determined that the details of physical sions of the general performance requirements and per. protection plans and programs submitted to the Commis-formance capabilities of } 73.20 and 73.25. sion should be withheld from public disclosure by the NRC pursuant to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of

3. PIIYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 1954, as amended. In addition, certain c'.ements of such plans and programs and of the notices given the NRC in A physical protection plan in written form is required to accordance witn paragraph 70.20b(d) of 10 CFR Part 70 be followed in providing physical protection for the tran- may be considered classified as Confidential National sient shipmerit. Although this plan does not have to be Security Information (CNSI) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 95 approved by the NRCin advance of the shipment,it must (published in the Federal Rethrer on March 5,19A0, be provided along with the wntten notification to the NRC at 45 FR 14483). Any physical protection plans or pro.

staff required by paragraph 70.20b(d) before the shipment grams prepared and maintained by carriers operatingin the first arrives in a U.S. port. United States or their agents to satisfy the physical protec-tion requirements of the NRC for transient shipments and in the case of unscheduled transient shipments, i.e., the notifications given by such persons to the NRC in tho'e resulting from exigent circumstances or route or accordance with paragraph 70.20b(d) are considered schedule changes that require stops at U.S. ports not on the classified and should be appropriately marked and handled transport's itinerary at the time the SSNM was loaded accordingly (see @ 95.39). however. similar types of aboard, the licensee may not have the same opportunit) for information generated by persons outside the United States advance planning as in the case of scheduled shipments. are not considered to be national secunty information if Ilowever, the licensee is required to notify the NRC and such information is not under the control of the United begin rnaking physical protection arrangements immediately States Government, it is expected that the persons who after the decision is made to stop at the U.S. port. Although generate such information will in their self-interest protect at the time SSNM is loaded aboard an aircraft or unt! it from unauthorized access and public disclosure to the carriers may not intend to stop at a U.S. port, the knowl. extent practicable. Detailed guidance regarding the elements edge (1)that they are carrying SSNM in formula quantity of plans that are considered classified can be found in and (2) that their itinerary brings them thrcugh or near Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. Part 95 containsinforms.

U.S. territory (i.e., territorial waters or air space) should tion on the proper handling and transmittal of classited prompt them to do the necessary preplanrung and make information, sppropriate prearrangements to meet the NRC's physical protection requirements should a stop at a U.S. port The following elements of the information required to become necessary, be prosided the NRC in the notification of a transient shipment are considered classified as CNSI:

When NRC officials are notified of or discover an impending transient shipment of a formula quantaty, they 1. Location of scheduled stops in U.S. territory.

will make preparations to inspect the carrier's physical protection system for the shipment while it is in port to 2. Arrival and departure times for scheduled stops.

ensure its adequacy c,r to take emergency measures if the required level of protection is not prosided. The authonty 3. Details as to the type and quantity of special nuclear to make such inspections is provided for in 10 CFR Part 70, material contained in the shipment.

1 5.63 2

4. The numben of guards who will protect the shipment. 1.2 Contingency Plans (Paragraphs 73.25(d)(1)(ll) and (lu)]

N 5. Contingency plans for the response of security forces.

) Safeguards contingency plans for transient shipments are ws not required to be submitted for approval in advance of hiost of this information is considered declassified when shipments as they are for domestic shJpments of formula it becomes operational. More details on the conditio..: quantities of SSNht. Contingency plans for transient ship.

undar which this information may be declassified may be ments should be an integral part of the physical protection found in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. plan provided by the licensee. A typical transient shipment is likely to remain in port for a limited time, from several hours to several day >, considerably reducing the complexity Artangements can be made on a case-by-case basis to of the contingency plans needed to satisfy the requirements coordinate the protection of safeguards-sensitive informa- of the regulation (compared with plans required for domestic tion regarding a transient shipment by contacting the road or multimode shipments that could involve several Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety different local law enforcement jurisdictions and changing and Safeguards, at the NRC headquarten in Washington, environments as the shipments move from one location to D.C- This contact can be made through tac appropriate another along the planned routes). Contingency plans for NRC Regional Office listedin Appendix A to 10CFR Part73, domestic shipments are discussed in detail in Regulatory Guide 5.56, "Standard Format and Content of Safeguards C. REGULATORY POSITION Contingency Plans for Transportation."

1. GENERAL CONSIDER ATIONS Contingency plans for transient shipments arc expected to inelude the following basic features and items of information:

1.1 Purpose and Scope

The licensee physical protection plan is required to 1. Scope . A determination and identification of the ensure that the bcensee has ene sufficient planning to ty pes of safeguards-related incidents covered and not physicauy protect transient . .. ments of formula quantities covered in the contingency plan. (For example, the plan of strategic specialnuclear material according to the require- may be designed to respond to armed attacks by small ments of the applicable regulations (i.e., N 70.20b. para. groups but not to armed insurrections.)

graphs 73.20(a) and (b), and { 73.25 of 10 CFR Parts 70 9 and 73). The plan should be available to the licensee's personnel for reference purposes when implementation becomes necesury.

2. Trigger I sents .Those events that will be used to signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contin-gency according to how they are perceived initially by licensee personnel (e.g., diseosery of a damaged SSNht A transient shipment is defined in paragraph 70.4(v) as a container or broken seal, receipt of a written or telephoned shipment of nuclear material originating and terminating in threat against the shipment, discovery of attempted sabo-foreign countnes, on a vessel or aircraf; which stops at a tage of the shipment).

U.S. port. The term "U.S. port" is intended to include all ports of entry that carrien would normally use in rnaking such shipments but in unusual circumstarices would also 3. Responses and Objectives.The actions that will be inclu je the irrst landfallin U.S. jurisdiction. U.S. territones taken by licensee personnel in response to each of the included, regardless cf the transport mode or location. It is trigger esents and the objectives to be accomplished by the carner's responsibility to determine whether the amounts each of the proposed actions. The persons within licensee of SSNht being carried constitute a formula quantity,and if management or the licensee security organization who will so, to proside the physical protection required by para- perform the response actions should also be specified.

graph 70.00b(c) and the notification to NRC required by paragraph 70.00b(d).

4. law Enforcement Assistance A hsting of the avail-able local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) for the U.S.

The general license issued punuant to 70.20b for ports at wruch the shipment will stop and the methods transient shipments of formula quant 2 ties of SSNh1 is arranged to communicate with them in the event their effectise from the time the shipment enters a U.S. port assistance is needed.

until the time the shipment exits that port. The planning and notification requi.'ments obviously must be accom-plished pnor to the tin.e the physical protection require- 5. Other Considerations . Such items as constraints ments of the general bcense become effectise. Specific imposed upon security organiiation members (i.e., guards) considerations related to meeting the physical protection by local and State laws, company policies and practices, O requirements for unscheduled transient shipments of formula quantities of SSNht are presented in Section 8.

and other facton, especially those relating to the use of deadly force.

5633

=

I R

, 1.3 Security Organization Training, Equipment, and firearms off the plane or vessel without such permits.

Qualification [ Paragraphs 73.25(d)(1)(1),(iv),and (v)] Inclusion of foreign nationals under a common command with other guards of local orig.m may hin#r effective Normally, seven armed personaci should be provided to commend and control of the guard force unless appropriate protect a transient shipment stopped at a U.S. airport, measures are taken to properlyintegrate the foreign nationals while it least two armed individuals should be proviJed to into the guard force.

Protect a transient shipment on a vessel (not offlo2ded).

Thb is consistent with the prosisions of pa agraphs 73.26(j)(3) Whether foreign nationals are utilited or not, the licensee and (IX4). should be prepared to demonstrate that persons employed to protect the shipmen' meet training and qualific3 tion Personnel selected to be rnembers of the licensee's requirements equivalent to the portions of Appendit B secunty organization entrusted with the physical protection to 10 GR 'ar' 73 relevant to their assigned duties and that of a transient shipment are required to be appropriately they can funct on effectisely together to satisfy the general trained anJ qualified to perform all the tasks to which they performance requirements and performance capabilities of are assigned. This includes being qualified and appropriately 73.20 and 73.25. Although there is no requirement licensed by the localjurisdiction to use the weapons assigned under the general heense to obtain advance approval from them and being sufficiently fluent in English to ensure the NRC regarding the adequacy of the tr:ining and qualifi-rapid and clear communications with the LLEA for pur. cations of guard force members, the licensee should be poses of requesting assistance from and coordinating with prepared to demonstrate such adequacy through appro-the LLEA response forces. Firearms, communications priate documentation upon request by the NRC inspector devices, and other equipment must be in good operating assigned to the shipment.

conditio . To ensure that all ecurity organization per-sonnel and armed response personnel are properly trained 1.4 Security Management [ Paragraph 73.25(d)(1)(i)]

and qualified, the licensee may arrange for the employment of such personnelin one of three ways: The plan should indicate the personnel (either by name or by position title) responsible for the physical protection

1. Use of LLI A personncL Such personnel may be of the transient shipment while the general license is in presumed to be properly quahfied with the weapons e f fec t, including the chain of command, if applicable.

assigned to them while on official duty and to hase the skills necessary to perform guard duties. LLEA personnel 1,5 Testing and Maintenance Program may be used while functicaing in their official capacity,or (Paragraph 73.20(b)(3)]

they may be pnvately employed while off duty, depending on local regulations goserning such employment and the Paragraph 73.20lbX3) requires testing and maintenance withngness of the LLEA to provide temporary gu ard of the physical protection system'a components and proce-seruces. dures.1his requirement cosers all activities and devices on which the licensee's physierl protection system depends to

2. Use of pnvate guards provided by an organization maintain shipment secunty. Its purpo*e is to ensure the beensed or approved by the NRC to provide physical continued availability of each component of the physical protection of SSNM (such as for another NRC licensee), protection system. Since the physical protection system for transient shipments will normally be personnel oriented,

3. Use of pnvate guards who hase been trained and the testing and maintenance actisity for such systems will quahfied by the beensee,its U.S. agent, or other organiza- consist mainly of ensuring that procedures are understand-tion and have been Jetermined by thelicensee to be prepared able and workable by the personnelinvolved in implement-to perform the tasks assigned them according to the licensee's ing them. 1he bcensee should ensure that all equipment, written physical protection plan. including communications devices and weapons,is in good working order. If equir.nent and armed personnel are l'oreign nationah who accompany a transient shipment provided the carrier by another organliation, the licensee into port as escorts for ph)sical protection purposes may be should obtain assurances from that organization that such constdered to make up a portion of the guard for e required equipment is in proper operating condition at the time for protection of the shipment w hile in the U.S. port. these services are provided and the personnel provided are llowcwr, sescral considerations apply particularly in this trained and quahfied. The beensee should also make case to ensure that such personnel are not unduly limited in certain from time to time that the arrangements made and the estent to which they are able to contnbute effectisely the procedures prosided for in the plan are current and to the protection of the shipment. It should be ensured remain practicable and applicable to the conditions a..Wi-that langune difficulties and in k of famihanty with local pated in future transient shipments.

communications systems do not present their communicat-ing rapidly and effectively with local law enforcement 1.6 Security Records [ Paragraph 73.70(g))

agencies or with other members of the guard forse recruited locally. I'f forts should be made to secure weapons permits lhe types of records that must be kept are identified in in adsante allowing them to lepily carry weapons in the paragraph 73.70(gt They irclude the names and addresses junsda tion in whnh the port is located. In most local of persons authorited access to the SSNM while it is in junsdictions, these indniduals may not legally carry their port, documeutation of secunt) tour

• and inspections of 5 61-4 i __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

e .

Inc area containing tne SSNM, and any other information 1,9 Notification (Paragssph 70.20b(d)]

obtained relating to the security of the shipment during the period of time the general license is in effect. Carriers of transient shipments planning to make sche-duled stops at U.S. ports sie required to notify the NRC of 1.7 Reports to NRC l 73.71 l their plans to do so prior to the arrival of the shipreent.

The notification should be sent by U.S. Mail to be received Section 73.71 requires that the NRC be made aware of by the NRC at least 7 calendar days before the fi;st sched-any security-related incidents that occur during the period uled stop in the United States. The notifications should of the generallicense. The plan r.tay specify procedures for be addressed to the Director of the apNorriate Nuclear

> reporting security incidents to the NRC when NRCinspee- Regulatory Commission Inspection and U niou.e me nt tors are not present on the scene. When NRC inspec- Regional Office listed in Appendix A to Part 73. This same tors are present, this requirement is satisfied by communi- office must be notified by telephone 7 calendar Jays in cating such incidents directly to them, advance (J the first scheduled stop at a U.S. port to infonn the NRC that a shipping notice has been sent by mail I.8 Redundancy and Diversity [ Paragraphs 73.20(b)(2) and whether any changes hne been made in the shipment's and 73.25(d)(4)] U.S. itinerary relative w the information mntained in the mailed notification, j

The physical protection system is required to be designed j with redundant and diverse measures. Redundancy means The licensee should take steps to ensure the confi. )

providing two or more measures that perform the same dentiality of the itinerary information and other informa-

]

funetion. This would prevent failure of the entire system tion containedin the written riotification since such informa- i should there be a failure of one or more key system elements. tion could be used to assist in planning a theft or diversion I Diversity means prosiding several types of measures that attempt. In the case of domestic heensees or others who l contribute to the performance of a particular security generate such information under the jurisdiction of the l function. if these measures have a common purpose but United States Government,the notification may come under j different performance characteristics (e.g., sensitisities, the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95, which require that it failure modes, strengths, weaknesses), the system may be be handled according to specific procedures desiF ned to able to continue functioning adequately despite particular protect it as Confidential National Security Information adverse operational conditions or an attempt to exploit a (CNSI).

particular component's performance characteristics.

The notification is required to include the following ir. formation:

Since the physical protection system fer a transient shipment is generally expectej to be less hardware oriented 1. Loeation of all scheduled stops in U.S. territory, than that for a U.S. domestic shipment, the means of ensuring redundancy in the system will be less involved. 2. Arrival and departure times for all scheduled stops in Licensees may focus their efforts at ensuring redundancy U.S. territ ory, j and disersity in the system by prirnarily addressing the '

communications functions and firearms capabdities. This 3. A description of the transport vehicle (ship or air. I may be done in several different ways. craft) used for the transient ship. ".nt. This would include additional transport vehicles to be used if transshipment (transfer of the SSNM to another transport schicle) is Alternative co.n munications capabihties should be contemplated. The description should be given in sufficient prosided so that more than one person can contact the detail to allow the NRC to unambiguously identify the L t.I' A to request assistance, and the communications transport vehicle for purposes of inspection when the equipment should be of different types in case one type shipment arrives in port.

becomes inoperable as a result of equipment fsilure, adverse broadcast conditions or jamming, or injury to one of the 4. A description of the nuclear materials in the ship.

guards. Also, the means pronded for alternatne communi, ment (cle ments, isotopes, enrichments, e tc.).

cations should be physically separated so that it would be unhkely that an adversary force would be able to destroy 5. The number and types of containers of SSNM.

both capabihties for contacting the LLE A in a singe attack.

A ungle guard who is isolated from other guards should be 6. The name and telephone number of the carrier's equipped with a personal duress alarm that annunciates at a representative in the U.S. at each location in U.S. terntory location occupicJ by other Fuards, at which a scheduled stop will be made. If the carrier does not have a regular U.S. representatise at a gnen U.S. port Guards shauld have shotguns and nfles asadable for use, factlity, he may name such a representatise after making m as wtll as indtudual handguns, to ensure that they wdl be temporary arrangements wth the representative for another

} able to respond effestnely to adscrsanes attacking from car? r, or he may indicate that no U.S. representatise has

/ either short or long range. ban designated.

l 5.63 5 1

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _~

s O w

7 A physical protection plan for implementing the and personnel (e.g , parking an aircraft at an isolatec requirements of paragraph 70.20b(c). The plan is required location on the airfield away from the passenger anJ freight '

to include the use of armed personnel to protect the terminals), and taking steps to facilitate the timely perform- ,

shipment during stops made at U.S. ports. This plan may ance of any funettons (e.g., repairs) that necessitated the be prosided in one of two ways; stopover (to minimize the time spent in port)

a. The plan may be included in fuu with other An important part of the plantting processis the arrange-ir. formation required to be incluued in the 7-day notifica- ment made with the LLEA Policies of these agencies differ tion, or with regard to the degree ofinvolvement to which they are (

willing to commit themselves in the event of a transient shits 1

b. The carrier may refer the NRC to a physcal cecu- ment, ne estent of potential LLEA involvement should be rity plan already submitted to the NRC by another licensee determined in advance, and the physical protection system or by the samelicensee for a previous shipment. lhe licensee desig/ted to ensure that an adequate legel of protection is may intend to implement this plan directly or arrange for provided. Where standing arrangements are in effect, previous another organization to use the plan to protact the transient arrangenunts with the LLEA should be reconfirmed just shipment. When a previously submitted plan is to be used, prior to a planned shipment's arrival to take account of any the carrier should ensure that the plan is specific to each intervening changes in circumstances at a given port facility.

U.S. port at which a stop is to be made or should submit additional information to indicate how the plcn is to be As part of the preplanning for trarnient shipments, a dia-adapted to any other port at which a stop is to be made. gram of the important features of particular port facilities rnay be provided in the physical protection plan to facilitate if U.S. Mail service is not directly available to the implementation of the plan by the carrier's personnel or licensee, the li;ensee should use other means to ensure that others.

the written notification wiu be received by the NRC at least 7 days prior to the first scheduled stop of the transient 3. DETECflON AND DELAY OF UN AUTil0RIZ ED shipment within the United States.

ACCE3S OR M ATE RIALS INTRODUCTION BY STEALTil OR FORCE

• The licensee is also required to place a foUowup call to the same NRC regional offne to confirm that the required 3.1 Establishment of Controlled Access Areas" notification information has been received in accordance [ Paragraph 73.25(b)(2)]

with the 7 day nctification requirement. .

Paragraph 73.25(b)(2) requires that controlled access

2. SillPhlENT PLA NNING AND CONTROL areas be established surrounding the SSNh! or its transport to inlate the SSNM and decrease the number of persons, 2.1 Preplanning of Shipment itineraries materials, equipment, and vehicles allowed to come in

[ Par: graph 73.25(b)(1)(i)] contact with the transport or the SSNM.

It is recognized thtt,in the case of transient shipments, Controlled access areas must hage some means of demar.

physical secunty objectives may not be the determining cating the restricted area \ boundaries that is clear to factor in the planning of the itinerary of the transport carry- both authorized and uniuthorized personnel, ing the shipment. Aho, the time may often be too short for carriers to make changes to accommodate such objec- There must be some way of controllir g access to the tives and still meet thei contractual commitments to other area at all tirnes to ensure that unauthorized persons are not shippe;s. Ilowever, sutficient planning could be done in admitted. Aircraft and seagoing vessels that enter U.S. port advance to ensure that a.1 NRC physical protection require- facilities need not be protected while they arein motion if ments can be met when a transient shipment is planned.

it is determined that the SSNM on board is not accessible to unauthorized personnel during such motion. Thus,in most Carrier's agents at U.S. ports should be informed of the instances, armed response personnel will be required to NRC requirements so that they can make the neceuary protect the SSNM only from the momer/, the transport advance generic arrangements for the LLEA and pri) ate comes to rest within the port until it starts or its way out Fuard organizations to le available as needed. These of the port (see Section 8 regarding unscheduled transient arrangemente and the plan for physical protection could be shipments) This greatly simplifies the physical protec-used by more than one carner in case an agent represents tion systen for transient shipments that use U.S. ports in numeteus carriers.

'"Stealth" means methods used to attempt to sain unauthortred Physical protection plans should be made as uncompli. access, introduce unauthortied malertals, or remove 55NM where the ract of such attrmrt ta concealed of an attempt la made to cated as possible to accommodate the necesuty for using concealit. %ce" means dolent methoda used 19 an aJnrsar to guard personnel who may have little familiarity with sEccial enemrt to Heal ssw w saware a nuclear rum, w mjent me thods useJ 19 res ponse personeel to peotect ag ainst auch procedures for protecting SSNM. This can be done by pro- aJursary estsa.

hibiting offloadmg of the SSNM fror_. the transport unless .."cortroneJ accen ares"means ans temporarsi absolutely necessary, arranpng to isolate the transport or estat4uheJ clearly Jemarcate4 area access to mtuch bor permanenur controned and shipment as much as possible from other transportsJ chicles, $.*' '

• 5.ti3 6

comparison with the protection for domestic shipments hasing to focus attention on two different areas at the same cx (i.e., those that originate or terminate within United States tim e),

j territory ). The physica! protection plan should recognize,

_j however, that the cargo compartment containing the SSNM, Physical protection requirements for shipments of formula quantities of SSNM other than transient shipments or the SSNM itself, should be placrd under immediate sur-sciuance as soon as the transpet comes to rest in port to include requirements for the emplacement and periodic ensure that the SSNM remains inaccessible to unauthor- inspection of tamper-indicating devices on transports and fred personnel. Airport ground crews, warehousemen, cargo containers. For transient shipments, carriers are not dockworkers, and other personnel should not be permitted responsible for the emplacement of seals or other devices to approach the transport or its cargo compartment unless but are responsible for ensuring that tne seals or other

) surveillante is prosided in accordance with 73.25. tamper indicating desices put in place by the shipper con-tinue to function during the pericxl the generallicense is in ne plan should describe the approximate dimensions of effeet. Seals are not specifically required by the NRC in the controued access area that would be established relative the case of transient shipments but they may be employed to the transport of SSNM and the means that would be by the shipper in accordance with requirements of the used for its demarcation. International Atomic Energy Agency (I AEA) for shipments subject to IAEA safeguards. Paragraph 73.70(g) requires It should also indicate how attempts to penetrate the appropriate records to be kept of seal inspections during controlled access area without authorization will be detected, the time the transient shipment is in port.

assessed, and communicated to ensure a response capable of preventing unauthonred remosal of the SSNM. Procedures 4 DETECT 10N OF UN AUTIIORIZED ACCC,a OR for accomplishing these tasks should be related to the M ATERIALS INTRODUCTON BY DECEIT

• response functions and communications capabilities de-scribed elsewhere in the plan. The plan should also detail 4.1 Access Authorizations [ Paragraphs 73.25(b)(3Xi) the procedures that will be used to establish a controued and (c)(1)(i)]

access area. Pcific o'g;estions regarding measures to estabbsh a controlled ac,ess area may be found in the Access authonrations are required to cetermine the time reference system for U.S. domestic shipments [ Para- and condations of access for persons who are authorized to F.raphs 73.26(f X2), (i)(7), (jX3), (kXI), and (I X3)), be admitted to a controlled access area or for introduction of materials, vehicles, or equipment into such areas. Access 9 3.2 Transport Features To Delay Access

[ Paragraph 73.25(cX2Xi)]

authorizations are also required for entry into the transport.

In the case of a transient shipment,there are expected to be few authorizations necessary, De number of individuals lhe requirement for a transport to have features that authorized access to the SSNM should be miminir/d.

delay a:eess to the SSNM will usually be satisfied, for By limiting the number of authonred persons, the author-transient shipments, by such physical barriers as locked fration subsystem may be kept relatively unsophisticated cargo compartments. 't o the estent that the transport lacks yet effecthe.

delay causing features (for example, during periods when the cargo compartment is opened for loading or unloading Access authorizations would normally be provided in other cargo), the physical protection system must proside written form, naming the indhidual to be granted accet.s or compensating features (for example, stationing guards at the item to be introduced, it would also detail the criteria the entrance) to ensure that the general performance for entry (e.g., time, place, circumstances) and specify the requirements of s 73.20 are satisfieJ 6easons for which access is granted (e.g., to perform senice on the transport, to load or unload other cargo). Written 3.3 Access Detection for Transports authortf ations may be obviated by implementing an escort

[ Paragraphs 73.2 5(cK2)(li) and (iii)] proced ure. Under this procedure, all persons requiring temporary access would be escorted by an armed guard The requirement for a capability to det et attempted dunna such access to ensure that only c thorized aethities penetrations of the transport containing the SSNM was are being performed. Section 73.70 requires that written intended to provide SSNM shipments with defense in depth- records be kept to document each occasion on which an added 1 vel of protection beyond that prosided for by temporary access is permitted.

the controlled access area -w hic h becomes especially important when many renonnel must be allowed access The physical protection plan may detail the procedures into the controlled access area for senicing schicles, hand- to be used by guards to determine which persons or mate.

hng other cargo, etc. In the case of a transient shipment, rials are authorised access to (1) a controlled access area or there would generally be sery few persons authorized to (2) the transport or the SSNM.

hase access to the SSNM or the cargo compartment in which it is contained The same guards who administer the

'(N I controlled access area procedures could be used to keep the SSNM or the transport under suncillance to deteet unauthor- mc eit a means methe vuJ to attemrt to sein uneuthorised ired attempts to gain access provided these two require- [','h,'",'[",'y"l,'"@'[,( 5,,',"*f'4L'/g' 7,", ,j"',

ments did not impose conflicting duties on a guard (e.g., authonsea access.

5.63 7

4.2 Acceu Control a Entry Control Points is removed to a more vulnerable situation outside the (f [ Paragraphs 73.2 5(bX3Xii) and (cMIXii)] transport. Additional guidance regarding acceptable procedures for removal of SSNh1 from the transport may be Access control procedures are required to be imple. ebtijned from Regulatory Guide 5.57, "Snipping and mented to ensure that only authorized individuals are Receising Control of Special Nudcar hlatenal."

admitted to controlled access areas or g.isen access to the transport or the SSNht. These procedures insche three 5.2 SSNM Remosal Controls [ Paragraphs 73.25(cM3)(ii) distinct subfunctions: (1)identifice. tion. (2) ver fication of and (iii)l identification, and (3) assessment against au th oritation s.

Where few persons or matenals are espected to be allowed Removal controls at: prosedures followed in remosing access, a in the case of most tranuent shipments, these SSNhl from the transport in which it has been contained, subfunct:ons can be performed quite simply without resort They are required both for routine (planned) and emer-to some of the more sophisticated access co.. trol hardware rency situations and may include such aetmties as serifica-and procedures used at fixed site facilities or for domestic tion of the identities of persons performing the removal road shipments.

operation and persons to whom custody of the SSNhlis to be transferred. The identity of the SSNht being remosed The main problem ansing ;n providing physical protec- and intepity of the containcts and any seals are slsoltems tion for a tranuent shipment will be to allow positise to be senfied. Inese procedures act as a filtering process to identification of the LLEA or other guard personnel who ensure that the proper conditions exist and appcopriate are actnely involved in the implementation of the carrier's personnel have been positively identified prior to the physical protection plan. The carrier's agent ma) also hase removal. Response measures to ensure that deceitful to be routively identified. The p;2n should detail the attempts at unauthorized remosal of SSNht will be detected means that wdl be used to identify these persons before the and communierteJ to responsible persons are intertwined carrier permits them access to the transport or the 55Nht. with remosal controls and may be desenbed in the main The carner should be capable ofimmediately communicat-body of the plan or referred to a more detailed description ing 10 the LLFA information concerning persons present- in the contingency plan.

ing themselses as contract gu ards, LLFA personnel, or other members of the secunty organization who are dis-covered to be impostors.

6. DETECT 10N OF UNAUTil0RIZED RE%IOVAL Of SSNhl FROh! TR ANSPORTS BY STE ALTil 0R FORCF Once the composition of the seeunty organisation is 6.1 Transport Features to Delay Remonal wnfirmed, these persor.. wdl assume the responsibdit) for (Paragraph 73.25(c)(4)(i)}

further implementaton of the physical protection system aaording to the licensee's ph> ucal protection plan. Tranrport features to delay unauthonied remoul of SSNhl from the transport by stealth or force shoulJ be lhe means used to positnely identify the members of conudered an integral part of the physical protection the security organhation who are to meet the shipment at system. When such features are desiened into the transport, the time it arnves in a U S. port must be designed to hnit the physical protection system may take credit for the the opp 3rtumty for suuessful use of false credentials or amount of delay provided by them. To the estent that the other deceitful actions. This would apply equally to other transport has features that provide for ordy a slig.ht delay persons w ho may be authonzed access to controlled access capabihty, other components of the physical protection areas or to the SSNht.

system must be strengthened to compensate for the lack of suff aient delay afforded by the transport. The b. dancing

5. PREVENTION OF UN AUTil0RIZED REhl0 VAL OF of these delay and other factors (e.g., response time, size of SSNst FROh! TR ANSPORTS BY DKElf guard f, ace) is a matter of judgment by the hcensee and 5.1 uttanately the NRC inspestica staff. The general guiJance Authoritation for Remosal of SSNhl from Transports  % that these factors must be balanced in such a way that (Paragraph 73.25(c)(3)Od general performance requirements of 73. 0 can be satisfied.

Authonratior; for remoul of SSN\l from a transport w ould follo w the same pattern estabbshed for access Some transport features that delay access may also delay au t honz a tions . For transient shirments, removal of SSNhl re mos al. I catures that were not previously discussed as while m U.S. ports wdi normally not be necesrary. Iloweser, dela>mg aacss should be included in this part of the plan if uns,heduled remosal of the SSNht from the transport becomes necessary as a result of some unusual circum-along with desenptions of those aspects of prenously Jewnbed features that help to delay remoul as well. These stance. remoul authoraations would be determmed on a features ruay inslude arrangements for secunns the SSNh!in contmgent t aas. The temoul would be carried out under the transport schiele (e.g., secunn; heavy equipment neces-the direction of the carner (or the perwn designated to sary for removal of the SSN\t, b ndmg tagether the indt-assume responuMht) for shipment) secording to procedures vidual packages of SSNNI so as to make a one-step remoul detaded m the contingency plan Remosal proccJures cumbersome, and bindmg the SSNht containers to the strue-shoulJ be Jesigned to emure that noimmment or arparent ture of the transport)- These features may or may not be threat exists to the safet) of the shipment before the SSN\l present on board the transport behicle for a transierit 5 63.h

=

e shipment. In some cases, these features may be present for 7.2 Communications Betueen Guard Force Commander safety or other purposes rather than for physical protection and Security Control Center O purposes. To the extent that the physical protection system depends on such features to delay unauthorized removal, the licensee should describe which of these features (Paragraph 73.25(dX2Xill) in the case of transient shipments, the requirement are utilized on board the particular transport vehicle used expressed in parag.raph 73.25(dX2Xii) translates to the for the subject transient shipment, if such features are not fouoming; a continuous communications capability should actually employed, the licensee should take action to be maintained between the guard force assigned to protect employ them or take compensatory action to ensure the transient shipment and a remotely located security satisfaction of the general performance requi ements. control center manned by personnel employed by the

!!censee to monitor the status of the shipment whilelt hin port. This security control center could be located in the 6.2 Detection of SSNM Removal Attempts offices of the carrier's U.S. agent or at some other temporary

[ Paragraph 73.25(cX4Xii)] location in the area of the port. The security control center should maintain knowledge of the status of the shipment at Detection of SSNM removal attempts for transient all times during the period the generallicense is in effect, shipments could be performed in most cases by the same This could be accomplished through an intermediary such personnal assigned to detect unauthorized access to the as an airport control tower or the harbor master's office controlled access area, the transport, or the SSNM. The during times the transport is in motion within the port.

licensee should be careful to ensure that these duties, when assigned to particular guard personnel, are not in connict Communications between the guard force commander with other duties assigned them, and the security control center need not be continuous, but the capabdity for immediate two way communications by either the security control center or the guard force should

7. TRANSMISSION OF DETECTION, ASSESSMENT, exist while the shipment is in port.

AND OTHER SECURITY RELATED INFORM ATION 7.3 Liaison with and Notification of Local Law Enforce.

Various requirements for communications capabuities ment Authorities (LLE A) [ Paragraphs 73.25(dX2XLil) are described in the regulations relating to detection and and (dX3))

assessment; requests for assistance from response forces or the LLEA are described earlierin this guide. The communi. Both the armed guards for the transient shipment and cations capabilities described in this part of the plan would the security control center personnel are required to possess support the performance of these other physical protection the capability for direct communications with the LLEA to functions, notify them of the need for assistanceif necessary. The need for such communications is underscored by the basic philosophy of the licensee physical protection system. The 7.1 Communications Among Guard Force Personnel guard force for the transient shipment need not be designed

[ Paragraph 73.25(d)(2XI)] to defeat potential attackers in an aggressive mode, but ordy to protect the shipment and guard personnel from A continuous communications capabihty is required attack Its primary objective should be to delay the adver- i between members of the transient shipment's guard force. sary from completing any act of theft of SSNM or sabotage This capabdity is needed for routine purposes as well as for until the LLEA forces arav , The system should be designed implementation of emergency procedures detailed in the to interface closely with LLEA forces whose responsibuity contingency plan. Communications could be conducted it is to enforce local and State laws regarding thefts and using citizens band hand-held transceivers or other similar other criminal acts. The capability of the guard force to equipment where face to face unassisted voice communica- call LLEA forces into action when such assistance is needed tions are not practical. On be..d docked oceangoing is of great significance to the success of the physical protec-vessels, the ship's hardwire commat. stions system may be tion system and deserves to be protected with an appro-used, esper'stly where metal shielling would not allow the priate level of redundancy and diversity. (Jaisons w'.th  ;

use of transceivers. The comn.unications function is an LLEA personnel should bt consummated in advance I extremelf important one with regasd to the overall effee of the shipment or as soon as possible following artisal in tiwness of the physical protection system,'so that its port.

redundancy and daersity needs to be addressed. Trans-cdvers capable of using more than one channel should be 8. SPECI AL CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNSCHEDULED utilized to ensure that some form of communications with TR ANSIENT SHIPMENTS the LLEA is possible at all times in the event of a safe-guards incident. Dividing the guard force into two or more

8.1 Purpose and Scope

different groups to ensure their survivability in case of n single attack has been suggested as one procedure to ensure The purpose of the physical protection system for that the communications function will be performed. (See unscheduled transient shipments does not differ from th:1 Sectic n C.I .8 of this guide.) for scheduled transient shipments, llowever, the scope of 5.63 9

e 9

protection may differ owing to the unpredictability of the d saster that may appear to pose a threat to the safety of

. circumstances that would require the transport to make an the shipment (e.g., increased nsk from mob actions),

unscheduled stop at a U.S. Port facility. There are usen. Another factor is the extent to which there is public tiauy two differences, knowledge of the transient shipment entering the port and how much advance knowledge could hase been obtained by

1. The randomness of stops made at U.S. ports would potential advenaries. Generauy, phnical protection make them difficult for the adversary to predict so that, for measures should be implemented within two hours after a renod of time fellowing arrivalin port, the shipment would arrival at the port. NRCinspectors or he.dquarters personnel have a degree of protection arising solely from the randcanness would make the final determination based on whatis reason-of the egent. As the time in port grov s tonger, the abihty able in the light of local conditions and other circumstances, of the adversary to assemble or regroup his forces and trans.

port them to the port from another location increases also. In the event physical protection of an unscheduled Ilds wdl affect the timing of implementatica of the physical transient shipment becomes necessary, the licensee wtu be protection system for the transient shipment, required to arrange for protection by armed personnel.

These may be armed guards prosided by a commercial guard

2. Since the unpredictable factors of weather, equip. service or persontvl prosided by the LLEA. Whether LLEA ment failures, or other unusual circumstances rnay result in personnel will b( available wdl depend on the operaths the shipment arrising at a U.S. Port at which the carrier policies of the LLEA at the particular port. If the port has neither has made presious arrangements for physical pro- its own security force of armed personnel,it is tikely that theh*

tection not has a U.S. agent or representative, the physical senices could be obtained, either temporarily untu other

. protectio 1 system may have to be implemented by the arrangements can be made, or for the duration of the stop.

carrier with little specific knowledge of the port. This will require a rnuch greater dependence on the po t's LLEA for 8.4 Physical Protection Plans coop (ration in the early period following arrival in port. [ Paragraphs 70.20b(d)(7) and (e)(1)]

8.2 Notification Requirements [ Paragraph 70.20b(e)(1)] In the event a carrier finds it necessary to bring a tr:n.

sient shipment into a U.S. port with rninimal preparation, For unssheduled transient shipments,it may be impos. carriers are required to indicate immediately after the sible for the licensee to notify the NRC 7 calendar days decidon to enter a U.S. port the means they will use to prior to the arrival of the transport in a U.S. port, as is ensure t. s physical protection of the shipment. Plans for required for scheduled transient shipments. Ilowever, the providins this phpical protection may become available to carrier is required to notify the NRC of its intent to bring a NRCinst ;; tors in a number of different ways:

transient shipment of a formula quantity of SSNM into a U.S. riort by telephone, radio, or other means immediately 1. Carr.as may prepar: and hase on board their own upon the carrier's decision to enter a U.S. port. The notifi- plans in accoidance with the regulations and the guidance cation should contain the same types ofinformation included contained herein. Carriers transporting SSNM of formula in the 7 day notification required for scheduled transient ship- quantities with itineranes bringing them within range of ments [as desenbedin paragrarh "'O.20b(d)] except that same U.S. ports might anticipate use of these ports for emer-information regarding the name and address of the carrier's gency stops and plan ahead to meet such contingencies.

U.S. based representative and the physical protection plan may be unavailable. The carrier may, in fact, not have a 2. Carners may have on board, or on fde with their U.S. based representative or agent at the port in question agents at a U.S. port or ports, phnisal protection plans and may have little choice of which port to use,especially prepared by themsch:s or their U.S. agents that (a) may be if the stop is made beciuse of adverse weather conditions or adapted specifically to particular ports at which they may equipment failure. In such situations,the carrier may choose make cuergency stops or (b) may be generically designed to name a member of the crew who would assumeimmediate to be adapted to any port as circumstances require. The respoeiriihty for the trantient shipment'a physical protec- latter alternative villleave the carrier with the necessity for tion and make other arrangements after landing. rnaking final ar.angernents for physical protection as the need arises for any given port situation, 8.3 Implementation of Physical Protection Plans for Unscheduled Transient Shipments 3. Carnern who have done no advance planning for

[ Paragraph 70.20b(e)(2)]

ph ical protection can stdl comply with the regulation by preparing ad hoc plans while approaching port, if time phyncal protection plans may not need to be traple- allow 1, or shortly after entering the port. They may pre-mented immediately upon arnval of a transient shiprm.nt at part their own plans in response to the guidance contained a U.S. port. lloweser, the time that would be allowed to in this guide, of they may attempt to obtain the ser$ ices of elapse before physical protection plans must be implemented a U.S. tused agent who may be more familiar with the NRC would depend on a number of factors such as the amount physical protection requirements fot trannent shipments, of time during ordch the shipment is expected to remain in port, whether it will te necessary to transfer the SSNM to NR'C inspectors may require the licensee to tale certain another transpcrt, or whether there has been any cisil actions in order to protect the SSNM if they determine that unrest te g., protest demonstrations) or a recent natural the ptotection prosided by tne bcensee is inadequate.

5.63 10 a

VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT A separate value/ imp;<t analysis has n(t been prepared in the proposed amendments when the fimal rule was

[o}

\s/

for this regulatory guide. The guide was developea to ptcWde guidance to persons subject to phyncal protection published.

requirements for transient shipments contair ed in 10 CFR The major coralusions of the value/ impact analysis were Parts 70 and 73. These requirements were promulgated by that the required physical protection could be prodded at amendments to NRC regulations publisheit in the Federal reasonable cost and minimalimpact to the parties concerned, Rethter on February 13,1981 (46 FR !l 593). A value/ that the costs of prodding such protection are essentially impact analysis was prepared for the amend.nents originally independent of the technical and procedural alternatives proposed for the physical protection of transient shipments considered, and that the overall level of impacts, including o's January 8,1980 (45 FR 1625), a copy of which was those to the NRC,other gmernment organizations,ind.astry, placed in the Public Document Room at that time This workers, and the public, and also the impact on inter.

analysis is also appropriate to the final amendments and to national relations, will be minimal because of the small

( this regulatory guide since only minor changes were made number of potentiallicensees, f

V i

l l

O v

5.63 11

o UNITED STATES NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N WASHINGTON. D C. 2T65

,lj*l'u"a.e$$

se

• s ec

's'ai o tasa 3 (

Of f CAL DV$ int 55 PtNAL77 POm PmW Af g yst,33c O

O

_