ML20198L601

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Rev 3 to Reg Guide 5.44, Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys. (Draft Was DG-5007)
ML20198L601
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/31/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:
References
TASK-*****, TASK-DG-5007, TASK-RE REGGD-05.044, REGGD-5.044, NUDOCS 9710270092
Download: ML20198L601 (19)
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  1. neg U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revision 3 A/

A October 1997

%***** ) OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGU L

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.44 (Draft was DG-5007)

PERIMETER INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEMS A. INTRODUCTION possessing Category 112 quantities and types of materi-al,10 CFR 73.67(d)(3) requires that the controlled ac-Part 73," Physical Proteeion of Plants and Mate-cess area be monitored with an intrusion alarm or other rials," of Titir 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations device or procedo'e to detect unauthorized penetration specifies performance requirements for the physical or act vities.

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protection of nuclear power facilities, independent spent fuel storage facilities, fuel facilities, and special This guide describes the functions of perimeter intrusion detection sensors and detection methods that nuclear materials. Some examples of Part 73 objectives and requirements follow. For power reactors,10 CFR are acceptable to t'a s clear Regulatory Commission 73.55(c)(4) requires detection of penetration or (NRC) staff for meewhe portions of the NRC's regu-attempted penetration of the protected area or the isola-lations specified above. It provides guidance on sensors tion zone adjacent to the protected area barrier to ensure and methods that can be integrated to form an effective O that adequate response by the security organization can perimeter intrusion detection system. This ;uide pro-(

/ be initiated. Adversaries are presumed to be determined vides guidance on selecting perimeter mtrusion detec-and knowledgeable. For independent spent fuel storage tion systems and on applications for nuclear power installations,10 CFR 73.50(b)(4), in part, requires reactors, independent spent fuel storage installations, and certam special nuclear matenal processing monitoring of isolation zones to detect the presence of facilities, individuals or vehicles within the zone. For Category 11 fuel fabrication facilities, the use of an intrusion in using this guide, it is not the intent of NRC to detection subsystem with the capability to detect pene-compel a licensee to revise commitments in previously tration through the isolation zones is specifically set approved security plans without benefit of site specific forth in 10 CFR 73.46(e)(1). (The special case of non-backfit and justification of a significant increase in power reactors with Category I types and quantities of protection of public health and safety, in advising materials is addressed in 73.60.) Finally, for facilities affected licensees of the appropriate use of the guide, NRC recommends that licensees, in replacing or redesigning a perimeter intrusion alarm system, con-ICategory I means 4trategic special nudcar material as defmed in 10 kategory 11 means special nudcar rnaterial of moderate strategic sig-CFR 73.2.

mricance as defmed in 10 CFR 73.2.

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4 sider the information in the guide as one factor, among best, an intruder can only estimate points where detec-others, in the overall planning of the system. A licensee tion will occur. In contrast, the detection zone of a taut may choose to voluntarily commit to this revision or wire system can easily and accurately be determined.

the guide, in total or in part.

The wires constitute the detection zone.

The information collections contained in this regu-In selecting a sensor capable of detecting an latory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR intruder,it is crucial to select and integrate sensors that Parts 50,72, and 73,which were approved by the Office will minimize false and nuisance alarm rates. (See of Management and Budget, approval numbers Appendix A, Glossary, for definitions.) Selecting the 31504K)ll, 315041132, and 31504)002. The NRC best sensor for a perimeter section will minimize the may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not re-false and nuisan:c alarm rates. In selecting the best sen-quired to respond to, a collection of information unless sor for a perimeter kication, the following factors are it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

considered.

Fence, barrier, and isolation zone conditions H. DISCUSSION So I types and conditions, including blowing sand GENEllAL Suitability of the perimeter for segmenting into The effective use of a perimeter intrusion detection detection zones system is influenced by a number of factors. These fac-tors include the environment (such as snow, rain, tem-Nearby roads urports, waterways, railroads, and perature, lightning); the selection, application, and the type of traffic they carry installation (including proper electrical grounding) of Perimeter penetrations (above and below ground) a equipment; testing and maintenance of the particular such as culverts, pipes, buried wires, and utilities sensor types used; the ability of the security organiza-I Temperature extremes tion to assess incoming alarm data in a timely manner; and the overall integration of the system. A perimeter Precipitation (e.g., rain or snow) amounts and intrusion detection system generally consists of one or rates, including ice accumulation and blowing S ""*

more sensors, electronic processing equipment, a I

power supply, signal transmission media, an alarm Lightning frequency and severity monitor with display, and a means for maintaining and Natural foliage

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providing an alarm history.

Wildlife types, population densities, and activity at Sensor systems can be classified, from an applica-or near the perimeter tions viewpoint, as either line-of-sight or terrain-following, and from a functional viewpoint, as either Electrom gnetic interference potential, including volumetric or planar. For line-of-sight systems to be radio frequency interference potential.

effective, the terrain surface must be relatively Dat with Some typical commercially available sensor sys-no significant contour depressions or elevations, in tems an. described below.

terrain-following systems, the sensor's detection pat-tern can adapt to sorae changes in the terrain's contour.

SENSOR SYSTEhlS The terms volumetric and planar refer to the general shape of the sensor's detection zone; the primary differ.

Alicrowave Systems ence between these teims concerns their depth dimen-Microwave systems are line-of-sight and volumet-sion, or the distance an intruder must travel to pass ric, and they are found in two basic configurations:

j through the sensor's detection zone. The depth dimen-(1) bistatic, consisting of a transmitter and receiver sion for a planar sensor is minimal to near zero (much remote from each other at either end of a microwave like a plate of glass). A taut wire system is an example; link, and (2) monostatic, with receiver and transmitter the intruder must contact the wire tocause an alarm. In located in the same unit.

contrast, a microwave sensor creates a volumetric bearn Each link of a bistatic microwave perimeter detec-pattern having a depth of up to several feet.

tion system is composed of a transmitter, receiver, An intruder's ability to determine a sensor's detec-power supply, signal processing unit, signal transmis-

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tion 7one boundary can compromise the sensor. Micro-sion system, and an output for connection to an wave detectors have invisible detection patterns. At annunciation device. The transmitter radiates a low-5.44 '

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power, three-dimensional,L typically modulated micro-objects comparable to an individual's movement, a waye signal toward the receiver. The receiver detects, detection signal is generated. Some systems have addi-amplifies, and processes the signal. A reference rate of tional signal processing to discriminate between people N

microwave energy transfer is established while the and what would otherwise be nuisance alarms.

transmitter is unobstructed. When an intruder enters the Ported Coaxial Cable Systems space defined by a conical beam, the total amount of microwave signal. energy entering the receiver is A ported coaxial cable system, considered to be increased or reduced from the established refe ence terrain-followita and volumetric, consists of two bur-level.This causes the receiver to generate an alarm.The - ied shielded coaxial cables, transmitters, detectors, microwave beam is typically-modulated to reduce power supply, processing unit, and an output for con-interference from spurious sources of radio frequency nection to an annunciation device. Radio frequency energy, to increase sensitivity, and to decrease the vul.

(RF) energy is transmitted along the transmission line nerability to defeat by the receiver capturing a false and is radiated through ports in the shield strands. This microwave source.

RF energy can be either pulsed or continuous wave. The pulsed system operates in principle as a guided radar, A monostatic microwave unit consists of a trans-and thus an intruder is both detected and located. The mitter and receiver in the same unit along with a power continuous wave system detects the intruder but does supply, signal processing unit, signal transmission sys-not localize the intruder's presence along the cable tem, and an output for connection to an annunciation length. The transmit-receive antenna pattern that is set device. There are two different kinds of monostatic up between the two cables produces a zone of detection microwave, ampilit de modulated (A.M) and frequency around and between the transmitting and receiving modulated (FM). AM monostatic microwave systems lines. Changes in this electromagnetic field that exceed detect changes in tae net vector summation (direct and threshold levels cause an alarm. The system detects reflected components) of the received signal, similar to moving targets in the zone of detection, and the signalis a bistatic system. FM monostatic systems operate on a digitally processed to provide enhanced signal charac-pulsed doppler jnciple and thus can provide range in-teristic identification. The received signal is generally formation in addition to detection. In general, the useful processed to reduce interference from nearby RF range of a monostatic microwave is considerably less

emitters, than that of a bistatic system. For this reason, its exte-rior use is generally limited to short links or volumes Active Infrared Multibeam Systems covering portals or gaps in coverage between bistatic Active infrared multibeam systems are considered microwave transmitters and receivers, line-of-sight and planar. Each link of an infrared system is composed of a transmitter, receiver, power supply, Electric Field Systems -

signal processor, signal lines, and an output for connec-tion to an annunciation device. The transmitter directs a An electric field perimeter intrusion detection sys-narrow infrared beam to a receiver. If the infrared beam tem is considered tetrain-following if the grade is uni-between the transmitter and receiver is interrupted, an form between mounting supports. First generation sys-alarm is generated. The infrared beam is usually modu.

tems are considered planar, while second generation-lated. Since the infrared beam does not diverge signifi-systems are more volumetric in nature. A typical sys-cantly, multiple infrared beams between transmitters tem consists of field wires, a field generator, sensing and receivers can be used to define a " wall." If this wires, a sensing filter, an amplifier, a discrimination

" wall" is then penetrated, an alarm will result. (Note:

unit, and an output for connection to an annunciation The term " active infrared" is used to distinguish these device. The field generator excites the field wires, systems from " passive infrared" systems. Passive creating an omnidirectional electrical field primarily infrared systems do not emit infrared energy, but between the field wires and the sensing wires (a field is instead, simply "look" at their field of view and detect also created between the field wires and the earth changes in the ambient infrared patterns or intensity ground). Electric field systems range from 4 to 7 wire levels.)

systems, i.e., from 2 sensing and 2 field wires up to 3 sensing and 4 field wires. A person approaching the Taut Wire Sys' ems j

system changes the pattern of the electric field. Sensing A taut wire system is a terrain following (with 1

. l wires installed at different locations within the trans-ground leveling) planar system. The system consists of mitted pattern detect changes occurring in the pattern.

a series of steel wires, typically barbed, securely

- If the changes' are within the frequency bandpass of anchored on posts and stretched parallel to the ground.

5.44 - 3

l The wires are closely spaced to prohibit climbing terrain-following and either volumetric or planar, beween the wires without causing an alarm and are depending on the specific installation and use.

typically tensioned to 36 kg (80 lb). Deflection of or Vibration or Strain Detection Systems cutting one or more of the tensioned wires activates a sensing device connecting each wire to either a sensing A variety of devices that detect strain or vibration post or anchor post. The sensing device may be a simple are available for use as fence-mounted intrusion detec-switch, strain gauge device, or other passive transducer.

tion systems. Typically, such systems are considered Slider posts are generally used to further support the terrain-following and planar. Although the deviccs wires, typically at 3-meter (10-foot) intervals.

vary greatly in design, each basically detects strain or vibration of the fence on which it is mounted, such as Fiber Optic Systems that produced by an intruder climbing or cutting the Fiber optics refers to light transmnsion through fence. In the simplest devices, the vibration or strain makes or breaks electrical continuity and thereby gen-specially constructed optical fibers for communica-crates an alarm. In more complex systems, vibration or tions, sett :ng, or imaging. Optical fiber consists of a strain changes light transmissioa characteristics light guiding core and a sunounding optical " insula-tor" called the cladding. The core has a higher index of through fiber optics.

refraction than the cladding, which permits total inter-C. ItEGULATORY POSITION nal reflection if the angle ofincidence is greater than the critical angle. Light can thus be confined in the core and transmitted along the length cf the fiber, 1.

DESIGN OllJECTIVES AND INTEGilATION A number of dif ferent techniques are being used in the developing technology of fiber optic intrusion 1.1 1.ayout detection. Speckle pattern and interferometry are two in designing an effective perimeter mtrusion detec-common techniques. In the speckle pattern technique, tion system, dividing the site perimeter into segments when light is sent through the optical 3ensing cable of that are independently alarmed and uniquely monitored the system, it appears at the end of the cable as a assists the security organization in assessing and speckled pattern of light and dark spots. The patterns of responding to an alarm by localizing the area in which a

light and dark are caused by the many different modes the alarm is initiated. The perimeter segment lengths or paths through which light can travel in a multi-mode should be selected with consideration of such factors as fiber optic cable. When the cable is stationary, the pat-range; limitations of the sensor system; and the loca-tern is stationary, llowever, when pressure is applied to tion, alignment, and viewing areas for closed circuit the cable, the light distribution through the cable is television (CCTV) cameras, when CCFV is used for

r. hanged. This change redistributes the speckle pattern alarm assessment. Segmenting the perimeter alarm sys-oflight and dark. These speckle patterns are converted tem also allows testing and maintenance of a portion of to usable electrical signals through the use of a photo-the system without affecting the remainder of the diode. An alarm processing unit uses this information perimeter. The individual segments should generally be to deter nine whether an alarm has occurred.

limited to a length that allows observation of the entire segment by an individual standing at one end of the seg-Interferometry can also be used to determine ment. This typically means that segments should not changes in the optical sensing cable. This technique exceed 100 meters (328 feet), but shorter segments may uses wavelength division multiplexing, which is a be needed to achieve the desired performance.

method capable of sending multiple signals at different wavelengths through the same fiber. The detection The ground surface of the detection zone should be method involves monitoring mode interference prepared by stabilizing the soil to prevent the growth of J

changes of the light that are caused by pressure, vibra-vegetation along the length of the zone. Depending on tion, or motion. To optimize detection capability and the system type, this may help to minimize nuisance minimize nuisance alarms for a particular installation, alarms caused by the movement of high grasses, etc.

the system allows the user to select appropriate process-Measures for accomplishing stabilization include sur-ing parameters to qualify a disturbance as an alarm. The facing or soil sterilization. Isolation zones on either parameters include the frequency band, energy level side of the detection zone also help to provide a clear and duration of the disturbance, and the number of dis-zone for assessment. For all systems, the distance turbances within a specified time. Fiber optic systems between the bottom of the detection zone and the using these techniques for detection are considered ground plane should not be large enough for an 5.44 - 4

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individual to pass undetected under the detection zone A single system that by itself does not meet detec.

and thereby circumvent the system.

tion performance requirements may, in conjunction with another system with a different sensing method,

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Perimeter intrusion detection systems should be placed to rnaximize detection and assessment capabili-provide adequate detection performance. Such com-bination systems should employ dissimilar detection ties and minimize nuisance and false alarm rates. The techniques. This combination of different sensing tech-following factors should be considered in locating the niques requires an intruder to defeat two (or more) detection system.

types of different sensing methods at the sarce time, 1.1.1 The system should be located so that ite;ns which would significantly increase the difficulty of such as existing (or plannod) barriers, sensor mounts, defeating the system.

light poles, or natural terrain objects (e.g., trees) cannot be used as aids for bridging the sensor's detection pat.

The design goal of a perimeter mtrusm, n detect,on i

tern, bhicking assessment, or providing cover and system is to detect an individual weighing a minimum concealment, of 35 kg(77 pounds), whether the individualis running, walking, crawling, jumping, or rolling through the 1.1.2 In determim.ng the distance between the per meter of a protected area. Further, the design goal of rone of detection and any area m which an adversary a perimeter intrusion detection system should be to may be concealed, the licensee shcald consider the time limit false alarms and nuisance alarms to a total of not needed to circumvent the barriers, the time to reach a nmre than one false alarm per rone per day and one nui-concealed hication, and the specific intruder-sance alann per zone per day, assessment capabilities at that location. Digital video frame storage systems are one means of addressingsite-llecause nuisance alarm rate data are extremely unique assessment problems by capturing video frames specific to location and detection technique, data before, during, and after an actual intrusion.

should be gathered for the first year after a new system 1.13 Pedestrian and ve nicular traffic should belo.

is installed to gain system experience and to allow for cated away from the tr.e of detection to reduce nui.

system alterations. After that period, the data simuld be examined to establish site specific rates for both nui-O sance alarms.

sance and false alarms. The findings should be reflected 1.1.4 Sources of strong, fluctuating electromag-in adjustments to security plan commitments based on netic fields (such as large transformers and electrical s te-specific operational and environmental circum-power distribution subsystems) should be considered stances and actual performance at the site. Such revi-when selecting sensors susceptible to such distur-sions to security plans may be submitted under the pro-bances (e.g., the electric field sensor and the ported visions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) if the changes do not coaxial cable system).

represent a decrease m effectiveness of the security 1.1.5 Site-specific environmental conditions plan. Settings of adjustable parameters should be should be considered in selecting the system. For recorded and future changes should be recorded with example, sites where fog sometimes obscues visibility justifications.

may not be suitable for beam-breaker type systems, such as the active infrared multibeam system, which Licensees should be able to observe, in a timely may have its detection capability degraded by the fog's manner, the bridging of a detection zone or tojustify to beam scattering effect.

NRC that successful completion of a bridging attempt is not feasible.

1.2 Detection and Alarm Capabilities The system should be designed to annunchte, Optimum detection capabilities for any particular audibly and visibly, under the following additional sensor system are achieved when the sensor selected conditions:

has a detection volume suited to specific segment con-figuration and terrain. In general, volumetric systems Marement of any portion of a perimeter m. trusm.n a

detection system in the access modec' are preferred because they are generally more difficult A unique indication, other than a normal alarm, of a to defeat. Ilowever, for cestain limited site configura-tiona, planar systems may provide coverage with fewer switch over to emergency or secondary sources of false o

power, O

sensor.r nuisance alarms compared toavolumetne-type d

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Access mode means the conditon that mamtams secunty over the sig.

nalimesbetween the detector and the annunciator and over the tam.

After adjustments m sen$or posiuon are complete, it might be neces.

per switch m the detector but aHows access mto the protected area 3

sar) to remove excesme lengths of mountmg poles.

through the tone of detection without mdicatmg an alarm condition 5.44 - 5

Any interruption or reduction of system power to supervision on these comnn.nication paths should pro-the degree that any part of the system is not func-tect against simple electrical bridging of the system or tioning properly, compromise of the system by :ny of toe following

    • ""8' Any indication of tampering (e.g., opening, short-ing, or grounding of the sensor circuitry) that ren.

Substitution of resistance, voltage, or current, dets the device incapable of normal operations; Substitution of equipment of the same design and Any indication of tampering by activation of a tam-manufacturer, per switch or other triggering mechanism.

Reintroduction by playback of signals previously ree rded onto the communication t)ath, 1.3 System Electrical Speelfications If primary power is interrupted, the security system Introduction of signals onto the @ 4t were syn-should contain provisions for automatic switch over to thesized externally.

emergency power (battery and/or generator) without The tamper switch and transmission medium causing false alarms and without causing a loss of sys-should be supervised to the saine extent in the secure tem function or data. Emergency power should be capa-mode as when the sensor is conditioned for authorized ble of sustaining operation without external support for access.

a minimum of four hours for Category I fuel cycle facil-ities, or for a site-specific period of time determined 1.6 System Vulnerabilities according to station blackout criteria for power reactor Licensees are cautioned that any sensor system facilities. If emergency power is furnished by battery, may have one or more design vulnerabilities that may all batteries (including stored batteries) should be enable the system to be compromised by a knowledge.

naintained at full charge by automatic battery charging able intruder. For this reason, it is important that all circuitry designed according to IEEE Standard 450, equipment be installed per manufacturers' specifica-

" Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and tions, meet the performance criteria required by Replacement of Large I ead Storage Batteries for Gen.

10 CFR Part 73 as clarified in this regulatory guide, and crating Stations and Substations"(1987).5 be thoroughly tested. In some instances, the conibina-tion of different sensor types can yield improved per-1.4 Tamper Protection formance with a reduction in vulnerabilities. (See Reg.

All enclosures containing controls that affect the ulatory Position 1.2,

" Detection and Alarm operation and sensitivity of the detection system and all Capabilities," on combining sensors.) Licensees access point controls should be h>cated within an enclo-should consider requesting that a system manufacturer, sure protected by a tamper-switch. The electronics a qualified engineer, or both be present during final should be designed so that tamper-switches remain in acceptance testing of a perimeter intrusion detection operation even though the system may be placed in the system to be sure that the system has been properly access mode. At power reactor sites only, cable pull installed, boxes and termination points need not be tamper-1.7 Assessment protected if line supervision is used, unless there are splices at the location.

A perimeter intrusion detection system is incom-plete without some means to assess and resolve alarms.

1.5 System Line Supervision it is imperative that the assessment techniques identify All signal lines connecting detection devices to the stimulus in a timely manner before the stimulus of alarm stations should be supervised.6 If the processing the alarm disappears from view. The time an intruder electronics are separated from the sensor elements and takes to run through the isolation zones and disappear are not kicated within the detection area of the sensor from the field of view of the assessment mechanis.n elements, the signal lines linking the sensors to the should be greater thaa the time required to visually processing electronics should also be supervised. Line assess the alarm zone. If the required protected area bar-riers and isolation zones adjacent to the intrusion detec-Nn$ 'P*Iiba'yNINs$'"

  • tion system do not provide sufficient delay to ensure as-sessment, additional means should be taken to increase 6 Signal ime supemsion is dncuued in tbe NRC's NUR ECuCR - 5723, secunty syuem signai suremsion tscriember 1991) copics may delay or improve assessment (e.g., an additional fence, be purcheed at eurtcnt raten from the U S. Gowrnment Prmtmg of-concertina rolls, razor tape, higher fence, video-cap-fwe, PO Ikn 37082, Mshmgton. DC 20402-9328 (telephone (2u2)il2-180nh of from the National Techmcal Information Scr.

ture monitoring techniques). Care should be taken that bY

  • ntmA NTIS at 5285 Port Roy al Road. Sprmgfwid, VA 22161.

the means used to provide additional delay do not inter.

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5.44 - 6

fere with assessment capioilities. 'l he following are ac-The amount of time that equipment is out of service ceptable methods of assessment.

should be minimized to preclude the overuse of com-

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- 1.7.1 CCTV systems that are fixed and properly P'"'"Iory meanesme majntenance group should be

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aimed parallel to the barrier or perpendicular to the in-cffective and respond in a timely manner. The use of

truder's path may be used to provide assessment in-dedicated on site maintenance techni':ians has proven formation to the alarm station operators. It is important effective to ensure perimeter intrusion detection system to select and orient equipment to maximize fields of operability and proper performance.

- view and, thus, maximize assessment time for evaluat-2.

PERIMETER INTRUSION DETECrlON -

ing intruders passing through detection zones. These SYSTEMS-MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS systems should be designed to display immediately,

= using the same signal that activates the annunciation-2.1 Microwave Systems Video-image capture devices with the capability to 2.1.1 Installation Criteria record an adversary within the zone of assessment and immediately prior to detection are an acceptable alter-llistatic transmitters and receivers should be native to alarm. activated display monitors.'At Cate-installed on even terrain clear of trees, tall grass, stand-gory I fuel cycle facilities, alarm. activated display ing or running water, and bushes. Typically, a bistatic monitors should continuously display and not "go microwa,s perimeter detection system should be w

blank" during quiet periods (periods of no alarm). Con-installed to operate effectively in a range not more than sideration should be given to the use of pan / tilt / zoom 100 meters (approximately 328 feet) long. Some mod-(PTZ) cameras to augment fixed camera installations, els are designed to operate over short ranges, e.g.,

as an adjunct to the fixed camera systems.7 across perimeter portals. Successive microwave links 1.7.2 Fixed guard posts can be effective if the and corners should overlap to climinate dead spots posts are positioned so that there is a clear field of view (areas where the microwave beara cannot detect) below of the assigned segment. These posts generally should and immediately in front of transmitters and receivers.

be positioned at the end of the assessment area with the The required amount of overlap of successive links is guard observing in one direction only. The intrusion contingent on the antenna pattern and unit height, in detection system should annunciate in the local guard zone overlap areas, the equipment for the overlapped

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post as well as in both alarm stations. Consideration zones should either both be transmitters or both be should be given to compensation for loss of guard receivers; this is to minimize interference between the observation capability during periods of reduced visi-successive l'nks that could otherwise result -in bility such as darkness, rain, fog, and snow.

decreased sensitivity and greater false alarm rates with-1.8 Maintenance in the zones. Each unit should be mounted rigidly on secure posts at a sufficient distance above the ground so The regulations in 10 CFR part 73 require that the that incident and renected signals combine positively, perimeter intrusion d6tection system be maintained in typically 60 cm (24 inches) for 100 meters (328 feet), or an operable condition, thus a preventive maintenance according to the manufacturer's installation criteria, program is necessary, Maintenance of the detection, llecause of variances in the antenna patterns of different alarm communication, annunciation, and assessment microwave systems, the height may have to be varied system is critical to successful operation. Licensees slightly to obtain coverage adequate to detect crawling should establish an ongoing program for maintenance.

intruders. Accordingly,the mounting mechanisms for a in addition, maintenanu may be initiated by the testin8 system should permit adjustment of antenna height and program, operational requirements, the routine peri-position to correct poor performance or alignment.

- othe maintenance program, or a trending program or analysis.

Receiver units for a microwave link may also need to be specially protected because of their susceptibility to tampering by a knowledgeable intruder _ or to h systems are answed in suREc/CR-5721 -video Svstem.

receiver capture" through electronic means. " Receiver for Alarm Assessment" (D. A; Greenwoll and L C. Matter capture" occurs when a receiver recognizes a false (SAND 91-0947). USNRC, September 1991), Copies may be pur.

transmission si nal as its own. Means available to E

chawd at current rates from the U S Government Printing Off cc,

' P D.

Dos - 37082, hhingtcn, DC 20402-9328 (telephone minimize vulnerabilities include the use of monostatic

[N (202)$12-1800); or from the National Technical Infoimation Ser.

microwave to Erotect the area where the receiver head is

. skt by wtiling NTIS at 52&5 Port Royat Road, Springticid, VA 22161.

k

, Copies ase avadable fot inspection orcopying fora fee from the NRC located or the use of additional perimeter intrusion Pubhc Document Room at 2120 L Street NW. Washington, DC;the detection equipment, such as an electric field system, PDRa maihng address is Mad Stop LL-6 washington DC 2uS$5-0001; telephone (202)634-3273, fas (202)634-3341.

Configured to require penetration of a detection zone in 5.44 - 7

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l order to access a receiver head. As with bistatic receiver transmitter nor a receiver should be mounted on a fence heads, monostatic transceiver heads may be vulnerable unless prior approval is received from the NRC. Over-to certain tampering methods and must also be pro-lapping transmitter / receiver paths should also be tected, possibly by placement inside another sensor's designed to prevent bridging from transmitter or detection zone as described above.

receiver posts and to prevent an intruder from moving undetected behind units. Similarly, care should be Stacking of microwave sensors is one means of taken to be sure that mounting posts cannot be used as increasing the elevation-detection-zone height of the step-off po. ts for jumping over the zone of detection.

m system to enhance its detection capabilities. The stack-ing technique, in effect, fills in the dead zones that can 2.1.2 Performance Criteria be inherent in simple histatic systems. Additionally, the A microwave perimeter detection system should use of stacked units can help detect the bridging or be capable of detecting an intruder weighing a mini-jumping of a detection zone. Multichannel microwave mum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing through the units should be used in an alternating pattern around the zone of detection between the transmitter and receiver, perimeter.

including the area in front of both the transmitter and Since the bistatic transmitter / receiver link is a line-receiver, whether the individual is walking, running.

of-sight system, variations in ground level (e.g.,

jumping, crawling, or rolling. Provision should be made to ensure detection in spite of the dead spots in ditches and valleys) may allow some intruders to crawl fr at of transmitters and receivers. The beam should be under the beam, and variable obst:uctions (e.g., snow modulated and the receiver should be limited to drifts or accumulations) may interrupt the beam. To prevent passage under the microwave beam, variations respond to selected frequencies to decrease susceptibil-in the ground should be leveled, ditchea should be ity to" receiver capture."

filled, and d structions should be removed so that the 2.2 Electric Field Systems area between the transmitter and receiver is clear of ob-2.2.1 Installation Criteria structions and free of rises or depressions. The distance between the bottom of the detection zone and the Electric field systems should be installed with ground plane should be such that a person cannot crawl zones that are limited to 100 meters (328 feet) or less in under the zone undetected. Typically, the distance order to have effective detection sensitivity for assess-between the bottom of the detection zone and the ment and response. The system can be mounted on ground should be 15.24 centimeMrs (6 inches) or less, metal, plastic, or wooden posts using specially de-The clear area should be suffidently wide to preclude signed electrical isolators that allow for small move.

the generation of alarms bylegitimate movements near ments of the posts without disturbing the wires. The the microwave link (e.g., personnel walking or vehicu.

wires need to be under a high degree of spring tension to lar traffic) and to preclude system degradation caused produce high frequency vibrations when they are by reflections fmm any structure, such as the perimeter struck by small foreign objects or blown by the wind, 4

fence. Approximate dimensions of the microwave pat.

both of which are out of the bandpass of the receiving tern should be provided by the manufacturer.

circuitry.

Motion or disturbance of objects such as tumble-The electric field sensor's wires should be spaced weed, paper, and bushes moving in the path of the beam so that an individual moving between the wires can be can cause nuisance alarms. Since the beam is relatively detected. It is important that the lowest wire of any elec-wide, care should be taken to ensure that reflections tric field system be consistently close enough to the from authorized activities do not create nuisance gr und to detect crawling under the wire. Accordingly, the bottom wire should be located 15.24 centimeters (6 alarms. With the microwave link installed inside a perimeter barrier or between a double perimeter barrier, inches) or less above ground level. The field wires and a

the transmitter and receiver should be positioned to sensing wires should be located and ; paced per the detect anyone jumping over the microwave beam into manufacturer 's specifications. The electric field detec-the protected area from atop the perimeter lence or wall.

tot is not a line-of sight system and therefore can be Typically, the distance between a chain link security installed on uneven terrain and in an irregular line.

fence with an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) and 11 wever, the terrain between posta must be of uniform the center of the microwave beam should be a minimum grade so that the field and sensing wires can be installed of 2.4 meters (8 feet). In addition, the microwave link parallel to the ground.

should be positioned within the isolation zone to Because of the characteristics of an electric field enhance assessment once detection is made. Neither a detection pattern, the system should not be mounted on 5.44 - F

or near a fence that an intruder could use to jump over crawling or rolling under the lowest wire, stepping or the field. Consideration may also need to be given to the jumping between the wires, or jumping over the wires.

g) ability ofintruders to set up, without observation, such The field and sensing wires should b: supe rvised to pre-

V hand-carried equipment as small ladders for jumping vent undetected cutting or bypassing of the system by over the electric field without detection. In general, electronic or clandestine means.

evasion of detection by jumping over a planar system need not be cmsidered if the overall height of the sys-2.3 Ported Coaxlal Cable Systems tem is about 3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater, because of 2.3.1 Installation Criteria the,mpact of jumping from those heights. For electric i

field systems, wires that are not connected to either Ported coaxial cable systems should be installed field generators or field change sensors may prove use-per the manuf,.cturer's specifications. The maximum fut for altering the field contours to fill in gaps or to and minimum separation of the transmitter and receiver extend the effective height of the field, in addition,if can vary. Generally, this type of system can operate in the electric field system is mounted on the side of a longer segments than other detection systems. Ilow-wall, the stand-off from the supporting barrier should ever, it is recommended that detection zones be not permit passage between the barrier and the system, restricted to segments of 100 meters (328 feet) or less to The surrounding terrain within 3 meters (10 feet) of facilitate assessment. The system is terrain following field wires should be free of all shrubs, trees, and under-and can be curved around corners. The lines are gener-

growth, ally buried approximately 18 centimeters (7 inches) deep and I to 3 meters (3 to 10 feet) apart. The installa.

The system should be well grounded per the t on of ported coaxial cable perpendicular to buried manufacturer 's recommendations along its entire metal conduit for electrical cables or metal pipes used length with special care given to the sections that go for water or storm drains may degrade detection or over walls or buildings. The control unit should be well cause nuisance alarms. Soil conductivity should be grounded using a 1 meter (39-inch) or longer ground

  • considered when installing this type of sensor. Soil ing rod or equivalent electrical ground. Grounding may found to have relatively high conductivity may cause

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be difficult under dry carth conditions. The resistance the detection field to be reduced. Highly conductive (h

between ground mds and carth should also meet so lincludes sdi that contains concentrations ofiron or manufacturer's recommendations, salt. Moving objects in the zone of detection such as Electric field systems should be tuned or over-f liage, rippling water, and grasses may create nuisance lapped if necessary to overcome any lack of sensitivity alarms. Rodents can chew through ported coaxial in the areas around tension springs and end insulators.

cable. Sensor locations should be selected carefully to Monostatic microwave could also be used to protect prevent nuisance alarms from such sources as person-these areas. Another alternative is to install barriers in nel and vehicular traffic. Similarly, the cleared area these areas to either channel an intruder into the higher above the sensor should be controlled to prevent the sensitivity envelope or require increased activity to placement of objects within the area, even temporarily, penetrate the barrier sufficient to be detected even in the which would degrade the vetection zore. The transmit-ter and receiver transducer lines should be installed on reduced sensitivity region. Each wire should be kept free of nicks, cuts, etc., and be properly tensioned per well-drained terrain cleared of trees, tall grass, and manufacturer 's recommendations along its entire bushes. System sensitivity may be affected by freezing length. Systems mounted on chain-link fence are sus-or thawing of the surrounding terrain. Because local ceptible to wind caused alarms and should be avoided, anomalies can cause variances in the antenna pattern, There may be some loss of sensitivity in the vicinity of the separation between the lines may vary slightly in metal posts used to support electric field fences. If site rder to obtain proper ground coverage. Neither the transmitter nor the receiver lines should be mounted conditions necessitate installations over buildings, nonmetallic posts (e.g., wood or fiberglass-reinforced above ground. Approximate dimensions of the detec-plastic) should be used to prevent gaps in the detection tion pattern should be provided by the manufacturer.

Z " e-The system should he installed relative to perime-2.2.2 Performance Criteria ter fencing, s th t the transmitter and receiver lines are O}

positioned to prevent someone from avoiding detection An electric field perimeter detection system should by jumping over the electromagnetic field. Typicdly, xs be ;ble to detect an individual weighing a minimum of the distance between chain link security fencing with 35 kilograms (77 pounds) whether the individual is an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) and the center of 5.44 - 9

the detection zone should be a minimum of 2.4 meters angles, with sufficient overlap to preclude th'e use of the (8 feet).

mounting posts for jumping over the plane of detectium this installation precludes the use of common posts.

Manufacturer's instructions should be followed when installing cable across concrete or asphalt areas.

Fog, rain, and tsnow can attenuate and disperse the Particular attention should be paid to the binding agent infrared beam and can cause nuisance alarms, llow-and applying epoxy over the cable groove after the ever, the system can be designed to compensate for cable is installed in the concrete or asphalt, severe atmospheric attenuation. Dust on the face plates

" " * " " " ' *

  • infrared beam, as will an accu-2,3.2 l'erformance Criteria mutation of condensat. ion, frost, or ice.

A ported coaxial cable perimeter detection system Condensation, frost, or ice may be eliminated by should be capable of detectmg an mdividual weighing a using heated face plates. Sunshine on the receiver may minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing over the cause nuisan;e alarms. A misalignment of transmitter transmitter and receiver wires, whether the individual and receiver caused by frost heaves may also cause nui-is walking, running, jumping, crawling, or rolling. The sance alarms. Like the miccowave system, vegetation electromagnetic field should be modulated, and the such as b"shes, trees, or grass and accumulated snow receiver should be frequency selective to decrease sus-willinterfue with the infrared beat.The passage of an I

ceptibility to " receiver capture.'

intruder may go undetected on irregular ground sur-faces, ditches, or hills.

2.4 Active Infrared Multibeam System 2,4.1 Installation Criteria The transmitter and receiver units shmild be posi-tioned a minimum of 3 meters (10 feet) from perimeter When installing an active infrared multibeam sys-fencing. The infrared detection system should not be tem, the maximum distance between transmitter and installed directly adjacent to a barrier, since the barrier receiver should permit proper operation during condi-may provide a solid base from which an intruder could tions of severe atmospheric attenuation that are typical jump over the beams into the protected area.

for the site. The maximum distance between transmit-2,4.2 l'erfermance Criterie ter and receiver is generally 80 meters (260 feet). The infrared perimeter system should be installed so that, a' An infrared perimeter detection systam should be a any point, the lowest beam is 15.24 centimeters (6 multibeam modulated type, consisting of a minimum inches) or less above grade and the highest beam is at of six beams per segment. The system should be capa-least 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) above grade to prevent ble of detecting an individual weighing a minimum of bridging.

35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing between the trans-mitters and receivers whether the individualis walking, Consideration should be given to the ability of intruders to set up, without observation such hand-running, jumping, crawling, r rolhng. This means that carried equipment as smallladders for jumping over the the infrared beams should be placed and interlaced to form an mfrared " war Funhermore, the splenu infrared beams without detection. In general, evasion should be able to operate as above with a factor of 20 of detection by jumping over a planar system need not (13dB) msertion loss fn n atmospheric attenuation be considered if the overall height of the system is about kg, fog) at a maximum r nge of 80 meters (260 feet).

3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater, because of the impact of jumping from those heights. The beams should be suf-2.5 Taut Wire Systems ficiently interlaced that an individual could not pene-2.5.1 Installation Criteria trate between the beams and remain undetected. The transmitters and i,:ceivers should be rigidly mounted Manufacturer's specifications should be followed (e.g., installed on a rigid post in a concrete pad extend-in the installation of the system. Ilowever, because of ing below the frost line) to prevent nuisance alarms the basic operating principle of the system (i.e., ten-from vibrations or ground shifting. Systems with sioned wires), the length of the segments should be lim-heights greater than 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) should be spe-ited to 60 meters (200 feet) or less. The overall beight of cially stabilized to prevent vibration-caused alarms, for the system should be 3.7 meters (12 feet) or gr:ater.

example, by mounting on a building wall. Each post on Wires should be spaced so no intruder can pass between which a transmitter and receiver is mounted should be the wires without detection, normally a distance of prcoided with a pressure-sensitive cap to detect 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) or less between wires. A attempts at scaling or jumping over the post. As an sensing post should be placed approximately halfway alternative, successive infrared links should overlap at between anchar posts. (Anchor posts may function as 5.44 - 10 1

sensor posts in certain models.) To provide addith,nal alarms caused by the wind can be reduced by rigidly system suppmt, slider posts should be spaced approxi-mounting the fence and thereby lessening the propen-mately every 3 rneters (10 feet) between the anchor post sity of the fence to vibrate in the wind. Electronic

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and sensor post or between anchor posts. The system signal processing equipment used in conjunction with may be installed on chain link fencing or an existing signal generating strain transducers can effectively wall with a standoff equal to or less than 15.24 centime-reduce nuisance alarm rates without sacrificing sensi-ters (6 inches). When installed on chain link fencing, tivity to climbing or cutting the fence, increasing the the taut wire system should be installed on the interior fence height also appears to enhance sensor perfor-or protected ara side of the fence The ground within 1 mance. Consideration should be given to the ability of meter (39 inches) on either side of the taut wire system intruders to set up, without observation, such hand-should be stabilized to prevent erosion and to maintain carried equipment as smallladdera forjumpingover the the bottom wire at 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) or less infrared beams without detection. In ger ral, evasion above the ground, of detection by jumping er a planar system need not be considered if the overall height of the system is about i

2.5.2 Performance Criteria 3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater,because of the impact of The system should be installed so that an alarm is -

jumping from those heights. Ilowever, most fence received on deflection of any wire that causes a vertical detection systems can be bypassed easily by a variety of opening greater than 15.24 centimeters (6 inches).

methods, 2.7.2 Performance Criteria 2.6 Fiber Optic Systems Vibration or strain-detection systems used for 2.6.1 Installation Criteria fence protection should detect an intruder weighing a Since the use of fiber optics in intrusion detection minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) attempting to is a fairly new technology, licensees are encouraged to climb the fence. The system should also detect any consult with the NRC on site specific usage. Manufac-attempt to cut the fence or lift the fence fabric 15.24 turer's guidelines for installation should be followed.

centimeters (6 inches) or more above grade. The system Segments should be limited in length to 100 meters should not generate excessive nuisance alarms. In addi-(328 feet). Since such systems detect pressure, motion, tion to the testing desciibed in Regulatory Position 3 of or vibration, they are sensitive to many of the vulnera-this guide, the vibration or strain detection systems bilities found under vibration or strain sensitive sys-should be tested for their ability to detect fence cutting tems or buried line technologies, attacks or other means of defeating detection unique to 2.6.2 Performance Criteria these systems.

A fiber optic detection system should be capable of 2.8 Other intrusion Detection Systems detecting an individual weighing a minimum of 35 Some systems currently under development may kilograms (77 pounds) passing over the cable, whether be acceptable, when fully developed, for use at NRC-the individual is walking, running, jumping, crawling, licensed facilities. Other systems that currently do not or rolling.

have an acceptable detection performance capability may at some future time be refined and be found suit-abl'. In either case, thu e systems would have to be per-2.7 Vibration or Strain Detection Systems e

If used, a vibration or strain detection system formance tested by the licensee and a' qualified inde-should be installed in accordance with the following pendent agent (such as a national laboratory) prior to criteria and used only as a secondary intrusion detection consideration by the NRC.

system to augment the detection capabilities of a pri-3.

RECOMMENDED TESTING mary system.

PROCEDURES 2.7.1 Installation Criteria in conducting any testing procedures, care should Depending on the variety of sensor, each sensor can be taken to ensure the safety of the individuals perform-monitor a length of fence ranging from about 1 meter ing the testing. The standard Occupational Safety and (39 inches) to several hundred meters, Vibration or llealth Administration procedures and practices should be followed.

strain detection devices for fence protection generally are susceptible to nuisance alarms caused by wind Specification testing should take place at the initial s

vibrating the fence, hail stones, or large pieces of trash installation of the equipment.-If available, test proce-blowing against the fence. The frequency of nuisance dures recommended by the manufacturer s.u_ld be fol-SA4-11

Iowed. As in all test situations, the area under test will,in most cases, be sensor and location dependent.

should be rnaintained under visual observation by a Note that vulnerability to penetration also varies with member of the s-urity organization while the test is environmental conditions, inclement weather may be a being conducted. For each perimeter segment, the test particularly good time for a realistic evaluation of pe-should (1) ensure that the mystem meets manufacturer's timeter vulnerabilities.

specifications and NRC-recommended detection prob-Test each segment using a combination of all the ability,(2) verify that no dead spots exist in the zone of applicable penetration approaches at the most vulner-protection, and (3) verify that line supervision and able area a total of 30 times. All 30 tests should result in tamper-protection in both the access and secure males successful detections, are functional. Records of initial te"ing capabilities, equipment sensitivity settings, or voltage outputs if the minimum number of successful detections is should be maintained by the licensee so that deteriora, not achieved, the system should be checked. If no prob-tion in equipment capability can be monitored.

lems with the system are discovered,10 more tests should be made. If the minimum nuniber of successfui Two acceptab e options for testing are described detections is achieved, in this case 39 out of 40 (see the below. Other testing methods may be used if the meth' following table), the testing for this segment can be en-ods are full" uocumented and are approved by the ded. If no problems with the system can be discovered NRC.

and less than 9 out of 10 additional intrusions are 3.1 Testmg Option I detected, the system must be upgradeu to increase the detection probability to the required level. If problems After the equipment has been installed and specifi-wah the system are discovered, the system should be cation tested, the perimeter intrusion detection and repaired and 30 new tests perfoimed. lf there are 30 sue-ularm systems should be operationally tested in all seg-cessful detections, testing can be ended, ments at least once each seven days in the following manner. Testing may be conducted during routine Minimum No, Maximum No.

patrols by members of the licens :e's security force. The Total No. of of Successful of i'ailures testing should be conducted by crossing the zonc of Tests Detections Detected detection or by disturbing the fence on which the sys-30 30 0

tem is attached to cause the system to alarm. Ilefore the O

M I

test, the individual making the test should notHy the alarm stations that a test is about to be conducted. The 50 48 2

detection system in all segments should be walk-tested in a different, preferab!y raadom, order every seven The penetration approach that is most difficult to days, and the testing should be conducted throughout detect should be attempted more frequently if an equal the week rather than conducting all tests on the same number of tests for each approach is not possible.

day. The testing should result in 100% detection on all segments every severi days, if the perimeter alarm sys.

The segments should be tested m..cadom order, tem fails to detect an intrusion on one or more seg-This will protect against the possibility that environ-ments, corrective actions should be taken and docu-mental effects and other unknown factors that niay af-mented. Records should be maintained to document feet the test results (detection or nondetection) always that all required testing has n accomplished favor or handicap the same segment or method of ap-proach. For example, if Segment i is always tested in in addition to operational testing, at least semi' the morning and Segment 2 is always tested in the after-annually, as well as after each inoperative state and after noon vad if the detection equipment is slightly more any repairs, the sptem should be performance tested. A sensitive to intrusions in the morning, the conclusion 90% probability of detection with 95% confidence might be drawn from the test results that Segment 2 is should be the design goal of the system. An acceptable less protected thw Segment 1. Ilow wer, the difference performrnce testing method follows.

noted between the two segments might only be due to the morning versus afternoon difference. Similarly, us-Model Performance Testing Program ing random methods, no approv "ill be continually Determine the most vulnerable area of each seg-favored if the time sequence br mg) affects the test s

ment and determine the method of approach most likely results. This will protect against disturbances that may to penetrate that segment. e.g., walking, running. jump-or may not occur and that may or may not be serious if ing, crawling, rolling, or climbing. This determination they do occur. A random numbers table can be used to SA4 - 12 i

determine the order in which the segments will be favored if the time sequence (ordering) affects the test

tested, results. This will protect against disturbances that may h

or may not occur and that may or may not be serious if Maintain records of the results of all tests per-they do occur. A random numbers table can be used to formed. These records should include the segment determine the order in which the segments will be number, date, time, and relevant environmental condi-tested.

tions when tests were performed. Records should be maintained corisistent with 10 CFR 73.70.

Because this option for tesiing is conducted on a weekly basis, the performance of the system need only be determined anruially, as opposed to semi annually as 3.2 Testing Option 11 with Test Option 1. At the conclusion of a 12 month Under this option, one pass (i.e., one attempt to cir, period, data accumulated from the weekly testing can cumvent the zone of detection) of a performance test is be applied to totals used in determining performance levels.

conducteo in place of an operational test and the burden for semi annual performance testingis greatly reduced' in essence, improved weekly tes'ing is conducted With proper system performance, semi-annual perfor-Groughout the year, as opposed to Test Option 1 in mance testing need not be conducted. Instead of a sim-which rudimentary weekly testing is conducted over ple "go, no-go" operational 1-st conducted by a member f>-month periods along with extensive performance of the security force passing through the zone of a testing at the end of the period. The gcal is improved detector on a weekly basis as with operational testing' testing over a year with reduced overall burden on the this performance type of test that is conducted weekly

licensee, represents a challenge to the system. The weekly per-formance test is conducted by determining the most Iinder Test Option 11,if a sensor achieves 50 detec-vulnerable a:ea of each segment and determining the tions over a 52 week (annual) period through weekly s

method of approach most likely to penetrate that seg-testing of the segrrer additional performance testing ment, e.g., walking, running, jumping, crawling, roll-need not be conductea at the end of the year. (Tradi.

'/

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ing, or climbing. This determination will, in most tional performance testing would still be required after V

cases, be sensor and hication dependent. Note that each inoperative state or repair.) Testing must never vulnerability to penetration also varies with environ-conclude on a nondetection. If three or more nondetec-mental conditions. Inclement weather may be a pa.ticu-tions occur, accumulated data for the period may not be larly good time for a realistic evaluation of perimeter counted toward totals for performance testing and the vulnerabilities.

accumulation of data must be restarted.

Over time, each r.egment should be tested by using As described in the model performance testing pro-a combination of all the applicable penetration gram in Section 3.1, records of all tests performed approaches at the most vulnerable area. The penetration should be maintained.

approach that is most difficult to detect should be D. IMPLEMENTATION attempted more frequently if an equal number of tests o

for each approach is not possible.

The purpose of this section is to provide informa-The segments should be tested in random order.

t on to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC TIA will protect against the possibility that environ-statf's plans for using this regulatory guide, mtal effects and other unknown factors that may affect the test results (detection or nondetection) always Except in those cases in which an applicant or favor or handicap the same segment or method of licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for approach. For example, if Segment 1 is always tested in complying with the specified portions of the NRC's the morning and Segment 2 is always tested in the after.

regulations, the methods describd :n ihis guide will be noon and if the detection equipment is slightly more used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with sensitive to intrusions in the morning, it might be con-applications for construction permits and operating cluded from the test results that Segment 2 is less pro-licenses. This guide will also be ased to evaluate sub-(,,)

tected than Segment 1. Ilowever, the difference noted mittals from licensees who propose system modifica-V between the two segments might only be due to the tions that are voluntarily initiated by the licensee if morning versus afternoon difference. Similarly, using there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifica-random methods, no approach will be continually tiar.s and this guidance.

5.44 - 13 l

i APPENDIX A GLOSSAltY Access mode The condition that maintains security over the signallines between the detector and the i 9 nun-ciuor and over the tamper switch in the detector but allows access into the protected area through the zone of detection without indicating an alarm conditien.

Active r ptem A type of intrusion detection sensor that emits a signal from a transmitter and detects changes in the reception of that signal.

llistatic system As used with a microwave sensor, a sensor consisting of a transmitter and receiver remote from each other at either end of a microwave link.

Bridging Circumvention of a perimeter detection system by traversing above the zone of detection using hand carried aids or nearby objects.

Cladding The re Dective outer layer of an optical fiber that surrounds the light-carrying core. The cladding contains the light in the core and allows the fiber to guide light from one end to the other. The cladding has a lower index of refraction than the core.

Crawling Crossing the detection rone lying prone on the ground with a low profile at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (l inch) per second, body aligned perpendicular to the zone of detection.

Dead spot An area in an intrusion detection zone where there is no detectior. capability.

Design stimulus An individual weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds), running, turs.iag, crawling, jumping, or rolling through the perimeter of a protected area.

l'alse alarm An alarm generated without an apparent cause.

1:alse alarm rate The frequency at which a particular alarm zone indicates a false alarm, the design goal for which is,io.nore than one per zone per day.

Index of refraction A measure of a transparent material's ability to bend light, usually abbreviated as "n." The index of refraction is the ratio of the speed of light in a vaccum to the speed of light in the material.

Interferometry Using the interference of light waves to precisely determine the wavelength of the light.

Isolation zone An area adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects that could conceal or shield an individ-ual. For facilities required to have double protected area barriers, this zone should extend 6.1 meters (20 feet) on either side of the protected area barriers and include the area bounded by the barriers. For facilities required to have a single protected area barrier, the isolation zone should extend 6.1 meters (20 feet) on either side of the protected area barrier.

,t Jumping Leaping over the zone of detection, including standing on a fence and attempting to leap across the zone of detection.

Line-of4ight As used with intrusion detection systems, a sensor that requires a terrain surface that is relatively system flat, with no significant contour depressions or elevations.

Monostatic As used with a microwave sensor, a sensor that has the receiver and transmitter located in the system same head or unit.

Multimode fiber Optical fiber that permits more than one light mode to be propagated.

5.44 - 14

Nuisance alarm An alarm generated by an identified input to a sensor or monitoring device that does not repre-sent a safeguards threat, Nuisance alarm The frequency at which a particular alarm zone indicates a nuisance alarm, the design goal for v

rate

- which is no more than one per zone per day.

Operational Testing performed at the beginning and end of any period in which a system is used. lf the period testing of ccmtinuous use is longer than seven days, under operational testing the system must be tested at least once every seven days.

Passive system A type of intrusion detection sensor that produces no signal fr m a transmitter but simply detects energy emitted in its vicinity.

Performance Testing conducted at least semi-annually, after each inoperative state, or after an repairs to ensure

/

testing the design stimulus will be detected properly. An inoperative state for an alarm system or com-ponent exists, for example, when the power is disconnected to perform maintenance or when, for any other reason, both primary and backup power sources fail to provide power. Placing a properly operating alarm system in access would not constitute an inoperative state unless accompanied or followed by any of the conditions above.

Planar system A system in which the distance an intruder must travel to pass through the detection zone is considered more two-dimensional, as a flat plane, than three dimensional or volurnetric.

Receiver capture As used with a sensor systern, the condition that occurs when a receiver recognizes a false trans.

mission signal as its own.

Rolling Crossing the detection zone on the ground with a low profile, body parallel to the zone of detec-tion, and moving at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (1 inch) per second.

Running Entering and leaving the zone of detection at an approximate velocity of 5 meters (16 feet) per second.

Secure mode The condition that maintains security over the signal lines between the detector and the annun-ciator and over the tamper switch in the detector; the secure mode does not allow access into the protected area through the zone of detection without indicating an alarm condition.

Segm:nt One of several sections into which a perimeter intrusion zone might be subdivided to optimize sensor performance, compensate for unique terrain features or vulnerabilities, improve alarm assessment capabilities, or facilitate response force deployment.

Spec 3.fication Testing done after completion of the system's initial installation or replacement of any major testing component to verify that the system complies with (1) the manufacturer's specifications for design, installation, and adjustment,(2) performance criteria set by the NRC and the site, and (3) any other criteria on which the :ystem's acceptability is based. Specification testing is more comprehensive than performana testing.

Speckle pattern A light-interference pattern produced at the end of a multimode fiber that is being illuminated by a laser source.

Terrain-following As used with intrusion detection systems, a sensor with a detection pattern that can adapt to system -

some changes in the terrain's contour.

I Wlumetric system A system in which the distance an intruder must travel to pass through the detection zone is

\\ -

considered more three-dimensional than two-dimensional or planar.

Walking Entering and leaving the zone of de. etion with a normal stride (2 30-inch steps per second).

5.44 - 15 I

l

APPENDIX 11 CilECKLIST This appendix contains checklists for each type of or structures are not amenable to standard instal-detection system described in this guide. They may be

lation, used as reminders when planning, installing, or using Be aware that microwave sensor detection zones the systems.

that parallel a road with vehicular traffic or long MICROWAVE fence lines may produce nuisance alarms unless sufficient offset is established between the sensor Ensure that microwave sensors are set up so that axis and the interference source, e.g., traffic on the they have a clear line of sight b..,veen transmitters roaA at swaying fence lines.

and receivers.

Note that standing water, e.g., from heavy rain, Ensure that microwave sensor systems are under the microwave sensor detection zone can installed over Oat ground or ground with a constant produce an increased maisance alarm rate when the slope to prevent shadowing (inadequate detection water is rippled by winds. Crowned surface grades in depressions).

and gravel beds can reduce or eliminate standing For corner overlap applications, keep intersection angles of micro vave beams as close as possible to Note that, after a heavy rain, moving water under e

90 degrees, i.e., orthogonal, the microwave detection zone may produce nui.

sance alarms.

Never mcunt on the same post two rmerowave re-ceivers for different segments or zones (or on the Note that significant snow depths and drifts can same channel).

produce voids in the detection zone.

Remember that dynamic multipath signals from Consider that the dead spot in detection immedi-microwave sensors can be subject to constructive ately below and in front of microwave units and destructive interference.

increases with mounting elevation.

Consider that the detection pattern is relative to the Consider that heavy rain exceeding 5.6 cm (2.2 mounting position, and it is sometimes possible for inches) per hour is likely to cause microwave sen-an advers ry to crawl under the detection beam sors to produce nuisance alarms, when microwave sensor antennas, i.e., receivers j

and transmitters, are relatively high.

Consider that electro-magnetic interference (EMI),

either reflected or direct, can s;rike the microwave Consider that it is sometimes possible tojump over receiver and cause nuisance alarms. Shielded

)

the zone of detection when microwave sensor radomes or enclosures with shielded wiring and

antennas, i.e.,

receivers and transmitters, are proper grounding can reduce or eliminate the mounted low so the detection zone is close to the effects of EMI.

ground.

Note that acoustic noises and vibrations, e.g., seis-When a boundary system is to be established using mic activities or mechanical disturbances, can microwave sensors and multiple zones or sectors

  • adversely affect some microwave sensors and not the detection zones should overlap to achieve a affect others, depending on their design, signal continuous detection pattern with no ar as of processing, and installation parameters.

reduced detection capability at the ends of each Remove food and water sources from the sicinity sector.

of the sensor system to prevent foraging animals Be aware that reflections of microwave signals from causing nuisance alarms, from nearby structures, traffic, or surface disconti-nuities may cause nuisance alarms. Ilowever, Limit grass heights to 10 cm (3.9 inches) to prevent reflection of microwave signals may sometimes be nuisance alarms caused by the wind moving the used effectively to extend coverage where terrain grass.

5.44 - 16

lie aware that the detection capability of active ELECTRIC FIELD SYSTEMS J*

- Avoid installation in areas that are subject to drastic infrared multibeam systems can degrade in adverse 1

environmental chages, such-as temperature

"".nr nments such as heavy rain, dense fog, scis-mic activity, and vibration as from vehicle traffic.

V

- extremes.

Install systems so that intruders can not crawl

~

  • ' Ensure that angles of corners are kept as close to 90

- under orjump over the detection zone.-

degrees as possible.

Install systems so that the ends of adjacent zones Note that electric storms can er.use electric field overlap,-

systems to malfunction and can cause false alarms, Note that wildlife activity can cause nuisance When electric field systems are installed on perim-alarms in active infrared multibeam systems.

etcr fencing, the perimeter fencing must be kept in good condition at all times.

TAUT WIRE Make sure that a constant tensiords maintained on For electric field sensor zones located parallel to roads, provide sufficient offset from the road to the wires through periodic checking and adjust-ments.

prevent nuisance alarms.

Be aware that certain environmental conditions, Note that significant srow drifts and depths can such as icing or frozen ground heaves, can cause

. degrade detection capabilities, nuisance alarms.

  • - Ensure that wires are retensioned after extreme sea.

Ensure that, prior to installation, terrain under the sonal temperature changes, system is leveled to a constant grade.

Ensure that the path along the alignment of the sen-PORTED COAXIAL CAllLE SYSTEMS s r fence is cleared of all vegetation, tree branches, Ensure that the ground in which a ported coaxial and other dehns.

b cable system is buried is firm and is not subject to

(

movement.

Consider the installation of curbing under the fence Note that groumi water can cause ported coaxial Ensure wat fence posts are securely anchored.

cable systems to generate false alarms.

Note that rodents can chew through ported coaxial FILLER OITICS SYSTEMS Install according to manufacturer's recommenda.

Avoid intersecting irrigation pipes and power lines tions, since many new and different technologies with the coaxial cable.

are being used in fiber optic detection.

For buried lines, be advised that nuisance alarms

& Note that the detection zone may be elongated at may be caused by tree-root movement in high

. curves, winds and by nearby vehicu'iar traffic.

s

-*. Note that the sensor may react to strong sources of radio frequency energy.

Forinstallation on chain link fencing, many of the same precantions apply as with vibration or strain-Perform soil conductivity tests to ensure that high detection systems.

conductivity, such as is caused by high concentra-tions ofiron or salt in the soil, does not "short out" VillRATION OR STRA DETECTION the radio frequency field.

SYSTEMS Foliage and debris touching or being blown against

. ACTIVE INFRARED MULTI IIEAM SYSTEMS a fence can create nuisance alarms.

Note that active infrared multibeam systems Fence fabric must be securely fastened down.

l require a clear line of sight.

All gates in the fencing system on whi:n the sen-lie aware that active infrared multibeam systems sors are mounted should be prevented from vibrat--

require flat ground to prevent shadowing, ing to prevent nuisance alarms.

5A4 '

Ensure vibrations from nearby vehicles do not If not encapsulated in conduit, system wiring cause nuisance alarms.

should be interwoven in the fence fabric, rather than simply clipped to it, to prevent removal as a Wildlife activity can cause nuisance alarms.

means of defeating the system.

+

1 4

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5.44 - 18

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VALUE/lMPACT STATEMENT N(~\\

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A separate value/ impact statement has not been prepared for this Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 5.44. A value/ impact statement was prepared for the upgraded physical protection amendments to the regulations that were published in the Fed-cralRegister on November 28,1979. This analysis is also appropriate for this reg-ulatory guide. A copy of the value/ impact statement is availatie, with Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC; the PDR's mail-ing address is Mail Stop LL-6, W.hington, DC 205554XX)l; telephone (202)634-3273; fax (202)634-3343.

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