ML20151A251
| ML20151A251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Levis W, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151A237 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-88-18, 50-325-88-18, NUDOCS 8807190302 | |
| Download: ML20151A251 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1988018
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UNITED STATES
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h!UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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AT L ANTA, GEORGI A 3o323
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Report No. 50-325/88-18 and 50-324/88-18
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
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Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No. 50-325 and 50-324
Facility Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: May 1 - June 4, 1988
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Inspectors:
i
. H. 8) land
Da'te Signed
E
'N
chq)d
kW. Levis
Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel
S. Shaeffer
Approved Bg:
$>!29 f k
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g . E. W edrickson, Section Chief
Date Signed
(J ' Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine safety inspection by the resident. inspectors involved
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the areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance
observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verifica-
tion, onsite Licensee Event Report (LER) review, in office LER
review, followup on inspector identified and unresolved items,
Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT)- Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR)
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controllers, and inadvertent heatup.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, 4 violations were identified:
failure to
follow a plant modification test procedure; withdrawal of a control
rod during condition 5 with the Reactor Protection System (RPS)
shorting links installed; failure to adequately control reactor
coolant system temperature; and High Pressure Coolant Injection
(HPCI)/ Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) high steam line flow
instrument setpoints greater than Technical Specification (TS)
setpoints.
8807190302 880629
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ADOCK 05000324
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Three unresolved items were identified:
control room fire detectors'
affect on control building emergency air filtration (CBEAF) system
operability; information provided to NRC regarding silicon b anze
bolts; and environmentally qualification of a non-safety pu, r'an
(. the SBGT system whose failure could have caused system failure.
No deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
W. Biggs, Engineering Supervisor
- E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
"J. Brown, Resident Engineer - Engineering
- S. Callis, On-site Licensing Engineer
T. Cantebury, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
- G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
- C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA
- R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support
- K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
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- M. Jones, Principal Engineer - On-site Nuclear Safety
R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
- R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
- J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
- T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
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engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force
members.
- Attended the exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 3,1988, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
t'e l ow .
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
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Item Number
Description / Reference Paragraph
325/88-18-01
VIOLATION - Failure to Follow a Plant
Modification Test Procedure (paragraph 6.b).
324/88-18-03
VIOLATION - Control Rod Withdrawn During
Condition 5 With the Shorting Links Installed
(paragraph 7, LER 2-88-06).
324/88-18-04
VIOLATION - Failure to Adequately Control RCS
Temperature (paragraph 11),
325/88-18-05 &
VIOLATION - HPCI/RCIC High Steam Line Flow
324/88-15-05
Instruments Inoperable (paragraph 9.b).
325/88-18-02 &
- URI - Failure to Environmentally Qualify
324/88-18-02
SCR Controllers for the SBGT System
(paragraph 10).
325/88-18-06 &
URI - Control Room Fire Detectors' Affect on
324/88-18-06
CBEAF Operability (paragraph 5).
325/88-18-07 &
URI - Adequacy of Action to Identify and Correct
324/88-18-07
Silcon Bronze Bolt Problem (paragraph 9.d).
Note: Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in para-
graph 13.
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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(CLOSED)
Violation 324/86-15-01, Failure to Maintain a Service Water.
Valve Motor Operator Breaker in the Correct Position.
The. inspector
reviewed the Notice of Violation response dated July 24, 1986.
The
training documentation for I&C/ Electrical Maintenance personnel was
reviewed by the inspector.
(CLOSED)
Violation 324/86-25-01, Inadequate Procedure to Control DG
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Jacket Water Cooler Service Water Outlet Valves.
The inspector reviewed
the Notice of Violation response dated November 26, 1986, and OP-39,
Diesel
Generator Operating
Procedure.
Revision 29, dated.
October 20, 1986, now incorporates steps allowing for the throttling of
the subject valves during diesel generator operation and for returning
them to the locked open position (with independent verification) upon
securing the diesels.
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- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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(CLOSED)
Violation 325/87-36-03, Allen Bolt Placed in Variable Hanger
Preset Hole.
The inspector reviewed the Notice of Violation responses
dated December 21, 1987, and February 11, 1988, along with the corre-
sponding documentation package.
The licensee believes that the subject
allen bolt came from the limit switch compartment cover of the adjacent
motor operator, a RHR heat exchanger inboard vent, which was missing a
bolt of the same type; however, the period of time when the bolt was
placed in the hanger could not be determined.
The limit switch internal
components were inspected and no apparent damage was found due to moisture
intrusion resulting from the missing bolt.
The inspector reviewed all
currently completed VERS which document the results of the initial
in-service inspections of Unit 2's spring can supports.
A total of 61
supports were examined, the remaining 7 were deferred to the next Unit 2
outage. None of the VERS identified any obstructions or pins installed in
the preset pin holes.
(CLOSED) Violation 325/88-01-01 and 324/88-01-01, Failure to Perform DG
Surveillance Within TS Time Limits. The inspector reviewed the Notice of
Violation response dated April 13, 1988. The licensee concluded that the
cause of the violation was due to a high level of activity resulting in
personnel error. The inspector verified that communications made with the
plant shift operating supervisors concerning the root cause of the
violation contained an adequate amount of emphasis on not continuing this
kind of personnel error trend.
In addition, timers have been purchased
and distributed for use by shif t foremen end control operators to assist
in keeping up with TS related significant events which have time limita-
tions.
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No significant safety matters, violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and
reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with
approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry
codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant
components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts
are adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were
ssed; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate;
quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-
maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification require-
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ments were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave
priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
WR/JO 88IAB211
Torque Switch Inspection for 2-SW-V294
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WR/JO 881AC211
Torque Switch Inspection for 2-SW-V295
WR/JO 88ALQ61
MCC 2 XC Bolt Replacement
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WR/JO 88PZP225
SLC 2B Accumulator
During the performance of the torque switch inspection for 2-SW-V294,
conducted in accordance with MI-10-25, the maintenance personnel noted
that the torque switch contacts were c'orroded and that the motor leads
were terminated with switch lock wire nuts and black electrical tape.
Trouble ticket 002564 was written to correct these deficiencies.
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inspector questioned why the limit switch contacts were also not inspected
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at this time.
In view of recent valve failures attributed to dirty limit
switch contacts (1-SW-V117, 2-E11-F003A) and the fact that the limit
switch contacts are readily accessible during the torque switch inspec-
tion, it seemed appropriate that the limit switches also be inspected at
this time.
The licensee had previously taken action in this area
associated with the failure of the 1-SW-V117 valve.
As stated in LER
,88-013, dated May 23, 1988, the expected implementation d te for the
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revised MI-10-25, which will include inspection and cleaning of the limit
switch contacts in addition to the torque switch contacts, is June 1,
1988.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by TS.
Through
observation, interviews, and record review, the inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to TS requirements; administrative controls were followed;
personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was
accurate and complete.
The inspectors independently verified selected
test results and proper return to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activi-
ties:
IMST-APRM12W
APRM CH B, D, and F Channel Functional Test RPS Inputs
Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure' ADS Permissive
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RCIC Steam Line Break High D/P Trip Unit Channel
Calibration
PT-34.4.1.3
Control Building Fire Detection System Operability
Test
During the performance of PT-34.4.1.3, Control Building Fire Detection.
Instrumentation Operability Test, the inspector observed that in step
7.0.4 the disconnect switch in the Control Building local alarm panel was
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placed in the disceanect position.
This switch was added in a plant
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modification to allow for testing of the Control Building fire detection
system without fear of a spurious initiation of the CBEAF system. Placing
this switch in disconnect disables the automatic start of CBEAF for both
units if smoke is detected in the control room area.
In the licensee's response to NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4, Control Room
Habitability, dated March 2,1983, Section 4.1 and 4.2.2, the licensee
states that the CBEAF will automatically initiate upon the detection of
smoke in the control room area. This design requirement was incorporated
into the licensee's TS Surveillance Requirements, Section 4.7.2.d.2, which
verifies that "on a smoke detector signal, the Control Building ventila-
tion automatically diverts its inlet flow through the HEPA filters and
charcoal adsorber banks of the emergency filtration system."
With the switch in disconnect, one of the design functions of the CBEAF
(i.e.,
automatic initiation on a smoke detection system signal) is
TS 3.7.2.b requires that the units be in hot shutdown within
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee has stated that they do not consider the automatic start
feature of the CBEAF system, due to a fire detection system signal, to be
part of the design basis of the system.
It is their position that this
design feature is not required to satisfy Criterion 19. In addition, the
licensee is pursuing a change to their TS which would remove the automatic
start feature of the CBEAF from a fire detection system.
This item is Unresolved pending NRR review and obtaining additional
information from the licensee:
Control Room Fire Detectors' Affect on
CBEAF Operability (325/88-18-06 and 324/88-18-06).
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance
with TS and other regulatory requirements by direct observations of
activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of
records, and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the TS were met. Control operator, shift supervisor, clearance,
STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed
to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service
safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with TS Limiting
Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control
room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to
verify operability and that operating parameters were within TS limits.
The inspectors observed shif t turnovers to verify that continuity of
system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators.
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Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified
weekly by ensuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in
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its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed' fon
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components that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem
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cross-tie valve for each unit was-closed with the- power. removed frcm the
valve operator; there was no leakage of cajor components; there was proper
lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition _did not exist
which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
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Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
operable by observir.g on-scale indication and proper instrument valve
lineup, if accessible.
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The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
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procedures were followed. This included observation of HP nractices and a
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review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument
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calibration.
Additionally the inspectors verified '. hat:
the security
organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of
performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked
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prior to entry into the protected area; vehicles were properly authorized,
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searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo
identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective
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compensatory measures were employed when required; and security's response
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to threats or alarms was adequate.
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The i nspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified
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position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and
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verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
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The following items were identified:
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Evidence of Smoking Found in DG Building Basement
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The inspectors found numerous cigarette butts in the DG building
basement during a routine tour on May 20, 1988, at 10:00 a.m. -The
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butts, with empty cigarette packs, were found in uni-struts above eye
level and on top of the DG transformers. The inspectors also found a
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paperback book above the No. 3 DG transformer.
Subsequent licensee
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inspection in the area found additional cigarette butts and several
magazines.
All of the safety-related AC power cabling passes through the DG
basement.
The area has an Appendix R Halon system installed but
not yet operational.
Consequently, a roving fire watch has been
stationed in the area. To date no individual has been found actually
smoking in the area.
This issue had been previously identified by the inspector in viola-
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tion 325/86-17-02; 324/86-18-02 and by QA in NCR S-87-024P and
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S-87-024C. Recently, on October 15, 1987, QA issued NCR S-37-065 for
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failure to take adequate corrective actions for the previously issued
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violation and NCRs.
QA issued a Notice of Deficiency (inadequate
response) to NCR S-87-065 on May 23, 1988, as a result of the-
inspector's findings.
No Notice of Violation is being issued regarding this issue now since
the licensee had previously identified this problem in the above
NCRs.
The inspectors will continue to- follow the licensee's
corrective actions during future routine inspections.
This is a
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Licensee Identified Item:
NCR Issued for Smoking in DG Building
(325/88-18-07 and 324/88-18-07), and will be opened and closed for
documentation,
b.
During a walkdown of the Unit 1 back pannel area on May 17, 1988, the
inspector noted that the keys for the drywell drain isolation logic
test switches A718-S56A and A71B-S56B were insertej with the B switch
in the test position. No maintenance or surveillance activities were
being performed at the time.
When informed of the situation and
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after verifying that plant conditions were prc;se, the SF had -the
B switch returned to normal and both keys removed.
The licensee's
investigation into the matter revealed that PM-85-061-W (ERFIS
modification) step 40.3.9 required that section 7.3.2 of IMST-PCIS38R
be performed, Step 7.3.2.4 of this test places the B switch in test
and step 7.3.2.8 places the A switch in test. Step 7.3.2.11 returns
the A switch to normal while step 7.3.2.15 returns the B switch to
normal.
The procedure was signed off as complete at 3:30 p.m.
Although the safety significance of this event is minimal, since
leaving the switch in test provides one of the two required trip
signals to the logic system for the affected inboard containment
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isolation valves, it does constitute a failure to follow procedure.
Accordingly, it is classified as a Violation:
Failure to Follow
Plant Modification Test Procedure (325/88-18-01).
It shouid also be noted that two shift changes occurred without
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realizing that this switch was in the wrong position.
Other
contributing factors to the event include the followin;
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Procedure did not require that the keys be returned. Had this
been the case, the switch would have to have been returned to
normal as that is the only position in which the key can be
removed.
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The switch position (Normal / Test) was not marked on the P611
panel for the B switch.
No significant safety matters, two violations, and no deviations were
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identified.
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Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
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The below listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information
provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification _ included
adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned,
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existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety signifi-
cance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that
necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing
requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.
UNIT 1
(CLOSED)
LER 1-86-10, Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level No. 1
Following Loss of Electrical Bus 10.
Following an investigation of the
UAT 1-A07 breaker to bus ID trip, the licensee could not reveal the cause
of the trip. Breaker testing and certain procedure revisions were made in
efforts to identify / prevent future occurrences.
The inspector. reviewed
the completed documentation package, enhancements to preventive mainte-
nance precedure PM-BKR001 relative to breaker' compartment checkouts of
ITE 4 KV switchgear, and completed work request / job orders initiated to
resolve minor problems identified during the event evaluation.
(CLOSED)
LER 1-86-11, Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Upscale Trips of
Intermediate Range Monitors A and H.
The licensee has completed adjust-
ments which lower the IRM upscale alarm annunciation and range for both
units to allow adequate operator response time to transient IRM range
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power levels.
Appropriate operations personnel have received training
regarding the event.
The inspector reviewed- the proceeding corrective
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actions and the documentation package.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-86-19, Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveil-
lance Requirement
4.3.5.7.1.
The inspector reviewed the completed
documentation package and internal correspondence regarding the event.
The licensee performed a review of surveillance test completion / exception
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form RCI-02.4, and identified the need for a revision-regarding "partial
completion satisfactory" notification. However, upon review, the licensee
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regarded the one identified deficiency in over a three year period in
completing the form, as inadequate justification for change.
The
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licensee's final root cause determination for the event was personnel
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error.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-21, Automatic Reactor Scram Resulting from Main Turbine
Master Trip Signal.
Other inspection effort related to this event was
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documented in report No. 325/86-21 and 324/86-22. The inspector reviewed
the corrective actions taken and the completed documentation.
(CLOSED)
LER 1-86-22, Reactor Scram Due to Upscale Tripping of Inter-
mediate Range Monitors.
The licensee completed Plant Modifications
PM-87-120 (Unit 1) and PM-87-182 (Unit 2), and declared them operable on
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May 22, 1987 and April 5,
1988, respectively.
A GE representative was
contracted by the licensee to evaluate the occurrence of noise spikes in
the source and intermediate range monitors.
The inspector ccapared and
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reviewed the completed modifications design basis with GE letter G-KB1-
6-169, dated March 30, 1987. The majority of the GE recommended modifica-
tions were evaluated to be beneficial by the licensee and incorporated
into the modification packages.
One difference noted was that GE
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recommended the rerouting of certain cables.
However, after a detailed
analysis, the licensee concluded that this rerouting was unnecessary. The
inspector interviewed engineering personnel with regards to this and otner
discrepancies and concluded that adequate analysi s . was exhibited in
justifying the currently completed PMs in order to reduce SRM/IRM noise
spikes which may occasionally cause a half or full scram.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-24, Automatic Reactor Scram Resulting from Loss of Main
Generator Output Voltage Control . See report No. 325/86-24 and 324/86-25
for further event details. The inspector reviewed the internal documenta-
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tion of the event and the licensee's subsequent corrective actions.
Corrective actions included the replacement of the automatic and manual
voltage adjustment potentiometers, an evaluation of on-line maintenance,
and operational review of the voltage regulators.
The licensee has
instituted weekly cycling of the manual controller and a momentary swap
from the automatic to the manual controller to preclude similar events in
the future.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-26, Manual Reactor Scram Resulting from Loss of Main
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Condenser as Heat Sink.
The licensee has completed implementation of
procedures OPM-CDU500, OPM-CDU501, and OPM-CDU502, dsted January 29, 1987.
These procedures provide for surveillance and inspection of the ball
collector for the Amertap condenser tube cleaning system. The inspector
reviewed the procedures for completeness and quality and found them to be
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adequate in helping to preclude similar events in the future.
(CLOSED)
LER 1-86-27, Late Performance of TS Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.7.2 Due to Perso,nel Error.
The inspector reviewed the LER
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package, which included appropriate procedural changes.
The inspector
also reviewed the lesson plan in the Real Time Training Package 87-1-1 for
subject adequacy and proper training emphasis.
No discrepancies were
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noted.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-86-31, Aito Isolation of RX Building Ventilation System
and Auto Starting of SBGT During Cable Pulling in Distrubution Panel .
The licensee has revised Construction Procedure WP-217, Cable Pulling,
Revision 0, Deviation 2, which provides specific guidance for construction
craft foremen to follow pri r to pulling cable into an energized panel
or box. The inspector revievred work request 87-AACM2 which was used to
ascertain whether any exposed cable section(s) exist which may nave
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resulted from the event.
No damage was found to cables, conduit, or the
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distribution panel.
Each cable was separately pulled, inspected, and
meggered. No discrepancies were noted.
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UNIT 2
(CLOSED) LER 2-82-83, Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breakers - X18A, C, and E -
Leakage Probitm. This item was previously addressed in inspection reports
324/86-30 and 324/87-35. . The licensee has changed PT-20.6, Drywell to
Torus Leak Rate Test, adding visual inspection of vacuum breaker seats for
defects which might prevent adequate sealing of the vacuum breaker. The~
inspector reviewed Revisions 5 and 16 of PT-20.6 and the previously issued
LER documentation.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-33, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors A and D Out of
Calibration.
This item was previously addressed in Inspection Report
No. 324/87-35.
The licensee has installed the new NUMAC monitors in both
units. All problems identified in the pre-installation checkout have been
corrected. The inspector verified. operability of the new monitors through
observation and personnel interviews.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-17, Automatic Scram on Low Water Level Resulting from
Failure of Reactor Feedwater Penp 2B Discharge Check Valve to Close. .The
inspector reviewed the completed work package and corrective actions taken
to prevent recurrence of this event. The licensee has determined that the
control logic for the feedpump discharge valves does allow the stroke
direction to be reversed at any time during valve travel. Along with
this, OP-32 for feedwater pump operation has been revised as of June 20,
1986, to minimize the potential for a defective check valve to cause a
level transient while placing reactor feedwater pumps in service.
'
i
(CLOSED)
LER 2-86-23, Primary Containment Group 4 Isolations of High
Pressure Coolant Injection System.
The licensee has completed modifica-
tion work involving the installation of lugs on those safety relt ed
thermocouple circuits where ERFIS was recently installed.
Appropriate
,
tests were conducted to verify the temperature readings from this
equipment were not deg.>aded by the lugging.
The addition of these lugs
providas a secure means of terminating the thermocouple wires mentioned
.
above in the RHR, HPCI, RWCU, and RCIC systems.
The inspector reviewed
4
the corrective actions and the records of their implementation.
(CLOSED)
LER 2-86-25, Failure to Perform keactor det Pump Surveillance
Testing. The licensee has completed Real Time Training for all applicable
operations personnel concerning the subject event. The inspector reviewed
the completed work package along with verifying that appropriate cautions
were included in PT-13.1, Reactor Recirculation Jet Pump Operability, to
preclude operating personnel from improperly performing jet pump surveil-
4
lance testing when normally used equipment is not in service.
(CLOSED)
LER 2-86-26, Late Performance of Required Hourly Fire Watches
Due to Radiological Spill in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The inspector
reviewed the documentation package.
,
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(CLOSED)
LER 2-87-05, Inoperability of High Pressure Coolant Injection
System (E41) Due to Closure of E41-F002 in Order to Comply with TS 3.6.3.
The inspector reviewed the work package and the analysis of the equipment
failure.
The licensee considers the event a random end-of-service life
failure that could not have been detected without destructive testing.
(CLOSED)
LER 2-88-06, Control Rod 10-39 Unknowingly Withdrawn With
Reactor Protection System Shorting Links Installed.
This event was
described to NRC in an Enforcement Conference held on May 27,.1988.
As
identified in the LER, the licensee violated TS 3.3.3, which requires that
the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table
3.3.1-1 shall be operable.
Taole 3.3.1-1 includes the neutron flux-high
functional units of the intermediate and average power range monitors.
These units are required operable in operational condition 5 (refueling)
with the shorting links removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during
the time any control rod is withdrawn.
Control rod 10-39 was withdrawn
'
with the shorting links installed in the refueling condition from
3:50 a.m. to 8:52 p.m. on March 8, ICB8.
This is a Violation:
Control
.
Rod Withdrawn During Condition 5 With the Shorting Links Installed
(324/88-18-03).
'
The' inspector reviewed the documentation of the operator counselling that
was performed subsequent to the event and had no questions.
This LER is
closed for administrative purposes.
No significant safety matters, one violation, and no deviations were
identified.
8.
In Office Licensee Event Report Review (90712)
The below listed LER was reviewed to verify that the information prov1ded
met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification includes adequacy of
event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of
,
potential generic problems and the relative safety s'gnificarce of the
event.
(CLOSED) LER 2-88-09, Full RPS Trip While Selecting a Cor. trol Rod for
'
Withdrawal with RPS Shorting Links Removed During Ref ueling/ Maintenance
Outage.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were id9ntified,
l
9.
Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Item (92701)
j
,
'
a.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 325/87-36-01, Review of Licensee's Root
Cause Determination for RCIC Problems.
The inspector reviewed OER
87-083, dated December 4,1987, which listed a detailed Sequence of
Events, root cause determination, and corrective actions to be taken
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12
concerning the Unit 1 RCIC unavailability from October 13 through
October 30, 1987.
The root cause of each evert appears to be
unrelated.
The inspector reviewed all procedural revisions which
implemented the corrective action (3) for each occurrence and found
them to be adequate.
b.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 325/87-39-05 and - 324/87-40-05, Erroneous
-
Setpoints, High Steam Line Instruments.
The inspector reviewed the
following licensee documents to verify appropriate corrective action
for the above matter:
OER-87-088
Potential HPCI/RCIC High Steam Flow Instrument Line
Problems, December 23, 1987.
EER-88-0074
Setpoints for HPCI/RCIC High Steam Flow Isolation
(Unit 1), February 12, 1988
EER-88-0184
Setpoints for HPCI/RCIC !iigh Stsam Flow Isolation
(Unit 2), March 31, 1988
.
01-3.1
C0 Daily Surveillance Report (Unit 1), Rev. 10,
May 17, 1988
0I-3.2
C0 Daily Surveillance Report (Unit 2), Rev. 15,
April 26, 1988
PID-06156 A&B HPCI/RCIC High Steam Flow Instrument Line Re-route
The inspector found that:
>
o
Loop seals existed in the following lines:
High Pressure Line for 1-E41-PDT-N004
Low Pressure Line for 1-E41-PDT-N005
-
High Pressure Line for 1-E51-PDT-N017
Low Pressure Line for 1-E51-PD1-N018
,
High Pressure Line for 2-E41-PDT-h004
Soth High & Low Pressure Lines for 2-E51-PDT-N017
o
Licensee established new setpoints for the above instruments in
an attempt to ensure that isolations would occur at less than-or
'
equal to 300% of rated flow considering the loop seal errors,
while still not causing spurious isolations during turbine
starts.
o
The nominal setroints i r,
inches of water - were revised as
follows:
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Unit
Instrument
Current
New
.
1
N004
205
125.5
1
N005
205
141.75
1
'N017
387
322.5
1
N018
387
534.0
.
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2-
NOC4
.207
122.81
2
362
336.5
o
Assuming that the new sotpoints are correct with the piping as
presently configured, the licensee has been in violation of TS 3.3.2 for years prior to the re-adjustment.
(S 3.3.2 requires
that isolation actuation instrumentation channels. for RCIC and
HPCI. steam line flow-high be operable with their trip setpoint
less than or equal to 300% of rated flow. The above corrections
indicate that the setpoints of 6 instruments were in excess of'
300% of. rated flow. No historical determinatior, of operability
was provided to the inspector,
o
No record wts shown to the inspector that indicated any
determination of reportability was made.
o
Proposed modifications to the instrument piping were deleted
from the current fiscal year.
Accordingly, the inspector relayed his concerns to the licensee on
May 26, 1988, and during the exit interview. The licensee agreed to
provide additional information to the ir.spector early in the week of
June 6 regarding past operability of the high steam -line flow
instruments.
The above matter is a Violatinn:
HPCI/RCIC High Steam Line Flow
Instruments Inoperable (325/88-18-05 and 324/88-18-05).
'
c.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 325/87-42-10, HPCI F001 Motor
Failure.
The inspector reviewed the licensee consultant's failure
,
analysis contained
in a Jeffries to Harness, April 26, 1988,
memorandum.
The inspector also interviewed selected plant personnel
regarding the progress of root cause determinatio.t.
The probable
root cause of motor failure was "development of a short-circuit
between the series and the shunt field windings and the resulting
open-circuiting of the shunt field winding
This fault could
"
...
have been caused by an initial flaw in the winding insulation or by
a voltage transient in either the shunt or serie.s field winding.
A voltage transient is induced in the shunt field winding every
,
,
time the local circuit breaker is opened. This occurs because no
"
discharge path exists for the energy stored in the shunt field for
the BSEP OC motors.
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The licensee issued a Part 21 report on this issue dated May 6, 1988.
.
,
In that report, the licensee identified the following corrective
actions:
o
Operability checks of DC valve motors in both units,
o
Implementation of a standing instruction requiring verification
of DC valve operability after power restoration to operator.
-
o
Installation of surge protection by January 20, 1989 (antici-
pated).
Based on the licensee's actions, the inspector has no further
questions regarding the licensee s plans.
This item is closed; any
further inspection in this matter will be conducted as followup to
LER 1-87-023 and the Part 21 report.
d.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 325/88-15-06 and 324/88-15-06,
Silicon Bronze Bolts in Safety-Related Switchgear.
The licensee
continued their program of replacing the 5/16-inch silicon bronze
carriage head bolts with steel bolts. On May 10, 1988, the technical
support manager informed the inspector. that they found recently-
replaced 5/16-inch silicon bronze carriage head bolts cracked.
Further, that certain of the above bolts had not been changed within
the past few months as previously thought.
This included 5/16-inch
silicon bronze carriage head bolts in the incoming lines to each MCC
or switchboard and in the shipping splices, and several sizes of
silicon bronze hex head bolts. The licensee issued EER-88-0258, JC0
for Unit 1 with silicon bronze MCC carriage head bolts, on May 11,
1988.
Unit I was at power while Unit 2 was in an outage; thus,
Unit 2 posed no immediate concern.
Region II had conference calls
with the licensee on May 11 and 12 regarding the issue.
On May 13, the licensee revised the JCO
Test results showed that
approximately 2 month old cracked 5/16-inch silicon bronze carriage
head bolts net the strength requirements of the ASTM specification.
p
The licensee also developed a sample and testing program for other
silicon bronze bolts.
The licensee shutuown Unit 1 on May 21 to
replace silicon bronze bolting in the MCCs and switchboards.
Some
exceptions were made.
Certain shipping splices .were analyzed
individually where the bolts were inaccessible.
e
The results of the licensee's sampling program for other silicon
bronze bolts in the switchgear will be provided to NRC by June 20,
1988. The licensee also provided the inspector with a silicon bronze
bolt balance-of plant replacement schedule. The last switchgear bolt
replacement is scheduled for November 3,1989.
.
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This matter is now Unresolved pending NRC review of operability
considerations for the failed bolts and review of the adequacy of
ccrrective action to solve this problem, from the first bolt failures
in 1986 to the present time:
Adequacy of Actions to Identify and
Correct Silicon Bronze Bolt Problem (325/88-18-07 and 324/88-18-07).
No significant safety matters, one violation, and no deviations' were
identified.
10.
During the procurement process for replacement SCR controllers for the'
SBGT trains, the licensee questioned the specified quality requirements.
Evaluation by licensee personnel revealed that although the device is not
required for proper operation of the SBGT system, its failure:(short to
ground) would make the SBGT train inoperable. Accordingly, its qualifica-
tion is required by 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2).
This item was not previously
identified as requiring environmental qualifications.
After this deficiency was identified and the inspector informed on May 13,
1988, the licensee prepared a JCO, documented in EER-88-0255, to allow
the continued operation of both units with the present SCR controllers
until they can either be replaced with qualified components or properly
electrically isolated. The completion date for this fix is June 30, 1988.
The JC0 was developed after evaluating the probable failure modes, the.
-
specific function to be performed, and the environment-in which the device
is required tc operate.
During standby operation, the SCR controller
controls the air intake heaters based upon a temperature signal input from
thermocouples in the prefilter compartment.
Upon SBGT initiation, the
power to the SCR controller is electrically bypassed.
However, the
controller is not electrically isolated and a failure that would result in
a short to ground could trip the supply breaker and shutdown the blowers
and heaters.
The licensee ha'd previously been issued a violation in this area (Inspec-
tion Report No. 325,324/87-22) which noted problems with the qualification
of skid mounted components, including SBGT. As a result of this report,
the licensee reviewed again the qualification of their skid mounted
equipment. The review for SBGT was completed on September 15, 1987. Page
3 of this review incorrectly concludes that the SCR controllers are not
,
required to be environmentally qualified.
The licensee has not yet
responded to the violation and their corrective action.
Therefore, this
item is classified as a Unresolved Item:
Failure to Environmentally
Qualify SCR Controllers for the SBGT System (325/88-18-02 and 324/88-18-02).
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11.
Inadvertent Heatup (71707)
.
On May 31, 1988, while shutdown in mode 4, Unit 2 experienced an inadver-
tent heatup of 35 degrees F from 170 degrees _ F to 205 degrees F. ,The "A"-
RHR heat exchanger was mistakenly isolated during troubleshooting efforts
on the E11-F003A RHR "A" heat exchanger outlet valve which had f ailed to
open earlier in the shif t.
The specific; sequence of events is shown in
Enclosure 3.
Some contributing factors noted by the inspector include the
following:
OP-17, Revision 76, RHR System Operating Procedure, requires that the.
F003 valve be only in an opened or closed position when the unit is
in the shutdown cooling mode.
During this evolution, the valve was
being throttled to maintain temperature control.
Operators were trained to monitor RHR beat exchanger inlet tempera-
ture when in mode 4 and in shutdown cooling (Standing Instruction
88-033).
If this valve were shut to limit cooldown, it was opened
to record temperature and then closed. Other parameters which could
have been used to monitor temperature were not used.
A "Caution" in OP-17 specifically alerts the operator that RHR heat
-
exchanger i nl et tempe-a'.ure is an invalid indication of reactor
coolant temperature when the F003 valve is closed.
o
No temperature band was specified in the Daily Instructions. Had the
160 - 180 degrees F band been explicitly stated, the 190 degrees F
value noted at shift turnover would have caused earlier action.
o
Lack of sensitivity to work in progress. The operators should have
been more cognizant of troubleshooting efforts on this valve and its
potential for affecting plant conditiors.
This incident was addressed by the licensee in an Enforcement Conference
htid on May 27, 1988, in Region II. This matter is a violation:
Failure
to Adequately Control RCS Temperature (324/88-18-04).
No significant safety matters, one violation, and no deviations were
identified.
I
12.
List of Abbreviations for Unit 1 and 2
Alternating Current
Automatic Depressurization System
A0
Auxiliary Operator
Average Power Range Ponitor
i
American Society for Testing Materials
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
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17
.
CBEAF
Control Building Emergency Air Filcration
C0
Control Operator
Direct Current
Diesel Generator
D/P
Differential Pressure
,
Engineering Evaluation Report
ERFIS
Emergency Response Facility Information 5ystem
.
Engineered Safety Feature
F
Degrees Fahrenheit
Hiah Efficieacy Particulate Air
Health Physics
High Pressure Coolant Injection
H/V
Heatup
Instrumentation and Control
NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
IPBS
Integrated Planning Budget System
JC0
Justification for Continued Operation
KV
Kilovoit
LER
Licen,ee Event Report
Motor Control Center
MI
Maintenance Instruction
Non-Conformance Report
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Operat;ng Experience Report
01
Operating Instruction
OP
Operating P ocedure
Operating Procedure Manual
Protected Area
Project Identification
Plant Modification
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Cimmittee
Periodic Test
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Reactor Coolant Sy;;am
.
Reactor Turbine Gauge Board
RX
Reactor
Standby Gas Treatment
j
Silicon Controlled Rectifie.
,
SF
Shift Foreman
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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.
.
18
,
Sequence of Events
SOS
Shift Operating Supervisor
FRM
Source Range Monitor
TS
Technical Specification
Unit Auxiliary Transformer
Unresolved item
VER
Visual Examination Report
WR/JO
Work Request / Job Order
i
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.
ENCLOSURE 3
'
SOE FOR INADVERTENT HEATVP FOR UNIT 2 ON. MAY_12, 1988
1255
E11-F003A (RHR A Heat Exchanger _ Outlet-Valve), would not open by the
control switch at the RTGB.
It was being opened so that the operator
could record RHR inlet temperature which they use to monitor reactor
coolant temperature. If this valve were shut, RHR inlet would not be
a true measure of RX coolant temperature as this line had no flow;
An operator was then sent to manually open the valve 15% open.
A t ot. ole ticket was written to have I&C troubleshoot.
'ote: This above sequence is logged at 1645 in the CO's log.
.
1357
WR/JO AMTL1 generated to troubleshoot the F003A valve.
1440
(Information taken from WR/JO_ AMTL1. )
Troubleshooting begins on
F003A valve. C0 closed valve from RTGB. C0 attempted to open valve
while I&C monitored logic.
I&C found no continuity across rotor
No. 1 contact No. 4.
They suspected dirty contacts as the cause.
The breaker was left in the off position and I&C waited until
clearance could be hung on valve to begin work.
>
1700
(Shift change.) Reactor temperature logged as 190 degrees F in SF
log.
2019
Clearance No. 1514 signed to allow work to begin on F003A valve.
2040
Work commenced on F003A valve.
Valve found closed by local indica-
tion.
2115
While obtaining 2100 temperature, the C0 noted thac a temperature
differential of 40 degrees F existed-across A RHR heat exchanger with
inlet temperature reading 165 degrees F and outlet 205 degrees F.
The SF was informed. At this time it was recognized that the F003A
s alve was shut and that the recorded inlet temperatures were not a
true measure of reactor coolant temperature.
An operator was
dispatched to open the valve 25% open.
After valve was opened,
temperature was verified to be decreasing.
Other temperatures
recorded at this time include the following:
'
A Recire. Suction 185 degrees F
B Recirc. Suction 190 degrees F
PWCU Inlet 190 degrees F (RWCU takes suction from Recire.
Suction line)
2140
Work completed by I&C on F003A valve.
OPS stroked valve open, closed
and back open.
Dirty switch contacts were found to be the problem.
I
_