:on 970422,automatic Test Initiator Sends Repeated Trip Signals to RSST Feeder Breaker Timing Circuit. Caused by Unexpected Interaction Between Unrelated Signals. Noise Interaction Will Be Isolated & Corrected| ML20148C731 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Millstone  |
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| Issue date: |
05/22/1997 |
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| From: |
Joshi R NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20148C729 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-97-019-02, LER-97-19-2, NUDOCS 9705290032 |
| Download: ML20148C731 (3) |
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1 NRC FORM 336 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED SY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)
EXPtRES 04/30/98
'#oE* EYE 5E*""aYo~uSI 5'oE5*l E "#"IE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) nt"M ar#78"Mo ?J'a#esT!a**W'a#4'1% EsM
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E8 S$$N Eo'55 awe To m'^E PAPERWO'N (See reverse for required number of ON RK REDUCTON PROJECT 13154 01041. OFFICE OF digits / Characters for eaCh block)
MANAGEMENT AN0 8UDGU, W ASHINGTON. DC 2M03 rm uryNAMsit)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 1OF3 j
Tnu m Automatic Test Initiator Sends Repeated Trip Signals to the RSST Feeder Breaker Timing Circuit EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) j SE U AL RE MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR U
NU 04 22 97 97
-- 019 --
00 05 22 97
(,PERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 1o CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11) 3 MODE (9)
N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X so.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
~ POWER 2o.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
So.73(a)(2)(ii)
So.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 000 2o.2203(a)(2Hi) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
So.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER o.
20.22o3(a)(2)(iii)
So.36(c)(1)
So.73(a)(2)(v)
Specify in Abstract below 1
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
So.36(c)(2)
So.73(a)(2)(vh)
Pr NRC Form 366A i
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
R. G. Joshi, MP2 Nuclear Licensing (860) 440-2080
}
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENr FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
P
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RE RT
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER O RDS pRD 4
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSloN X NO DATE (15) i (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On April 22,1997, a review of a Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) Load Shed Time delay retest revealed that the load shed time delay would not meet a six to ten second window to comply with Technical Specification requirement Table 3.3-4, item 8b.
The cauSe of this condition is an unexpected interaction between unrelated signals in the upgraded RSST Load Shed Timer and the Automatic Testing Insertor circuitry.
i Noise interaction will be isolated and corrected prior to entering Mode 4 from the current outage.
1
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9705290032 970522 PDR ADOCK 05000336 S
PDR NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
NRC' FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON (4 95)
LICENSED EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CGNTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2OF3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 97
- - 019 -
00 TEXT (1f more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC form 366A) (17) 1.
Description of Event
On April 22,1997, a review of a Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) [EA) Load Shed Time delay retest revealed that the load shed time delay would not meet a six to ten second window to comply with Technical Specification requirement Table 3.3-4, item 8b. At the time of discovery of this condition, the unit was defueled.
On November 20,1996, Instrument and Control Technicians were performing a routine, refueling outage frequency, calibration and functional test on the RSST Level Two Undervoltage circuitry in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) [JE] cabinets. The technicians involved were measuring the duration of the Load Shed time delay contained in the Sequencer module. The technicians noted that after the expected 8 second time delay had elapsed, the control relay energized, and then unexpectedly de-energized. The Level Two Undervoltage condition was still pr'sent when this occurred, and the relay should have remained energized.
After a brief period, the control relay re-energized and then de-energized. This cycling continued as long as the Level Two Undervoltage signal was present.
This condition is inherent to the new sequencers installed in 1992. These sequencers use lower voltage electronic device to develop the timing. This lower voltage design has been a major factor in the ESFAS susceptibility to noise in the past. The load shed circuitry used prior to 1992 had a mechanical agastat timer that was less accurate but not as susceptible to noise.
This problem was discovered during performance of a refueling frequency surveillance procedure which tested the RSST Load Shed time delay. This procedure was recently revised to include a more thorough testing methodology. The time delay is now measured by a digital counter. The new procedure incorporates a test equipment setup that causes an increase in the time it takes to verify readings. Because of the increased time, j
the test button is held depressed for at least one complete cycle of the Automatic Testing Insertor (ATI) ( 27 sec.)
almost assuring a timer reset will occur. The previous procedure simply used a stop watch and the audible sound of a relay picking up 8 seconds after a trip test button was depressed. Once the relay picked up the trip button was released. This did not allow for a complete cycle of the ATI, which greatly reduces the chance of a timer reset. This explains why this reset problem was not noticed before.
A retest of the RSST Undervoltage circuitry in the ESFAS cabinet was performed on April 22,1997 which venfied that the ATI sends repeated signal to the RSST Load Shed undesvoltage timer to resel The ESFAS Undervoltage time delay does not satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2.1 that requires ESFAS instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 to be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
11. Cause of Event
The cause of this condition is an unexpected interaction between unrelated signals in the upgraded RSST Load Shed Timer and the Automatic Testing insertor (ATI) circuitry.
Ill. Analysis of Event The ESFAS detects accident conditions and initiates safety features systems. The system functions are implemented by means of redundant sensors, instrument loops, logic and actuation devices. The system is designed to permit ATI testing through to the actuation module outputs during power operation. The system is
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MRc' FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON i
(4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) j TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3OF3 3
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 j
97
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00 4
TEXT ll1 rnore space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366A) (17) l capable of being manually tested from bistable inputs through to the actuation module outputs. The system has an automatic testing system (ATI) which continuously validates operation of all two of four trip combinations, 1
every 27 seconds.
A degraded voltage on the 4.16 kV emergency bus is detected thr5 ugh the potential transformers by the ESFAS low voltage Bistable Modules. The Bistable Module supplies an output to isolation Module which in turn feeds the 2 out of 4 logic in the Actuation Module. The output of the Actuation Module is applied through an 8 second time delay that will trip the RSST breakers. If power is being supplied from the RSST, load shedding and sequencing are required for sequentialloading of the diesel generators.
i The condition in question appears to be related to electronic noise (EMl/RFI) that is generated by the ATI test l
signals. There is not a direct circuit connection between the ATI circuitry and the load shed timer circuitry. The j
i noise event causes the 8 second RSST load shed timer to reset, and be re-triggered by the degraded voltage condition caused by the test. The cycle time for one ATI test is approximately 27 seconds, during which the Sequencer module is tested once. The initial timing of this interaction is random, as the ATI test and the i
Undervoltage test procedure are not synchronized. The 8 second timer may elapse normally, or be reset at any 1
time during its eight second cycle. This could result in an additional RSST load shed time delay of between 0 and 8 seconds, with a total delay as high as 16 seconds. The allowable total value for the delay, per Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, item 8b, is 10 seconds. The interaction between the ATI and the RSST Load Shed circuitry is an unexpected condition.
The effects of the additional 8 second time delay are still being evaluated, and if necessary, a supplement to this LER will be submitted. Since the effects of 8 second time delay have not been fully evaluated, this condition is potentially safety significant.
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IV. Corrective Action
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Noise interaction will be isolated and corrected prior to entering Mode 4 from the current outage.
V.
Additional information
Similar Events
Previous LERs that involve an interaction between ESFAS components and LNP circuitry include:
LER 92-012:
A LNP occurred when an Operator secured power to the second of four ESAS sensor cabinets during the replacement of inverter. This satisfied the 2 out of 4 logic needed for ESAS actuation. This action isolated Vital AC Bus and generated a load shed signal. The EDG started and closed in on the vital bus, but was not able to provide power to the loads placed by the EDG sequencer.
LER 88-005:
A LNP occurred when a Operator was placing a breaker in its test configuration, inadvertently causing the auxiliary contact to be made up. Upon the loss of power to the vital bus the EDG started but did not sequence loads as expected due to a failed sequencer.
LER 88-002:
An undervoltage condition was caused when a DC/AC inverter, which was supplying power to 120 VAC instrument panet VA-10, tripped off due to a DC capacitor failure. This condition resulted in a loss of power to a vital bus and subsequent automatic start of a diesel generator.
Energy Industry identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XXJ.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000245/LER-1997-001-02, :on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired |
- on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001, Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures |
- on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-002, :on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised |
- on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000245/LER-1997-002-02, :on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled |
- on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position |
- on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-003-01, :on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue |
- on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1997-003-01, Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revis | Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revised | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003-02, :on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised |
- on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised |
- on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-01, Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-02, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-004, :on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed |
- on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-005-01, Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-005, :on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately |
- on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1997-005-02, :on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented |
- on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-005, Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | | | 05000245/LER-1997-006-01, :on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided |
- on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006, :on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined |
- on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006-01, Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006-02, :on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented |
- on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure |
- on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-007, Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-007, :on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-008, :on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95 |
- on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008-02, :on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised |
- on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008-01, :on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR |
- on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-02, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated |
- on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-010, :on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised |
- on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified |
- on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010-02, :on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised |
- on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
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