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' WRC oRM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CPPROvED 8V OM8 NO. 3150 0104 (4 95)
I EIIPIREs 04/30/98 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) y,E 'rd," $ ?;"f,y y [jo M Q $j j "d $
INAIE ro"r%'i"loault E'E aEcEa"/sT'ANUEEEiaA'N"c"M'r" l
(See reverse fOr required nurnber Of ogllg a ycga,a agg gouysjgasgry g
c digits / characters for each block) omcs OF MANAGEMENr ANO SuoGEr. W ASMiNGrON. DC 205o3 FACUTV WAME (1)
DCCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 1OF3 l
nits i4 l
Instrumentationloop Components Do Not Meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 C' tegory 1 Recommendations a
i EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7) oTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
SE AL RE N
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NU R
04 21 97 97
-- 018 00 05 21 97 oPERATINo THis REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR S: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9)
N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
X 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) j LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2stil 20.2203(a)(3)(n) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(aH2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
So.73(a)(2)(iv) oTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
So.36(c)(1) 50.73(aH2)(v)
Specify in Abstract below l
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER ilnclude Area Code)
R. G. Joshi, MP2 Nuclear Licensing (860)440-2080 COMPLETE ONE LINE FoR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 1
^
^
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER PR PRDS
)
l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I
YES SUBMISSloN X No DATE (16) l (if yes, complete EXPECTED Submission DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately 15 single spacedtypewrittenlines) (16) l On November 6,1996, while performing a review of the plant compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Rev. 2, it was discovered that discrepancies existed between current plant commitments and the i
actual installation for certain Type A, Type B, and Type D instrumentation. These instruments, although reported to
. the NRC as Category 1, do not meet the Category 1 requirements. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company had stated that these instruments were in compliance with RG 1.97, Rev. 2 recommendations. This condition was first identified on November 6,1996, the evaluation to determine the details and extent of the condition was completed on Aoril 21, j
1997, and a prompt report of the condition was made on that date At the time of discovery the plant was defueled.
l The cause of this condition is the ineffective implementation of program controls used to comply with RG 1.97.
l The following actions will be taken to correct this condition: Complete the RG 1.97 Rev. 2 compliance review including NNECO committnents and resubmit the results to the NRC before entering MODE 4 from the current outage.
4 k
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9705280415 970521 PDR ADOCK 05000336 S
PDR NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
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NRC Ft')RM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMM!ssioM I
(4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2OF3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 97
- - 018 -
00 TEXT tif more space is reqwred. use additionalcopses of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.
Description of Event
l On November 6,1996, while performing a review of the unit's compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory l
Guida (RG) 1.97, Rev. 2, it was discovered that discrepancies existed between current unit commitments end the actualinstallation for certain Type A. Type B, and Type D instrumentation. These instruments are used in the following systems: High Pressure Safety injection (B0], Flux Monitoring (IG), Containment Monitoring (IK], Steam
. Generator Level Control (JB], Reactor Protection (JC], and Condensate Storage & Transfer (KA). Although j
reported to the NRC as Category 1, these instruments do not meet the requirements for Category 1(Cat 1) instruments. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) had stated that these instruments were in compliance with RG 1.97, Rev. 2, recommendations. This condition was first discovered on November 6,1996.
The evaluation to determine the details and extent of the condition was completed on April 21,1997, and a prompt report of the condition was made on April 21,1997 at 15:51 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii). At the time of discovery the unit was defueled.
Subsequent review determined that a more applicable reporting rule is 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), a condition that l
is outside the design basis of the plant.
II.
Cause of Event
l l
- - The cause of this condition is the ineffective implementation of program controls used to comply with RG 1.97.
Ill. Analysis of Event The original plant design basis considered the control room panelindicators as non-safety related. As a result, these QA listed instruments were not identified as failing to meet the Cat i recommendations of RG 1.97, and no design changes were initiated to make the instruments ccnform with the recommendations.
On June 15,1987 and March 2,1992, NNECO submitted a RG 1.97, Rev. 2 compliance matrix for Millstone Unit No. 2 to the NRC. On January 30,1995 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) which identified errors in the information provided in the compliance matrix. In response to the NOV, NNECO committed to perform a review of the plant design basis and actual installation, including compliance with the recommendations of RG 1.97, Rev. 2.
During the review, it was discovered that instruments which were previously listed as QA had been downgraded to i
non-QA during several material, equipment, and parts list evaluations. The instruments were downgraded l
because some do not meet separation criteria, and others were not electrically isolated from non-QA portions of l
the instrument loop. The indicators are installed in the control room, a mild environment, and do not have Environmental Qualification requirements. The indicators, although listed as non-OA, were purchased as nuclear qualified indicators. The indicators are isolated from reactor trip and safeguard actuation functions, so that any failure of the indicator loop would not prevent any safety system from performing its safety function. Based on the redundancy of the instruments involved, other indicators could provide the operator with the information needed in the event of a failure of an indicator or its instrument loop. However these instruments do not meet the Category 1 requirements.
d f.
m..__
/, HRC PoRM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSloN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL Revision YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3OF3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336 97
-- 018 -
00 l
TEXT (If more space is requwed. use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11)
. Type A instruments are instruments which provide primary information needed for the operator to perform manually controlled actions, for which no automatic control is provided, that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function for design basis accident events. The following are the Type A Instruments which lack qualification and the associated operator actions for accident mitigation:
i TYPE A INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATOR ACTIONS
Pressurizer pressure Tripping Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) on low pressure Steam Generator (SG)
SG isolation on excess steam demand Pressure l
SG Level Verification of SG level for heat removal - Critical Safety Function (CSF) l Reactor Water Storage Switch valves SI-659 & SI-660 to Operate (SI Min-flow isolation)
Tank (RWST) Level j
Hot Leg & Cold Leg SG isolation on excess steam demand Temperatures Cooldown rate monitoring i
l Considering the above information this condition is of low safety significance.
l
IV. Corrective Action
Complete the RG 1.97 Rev. 2 compliance review including NNECO commitments and resubmit the results to the NRC before entering MODE 4 from the current outage.
V.
Additional Information
Similar Events 1
l LER 96-019.
Certain solenoid operated valve electncal connections in the containment do not meet environmental qualification requirements The original assumption was that the valves were j
required to operate for containment isolation only. Subsequent review found the valves must be 1
reopened post accident, and were not qualified for this function Energy Industry Identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XX).
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| 05000245/LER-1997-001-02, :on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired |
- on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001, Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures |
- on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-002, :on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised |
- on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000245/LER-1997-002-02, :on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled |
- on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position |
- on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-003-01, :on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue |
- on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1997-003-01, Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revis | Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revised | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003-02, :on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised |
- on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised |
- on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-01, Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-02, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-004, :on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed |
- on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-005-01, Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-005, :on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately |
- on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1997-005-02, :on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented |
- on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-005, Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | | | 05000245/LER-1997-006-01, :on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided |
- on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006, :on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined |
- on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006-01, Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006-02, :on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented |
- on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure |
- on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-007, Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-007, :on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-008, :on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95 |
- on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008-02, :on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised |
- on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008-01, :on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR |
- on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-02, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated |
- on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-010, :on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised |
- on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified |
- on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010-02, :on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised |
- on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
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