ML20140G361
Text
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c UNITED STATES
- t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j f (/2 1 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 w
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gv f December 7, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Roger S. Boyd, Director, DPM Harold R. Denton, Director, DSE Roger J. Mattson, Director, DSS Victor Stello, Jr., Director, D0R l
FROM:
Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
SUBJECT:
GENERIC TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES l
l Enclosed for your infonnation are several pages extracted from a decision issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board on November 23,1977 (ALAB-444), that deal with the subject of the NRR Technical Activities Program.
Since the initiation of this program, it has been understood that eventually we would be required to specifically justify why we feel it is acceptable to continue licensing and/or operating nuclear plants in l
light of these identified outstanding generic matters.
It appears that l
now is the time to formalize cur views in this regard.
In light of 1
ALAB-444, we can expect that licensing boards will require us to fur-
)
nish this information on each of the generic technical activities in f
future licensing proceedings.
To prepare for.this eventuality, each Task Manager of a Category A technical activity should prepare a short write-up, in the format of and containing the infonnation indicated in Enclosure 2.
(The format has been selected so that the write-up can be inserted directly in the Task Action Plan.) Please provide draft versions of these write-ups to Mike Aycock by C0B.on December 15, 1977.
Following review by the TASC Advisory Group, and revision as necessary in comparison text format, the write-ups will be provided to you for comment or concurrence.
A justification for not addressinj Categt,ry B and lower priority generic 8604020226 860114 PDR FOIA FIRESTO85-665 PDR
,er 1
b
Multiple Addressees December 7, 197/
tasks on an issue-by-issue basis in SERs will be developed by the Advisory Group and also provided to,you for comment or concurrence.
Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Pages from ALAB-444 2.
Format Sample cc:
R. Deyoung NRR Assistant Directors Task Managers Advisory Group PDR e
e G
l ant'cy%
m j
UNITED STATES y
8t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 December 7, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Roger S. Boyd, Director, DPM Harold R. Denton, Director. DSE Roger J. Mattson, Director, DSS Victor Stello, Jr., Director, D0R FROM:
Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
GENERIC TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES Enclosed for your information are several pages extracted from a decision issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board on November 23,1977 (ALAB-444), that deal with the subjer.t of the NRR Technical Activities Program.
Since the initiation of this program, it has been understood that eventually we would be requireo to specifically justify why we feel it is acceptable to continue licensing and/or operating nuclear plants in light of these identified outstanding generic matters.
It appears that now is the time to formalize our views in this regard.
In light of ALAB-444, we can expect that licensing boards will require us to fur-nish this information on each of the generic technical activities in future licensing proceedings.
To prepare for this eventuality, each Task Mar,ager of a Category A technical activity should prepare a short write-up, in the format of and containing the information indicated in Enclosure 2.
(The format has been selected so that the write-up can be inserted directly in the Task Action Plan.) Please provide draft versions of these write-ups to Mike Aycock by COB on Decemoer 15, 1977.
Following review by the TASC Advisory Group, and revision as necessary in comparison text format, the write-ups will beyvided to you for comment or concurre.. ice.
A justification for not addressing. Category B and lower priority generic O
6 2-December 7, 1977 Multiple Addressees 1
tasks on an issue-by-issue basis in SERs will be developed by the Advisory Group and also provided to you for comment or concurrence.
,l Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Pages from ALAB-444 2.
Format Sample 1
cc:
R. Deyoung NRR Assistant Directors Task Managers Advisory Group PDR i
(
e l
?.-.
~
ENCLOSURE 2 INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED l
FOR EACH CATEGORY A TASK TO ADDRESS ALAB-444 APPLICABILITY State the type of nuclear plant to which the task applies, e.g., BWRs, PWRs, LWRs, Mark I containments, Westinghouse plants.
BASIS FOR CONTINUED PLANT OPERATION AND LICENSING PENDING COMPLETION OF TASK (Anticipated results of task action plan - Brief discussica of what general results are anticipated from the task plan, c.g., confinnation of current licensing criteria, more stringent licensing requirements, relaxed licensing requirements, quantification of safety margins... etc.)
(Interim measures - Briefly describe the interim measures or current licensing requirements that are relied upon to assure plant safety while the task is being worked on.)
J I
S
2 (Alternative Courses of Action - Briefly describe alternative means of justifying continued operation and licensing should the anticipated results discussed above not be realized, e.g., Design modifications?
De-rating? Increased surveillance? Continue with current licensing requirements?)
(Summary - In-view of the various considerations, state why it is acceptable to continue with plant licensing or operation pending ultimate resolution of the issue addressed by the task action plan.)
4
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i Ui!fT!.D ST.; 1:!; nl' /.t:1:iucA I
1.:UCLPAR ltLGUf.l. TORY CO:knG:,10?1 ATOMIC GTd'ETY AND LICLI UlilC At>PI ab EOAP.D
,,,y
.a
..,i O Alan G.
Poncitthal, Chairiaan t -
Dr. John 11. I.uck
, g'g Michael C. Farrar i~
)
In the flatter of
)
)
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO:iPANY
) Docket No';. 50-4 58
)
50-459
, g"/,,,,;,;.,
(River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2)
- ' k i c,'j 'j / n V ; /.
/ '"/,
n fia rm r s. Uillian J.
Cu::Lc, if r., Idtorney General,
- nd ;:Ich.if a M.
': r t iv,
Jr.,
Isssis tant httorney Gec.cral,
~
i:ew or te..ns, Loultis ana, and f<r. Anth'any Z.
Roisman i.nd II:.. 1:arin P.
C.he.l_d o_n, Wahlhncj ton,
D.
C.,
for the S, tate of Loulslana.
f ic:n.ri.. Trov B.
Conner, Jr. and f *0 rk J. Untterhahn, U4; shiTO.jEn,
D.
C., f or Gulf StateU~ Tit!1TTtilis Company, applicant.
for
...L.:m_tr..c nce Br<mner and Ri cha_rd 1:.,lloe flina fic a n_ r..F:.
n the Uticicar Regulatcry Co:renssa.on straf.
Ms. l'a r i n P. Sheldon, Washintiton,
D.
C.,
for Union of Concerneu Scientists, petitioner for intervention.
DECISION November 23, 1977
, ( ALAB-4 4 4 )
1 This construction permit proceeding involves Units 1 j
1 l
j and 2 of the River Bend Station, to be located on the cast bank of the Mississippi River in West Feliciana Parish, l
1 Louisiana.
In ALAB-317, 3 NRC 175 (1976), we reviewed e
i l
l I
j
25 -
i 3.
The fa.ilure of the State to have ace,erted the on the one hand, the niver nend requisitc nexun between, faci,lity and, on the other, the TSAn items and the neuly i
issued regulatory guides in question is thus dispositive of the complaint recpecting the J.icensing Board's treat-ment of the attempt to raise issues on t.hc basis of those I
items and guidos.
lionethclcss, a few additional obscr-1 vations. arc in order at this point.
~
The ):en; onsibilitics of a licensing board in the radiological health and safety sphere are not confined
\\
to the concideration and disposition of those issues which may have been p2csonted to it by a party or an
" interested State" uith the required degree of specificity.
To the contrary, irrespective of what matters may or may not have been properly placed in controversy, prior to authorizing the issuance of a construction permit the l
board must make the finding, inter alia, that there is
" reasonable assurance" that "the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location with-out undue risk to the health and safety of the public".
To be sure, in the absence of a con-particular safety matter, the board need not test on a duplicate the staff's review.
Nonetheless, as previously noted (supra, pp.8-9), to discharge its functions properi-e r
--m v-.
c
4 1
26 -
1 it. iaun t pasu jud.jmen t upon what h< r
- t. hat revicu "has
)
been adequ.it.c".
10 C1'R Part. 2, 7.ppendix A, Sect. ion V ( f) (.
Con: umerr_pwgr Co_.
(Mid]and Plant, Unitn 1 and 2), ALAP.-J :
.r we,r n_cel c n o t.he r g round s sub nom.
6 A1:C 331, 335 (1973),
Aeschliman v. line, :jupt q.-
of necessity, this detor-mination will entail an inquiry into whether the staff review satisfactorily has ccmc to grips with any unrc-i solved gencric safety prob] cms uhich right have an impact l
upon operation of the nuclear Lacility under consideration.
The S1:n is, ot' coursc, the principal document before the licensing boai-d which reflects the content and outcome o,f the staff's safety review.
The board should therefore
-26/ Alther;h Section V(f) (2) of Appendi>: A to Part 3 is expresn] / directed to licencing board responnibilitic:.
in "an uncontout.cd case", the obl.igation to determine t
uhet.he'r the staff safet.y ro*/icu was " adequate" obvioun' is equally applicable to the uncontested portions of a case in which some matters have been placed in contto-versy.
It would make no sense at all to construe the Appendi>: otherwise; e.g.,
to conclude that the licensin i
{
boards must make nucli is dctormination if no issues are contested but need not do no if an intervenor has ente:
~
the proceeding for the purpone of raising environmenta) l mattern.
Rather, the only reasonable interpretation in that the intended distinction insof ar as licensing boa:
treatment in a. construction permit proceeding is con-cerned is between issues in contest and matters which have not been plac5il in cent.roversy.
With rcupcct to the former, the board must resolve the controversy and also decide whether the required narcty and environ-mental findings can be made.
Section V(f) (1).
With respect to the latter, the board must decide whether t.hc staff's review has been adequate to support such findings.
1 g
+
9
'l-E t
be able to Joak to t.ha t doctw nt Lo accertain the extent to which genocic tuiresolver1 nafet y probl. cms which have been previously identified in a TSAR item, a Task Action Plan, an Acr.. report or elscwhere have been factored into the staff's analysin for the particular reactor -- and with what result.
To this end, in our view, cach SI:R chout contain a curanary description of t.hoce generic problems under continuing study which have both relevance to facilitics of the type under revicu and potentially significant public cafety implica tions.
This tsu =tary description should include information of the kind nou containcd in most Task Action Plans. More specifically, there should be an indicat. ion of the inventiu tive program which has been or vill be undertaken with reg..
the probleu, the program's anticipated time-span, whether (Ed if so what) interim measures have been deviced for dealing with the probicm pending the completion of the investigation, and what alternative courses of action might be available should the program not produce the envisaged result.
In short, the board (and the public as well) should be in a position to ascertain f rom the Sl.;R itself -- wi thou t the need to resort to ch.trinsic documcr.ts -- the staf f 's e
e 9
h
20 -
perception of the nature and e:< tent of the relationship between cach significant unresolved generic safety question and the eventual operation of the reactor under scrutiny.
Once again, this annessment might well have a direct 1;carin" upon the ability of the licensing board to make the safety findings required of it on the countruction permit level even though the generic anuucr to the question remains -
in the offing.
Among other things, the furnished infor-mation would likely shed light on such alternatively important considerations as whether (1).the problem has already been resolved for the reactor under study; (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that a satis-factory solution will be obtained before the reactor is put in operation;~~27/ or (3) the problem would have.no safety implications until after several years of reactor operation and, should it not be resolved by then, alter-native means will be available to insure that continued operatior. (if permitted at all) would not pose an undue 28/
~~
risk to the public.
l 27/ See 10 CPR 50.3 5 (a) (4), quoted at p. 31, infra.
28/ Uc need not pause to consider whether we miqht have l
f the power to diyect (rather than simply to urgo) the
~
inclusion in SERs of the information referred to in the text above.
In all events, the 1. censing boards I
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).
i e
9
29 -
~
C.
Uc have seen that although the Licensing naard rejccted the State's endeavo): to inject the TSAR items and newly issued regulatory guides into the proceeding as issues in controversy, it did allou the State to raisc issues based u})on the indication in the SER that, with roupcet to certain reactor components and features, additional information would be required before a definitive safety finding were made respecting that component or feature.
To the extent dccmed necessary, we shall discuss these so-called "SER items" individual]y 29/
in a later portion of this opinion.
At the threshold, however, some attention must be given to the State's broad claim that, as a matter of law, issuance of con-struction permits could not be authorized until after g/ (FOOTUOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE),
plainly have the authority to insist that the infor-mation he supplied on the record -- if not through the vehicle of the SER then by other evidence.
This being so, the interests of the staff -- as well as those of the beards and other parties -- will be best served by insuring that the information (to the extent available) is at hand before the evidentiary hearing on radiological health and safety matters con.mence s.
Otherwise, there will be a high cotential for delay in the progress of the hearing.
More likely than not, the hearing will have to be adiourned to all<-
for the belated submission of the information.
And, or it has been submitted, the licensing board may be confronted with the necessity to provide time for additional discovery or the preparation of rebuttal I
evidence.
29/ As part of our revicu sua spente of those aspects of the Licensing !! card's deciFEn whf ch did' not involve
~
matters properly placed in controversy, we will also consider some of the TSAR and regulatory guide ques-tions sought to be raised by the State.
j
30 -
the informationa] gaps pointed tu in the SEit had been filled.
4 In advancing this claim, the State has disavowed any j
assertion that all design detai]s of a facility must be supplied at the construction permit stagc, or that unsucrs to all questions.bcaring on safety must be reached prior to issuance of a construction permit.
Such disavowal was noccusary in light of PRDC v. Inte? national Union, sunra, in which the Supreme Court long ago gave its approval to the Cor. mission's two-step licensing procedure and explicitP i
sanctioned the deferral of "a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed".
367 U.S.
at 407.
Rather, the question which the State poses goes to the extent to which safety information must be supplied (or, f
conversely, need not be supplied) prior to authorization i
of construction.
Our examination of this question starts with 10 CFR 50.35(a), which permits issuance of a construction permit i
i so long as the following findings can be made:
i (1) the applicant has described tac proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, i
the principal architectural and engineerino criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or ccmponents incorporated there-in for the protection of the health and safety of the public;
'A 7$s f
,34 ENCLOSURE 2 INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR EACH CATEGORY A TASK TO ADDRESS ALAB-444 APPLICABILITY State the type of nuclear plant to which the task applies, e.g., BWRs, PWRs, LWRs, Mark-I containments Westinghouse plants.
BASIS FOR CONTINUED PLANT OPERATION AND LICENSING PENDING COMPLETION OF TASK (Antic 1 pated results of task action plan - Brief discussion of what general results are anticipated from the task plan, e.g., confirmation of current licensing criteria, more stringent licensing requirements, relaxed licensing requirements, quantification of safety margins... etc.)
(Interim measures - Briefly describe the interim measures or current licensing requirements that are relied upon to assure plant safety while the task is being worked on.)
w
2-(Alternative Courses of Action - Briefly describe alternative means of justifying continued operation and licensing should the anticipated results discussed above not be realized, e.g., Design modifications?
De-rating? Increased surveillance? Continue with current licensing requirements?)
i (Summary - Ir, view of the various considerations, state why it is acceptable to continue with plant licensing or operation pending ultimate resoluti~on of the issue addressed by the task action plan.)
b J
.e I
I e
o e
C
~
'%T
~1 N tir!IT).D nTn 1:s nr Ani:nica 140 CLEAR !!LGUT.I. TORY CO lt!13510!J
't ATOMIC UAI'ETY AND LICLl!U]ilG At>Pr.nb BOAP.D g
t, 0*
N,i '"i 2,7 Alan G.
Recenthal, Chairtaan Dr. John II. Luck
~-
Michael C. Farrar L
)
In thn 11atter of
)
)
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO;U)ANY
) Docket Nos. 50-458
)
50-459
-)--A,[,gh,. e...g;,..p..
)
A (River _llencl._Sttttion., Units 1 and 2) y
'y,j lia r:s rn. Uilliaza J.
ru s te,.~1r., li ctorney General,
diid~i!INi.E: M.
- 1 rov, Jr., Assistant isttorncy Geacral, New Ui le,ais, Louin.iana, and l*r. Anth'>ny Z.
Roisman
~
und Ih,.._l*p. yin 12 C!teldo3, Waidiington, D.
C.,
for the State of Louis.La n a.
!!cntrn. Trov D. Conner, Jr. cnd l'arh J. Metterhnhn, ucshiEfC5n, u.
C., tor Gulf states Tft:1T1Eids Ccmpany, appliennt.
IIe n n r.=:. Lawrence I!renner and Richard 1:. !!ceflina for
~
tfic"DUcIcO Ecgu'latcry Co:renusa.on st?.Tf.
Mc. 1:a r i n l'. Sheldon, Washing ton,
D.
C.,
for Union of ConcerncJ Scientists, petitioner for intervention.
DECISION November 23, 1977 (ALAB-444)
This construction permit proceeding i. wolves Units 1 and 2 of the River Bend Station, to be located on the east bank of the Mississippi River in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana.
In ALAB-317, 3 NRC 175 (1976), we reviewed e
y15 4
-.--.9.
s s
25 -
s 3.
The failui:c of the State to have asserted the the River nond requisitc nexun bcLucen, on the one hand, faci,lity and, on the other, the TSAR items and the newly w
issued regulatory guides in quention is thutdisponitive of the complaint respecting tho ).icent:Ing Lourd's treat-ment of the attempt to rais<: iscuca on the basis of those itema and guidos.
lionetheless, a few additional obscr-vations are in order at this point.
The rc::;'onsibilitics of a licensing board in the
~ }
radiological hcalth and safety sphere are not confined k
to the consideration and disposition of those issucs which saay have been pr ecented to it by a party or an
" interested State" uith the required degree of specificity.
To'the contrary, irrespective of what matters may or may not have been properly placed in controversy, prior to authorizing the issuance of a construction permit the board must make the finding, inter alia, that there is "reasonabic assurance" that "t}ic proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location with-out undue risk to the health and safety of the public".
To be sure, in the absence of a con-test on a particular sa
- matter, the board need not duplicate the staff's review.
tionetheless, as previously noted (supra, pp.8-9), to discharge its functions properl-
s 26 -
it. launt pacu jud.jmen t i'pon whot h<'r t.ha t review "has been adequat.c".
10 CI'R Part. 2, Appendix A,Section V (f) (.'
Con.-tuncrnyggr Co. (!4id.1.m:1 P]rint, Unitn 1 and 2), ALAB-]*
G A1:C 331, 335 (19 */ 3 ),.r_e v_e.r n_cel e en o t h e r g rou nd s sub nom.
-j Accchliman v. ImC, mi p t_a.
of necccsity, this deter-minaticen will entail an inquiry into whether the staff rovicu satisfactorily has ccmc to grips with any unre-solsed generic safety probJems uhich might have an impact upon operation of the nuclear f.acility under consideration.
The SEn is, of course, the principal document before "
i the licensing boa' d which reflect.s the content and outcome r
of the staff's safety review.
The board should therefore
""-26/ Alt.hou'lh Secticn V(f) (2) of Appendix A to Part 2 is cxpress) / directed to licenning board responnibilition i
in "an uncontented case", the oblication to determine whet.he'r the staf f saf et.y re"icu was " adequate" obvioun.1 is equally a!plicuble to.the uncont.csted portions of a f
cano in which 3 cme matters have been placed in contro-versy.
It wou'ld mahc no sonr.c at all to construe the Appendix otherwise; e.g.,
to conclude that the licensin boards must make;sucII is determination if no issues are contacted but need not do no if an intervenor has ente:
the procccaing for the purpone of raising environmenta) mat >ctn.
Rather, the only reasonable interpretation in that t.hc intended distinction insof ar as licensing boa:
treatment in a construction permit proceeding is con-ccrned is between issues in contest and matters which have not been place ~in cont.rovercy.
b'ith rcupcct to the former, t.hc board must reso'.vc the controversy and also decide whether the required safety and environ-mental findings can be made.
Section V(f) (1).
With respect to the latter, t.he board must decide whether t.he staff's review has been adequate to support such findings.
e
f kI y;
1 y
~
7.7 -
4 Le able to Jock to that dbcoment to.mccrtain the extent to which gencric unresolved safety problems which have been previously identified in a TSAR item, a Tash Action Plan, an ACES rcport or elscwhere have been factored into the staff's analysin for the particular reactor -- and with what result.
To this end, in our vicw, cach SER shoul.
contain a summary description of those generic problems under continuing study which have both relevance to facilitics of the type under revicu and potentially significant public safety implications.
This sur: unary' description should include information of the kind nou contained in most Task Action Plans. More specifically, there should be an indication of the inventig.
tive program which has been or will be undertakun with regm
~
t problem, the program's anticipated timc-span, whether (5nd if so what) interim measures have been devised for dealing with the prob 3.cm pending the completion of the investigation, and what alternative cources of action might be available should the program not produce the envisaged result.
In short, the board (and the public as well) should be in a position to ascertain from the SUR itself -- w2thout the need to resort to extrinsic documents -- the staff's 4
28 -
perception of the nature and extent of the relationship betwcen cach significant unresolved generic safety question and the eventual operation of the reactor under scrutiny.
Once again, this annessment might well have a direct bearin" upon the ability of the licensing board to make the safety findings required of it on the construction permit level even though the generic answer to the question remains in thc_offingdmonrLother thinss_, the furnished infor-mation would likely shed light on such alternatively important considerations as uhether (1).the probicm has already been resolved for the reactor under study; (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that a satis-factory solution will be obtained before the reactor is 27/
put in operation;~~
or (3) the probicm would have no safety implications until after several years of reactor operation and, should it not be resolved by then, alter-native means vill be availabic to insure that continued operation (if permitted at all) would not pose an undue risk to the public.
22/ see lo era so.as ta) (4), quoted at p. 31, infra.
- l. 28/ We need not pause to consider whether we might have the power to direct (rather than nimply to urgo) the 1
iniclusion in ifl?Hs of the information referred to in the text above.
In all events, the licensing boards I
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).
)
29 C.
Uc have seen that although the Licensing lloard rejected the State's cudcavor to inject the TSAR items and newly incued regulatory guides into the proceeding as issues in controversy, it did allow the State to raise issues based upon the indicat. ion in the SER that, with respect to certain reactor components and features, additional jnformation would be required before a
d of init-ive-sa foty-f-ind ing--uc rc made - rcspec ting __that component or feature.
To the extent deemed necessary, we shall discuss these so-called "SER items" individually in a later portion of this opinion. --29/ At the threshold, however, some attention must be given to the State's
?
broad claim that, as a matter of law, issuance of con-struction permits could not be authorized until after g/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FRO.\\1 PREVIOUS PAGE).
plainly have the authority to insist that the infor-mation~be supplied on the record -- if not through the vehicle of the Srn then by other evidence.
This being so, the interests of the ntaff -- as well as those of the boards and other parties -- will be best served by insuring that the information (to the extent available) is at hand before the evidentiary hearing on radiological health and safety matters commences.
Otherwisc, there will be a high ootential for delay in the progress of the hearing.
More likely than not, ' he hearing will. have to be adiourned to aller for the belated submission of the,information.
And, on it has been submitted, the licensing board may be confronted with the necessity to provide time for additional discovery or the preparation of rebuttal l
evidence.
29/ As part of our revieu sua scente of those aspects of the Licensing Beard's DeciEThn which did not involve matters properly placed in controversy, we will also consider some of the TSAlt and regulatory guido ques-tions sought to be raised by the State.
T
~..3+
2 s
30 -
the informationa.1 gaps pointed tu in ti;c SER had been N
filled.
A In advancing this claim, the State has disavowed any assertion that all design details of a facility must be supplied at.the construction permit stage, or that unsucrs to all questions bsaring on safety must be reached prior to issuance of a construction permit.
Such disavowal was neccusary in light of PRDC v. Interhational Union, sunra, in which the Supreme Court long ago gave its approval to the Commission's two-step licensing proceduro and explicitl sanctioned the defc.rral of "a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed".
367 U.S. at 407.
Rather, the question which the Stato poses goes to the extent to which safety information must be supplied (or, conversely, nood not be supplied) prior to authorization of construction.
Our examination of this question starts with 10 CPR 50.35(a), which permits issuance of a construction permit so long as the following findings can be made:
(1) the applicant has doccribed the proposed design of the facility, inclnding, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineerino criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or components incorporated therc-in for the protection of the health and safety of the public;
.