ML20140F724
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisstON W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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K FEB 4 1975 N
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K. R. Goller, Assistant Director
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for Operating Reactors
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Division of Reactor Licensing 77*
HIGH TORUS WATER TEf'PERATURE DUE 'TO EXTEtlDED BLOWDOWN - SUfetARY 0F RESPONSES TO R08 74-14 f
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This is a summary of the responses to R0 Bulletin 74-14 (copies enclosed) issued in accordance with Item 3 of Transfer of Lead Responsibility, R0-Ca0-74-13.
The bulletin requested BWR licensees having suppression pools to review their operating procedures, which are applicable to the problem, to detemine whether they are adequate
'f or should be modified. Many of the responses describe procedural Y
changes which adhere to the important features of GE's suggested l1-interim operating procedures for limiting BWR suppression pool temper.atures.
In addition, several of tne responses have blanket J'
statements that procedural changes are being made to cover all of the areas of concern.
Six of the responses, however, either deviate significantly frorrGE's suggested procedures or are silent with respect to certain'of the areas of concern.
These, by plant name are:
- 1.. Pilgrim - This response states that the present procedures are adequate for extended steam discharge from stuck relief valve, but is silent regarding other events that lead to high suppression pool temperatures.
2.
Millstone - Their procedures require a reactor scram at a pool temperature of 140 F instead of 110*F as suggested by the GE procedures.
3.
Cooper - Their procedures permit operation with pool temperaturas of up to 120*F during HPCI, RCIC and RHR operation.
They require plant shutdown, but no scram, above 120 F.
4.
Nine Mile Point - Their procedures require a suppression pool temperature of 130 F instead of 110*F, and then only during unconti alled blowdown.
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S FEB 4 1975 K. R. Goller.
5.
Hatch 1 - This r.esponse states that a reactor trip will be required at 110*F after the failure of a relief valve to reseat, but is silent regarding high temperatures durir.g other types of events.
6.
Fitzpatrick - Their procedures allow pool temperatures of up to 130 F during RCIC, HPIC and relief valve operation.
A scram is required at 130*F during relief valve failure, tut is not regtrired for other events that lead to high pool temperatures.
It is apparent that the responses vary widely, both in the details concerning the actions to be taken to minimize the hazards resulting from blowdown to suppression pools, and to the degree of adherence to GE's recomended interim operating procedures. We understand that GE is doing an individual evaluation of the problem for each of these licenses, but we do not expect that these evaluations will be completed for a considerable time period.
In view of this situation, we recommend that each facility be required to conform to GE's interim operating procedures until the specific evaluation for the facility is completed and that present Technical Specifications relating to suppression pen 1 temperature li,it: M rs';isad 1:::rdir.;b.
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B. W/Grier, Assistant Director for Construction and Operations Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
Copies of all licensee responses to R0B 74-14 cc: E. G. Case, NRR G. W. Reinmuth, IE D. F. Knuth, IE J. H. Sniezek, IE A. Giambusso, RL H. D. Thornburg, IE F. Schroeder, TR J. P. O'Reilly, IE:I J. G. Davis, IE F. C. Moseley, IE:II R. C. DeYoung, RL J. G. Keppler, IE:II.I V. A. Moore, RL E. M. Howard, IE:IV D. L. Ziemann, RL R. H. Engelken, IE:V D. Elliott, RL R. L. Tedesco, TR
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K. V. Seyfrit, IE T. Abell, MIPC l
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