IR 05000440/1985050

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Safety Insp Rept 50-440/85-50 on 850731-0816.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Deficiency Repts,Quality records,10CFR50,App A,Gdc 4 & as-built Verification of Electrical Cable Trays
ML20137M753
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/05/1985
From: Neisler J, Williams C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137M716 List:
References
50-440-85-50, NUDOCS 8509130321
Download: ML20137M753 (5)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/85050(DRS)

Docket No. 50-440 License No. CPPR-148 Licensee:

Cleveland. Electrical Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At:

Perry Site, Perry, Ohio Inspection Conducted: July 31, August 2, 14-16, 1985

[Date-- f - 7 p Inspector:

J. H. Neisle v

$&l0WkW Approved By:

C. C. Williams, Chief T-f-97 Plant Systems Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on July 31 through August 16, 1985 (Report No. 50-440/85050(DRS))

Areas Inspected:

Routine safety inspection of licensee activities relative to:,

previously identified inspection items; construction deficiency reports; quality records; 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 Criteria; as-built verification of electrical cable trays and control panels and electrical penetration seal installation.

The inspection involved a total of 30 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified; however, an unresolved issue was identified in Paragraph 7 which will require further evaluation.

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8509130321 850906ADOCK 05000440 PDR PDR

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

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Principle Project Organization Employees

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  • C. M. Shuster, Manager, Quality Assurance
  • E. Riley, General Supervisor, Quality Ascurance
  • K. Kaplan, Senior Engineering Technician
  • S. Tulk, Unit Supervisor, CQS
  • B. Thompson, Lead Civi' Quality Engineer
  • K. Cimorelli, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer
  • E. Parker, Unit Supervisor P/M, CQS
  • C. Angstadt, Senior Engineer, NCES
  • R. Bierkee, Lead Engineer SCV Group, NCES R. Matthys, Lead P/M Quality Engineer, CQS
  • V. Higaki, Supervisor Electrical /I&C, CQS R. Segen, Lead Construction Procurement E. Thomas, Equipment Qualification Engineer W. Augsberger, Electrical Engineer R. Varner, Quality Engineer, CQS D. D'Amico, Equipment Engineer
  • W. Morris, Quality Engineer, CQS
  • F. Manno, Alternate Lead Seise,ic Inspector D. Siedlarczyk,-Quality Engineer, CQS
  • G. Greeneberg, Lead Electrical QC, CQS

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  • Denotes those persons attending exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-440/83-25-02):

Verification of disposition of NCR identified in audit report. The inspector determined that Pullman Power Products Procedure XV-2 was rr.'i n d on March 22, 1984, to include the requirement in Section 10.3 that vendors shall be notified of nonconformances and that the notifications shall be formally documented and copies attached to the nonconformance report.

Appendix D, Step 13, requires the QA manager or his designee to review all documentation affecting the resolution of a nonconformance report to assure completeness and acceptability.

In addition, the inspector reviewed training records, surveillances and audit reports to assure that this item has been satisfactorily resolved.

3.

Construction Deficiency Reports (10 CFR 50.55(e))

(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report (50-440/85014-EE) (DAR 133):

Safety Relief Valves actuator solenoids Viton seals and static 0-rings failed pressure test after being irradiated during qualification testing.

The inspector examined documentation attesting to the replacement of the Viton material with qualified EPDM materials and the solenoids with

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hermetically sealed solenoids manufactured by Eugene Seitz Company.

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In addition, the inspector reviewed documentation describing the successful qualification and pressure testing of the replacement seals, 0-rings and solenoids.

(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report (50-440/84-41-EE):

During loss of offsite power, a failure of Division 1 direct power source could prevent Division 2 direct current circuitry from initiating an automatic start signal to Division 2 control room chiller.

The inspector reviewed the architect / engineer's analysis of the consequences of the failure of the control room chiller to automatically start on loss of off-site power.

The analysis shows that temperature rise in the control room would not be at a rate to cause temperature in the control room to exceed design limits before the operators could manually start the chiller units.

The inspector's review of ECN 20137-86-348/B and revised drawing B-208-206, sheet 68, determined that the design has been changed to assure the automatic start of the Division 2 chiller upon loss of Division 1 direct current power. The licensee withdrew this item as a reportable deficiency.

The inspector concurs with the withdrawal.

4.

Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed quality assurance records for electrical cable trays, conduits and circuits that had been visually inspected during the as-built inspection walkdowns (Section 6).

Records reviewed included receiving records, installation and inspection checklists, qualification records, personnel training records, pull slips, insulation resistance /

continuity test reports, pre pull walkdown checklists, pre-cut /re-spool inspection checklists, termination cards and termination inspection checklists, weld material issue slips, and certified material test reports.

Records for the following circuits were reviewed:

1R23F 20C 1R23F 178 1R22C 2828 1R22C 1628 1R22C 170C 1R61A 1038B 1821A 758A EllR 293B

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No violatio6[or deviations were identified in this area.

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10 CFR 50, Appedix A, GDC 4 Criteria The inspector observed non-seismically qualified fire sprinkler piping installed over Class 1E safety-related cable trays on the 634 level cable spreading room.

Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that the licensee had identified the non-seismic pipe over seismically qualified trays in this area and had initiated a program designed to identify and correct conditions where non-seismically qualified components could cause damage to seismically qualified components during a design basis seismic event.

The inspector's review of the licensee's

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program determined the program as outlined in approved procedures to be adequate to identify and correct those conditions where non-seismic components installed over seismic Category 1 components exist in the plant.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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6.

As-Built Electrical Systems Verification The inspector selected 14 electrical cable trays for examination and comparison with the as-built drawings to determine whether the cable trays had been installed according to the as-built drawings and applicable specifications.

The inspection consisted of a walkdown and visual inspection of the cable trays including tray location, cable routing within the trays, tray support design and location, weld inspection, cable tray fill and barrier installation.

The cable trays selected for this inspection were:

657A 13318 1316B 693A 13178 645A 1822B 1843B 1338B 18098 1356B 2728 18228 18208 In addition to the cable tray inspection, the inspector performed an as-built verification inspection of terminations in Panel 1C61-P001.

During the inspection of this panel the inspector noted some discrepancies between the as-buiit terminations and the terminations shown on drawing 0-209-039, s%et 5, Revision D, used for the verification inspection.

Licensee representatives indicated that there were engineering change notices being posted against the drawing that resolved the an'". rent discrepancies.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

7.

Penetration Seals The inspector observed the installation of penetration fire seals in electrical penetrations.

Observations included the in plant storage of seal material components, installed silicone foam and elastomer seals in floor and wall penetrations.

In floor penetrations ECC 3032 and ECC 3034 on the 620 foot level of the control complex, the inspector observed that the silicone foam had shrunk'away from the penetration sleeves leaving a void of undetermined depth along the edges of the seal. The inspector questioned licensee representatives as to whether the shrinkage was within acceptabFe limits and what method was used to determine whether an acceptable seal depth was maintained in the penetration.

NCR CQC-4075 has been issued by the licensee to resolve this issue. This item remains unresolved pending the NRC review of the disposition of NCR CQC-4075 during a future inspection (50-440/85050-01).

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No violations, deviations, or unresolved items other than that discussed above were identified.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation or a violation.

An unresolved item disclosed in this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 7.

9.

Exit Interview The inspector met the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

The licensee representative acknowledged this information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and processes reviewed during the inspection.

The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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