IR 05000327/1985043
| ML20137L614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1986 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson, Weise S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137L611 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-327-85-43, 50-328-85-43, NUDOCS 8601280038 | |
| Download: ML20137L614 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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n REGION 11 y,
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Report Nos.
50-327/85-43, 50-328/85-43 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N11 B Missionary Ridge Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.-
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.
DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
November 6, 1985 thru December 5, 1985 Inspectors:
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/M.:$/88 K. M. Jeiiison, Seni(Repent Inspector
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YA/W 1. J 3 atson Res de(
specitor Date Signed Approved by:
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A 7[
S. P. Weis'a, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved 251 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of operational safety verification including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, security and housekeeping inspections; surveillance and maintenance observations; review of previous inspection findings; followup of eventi; review of licensee identified items; walkdown of Engineered Safety Features; and review of inspector followup items.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Two unresolved items were identified as discussed in paragraph 6.
8601280038 860114 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director
- P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager L. M.. Nobles, Operations and Engineering Superintendent
- B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. M. Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor R. W. Olson, Modifications Branch Manager M. R. Sedlacik, Electrical Section Manager, Modifications Branch H. D. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager
- M. A. Scarzinski, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
- M. R. Harding, Engineering Group Manager
- D. C. Craven, Quality Assurance Staff Supervisor
- D. L. Cowart, Quality Surveillance Supervisor
- R. W. Moore, Plant Evaluation Group Supervisor
- D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
- G. B. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor M. L. Frye, Compliance Engineer H. R. Rogers, Compliance Engineer j
- R. C. Burchell, Compliance Engineer D. H. Tullis, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor J. H. Sullivan, Regulatory Engineering Supervisor
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- D. L. Love. Mechanical Maintenance Craft Section Supervisor
- R. J. Griffin, NSRS Sequoyah Site Representative Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers and maintenance personnel.
Other NR Personnel:
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- M. B. Shymlock, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Watts Bar
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- A. J. Ignatonis, NRC Project Engineer i
- W. C. Bearden, NRC Resident Inspector, Bellefonte
- J. D. Smith, NRC I&E Headquarters
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview i
The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Manager and
members of his staff on December 9, 1985. Two unresolved items described in l
paragraph 6 were discussed.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
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reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
During the reporting i
period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings. At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
This subject was not addressed in this inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to j
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. Two unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed
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in paragraph 6.
'5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours
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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspec-tors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and verified return to service of affected components. The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.
Tours of the diesel generator, auxil ia ry, control, and turbine buildings and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment i
conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
The inspectors talked down accessible portions of the following
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safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:
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Residual Heat Removal System (Units 1 and 2)
Charging Pump Flowpath (Units 1 and 2)
Control Room Ventilation Chlorine Detection System (Common)
Diesel Generators (Unit 1 and 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Security During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected
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and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No violations or deviations
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were identified.
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c.
Radiation Protection
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The inspectors observed Health Physics (HP) practices and verifiea
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implementation of radiation protection control.
On a regular basis, l
radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activi-ties were monitored to assure the activities were being conducted in
i accordance with applicable RWPs.
Selected radiation protection l
instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were-reviewed.
6.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
l The inspector verified operability of the Component Cooling Water System
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(CCS) on Units I and 2 by completing a-walkdown of the accessible portions of the systems. Inspection Reports 327,328/85-32 and 327,328/85-35 document j
the previous inspection of this system.
The inspector verified operability of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment i
System (ABGTS) on Units 1 and 2 by completing a walkdown of the system.
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The following specifics were reviewed and/or observed as appropriate for
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both the CCS and ABGTS:
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a.
that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant
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drawings and the as-built configuration; l
b.
that equipment conditions were satisfactory and items that might
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degrade performance were identified and evaluated (e.g. hangers j
and supports were operable, housekeeping etc, was adequate);
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c.
with assistance from licensee personnel, the -interior of the
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breakers and electrical or instrumentation cabinets were inspected
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for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc;
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i d.
that instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning and
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j calibration dates were appropriate; e
that valves were in proper position, breaker ' alignment was
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correct, power was available, and valves were locked as required; and f.
local and remote instrumentation was compared, and remote
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j instrumentation was functional.
I-l During the walkdown of the ABGTS, several concerns were. identified.. System Operating Instruction, S0I-30.6, - Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System,
l requires three FR 45-amp fuses and two KT.N 2-amp fuses in the local control
panel for the ABGTS humidity control heaters.
The inspectors determined l
that three 50-amp fuses and two 1-amp fuses had been installed. In addi-tion, the procedure required that-a local disconnect switch for humidity I
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control be closed for manual start of the system. The inspectors determined that this switch had been disconnected at the local control panel.
The licensee stated that a modification had been made to the system to change
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j the fuses and disconnect the switch in late 1984. Review of this modifica-tion and the failure to update the S0I to include these changes is identi-
i fied as Unresolved Item 327,328/85-43-01.
The inspectors determined that valves in the air supply to. all the air
i operated dampers in the ABGTS were not-included in_ the valve checklist for i
system lineup in S01-30.6. Isolation of these valves could result in loss of the capability to automatically open dampers required for system
operability.
Review of system operating procedures to determine the controls for lineup of air supply valves required for operation of safety I
related air-operated valves and dampers is identified as Unresolved Item i
327,328/85-43-02.
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The inspectors noted that Temporary Alteration Control Forms (TACF) were
attached to dampers FC0-30-148, -149, -279 and -280.
In addition, 501-30.6 which listed the post accident sampling facility gas treatment exhaust air fan discharge isolation dampers as' 1-FCO-30-476 and -475 and 2-FCO-30-475
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and 476 did not agree with the name tags on these dampers which identified
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the dampers as associated with system 31. The inspector also noted that the
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upper contact on damper 1-FC0-30-475 was covered with paint.
These items were brought to the attention of the licensee and will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,3?3/85-43-03.
The inspectors determined that 50I-30.6 provides the license requirements,
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conditions for operation, precautions, and the instructions for startup i
operation, both manual and automatic, of the ABGTS.
Although several
Auxiliary Building isolations, which automatically start the ABGTS, have occurred during 1985, there was no - record of the performance of the
l veification requirements for automatic start of-the ABGTS.
The licensee
stated that for procedure steps that fell under Category B requirements per i
Administrative Instruction, AI-4, Plant Instructions - Document Control, the
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documentation of performance is not kept.
Category B inclucM those 1'
instructions not required to be present during task performance s nce they
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are either frequently performed or not especially complex procedures.
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addition, the licensee stated that performance is not recorded in the
operator logs.
Review of Administrative Instruction, AI-6, Log Entries and j
Review, indicates that operations logs should list those opereting instruc-
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tions used during the shift in performing tasks, including the latest i
revision level as shown on the cover sheet.
Logging of the use of S01
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Category B steps in the operating logs will be discussed with the licensee and is identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/85-43-04.
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7.
Monthly Surveillance Observations -(61726)
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The inspectors observed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance i
testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that Limiting Condi-
l tions.for Operation were met; that test results met acceptance criteria l
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requirements and were reviewed by personnel other that the individual y
directing the test; that deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and i
that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved. by management personnel; and that system restoration was
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adequate.
For complete tests, the inspector verified that testing frequ-encies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following surveillance test activities:
SI-26, Loss of Offsite Power With Safety Injection SI-82.2, Functional Test for Radiation Monitors
SI-171, Periodic Flushing of High Pressure Fire Protection System l
SI-620, Control' Air System Instrument Calibration SI-260, Circuit Breaker Inspection
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HPSIL-3, Respiratory Protection Program SI-83, Channel Calibration for Radiation Monitoring System i
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
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a.
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in l
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes I
and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review: LCOs met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components operable; approvals obtained prior to initiating the work; activities accomplished using approved procedures and inspected as applicable; procedures used adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting i
I activities controlled and the repair record accurately reflected work activities; functional testing and/or calibrations performed prior to
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j returning components or systems to service; quality control records j
maintained; activities accomplished by qualified. personnel; parts and materials used properly certified; radiological ' controls implemented; i
QC hold points established where required and observed; fire prevention controls implemented; outside contractor force activities controlled in accordance with the approved Quality Assurance (QA) program; and housekeeping implemented.
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b.
The follow! 1 maintenance activities were observed / reviewed by the inspectors.
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i A302449 - repair of valve 1-VLV-70-538 l
A536429 - repair of valve 1-FCV-26-183 i
A543860 - repair of 0-RM-90-122 A549034 - repair of 0-RM-90-134 A536222 - repair of 0-RM-90-134 A536415 - repair of the A Auxiliary Control Air Compressor No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, the LER forms were complete, the licensee had reviewed the event, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
LERs Unit 1 327/83011 Inoperable Pressure Switch for Auxiliary Feedwater 327/83035 Inoperable Feedwater Flow Channel 327/83037 Inoperable Steam Flow Channel 327/83043 Failure to Perform Surveillance on 125V Batteries 327/83071 Inoperable Oxygen Analyzer Monitor 327/83077 Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Autom,atic Valve 327/83088 Failure of Handswitch for Auxiliary Feedwater Valve 327/83138 Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve 327/83143 High Oxygen in Waste Gas Decay Tanks 327/83158 Inoperability of RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor 10.
Event Followup (93702, 62703, 61726)
a.
On October 9, 1985, the licensee initiated removal of the Unit 1 B train of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) from service and alignment of the A train of RHR. The RHR system was being realigned to facilitate main-tenance activities on the C Component Cooling Water System heat exchanger. The_ A RHR pump was started while the B RHR pump was still running which resulted in a vortex in the combined RHR pump suttion line and resulted in a loss of net positive suction head to both pumps.
The operators secured both pumps, vented the pump cases, raised Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level and restarted only the B train pump.
This action was successful in returning flow to the core within approxi-mately eight minutes.
RCS heatup was negligible.
b.
On November 14, 1985, certain hose stations in the Unit 1 annulus were inadvertently isolated as a result of an operator misreading a system print. The operator had intended to isolate the deluge valves near the Reactor Coolant Pump seal standpipes in order to facilitate some corrective maintenance. The inspector reviewed other system lineups to determine if this system lineup error was an anomaly. This lineup error appeared to be singular in nature and of little safety signifi-cance for the mode of the unit (mode 5). The inspector had no further questions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Refueling Activities (60710)
' The licer.see completed fuel loading for the Unit 1. reactor for the Cycle 4 fuel load on November 13, 1985.
The inspector observed fuel handling operations and other ongoing activities associated with the refueling.
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inspector verified that selected Technical Specification requirements were met, that appropriate procedures were being utilized, that containment integrity was being maintained, that housekeeping and control of materials entering containment was adequate and that staffing was in accordance with th> Technical Specification requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 12. Review of Facility Operating License (FOL) Conditions and NUREG-0737 (TMI-2
Action Plan Commitments) (25565)
a.
NUREG-0737, Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display System The SPDS was installed by the licensee by October 31, 1985, for Unit 1 i
and November 31, 1985, on Unit 2.
Additional review of the installation l
will be conducted by the Operational Readiness Review Team prior to startup of Units 1 and 2.
The inspector interviewed operators and STAS on the use of the SPDS and compared the displays to the Emergency Operating Instructions issued in August, 1985.
The inspector noted
that the operators displayed difficulty in obtaining the fault tree data. A more detailed review of operator and STA training on the use of the SPDS is an Inspector Followup Item (327,328/85-43-05).
b.
FOL No. DPR-77 Section 2.C(23)E. and FOL No. DPR-79 Section 2.C.(16)f.;
NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1 - Reactor Coolant System Vents
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Facility Operating. License No.
DPR-77 for Sequoyah Unit 1,
I Section 2.C.(23)E. and Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for
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Sequoyah Unit 2, Section 2.C.(16)f. require the installation of reactor j
coolant system and reactor vessel head highpoint vents that are
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remotely operable from the control room no later than startup following
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the second refueling outage for Unit 1 and the first refueling outage
for Unit 2.
The Reactor Vessel Head Vent System (RVHVS) was installed and the changeout of the pressurizer power operated relief valves i
(PORVs) was completed during the refueling outages required by the
license conditi.ons.
i An inspection was performed on the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System (RVHVS), installed on the Upper Head Injection penetration of the reactor vessel to vent noncondensable gases or steam from the
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reactor vessel head. The inspector verified installation in accordance i
with FSAR Sect' ion 5.5.15.
The inspector also reviewed Functional Restoration Guideline, FR-I.3, Response to Voids in the Reactor Vessel, i
which was issued on August 21, 1985, and provides instructions for the i
use of the RVHVS.
Operation of the RVHVS, which has two pair of l
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normally deenergized valves in series, is administratively controlled by a hold order issued to the plant manager.
The licensee submitted proposed Technical Specifications for the RVHVS.on January 25, 1984.
This submittal is under review by the NRC.
Interviews with ' operators were conducted to determine familiarity and training.
Additional interviews, a review of training records and verification that training i
is included in requalification training is identified as Inspector I
Followup Item 327,328/85-43-06.
In uallation of tne RVHVS is considered complete with the exception of the review of training which I
will be followed under the IFI identified above.
This item is therefore closed.
The reactor coolant system high point vent is provided by the pres-
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surizer power operated relief valves (PORVs).
The licensee completed
the replacement of the PORVs with Target Rock electric solenoid valves which are environmentally qualified within the required time frame.
During the Unit 2 Cycle 2 refueling outage and during the Unit 1 Cycle l
3 refueling outage, the PORVs were rebuilt due to leakage problems.
j Leakage problems on the P0kVs and block valves are being followed~under
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IFI 327,328/85-08-01.
Modifications on the loop seals, including addition of valve tailpipe supports and mirror insulation on the Unit 1 PORVs was completed during the Un't 1 Cycle 3 refueling outage.
Modifications of a similar nature till be made to the Unit 2 valves during the next Unit 2 refueling outage.
This portion of the license condition and NUREG-0737 commitment wili i m..: i n p n pending completion of these modifications and the NRC review of environmentel qualifica-I tion of the valves. Performance testing of the pressurizer relief and j
safety valves (NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1) is under review by NRC.
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FOL No. DPR-77 Section 2.C(;?)F. and FOL No. DPR-79 Section 2.C(16)g. ;
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l NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, Posc Accident Sampling
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l Permanent post accident sampling facilities have been installed by the l
licensee and are operable for Unit 1 and 2.
Inspection Reports
327,328/81-23, 81-20, 83-09, 84-14 and 84-21 document the inspection of I
this area. License Conditions 2.C (23) F. and 2.C (16) 9 for Unit 1
and 2, respectively, which require that the Post Accident Sampling
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System be operable no later than the second refueling for both units, is closed.
Two inspector followup items concerning administrative controls for personnel exposure (327,328/84-14-01) and planning of periodic performance tests (327,328/84-14-06), and one deficiency concerning training for limitations of sampling and radiation safety (327,328/83-13-09) have been identified for followup review by NRC regional inspectors.
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I d.
FOL No. DPR-77, Section 2.C(23)D. and TOL No. DPR-79, Section
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2.C(16)l.; NUREG 0737, Item II. F.1. 2, Accident Monitoring instru-i mentation I
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i The FOL for both units requires that the instrumentation listed below be installed and operable by the end of the second refueling outage.
Installation of the accident monitoring equipment was accomplished within these requirements as documented below.
(1)
Items A&B - Noble Gas Monitor, Iodine / Particulate Sampling An inspection was performed of the installation of the permanent shield building particulate, iodine and noble gas moni. tors for i
Units 1 and 2.
The monitors were installed during the second refueling outage for both units and are considered operational by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed several completed surveil-lance instructions for channel calibration and functional tests of
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the monitors. No concerns were identified. During review of Work
Plans associated with the installation of the monitors, the
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inspector identified commitments made by TVA in a December 10, 1980 letter to the NRC.
This letter appears to contain commit-ments that exceed NRC requirements for accident monitoring j
instrumentation, however the commitments did not appear to have been met. Further review of correspondence between TVA and NRC is j
required to resolve the status of these commitments This is
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identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/85-43-07. Work plan review was not completed during this inspection.
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(2)
Item C - Containment High Range Radiation Monitors The inspectors reviewed the work plans for installation of the containment high range monitors. The inspectors were not able to determine from the documentation reviewed whether post-modification testing was conducted after the original installation.
This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/85-43-08.
The containment high range monitors were removed from the Units 1 and 2 containments during the shutdown which began in August, 1985 to perform calibration using a high range source. The inspector observed a portion of this testing, which appeared adequate.
The monitors are to be replaced and tource checked in the field prior to startup.
Review of the installation and testing of the monitors prior to startup is identified as Inspector Followup Item 327, 328/85-43-09.
(3)
Item D - Containment Pressure Monitors An inspection was conducted of the installation of the containment pressure monitors.
These monitors were originally installed in Unit 1 in July 1980 and Unit 2 in November 1980.
The monitors were upgraded to meet IEEE 323 1974 in October and November, 1984 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
The inspector noted that the nameplate data on the pressure transmitters indicated that the monitor had a range of 100 p:ig,.but had a safe pressure of only
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12 psig. In general, the safe pressure should be one and one-half times the range.
The licensee provided documentation that
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indicates that the transmitters were tested by the vendor to 150 l
psig.
Further review of the nameplate data discrepancy is j
identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/85-43-10.
t (4) Item E - Containment Water Level Monitors
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l An inspection of the installation of the containment water level
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monitors was conducted.
The monitors have been installed since
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fuel load. A review of the surveillance documentation indicates i
that a problem exists with calibration of the monitors.
Discussions with the licensee on the calibration of 'the monitors
will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/85-43-11.
(5)
Item F - Containment Hydrogen Monitors
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This item was reviewed as documented in Inspection Reports 327/81-23,328/81-28 and 327,328/84-14.
Installation of the
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monitors was completed prior to fuel loading. The monitors were subsequently moved outside containment for environmental qualifi-cation reasons in 1984.
The licensee determined on December 11, 1985, that the Unit 2 Train A hydrogen monitor had been tied into a l
nonessential air supply during these modifications.
Followup on this discrepancy is identified as Inspector Followup Item
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i 327,328/85-43-12.
I 13. Meeting with Local Officials (94600)
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On November 15, 1985, the Sectw Chief from Region II, Atlanta, for l
Sequoyah and the Senior Resident Inspector at Sequoyah met with the
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following local officials:
the City Manager for Soddy Daisy, Tennessee, and the Emergency Preparedness Manager for Hamilton County, Tennessee.
During these meetings with local representatives, the following - topics I
were discussed:
h a.
Purpose of meeting b.
Introduction of Re'gion II personnel and regulatory relationship to TVA i
c.
Brief description of NRC organization and responsibility
d.
Brief description of NRC, TVA, State emergency planning activities
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Answers to specific questions, and business telephone numbers of
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appropriate NRC contacts.
The ~ local officials were pleased with the discussions and felt that the
meetings were worthwhile and informative.
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