ML20137E821
| ML20137E821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | Stevens J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Callihan A, Cole R, Grossman A, Grossman H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| TASK-AS, TASK-BN86-002, TASK-BN86-2 BN-86-002, BN-86-2, NUDOCS 8601170326 | |
| Download: ML20137E821 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000456/1985037
Text
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~g UNITED STATES
8' n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
$ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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Docket Nos.: 50-456
50-457
MEMORANDUM FOR: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
for Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2
(H. Grossman, A.D. Callihan, R.F. Cole)
FROM: Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager
PWR Project Directorate #5
Division of PWR Licensing-A
SUBJECT: BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING AN INSPECTION OF THE
BRAIDWOOD STATION'S EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
(BN-86-02)
. In accordance with the NRC procedures for Board Notifications, the enclosed
inspection report is being provided. This information is applicable to the
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. Parties to the proceeding are being
informed by copy of this memorandum.
A routine announced inspection was conducted by the NRC on November 5-8, 1985,
of the Braidwood Station emergency preparedness exercise. This
full-participation exercise, conducted on November 6, 1985, tested the
integrated response of licensee, State, and local organizations to a
hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive
material. No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified.
However, some exercise weaknesses were identified as summarized in the
Appendix. These weaknesses will be examined during a future inspection.
stIce h
Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager
PWR Project Directorate #5
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosure: As stated
cc: SECY (2) ~'
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ACRS (10)
Parties to the Proceeding
See next page
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aL30LA104Y 14F Jn M A l l ure DISIHidJT10N SYSTEM (RIJSl
ACCLSSIOi NBR:SS12030281 30C.DAIL: 65/11/27 NOTAHlZED: NU DJCKE1 s
FACIL:STN-50-45b 3raiowood Station, unit 1, Commonwealtn Edison Co 05000456
STN-50-457 Braio.ood Station, unit 2, Commonwealth Edison Co 05000457
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
SNAFERe a.D. Region 3, Office of Director
RLCIP,NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATI3N
REED,C. Commonwealth Edison Co.
SUBJECT: Forwards Safety Inso Repts 50-456/85-37 & 50-457/85-36 cc
851105-06.No viointions noteo.neaunesses re merginal
accestability of Joint public info ctr identified. Updated
info & schedule re olenned improvements requested.
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DISTHIBUTION C00L: IE35J COPIES NECEIVEO:LTH .1 ENCL .b SIZE:
TITLE: Emergency Preparedness-ADDreisel/Ccnfirmatory Action Ltr/ Exercise Reo
NDTES Standardized Plant. 05000456
Standardir.d Plant. 05000457
RECIPIENI CUPIES RECIPIENT COPIES '
ID C3DE/NAME LTTW ENCL LD-C^^C4"44 LTTR ENCL
Pnk-A PD5 PD 1 1 gr~ o l t vr36, J _ _ 1 1
INTERNAL: ADM/LF4d 1 0 IE/DEPER/EPS 3 3
nRH d4R AdiS 1 1 NRM Pod-A ADTS 1 1
NRR Pn4=b AJTS 1 1 NRR/DSRO DIR 1 1
H Giv 3 FILE 01 1 1 RGN2/0RSS/EPRPS 1 1
EXTERNAL: 24x 1 1 LPDH 1 1
IvHC P3R 1 1 NSIC 1 1
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NOV 4 7 M
Docket No. 50-456
Docket No. 50-457
Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed
Vice President
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. T. Ploski and
others of this office on November 5-8, 1985, of activities at the Braidwood
Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, authorized by NRC Construction
Permits No. CPPR-132 and No. CPPR-133, and to the discussion of our findings
with Messrs. D. Galle, E. Fitzpatrick, and others of your staff at the
conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during
the inspection: Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective
examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and
interviews with personnel.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this
inspection. However, weaknesses were identified which will require corrective
action by your staff. These weaknesses are summarized in the Appendix to this
letter. As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (IV.F), any weaknesses that
are identified must be corrected. Accordirq1y, please advise us within 30 days
of the date of this letter of the correctiva actions you have taken or plan to
take, showing the estimated dates of completion.
We remain concerned about the marginal acceptability of the facility that serves
as the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) at Mazon, Illinois. We understand
that you plan to upgrade this facility. We hereby request that, along with your
formal response to the exercise weaknesses, you also provide updated information
regarding the extent of your planned improvements for this JPIC and the current
schedule for completing these improvements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of
this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed
in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance
procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
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Commonwealth Edison Company 2
NOV 2 7 G8%
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
%riginalsignedbyW.p.Shafara
W. D. Shafer, Chief
Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosures:
1. Appendix, Exercise Weaknesses
2. Inspection Reports
No. 50-456/85037(DRSS);
No. 50-457/85036(DRSS)
cc w/ enclosures:
D. L. Farrar, Director
of Nuclear Licensing
M. Wallace, Project Manager
D. Shamblin, Construction
Superintendent
E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station
Superintendent
C. W. Schroeder, Licensing and
Compliance Superintendent
DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspector, RIII
Braidwood
Resident Inspector, RIII Byron
Phyllis Dunton, Attorney
General's Office, Environmental
Control Division
D. W. Cassel, Jr., Esq.
J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public
Utilities Division
H. S. Taylor, Quality Assurance
Division
E. Chan, ELD
J. Stevens, NRR
The Honorable Herbert Grossman, ASLB
The Honorable A. Dixon Callihan, ASLB
The Honorable Richard F. Cole, ASLB
D. Matthews, EPB, OIE
W. Weaver, FEMA, RV
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Appendix
EXERCISE WEAKNESSES
1. Neither Control Room nor Technical Support Center staff simulated a
call to the NRC Operations Center as a result of the Alert declaration.
(456/85037-01 and 457/85036-01) (Sections 4.a and 4.b)
2. Forecast changes in meteorological conditions were not adequately
incorporated into the offsite protective action decisionmaking process.
(456/85037-02'and 457/85036-02) (Section 4.e)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/85037(DRSS): 50-457/85036(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Braidwood Station, Braidwood, IL
Inspection Conducted: November 5-8, 1985
Inspectors: T. Ploski
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Approved By: . P. ps, Chief
Emergency Preparedness Section
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on November 5-8, 1985 (Reports No. 50-456/85037(DRSS:
No. 50-457/85036(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the Braidwood Nuclear
Generating Station's emergency preparedness exercise, involving otservations
by thirteen NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the
exercise. The inspection involved 226 inspector-hours onsite by eight NRC
inspectors and four consultants.
Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified.
However, exercise weaknesses were identified as summarized in the Appendix.
8512030287 8511P7
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DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
a. NRC Observers and Areas Observed
T. Ploski, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC)
J. Patterson, Corporate Command Center (CCC)
M. Phillips, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
N. Williamsen, TSC
L. Kers, EOF
F. McManus, Control Room
F. Carlson, Operational Support Center (OSC), Fire Brigade,
Inplant Teams
G. Stoetzel, OSC, Inplant Teams
E. King, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Teams
R. Lickus, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and EOF
J. Strasma, JPIC
b. Commonwealth Edison Personnel
D. Galle, Assistant Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear
Stations
E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager
D. O'Brien, Assistant Superintendent, Administrative Services
L. Butterfield, Manager, Nuclear Services, Technical
J. Golden, Supervisor of Emergency Planning
T. Blackmon, Lead Controller, EOF
L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator
S. Stapp, Quality Assurance Department *
L. Bush, Controller, Control Room
D. Vestal, Controller, TSC
W. McNeill, Controller, TSC
M. Whitemore, Controller, OSC
J. Barr, Controller, CCC
H. Finch, Controller, Control Room
T. Markwalter, Controller, OSC
T. Greene, Controller, Environs Team
W. Brenner, Lead Emergency Planner
The above licensee personnel attended the November 7, 1985 exit interview.
2. General
An exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and
the Braidwood Annex was conducted at the Braidwood Station on November 6,
1985, testing the integrated response of licensee, State, and local
organizations to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major
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release of radioactive material. The exercise was integrated with a test
of the Illinois State, Will County, Kankakee County, and Grundy County
emergency plans. This was a full participation exercise for the State of
Illinois and all counties. Attachment 1 describes the licensee's scope
of participation for the exercise. Attachment 2 describes the exercise
objectives. Attachment 3 is a narrative summary of the scenario.
3. General Observations
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a. Procedures
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Braidwood Annex, and the
emergency plan implementing procedures used by the Station,
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and Corporate Command Center
, (CCC).
b. Coordination
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If
the events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have .
ceen sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take
appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
c. Observers
Licensee observers observed and critiqued this exercise along with
NRC observers and several Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
observers. FEMA observations on the responses of the State and local
governments will be provided in a separate report.
d. Critique
The licensee held critiques immediately following the exercise on
November 6, 1985. The NRC critique was held at the Mazon E0F on
November 7, 1985. In addition, a public critique was held on
November 8, 1985 to present both the onsite and offsite preliminary
findings of the NRC and FEMA representatives, respectively.
4. Specific Observations
a. Control Room
The Shift Engineer (SE) activated the Station's Fire Brigade after
receiving a report of heavy smoke in an inplant area. An Unusual
Event was correctly declared when the fire location was not identi-
fied within ten minutes of the smoke report. Initial notifications
to the State of Illinois and the NRC Operations Center were completed
in a correct and timely manner; however, the SE became overly involved
in making the calls himself rather than delegating more calls to a
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knowledgeable communicator. Meanwhile, another member of the j
Control Room crew was stopped by an exercise controller while calling 1
the Braidwood Fire Department to request its assistance. Other i
onshift personnel continued to closely monitor radio communications
from the Fire Brigade, which had split into two groups as more than
one fire location was suspected.
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As a result of the SEC becoming overly involved in personally making
certain calls and the late controller action in stopping an exercise
participant from contacting the local fire department, there was about
twenty minutes of confusion among all onshift personnel as to whether
the local fire department was responding to the Station. Before the
confusion was resolved, the Corporate Command Center (CCC) and the
Operations Duty Supervisor (005), who later reported to the Technical
Support Center (TSC), had been informed that the fire department was
expected onsite. Several other work groups were also alerted to meet
the fire trucks at the gatehouse. All facilities and work groups
were later informed that offsite firefighting support had only been
simulated.
The SE and 005 were well aware of the potential to upgrade the
emergency classification depending on what plant equipment degrada-
tion had occurred. A proper, conservative decision was made to
activate certain TSC personnel and the Operational Support Center
(OSC) due to the then unknown number of fires and associated damage.
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Once'the SE learned that there had been only one fire and that it had
not affected safety related equipment, it was decided to continue OSC
and TSC activation for damage assessment and corrective actions
management purposes.
With one exception, personnel demonstrated adequate knowledge and
efficient use of relevant emergency procedures. Personnel neglected
to fill out a Fire / Injury checklist form found in Administrative
Procedure 1110-16. However, onshift personnel did take all proper
actions in response to the fire. Due to the status of Control Room
construction and licensed operator training, operators were, on
several occasions, uncertain whether certain panel switches had yet
been installed. One operator also expressed unfamiliarity with the
meaning of scenario information that the incore thermocouple readout
was "9999 and flashing." Later, there was some uncertainty regarding
whether containment purge line valve IVQ005A was located inside or
outside the containment building. It was determined that this valve
- was in containment and, therefore, inaccessible to any team sent to
attempt its closure.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered
- for improvement:
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- Control Room personnel should demonstrate the capability to
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properly complete all forms and checklists relevant to an
- exercise scenario.
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- Knowledgeable communicators should be utilized whenever
appropriate to relieve the SE of becoming overburdened with
telephone communications.
b. Technical Support Center (TSC)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated following the Unusual
Event declaration. The decision to activate this facility, due to one
or more inplant fires of unknown origin and significance, was conser-
vative and appropriate. Activation was rapid and orderly; however,
- it included all clerical support staff and the Administrative and
Stores Directors, who would typically not be activated until an Alert
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had been declared. This over response may have been due to the
knowledge that an exercise was occurring. In the future, the TSC
activation should be limited to the Station Group Directors and other
personnel who would really respond to the TSC for this particular
Unusual Event declaration.
The Station Director (SD) assumed command and control of onsite '
emergency response activities from the SE (acting SD) in a timely
manner, only after having been adequately briefed on the situation
and ensuring that TSC staff were ready. Periodic briefings were
utilized throughout the exercise to keep TSC staff well informed
of scenario events and major decisions, with the only significant
exception being what protective actions were being implemented
offsite. TSC staff demonstrated their capabilities to perform their
assigned responsibilities. Relevant plant drawings were effectively
. utilized in problem analyses. Trending of relevant plant parameters
was well done. There were numerous examples of good teamwork. The
directors maintained adequately detailed records of their actions.
In general, the use of internal message forms was very good; however,
a message containing the analysis results of a post accident sample
was misplaced for a few minutes at a time when this information was
being sought as input to emergency reclassification decisionmaking.
One Director soon realized that this information had been reported,
, and the misplaced message form was found and given to the 50. The
various TSC logs and message forms were transcribed on a personal
computer, enabling administrative staff to generate a duplicate of
an individual log or a comprehensive, chronological record of all key
staffs' log entries. Thus, the applicant would have no trouble
regarding reconstruction of actions and decisions involving TSC
personnel.
The SD's decisions to reclassify conditions as an Alert and later as
a Site Area Emergency were correct and timely. The associated
initial notifications to the State of Illinois, using the Nuclear
Accident Reporting System (NARS), were very prompt. Although the
simulated notification of the NRC Operations Center was performed
i immediately after the State was told of the Site Area Emergency
j declaration, no Control Room or TSC communicator simulated a call
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to the NRC concerning the Alert declaration. Had scenario events
been real, it is possible that the Control Room or TSC would have
maintained open line communications with the NRC Operations Center
at any time following the Unusual Event declaration. It is also
possible, however, that a real emergency would not have escalated
beyond that classifiable as an Alert, especially since the reasons
for the Unusual Event and Alert declarations were unrelated (fire and
loss of coolant accident, respectively). The fact that a call to the
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NRC Operations Center was not simulated for the Alert declaration is
an Exercise Weakness (456/85037-01 and 457/85036-01).
In general, communications between the TSC, CCC, and Emergency
Operations Facility (E0F) were adequate. As the exercise progressed,
TSC dose. assessment staff continued to generate offsite dose pro-
jections and to monitor transmissions from offsite survey teams
under EOF control, thus enabling the SD to have the information he
needed to meaningfully participate with his EOF and CCC counterparts
in offsite protective action decisionmaking. In contrast, there was
some confusion between the TSC and EOF regarding the number and status
(closed or open) of three valves in the release path for this
scenario. For this reason, and due to some dubious scenario infor-
mation regarding an alarming radiation monitor downstream of the "
valves in the release path, personnel in both facilities incorrectly
concluded that the release had initiated shortly after 1030. After
j many communications involving the TSC, EOF, and inplant and offsite
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survey teams, it was verified that the release had not begun at that
time. However, TSC staff should have been more aggressive in
attempting to have an inplant team attempt closure of one or both
accessible valves in the potential release path, which was a
containment building purge line having three valves - one within and
2 two outside containment. Volunteers should have been sought and
emergency worker exposure limits authorized for this task. Instead,
work on this task was inhibited when an inplant team encountered a
higher radiation field than they were allowed to work within. By.
not providing emergency worker exposure limits such that teams had to
abandon this task, the opportunity to prevent a release from occurring
through this flow path was lost.
Promptly after the Site Area Emergency declaration, the SD ordered
the simulated assembly and accountability of all onsite personnel.
Once informed that this task had been completed, the Station, Rad
Chem, Environs, and Security Directors showed good judgement and
concern for nonessential personnel by simulating their evacuation ~
from the Station along a radiologically safe route. Allowing for
reasonable times for the assembly, accountability, and site
evacuation processes to be accomplished, the latter would have been
completed prior to the radioactive release.
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Later in the exercise when the release began through the containment
purge line, TSC staff had no difficulty in confirming the release and 1
the release path. Several inplant survey teams were dispatched to -
confirm that there were no additional unmonitored release paths.
- TSC staff then demonstrated good knowledge of plant systems in the
identification of several possible methods to close at least one of
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the two accessible valves in the release path. Actions were well
underway to close one of these two valves when a scenario message
indicated the closure of a third, inaccessible valve in the release
- path. Nevertheless, TSC staff and an inplant team continued their
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efforts and demonstrated that they could also close one of the two
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accessible valves, providing further assurance that the release had
been stopped.
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Following a scenario time jump, TSC staff successfully demonstrated
their ability to identify and prioritize short-term recovery tasks.
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Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered
for improvement: ,
- Emergency worker exposure limit should be promptly provided to *
teams that perform tasks which could mitigate or prevent a
release of significant amounts of radioactivity from the plant.
c. Fire Brigade, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams
The strategy of splitting the fire brigade to expedite identifying
the fire location (s) was appropriate. Considering the potential for
having multiple fires, the brigade captain's request for offsite
support was proper. The brigade identified the only fire location
within an acceptable twenty minutes and correctly reported the fire's ,
location to the Control Room. Both portions of the brigade were
adequately equipped, and demonstrated their abilities to keep each
other and the Control Room well informed of their activities.
The OSC was fully operational with adequate staff within an
acceptable thirty minutes of the decision.to activate this facility.
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The OSC Director effectively managed the facility. Communications
between the OSC, TSC, and Control Room were good. An adequately
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detailed OSC log was maintained. Personnel were issued high range
dosimetry upon their first arrival at the OSC. Portable radios and
a status board were effectively utilized to track inplant teams.
Dose extensions were requested from the TSC for members of the teams
l who could receive over 100 millires exposure while performing
assigned tasks. Personal exposure records were adequately maintained.
No teams were observed to leave the OSC without Radiation Chemistry
Technician (RCT) support. RCTs routinely checked their survey
instruments for proper operation and current calibration before
leaving the OSC.
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The quality of briefings given to OSC personnel was adequate, with
the exceptions that assembled persons were not told that a General
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Emergency had been declared for about ninety minutes, and later that
the release had ended around 1345. The quality of briefings given
to specific teams generally improved during the exercise. Although
the briefings addressed rauiological hazards, they did not routinely
incorporate current Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) data available from
the Control Room. Several teams stopped in the Control Room to
obtain such data before proceeding on their missions. In addition,
inplant radia u rn survey information posted on plant layout maps in
the OSC did not always include the valid times of the data,
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OSC's entrance while background radiation levels were low. OSC
habitability surveys were periodically done. Several air samples
were also taken in the OSC, beginning before the radioactive release.
, The initial air sample was taken over a twenty-five minute period,
although it was reported as a thirty minute sample. The technician
had difficulty in finding procedural guidance for collecting and
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counting the sample. The sample cartridge was then improperly left
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on a table for several hours. A RCT who collected another sample was
observed to be handling the particulate filter without gloves.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered
for improvement:
- All persons in the OSC should be kept well informed of all
major events during an emergency, including any emergency
reclassifications.
- Briefings given to inplant teams should incorporate relevant
ARM data in addition to available survey information. Valid
times of these types of data should be available in the OSC.
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- * RCTs assigned to collect air samples should receive additional -
training on sample collection, counting, and handling techniques.
d. Corporate Command Center (CCC)
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The CCC was activated in a timely manner. Actual transfer of command
and control of emergency response activities from the TSC to the CCC
was appropriately delayed for a short time, as persons in the TSC
l were very involved in finalizing an emergency reclassification
decision and in completing the associated initial offsite notifica-
tions. Subsequent transfers of command and control from the TSC to
the CCC, and later from the CCC to the EOF were smooth and done only
after the managers of both involved facilities had been adequately
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briefed. Optional transfer of control of the Station's offsite
l monitoring teams from the TSC to the CCC was not accomplished, per
l the agreement of the staffs of both facilities. The CCC Director
kept in close communication with his TSC and EOF counterparts, and
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ensured that his staff did likewise. Key staff maintained adequately
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detailed records of their activities. In general, status boards were
kept up to date; however, offsite monitoring team data could have
been posted in a more timely manner. ;
e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF became fully operational within one hour of the decision to
activate this facility. Access control was adequate, although over-
zealous regarding NRC personnel who displayed proper identification
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and had already been granted unescorted access to all areas of the
EOF building. Staff briefings were adequately detailed, but could
have been more frequent later in the exercise. Recordkeeping was
sufficient to provide adequate reconstruction of EOF activities and
j major decisions. Status boards were adequately maintained with a
, few, relatively minor informational discrepancies. Trending of
critical plant parameters was adequate.
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All offsite notifications for the General Emergency and subsequent
major events, such as the beginning and end of the simulated release
and what protective actions were being recommended, were completed -
in a timely and accurate manner. Based on the radioactive release
rate and containment radiation level data available from the scenario,
EOF staff developed the appropriate offsite protective action
recommendations.
Although EOF staff issued appropriate protective action recommenda-
tions, the Recovery Manag a (RM) did not maintain a sufficient
awareness of what recommendations had been implemented offsite or
what was the progress of their implementation. Such information was
not, therefore, relayed to the TSC, CCC, or to the offsite monitoring
teams. Although TSC and EOF staff followed procedures and acquired
a meteorological forecast, a forecast shift in wind direction was not
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incorporated into the protective action decisionmaking process. The
forecast wind direction shift did not occur prior to release termina-
tion. Nevertheless, the failure to adequately consider forecast
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changes in meteorological conditions during the protective action
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decisionmaking process is an Exercise Weakness (456/85037-02 and
, 457/85036-02).
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Environs staff compiled and analyzed data received from the Station's
offsite survey teams; however, it was not evident that attempts were
made to acquire and utilize survey results from the State's teams
which were kept further from the Station.
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In addition to the exercise weakness, the following items should be
considered for improvement:
- Movements of NRC personnel displaying proper identification
should not be inhibited within the EOF once facility access
l has been granted.
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- The Recovery Manager and appropriate aides should maintain
adequate knowledge of the protective actions being implemented
offsite, including their completion status. Such information
should be relayed to the CCC, TSC, and to offsite survey teams.
- Offsite survey results from State field teams should be
routinely acquired and utilized by EOF environs staff.
f. Radiological Environmental Monitorina Teams
Two teams were activated for this exercise. Both were adequately
briefed prior to being dispatched. They checked their field survey
kits for completeness, equipment operability, and equipment calibra-
tion before leaving the Station. Radios were also performance
checked; however, one team's only radio failed during the exercise,
resulting in a temporary loss of communications with this team.
The teams were well utilized by the TSC Environs staff to help
verify that no release had begun shortly after 1030. Both teams
remained relatively close to the Station throughout the exercise,
while the State's teams remained further away. The teams were
provided with adequately detailed, legible maps and exhibited
no difficulties in finding the locations to which they were directed
by TSC or EOF staffs. The team which was accompanied during the
exercise demonstrated proper techniques in collecting, handling, and
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storing air, soil, and vegetation samples and in taking direct
radiation readings. Samples were adequately labeled for later iden-
tification. Proper care was taken to avoid spreading contamination
in the vehicle and among the sampling equipment. The team spent
much of its time in sampling at only one or two locat:ons and then
waiting outside the plume for further instructions. At no time was
either team utilized to determine the approximate borders of the
plume in order to ascertain whether its location in the environment
corresponded closely to predictions made by the Environs staff. On
one occasion, a team was told to replace environmental dosimeters.
However, no replacement dosimeters were available in their van,
, although it was understood that the van contained such equipment.
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Radio communications between the teams and their TSC or EOF
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controllers were not always easily understood, especially when a
team member attempted to communicate while wearing a face mask and
a throat microphone. However, those involved in the communications
persisted until the messages were understood. The teams were kept
sufficiently appraised of major scenario events, with two notable
exceptions. They were not promptly told when a Site Area Emergency
had been declared, and they were never infornied of what protective
actions were being implemented offsite.
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Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered
for improvement:
- All environmental monitoring teams should be equipped with
multiple radios.
- Teams should be occasionally directed to ascertain the
approximate boundaries of the plume.
- The teams should be provided with environmental dosimeters, if
they are expected to replace those currently deployed in the
field.
- Teams should be promptly kept informed of all emergency
reclassifications and all protective actions being implemented
offsite.
g. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was located in a storage /
workshop area at the eastern end of the EOF building. This location
has been utilized as the licensee's JPIC for all exercises of the
Dresden and LaSalle County Stations' emergency plans subsequent to
June 1983. The staff's concerns regarding the JPIC's marginal accept-
ability, in terms of its size; inadequate soundproofing evident when
the building's heating, ventilation, air conditioning, or water
pumping equipment are operating; and its inadequate number of
electrical outlets for the expected amount of media equipment have
already been documented in Inspection Reports No. 373/84018(DRSS)
and No. 374/84024(DRSS). The staff understands that the licensee has
budgeted funds for improving this and its other JPIC facilities,
although no schedule has been established for planned improvements.
The licensee issued six press releases during the exercise. All but
the first release, which was issued by the CCC, were approved by the
RM. None of the press releases contained false information; however,
the use of the word " stable" in Press Release No. 4 when describing
j the core's condition was confusing. While this press release
correctly stated that no release had yet occurred, there was already
sufficient evidence of significant core degradation. Emergency class
definitions were included where appropriate in the press releases.
However, the General Emergency definition was incompletely stated
in Press Release No. 3. None of the press releases adequately
addressed the licensee's prognoses on scenario events, the serious-
ness of the events, or what activities were being taken to mitigate
the consequences of the accident.
Several problems were evident regarding the performance of the
licensee's technical spokesperson. First, several of the licensee's
press briefings were not well coordinated with those of the govern-
mental spokesperson. At the first briefing, the licensee
spokesperson read an outdated press release issued by the CCC which
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dealt with the Alert phase of the emergency. While the spokesperson
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said that an updated release was being prepared, his presentation
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was then followed by that of a State spokesperson who was prepared
to discuss the current Site Area Emergency situation. The licensee
1ater held a-briefing regarding the General Emergency very soon
after it had been declared; however, the State spokesperson was not
yet ready to follow with his presentation in response to this.
significant change of scenario events. The second major problem
1
with the performance of the technical spokesperson was that he failed
to anticipate some basic questions relative to the emergency
conditions and thuc was not readily able to answer the audience's
questions. Such basic questions addressed when had the Loss of
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Coolant Accident begun, and was the reactor core currently covered.
The spokesperson did, however, provide adequate answers to such
obvious questions at a later time.
I
i Such problems involving the performance of the licensee's technical
! spokespersons had been identified during several exercises at
the licensee's other nuclear generating facilities. By letter dated
September 5, 1985, the licensee has committed to complete several
specific corrective acticas to upgrade the capabilities of its
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technical spokespersons. This will consist of revising the selection
i criteria for technical spokespersons and providing expanded training.
The current scheduled completion date for these corrective actions is
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December 1986. As the inadequate performance of the licensee's
technical spokespersons has previously been identified as an exercise
,
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weakness and a schtdule for corrective actions has already been
i estaolished, the performance of the technical spokesperson at the 1985
i
Braidwood Exercise is not a new exercise weakness. However, the
- licensee's progress toward completing its commitments to improve the
!
capabilities of its technical spokespersons will be closely tracked
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as will adherence to scheduled corrective action completion dates.
!
Other problems evident in this exercise were that the spokesperson
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too often left the JPIC between press briefings, leaving no licensee
person obviously available to address media concerns in between press
briefings. Also, the building's ventilation and water pump equipment
was occasionally shut off to reduce background noise levels during
i
press briefings. The water pump equipment was restarted between
briefings when the building's water pressure was lost.
l Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered
l for improvement:
!
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e Additional attention should be paid to the contents of press
j releases so that all information is clearly stated and complete.
- Press releases should include, where appropriate, additional
. details to give some indications of the prognoses of the current
l situation, and activities to mitigate the consequences of the
event.
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- A knowledgeable licensee representatives should be clearly
designated and readily available within the JPIC at all times
when the technical spokesperson is absent from the JPIC.
5. Exit Interview
The inspectors held an exit interview on November 7, 1985 with those
licensee personnel identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors discussed
the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection. The licensee
agreed to consider the items discussed. The inspectors determined from
the licensee that none of the information discussed was proprietary in
nature.
Attachments:
1. Exercise Scope
of Participation
2. ExerciseObjectives
3. Exercise Narrative
Summary
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E94IDWOOD 1985 GSEP EXERCISE
' SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION
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Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Braidwood Station
exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization
and the off-site emergency response organization as appropriate,
subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe
efficient operation of Braidwood Station and other CECO nuclear
generating stations.
Activation of tne TSC and other on-site participants will oe
conducted on a real time basis during the day time hours. The
exerciseshiftwillreceivetheinitialscenarioinformation{and
respond accordingly.
The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group
will be prepositioneo close to Byron to permit use of Recovery Group
personnel from oistant locations.
The Corporate Command Center will be activated.
Commonwealth Edison will' demonstrate the capability to make
contact with contractors whose essistance would be required by the
simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense
of using contractor ser:!ces to simulate emergency response except
as prearranged specificali, for the exercise.
Commonwealth Edison vil! arrange to provide actual
transportation and comagiire: ion support in accordance with existing
agreements to the eF$($P $pi.:ifically prearranged for the exercise.
j Commonwealth Edison ffli E ,<1de unforeseen actual assistance only to
the extent the resources are available and do not hinder normal
operation of the company.
l
l On-site assemoly and accountability along with High Range
- Sampling System (HRSS) procedures will be simulated during the
!
exercise. Assembly and accountability will be demonstrated at a
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date ano time selected to minimize disruption of construction work
in progress. HRSS will be demonstrated upon the completion of the
system at the Braidwood Station.
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BRAIDWOOD 1985 GSEP EXERCISE !
OBJECTIVES l
Primary Objective:
Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth
Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan in cooperation with the
Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents to protect the public in
the event of a major accident at the Braidwood Station. This
capability will De demonstrated during the hours to qualify as a
day-time exercise in accordance with NRC guidance.
Supporting Objectives:
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1) Incident Assessment and Classification
a. Demonstrate the capaoility to assess the accident
conditions, to determine which Emergency Action ,
Level (EAL) has been reached, and to classify the
accident level correctly in accordance with GSEP.
2) Notification and Communication
a. Demonstrate tne capability to notify the .
principal offsite organizations within 15 minutes
of declaring an accioent classification.
b. Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC
within one hour of the initial incident.
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(CR)
c. Demonstrate the capability to contact
organizations that would normally assist in an
emergency, but are not participating in this
exercise (e.g. INPO, Murray & Trettel,
Westinghouse, etc.)
d. Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and
timely information so that reports may De made to
the emergency news center for press releases.
e. Demonstrate the ability to provice follow-up
information to the State in a timely manner.
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(EOF)
3) Radiological Assessment
a. Demonstrate the capability to calculate off-site
l cose projections.
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b. Demonstrate the capability of environmental
field teams to conduct field raoiation surveys
and collect air, liquid, vegetation and soil
samples when needed.
c. Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant
raciation protection activities.
d. Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations
with radiological survey information, trend this
information, and make appropriate
recommendations concerning protective actions.
4) Emergency Facilities
a. Demonstrate the capability to activate the
emergency organization and staff the nu~ clear
4
station emergency response facilities in
accordance with procedures during a day time
period.
b. Demonstrate througn aiscussion and staff
planning, the ability to perform a shift change
in the TSC, EOF and control room.
5) Emergency Direction and Control
a. Demonstrate the ability of the directors to
manage the emergency organizations in the
implementation of the GSEP.
b. Demonstrate the capability of cooroinating the
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direction of emergency response among CECO and
Illinois offsite command centers by using
Liasion personnel and communicators.
- (EOF)
6) Recovery and Re-entry
a. Demonstrate the capability of the emergency
response personnel to identify requirements,
, programs, and policies governing damage
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assessments and implementing procedures for
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recovery and re-entry.
l - (Groups that are primarily concerneo)
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( NOVEMBER 1985 EXERCISE
Narrative Stannary
IMITIAL SITUATION 0'700 - 0'115 (15 minute duration)
- Plant Status
Unit One: In operation at 100% power with a normal full power
electrical lineup with the exception of the IB Diesel Generator.
Surveillance testing of the Reactor Protection System was completed on the
previous shift. No power changes are anticipated. RCS activity is steady at
18 uci/gn. A tube leak of 0.15 gallon per minute atti;ibuted to tubes in the
la Steam Generator and well below Tech Spec limits is being tracked.
Unit Two: Shutdown in Mode 5 with major steam generator maintenance in
progress. Shutdown occurred within previous % hours following greater than
180 full power days of operation. Secondary plant maintenance is in progress
on the feedwater system and the turbine auxiliary systems.
- Service Report
Unit One: Diesel Generator la has been out of service for 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> for
turbocharoe- bearing changeout. It is_ estimated that three hours remain to
8
restore ic to service. 1B centrifugal charging pump was placed out of service
at 0500 today for work on the coupling. A Mini Purge is in progress to
balance containment pressure.
Unit Two: Steam Generator's 2A and 2B have tube plugging in progress
based upon previously scheduled repairs. Steam Generator 2C's secondary side
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is drained and repairs are in progress to a secondary side inspection aanway.
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- Precursor Events
Two coal powered stations on the grid have gone off the line for
emergency maintenance within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the Load Dispatcher has
advised that maximum power should be maintained on Unit one.
In the following zones of the fire protection system, a number of
ionization detectors but less than one-half the total for each zone, have been
reported as inoperable due to failure of their ionization detectors in the
surveillance test administered 11/4/85.
Zone 8 - 401' elevation
zone 9 - 401' elevation
Zone 10 - 383' elevation
zone 11 - 330' elevation
Zone 13 - 383' elevation
Zone 29 - 383' elevation
( Zone '76 - 426' elevation
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Generator fuel storage tank.At this time, investigatory work is being conducted in I
the last shift and is in the process of being replaced.The condens
instruments, on the average, were indicating 0.4% high.A calor
taken. No action has been
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UNUSUAL EVDIT (0715 - 0800) (45 minute duration)
t = + 15
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EAL 5A Fire.
10 minutes. Fire requires WRC notification if not identified within
located in the Unit 1 ESV Pump room (330'Heavy elevation).An
EP1B which iselectrical
smoke is carried
i IPM09J, zone 25; Aux Building HVAC system energized.through
Ten minutes later
annunciation on 2PM09J, zone 1*l. helping to localize the problem. Upon local
determination, the fire is classified as not requiring offsite assistance .
The non-safety related equipment within the tray is rendered inoperable.
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A1.ERT 0800 - 0900 (60 minute duration)
t = +60
EAL 16 loss of Primary Coolant.
A > 50 gym leakage _ increase in a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
period
flow, or VCT level changes. leak rate calculation, charging pump
as indicated by either
leak of approximately 55 gym to develop suddenly.A stressed weld in
high VCT make-up.and a Pressurizer level decrease are the initial indications f
the humidity (slowly). Area radiation monitors in containment trend up, as does
initiated. A power rampdown of approximately 12 Mw/ min is
NOTE:
When this occurs, valve Ivg005A will fail to shut.An automatic securing of Mi
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SITE EMERGENCY 0900 - 1030 (90 minute duration)
t = +120
EA1. 16 14ss of Primary Coolant. Primary system leakage is beyond makeup
capabilities of charging pumps.
The two inch cold leg bypass pipe shears with an instant leak rate of
approximately 1400 gym. Safety Injection is initiated either manually or
shortly thereafter automatically. High head SI flow is prevented from
entering the RCS by manual valves ISI 8810 A, B, C, and D, which have been
lined up in.the shut position instead of the open position. Initiation of
high head SI breaks loose a cap on the test connection in the line to these
valves, which allows flow through the line and out the test tee. Five minutes
after the initiation of the break, thermocouple and structural material broken
loose by the high velocity break flow lodges in the broken pipe and reduces
the break flow to 300 - 350 gpm. Shortly thereafter the primary pressure
begins to cycle between 1300 and 1550 PSIG as limited SI pump input and high
decay heat provide insufficient cooling for the core.
NOTE: Any attempt to depressurize the primary via the Pressurizer
PORV's during this time period will be met with failure. PORV 1 RY 455A is
inoperable due to a leaking diagram. PORV 1 RY 456 is inoperable due to a
(
bleed down of the nitrogen flask through a leaking check valve connection.
t = +130 (At 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> an electrical fire reoccurs this time in the safety
system, tripping Bus 141 on overcurrent. Temperature spikes greater than
15000F noted by mainboard annunciation occur on thermocouple readout in
certain areas. Core damage occurs in the form of rod bursts,
t = +165
"With the restoration of Bus 141 and the second Safety Injection pump,
some cooling begins to take place in the core, which up until now had been
voiding and flooding, voiding and flooding due to insufficient cooling and
deeper and deeper core uncovery (greater mass loss than mass input and little
cooling effect from voided steam generator tubes). Increased cooling to the
hotter core areas, causes stress damage to the marginal clad / fuel positions,
resulting in more fission product release to the coolant and containment."
t = +180
Containment Radiation monitors indicates levels inside in excess of
4,000 R/hr.
t = +195
Coolant grab sample results delivered. [ Greater than 300 uci/gm].
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GENERAL EMERGENCY 1030 - 1330 (210 minute duration)
t = +210
EAL 24 Loss of Fission Product Barriers.
A. > 2.0E 3 R/hr Primary containment Radiation, bhp.
B. Loss of two of the following three fission product barriers
with an imminent loss of the third barrier:
1. cladding; grab sample results > 300 uci/gm equivalent of
. 1-131,
a) containment pressure > 5 psig 3,gg,
b) containment temperature > 1500 F gnd,
c) containment humidity > 50%.
a) containment pressure > 50 psig g ,
b) Containment temperature > 2800 F E,
c) Loss of Containment integrity when containment integrity
, is required.
One containment Purge path valve (1VQ 005A) is already open. Indication
of mid position is seen for valve IV9005B.
t = +250
With the decrease in RCS pressures, the debris partially blocking the *
break flow shifts positions, and the leak increases to 1100-1200 gym. Break '
flow and charging flow counterbalance each other as cooling continues.
t = +315
Release path open via remaining purge valve (1VQ 005C) failing -
neophrene/ rubber seal fails under heat and pressure. Containment begins
venting to atmosphere through the path outlined above, an open exhaust damper,
and out the plant vent stack.
At 1345 valve IV9005A, purge valve, returns to it's shut position, thus
terminating the release.
RECOVERY / REENTRY (1430)
At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, a. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jtamp occurs. The plant condition is
deemed stable, with sufficient subcooling, containment conditions under
( control (temperature, pressure, hydrogen levels, and sump recirculation in
progress.) No further indications of fire in the electrical system are found,
and radiation levels in containment have stabilized.
DSV/1mk/6342E/52 .
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DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION
Braidwood
Docket No. 50-456-457
Comonwealth Edison Company
Region III, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comission
Dr. A. Dixon Callihan
Douglass W. Cassel, Esq.
Dr. Richard F. Cole
Lorraine Creek
H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.
Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Herbert Grossman
Erie Jones
Rebecca J. Lauer, Esq.
Ms. Bridget Little Rorem
Elena Z. Kezelis, Esq.
Jane M. Wicher
Mr. William Kortier
C. Allen Bock
'lhmas J, Gordon
Mr. Edward R. Crass
U. S. Koclear Regulatory Cannision'.
Resident Inspectors Office
ACRS (10)
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