ML20135H673

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SALP Rept 50-440/85-01 for Jan 1984 - June 1985.Lack of Mgt Attention to Development of Adequate Testing Procedures & Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations Identified. QA Program Not Effective in Preventing Recurrence
ML20135H673
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/18/1985
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135H668 List:
References
50-440-85-01, 50-440-85-1, NUDOCS 8509240120
Download: ML20135H673 (38)


See also: IR 05000440/1985001

Text

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SALP 5

SALP BOARD REPORT

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.

REGION-III '

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

50-440/85001

Inspection Report

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

Name of Licensee

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1

Name of Facility

January 1, 1984 - June 30, 1985

Assessment Period-

.

8509240120 850918

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ADOCK O j

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an

integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and data on a

~

periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this infor-

mation. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to ensure

compliance.with NRC rules and regulations. SALP is intended to be sufficiently

diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to

provide meaningful guidance to the licensee's management to promote quality

and safety of plant construction and operation.

An NRC SALP Board, ccmposed of the staff members listed below, met on

! August 15, 1985, to review the collection of performance observations and -

data to assess the licensee's performance in accordance with the guidance

in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."

A summary.of the guidance and evaluation criteria is provided in Section II

of this report.

This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety perfor-

mance at Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 for the period January 1,1984,

through June 30, 1985.

Personnel attending the SALP Board for Perry Nuclear Power Plant:

Name Title

J. G. Keppler Regional Administrator

A. B. Davis Deputy Regional Administrator

C. E. Norelius Director, DRP

C. J. Paperiello Director, DRS

J. F. Streeter Technical Assistant, DRS

L. A. Reyes Branch Chief, DRS

W. D. Shafer Branch Chief, DRSS

J. J. Harrison Branch Chief, DRS

R. F. Warnick- Branch Chief, DRP

B. J. Youngblood Branch Chief, NRR

R. C. Knop Section Chief, DRP

M. A. Ring Section Chief, DRS

C. C. Williams Section Chief, DRS

F. C. Hawkins Section Chief, DRS

J. J. Stefano Project Manager, NRR

J. A. Grobe Senior Resident Inspector, DRP

J. W. McCormick-Barger Project Manager / Inspector, DRP

R. A. Westberg Reactor Inspector, DRS

W. G. Snell Emergency Preparedness

Analyst, DRSS

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- II. CRITERIA

)

The licensee's performance is assessed in selected functional areas i

depending on whether the facility is in a construction,. pre-operational,

or operating phase. Each functional area normally represents areas

significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal

programmatic areas. Some functional areas may not be assessed because

of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations.

Special areas may be added to highlight significant observations.

One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess

each functional area.

1. Management involvement in assuring quality.

2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.

4. Enforcement history.

5. Reporting and analysis of events.

6. Staffing (including management).

7. Training effectiveness and qualification.

However, the SALP Board is not limited to these criteria and others may

have been used where appropriate. .

Based upon the SALP Board's assessment, each functional area evaluated is

classified into one of three performance categories. The definition of

these performance categories is:

Category 1: Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee manage-

ment attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear

safety. Licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high

level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction

is being achieved.

Category 2: NRC attention sho~uld be maintained at normal levels. Licen-

see management attention and involvement are evident and management is

concerned with nuclear safety. Licensee resources are adequate and are

reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to

operational safety or-construction is being achieved.

Category 3: Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licen- ,

see management attention and involvement is acceptable and considers l

nuclear safety, but weaknesses are' evident. Licensee resources appear to

be strained or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory

performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being

achieved.

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' Trend: -.The"SALP' Board has also categorized the performance trend in each

functional area rated over the course'of the SALP assessment period. The-

. categorization describes the general .or prevailing tendency (the perfor-

mance gradient) during the SALP period.

'

The performance trends are

defined as follows:

Improved: Licensee performance has generally-improved over the course

of the SALP assessment period.

Same: Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over

the course of the SALP assessment period.

Declined: Licensee performance has generally declined over the course

of the SALP assessment period.

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III. SU N RY OF RESULTS

The licensee's performance was found to be acceptable. The licensee was

found to exhibit an aggressive management attitude and demonstrated a high

level of performance in the (1) Containment and Other Safety-Related Struc-

tures, (2) Safety-Related Components, (3) Instrument and Control Systems,

and (4) Emergency Preparedness functional areas. Performance in the

Preoperational Testing area was found to need increased management atten-

tion. Particular attention to Preoperational Quality Assurance is needed

to help reverse the negative trend in performance in this area. Perfor-

mance in.the Licensing. area would also be. enhanced by increased management

involvement and increased staffing. Increased management responsiveness

to operational needs has been apparent during the latter part of the

assessment period. With the exception of the Preoperational Testing area,

management has been responsive to NRC findings and concerns and enforcement

history has been good during the SALP period.

Rating Rating

Last This

Functional Area Period Period Trend

A. Containment and Other 1 1 Same

Safety-Related

Structures

B. Piping Systems and Supports 2 2 Improved

C. Safety-Related Components 2 1 Same

D. Electrical. Power Supply 2 2 Improved

and Distribution

E. Instrument and Control 2 1 Same

Systems

F. Quality Programs and 2 2 Same

Administrative Controls

Affecting Quality

G. Licensing Activities 2. 2 Declined

H. Preoperational Testing NR 3 Declined

I. Radiological Controls 2 2 Improved

J. Fire Protection NR 2 Not Rated

-- K. . Emergency Preparedness NR 1 Same

L. Security NR 2 Improved

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Rating _

Rating  !

-Last

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Functional-Area Period Period Trend

Operational Readiness'

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M. NR 2 Same

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.NR = not rated.

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b IV.' PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

i

A. 'C_ontainment and other Safety-Related Structures

-1. Analysis

4- Examination of this functional area consisted of three inspec-

1L tions by regional based-inspectors and portions of seven

, inspections by the resident inspection staff. . Areas examined

4- included (1) walkdown of the containment and auxiliary building;

!' (2) observation of installed penetrations in containment; (3)

!

concrete drilling and coring; (4): review of the results of a

limited re-inspection.of structural steel; connections; (5)

reworked safety-related.HVAC support structure welds and asso-

}- ciated ~ documentation; (6) documentation concerning control rod

guide tube welds.to-stub tubes.in the bottom head of the reactor ,

i vessel;:(7) observation of placement of portions of concrete;

and (8) previous inspection findings and 10 CFR 50.55(e) items.

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One; violation was_ identified relative to the control over

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structural steel installation:

<

Severity Level IV - Failure to implement corrective- -

. action to prevent recurrence of-improper reinstallation -

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of structural steel bolting (50 440/84022).

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The licensee took corre'ctive action including revision of

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procedures governing the issuance and review of nonconformance

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reports and training personnel responsible for disposition,

review,'and approval-of nonconformance reports.to_the new

j- requirements of the project procedures. The-licensee also ,

reviewed all nonconformance. reports for'an approximate one'

year period to ensure that the probles was not; generic.

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The bolting problem indicated a programmatic weakness in the '

removal and re-installation of: structural steel. As a~ result,-

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a limited re-inspection of bolted connections.was performed in

? .the Auxiliary, Reactor, and.Radwaste Buildings by the licensee.

E Although some bolted connections were found to be inadequate,

the bolting problem did not appear.to be widespread.

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Licensee resources? appeared to'be appropriate for the activities

being performed in this-area. Records. reviewed during these

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i . inspections were foundLto be complete, well maintained; and

. easily retrievable. Observations' indicate l personnel have an

-adequate understanding of work practices and that procedures

, . were adhered to. Deficiencies, when identified,'were-promptly.

reported to. the staff.'and the analyses of these reported defi-

ciencies were consistently found to be adequate. Management >

1showed aggressive involvement in the resolution of identified

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deficiencies. -

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2. Conclusion

. . The'l_icensee is rated Category 1 in this area. This'is the same

1

rating as the previous assessment period. Licensee performance

has remained essentially constant over the course of the SALP

i- assessment period.

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3. Board Recommendations

None.

~B. Piping Systems and Supports

l 1. Analysis -

Construction was essentially complete. Examination of this

functional area consisted of nin<! inspections by regional based

'

inspectors and one inspection by the resident inspection staff.

Areas examined for reactor coolant pressure boundary and other

safety related piping included (1) observation of inprocess

. welding; (2) visual examination of completed welds and weld

repairs; (3) selected review of procedures and documentation

related to fabrication, installation, welding, and heat treat-

ment; (4) review of the applicability to the Perry plant of

deficiencies identified at the'Vogtle plant concerning shop

, welds in spool pieces fabricated by Pullman Power Products;.

I

(5) review of.ASME Code N-5 Data Reports; (G) review of ultra-

sonic examinations performed on recirculation system piping

welds susceptible to intergranular stress' corrosion cracking,

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and piping welds prepared with corrosion resistant cladding;

! (7) review of licensee actions related to previous inspection

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findings; (8) review of Reactor Coolant System, hydrostatic test

procedure and.results; (9) observation'of.the-iteactor Coolant

' System hydrostatic test; and (10) examination of allegations

brought to the attention of the NRC. 'No violations or devia-

tions were identified.

For the areas examined, the inspectors determinsd that the

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.ranagement control systems aggressively addressed nuclear

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' safety and the personnel and material. certifications were

current and, complete. Records were found to be complete,.well

maintained,.and easily retrievable. Discussions-with licensee

3 and contractor personnel-indicatedithat they were; knowledgeable

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in their- job. 2The two violations' identified 'during. th'e last

r. - assessment period by the Construction Appraisal-Team were

promptly corrected during that assessment period and no

recurrence has been'found.

$ iA11egation'sreviewed'relatedprimarilyto(i)theus'eofthe 1

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wrong diameter weld rod on piping hangers; (2) the accuracy of '

assumptions and' calculations by Gilbert Associates staff during

othe' design and verification of pipe-supports; and (3) pipe-

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. support 2G42H001 n'ot being installed as required. LAllegations

(1) and (2) above could not be substantiated. Allegation (3).

was partially substantiated; however, the allegation concerned

a non-safety related pipe support.

The NRC's Integrated Design Inspection (IDI) team found some

weaknesses in the design process in this assessment area which

'

included: (1) piping stress analyses for the faulted conditions

~

did not always consider piping thermal stress in nozzle loadings

on NSSS equipment, as required by-licensing commitments; and (2)

piping stress analysis modeled equipment as rigid when the equip-

ment had a frequency more appropriate to dynamic modeling.

These weaknesses should have been identified through licensee

audits and reflects upon management involvement and control in

assuring ~ quality. Licensee's responsiveness in correcting the

problems identified by the IDI and expanding the scope to include

systems not reviewed by the IDI, indicated an aggressive

approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety stand-

point. All findings were resolved to the satisfaction of the

IDI team by the end of the assessment period.

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. This is the

same rating as in the previous assessment period. Licensee

performance has generally improved over the course of the SALP

assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

C. Safety Related Components

1. Analysis

Construction was essentially complete prior to the assessment

period, and examination of this functional area was somewhat

limited. It_ consisted of one inspection by regional based

inspectors and portions of three inspections by the. resident

inspection staff. Areas examined included (1) observation of

4- completed work; (2) review of selected quality records related

to material certification, installation and cleanliness of

installed components; (3) observation of inspection and test

activities associated with the quality revalidation program .

for the Division I and II standby power source Transamerica

Delaval Inc. (TDI) diesel engines; (4) review of test proce-

dures and results of the TDI diesel engine-testing; and (5)

review of test procedures, observation of testing, and review

of results for testing of the Division III High Pressure Core

Spray System General Motors Electromotive Division diesel

engine. No violations or deviations were identified,

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In addition to regional inspections, the integrated design

inspection team performed an evaluation of the design adequacy

of specific Seismic Category 1 components. Although minor

deficiencies concerning ball joints and pump qualifications

were identified, the licensee / Architect Engineer took prompt

corrective action in-resolving these concerns. Reviews of

safety-related component seismic and environmental qualifica-

tions were also performed and found to be well documented

and adequate.

Problems identified during the previous SALP assessment period

were adequately resolved by the licensee and not found to have

recurred during this assessment period. Licensee management

was aggressive in identifying and resolving deficiencies during

the assessment period. This was particularly evident by the

prompt reporting of vendor identified material / component dis-

crepancies and the high quality of the analysis and approach to

resolving these problems. The prompt and adequate resolution of

the TDI diesel engine concerns was another example of the licen-

see's high level of involvement and commitment to assuring a

quality plant.' Staffing in this area was ample and effective

in achieving well documented sound resolutions to identified

deficiencies.

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 1 in this area. The licensee

was rated a Category 2 during the last assessment period.

Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over

the course of the SALP assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

D. Electrical Power Supply and Distribution

1. Analysis

Portions of fourteen inspections were performed by region based

inspectors and the resident inspection staff of activities in

this functional area. These inspections included (1) examination

.of cable tray and conduit installations; (2) review of welding

processes; (3) examination of cable installation and termina-

tion;'(4) review of quality assurance implementing procedures;

(5) review of equipment and materials qualification; and. (6)

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' review of. quality assurance documentation.

Also, due to problems with L. K. Comstock welding procedures

identified at another site, a comprehensive review of the

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control of welding ~ processes for electrical cable trays and

supports was performed. All welding procedures were reviewed

and approximately'300 welds were visually examined. 'The general ] ,

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workmanship of all welds appeared'to be acceptable.

Three-violations were' identified:

, (a) Severity Level,V - Inadequate' documentation of electrical

insoections (50-440/84007).

t (b); Severity Level..IV - Inadequate design-review and veri-

fication of safety-related schematic and wiring diagrams

(50-440/84007).

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(c) Severity' Level IV - Programmatic violation with four
examples of a failure ~to control the welding process'

(50-440/85043). '

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The first two violations were isolated and the-licensee took. 4

l prompt and effective corrective action to resolve the'defici-  !

E encies. The licensee's corrective action on the third violation-

will be reviewed'during a' subsequent. inspection prior to fuel

1- - load. This violation was not repetitive of violations-identi-

fied during the previous assessment period and the licensee

has initiated corrective action.

i Additionally, an Integrated Design Inspection was conducted

- during the SALP. period. The IDI included an examination of.

licensee activities in design, design bases, design procedures,

records, and as-installed systems to determine whether regulatory

- requirements and design bases specifiedein~the li. cense applica--

'

, tion had' been correctly translated into 'as-built. design, correct -

i design.information had been provided to the responsible design

4

. organizations, and sufficient technical' guidance to perform

assigned engineering functions.and design controls equivalent to-  ;
original design processes was-available for design changes

including field changes. Issues identified by;the integrated

i

design inspection were promptly. resolved to the satisfaction '

of the team inspectors with the exception'of!the' voltage drop

, issue'which resulted in'the initiation of seve'ral-construction

L deficiency reports pursuant to 10'CFR 50.55(e). The voltage

drop issue concerned long cable-length and the.effect of asso-

ciated equipment'during: degraded supply voltage conditions.

, --After.an extensive ~ eval.uation by theilicensee, components in-

j- three systems'were found to require wiring'modificationssto-

preclude possible adverse.a'ffects'~on the' operation of certain

Region based ~ inspections confirmed,the pre L i

- plant equipment.

existence of a program implemented by the licensee intended to
Lidentify .these conditions l prior to reactor operation. Further

i' NRC;reviewlof these' construction deficiency reports are

required prior to fuel load. '

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In general the licensee and contractor staffs appeared to be

adequate during the SALP period in this functional area. -At

~the end of the appraisal period electrical installation activity '

was virtually complete.

]

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. This is the

same. rating as the previous assessment period. Licensee

i performance has generally improved over the course of the SALP

,

assessment period.

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_ 3. Board Recommendations

. 'None.

l E. Instrument and Control Systems

! l'. -Analysis;

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Examination.of this functional' area included eight inspections

L 'by-reofonal based inspectors. The inspections included (1) the-

examination of the licensee's control of activities involving

4

installation of materials.and components including direct in' spec-

,

tion of in process and. completed work; (2) system walkdowns;

i. (3) examination of quality assurance records including equipment-

qualification documentation; and (4) review of quality control

activities.

.In addition to the regional inspections, an Integrated Design

i. ' Inspection (IDI) was performed during this appraisal period.

The integrated design inspection examined (1) design control

'

procedures; (2) general and.' specific. design criteria; (3) func-

tional" system requirements;--(4) logic. diagrams; (5)~ piping and

instrument. system diagrams; (6)-instrument procurement specifica-

.tionst and (7) instrument qualification reports. One weakness
. identified during the IDI team inspection was the unavailability

l- of-calculations and supporting documentation for instrument' set -

point values. Instrument setpoint.value validation, following

the-General Electric-Instrument Setpoint Methodology,.isLa

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generic ~ problem at General Electric facilities and has been an

Longoing process which is currently being reviewed by the NRC.

All issues raised by the' team were promptly resolved to the;

1- satisfaction'of the team members.-

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- No violations of.NRC: requirements or deviations from commitments

. ' were identified in this functional. area. - In addition; procedural

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weaknesses identified during the previous assessment period have

l' not recurred indicating'that the licensee's correctiva actions

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, were adequate and lasting... ,

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The licensee was found to have an adequate and well trained

staff in this assessment area. -Management involvement par-

ticularly in the prompt resolution of construction deficiencies

and IDI-findings has indicated an aggressive and high level

of performance with respect to construction of the plant and

. assuring quality.

2. Conclusions

The licensee is rated Category 1 in this functional area.

The licensee was rated a Category 2 during the last assess-

ment period. Licensee performance has remained essentially

constant over.the course of the SALP assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

F. Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality

'

1. Analysis

In this functional area, four inspections were conducted by

regional based personnel and portions of nine inspections were

conducted by the resident inspection staff during the assessment

period. These inspections were performed to determine the ade-

.quacy.of the written operational Quality Assurance Program in

the following areas: (1).preoperational testing; (2) audits;

~(3) QA/QC administration; (4) document control; (5) maintenance;

(6) design changes and modifications; (7) surveillance testing;

(8) procurement; (9) receipt, storage, and handling of equipment

and materials; (10) records; (11) test and measuring equipment;

(12) operating staff training; and (13) onsite review committee

activities,

c One violation was identified:

Severity Level V - Failure to perform procurement activi-

ties in accordance with procedures and failure to-include

appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria

in procurement procedures (50-440/85014).

-This item did have some significance, in that commercial grade

hardware of-indeterminate quality could have been installed in

safety-related systems. The licensee's' proposed corrective

action on this-item involving procedural changes,-audits of'

vendors, and inspection and testing of comme'rcial grade hardware ,

should resolve this issue.

'

.The promptness and extent of licensee corrective action in

resolving NRC- open and unresolved items Lidentified prior to -

and during the assessment period, generally indicated appro -

priate management involvement. However, problems identified

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.in the'preoperational-testing assessment area (Section H)

were not adequately addressed when initially identified in

that measures.taken to preclude recurrence were not adequate.

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This indicated a weakness _in the preoperational quality-

assurance implementation. '

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+ The written quality-programs were found to be well defined and

stated; however, it is too early to fully assess the implemen-

-tation of the QA program for operations. This functional ~ area

is well staffed by knowledgeable, dedicated personnel.

In addition to the regional inspections, an Integrated Design

?

Inspection (IDI) was performed during the appraisal period.

?

Activities included examination of (1) design bases; (2) design

. procedures; (3) records; and (4) systems as installed in the

_

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r plant. Emphasis was placed on reviewing the-adequacy of-design-

{ details as a means of measuring how well the design process had

! functioned for the selected samples.

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Although no violations of NRC requirements were identified from

the IDI, technical issues were found which' indicated a weakness

in the. licensee's management involvement and control in assuring

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quality design, particularly concerning the audit program. The

responsiveness of the licensee and Gilbert Associates Inc. in

taking broad corrective actions to address the problems identi-

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fied by the IDI reflects favorably upon the licensee's approach.

to resol.ution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

-2. Conclusion-

The licensee is rated Category 2 in-this area. This is the same

rating as'in the previous assessment period. Licensee perfor-

i mance has generally remained constant over the course of the

j iSALP. assessment period.

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-3. Board Recommendations

The Board. recommends that I the licensee. review the adequacy of

its quality assurance and management systems to promptly

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identify and correct problems such as those found in the-

preoperational" testing assessment area.

G. Licensing Activities

1. Analysis

Evaluation of the licensee's performance for this rating period

involvedLthe areas of-(1)~ management involvement and control in

-assuring quality;-(2) licensee's approach.to the resolution of

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technical issues; (3) licensee's responsiveness ~to NRC initia-

tives; (4)' projected staffing in the emergency planning'and

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licensing organizations; and (5) training of plant operators

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in-accordance'with the guidance in NRC Generic Letter 84-16. .i

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With respect to approach to resolving technical issues, the

licensee was found to be thoroughly competent and understanding

~o f technical issues to be resolved in obtaining an operating

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license. The performance of the technical staff was better.than- ,

2 average in addressing difficult open licensing issues, such as: l

' reliability of TDI diesel' engines; hydrogen control system.

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design; qualification of safety-related mechani_ cal and-elec-

trical equipment; containment purge; suppression pool dynamic

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loads; and emergency plans. The results of_the licensee's

, resolution were documented in Supplemental Safety Evaluation

Report Nos. 4, 5 and 6 issued during the assessment period. The

licensee's technical competence was also quite evident and

{ instrumental ir.~the timely litigation of contention issues at

3

the licensing board hearings in April and May 1985. Responsive-

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ness to NRC_ initiatives has~been most satisfactory in that-the

licens~ee is always ready to meet with the staff', often generating

. meetings themselves, to ensure a correct response to NRC needs.

! Examples of this were most evident'in the preparation of the

- NRC staff's equipment qualification files which resulted in a

relatively deficiency-freeiequipment qualification audit.

)' Assessments of the licensee's staffing and training were limited

, to plant operators' conformance with the guidelines of NRC

Generic Letter 84-16,-and the-licensing organization.~ Perfor-

mance.in these areas was-~found to'be acceptable. =However, '

F

contrary to past performance ~, the CEI licensing organization

missed several~ commitments in providing information required by

- the NRR staff for. completing their reviews. This occurred

1 during the.last three months of this assessment period. We

? believe that this1is attributable to.the increased ~ activities

, and often concurrent and-conflicting _ matters which can be

experienced when a plant is to receiv'e an operating license.

< While this has:not had a significant impact on the NRR staff's

-ability to support project schedules, failure to reverse this

condition could impact fuel load schedules.-. Additional =

, resources are needed to mitigate peaking workloads through

,

compl.etion of the Perry project.

t

. The primary weakness was found to be in the area.of management

control to ensure quality. While the licensee.has demonstrated

strong participation in. licensing ~ activities and is abreast of'

~

4 current and anticipated licensing actions, there has been some-

. inconsistency in~ documenting commitments to the NRC. This- -

'

Lincludes Regulatory Guides in the FSAR,-numerous _ deficiencies

.found during the;NRC ' Integrated Design Inspection, :and problems

with_the FSAR description of the preoperational test program.

The ' staff' believes that' errors- could have been avoided with'a

' ore vigorous control _by manageme t to assure quality of FSAR

m _

. commitments.

l

.

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. , .

-w,- V t T * *'e -

T '-* b& '-*v - y e 3w v r4< - ~ =hw mr-a F - ' + e rm e v-d m * 'e -

.

One Severity Level IV violation was issued as a result of a ,

motion,-dated ~ April 28, 1983, filed before the Atomic Safety 1

and Licensing Board concerning a material false statement that

had.been made in the licensee's application concerning the use

of herbicides to control vegetation along. transmission lines

(50-440/84006). The licensee's initial incomplete statement

.and its failure to correct the staff's use of the licensee's

statement in the Final Environmental Statement, did not have

significant regulatory impact. -This was considered to be an

isolated occurrence.

2. Conclusion

An overall Category.2 rating is assigned the licensee for this

rating period. Thi's is the same rating as the previous assess-

ment period. Licensee performance has generally declined during

the SALP assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations

The licensee should enhance its management control of the Perry

project to ensure quality in addressing licensing issues to

attain a higher performance rating. Assurance of appropric.te

resources in the licensing organization is also recommended

during the time remaining for licensing of the plant.

H. .P_reoperational Testing

1. Analysis

'

During this assessment period region based inspectors performed

five inspections and resident inspectors performed portions of

nine inspections in this functional area. The inspection effort

included (1) review of administrative controls and implementing

._

procedures; (2) detailed reviews of preoperational test proce-

dures and results; (3) preoperational test witnessing; (4)

independent inspection; and (5) followup 'of previous inspection

items.

Thirteen violations were identified as follows:

a. Severity Level IV - Failure to properly implement the

- test program by not properly ver.ifying instrument air

cleanliness specification:; (50-440/84015).

b. Severity Level V - Failure to properly implement juris-

dictional tagging controls in the installation of juris-

.dictional tags and dots on thirteen safety-related 480

volt motor control center compartments (50-440/84022).

15

.- - _ ._ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - _ - _

_

.

c. Severity Level IV - Test program not properly identified

and documented to facilitate tracking. The containment I

atmosphere monitoring system, motor control centers and

120, 240, and 480 distribution systems, seismic monitoring

system, and feedwater leakage control system were not

included on the preoperational test program " Software

Status Report"~as requiring preoperational tests

(50-440/84022).

d. Severity Level-IV - Preoperational test procedures

1821B-P001, " Automatic Depressurization System / Safety

Relief Valves",.and 1P57-P001, " Safety Related Instrument

Air System", were determined to be inadequate to properly

test system design requirements (50-440/85002).

e. Severity Level V - Failure to implement program require-

ments pertaining to Alarm Response Instructions (50-440/

85013).

f. Severity Level V - Failure to adhere to jurisdictional

program controls with regard to tagging for the hydrogen

recombiner system and emergency closed cooling water

system. In addition, jurisdictional controls were violated

when a recirculation flow control valve cable was discon-

nected without the knowledge of the_ Nuclear Test Section

(50-440/85013).

g. Severity Level IV - Failure to implement applicable regu-

latory requirements in preoperational test procedures

OM25/26-P001, " Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air

Conditioning and Emergency Recirculation System", IM98-P001,

" Supplementary Charcoal and HEPA Filter Ef'iciency Test",

and generic test procedure GEN-M-016, " Test Balancing (Air)"

(50-440/85013). Further examples of this violation were

delineated in a subsequent inspection (50-440/85017) in

that test precedures 1833-P001, " Recirculation Flow Control

Valves", and 1E12-P001 " Residual Heat Removal System", were

also determined to be inadequate.

h. Severity' Level V - Administrative controls were inadequate

to control test performance sequence of testing (50-440/

85017).

i. Severity Level V - Required pre-test check list verifica-

tions were inadequately accomplished to ensure design-

changes were incorporated into test procedure 1E12-P001,

" Residual Heat Removal System" and to ensure that lifted

leads and jumpers had been reviewed for impact on testing

of procedure 1R43-P001, " Division I_ Standby Diesel

Generator",~(50-440/85017).

j. Severity Level IV - The Low Pressure Core Spray Sys'. . was

not operated in accordance with procedures (50-440/6.,a 7).

16

L

y ._

,

1

-k. Severity Level IV - Inadequate adsinistrative controls

.for. integrated run in testing activities-performed under

control of Temporary Operating Instructions. This-was

exemplified by two events which occurred under this type

of testing: (1).an inadvertent containment spray actua-

tion, and (2) exceeding the design. pressure of the Emer-

gency Service Water Heat Exchangers (50-440/85017).

1. Severity Level V - Failure to adhere to program. require-

ments for conducting annual evaluations to. determine

continued individual certifications (50-440/85029).

' m. Severity Level V - Preoperational~ test procedure 1M15-P001,

" Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System", was determined to-

be inadequate.in that it did.not include a section for

system restoration (50-440/85029).

These violations.can be' categorized into three general areas of

-(1) inadequate. administrative controls; (2)' failure to adhere to

program requirements'and controls; and (3) inadequate preopera-

tional test procedures. The identified violations encompass a-

wide range of program areas representing fundamental aspects of

the. test program and signify a serious concern pertaining to

overall program implementation'.

As a result of these problems,.a management meeting (Inspection

Report No,. 50-440/8f,036) was conducted'on June'3, 1985, to'

discuss the excessive number of violations, the. increasing rate

of violation _of regulatory requirements, the major concern of

inadequate procedures, misleading licensee statements / commit-

ments, inadequate or minimal corrective' actions, untimely

corrective actions, and non-responsiveness to NRC concerns. The

licensee has implemented aggressive corrective actions.to address

the concerns presented at the management meeting.' Corrective

actions include a detailed search ofzlicensing documentation to

identify commitments and their basis,La detailed re-review of

all preoperational test procedures and'other procedures affecting

test results, formalization'of-onsite verbal communication with

written followup, and restructuring test management to ens'ure-

timely'and thorough corrective action in response to NRC'

findings. An overview of this' corrective' action is included.in

Inspection Report ~No. 50-440/85036. The' effectiveness of.these.

actions will be evaluated during the next assessment period.

~

' Staffing including management'at the end of.the assessment-

- period appeared to be adequate. Training effectiveness:and

qualification:of test personnel was.the subject'of Violation 1-

and may have contributed to Violations f, j, and k. These areas

.are.also expected to be more closely examined'during the next'

assessment' period.

17

s..

r

- _

e

i

i

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 3-in this area due to the number

of violations, the majority of which were issued in the latter

half of the assessment period, and the wide range of fundamental  !

program aspects t.hese violations represent which indicates a

basic weakness in the preoperational test program implementation.

The licensee was not rated in this area in the previous assess-

ment because no inspections were performed. Licensee perfor-

'mance has generally declined over the' course of the SALP assess-

ment period.

3. Board Recommendations

The. board recommends that the licensee continue the high level

of management attention developed as a result of the June 3,

1985, management meeting to ensure responsiveness to NRC

concerns and proper and continued implementation of corrective

measures pertaining to the test program. In consideration of

the rapid and intense testing schedule the licensee has

implemented, the current high level of NRC attention should be

maintained.

I. Radiological Controls

1. Analysis '

Five preoperational inspections of-this functional area by

regional specialists and portions of one inspection by the '

resident inspection staff were conducted during the assessment

period. The inspections covered (1) radiation protection; (2)

radiological environmental monitoring Program (REMP); (3) con-

firmatory measurements' programs; and (4) implementation of

radiological protection measures during initial fuel receipt.

No violations were identified.

Since the last assessment period, continued management attention

to the staffing and development of the radiation protection

program has resulted in significant progress-in program develop-

ment. Staffing of the health physics unit is nearly completed-

as is procedure development-and equipment readiness.' Health

physics unit personnel are adequately experienced and. trained.

Health physics related training programs have been developed

and implemented, and appear good. INP0 accreditation of train-

ing programs is being sought. The licensee has demonstrated a

willingness to correct identified problems and to perform

reviews necessary to determine and demonstrate compliance with-

requirements. -Adequate manpower is being~ utilized to perform

the necessary tasks and reviews.

18

o )

l

.

,

Office. space for health physics and chemistry personnel is tight.

Additional space is being made available by alteration of space

adjacent _to the health physics and chemistry facilities.

Organization,-training, an'd staffing of.the chemistry group

appear adequate to meet FSAR requirements'. Two supervisors

for the chemistry laboratories and counting room meet ANSI /ANS

3.1 qualifications. They-are supported by_two chemists with-

Bachelors' degrees and twelve technicians,~mostly with nuclear

navy experience. A satisfactory formal training program on

-chemistry and technical systems is underway along with on-the-

job qualifications in performing required analyses. This group

was augmented by;six new technicians.

Chemistry laboratories and equipment are adequate. Gross alpha

and gross beta _ counting capability ~in the counting room was

limited _but the licensee indicated that a_ backup counter used

by the radiation protection group would be available if needed.

Instruments were_being calibrated in accordance with procedures

and quality controls were being maintained on all counting

equipment. However,_ implementation of a'QC program to test

technician proficiency by..using blind or spiked samples, estab-

lished in May 1984, was. delayed until the second quarter of

1985 and will be reviewed subsequent to the assessment period.

-

The licensee has demonstrated capability at performing satis-

factory analyses of radiological samples. Twelve agreements

in-twelve confirmatory measurement comparisons on spiked air

particulates and charcoal filters, and five. agreements in five

comparisons for tritium,. strontium, and gamma emitters on a

spiked liquid sample were achi.eved by the licensee.

~

Licensee implementation of the pre-operational radiological

environmental monitoring program (REMP) has generally been

adequate. Responsibility for.. implementation.and review are

defined in licensee procedures and audits are being perfotaed

of the REMP contractor. Sampling procedures ~ exist in draft

form and were awaiting final management approval. A replacement

REMP contractor was engaged when the original contractor

discontinued providing laboratory analytical-services in

August 1984. The.riew contractor,' Applied Sciencs Laboratory

(ASL), had submitted QA plans and procedures to meet Regulatory

-Guide-4.15 in response to_a licensee pre-acceptance audit. A

followup audit was performed in March 1985 to close out' audit-

findings prior to putting' ASL on the approved vendors list.

~

, .

2. Conclusion

The; licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. This~is the

_

,

same rating as-the previous' assessment period. ' Licensee per-

formance has generally improved' aver.the course of the'SALP~

assessment. period. ,

i

(191

E

.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

J. ' Fire Protection

1. Analysis

During this assessment ~ period, one inspection by Region III I

based inspectors and their consultants was performed to deter- l

mine the licensee's progress in implementing the applicable I

requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and their fire protection

pre-operational test program and a review of allegations received

by the NRC relative to fire barrier seals. In addition, the

resident inspector reviewed preparations for department fire

brigade training including the training program and equipment

to be used which was generally found to be acceptable. No vio-

lations were identified.

Based on the regional inspection, it was determined that the

licensee was making satisfactory progress in implementing the

applicable sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and the fire

protection pre-operational test program. Licensee management

was involved in fire protection, and adequate staffing including

a fire protection engineer, was assigned. Numerous items remain

to be completed. Items to be completed include installation of

certain fire barriers, installation of automatic sprinklers in

areas containing safe shutdown equipment; rerouting of cables

and instruments to achieve twenty feet of separation between

redundant components; installation of penetration seals,

installation of emergency lighting; verification that fire

dampers function properly, verification that certain gypsum

board wall designs, which deviate from SER descriptions, will

withstand postulated fire exposures; verification of fire alarm

system design and installation, and verification that all

required fire door _ assemblies are labeled, listed, or tested

in accordance with NFPA 252.

Three allegations were reviewed relative to penetration seals.

They were closed based on supporting test data and the technical

adequacy of procedures.

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. The licensee

was not rated in this category during the previous assess-

ment period. . A performance trend is not assessed during this

evaluation due to the limited inspection performed.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

>

20

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. . _ . . - - . _ _ . . . . _. _ _ _ . _ _ _

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'

K. Emergency Preparedness

1. Analysis '

, Three-inspections were conducted during the assessment period

- by region based inspectors to evaluate the licensee's perfor-

3

'mance with regard to emergency preparedness. These included

e (1) a-pre-emergency preparedness implementation appraisal

ll to assess the applicant's progress in emergency preparedness

[ activities; (2) observation of the applicant's first full-scale

j' emergency exercise; and (3) a two-week in-depth examination of

the licensee's entire emergency preparedness implementation

appraisal-(EPIA).

Although no violations or deviations were identified during

'

, the SALP period,-seven weaknesses were identified during the

,

exercise and 25 incomplete items were identified during the:

EPIA. Many of the items identified were the result of

.

. incomplete construction activities, and not a failure.to

4 raddress items due to'an oversite or lack of knowledge of

! regulatory requirements. For all.of these items the licensee  ;

has been responsive to NRC concerns by providing viable and

~

!

'

generally sound and thorough responses in a-timely manner.

The seven weaknesses were corrected.and from a safety ,

. standpoint,ithe licensee has demonstrated a clear
understanding of the issues involved.

i.

i Management involvement in emergency preparedness has been very

strong as evidenced by their participation in the exit meetings

i following each inspection. One NRC concern identified during

the EPIA involved the. licensee's ability to maintain an accept-

! able level,of emergency preparedness based on the existing

organizational structure and assigned' duties and responsibilities

! of emergency preparedness personnel and their associated review.

. These concerns were quickly and adequately addressed through a

j reorganization that changed the chain of management review and

responsibility for emergency preparedness activities'.

i - Staffing of key emergency response positions has been adequate

with the authorities and responsibilities of personnel identi-

fied. . An.in-depth review of the: licensee's emergency' prepared-

ness training ~ program was conducted during the EPIA and.it was

,

determined to be a well defined program that provided an adequate

level'of material-and understanding to the staff. In addition,

i the NRC conducted extensive walkthroughs with plant personnel to

- test their knowledge and understanding in the area of emergency'

,

response. -Overall,.it was determined-that personnel were well

.

trained'and, knowledgeable of their emergency response. duties and

. responsibilities. ~This was also supported by a good demonstra-

'

. tion of the licensee's capabilities during the emergency

-exercise. .

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. _. ,

.

2. Conclusion-

The licensee is rated Category 1 in this area. The licensee

was not rated in this category in the last SALP period. The

licensee's performance.during the assessment period has remained

essentially constant.

3. -Board Recommendations I

None.

l

L. Security

1. Analysis

, Three safeguards inspections by regional based specialists and

one inspection by.the resident inspection staff were conducted

during the assessment period. The inspections addressed

1 (1) security measures for onsite receipt and protection of new

fuel; (2) observation of fuel receipt activities; (3) material

control and accountability requirements for stored fuel; and

(4) preoperational inspections to determine the licensee's

progress in the implementation of the security program.

The licensee's Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency

Plan, and Training and Qualification Plan become effective upon

, issuance of an operating license. Therefore, no violations

were cited during the preoperational security inspections.

Additionally, no violations were identified during the new fuel

receipt, storage, and material control and accountability

, inspections. During the preoperational security inspection,

numerous items were identified which must be corrected or

resolved before issuance of an operating license. The licensee

has been very responsive to the concerns identified by the NRC.

-The security. force appears to be of sufficient size, supervision

and administrative support appears adequate, and the licensee is

aware of all major elements necessary to implement the security

program. . The senior security personnel represent broad technical

disciplines, have a high degree of expertise, and have been

effective in identifying problem areas and recommending solutions.

Adherence to the current' security program implementation

schedule is essential so full implementation of the program

can be initiated so as not to impact the licensee prior to

licensing. The necessary resources are available to ensure

and assist in the implementation of the security program.

Essential security equipment acceptance testing by the licensee

is scheduled to be completed early during the next assessment

period. Although notable. progress has been made,.the implemen-

tation and completion of the security system will require a

22

. . -

.

' major effort and the licensee's current completion schedule

appears optimistic. The licensee indicated that the necessary

resources will be available with continuous management overview

to assure schedule completion.

Due to a lack of security experience in the licensee's Quality

Assurance staff, the licensee is having experienced represen-

tatives of another utility conduct a comprehensive audit of

the security program prior to licensing. The licensee's QA

department needs to gain experience in the security audit area

so they can effectively audit and identify program deficiencies

to meet regulatory requirements.

In summary, the. licensee's staff has been effective in planning

for implementation of the security program and in identifying

problem areas during implementation of the program. Senior

site management personnel appear willing to commit the necessary

resources to ensure timely implementation as indicated by the

upgrading and expansion of the access facility. The licensee

management's ability to resolve identified problems and imple-

ment major. elements of the security program, such as personnel

screening, badging, and integration of the computerized security

program will extend into the next assessment period.

2. Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. The licensee

was not rated.in this area during the previous assessment

period. Licensee performance has generally improved over the

course of the SALP assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations ,

None.

M. Operational Readiness

1. Analysis

During this assessment. period, the resident inspection staff

performed portions of nine inspections to assess the licensee's

readiness for operation. The inspectors followed program and

procedure development and implementation for operational

related activities. This' analysis extends beyond the assess-

ment period to the date that the Board convened, August 15, 1985.

'

Three violations were identified in the operations area which

do not pertain to a specific rated functional area:

23

.

a. Severity level V - The licensee failed to properly imple-

ment the administrative program controlling temporary

mechanical alterations to equipment (440/84009).

b. Severity level IV - The licensee failed to properly

establish and implement housekeeping and equipment

cleanliness controls to ensure prevention of equipment

degradation (440/85010).

c. Severity level V - The licensee failed to properly

document foreign material control in the reactor vessel

and reactor well area (440/85033).

The last two items are repetitive in nature in that they address

implementation of equipment protection measures and reflect poor

facility housekeeping conditions. Since those violations were

identified, the licensee has taken effective action to ensure

housekeeping prntices are appropriate and equipment integrity

is not compromised, including additional staffing, supervision,

and implementation of the " call for cleanup" program.

At the beginning of the assessment period, Unit 1 construction

was 92 percent complete, 52 percent of all Unit 1 required

systems were turned over for preoperational or acceptance

testing, 11 percent of all tests had been field completed and

fifteen percent of all Unit I required systems were turned over

.to operations. At that time, the Nuclear Test Section (NTS)

reported to the Manager, Nuclear Construction Department, and

all operations functions reported to the Manager, Perry Plant

Department.

In April 1984, the Superintendent of Operati.ons, Perry Plant

Department, was temporarily detailed to the Nuclear Operations

Division (N0D) and reported directly to the Vice President, N0D.

The Neclear Test Section was transferred from construction to

operations under the Superintendent of Operations. This was

considered by Region III to be a positive move with the

beginning of the transition from construction to operations.

In October 1984, the Perry Plant Department was split into' the

Perry Plant Operations Department (PP00), containing the opera-

tions, maintenance, outage planning and nuclear test sections,

and the Perry Plant Technical Department (PPTD), containing the

technical, health physics, training, sesrity, and the adminis-

trative unit. The managers of those departments report to the

Vice President, N00. This move strengthened the alignment

between test and operations activities, but fragmented these

activities into two separate departments under separate managers

who' report to an executive. The technical supervision and

management in PPTD has very little actual applicable operating

nuclear plant experience. Also reportir.g to that executive

24

L'

.. .- - . . ~ . - - . - - - . - - -.- -- . - - . - .-

r .

..
-

i

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is the Nuclear Engineering Department which provides licensing, '

modification design, and engineering review support to the Perry

4

Plant: Departments. These three departments and the Vice

l President, N00,-are onsite.and will remain onsite following  ;

[ Unit 1 licensing.

E At the end of the assessment period, fuel-load was predicted to

, be September 27, 1985. This completion schedule was optimistic.

Unit 1 construction was essentially complete with no systems

.under construction jurisdiction. Approximately 62 percent of.

2

the preoperationalitests and 93 percent of the acceptance tests-

were field complete-and 61 percent of all systems were turned

j. over for operations. .

1

i During the assessment period, the licensee undertook several

-major activities to prepare for operation:

[ The licensee obtained sufficient operating experience

!- through experience and training.at other BWR operating ,

plants for individual shift members to enable plant

l licensing and startup without dependence on contract

experienced shift personnel.

The licensee successfully licensed 24 personnel as reactor

operators.or senior reactor operators. This.is sufficient

i ~for five fully. qualified and certified rotating shifts.

i. . The licensee: expects sufficient reactor licenses during

i

December 1985: examinations to staff a sixth shift. The

i licensee examination pass rate-to date has;been'approxi-

mately 68%, which is below the industry average of approxi-

.mately 74%. The licensee is undertaking efforts to improve

the pass rate for the December 1985 examinations.

~

!

The licensee implemented access control to the control room

i complex limiting persons not' required for plant operating

and testing activities, and moved all non-operations per-

l sonnel-out ofJthe control room. The licensee-also imple-  ;

i mented strict access control to the control room " horseshoe" '

,

-area requiring operator approval for entry.

!

} The' licensee prepared ~ facility technical specifications

F which are scheduled to be issued in final draft on August

! 30,~1985. The technical specifications, with few excep-

tions, have been. complete and accurate.

-

. The licensee completed an FSAR verification program on-

l." -July 19,:1985, with FSAR Amendment No. 20,.to ensure that

adequate.; basis exists for statements in the FSAR. :This

-

was a Perry-unique activity which was 'self initiated.

'

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,

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-

- -

_ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

4

The licensee has a continuing effort to complete the opera-

tions procedures of which 68 percent of the procedures have

been finalized. The NRC procedures inspection effort in

this area was underway when the licensee initiated a

reanalysis of their licensing commitments in the operations

area to ensure that their procedures addressed all appli-

cable commitments and requirements. This effort was preci-

pitated from the procedural difficulties encountered in the

i preoperational testing area and minor preliminary inspection

findings regarding operations procedures.

The licensee is " dry running" mechanical and instrument and

control system surveillance test instructions and revising

them as necessary. Following an NRC management meeting on

June 3, 1985, the licensee has increased the use of system

operating instructions during test activities to ensure

procedure accuracy. Maintenance and instrument calibration

is performed routinely using the operations program from

the time each system is turned over to the test section.

The licensee has been preparing packages addressing each

inspection finding, generic notification, and construction

deficiency report. With very few exceptions, these

packages have been comprehensive and technically adequate.

At the end of the assessment period the licensee had underway

development and implementation of all major programmatic

aspects necessary for operation of the unit. Management was

properly focusing efforts to achieve operational readiness.-

2. :onclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area. The licensee

was not rated in this category during the previous assessment

period. The level of activity has increased during the assess-

i

ment period, and licensee performance has remained essentially I

constant over the SALP assessment period.

3. Board Recommendations

The licensee should consider taking steps to bolster the commer-

cial nuclear power plant experience level of the technical

department supervision and management.

26

_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .-

.

3 1 ,

..

,

V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMARIES

-

A. ' Licensee Activities

  • The' construction of Perry Unit 1 at the close of this assessment

period was essentially 100% complete. . Major activities performed

E during the assessment period were related to the completion ~of

. construction, construction test (initial checkout and run test),

operator training, completion of Reactor Vessel Internals

installation, receipt of fuel, preoperational and acceptance testing,

system' turnovers, and completion of licensing board hearings.

Specific' activities are listed below.

Date. Selected Perry Milestones / Activities

Jan. 17-19, 1984 NRR Site Audit of Environmental

. Qualification of Electrical. Equipment

February 1,1984 ~Vice President of Nuclear Operations

? Division established to direct Perry Plant

. Department (PPD), Nuclear Engineering

Department-(NED), and Nuclear Training

Section

February 17 1984 Perry Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report

(SSER) No. 4 Issued

March 1984 . Resolution of ASLB;Iss'ue:No. 9 Polymer

Degradation

March 8, 1984 Operational Quality Assurance (0QA) Plan

Approved by NRC

May 26, 1984 Start Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)

Flushing'

'

June 12, 1984 .First Safety Related System turned over

to Operations (Emergency-Service Water

Screen Wash System)

-June'26, 1984 " Call for Quality" instituted to address

allegations.

'

July 19, 1984 - National, Board of Boiler and Pressure-

Vessel Inspectors: issued NR: Certificate

' July 27, 1984 Initial Draft Perry. Technical. Specifications

submitted

July 29, 1984 _ National ~ Board cf Boiler and Pressure

-

Vessel Inspectors issued R Certificate

27

, <

.

July 30, 1984 Consolidation of test procedures into Test

Program Manual

August, 1984 - Conducted the NRC Integrated Design

October, 1984 Inspection (IDI)

August 14-17, 1984 NRR Site Audit of Seismic Qualification and

Pump Valve Operability

August 31, 1984 Completed Reactor Vessel Construction

September 11, 1984 Completed NSSS Flushing

September 17, 1984 Completed Integrated Flush and Outflush

September 26, 1984 Completed Reactor Pressure Vessel Hydro

October 1, 1984 Reorganization of PPD into Perry Plant

Operation Department and Perry Plant

Technical Department under Vice President -

Nuclear Operations Division

October 6, 1984 ASLB Issue No. 6, Anticipated Transient

Without Scram (ATWS)/ Standby Liquid Control

' System (SLCS), dismissed

November, 1984 Initial Nuclear Safety Review Committee

(NSRC) Meeting held

November 3, 1984 Completed Reactor Vessel Internals to

support Control Rod Drive System Preopera-

tional Test

November 28, 1984 Completed Reactor Recirculation System

Construction

November 28, 1984 Conducted NRC/ FEMA Emergency Plan Evaluation

Exercise

December 2, 1984 Initial Control Rod Motion test completed

February 2, 1985 Established Independent Safety Engineering

Group

February 21, 1985 Steam Bypass and Electrical Hydraulic

Control (EHC) Systems operational

February 26, 1985 Perry SSER No. 5 issued

February 27, 1985 ASLB Issue No. 14, In-Core Thermo Couples,

dismissed

28

L _ _ _____

.

March 7, 1985 NRC Appraisal of the PNPP Onsite Emergency

Preparedness Program l

March 7, 1985 NRC Special Nuclear Material (SNM) License

issued

March 10-22, 1985 RIII/NRR Appendix R Audit

March 12, 1985 Completed Diesel Generator (D/G) Division I

and II Revalidation, Flush, Rework, and

Restoration

March 13, 1985 ASLB Issue No. 15, Steam Erosion, dismissed

March 15, 1985 Completed Condenser Vacuum Pull

March 15, 1985 Security Building turned over to Operations

March 17, 1985 Arrival of first shipment of fuel

May 13-17, 1985 NRC First Preoperational Security Inspection

April 3, 1985 PNPP Mechanical Equipment Qualification

Program submitted

April 8, 1985 Proof and Review copy of Perry 1 Technical

Specifications issued

April 9-12, 1985 NRR Detailed Control Room Design Review

Implementation Audit (DCRDR)

April 10, 1985 Hearing on Issue No. 16, Diesel Generator

Reliability, completed

April 12, 1985 Hearing on Issue No. 1, Emergency Planning,

completed

April 19, 1985 Perry SSER No. 6 issued

April 23-25, 1985 NRR Instrumentation and Control Systems

Branch Design and Verification Audit

April 27, 1985 Completed Re' circulation System Slow Speed

Preoperational Test

April 30, 1985 Completed Control Room HVAC Testing

May 3, 1985 Hearing on Issue No. 8, Hydrogen Control,

completed

June 5, 1985 Completed D/G Division I, II, and III

Preoperational Test

29

.

June 7, 1985 Completed Closure of IDI Findings  ;

l

June 12, 1985 Completed Reactor Recirculation Fast Speed l

Tests

June 13, 1985 All Systems turned over to Test Section

June 21, 1985 Completed Fuel Receipt

June 30, 1985 24 NRC Licensed PNPP Personnel (22 Operators)

B. Inspection Activities

1. Inspection Data

Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Docket No. 50-440

Power Plant

Unit 1

Inspections: No. 50-440/84001 through 50-440/84013,

50-440/84015 through 50-440/84018, 50-440/84020 through

50-440/84024, 50-440/84026 through 50-440/84030, 50-440/85001

through 50-440/85003, 50-440/85006 through 50-440/85015,

50-440/85017 through 50-440/85020, 50-440/85022 through

50-440/85024, 50-440/85026, 50-440/85028 through 50-440/85030,

50-440/85032, 50-440/85033*, 50-440/85035 through 50-440/85045,

and 50-440/85046*.

  • Inspections performed subsequent to this assessment period,

but included in the assessment.

Violations and Severity Levels

Functional Areas Assessed I II III IV V

A. Containment and Other

Safety-Related Structures 1

B. Piping Systems and Supports

C. Safety-Related Components

D. Electrical Power Supply and

Distribution 2 1

E. Instrumentation and Control

Systems

F. Quality Programs and

Administrative Controls

Affecting Quality 1 )

'

G. Licensing Activities 1

l

1

l

30

L

'

.

.

Violations and Severity Levels

Functional Areas Assessed I II III. IV V

H. Preoperational Testing 6 7

I. Radiological Controls

,

J. Fire Protection

K. Emergency Preparedness

L. Security

M. Operational Readiness 1 2

11 11

2. Inspection Summary

Fifty eight inspections were performed at Perry during the

assessment period, two subsequent to the assessment period,

and five NRR audits. Team inspections included'the integrated

design inspection, fire protection, emergency preparedness,

environmental qualification of electrical equipment audit,

seismic qualification and pump valve operability audit,

security, control room design review implementation audit, and

Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch design and verifica-

tion audit. Portions of the inspection effort were dedicated

to allegation inspections.

C. Investigations and Allegations Review

A formal investigation involving potential wrongdoing, was initiated

during the assessment period and should be completed in the next

assessment period. . Thirteen allegations concerning Perry and relating

to deficient construction and. Quality Assurance practices were also

received by the NRC during the assessment period. Region III has

inspected, dispositioned, and documented 10 of the thirteen allega-

tions. No violations were identified. The inspection of the

remaining three allegations had not been completed by the end of the

assessment period.

The licensee has a program called " Call for Quality" which provides

personnel at the plant a means to contact CEI Quality Control with

plant. safety or quality concerns. In addition, the licensee performs

mandatory. interviews with all quality control personnel'and all CEI

personnel that are departing the plant. .These interviews are

reportedly designed to give the departing employee the opportunity

to state any concerns they may have regarding the plant. Concerns

.are investigated by the CEI QA organization and results relayed to

the departing employee. Feedback from the departing employee is

encouraged and' followup.on feedback initiated-if deemed necessary.

Results of the investigation's are available to the NRC.

'

-31~

. s

D. Escalated Enforcement Action-

There were no escalated enforcement actions during this assessment

period.-

E. Management Conferences

Thefollowingmanagementmeetingswerecon'dUctedduringthisperiod:

April 10, 1984

.

A management meeting to present and

~

discuss the results of the SALP 4

evaluation.

October 30, 1984 The "Second Corporate Management

Meeting" was~ held by Region III at

Perry to discuss with licensee

management their preoperational test '

program and lessons learned from

preoperational tests at other plants.

March 21, 1985 A management meeting was held to dis-

cuss matters relating to Perry schedule

and performance. The meeting was

requested by CEI.

June 3, 1985 A management meeting was. held to discuss

the status and recent inspection-findings

of the Perry Preoperational Test Pro- '

'

gram, including failure to properly

implement the Test' Program.

F. ' Licensee Report Data

Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs)

During this SALP period, seventy 10'CFR 50.55(e) items were reported

-by the licensee. Eighteen were vendor related.~Of the' seventy

- reported, seventeen were . subsequently withdrawn prior to the end of

the thirty day reporting period. -Corrective-actions were initiated

by the licensee on the remaining 53 reportable; items and'all but 22'

were reviewed and documented as closed in Region III inspection -

reports. Below is a list of the fifty-three 50.55(e) items:

. Licensee's ..

-DAR No. .' Description'

153 Borg Warner MOV shaft keys too long

154 ASME' Class 1, 2 and 3. material installed on

ASME Class 1 piping supports

155' Pullman (site contractor) accepted materials

that were not manufactured to NA-3700

.

32 -

W-____--__-___- . __-__ - __ = __-_ _ _ _ _ ___ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

.

Licensee's

DAR No. Description l

156 Problems with Diesel Generator flexible coupling

drive hubs  !

158 Surface cracks found on actuator mounting

brackets for 24 motor operated exhaust louvers

associated with diesel room HVAC system

159 Pacific Air Products Part 21 - Linear converters

may wear excessively (HVAC)

160 Disagreement between logic and FSAR drawing for

the Standby Diesel Generator

161 Problems with synchronizing the standby diesel

generator from the diesel generator room

162 HPCS System - No power monitor downstream of the

fuses that supply some control relays

163 HPCS System - MOV E-22-F001 shuts before

E-22-F015 is fully open, which could result in

less than specified flow

164 HPCS System - Suppression pool cleanup suction

does not isolate between reactor levels 1 and 2

which could result in less than specified flow

171 ASME Code Class I pipe tees were found to have

discontinuity in thickness

172 HPCS power supply - drawings do not indicate

FSAR required logic for switch S-26

175 Transamerica Delaval Part 21 potential problem

with 2 spare piston skirt castings

178 Licensee discovered that failure of a K-70 relay

contact could result in both the inboard and

outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves not closing

182 . Inadequate weld documentation and questionable

welds on equipment hatch of drywell

183 During loss of critical 120 VAC and 24 VDC

systems, the systems would not annunciate in the

control room

185 MCC units 1 and 2 R4250015 were found missing 12

rear bracing panels rendering the seismic

qualification of the MCCs indeterminate

33

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,

.

Licensee's

DAR No. Description

186 Brown Boveri Part 21 - 480 voit circuit on R23

system may contain silicon controlled rectifiers

which exhibit excessive leakage that would

result in false circuit breaker trips

189 Incorrect electrical design, which if it had gone

uncorrected, would not have allowed the diesel

generators to synchronize to the grid in certain

switch positions

190 Johnson Controls 3/4" socket welds were found to

have improper welds

194 Lack of leakage acceptance criteria in fuel pool

gate testing specification

197 Emergency service water pump will start with

either LOCA or loss of offsite power signal but

not both

200 Carrier fans for the control complex auxiliary

building vent system may have error in seismic

report due to the use of wrong natural frequency

data

201 Conex Part 21 concerning 821 defective power

lead gland sealing assemblies at Perry Units 1

and 2

202 Rosemount Part 21 - Rosemount transmitters Model

1153 Series B have a potential environmental

leakage into transmitters which could result in

an electrical failure

203 Delaval Standby Diesel Generators could have

field resistors overheat during coastdown

204 FSAR design evaluation revealed that a

non-safety related moisture detector was used in

the HVAC for the control complex

209 Incorrectly installed Hilti drop in anchors by

fire protection system contractor

34

_

.

Licensee's

DAR No. Description

211 General Electric Part 21 - Class 1E inverters

were not supplied with proper low voltage cutoff

adjustment.

212 Containment isolation valves stick closed when

they should be wide open

~213 Borg Warner Part 21 - 20" Class 1 gate. valve

would not fully open due to gate binding on body

mounted guide rails

216 Gilbert Part 21 - Jet impingement design for

~feedwater system was nonconservative

218 Overpressurization of some isolated pipe systems

during a LOCA inside drywell

220 Two locations were found where condensate can

collect in the RCIC steam supply line and

potentially disable the system

221 Ruskin Part 21 - Concerning fire dampers

supplied to Perry that are unable to function

properly under normal duct pressure er operating

conditions

222 Concerns starting voltage drops in the power.

feeder cables for motor operated valves

associated with the RCIC system

223 Concerns voltage drops in control circuits (M32

system) that may be large enough to result in

the loss of Division I and II pump ventilation

fans-

224 The voltage drops in some P45 power and control

circuits may cause loss of. Division I, II'and

III emergency-service water pumps and/or

discharge valves

225 Delaval Part 21 - Filter on'TDI diesels not

rated for pressure ~used in service

,

35'

_.

,_ _

e

Licensee's

DAR No. Description

226 Perry may not be in compliance with Appendix R

due to lack of adequate separation of associated

Division I and II circuitry,

230 A review of the 4160 and 480 volt power systems

indicated that a LOCA in combination with a

degraded off-site power supply condition could

result in a loss of starting voltage to motors

232 Brown Boveri Part 21 - Concerns ,480 volt circuit

breakers that may have damaged control wire

insulation

234 Gilbert Part 21 - Design error where the floor

response spectra was not considered'during the

design of the diesel generator building-

238 Tubing clamps made_by Basic Engineering do not

provide enough seismic restraint to meet

specification

239 Gilbert Part 21 - Potential flooding of the

turbine building due to design problem of under

drain system I.in the-turbine building

240 Licensee unable to identify the seismic

qualification of the emergency service water

backwash strainers

241 Potential excess off-site releases due to single

isolation valve between post accident sample

system and primary containment

242 Brown Boveri Part 21 - Low voltage (480V) K-line

circuit breakers potentially have incorrect

'short time delay band levers installed in

electro-mechanical overcurrent trip devices

243 During a review of as-built seismic support

spacing criteria for instrument and control

piping, the AE noted that spacing criteria had

not always been properly interpreted by the

installation contractor

36

_

'

c

Licensee's

OAR No. Description

244 Level detector transmitter output had an error

band above that allowed by G.E. specification

for the standby liquid control system tank

245 Incorrect logic for the vacuum relief valves

between containment and the suppression pool

246 Approximately fifty components and five motor

operated valves may have inadequate voltages

under certain conditions such as degraded grid

voltage

The number of CDRs identified during the assessment period was

approximately 250% of of the number identified during the previou's

SALP period. This rise was in part a result of the IDI and licensee

initiated pre-IDI review of Perry's design. Increased activities in

the preoperational testing area.have also resulted in increased

identification of construction deficiencies. A review of the nature

and details of the items reported and the timeliness of the reporting

indicates that the licensee maintains a proper reporting threshold

and is responsive to the 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting requirements. The

quality of the written reports and associated analysis and relative

ease with which Region III staff have been able to review and close

these construction Deficiency Reports reflects favorably on the

licensee's management and staff.

37

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