ML20135C261
| ML20135C261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/05/1988 |
| From: | Beckjord E NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Morris A ANBEX, INC. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135B134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703030454 | |
| Download: ML20135C261 (2) | |
Text
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, ; i o n. '
- . + jog UNITED STATES E o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l l E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 4 %
%,, . . . . . / APR 0 51998
[
! Mr. Alan Morris . President i ANBEX, Inc.
1 113 Morris Avenue i
Denville, New Jersey 07834 4
,4
Dear Mr. Morris:
I have been asked to respond to your letter dated February 17, 1988 tr '
Mr. Stello. It is clear that you are opposed to the existing federal aolicy regarding predistribution of potassium iodide.(KI) to the general pub 1 w as a thyroid disease prophylactic. You have provided comments to this effect on l the draft of NUREG-1251, have sent a proposal to Senator Bradley to assure j-acquisition of KI, and again expressed your opposition to the federal position l
in your latest letter of February 17, 1988.
l At this point, it is not clear that a discussion of the technical factors upon
' which the federal policy is based would be helpful. At the risk of being i
repetitious, it should be stated that the policy was based upon an assessment !
(NUREG/CR-1433) which examined a full range of accidents, including The the i
consequences of severe core melt accidents with large releases.
probabilities of such accidents were taken from the Reactor Safety Study l (WASH-1400), or Rasmussen report, and were estimated as realistically as i
i possible.
UASH-1400 concluded that the probability of a core damaging accident may average approximately 1 in 10,000 per reactor-year of operation. Using a population.of about 100 reactors in the U.S., this translates to a rough estimate for the nation of about a 50 per cent chance of a core damaging sccident.somewhere in the U.S. within the next 20 years. More refined calculations have indicated that this number may be unduly pessimistic and is probably closer to about 10%. Further, not all core damaging accidents lead to i
a large release.- In fact, recent research indicates the likelihood of an accident leading to a large release is significantly lower than the likelihood of a core damage accident alone. This is due largely to the substantial
' With regard to commercial nuclear containments which surround U.S. reactors.
- . power operations in the U.S., the Three Milenot It did Island accident result in a large is the only core release.
! damaging accident that has occurred.
The technical assessment also carefully considered the benefits and risks of KI
.in relation to the range of protective measures available to the public for 1 such a range of accidents. A full reading of the policy statement makes it clear that there was a careful and deliberate assessment of all these factors which went into the recommendation that the federal government should not J
require predistribution of KI to the general public, and that any decision to I
use K1 'hould be made by state and local authorities.
,V m
9703030454 970226 NIRCTN PDR ORG PDR .
Mr. Alan Morris ..
As Mr. Stello stated in his letter of January 15, 1988 to Senator Bradley (a copy of which you have received), after examining the details of the Chernobyl accident, including Soviet responses to it, we have concluded in draft NUREG-1251 that there are no substantial reasons to reconsider this position.
This recommendation was based not only upon the known differences between the Chernobyl reactor and U.S. plants which indicate a reduced likelihood and size of iodine releases for U.S. plants as compared to Chernobyl, but it also factored in recent research results that confirm our earlier understanding that core damaging accidents are unlikely, though not impossible, and that large releases resulting from such accidents are even rarer. As also stated in Mr. Stello's letter, current research also indicates that accidental releases of iodine from U.S. reactors are generally estimated to be lower in magnitude than was estimated at the time the federal policj was established and, therefore, the need for a thyroid disease prophylactic is reduced further.
In closing, I want to assure you that the NRC places safety as its highest priority. We have carefully considered the policy regarding KI in light of all available infonnation, and have concluded that no change is warranted.
Sincerely, P O O d .
b']4w Eric 5. Beckjord, Dit ector Office of Nuclear R6 9 ;1atory Research l
l