ML20135B262

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Provides Update on Disposition of Differing Professional Opinion on Stockpiling Potassium Iodide
ML20135B262
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/21/1991
From: Thompson H
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20135B134 List:
References
NUDOCS 9702280148
Download: ML20135B262 (4)


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UNITED STATES

!8\s),g [ n/. i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20056 0,,

[ October 21, 1991

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MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations FROM: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.

Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards, and Operations Support

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON STOCKPILING POTASSIUM i

IODIDE As you know, the staff has had under review a differing professional opinion (DPO) filed by Peter Crane, formerly of the Office of the General Counsel.

The original DP0 had two basic points: (1) that the cost-benefit analysis in NUREG/CR 1433 concerning the stockpiling of potassium iodide contained flaws and omissions, and (2) that misleading information was provided to the public and the Commission on the significance of radiation-caused thyroid abnormalities during a public Commission meeting in November of 1983. In correspondence from Mr. Crane subsequent to the DPO, he also brought up a third point -- that the staff knowingly misled the Commission at the November, 1983 Commission meeting.

The DP0 suggested prompt withdrawal of NUREG/CR-1433, " Examination of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) as an Emergency Protective Measure for Nuclear Reactor Accidents;" notification of States, localities, and other federal agencies, and the public of the flaws and omissions in the cost-benefit >

analysis; and that affirmative steps be taken to ensure potassium iodide is stockpiled for possible emergencies.

This memo provides an update on the disposition of the DPO.

Disposition of the DP0 with respect to point 1 -- that the cost benefit analysis in NUREG/CR 1433 contained flaws and omissions: l With respect to point 1, the DP0 review panel, which issued its report in December,1989, agreed with Mr. Crane that the analysis in NUREG/CR-1433 was flawed, but concluded that the revised analysis did not warrant any change in the Federal policy. However, Mr. Crane believed that the panel failed to address two qualitative factors in their reassessment of the cost-benefit enalveis. As a result of the DP0 panel report, review of the report by the L. .cor, RES.-and subsequent direction from you, the following actions have been taken to resolve point 1:

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- On September 28, 1990, a Federal Register Notice was published informing the public that the cost-benefit ratio supporting the current federal policy may have narrowed, announcing the planned revision of NUREG/CR-1433, and noting our participation in the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordination Committe 's (FRPCC's) reevaluation of the Federal position on stockpiling KI 1

- On December 24, 1990, RES issued the attached Task Action Plan (TAP) for

! policy re-evaluation regi.rding potassium iodide use during a nuclear plant accident. The TAP addresses the qualitative factors raised by Mr.

Crane and updates the quantitative factors, including the correction of previously identified flaws. The planned RES activities are also explained in the recent Commission Paper (SECY 91-321).

Upon completion of the TAP, I expect point 1 of the DP0 to be resolved.

Disposition of the DP0 with respect to point 2 -- that misleading information was provided to the public and the Comission:

The second point of the DP0 was that misleading information was provided to the public and the Commission on the significance of radiation-caused thyroid abnormalities during a public Commission meeting on November 22, 1983. The cost of treating cancerous thyroid nodules (about 40% of the total nodules) and the fact that an estimated 2.4% of all nodules prove fatal was omitted from the discussion. In addition, other statements made by the staff at the briefing could have left the Commission with a mistaken impression concerning the gravity of radiation-induced thyroid illness. Although a discussion of l the cancerous nodules and estimated fatalities was included in the supporting material provided to the Commission in SECY-83-362, this information was never brought out at the Commission meeting.

Subsequent to the Commission meeting, Mr. Crane discovered the aforementioned differences between the oral discussion recorded in the transcript of the Commission meeting and the written materials that had been provided to the  !

Commission in advance of the briefing. This was pointed out to the Commission in a letter from the General Counsel, and the Commission was later provided with additional information by the EDO, OGC, and the Office of Policy Evaluation concerning this point. Thus the Commission was fully informed before reaching its policy decision in May, 1985.

' The FRPCC's reevaluation of the Federal KI policy was prompted by a Septwber,1989 letter to the Chairman of the FRPCC from the American Thyroid Asse ation (ATA). A meeting of the FRPCC was held on July 24,1990 attended by representatives from the American Thyroid Associatkn (ATA), FEMA, FDA, NIH, NRC, and the state of Tennessee to discuss the KI issue. It was decided that the existing store of KI should be inventoried and that a working group should be established to further address the issue of stockpiling and to make recommendations regarding the Federal policy.

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a However, Mr. Crane argues that the States and the public were not informed of the misinformation.

Mr. Crane believes that the facts concerning the gravity of thyroid illness

and the intangible benefits of preventing this illness, taken together with

! the narrowing of the differences between costs and benefits of stockpiling KI, could enter into the public's and States' evaluation of stockpiling. He 2 the*efore believes that the NRC has an obligation to correct the record on the j gravib of radiation-caused thyroid illnesses as portrayed by the staff during the November,1983 Comission meeting, whether or not its bottom line' position j on the cost-effectiveness of KI has changed.

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' The DP0 panel did not directly address the issue of correcting the public l' record; however, the RES action plan does address this issue. The planned i

NUREG will correct the analysis and address both the quantitative and

! qualitative issues raised by Mr. Crane. Through the FRPCC working group, the

States will be invited to review the draft NUREG. In addition, the staff will i

distribute SECY 91-231 to the appropriate state and local government agencies to assure that these groups have full knowledge of the planned KI policy

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reevaluation and the points raised in the DP0 concerning the staff's oral i presentation to the Commission. I believe that these actions are responsive to point 2 of the DPO,

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. Disposition of the DP0 with respect to point 3 -- that the staff knowingly j

! misled the Comission:

The third point concerns the assertion that the staff knowinalv misled the  !

,, Comission on the gravity of thyroid illness by omitting certain information
j. from the briefing and understating the gravity of thyroid illness. Mr.

1 Crane's allepticn on this matter was referred to the Inspector General for

review on December 21, 1990; however the IG declined to pursue it, deferring  ;

the matter to us for resolution.

After reviewing the full transcript of the 1983 Comission briefing, as well j as letters from Peter Crane dated 11/9/90 and 3/2/91 and the attached letter F

from Robert Bernero dated 2/26/91, I have concluded that although the staff

were persuasive in presenting their position that the stockpiling or predistribution of KI was not worthwhile, they did not intentionally mislead  !

F the Comission. The general atmosphere of the briefing was one of careful l examination and questioning of the staff's position, particularly by Chairman i Palladino and Comissioner Bernthal, including a fair amount of discussion on 1 e the subject of individual risks versus the costs of KI. In view of the l j

probing questions and discussion of the cost-benefit issue during the t o briefing, it seems unlikely that'the Commission was substantively misled by ,

the omission of the specific facts cited by Mr. Crane. It should also be i

) noted that the written material that had been provided to the Commission was '

L reasonably complete on the issue in question, and the Commission was _

i subsequently provided with several differing views on the issue by the General j _ Counsel, the NRC Office of Policy Evaluation, and the EDO prior to making its l l

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-4 October 21, 1991 2 policy decision a year and a half later in May of 1985. Mr. Crane was listed as the staff contact on a Commission paper from the General Counsel dated April 17, 1984 which directly addressed the omission of fatalities from the staff's analysis.

I I do not believe that any further action on this point is warranted. I have discussed the proposed work with the RES staff who are carrying out the revised analysis, and I am convinced that they are approaching this task with objectivity and professionalism. In addition, none of these staff were involved in the original analysis.

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Hu . Thompson, .

De u y Executive rector clear Materials Saf , Safeguards, and Operations Suppor  ;

i cc: W. Parler E. Beckjord R. Bernero  !

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