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NRC F0nM.26 U.S. NUCLEAR RfGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 0104 (5 92)
EXPIRES 5/31/95 EST{ MATED BURDEN PER RE{PONSE TO WITH [HMNFORMAIt OlgrT NP EST Eg HR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) o THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CC* HISS 10N.
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AND TO TH ER OC2050h MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHING 0$000352 1 Oi 4 Li rick Generatine Station. Unit 1 TITLE (4) capability to reject the electrical load of an RilR pump not fully verified Ev'.
DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Limerick, Unit 2 05000353 FACILITV NAME DOCKET NUPEER
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.00 11 11 96 05000 10 26 84 96 019 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR $: u.nect one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 1 25.402tD) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(c) 23.405(alli)(1) 50.36(c)(1) 50.13(all2)(v) 13.llic)
PMR LEVEL (10) 100 iU.405ta)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2)
X 50./3(a)(2)(vii)
OTHER a.405(altlaliii)
X 50./3(a)(2)li) 50,13(dit2)(viii)(A)
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NRC Fonn 266A) i LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEFn0NE NUMBER tinciuce Area t.cce)
James L. Kananter, Manager, Experience Assessment, Lcs (610) 718-3400 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
N f0 E
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 0
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MUNTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES X
NO (if yes, ccmolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE (15)
ABSTRACT tumit to 1400 5; aces, i.e.
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On 10/10/96, an engineering evaluation concluded that the previously established surveillance testing for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) may not have fully verified the capability to successfully reject an electrical load of equal to or greater than the specified electricalload of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump motor (992 kW) as required by Technical Specifications (TS). This resulted in operation prohibited by TS and in a condition where at least two independent trains of a single safety system being inoperable due to a common cause. The testing procedures did reject the electricalload of an RHR pump motor while the RHR pump was operating at the designed post-accident flow rate. However, the actual electrical load was less than the TS value of 992 kW. By 10/11/96, an engineering evaluation was performed or the EDG was tested to verify the capability of each EDG to reject a load of 992 kW. Analysis of previous test results has concluded that the EDGs were capable of rejecting the specified electricalload of the RHR pump motor while maintaining the 4kV cafeguard bus within the TS limits for voltage and frequency. The cause of the event was an inadequate test procedure. As originally written, the test did not incorporate data from the pump / motor curves to ensure at least 992 kW of electrical load was actually rejected during the test. The tests will be revised prior to the next performance and a TS change request is being pursued.
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05000 2 0F 4 Limerick Generating Station,' Unit 1 352 96
-- 019 --
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Unit Conditions Prior to the Event:
Unit 1 and Unit 2 were both in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power level at the time of the discovery of this issue. There were no systems, structures or components inoperable or out of service that contributed to the event.
Description of the Event:
1 On October 10,1996, an engineering evaluation concluded that the previously established surveillance testing for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs, Ells:DG) may not have fully verified the capability to successfully reject an electrical load of equal to or greater than the specified electrical load of a Residual Heat Removal pump motor (992 kW). The RHR pump motor is the single largest post accident electrical load on the 4kV safeguard bus.
Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.e.2 establishes this requirement along with limits for the specified voltage and frequency fluctuations immediately following the trip of the RHR pump motor. These tests are performed on each EDG and the associated safeguard bus and loads while the unit is shutdown and while the electrical bus is disconnected from the offsite electrical power source.
The testing procedures did reject the electrical load of an RHR pump motor while the RHR pump was operating at the designed post-accident flow rate of 10,000 gpm (approximately 940 to 992 kW). However, due to the characteristic of the pump / motor curves, the specified electrical load occurs at a flow rate between 7,000 and 9,000 gpm depending on the RHR pump. Therefore, the minimum prescribed electrical load of 992 kW was not always rejected during the testing. Additionally, for those tests that rejected less than 992 kW, an analysis using the actual test data was not performed to conclude whether the EDG would have been capable of rejecting the 992 kW while maintaining the voltage and frequency within the required limits. Since these tests were originally written to establish a RHR pump flow rate of 10,000 gpm, the TS SR was not always met for each EDG since original fuelload of Unit 1 and Unit 2. (i.e., October 26,1984, and June 22,1989, respectively).M
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.NRC KMM M6A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 0104 l
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DOCKET NUPEER (2)
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PAGE (3)
YEAR SE AL N
05000 3 0F 4 Limerick cenerating Station, Unit 1 352 96 019 --
00 TEXT Ut more space us requireo, use acartionai copres at MC f ann sooA) (11) i Since this issue was not discovered until October 10,1996, the TS actions for each l
inoperable EDG were not previously taken within the specified TS Action limits resulting in operation prohibited by TS. Additionally, this condition resulted in at least two independent j
trains of a single safety system being administratively inoperable due to a common cause.
Therefore, this report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii).
On October 10,1996, an engineering evaluation was performed using the most recent test i
results. Two (2) of the EDGs had been tested with a rejected load of greater than or equal to l
992 kW and were in surveillance. The evaluation further verified five (5) of the remaining six i
(6) EDGs were capable of rejecting a load of equal to or greater than 992 kW with voltage j
and frequency fluctuations within the TS limits. The test data for the eighth EDG was not i
immediately available and this EDG was successfully tested on October 11,1996.
i Analysis:
The consequences of this event were minimal in that no radioactive material was released, an accident did not occur, and the EDGs were not called upon to perform their design function. Analysis of previous test results has concluded that the EDGs were capable of j
rejecting the specified electrical load of the RHR pump motor (992 kW) while maintaining the i
4ky safeguard bus within the TS limits for voltage and frequency. Therefore, the EDGs were i
fully capable of performing their design function even though the analysis was not performed within the specified TS SR interval and TS ACTION limits.
i
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.Qause of the Event:
The cause of the event was an inadequate test procedure. As originally written to meet the TS, the procedure established a pre-test condition with the RHR pump operating at 10,000 gpm based on the assumption that this flow rate produced the specified electrical load for the j
motor and that 10,000 gpm represented the design basis flow for the RHR system. The tests did not incorporate the data from the pump / motor curves to ensure at least 992 kW of j
electrical load was actually rejected during the test.
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'U.S. NCCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 0104 J592)
EXPIRES 5/31/95-IN ORf N COLLE O EST $0.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
$ $ r M $S $$ $EC$RDS E
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I IOC FACILITY NAME (1)
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PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 05000 4OF4 Limerick cenerating Station, Unit 1 352 96 019 --
00 TEXT Ut more space is requirea, use additional coptes of hkC forin 366A) (11)
Corrective Actions
The test procedures will be revised prior to the next performance. The revisions will ensure 992 kW or more electrical load is rejected during the tests or that an analysis is performed that uses the test data to ensure that each EDG has the capability to successfully reject 992 kW.
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A TS change request is being pursued to revise the TS SR that will remove the "992 kW" text and establish a requirement to verify the capability to reject an electrical load of equal to or j
greater than the single largest post accident electrical load.
Previous Similar Occurrences:
None i
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| 05000352/LER-1996-001, :on 960111,automatic Isolation of RCIC Sys During Surveillance Testing Occurred Due to Less than Adequate Attention to Details.Counseled Technician & Held Team Meetings to Discuss Event |
- on 960111,automatic Isolation of RCIC Sys During Surveillance Testing Occurred Due to Less than Adequate Attention to Details.Counseled Technician & Held Team Meetings to Discuss Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000353/LER-1996-001-02, :on 960220,condition Prohibited by TS in That Two Independent SGTS Inoperable Due to Personnel Error. Counseled EO & Conducted Operator Standdown Meetings to Discuss Event |
- on 960220,condition Prohibited by TS in That Two Independent SGTS Inoperable Due to Personnel Error. Counseled EO & Conducted Operator Standdown Meetings to Discuss Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-002, :on 960118,unit Operated in Excess of 100% Rated Power Due to Core Thermal Power Calculation Methodology Error.Reactor Heat Balance Revised |
- on 960118,unit Operated in Excess of 100% Rated Power Due to Core Thermal Power Calculation Methodology Error.Reactor Heat Balance Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000353/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960315,ESFA Occurred Due to Loss of Power to Rps/Ups Power Distribution Panel.Caused by Inadvertent Actuation of Underfrequency Relay.Created Necessary Addl Physical Barriers Arounds Units 1 & 2 |
- on 960315,ESFA Occurred Due to Loss of Power to Rps/Ups Power Distribution Panel.Caused by Inadvertent Actuation of Underfrequency Relay.Created Necessary Addl Physical Barriers Arounds Units 1 & 2
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000353/LER-1996-003-02, :on 960314,failed to Perform Accelerated Surveillance Testing of Unit 2 EDG Due to Inadequate Evaluation Program.Reviewed & Enhanced Program & Associated Implementing Documents for Failure Evaluations |
- on 960314,failed to Perform Accelerated Surveillance Testing of Unit 2 EDG Due to Inadequate Evaluation Program.Reviewed & Enhanced Program & Associated Implementing Documents for Failure Evaluations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-003, :on 960204,ESFA Occurred Due to Loss of Power to Rps/Ups Power Distribution Panel Caused by Spurious Actuation of Underfrequency Relay.Replaced Relay |
- on 960204,ESFA Occurred Due to Loss of Power to Rps/Ups Power Distribution Panel Caused by Spurious Actuation of Underfrequency Relay.Replaced Relay
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000353/LER-1996-004-02, :on 960514,reactor Scram Resulted from Main Generator Lockout Due to Actuation of Voltz/Hertz Relay. Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Relay 359/381A Drawing Corrected & Relays Inspected |
- on 960514,reactor Scram Resulted from Main Generator Lockout Due to Actuation of Voltz/Hertz Relay. Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Relay 359/381A Drawing Corrected & Relays Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-004, :on 960206,reactor Scram Signal Occurred While in Hot Shutdown Due to Operator Error During Depressurization.Provided Briefing Sheet to Operations Managers |
- on 960206,reactor Scram Signal Occurred While in Hot Shutdown Due to Operator Error During Depressurization.Provided Briefing Sheet to Operations Managers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000353/LER-1996-005-02, :on 960527,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred. Caused by Burnt Circuit Board Trace on Relay Board.Radiation Monitor Satisfactorily Tested & Returned |
- on 960527,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred. Caused by Burnt Circuit Board Trace on Relay Board.Radiation Monitor Satisfactorily Tested & Returned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-005, :on 960207,daily RECW Sys Fluid Sample Not Obtained & Analyzed within 24 H as Required by TS 3.3.7.1. Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Chemistry Section Sampling Program.Program Revised |
- on 960207,daily RECW Sys Fluid Sample Not Obtained & Analyzed within 24 H as Required by TS 3.3.7.1. Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Chemistry Section Sampling Program.Program Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-006-01, Forwards LER 96-006-01 Re Multiple Instances of Loss of Safety Function of Control Room Emergency Fresh Air Sys, Resulting in Operating Conditions Prohibited by Tech Specs | Forwards LER 96-006-01 Re Multiple Instances of Loss of Safety Function of Control Room Emergency Fresh Air Sys, Resulting in Operating Conditions Prohibited by Tech Specs | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-006, :on 960207,control Room Emergency Fresh Air Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Flow Switch Coordination Deficiency.Flow Switches Adjusted,Station Guidance Revised & Site Staff Training Performed |
- on 960207,control Room Emergency Fresh Air Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Flow Switch Coordination Deficiency.Flow Switches Adjusted,Station Guidance Revised & Site Staff Training Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000353/LER-1996-006-02, :on 961202,inadvertent Start of D21 Edg,An ESF During Surveillance Testing Was Noted.Caused by Malfunction of Test Switch Box.Test Box Was Repaired & Tested & Generic Implications of Event Was Evaluated |
- on 961202,inadvertent Start of D21 Edg,An ESF During Surveillance Testing Was Noted.Caused by Malfunction of Test Switch Box.Test Box Was Repaired & Tested & Generic Implications of Event Was Evaluated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1996-007, :on 960220,trip of FPC Pumps Resulted in Loss of Core Circulaton & Decay Heat Removal.Caused by Insufficient Procedural Guidance.C/A:Assessment Performed |
- on 960220,trip of FPC Pumps Resulted in Loss of Core Circulaton & Decay Heat Removal.Caused by Insufficient Procedural Guidance.C/A:Assessment Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000353/LER-1996-007-02, :on 961206,manual Scram Occurred Due to Leak in Main Turbine EHC Sys.Caused by Failure of Pressure Switch Support Bracket & Tubing.Replaced Failed Bracket & Tubing & Performed Walkdown of Main Steam Sys |
- on 961206,manual Scram Occurred Due to Leak in Main Turbine EHC Sys.Caused by Failure of Pressure Switch Support Bracket & Tubing.Replaced Failed Bracket & Tubing & Performed Walkdown of Main Steam Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000353/LER-1996-008-01, :on 961214,two Closed Primary Containment Isolation Valves Were Discovered W/Motor Operator Breaker Closed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure GP-2 Will Be Revised to Separate Specific Steps |
- on 961214,two Closed Primary Containment Isolation Valves Were Discovered W/Motor Operator Breaker Closed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure GP-2 Will Be Revised to Separate Specific Steps
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000353/LER-1996-008, Forwards LER 96-008-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Lgs,Unit 2 on 961214.Commitment Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 96-008-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Lgs,Unit 2 on 961214.Commitment Made within Ltr,Listed | | | 05000352/LER-1996-008, :on 960303,HPCI,ESFA & Condition Which Could Have Prevented Intended Safety Function Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Issued Event Training Bulletin to All I&C Technicians by 960415 |
- on 960303,HPCI,ESFA & Condition Which Could Have Prevented Intended Safety Function Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Issued Event Training Bulletin to All I&C Technicians by 960415
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960422,main Steam System Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift Occurred.Caused by Corrosion Induced Bonding Between Pilot Disc & Seat.Installed Special Modified Pilot Disc in Several SRVs |
- on 960422,main Steam System Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift Occurred.Caused by Corrosion Induced Bonding Between Pilot Disc & Seat.Installed Special Modified Pilot Disc in Several SRVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000353/LER-1996-009-03, :on 961224,unit Scram & Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred Due to Failure of Bill Joint That Connects Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube to Tube Positioner.Failed Ball Joint Was Replaced |
- on 961224,unit Scram & Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred Due to Failure of Bill Joint That Connects Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube to Tube Positioner.Failed Ball Joint Was Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000353/LER-1996-009, Forwards LER 96-009-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 on 961224.LER Is Being Submitted Pursuant to Requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) | Forwards LER 96-009-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 on 961224.LER Is Being Submitted Pursuant to Requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1996-009, :on 960314,five of Six as-found Setpoint Tests on Main Steam Sys SRVs Found Outside Required Pressure Ranges.Caused by Setpoint Drift Due to Corrosion Induced Bonding.Modified Pilot Disc Installed in SRVs |
- on 960314,five of Six as-found Setpoint Tests on Main Steam Sys SRVs Found Outside Required Pressure Ranges.Caused by Setpoint Drift Due to Corrosion Induced Bonding.Modified Pilot Disc Installed in SRVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-010, :on 960423,discovered Two Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) Control Circuits Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Rsp Surveillance Test Procedures Revised by 960731 and RSP Cleaned by 960731 |
- on 960423,discovered Two Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) Control Circuits Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Rsp Surveillance Test Procedures Revised by 960731 and RSP Cleaned by 960731
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-011, :on 960425,manual Operation of CREFAS Sys Resulted from Initiation of Toxic Chemical Detection Sys. Caused by Insufficient Guidance in Planning Process.Work Packages for Cleaning & Sealing Reviewed |
- on 960425,manual Operation of CREFAS Sys Resulted from Initiation of Toxic Chemical Detection Sys. Caused by Insufficient Guidance in Planning Process.Work Packages for Cleaning & Sealing Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-012, :on 921103,identified Improper Fuse Sizing. Caused by Personnel Error.Approved Design Change Re Proper Fuse Coordination & Reviewed Modifications Associated W/Fuse Ratings |
- on 921103,identified Improper Fuse Sizing. Caused by Personnel Error.Approved Design Change Re Proper Fuse Coordination & Reviewed Modifications Associated W/Fuse Ratings
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-013, :on 960521,Unit 1 Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance & Undetermined Equipment Malfunction.Procedure Will Be Revised to Ensure Appropriate Barriers,In Place to Minimize Risk of Scram |
- on 960521,Unit 1 Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance & Undetermined Equipment Malfunction.Procedure Will Be Revised to Ensure Appropriate Barriers,In Place to Minimize Risk of Scram
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-014, :on 960702,discovered Improperly Controlled Safeguards Information.Cause Undeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Be Provided by 960930 |
- on 960702,discovered Improperly Controlled Safeguards Information.Cause Undeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Be Provided by 960930
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000352/LER-1996-015, :on 960726,failure to Maintain Equipment Needed for Operator Actions to Assure Fire Safe SD Capability. Caused by Unclear Ownership & Accountability of Procedures. Interim Procedure Revs Implemented |
- on 960726,failure to Maintain Equipment Needed for Operator Actions to Assure Fire Safe SD Capability. Caused by Unclear Ownership & Accountability of Procedures. Interim Procedure Revs Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-016, :on 960725,core Thermal Power Exceeded Licensed Power Limit During Power Transient.Caused by Defective EHC Sys Component & Reactor Scram.Defective Primary Frequency/ Voltage Converter Replaced & Calibration Performed |
- on 960725,core Thermal Power Exceeded Licensed Power Limit During Power Transient.Caused by Defective EHC Sys Component & Reactor Scram.Defective Primary Frequency/ Voltage Converter Replaced & Calibration Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-017, :on 960820,4 EDGs Inoperable Resulting from Separate Crankcase Pressurization Events.Caused by Plugging of Exhaust Stack Bird Screens by Rust Debris in Stream Gas Flow.Exhaust Stacks Scraped,Cleaned & Vacuumed |
- on 960820,4 EDGs Inoperable Resulting from Separate Crankcase Pressurization Events.Caused by Plugging of Exhaust Stack Bird Screens by Rust Debris in Stream Gas Flow.Exhaust Stacks Scraped,Cleaned & Vacuumed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-018-01, Forwards LER 96-018-01 Which Discusses Event That Occurred on 960925 Re Inoperability of HPCI Sys Due to Loss of HPCI Turbine Speed Signal Caused by Loose Speed Sensor Connector | Forwards LER 96-018-01 Which Discusses Event That Occurred on 960925 Re Inoperability of HPCI Sys Due to Loss of HPCI Turbine Speed Signal Caused by Loose Speed Sensor Connector | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000352/LER-1996-018, :on 960925,single Train HPCI Sys Was Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Signal Cable Connector.Connector Was Replaced on 970102 & Common HPCI Turbine Maint Procedures Have Been Revised |
- on 960925,single Train HPCI Sys Was Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Signal Cable Connector.Connector Was Replaced on 970102 & Common HPCI Turbine Maint Procedures Have Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-019, :on 961026,capability to Reject Electrical Load of RHR Pump Not Fully Verified.Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.Tests Will Be Revised Prior to Next Performance & TS Change Request Is Being Pursued |
- on 961026,capability to Reject Electrical Load of RHR Pump Not Fully Verified.Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.Tests Will Be Revised Prior to Next Performance & TS Change Request Is Being Pursued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000352/LER-1996-020, :on 961205,primary Containment Isolation Valves Inadvertently Closed Due to Personnel Error.Reopened Valves & Counseled Individual Involved on Work Techniques |
- on 961205,primary Containment Isolation Valves Inadvertently Closed Due to Personnel Error.Reopened Valves & Counseled Individual Involved on Work Techniques
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1996-021-01, Forwards LER 96-021-01 Re Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown in Event of Fire as Provided by Fire Protection Program | Forwards LER 96-021-01 Re Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown in Event of Fire as Provided by Fire Protection Program | | | 05000352/LER-1996-021, :on 841026,determined Fire Safe Shutdown Made in Fire Safe Shutdown Repair Would Not Function as Desired Due to Incorrect Assumption.Revised Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures |
- on 841026,determined Fire Safe Shutdown Made in Fire Safe Shutdown Repair Would Not Function as Desired Due to Incorrect Assumption.Revised Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000352/LER-1996-022-01, Forwards LER 96-022-01 Re Event Which Occurred on 961102 Re Amount of Fuel Oil Contained in D14 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank.Challenging Method for Determining Tank Oil Level Resulted in Operator Obtaining an Incorrect Level Re | Forwards LER 96-022-01 Re Event Which Occurred on 961102 Re Amount of Fuel Oil Contained in D14 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank.Challenging Method for Determining Tank Oil Level Resulted in Operator Obtaining an Incorrect Level Reading | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-022, :on 961102,D14 EDG Was Declared Inoperable Due to Low Fuel Oil in Storage Tank.Caused by Challenging Method for Determining Tank Level.Increased Operator Awareness of Potential for Error Is Being Utilized |
- on 961102,D14 EDG Was Declared Inoperable Due to Low Fuel Oil in Storage Tank.Caused by Challenging Method for Determining Tank Level.Increased Operator Awareness of Potential for Error Is Being Utilized
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1996-023, :on 950403,FPS Surveillance Tests Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Involved Disciplined & New Supervisor Assigned to Onsite Fire Protection Group |
- on 950403,FPS Surveillance Tests Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Involved Disciplined & New Supervisor Assigned to Onsite Fire Protection Group
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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