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Abstract:
88-001 On January 6, 1988, the requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.b was not met.
During a review of surveillance test ST 107-590-1 "Daily Surveillance Log" it was noticed that a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system pipe-routing area temperature reading was deviating from previous shift readings.
Subsequent investigation revealed that during the performance of an ST the thermocouple leads were inadvertently reversed.
This condition went undetected during.the performance of the Independent Verification of Restoration portion of the ST.
Additionally, operations personnel recognized the abnormally low temperature indication but attributed the reading to extreme cold weather.
There were no adverse consequences and no release of radioactive material as a result of this event.
Had a steam leak occurred in the RCIC pipe-routing area with the subject thermocouple leads reversed the isolation logic would still serve its design function due to the presence of an alternate trip system containing a redundant thermocouple.
The thermocouple leads were properly relanded at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on January 6, 1988 and indication was verified to reflect current plant conditions.
The technicians involved were counseled as to their error and discussion of this event will be included in annual technician training.
Shift Operations personnel have received a memo detailing this LER and the requirement to notify Shift Supervision of inconsistent channel readings.
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Operating Mode:
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Reactor Power:
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1 Description of the Event:
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On January 6, 1988, it was discovered that an incorrectly connected thermocouple resulted in a condition which did not meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.2.b which states, "With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel (s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition with.in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />."
During a review of surveillance test ST-6-107-590-l "Daily Surveillance Log" it was noticed that a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system pipe-routing area temperature reading was deviating from previous shift readingn.
Specifically, the day shift (X) reading on January 5, 1988 was 84 degrees F while the afternoon (Y) shift and the night (Z) shift readings where both 54 degrees F.
The January 6, 1988 X-shift Instrument and Controls group was l
notified of the problem and requested to investigate the cause.
l While troubleshooting, it was discovered that the leads to a RCIC pipe-routing area high temperature thermocouple (TIS-049-lN603J) had been reversed.
This incorrect wiring hookup had resulted in the inconsistent temperature readings and rendered thermocouple TIS-049-lN603J inoperable.
Consequences of the Event:
There were no adverse consequences as a result of this event.
There was no release of radioactive material as a result of this event.
Had a steam leak occurred in the RCIC pipe-routing area with the thermocouple disabled due to reversed leads, the RCIC steam supply isolation valve would have closed and performed its design function due to redundancy of the temperature detection in this area.
The isolation actuation instrumentation for this system consists of two trip systems.
Thermocouple TIS-049-lN603L
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I is located six feet from thermocouple TIS-049-lN603J and is on the alternate trip system.
The RCIC isolation logic is a one out of one logic, therefore the RCIC steam supply isolation valve would close on a high temperature signal from the redundant thermocouple TIS-049-lN603L.
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Cause of the Event
The immediate cause of t'nis event was the incorrect reconnection l
of the thermocouple, which had apparently occurred when contractor employed Instrument and Control technicians performed surveillance test ST-2-049-613-1, "Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System - RCIC Equipment Room Temperature Division I Functional Test."
This ST was completed at approximately 0950 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.61475e-4 months <br /> on January 5, 1988.
During the performance of this surveillance test it is believed that the thermocouple leads were j
inadvertently reversed on reconnection.
This was not discovered I
during the Independent Verification of Restoration (IVOR) portion i
of the surveillance test.
The IVOR consists of a sign-off space verifying that the field wires have been properly reconnected following the performance of the surveillance test.
Although the IVOR provides wire tag numbers and the terminal numbers to which they are to be attached, the contractor employed Instrument and Control technician performing the IVOR failed to recognize the incorrect reconnection of the field wires.
Operations personnel performing channel checks for this instrument during performance of ST-6-107-590-1 "Daily Surveillance Log" during Y and Z shifts on January 5, 1988 recognized the abnormally low temperature indication but attributed the reading to extreme cold weather.
Corrective Actions
Operations personnel suspected the deviation in the temperature reading might be a problem during the review of ST-6-107-590-1, "Daily Surveillance Log" at the beginning of X-Shift on January 6,
1988.
Instrument and Control personnel were notified of the problem on X-shift, January 6, 1988.
Following an investigation to determine the cause of the problem the thermocouple leads were properly connected at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on January 6, 1988 and indication was verified to reflect current plant conditions.
The incorrect wiring condition existed for approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
The event was discussed at the "All Hands" meeting of the I&C technicians on January 15, 1988.
The personnel were reminded of the importance of accurate performance of the independent verification program and the attention to detail requirements involved in the surveillance test program.
The technicians involved were counselvd as to their error and the importance of properly verifying the reconnection of leads when removed for testing.
A memo has been sent from the Assistant Superintendent Operation to Shift Personnel detailing this LER.
When performing channel checks, inconsistent channel readings shall be highlighted aad Shift Supervision notified.
The ST and Independent Verification of Restoration (IVOR) programs are part of the technician continuing training program.
The technician yearly procedurs refresher class will specifically address this event.
All technicians are scheduled for the class in the first quarter of 1988.
The following Human Factors Enhancements will be added to the specific type of surveillance test involved by June 1, 1988 as follows:
1)
The IVOR section of the ST will be formatted in such a way that the sequence of verification is consistent with the physical terminal locations in the panel.
2)
Wire colors will be mentioned throughout the body and the IVOR section of the ST.
This will provide an additional means of identifying the field wires thrcughout the test.
The process of lifting leads during surveillance testing is being evaluated by the Nuclear Engineering Department.
Modification No. 790 is evaluating the possibility of installing switches to obviate the need to lift leads on this test during routine surveillance testing.
EIIS Codes BN - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System TW - Thermocouple
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Previous Similar Occurrences:
LGS LER 85-019 reports t'eversed thermocouple wires for the High Pressure Coolant Injection System turbine steam supply outboard l.
isolation valve.
Tracking Codes: A, Parsonnel Error S
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY s
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P.O. BOX 8699 PhlLADELPHI A, PA.19101
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February 8, 1988 L-r Docket No. 50-352 r
Document Control Desk
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U.S. Duclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 y
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1 This LER reportssthe failure to meet Technical Specificalion
, requiteihents of the Re. Actor Core < Isolation Cooling System due to
. person 11el error.
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< Reference:
Docket No..50-352 Report Number:
88-001 Revision Number:
00 Event Date:
Januaryp5, 1988 Discovery Date:
January' % 1988 Report Date:
February'8, 1988 q'
Facility:
Limerick Generating Station i
P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA, 19464 This 1ER is being submitted pyrsuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50173(a)(2)(1)(B).* We regret the delayed edbmittal of thJs LER and any inconvenience that it may have caused.
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I WWW j a, R. H. Logue Assistant to the Manager Nuclear Support Division
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W. T. Russell, Administrator, Regfon,I, USNRC
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E. M. Kelly, Senior Resident Inspector fl
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000352/LER-1988-001, :on 880106,discovered That RCIC Sys pipe-routing Area Temp Reading Deviating from Previous Shift Readings.Caused by Incorrect Reconnection of Thermocouple & Personnel Error.Technicians Counseled on Error |
- on 880106,discovered That RCIC Sys pipe-routing Area Temp Reading Deviating from Previous Shift Readings.Caused by Incorrect Reconnection of Thermocouple & Personnel Error.Technicians Counseled on Error
| | | 05000352/LER-1988-002, :on 880130,isolation of Reactor Encl Secondary Containment Occurred.Caused by Exhaust Fan a & B Blade Pitch Settings Requiring Adjustment.Instrument Air Tubing to Exhaust Fan B Damper Replaced |
- on 880130,isolation of Reactor Encl Secondary Containment Occurred.Caused by Exhaust Fan a & B Blade Pitch Settings Requiring Adjustment.Instrument Air Tubing to Exhaust Fan B Damper Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-003, :on 880201,monthly Surveillance Test Discovered to Be Overdue & Violating Tech Specs Due to Scheduling Error.Caused by Incorrect Master List W/Invalid Scheduled Date.No Corrective Action Required |
- on 880201,monthly Surveillance Test Discovered to Be Overdue & Violating Tech Specs Due to Scheduling Error.Caused by Incorrect Master List W/Invalid Scheduled Date.No Corrective Action Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-005, :on 880219,determined One of Four Reactpr Coolant Leakage Monitoring Sys Inoperable in Violation of Tech Spec 3.4.3.1.Investigation Continuing.Wiring Restored to as-built Condition & Sys Declared Operable |
- on 880219,determined One of Four Reactpr Coolant Leakage Monitoring Sys Inoperable in Violation of Tech Spec 3.4.3.1.Investigation Continuing.Wiring Restored to as-built Condition & Sys Declared Operable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-006, :on 880229,fire Protection Sys Required by Tech Specs Declared Administratively Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Firewatch Posted & Addl Fire Hoses Made Available in Area of Inoperable Water Curtains |
- on 880229,fire Protection Sys Required by Tech Specs Declared Administratively Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Firewatch Posted & Addl Fire Hoses Made Available in Area of Inoperable Water Curtains
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-007, :on 880309,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pressure Transmitter Failure.Transmitter Replaced & Tested & Cause for False Signal Due to Failed Amplifier Board |
- on 880309,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pressure Transmitter Failure.Transmitter Replaced & Tested & Cause for False Signal Due to Failed Amplifier Board
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000352/LER-1988-008-01, :on 880323,discovered That Electrical Conduit Penetrating fire-rated Door Lacked fire-rated Internal Conduit Seals.Cause Undetermined.Missing Seals Installed When Cable Pulling Work Complete |
- on 880323,discovered That Electrical Conduit Penetrating fire-rated Door Lacked fire-rated Internal Conduit Seals.Cause Undetermined.Missing Seals Installed When Cable Pulling Work Complete
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-008, :on 880323,Tech Spec 3.7.7 Violated.Caused by Fire Watch Measures Not in Place for Discovered Electrical Conduit Found Lacking Fire Rated Internal Conduit Seals.Fire Watch Patrol Established & Seals Installed |
- on 880323,Tech Spec 3.7.7 Violated.Caused by Fire Watch Measures Not in Place for Discovered Electrical Conduit Found Lacking Fire Rated Internal Conduit Seals.Fire Watch Patrol Established & Seals Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-010, :on 880326,initiation of ESF Occurred Due to Reactor Encl Isolation.Caused by Nonlicensed Operator Failure to Follow Procedures.Reactor Encl Isolation Reset & Normal Ventilation Put in Svc |
- on 880326,initiation of ESF Occurred Due to Reactor Encl Isolation.Caused by Nonlicensed Operator Failure to Follow Procedures.Reactor Encl Isolation Reset & Normal Ventilation Put in Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-011-01, :on 880326,RWCU Isolation Occurred on Nssss Due to High Differential Flow.Caused by Pressure Transient While Removing Filter Demineralizer from Svc.Isolation Reset & RWCU Returned to Operation |
- on 880326,RWCU Isolation Occurred on Nssss Due to High Differential Flow.Caused by Pressure Transient While Removing Filter Demineralizer from Svc.Isolation Reset & RWCU Returned to Operation
| | | 05000352/LER-1988-011, :on 880326,RWCU Isolation Occurred Due to High Differential Flow.Caused by Pressure Transient While Removing Filter Demineralizer from Svc.Filter Demineralizer Bypass Valve to Be Replaced During Outage |
- on 880326,RWCU Isolation Occurred Due to High Differential Flow.Caused by Pressure Transient While Removing Filter Demineralizer from Svc.Filter Demineralizer Bypass Valve to Be Replaced During Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-012, :on 880409,actuation of Reactor Protection Sys & ESF Occurred.Caused by Reactor Operator Error.Operator Cautioned to Be Constantly Aware of Condition Which Affect Core Reactivity |
- on 880409,actuation of Reactor Protection Sys & ESF Occurred.Caused by Reactor Operator Error.Operator Cautioned to Be Constantly Aware of Condition Which Affect Core Reactivity
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1988-013, :on 880409,full Scram Signal Received When Intermediate Range Monitor Detector Failed.No Control Rod Motion as Result of Event Due to Control Rods Insertion When Entering Shutdown Mode.Monitor to Be Replaced |
- on 880409,full Scram Signal Received When Intermediate Range Monitor Detector Failed.No Control Rod Motion as Result of Event Due to Control Rods Insertion When Entering Shutdown Mode.Monitor to Be Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-014, :on 880416,control Room HVAC Isolated Due to False Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal.Probably Caused by Rainwater Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Mod to Emergency Fresh Air Supply Sys to Be Installed |
- on 880416,control Room HVAC Isolated Due to False Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal.Probably Caused by Rainwater Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Mod to Emergency Fresh Air Supply Sys to Be Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-015, :on 880418,emergency Diesel Generator auto-started Due to Unplanned Test Start Signal.Caused by Personnel Error.Training Memo Issued to All Field Engineers Requiring Completion of Stated Form |
- on 880418,emergency Diesel Generator auto-started Due to Unplanned Test Start Signal.Caused by Personnel Error.Training Memo Issued to All Field Engineers Requiring Completion of Stated Form
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000352/LER-1988-016, :on 880507,Channel B Reactor Protection Sys 1/2 Scram & Various Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Isolations Occurred.Caused by Overheating of Fuse Due to Inadequate Contact.Fuse Replaced |
- on 880507,Channel B Reactor Protection Sys 1/2 Scram & Various Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Isolations Occurred.Caused by Overheating of Fuse Due to Inadequate Contact.Fuse Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-017, :on 880509,reactor Encl Isolation & Nssss Group VI a & B Isolations Occurred.Caused by Component Failure. Instrument Air Supply to SV-76-144A Closed Following Second Reactor Encl Isolation |
- on 880509,reactor Encl Isolation & Nssss Group VI a & B Isolations Occurred.Caused by Component Failure. Instrument Air Supply to SV-76-144A Closed Following Second Reactor Encl Isolation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-018, :on 880511,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated Due to Channel C High Chlorine Concentration Signal.Caused by Contact of Rainwater W/Analyzer Probe. Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented |
- on 880511,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated Due to Channel C High Chlorine Concentration Signal.Caused by Contact of Rainwater W/Analyzer Probe. Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-019, :on 880506,17 Agastat Relays Found W/Missing or Unsecured Locking Springs.Caused by Inadvertent Dislodging During Work Activities in Relay Cabinets.Memo & Surveillance Test Written for Future Ref |
- on 880506,17 Agastat Relays Found W/Missing or Unsecured Locking Springs.Caused by Inadvertent Dislodging During Work Activities in Relay Cabinets.Memo & Surveillance Test Written for Future Ref
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-020, :on 880521,reactor Encl Secondary Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Vibration Induced to Tubing or Tubing Defect.Air Line Tubing Repaired & Reactor Encl Isolation Reset |
- on 880521,reactor Encl Secondary Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Vibration Induced to Tubing or Tubing Defect.Air Line Tubing Repaired & Reactor Encl Isolation Reset
| | | 05000352/LER-1988-021-01, :on 880601,main Control Room HVAC Sys Isolated Due to Channel D High Chlorine Isolation Signal.Caused by Rainwater Contacting Chlorine Analyzer Probe D.Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented |
- on 880601,main Control Room HVAC Sys Isolated Due to Channel D High Chlorine Isolation Signal.Caused by Rainwater Contacting Chlorine Analyzer Probe D.Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-021, :on 880601,control Room HVAC Isolation Resulting from High Chlorine Concentration Signal Occurred. Caused by Rainwater Contacting Chlorine Analyzer Probe D During Storm.Mod to Instrumentation Planned |
- on 880601,control Room HVAC Isolation Resulting from High Chlorine Concentration Signal Occurred. Caused by Rainwater Contacting Chlorine Analyzer Probe D During Storm.Mod to Instrumentation Planned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-022, :on 880609,inadvertent Start of Emergency Diesel Generator During Installation of Test Equipment Occurred.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Special Procedure SP-ST-012 Revised |
- on 880609,inadvertent Start of Emergency Diesel Generator During Installation of Test Equipment Occurred.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Special Procedure SP-ST-012 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-023, :on 880610,emergency Svc Water (ESW) Pump Start Occurred During Relay Calibr.Caused by Procedure Inadequacies.Esw Pump C Secured 1 Minute After Auto Start. Procedure Revised to Prevent Sys Interaction |
- on 880610,emergency Svc Water (ESW) Pump Start Occurred During Relay Calibr.Caused by Procedure Inadequacies.Esw Pump C Secured 1 Minute After Auto Start. Procedure Revised to Prevent Sys Interaction
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-024, :on 880623,failure to Stroke Test Valve Following Maint Resulted in Failure to Take Tech Spec Action Statement.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Counseled About Importance of post-work Testing |
- on 880623,failure to Stroke Test Valve Following Maint Resulted in Failure to Take Tech Spec Action Statement.Caused by Personnel Error.Individuals Counseled About Importance of post-work Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-025, :on 880627,reactor Encl Isolation Occurred While Performing Surveillance Test.Caused by Instrument Isolation Valve Being Partially Closed During Surveillance. Reactor Encl Isolation Reset Per Procedure |
- on 880627,reactor Encl Isolation Occurred While Performing Surveillance Test.Caused by Instrument Isolation Valve Being Partially Closed During Surveillance. Reactor Encl Isolation Reset Per Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-026, :on 880717,control Room HVAC Isolation Resulted from High Chlorine Concentration Signal Caused by Rain Water Contacting Analyzer Probe.Proper Control Room Isolation Verified & Control Room Ventilation Restored |
- on 880717,control Room HVAC Isolation Resulted from High Chlorine Concentration Signal Caused by Rain Water Contacting Analyzer Probe.Proper Control Room Isolation Verified & Control Room Ventilation Restored
| | | 05000352/LER-1988-027, :on 880721,control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal During Heavy Rain Storm.Caused by Rainwater in Contact W/ Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Mod Implemented |
- on 880721,control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal During Heavy Rain Storm.Caused by Rainwater in Contact W/ Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Mod Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-027-01, :on 880721,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal. Caused by Rainwater Coming in Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented |
- on 880721,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Concentration Signal. Caused by Rainwater Coming in Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe.Special Event Procedure SE-2 Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-028, :on 880817,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Room Emergency Fresh Air Supply Sys.Caused by Rainwater Coming in Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe During Thunderstorms |
- on 880817,main Control Room Ventilation Sys Isolated on Channel D High Chlorine Room Emergency Fresh Air Supply Sys.Caused by Rainwater Coming in Contact W/Chlorine Analyzer Probe During Thunderstorms
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-029, :on 880830,individual Responsible for Maintaining Continuous Firewatch Post Discovered Inattentive.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Firewatch Person Terminated |
- on 880830,individual Responsible for Maintaining Continuous Firewatch Post Discovered Inattentive.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Firewatch Person Terminated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-030, :on 881003,determined That Unit Operating in Unanalyzed Condition from Receipt of OL Until 880419.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Design Change Not Implemented During Const.Fire Damper Doors Inspected |
- on 881003,determined That Unit Operating in Unanalyzed Condition from Receipt of OL Until 880419.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Design Change Not Implemented During Const.Fire Damper Doors Inspected
| | | 05000352/LER-1988-031-02, Forwards LER 88-031-02.Safe Shutdown Analysis self- Assessment Program Presented in 890123 Meeting.Assessment Resulted in Determination of Overall Root Cause of Various Reportable Deviations & Schedule for Corrective Actions | Forwards LER 88-031-02.Safe Shutdown Analysis self- Assessment Program Presented in 890123 Meeting.Assessment Resulted in Determination of Overall Root Cause of Various Reportable Deviations & Schedule for Corrective Actions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000352/LER-1988-031, :on 881006,determined That Plant Not in Compliance W/Fire Protection Evaluation Rept.Caused by Misunderstanding & Misapplication of Detailed Regulatory Requirements.Fire Watch Patrol Established |
- on 881006,determined That Plant Not in Compliance W/Fire Protection Evaluation Rept.Caused by Misunderstanding & Misapplication of Detailed Regulatory Requirements.Fire Watch Patrol Established
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000352/LER-1988-033, :on 881101,discovered Unacceptable Electrical Isolation Between Facility Class 1E Div II Dc Power Source & D22 Bus Dc Circuits.Caused by Personnel Error.All non-Class 1E Circuits Removed from Div II Dc Source |
- on 881101,discovered Unacceptable Electrical Isolation Between Facility Class 1E Div II Dc Power Source & D22 Bus Dc Circuits.Caused by Personnel Error.All non-Class 1E Circuits Removed from Div II Dc Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000352/LER-1988-034, :on 881106,isolation of Reactor Encl Secondary Containment Occurred on Low Differential Pressure.Caused by Severed Instrument Air Line Servicing Reactor Encl Exhaust Fan Blade Pitch Positioner B |
- on 881106,isolation of Reactor Encl Secondary Containment Occurred on Low Differential Pressure.Caused by Severed Instrument Air Line Servicing Reactor Encl Exhaust Fan Blade Pitch Positioner B
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000352/LER-1988-042, :on 881223,inoperability of Plant Sys Due to Unacceptable Physical Separation Between safety-related Cabling Determined.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Procedure Will Incorporate Consolidated Open Items List.W/Undated Ltr |
- on 881223,inoperability of Plant Sys Due to Unacceptable Physical Separation Between safety-related Cabling Determined.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Procedure Will Incorporate Consolidated Open Items List.W/Undated Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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