ML20134G111
| ML20134G111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1996 |
| From: | HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134G092 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9611130042 | |
| Download: ML20134G111 (80) | |
Text
-
Lic;nsing Doc. Change Requ;st CN-1979 R v._.Q.
Page 21, of 2.2 NEAREY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MII.ITARY FACILITIES 2.2.1 Location and Routes 2.2.1.1 Industrial racilities. There are presently three operating industrial facilities within 5 miles of the South Texas Project Electric cenerating Station (STFECS) and one more within 6-1/2 miles, as shown on Figure 2.2 1.
Additionally, four plant sites are located within the 5-mile radius and one more site within 5.5 miles. These facilities are described in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1.2 Extractive Industries. There are no known extractive industries within 5 miles of the propos,ed plant.
2.2.1.3 Nuclear Power racilities. Other than the STPECS, there are no nuclear facilities either operable or being built or planned (reactors ordered) within 50 miles of the plant site (Ref. 2.21).
2.2.1.4 Transeertation.
2.2.1.4.1 Roads: As shown on Figure 2.1-2, there are four roaddays within 5 miles of the plant. The road nearest the plant is Farm to-Market Road (TM) 521, which has been relocated so that it is at least 0.89 miles (1,430 meters) from the Containment structures. Other information on this and other roads within 5 miles is given below:
E22d Direction Distance (afi 24-hr Traffic Surface Classifiestion FM 1095 V
4.2 1,260 Bituminous B
1 IM 521 ENW*
0.89*
900 Bituminous A
FM 3057 NNE 4.5 1,060 Bituminous A
IM 2668 ENE 4.8 1.445 Bituminous A
FM 1468 N
1.0 400 Bituminous None
- Relocated classification: Class A = 80,000 lbs. load limit Class B = 58.420 lbs. Ioad limit
- All roads are two-lane, 24-fe-travel-vay, counh-maintained roads.
The closest major highway is Texas State Highway 60, which is located approximately 7.2 miles east of the Containment structures. Highway 60 runs north-south.
There are no statistics with respect to estimated future traffic along IM 521; however, the Texas State Highway Commission assumes a 5 percent per year increase in use as a standard rule of thumb.
2.2-1 Revision 0 9611130042 961031 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P
Licensing Doc. Change Request CN 1979 R:;v. _Q,,
Pag).jo cf STPECS UPSAR i
2.2.1.4.2 Railroads: There are presently three railroad systems in the area of the plant. They are listed below and shown on Figure 2.2 2 alens with their proposed spur lines to the plant, t
Distance (mi) and Direction F.ailroad from Plant at Closest Point Santa Fe - Main Line 7E
- Spur to DuPont 6E
- Industrial Spur 4.8 N
- Spur to Cities Service 5.6 NE Missouri Pacific - Main Line 7N
- Spur to Celanese 4.8 N Southern Pacific 10 W Other than the spur to the plant, the rail line nearest to the STPEGS is composed of industrial spurs from the Missouri Pacific and Santa Fe railroads, which join to form a single spur extending to the Celanese Chemical Co=pany.
The Southern Pacific Line is out of service.
2.2.1.4.3 Vater: The principal watervey near the site is the Colorado River, shown on Figure 2.2-1 and discussed in Section 2.2.2.4 2.2.1.4.4 Airvnys: Airways near the site are shown on Figure 2.2-2 and discussed in Section 2.2.2.5.
2.2.3.4.5 Hilitary Facilities: There are no military facilities, missile bases, or operations within 5 miles of the plant (Ref. 2.2-1).
2.2.1.4.6 Pinelines: Pipelines in the vicinity of the site are shown on Figure 2.2-3 and discussed in Section 2.2.2.3.
2.2.1.4.7 Underrround 6as storare: 1here is no underground storage of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) within 5 miles of the plant site. The nearest LPG underground storage facility is in the Markham salt dome,16 miles north-northwest of the plant site. Markham is used to atore ethane and propane. Because there are no salt domes underlying or closer to the plant site than the Markham salt dome, any future storage of LPC need not be considered. See Figure 2.2-4 for location of salt domes and Table 2.2-4 for information on the salt domes.
2.2.1.4.8 Above-Cround Ces sterece: The Bulk Cas Storage Facility (BCST) on-site vill store up to 200,400 standard cubic feet (sef) of hydrogen in twenty-four pressurized tubes. The BCSF also stores liquified nitrogen and 2
gaseous nitrogen. The storage parameters for these gases are given in Table 2.2-7.
The BCSF is located approximately $25 feet North of the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Building (DCB) and serves both units.
2.2-2 Revision 2
Ucendng Doc. Chang 3 Request _CN-1979_ Rev._Q_.
Pags JJ_ cf 2.2.2 Dascriptiens 2.2.2.1 Descrivtion of Facilities. The five offsite industrial 1
2 facilities located within approximately 7 miles of the STPECS are indicated on Figure 2.2-1.
The Celanese Chemical Company is the largest facility located near the STPECS alte (approximately 4.8 miles to the north-northeast) and employs approximately 500 workers. The celanese chemical company produces a variety of chemical products. Potentia 1 rardous chemicals stored at and shipped from the celsnese plant ar _ talled in Referende 2.2-33 DuPont owns and operates a high density polyethylene plant located,
approximately 7 miles east of the STPECS site. The plant site covers 2,100 acres and employs approximately 150 persons. There-is no hazard to STPECS associated with the DuPont facility plant location and hazardous material transportation routes.
l Tive and one-half miles north-northeast cf STFECS is the K and K Compression site, which was purchased from the Big Three Industrial Cas and Equipment Co.
4 All production equipment has been dissantled and there are no plans for j
further industrial production.
4 A public wharf located at the Fort of Bay City, 4.8 miles to the north-3 northeast, is the terminal used by Crysen (formerly the Bay Tex terminal), a j
facility for unloading gasoline and diesel oil from barge transport on the Colorado River. After unloading and storage. the petroleum is shipped by truck to retail terminals. The Crysen Terminal. employing 6 persons, i
maintains a petroleum product storage capability of 120,000 barrels. The Crysen Terminal transports about 25,000 gallons of petroleum a month. The Celanese Chemical Company uses the public wharf and, transit shed facilities at 2
the Port of Bay City for the shipment of nylon salt. Six hundred tons of nylon salt have been bargeloaded from the Crysen facility for a single shipment.
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Incated in the area where D1521 crosses the Colorado River (3.5 miles east) is the Parker Brothers facility, which was used for unloading oyster, clam and reef shells.
The dock facility ceased operations in December 1982.
Table 2.2-1 suadarizes the information presented above.
2.2.2.2 Descrietion of Prodoets and Materials. A description of the Froducts and. materials at the industrial facilities is presented in Section 2.2.2.1.
A description of the products and materials in the Bulk Cas Storage 2
Facility appears in Table 2.2-7.
2.2.2.3 Finelines. Figure 2.2-3 shows the natural gas pipelines within 5 miles of the plant. There are no 1.PG or liquid natural gas lines within 5 miles of the site. Also shown on Figure 2.2-3 are the gas and oil production fields within the safse distance from the plant. It should be noted that the area described by Figure 2.2-3 is crossed by many more pipelines and fields than those represented. For clarity, only those lines and fields which are within the above distance from the plant are shown. The transmission pipeline nearest the plant is a 16-in. natural gas pipeline of the Dow Chemical 2.2-3 Revision 2
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Company. At its classst cpproach to the plant, this pipeline is 2.1 miles to the northwest (Ref. 2.2-1).
The Delhi 4-in. gathering line serves the South Duncan Slough field and is 1.6 miles from the STPECS plant at the point of 2
closest approach. Data on the pipelines are summarized in Table 2.2-2.
8 Two Big Three pipelines from the Freeport, Texas area carry oxygen and nitrogen to the Celanese Chemical Company. The closest approach of the pipelines to STPECS is their termination point at the celanese plant.
1
, There is little or no potential for future expansion of the oil and gas production fields within 5 miles of the site because each field is surrounded by dry holes and the limits of the structure of each field are known from reflection geophysical data. As of August 1985, there has been a decline in production in each field. Production zones in all the fields are in the Frio Formation at depths ranging from 10,200 to 12,650 fr. Development of producing zones in Eocene Age sands is unlikely because of the great depth of such sands (estimated to be about 20.000 f t) in the vicinity of the site.
The four fields within 5 miles of the site are shown on Figure 2.2-3.
An evaluation of the possibility of the development of oil and gas production fields closer to the site than those now indicated on Figure,2.2-3 is presented in Section 2.5.1.1.6.6.7.2.
The proposed 1.s Salle liquified natural gas (INC) terminal (Ref. 2.2-28) site is located about 35 miles southwest of the STPECS site and five miles northwest of Port O'Connor. A 36 in. pipeline trends in a vest-northwest direction, 463 miles to Fecos County. Texas. The La Salle terminal is the pipeline's closest point to the STPECS (Ref. 2.2-20).
2.2.2.4 Va tervavs. The primary waterway in the vicinity of the site is the Colorado River, which is used primarily for barge traffic. From the Gulf Intracoastal Watervsy, which is 125 ft vide and 12 ft deep, the river winds along a 15-mile stretch until it approaches the turning basin. The river channel is approximately 15 ft deep and 100 ft vide. The minimum depth of the Colorado River between the Gulf and the Crysen Terminal is 71/2 ft.
During the 12-month period from July 1981 through June 1982, 1.186 barges and 934 tug boats used the river for the transportation of rav and finished materials to the celanese DuPont, Farker Brothers, and Crysen facilities. There are presently no p1'ans by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to enlarge the river for larger operations. However, the USACE has begun a diversion project at the mouth of the Colorado River.
The project is situated on the Texas Coastline approximately one mile south of Matagorda (Figure 2.2-6).
The river diver'sion features are to be located in Matagorda Bay and the Colorado River adjacent to the Culf Intracoastal Waterway near the town of Matagorda.
The project is expected to enhance the Bay's commercial productivity and take advantage of incidental opportunities to provide flood control and reduce navigation hazards and navigation maintensnee dredging. Project details and impacts are discussed in an Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the 11SACE in March 1981.
2.2-4 Revision 2 a
i Ucensing Doc. Ching) Request: CN-1979 Rev. p_
. Page _J.3, cf 2.2.2.5 M roort s.
Tha,, current.corial n2vigation charts (Houston
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Farm, 9.5 miles to the vest-northw,vithin 10 miles of the S1PECS, sectional) show only evo airports C-Level est of the proposed plant, has a 3,700-ft turf runway. The facility is used primarily for crop-dusting operations and for the sale of agricultural aircraf t.
There are from 2 to 12 aircraft based i
at the airport, depending on sales stock and crop dusting operational requirements. During the working seasons, the serial applicators make approximately 25 to 30 take-offs and landings a day.
Collegeport Airfield, located approximately 8.5 miles to the southwest, is no longer in active use. However, a replacement airfield with a 2,800-ft runway 1
has been constructed about 1/4 mile east of the old runway. The primary use
'of the airport vill be agricultural aviation. During the peak growing season.
- there vill be approximately 100 take-offs and landings per day.
There are, however, another 18 runways within 10 miles. The majority of these facilities are small grass strips used intermittently during serial application (crop-dusting) operations. 1hese strips are typically 1,800 to 2,600 ft long.
The predominant agricultural aircrait used in the area are the Crumman As at, c
the Cessna Ag Truck, and the Cessna Ag Wagon, lhe Ag Cat has an 80-gallon j
fuel capseity and can carry 2,000 pounds of chemicals. The Ag Truck and Ag
,Usgon each can carry 1,800 pounds of chemicals and have 56-gallon fuel l
capacities. The likelihood of significant plant damage from light aircraft of this type is considered to be remote even in the event of a crash.
4 j
The nearest airport with an associated control zone is at Palacios,13 miles j
to the vest-southwest. Approximately 11 aircraft are based at Palacios, the largest of which is a Twin Beech Bonanza D50. There are approximately 100 to 150 take-offs and landings a week at Palacios. Falacios Airport supports no commercial passenger operations (rigure 2.2-2 and Reft. 2.2 1, 2.2-7, and 2.2-8).
There are no airport's within 10 miles of the plant with greater than 500 d2 j
(d is the distance in miles from the site) operations annually or farther than 10 miles with greater than 1,000 d8 operations annually, so no detailed i
evaluation of probability of an aircraft crash associated with nearby airports is required.
There are two low-level federal airways within 10 miles of the plant. The centerlines of v70 and V20 are approximately 5 and 9 miles, respectively, I
northwest of the plant. Formerly, low-level federal airway V20S coincided with V70, but V205 has been discontinued. ' Due to the extent 4 nautical miles on either side of the centerline, V20 does not pass within 2 miles of the site. An evaluation of the hazard to STPECS from air traffic on V70 (which does pass within 2 miles of the site) is described in Section 3.5.1.6.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy had maintained a flight route designated 05-19 (Olive Branch 19) for the purpose of conducting low-level navigation and bombing training flights in jet aircraft. Use of this route, which Passes over the STPECS site, has been discontinued, effective January 30, 1975. In fact, this route had been inactive since 1972.
The 20 active runways and two low-level federal airways are shown on Figure l
2.2-2.
i 2.2-5 Revision 2 i
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UcInsing Doc. Change R;quxt: CN-1979 Rev. _0__
Page d cf 2.2.2.6 Protections of Industrial crowth. The Bay City area including the vicinity of the STPECS site, %as access to barge, rail, and road transportation and includes large undeveloped areas. It can be anticipated that there vill be some industrial growth in the area during the operational t
life of STPEGS. A survey of the area has revealed the following plans for industrial growth in the area.
The Celanese plant is being modified to increase its production capacity, but these modifications vill have no effect on the storage capacity of the toxic gases or chemicals previously discussed, nor vill other toxic gases or chemicals that could constitute a hazard to STPECS be stored there as a result of the modifications.
The Union Carbide Corporation owns a site near Bay City, as shown on Figure 2.2-1.
It is anticipated that Chemicals & Plastics of Union Carbide Corporation will develop this site in the future. Due to economic conditions, however, firm plans for the development of the site have not yet been established.
In addition, an 1.NG terminal has been proposed for a site on Matagorda Bay approximately 35 miles from the STPEGS site. Because of the great distance from STPEGS, we have concluded that this facility does not pose a hazard to STPEGS. This conclusion is supported by safety analyses done by both the El Paso Marine Company and the Federal Power Coenission (FFC). The more conservative of these analyses was done by the FPC and indicated the following two modes of risk (Refs. 2.2-18 and 2.2-20):
1 1.
A pool fire from a spill, which could result in fatalities to unprotected individuals at a distance of about 3,830 ft 2.
A flammable vapor cloud or plume which, assuming Pasquill stability class F and a vind speed of 1.5 m/sec, would be dispersed to its lover flam:nability limit within a distance of 26.6 km (16.6 miles) 2.2.2.7 On-Site Eulk Cas Storare. The BCSF contains bulk quantities of hydrogen and nitrogen (both liquified and low-pressure). The storage facilities for these gases are sized to accommodate the maximum expected usage for initial filling of user systems and for two weeks of operational use. The applicable guidance of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Special Report NP-5283-SR A (Reference 2.2-29) has been incorporated into the design of the BCSF.
The storage facilities are designed to withstand 125 mph sustained winds and a seismically-generated acceleration of 0.1 C both vertically and horizontally.
2 The BCSF is located outdoors and away from spaces that could confine a hydrogen gas cloud. The BCSF design includes excess flow control valves for the hydrogen supply station to prevent excess leakage.
Lighting is provided for the BCSF, and the facility is surrounded by an isolation fence. Vehicle barriers prevent direct access to the facility. The facility is posted as a flammable gas area. The nearest high voltage power lines are approximately 40 feet avsy from the distribution manifold and 50 feet away from the storage cylinders. The BGSF is located approximately 525 2.2-6 Revisien 2
feet due tierth k:s Doc. Change Request CN-1979 Rev. 0, PageJIcf Unit 2 DGB, outside ths Prctected Area.
cnd hydrogen deliver routes will be from the v st sid.*of the siteVehicle access e
and will utilize Di 521.
J 2
2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents 2.2.3.1 Determinatten er testen Basis Events.
2.2.3.1.1 Industrial Facilities: There are only four industrial facilities located within 5 miles of the plant.
The HVDC facility, located on site, is similar to an AC switchyard in terms of equipment and operation and poses no hazard to the STFECS' plant.
The Parker Brothers facility. which'eessed operations in December 1982, was
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used for unloading ' oyster shell and presented no hazard to the plant.
1he Crysen Terminal facility, which provides storage capacity for 120,000 barrels of gasoline. is located approximately 4.8 miles from the plant site.
At this distance the peak overpressura from an explosion of a 10-percent gasoline-air mixture (the most explosive mixture) is estimated to be less than
{
]
0.1 psi with a duration of 0.5 seconds. This will present no hazard to the plant.
4 The peak acceleration due to ground shock is calculated uzing the data j
in Reference 2.2-10 as.OO5g.
The velocity of missiles generated by the explosion was computed using an impulse-momentum technique.
This was compared with the velocity requi, red to reach the plant site considering aerodynamic drag effects, and it was found that no missiles can reach the plant site.
It is concluded that there are no design basis events associated with the Crysen 2
l Terminal facility.
i The Celanese _ Chemical _ Company facility Is located _almost S miles from the lant.
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An analysiT(Ref._2.2-3Tw'Ulisforriied) to determine the effects that a postulated release ofgttfass chemicals vopF -
I have on centrol room habitability.
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The methods and assumptCons of the pHentisE r analysis are in agreement with the guidance given in Regulatory 1
e Utcrhazardous, 1.78 and_pethoddlogy presente n NUREC-057_0 and_ NOREC/CR.1741
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The-l results of this ~ analysts show;;.et n6ne of the G &..csa storea et orsuppea ao and frond J
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2.2-7 Revision 2 l
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- Ucordng Doc. Changa Requist: CN-1979 Bev..g_.
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2.2.3.1.2 Trsnsoortation: JThere are no munitions manufacturers or munitions users located near the plant. Therefore, there will be no routine shipments of high explosives on FM 521, which passes near the plant. Analyses were performed assuming the explosion of either an 8,000-gallon gasoline truck j
or a truck carrying 5 tons of TNT. At 4,000 ft (the closest approach of fM 521 to safety-related structures), there would be no adverse effects due to explosions of gasoline or TNT-loaded trucks due either to overpressure from the blast er missiles generated by the explosion.
J The nearest approach of a railway is the industrial spur serving the celanese 1
Cheatcal Company. Shipments to and from the celanese facility will'always involve'1 esser amounts of any hazardous chemicals than the amount stored at the facility. The closest approach of road, rail, and shipping routes is such l
that STFECS is in complianze with RC 1.91.
i
,;. The Colorado River passes approximately 2.75 miles east of the plant. As discussed above for road traffic, there will be no routine shipments of high explosives on this stretch of the river. The largest shipments of petroleum products to the Crysen Terminal will be two 15,000 barrel-capacity barges. At the nearest distar ce from the plant to the river (2.75 miles), the ground shock acceleration will be less than.01g, and the peak overpressure from the explosion will be less than 0.1 psi. These values are based on the explosion of a 10 percent gasoline /9 percent air mixture in each of the two barges. At 2.75 miles, no missiles generated by this explosion can reach the plant site.
The major s i er of hazardous _ chemicals on the river _is the celanese Chemical mi a 1
e
-[An analks was perIonned to evalush the effects that a postulated release ok these (chernicals would have on control room habitability. The results of this evaluatio of the chemicals _ transported on the Coloradg River pose a credible hazard to STPEGSg-
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Plant cooling water is supplied from an ensite reservoir. Makeup water is taken from the Colorado River. There would be no safety-related consequences of vessels impacting the river intake structure or from liquid spills of corrosive chemicals in the Colorado River.
2.2.3.1.3 Brush or Foraar Fires: The land around the STPECS site is almost entirely cleared agriculture land. The only wooded area which could support a fire is along the Colorado River. Except for isolated trees, there are no wooded areas within 1 mile of safety-related structures. Underbrush is limited to locations along sloughs or between fields; hence, brush fires would be limited in extent. In addition, the safety-related structures are surrounded on the east, north and west by relocated FM 521 and on the south by i
the Cooling Reservoir. The plant structures themselves are all surrounded by service roads. Considering the above, forest or brush fires do not represent a credible hazard to STPEGS.
2.2.3.1.4 Ploelines: Table 2.2-2 lists natural gas pipelines in the plant vicinity. The 16-inch-diameter Dow Chemical company pipeline loested 2.1 miles from STPECS Category I structures and the 30 in. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation pipeline located 4.5 miles from STFECS Category I structures have the greatest potential for adverse effect on STPECS in the event of a pipeline rupture. The effects of a break in each of these pipelines has been evaluated for rvo esses:
2.2-8 Revision 2
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The release and detonation at.the break location of the entire amount of gas which could escape from the ruptured pipeline over the course of the accident.
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2.
The delayed detonation of the gas. air mixture in the plume as the wind blows in the direction of the STFECS site.
Fotential hazard to STFEGS from the oxy 5en, nitrogen, and hydrocarbon pipelines terminating at the Celanese plant is discussed in Appendix 2.2.8.
The use'cf existing natural Sas pipelines for transport of IJIG is not feasible because of the reduced temperatures required (-140 to.300*T). The use of existing gas pipelines for transport of other products could be technically feasible depending on the nature of the products. There is no gaseous product other than natural gas shipped by pipeline in large enough quantities to be a potential hasard to the plant.
Only highly volatile liquids could pose a realistic hazard to the Mant.
LPG is the major product of concern. A large supply of IFC would have to be developed to economically justify converting and operating the 30-in. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation pipeline for LPG service. Since the development of such a supply is extremely unlikely in this area, this possible LPG conversion is not considered to be a hazard to STPECS.
The two Dow Chemical Company pipelines in the piant vicinity carry gas from two gas fields to Dow's plant in Freeport, Texas. There are no existing or I
potential sources of LPC for' transmission through these lines to Freeport and there are no potential markets which would justify reversing flow in these lines.
The other pipelines in the area are part of gathering systems that moveNo natural Eas from the producing fields to a central collectivn point.
potential LPG sources or markets exist to justify conversion of these pipelines.
2.2.3.1.4.1 Detonation of Entire Amount 6f Cas Released - The assumptions and parameters used in the analysis of this hypothetical occurrence are as follows:
1.
Double-ended rupture occurs at point of closest approach to Category I structures (2.1 miles and 4.5 miles).
2.
Total quantity of gas released is the sum of that in the pipeline between compressor stations and that released at maximum normal flow during time required to isolate.
Distance between compressor stations: 60 miles for the 16.in.
a.
line and 116 miles for the 30 in line.
8 lb for the 16.in.
b.
Quantity of gas between ststions:
1.3 w,10 line and 1.1 x 10' lb for the 30-in. line.
Revision 2 2.2 9
Lloon11ng Doc. Change Requezt: CN-1979, Rev. g_
PegaJ,j,,of STPECS UFSAR t
c.
Time to isolate: for the 16.in. line, cloud travel time to the plant at 0 71 m/see plus I hour; for the 30-in. line, I hour
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(compressor station is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and rupture would be sensed at compressor station immediately).
d.
Qaantity of gas released in above time at normal flows of 81 lb/see for the 16-in. line and 163 lb/see for the 30-in. line:
7.2 x 105 lb for the 16 in. line and 6.2 x 108 lb for the 30-in.
line.
3.
Explosive equivalent of 10-percent gas-air mixture based on 1.225 stu/lb I
mixture and 2,060 Bi:u/16 TNTi~ ~11x10"1b 11tT'f6r the~1 bin. line and
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i 1.1 x 10' lb TNT for the 30-in. line.
4.
The resultant overpressures are based on the work of Kinney (Ref.
2.2 11) and are given in Table 2.2-8.
I Under the physically impossible conditions described above, the resulting loads on Category I structures are less than those due to the wind loads associated with 290-aph rotational and 70. mph transnational tornadoes (Section l
3.3).
The occurrence of the above hypothetical event will not affect the ability to safely shut down the plant.
4 The postulated conditions are considered impossible since it is assumed that all of the gas released over the period of an hour or more vill be diluted to within the flammable range without further dispersion. No consideration is t
5 ven to the upward momentum or buoyancy of the gas. These effects will tend to disperse the gas so that only a small portion of the released gas will be within the flammable range at any given time.
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2.2.3.1.4.2 Delayed Detonation of Movine Plume - The assumptions and i
parameters used in the analysis of this hypothetical occurrence are as follows:
i 1.
Double-ended rupture occurs at point of closest approach to Category I j
structures (2.1 miles and 4.5 miles).
1 2.
Cas escap,es continuously at the rate of 81 lb/see for the 16-in line and 163 lb/see for the 30-in. line'.
j 3.
Five-percentile meteorolo& cal conditions based on the data given in 1
Section 2.3 without building vake correction.
j 4.
Distance downwind from break using the x/Q's where the centerline concentrations reach the lower flammability limit of 5 volume percent 4
(2.5 x 10-3 lb/ft*) and reach the upper flammability limit of 15 volume percent (75.x 10-s 1b/fts): 1,020 meters and 540 meters respectively i
for the 16-in. line and 1,550 meters and 800 meters respectively for the 30-in. line.
5.
The amount of gas within the flammability limits based on the amount of gas released in the time for plume to travel between the above points:
5.5 x 10' lb for the 16-in. line and 1.7 x lo Ib for the 30-in. line.
s t
2.2-10 Revision 2
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Pageaf,gf STEECS UFSAR 6.
The equivalent amount of TNT using the method of item 3 in Section 2.2.3.1.4.1:
5.3 x 10 lb TNT for the 16-in. line and 1.6 x 10' lb TNT 5
for the 30-in. line.
7.
The resultant overpressure for a detonation centered at the midpoint of the flammable mixture using the same mett,1s as item 4 in Section 2.2.3.1.4 is given in Table 2.2-8.
Since the overpressure is less than that due to tornado winds, the occurrence of this improbable event will not affect the ability to safely shut down the plant.
The above analysis is conservative since the amount of gas considered in the detonation includes gas off the centerline of the plume which is below the lower flamability limit. This will be particularly significant for the portion of the plume nearest the plant and will not only reduce the equivalent yield but will also increase the effective distance from the plant. The analysis is also conservative because the effects of buoyancy were neglected.
Methane has a density of approximately 50 percent of air, which causes the gas to rise and 1 cads to additional dispersion.
2.2.3.1.5 Gas and Oil Production Fields:. _The gas and oil production fields within 5 miles of the STPECS site are identified in Section 2.2.2.3 and shown on Figure 2.2-3.
(Ca's and oil production fields are discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.1.1.6.6.7.2.)
The closest well to the STPEGS site is a single well in the South Duncan Slough gas field, approximately 1.6 miles from the nearest STPECS safety-related structure.
As stated in Section 2.2.1.4.6, it is assessed that there is very little potential for future expansion of the oil and gas fields within 5 miles of the STPEGS site. This conclusion was based on production data from the existing fields and the geological data for the site vicinity. Nevertheless, the likelihood and potential consequences of accidents which might occur during gas or oil well' drilling operations or production operations adjacent to the STPEGS site were evaluated. This analysis, summarized in Appendix 2.2.A, shows that even if a gas well is drilled at the worst location immediately adjacent to the STPEGS site there would be no adverse effect on STPECS safety-related structures. The fields within Matagorda County do not produce hydrogen sulfide gas, and the potential for an accidental release of toxic gas within 15 miles of the STPEGS site is therefore nil. This analysis also shows that the existing gas well located 1.6 miles from the plant poses no credible hazard to the STPEGS plant.
2.2.3.1.6 Plant Site Chemical Storace Protection: The circulating cooling water, the essential cooling water, the potable water, and the auxiliary cooling water vill be chemically treated for control of biological growth with a 0.8-percent solution of sodium hypochlorite. Small amounts of liquid chlorine will be stored in the potable water chlorinator at the Nuclear Training Facility. The sodium hypochlorite solution will be generated at the plant site by an electrolytic process which uses sodium chloride and water as raw materials. The diluted sodium hypochlorite solution will present no threat to the control room. The sodium hypochlorite solution, for the 3
essential cooling water system, will be enhanced with a sodium bromide salt and biodispersant.
2.2-11 Revision 3
tjo;nsing Doc. Change Request: CN 1979 Rev. 9_.
Page_fo of An analysis of the remaining en-p'ite gases was performed using the guidance from RC 1.78 and the methodololyln NUREC-0170 and NUREC/CR-174L h e resu ts of this analysis _show that et c
- o,
a' fid,4oMtfon/w71 Mdigd/osal
_ni f,_ J _ y
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- e Jthe. i ;.Jngh.; - =
M_Jaga For tpope AM taEm gagM fogM/1+ mM _a E9M
==d to_ the OTM5 shiii.T VTpb1d J."R5)
~
2.2.3.1.7 Plant 1inhenin-Pr eemeten: Measures will be taken on the above-ground outdoor STFECS appurtenanets to prevent damage to either energized or monenergized structures dich could be subject to a direct lightning stroka where receipt of such a stroke could damage critical plant components, including:
1.
Lightning arrester' will be installed on the generator transformers and s
other similar energized equipment to provide a direct coupling to ground for lightning stroke-incurred surge current and any follovup 60-Hz current.
At the location of each lightning arrester, an array of buried vertical ground rods or the equivalent will be installed to provide a deep earth coupling with the shortest required length of interconnecting ground cable.
2.
Air terminals and downeomers will be provided, as required, for critical nonmetallic plant structures not effectively shielded from a direct lightning stroke by an adjacent structure.
Air terminals, as required, will be provided on metallic plant structures which are not otherwise effectively shielded where a direct lightning stroke could damage a structtire to the detriment of proper plant operation.
3.
Cround rods or the equivalent will be installed as part of the overall plant grodnding system and also specifically as stated in item 2.
4 All measures, devices and considerations of lightning protection requirements shall be in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA's) *1.ightning Protection Code - NFPA No. 78".
(Ref. 2.2-10).
2.2.3.1.8 Hydreren Cas Exelosions: An analysis has been performed of the effects of a detonation involving the hydrogen gas stored in bulk in the on-site BCSF.
Per the guidance of Reference 2.2-29, this analysis assumes that one of the hydrogen cylinders in the BGSF ruptures and its contents are instantaneously released. The hydrogen fully forms a
- puff,* and the gas 2
immediately detonates. The " puff
- cloud of the gas was assumed to have a caussian concentration distribution (per the model described in Regulatory cuide 1.78).
Dispersion of the hydrogen due to winds and the buoyancy of the hydrogen is conservatively neglected.
2.2-12 Revision 2
- This Page Requires Revision
- Uccnsing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. Q.
Pag 3.1 cf The analysis assumes that the rel&ase becomes well mixed with air. The detonation concentration range for the gas-air mixtures is assumed in the analysis to be from 4s to 74.2% hydrogen by volume. This range is much larger i
than the detonation concentration range for hydrogen which is normally 18s to 596 hydrogen by volume in air. This assumption conservatively over-estimates the amount of hydrogen that detonates.
The results of the analysis show that the radius of the maximum acceptable over-pressure circle for the explosion of hydrogen (as defined in RC 1.91, Revision 0) is 163 feet. The nearest safety-related structure to the BG5F is the Unit 2 DCB, which is approximately $25 feet away. Therefore, detonation 2
of the hydr. ogen in the BCSF does not pose a threat to safety-related structures.
Analyses for the nitrogen pressure vessels at the BCSF have been performed to determine the burst energies of the vessels. The resulting energies were converted to equivalent amounts of TNT and the radii of the maximum acceptable over-pressure circles (per RC 1.91, Revision 0) are shown in Table 2.2-7.
The peak reflected over-pressures for the DCB North wall due to ruptures / explosions of the BCSF canks are given in Table 2.2-7 as well.
The results of these analyses show that the BCSF vessels do not present a 1
threat to safety-related structures.
I Effects of7 Des [rn[ Bas [s E[ent/.
I t esi eat te
.2
.2 o.or ed as re ul of h de gn as e en i en fi d S cti n
.2 1 are l
1.
De et n d
a frH1, ce e cid a ta e de an n ht v 1 b ne ss y o lo le in fo c tr r om er nn d
ot ti ebea i a ar us De ec on. al rm nd aut sa e sol i fo a yd ous ni oi l
h dr id.
d iny a ta e v 1 e ce a to all v p1 ti e or i
on el o p rs ne to do pro oc ve re i g a par tu.
d cr pti n e
t um ta on nd aut at c i ola io fe rs s I
pr id d S et n
.4._.3_-
j l
i a
a j
2.2-13 Revisien 2
- This Page Requires Revision 1Ar e.se
LJc:nsing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev.,,,g_
Page,'Q of STPEGS UTSAR REFERENCES,,
Section 2.2:
2.2-1 NUS Corporation, Standard Demorravhv. tand Use end Vater Use Survey. NUS Survey, Rockville, Maryland.
2.2-2 Not Used.
2.2-3 Onsite Toxic Gas Analysis (NC9006); _Offsite Toxic Gas Analysis (NC9015).
2.2-4 For Used.
2.2-5 Not Used.
2.2-6 Not Used.
2.2-7 U.S. Department of Commerce " Sectional Aeronautical Chart-Houston-11th Edition", Atmospheric Administration National Ocean Survey, Washington, D.C. (Harch 29, 1973).
2.2-8 U.S. Department of Transportation, " Airman's Information Manual.
Pt. 4 Craphic Notices and supplemental Data", Federal Aviation Administration (July 1973).
2.2-9 Not Used.
2.2-10 Iotti, R. C., U. J. Krotiuk, and D. R. DeBoisblanc, " Hazards to Nuclear Plants From On (Or Near) Site Caseous Explosions",
in Teetcal Meetine on Vater Resetor Safety. G. A. Freund compiler, CONF-730304 (March 1973), pp. 641-661.
2.2 11 Kinney, G. R., " Engineering Elements of Explosions", AD844917 (November 1968).
2.2-12 Not Used.
2.2-13 Not Used.
National Fire Protection Association, " Lightning Protection Code -
2.2-14 NFPA No. 78".
2.2-15 Not Used.
2.2-16 Not Used.
2.2-17 Not Used.
2.2-18
Analysis of the Risk to the Public Due to the Marine Transportation of Liquified Natural Cas in the Matagorda Ship Channel. Texas", draft environmental impact statement for the Hatagorda Bay Project, Attachment A Federal Power Commission Docket No. CP77-330 et al., July 1977.
Revision 2 2.2-14
- This Page Requires Revision N sw <
Ucensing Doc. Ch:nge Requnt: CN-1979 Rev.,0 Page j of RETERENCES (Continued) i Eection 7.2:
2.2-19 Not Used.
2.2-20 Joint ING Safety Study of El Paso Atlantic Company, El Paso Eastern Company, and El Paso ING Terminal Company in support of applications for import authorizations and certificates of public convenience and necessity respecting the proposed A1 eria 11 Project, Docket No. CP73-258 et al.,
5
- April 1, 1977.
2.2-21 Not Used.
2.2-22 Hot Used.
2.2-23 Not Used.
2.2-24 Not Used.
2.2-25 Not Used.
2.2-26 Not Used, i
2.2 27 Not Used.
2.2-28 FPC Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Matagorda Bay Project, July 1977, page 25.
2.2-29
'cuidelines for Permanent BVR Hydrogen Water Chemistry i
Installations - 1987 Revision," EPRI NP-5283-SR-A 2
(Septemb'er 1987).
~
Revision 2 2.2-15
Ucen:ing Doc. Chang) Request: CN-1979 Rev._9_
Pag 3 g cf STyECS UFSAR l
TABLE 2.2-1 DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES._ _ _
Location Relativa Hazardous No.
Facility to STPEGS Products / Function of Emolovees celanese Chemical _
4.8 mi acetic acid 400-500 Co.
NNE anhydrous ammonia hydrochloric acid naphtha vinyl acetate acetaldehyde E and K Compression 5.5 mi none 0
i Co.
NNE Crysen Terminal 4.8 mi loading dock 6
NNE Parker Brothers 3.5 mi none 0
Facility E
Dupont Facility 7 mi sulfuric acid.
150 (HDPE Plant)*
E sodium hydroxide hexane fuel oil (no 2) toluene gasoline diesel fuel 1-butene propylene hydrogen
- Due to their location outside the 5-mile radius, the listed hazar'dsus
~' ~
~
materials are not to be included in the hazardous chemical analysis.
2.2-16 Revision 4
Ucensing Doc. Change Requ;st: CN-1979 Rev._0__
Paga I of ST. PEGS UFSAR TABLE 2.2 2 NATURAL CAS PIPELINES.
Overator TETCO Vallev Amoco Delhi Dow Line Size (in.)
30 8
4 4
16 12 Age (yrs) 17 10 11 5
20 26 Design Pressure
~-
(psig) 1,100 (1)
(2)
(3) 1,000 700 Depth of Cover (in.)
30 24-36 36
. 36 30 24 Distance from Site 3.4 1.6 2.1 2.1 (mi) 4.5 2.9 1.
Test pressure 1,800 psig, operating pressure 500-600 psig.
2.
Test pressure 1,800 psig; operating pressure 700 pt:Ig.
3.
Test pressure 2,000 psig; operating pressure 500-600 psig.
2.2-17 Revision 4
Ucaising Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev.4 Page & 6f 5,TPEGS UFSAR Table 2.2 3 is not used.
2.2-18 Revision 4
e.
Licensing Doc. Change Requist: CN 1979, Rev. 9.,
Pega,,91 cf STPEGS UFSAR TABLE 2.2-4 CONFICURATION AND EXPIDITATION OF SALT DOMES IN MATACORDA COUNTY
'~
~ " " ^ '
AND ADJACENT CULF COAST REGION Top of
.. Top of Vo1** of Caprock Salt Salt Sulfur Brine Name County (ft)
(ft)
(mia )
Prod.
P r o d_._
Barbers 11111 chambers 350 1,000 5.1 X
l Big Hill Jefferson 200 1,300.
2.6 Blue Ridge Ft. Bend-143 230.
1.3 X
Clemens Brazoria 530 1,380 1.9
- Day Madison 2,780 3,167 3
Fannett Jefferso~n 741 2,080
- 1. 0 '
X Hull
.. Liberty 260 595 2.6' Markham Matagorda 1,380 1,417 1.9 X
Pierce Junction Harris 630 860 1.3 X
Sour Lake Hardin 660 - ~ ~ "
719 1.8 Stratton Rid e Brazoria 850 1,250 9.6 X
5
- Not shown on Figure 2.2-4: 150 miles north of site
- Salt volume estimated from top of salt to a depth of 10,560 ft 2.2-19 Revision 4
r Ucensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev.jl Page_H,of
)STPECS UFSAR l
ivamavil AT HAT
_C TC sin l
ELANWkR iiii-kicAT. AnM*Al# Aun d WR Iir-as IITE '
j i
l xie l
mi manne (ths)
Die (P
t) 1i=4 nem y/o e
etic cid.
7.
x 108 2.5 x O'
10
.77 x 08
\\
{
Vi Ace te
.1 x 2.
x 10' 10 2.9 x 10-l N phth 2.1 10'
.5 x 8 4x I
Anhy ous f
onta
.F x 08 39 25 3.2 x 10-f nl Hydr ide 1 3x1 406 25
.36 10-2 Ac aldeh e 7.5 x O'
2.
x 10' 100 3.1 x 10-l
\\
l ydrog 1.0 x 10' 5
3 N/A
-(BCS
\\
\\
j l
}
\\
[
1
[
I t
l ra e was suae to be 00*F.
The trol com as t n
per 1.78 or initi ser ning chen cals, with f1 j
sent in F e2
-5.
{
~
}
2.z-zo ~
Revision 4
- 11ds Page Requires Revision
- Ucensing Doc. Change Request _ CN-1979 Rev. _Q.
Pag 3 '!3. of STPECS UFSAR j
TAB 2.2-POTFETIAL i
DOUS CHEMI SHIPPED fROM d E CEIINESE (HEMICA COMEdNY Ch ica v/0 (mee/ )
ce c Ac 4.8 x 10*
2.85 x 10' 3.25 10 ** /5.96 x 10-V y1 eta 2 4x 5.9 x 10 1
4.3 x 10*
.35 10-*
dro oric Ac 4.8 x 0*
2 5x i
Ac ide de 4
x 10*
3.23 10-*
t I
k l
(
Atyfdroch?>ric id to city imit
'5p was ed.
- T %ck ro te value b a e
e RG f r the nit a s ing o ch m cal ith fl i
atte as pr ented n F1 re 2.
-5.
2.2-21 Revision 4
- This Page Requires Revision
- i
.~
Ucensing Doc. Change Roquest: CN-1979_ Rev.,0_
Page _fo cf, SIPEGS UFSAR TABLE 2.2-7 EFFECTS OF TANK RUPTURES /EXPIDSIONS FOR CASES STORED IN BULK ON-SITE Nurnber Volume /
RG 1.91 of Vessel
. Pressure Temp.
Rev. O Peak Reflected Stored Can Vessels R*)_.
(PSIC)
. 1*f)._
Radius Pressure O DGB I
11ydrogen 24 56 2400 70 163 ft
,0.396 psi LP N, 1.
1471 185 305 136 ft 0.302 psi 11P N,
12 56 2400 70 121 ft 0.253 psi 9
i
)
i I
I 2.2-22 Revision 4 l
r
l l
6 TABLE 2.2-8 EFFECTS OF BREAKS IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINES I
Ce Detenation of Entire Amount of Delayed Cas Released Detonation of Movine Plume h -
[
c F
L Line 16" Dow 30" TETCO 16" Dow 30" TETCO 9
O Amount of gas (1b) 2.02 x 108 1.16 x 10' 5.5 x 10' 1.7 x 10' TNT equivalent (1b)
- 1. 8 x 10' 1.1 x 10' 5.3 x 10$
1.6 x 10' 2
Oh Distance from plant (mi) 2.1 4.5 1.6 3.4 g3 g
o n u
4 Peak side on overpressure (psi) 0.,7 0.6 0.21 0.15 g
l w
a Peak reflected overpressure '(psi) 1.5 1.3 0.42 0.31 5 m*
Positive phase duration (sec) 0.8 1.4 0.27 0.41
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i OPGP05-ZN-0004 Rev.1 Changes to Licensing Basis Documents and Amendments to the Operating License CN-1979 Licensing Document Change Request Page,6L of __,
UFSAR SECTION 6.4 l
IIabitability Systems l
a l
Affected Sections:
6.4.1.6 Noxious Gas Protection i
i 6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas Protection 4
i i
l i
i i
a 4
4 4
e f
w
t.lcensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. _Q_
Page g cf STPECS UFSAR 6.4 HABITABILITY SYSTEMS The habitability systems for the control room envelope are designed in accordance with the design bases described in Section 6.4.1 so' that habitability of the control room envelope can be maintained under normal and accident conditions. The habitability systems and provisions include:
1.
Shielding 2.
Control room air purification and pressurization (includes makeup and cleanup filtration units) 3.
Kitchen and sanitary facilities The general guidance contained in General Design Criterion (CDC) 19 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, is reflected throughout this section.
6.4.1 Design Bases The functional design of the habitability systems and their features are established by the following design bases:
6.4.1.1 Control Room Envelone. The control room envelope is located at El. 35 ft and in two heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) rooms at El. 10 ft and 60 ft. in the Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) as shown in Figure 6.4-1.
The control room envelope i.: provided with HVAC equipment, fire protection equipment, adequa'te ligtstipg, communication equipment, kitchen, sanitary, administrative and storage facilities, and sp' aces required for normal plant operation and for maintaining the plant in a safe condition following an accident.
6.4.1.2 Habitabiliev. The control room envelope is equipped to
[
maintain the control room atmosphere at environmental conditions 9.titable for occupancy per GDC 19, 6.4.1.3 Canacity. The normal occupancy level of the control room envelope is 10 persons.
6.4.1.4 Food. Water. Medical Sunolles; and Sanitary Facilities. Food, water, basic medien1 supplies, and first-aid equipment are provided by the Emergency Response Organization in tife event of an emergency. Kitchen and sanitary facilities including toilets, washrooms, and lockers are provided within the control room envelope. If emergency conditions require confinement, food is brought onsite in protected containers. Site accessibility is determined by the Radiological Services. Potable water required for toilet, kitchen, and lavatory is provided by a storage tank during plant emergency. One gallon of water per person per day is provided for drinking, food preparation, and medical needs. The Potable and Sanitary Water System is described in Section 9.2.4.
Should this system becemo
- 6. 4 -l' Revision 4 t
T' '
Ucensing Doc. Changa Request: CN-1979 Rev.._q.
Pags g cf _
~
unavailable during an emergency period, bottled water could be brought into
[
the control room e melope if required.
Normal sanitation facilities are available as described in Section 9.23.
l 6.4.1.5 Radiation Protection., Kadiation protection as required by CDC 19 of 10C5150, Appendix A, is provided by shield walls, shield slabs at floor and ceiling, radiation anonitoring equipment, and emergency filtering
.rsumptions and analyses regarding sources and amounts of units.
- radioactivity which may surround or leak into the control room e melope are.
discussed in Sections 6.4.4.1 and 15.6.5.
Related shielding requirements are
. discussed in Section 12.3.2.
The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) is discussed in Sections 11.5 and 12.3.4.
6.4.1.6 Noxious Cas Protection. 5.moke detectors, located in,the control room envelope return air duct actuate alarms and display them to the operators in the control room to indicate the presence of smoke in the control room emelope. Additionally, the control room e m elope can be purged of smoke by ou* side air if required as described in Section 9.4.1.
n c em a de ec or
'a E 3 e ca ed in t o s e i ro d t ne ol o ve op w h u na 1 is la io f om i
pt t al z do e ic s n e ev t f n t or o s e h i lh p 1 ace d t.
is is a o e ab 11 s
s d n e i 4
roid_f_ ~
_n _a_ar r
ne de ec_ r a_
o t
t'on s s o e s e_ f_
_ e ca sj Refer to Section 2.2.'3 for an evaluation of Hazardous j
emicals located on-and off-site.
i 6.4.1.7 Reseiratory Anoaratus for Emermancies. A 6. hour supply of breathing air and self-contained breathing apparatus (including required redundant apparatus) will be provided for the emergency team with provision for obtaining additional air beyond the 6-hour limit. A minimum of 1-hour supply with redundancy will be provided within the control room envelope. A portion of the total 6-hour supply may bi stored elsewhere in the EAR in i
locations easily accessible to the emergency team, if required due to storage limitations within the envelope.
6.4.1.8 Habitability Systa== Ooeration Durine Emeraencies. Operation j
of the habitability systems during emergencies is discusred in Section 9.4.1.
t Fire protection for the control room emelope is discussed in Section 9.5.1.
6.4.1.9 Radiation Monitors. Radiation monitors are discussed in Sections 11.5 and 12.3.4.
l 6.4.2
System Design
6.4.2.1 Definition of Control Room Envelone. The areas included in the control room emelope to which the control room operator could require access during an emergency are the following:
6.4-2 Revision 4
- This Page Requires Revision
- Licensing Doc. Change Requ;st CN-1979 Rev.,Q.
Control room main control board and monitoring panel area - Continuous occupancy required, 2.
Computer room - Infrequent access required.
3.
shift supervisor's office - Infrequent access required.
4.
Shift engineer's office - Infrequent access required.
S."
Men's toilets ed bunkIs 5 ~ Infrequent acces's regulred.
~-
6.
Women's toilets and bunks - Infrequent access required.
7.
Kitchen - Infrequent access required.
8.
Relay Room - Infrequent access required.
9.
Iobby - Infrequent access required.
10.
Results Engineer's Office - Infrequent access required.
11.
Control Room HVAC equipment rooms other than makeup filter unit rooms -
clean surrounding required because of inleakage and infrequent access required.
The equipment to which control room operators could require access during an emergency is listed in Table 6.41 and the layout of the control room envelope is given in Figures 6.4-1 and 6.4-2.
6.4.2.2 ygntilation system Desien. The control room envelope HVAC
~
system is designed to maintain the control room envelope area at room design temperature and relative humidity conditions given in Table 9.4-1.
The HVAC system is also designed to maintain the control room envelope at a minimum of 0.125-inch water gauge (vg) positive pressure relative to the surrounding area, following postulated accidents other than hazardous chemical / smoke releases and/or loss-of-offsite Power (LDOP), by introducing makeup air equivalent to the expected exfiltration air during plant emergency conditions I
(Engineered Safety Features {ESF] signal and/or high radition in outside air).
The design outside makeup air is 2,000 fts/ min and drawn from a single intake on the east side of the EAB at El. 80 ft-0 in. (Figure 9.4.12).
This arrangement minimizes any possibility of contaminants infiltrating the control roca envelope from the surrounding areas. Additionally during postulated accident conditions, on detection of high radiation in the outside air or safety injection (SI) signal, outside makeup air for the control room envelope is automatically routed through makeup air units and cleanup units containing charcoal filters. The control room air it miso autematically recirculated partially (i.e.,10,000 fe / min) through control room air cleanup units s
c containing charcoal filters. This arrangement provides cleanup oi~ the control room air. A IDOP event by itself does not start the makeup air units, but it does isolate the control room envelope and start cleanup units.
The design features, fission product removal capability, and protection capability of the control room envelope HVAC system are as follows:
'6.4-3~
0205
~
Revision 0
1.lconswg Doc. Change Request CN-1979 Rev. Q.
Page H cf 1
f
- STPECS UFSAR I
i 1
-1.
Normal and emergency ventilation of the control room envelope area are I'
discussed in section 9.4.1.
The system configuration is shown on Figure 9.4.1-2.
Principal components, ducts, dampers, instrumentation, and l
airflows for normal and emergency modes are indicated in the above.
l mentioned figure.
2'.
Design paramete,rs and data for major system components are listed and i
described in Table 9.4 2.1.
4 l
3.
Control room e melope HVAC system components, essential instrumentation, i.
ducting, and outside air intake are designed in accordance with seismic category I requirements. The components are not subject to the effects of floods, hurricane, tornado, internal or external missiles, pipe whip, or jet impingement. Tornado damper and missile shielding is provided at the outside air intake to protect the system components from tornado and external missiles.
Figures 1.2-28, 12.3.1-9, and 12.3.1-18 present layout drawings of the control room envelope showing doors, corridors, stairvells, shielded walls, and the placement and type of equipment within the control room emelope. The location of control room air inlets is shown on Figure 1,2-30.
A description of the emergency filter trains, their filtration capability, and the extent of their compliance with Regulatory Guide (RC) 1.52 are presented in section 6.5.1.
6.4.2.3 I4pktirbtness. The HVAC system is designed to maintain the control room envelope at 0.125-in. wg positive pressure relative to the surrounding area during emergency conditions. The control room e melope HVAC system operates on a continuous basis. During the plant emergency operation mode, the following potential paths of air infiltration to the control room e melope exist.
1.
Outside air normal intake isolation dampers, return air smoke relief dampers and exhaust air dampers in the control room e melope HVAC system. These dampers are used for isolating the control room emelope.
2.
Penetration space around supply air, return air and exhaust air ducts in the control room emelope and chase walls and floors.
3.
Penetration space around electrical co'duits and cables in the control room e melope and chase walls and floors.
4.
Penetration space around piping in the control room e melope and chase walls and floors.
5.
Space around doors.
6.
Hakeup filter units and associated ductwork outside the e m elope.
A review of these leak paths, as summarized below, indicates that infiltration through these paths during the plant emergency mode is minimal.
1 6.4-4 Revision 0 0200
Lic nsing Doc. Ch:nge Requ;st: CN.1979 Rev. _0__
Pag d r,f
1.
In the control room envelope HVAC system, the outside air normal -intake dampers, return air smoke relief dampers, and exhaust air dampers are s
designed leak-tight with a 5-second closure time.
2.
Supply air, return, air and exhaust air duct penetrations in the control room envelope walls and floors are sealed airtight (seal-welded).
3.
Penetration space around electrical and control conduits and cables in the control room envelope and chase walls and floors are sealed airtight.
4.
Penetration spaces around chilled water piping for HVAC equipment, piping to plumbing fixtures, drains, and potable water piping in the control room envelope and chase walls and floors are sealed airtight.
5.
Doors leading from the control room envelope at El. 35 ft to the EAB and the Mechanical Auxiliary Build:'.ng (HAB) are 3-hour-fire rated automatic closures. The doors leading free the control room envelope to the electrical penetration area, ths MAB, and the Diesel Generator Building (DGB) are provided with air '.ocks.
None of the control room envelope doors leads directly te the outside. All doors lead to closed chase spaces, closed stairwells, or closed corridors and are designed for low leakage. Thus, the effect of outside vind or other adjoining building ventilatio'n systems on infiltration or leakage into the control room envelope is insignificant. The elevator door at elevation 35 ft is a potential leak path and therefore is provided with an air lock.
6.
Makeup filter units and associated ductwork downstream of the unit are pressurized to prevent inleakage and are designed for low leakage.
6.4.2.4 JntnIAstiertw11b_.Qther 7enes and Pressure-Containing Eculoment.
The control room envelope HVAC system is not connected to other areas or HVAC systems where the potential for radioactivity exists, except for sharing commou air intake and exhaust with the remaining EAB. The computer and relay rooms are provided with fire protection by a total flooding halon system. In the event of fire in these areas, these rooms are flooded with Halon 1301.
The supply and return air ducts of the ventilation system for these areas are automatically sealed with isolation dampers preventing the esespe of Halon 1301 to the remaining control room envelope. Any leakage of halon around the 3-hour-rated fire doors of the computer room and the relay room is diluted by the volume of control room envelope. The other rooms in the control room envelope are provided with portable fire extinguishers or deluge water spray fire protection. All HVAC ducts penetrating fire walls in the control room envelope are provided with quick-acting fire dampers which isolate the fire affected room from adjoining rooms.
As descr'ibed in Section 6.4.2.3 above, the control room envelope is maintained at 0.125-in. vg positive pressure relative to the surroundings during emergency conditions. Additionally, as described in Section 6.4.2.2, above, upon detection of an unacceptable level of airborne radioactivity in the l
outside makeup air of the control room envelope HVAC system or receipt of an SI signal, the makeup air and part of control room envelope recirculation air are filtered by makeup air units and control room air cleanup units containing charcoal illters.
6.4-5 Revision 4 s
-- - - ~.- -..- -
Lic:nsing Doc. Change Requist CN-1979 Rev..A.
Pogsgf_ cf STFECS UFSAR s
here are no pressure-containir.g tanks, pipes, or equipment containing hazardous materials in the control room envelope. In the event of an inadvertent release of hazardot:s materials from outside of the control room, the low-leakage fire-rated doors of the control room envelope will prevent a si nificant transfer of such materials into the control room envelope.
5 6.4.2.5 Shieldine Desiert. %e control room envelope radiation shielding design is discussed in Section 12.3.2.
6.4.3 System operational Procedures The method of operation of the control room envelope MVAC system during normal plant and emergency conditions is described in Section 9.4.1'.
6.4.4 Design Evaluation Each of the operating systems which ensures control room envelope habitability is discussed in detail in other sections. n ese systems and the sections in which they are discussed are-Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC Systems 9.4.1 Fire Protection System 9.5.1 Communication System 9.5.2 Lighting System
. 9.5.3.
i Offsite Power System
.8.2 Onsite Power System 8.3 1
Radiation Monitoring System 11.5, 12.3.4 6.4.4.1 Radioloaical Protection. % e control room entre b pe HVAC system has been designed to limit the dose equivalent to the plant operators from airborn radioactivity after a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
1 1
The postulated loss-of-Coolant Accident (IACA) has been qualitatively determined to be the DBA resulting in the highest control room operator doses.
e I
he radioactive transport model is described in Section 155. Refer to Section
,"f
- 15.6.5 for a discussion of the offsite environmental consequences of a j
postulated IDCA, using the assumptions of RG 1.4.
Rese assumptions have also s
been used for the control room dose analysis. Due to the close proximity of the charcoal filters to the control room envelope, the filter units dose contributions were considered in the control room envelope dose analysis.
i ne emer8ency HVAC for the control room envelope is discussed in Section 9.4.1.
% c system configuration is shown on Figure 9.4.1-2.
%e mathematical i
j model used to represent the system uses a single outside air intake and a filtered pressurization inflow which mixes with part of the return air, and j
then the mixed air is filtered again before being supplied to the air-handling i
unit along with the remaining return air. If one train of control room HVAC i
is inoperable, for example due to diesel generator failure, not all of the makeup air would be filtered twice before it is introduced into the control 1
j 6.4-6*
Revision 4 h
}.
l Ocensing Doc. Changa Request: CN-1979 Res_9_
Pag 3_ loo cf ISTPECSUFSAR Toom envel->pe.
the makeup units, but not by the recirculation units, before it into the control room envelope.
conditioned air to the control room emelope.The air-handling unit supplies the ntr 2
A summary of these parameters is presented in Table 6.4-2.
control room envelope has also been assumed (Ref. 6.4-4).An unfiltered inle hi atmospheric releases from the Containment purge valves prior to closu the Refueling Vater Storage Tank (ESF leakage) and from the fuel Handli suilding (fBB) (ESF leakage) are assumed to be tr ng 3
the time.
These conditions are estimated using the methods of Refr 4.
He atmosphere dispersion factors for each case can be found i > Ieble 6 4 ence 6.4 2.
ne inhalation thyroid dose and the semi-infinite cloud gamma and beta dose occupancy factors noted in Table 6.4-2.are calculated using the time-integ j
n The semi-infinite cloud gamma dose calculated is d i
c es.
which converts the semi-infinite gamma dose to a finite dose (Ref actor h is factor is given as:
. 6.4-4).
I nu c,,
Vs.3ss where:
1 V - volume of region of interest, fc3 i
The resulting doses to control room personnel are given in Table 6 4 2 The calculated thyroid dose total is less than the design limit of 30 roent 1
equivalent man (rea), as is the skin beta dose total.
gen gamma dose is less than the design limit of 5 rem.
The total whole-body Thus the control room envelope HVAC System design meets the dose requirements of CDC 19 of 10 Appendix A.
6.4.4.2 Toxie Gas Protection.
1.78, has been considered in the design of the control room envelope in Sech o a 1 The habitability of e control r~oom was evaluated using tt@ures' described in Regulatory Guide 1.78. As indicated in Section 2.2, no offsite storage or transport of chemicals is considered a hazard to the plant based on the Offsite Toxic Gas Analysis 2.2-3). There are no onsite chemicals that pose a credible hazard based on the Onsite Toxi Gas Analysis (Ref. 2.2-3). 'Iherefore, special provisions for protection against toxic ga are not required In accordance with the plant emergency plans and procedures, self i
(contained brea.thinf apparatus is provided for assuraag of control room habitability
,.-r..
,.m =-
non Systems and their components, listed in Section 6.4.4 above control room envelope habitability are subjected to documented preoperational
, which maintain testing and inservice surveillance to ensure continued integrit conducted verify the following for both normal and emergency conditions y.
The tests 6.4-7
- Revision 3
- 'Ihis Page Requires Revision *
..-v
~
Ucensing Doc. Changs Rrquelt CN-1979 Rev. _9.
.Pagafj_ cf STPECS UFSAR 4
1.
System integrity and leaktightness 2.
Inplace testing of' emergency filter plenums to establish leaktightness of plenums and design parameters of the high. efficiency particulate air 3
and charcoal filters t
i 3.
Proper functioning of system components and control devices 4
Proper electrical and control wiring i
5.
System balance for design airnow,- water flow and operational pressures 6.4.5.1 control Room Envelone INAC System Inteerity and Imaktieheness Tsuu;. 'Ihe control room emelope is leak tested prior to plant startup and subsequently in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
6.4.5.1.1 Considerations f4sdine to the selected Test Frecuenev: The j
frequency of performing this test is determined by the following considere-tions:
1.
Preoperational test data 1
l 2.
Normal control room envelope HVAC system performance data, as correlated to the cleanup cycle performance data 3.
Periodic monitoring of the cont'rol room envelope HVAC system, which j
gives an indication of building tightness and system performance i
j
- 6.4.5.1.2 Test Methods:
The' test is conducted by closing all the access points to the control room envelope including doors, temporary openings, etc.
~
Control room envelope pressure is established by setting the return air volume to less than the supply air volume such that the design pressure is achieved.
Tests are repeated as often as necessary until the acceptance criteria are me t.
Control room envelope pressure and outside makeup airflow rate are i
measured by the portable pressure gauges and/or permanently installed flow monitors in the ductwork.
6.4.5.1.3 Accentability Recuirements: The result of the final leak test is accepted if the control room envelope makeup airflow does not exceed 2,000 ft / min at a positive envelope pressure of a:0.125-in. wg. This 8
criterion is based on a measuring accuracy of il percent of full scale on pressure reading and 15 percent of full scale on airflow reading.
6.4.5.2 In. Place Testine of Emereenev Filter tinits. In place testing of control room envelope HVAC system emergency filter units is performed prior to system startup and thereafter in accordance with the guidelines contained in RC 1.52.
This testing is described in Section 9.4.1.4.
6.4.5.5 other Tests _. Tests to verify proper functioning of control room envelope HVAC system components and control devices, proper electrical and control wiring, and system design air and water flow are described in Section 9.4.1.4.
6.4 8 Revision 0 e
n
Ucensing Doc. Change Request CN-1979 R;v. A Pags A cf
-STFECS UFSAR 6.4.5.4 Jnsoection. After control room envelope HVAC system testing, balancing, and startup procedures have been completed, the. system is periodically and routinely inspected as per"the Technical Specifications.
6.4.6 Instrumentation Requirement The control logic and the instrumentation requis:ed to actuate the control room envelope HVAC system are described in Section 7.3.
Instruments for monitoring the makeup and cleanup air filter units are described in Section 6.5.1.5.
The instrumentation and. controls provided to ensure the habitability of the control room envelope are discussed in Section 9.4.1.
Control room envelope radiation monitoring instruments are discussed in Sections 11.5 and 12.3.4.
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a mim Lic:nsing Doc. Ch2aga Requ st: _ CN-1979 R:v. 1 Page k$_ cf _
'STPECS UFSAR a
REFERENCES l
Section 6.4:
6.4-1 Not Used 6.4-2 Not Used 6.4-3 Department of Defense, Office of civil Defense, shelter Dggirn and Analysis, Vol. 3, Chapter 9.
6.4-4 Murphy, K.
C., and K. M. Campe, " Nuclear Power Plant Control Room ventilation System Design for Meeting General Criterion 19",
13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, August 1974 1
i
'f A
E 0012 6.4-10 Revision 0 l
Licensing Doc. Chang 3 Request: CN-1979 Rev..p_
Pag) M of
, 5 ': PEGS UFSAR TABLE 6.4-1 EQUIPMENT TO UHICH THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS COULD REOUIRE ACCESS DURING AN EMERCENCY l
Location Within Control Item or Eautoment Room Area Control and monitoring panels See Figure 6.4-2 Portable radiation measuring Storeroom instruments Emergency procedures, manuals, Storage space and drawings self-contained breathing See Section 6.4.1.7 apparatus Communications equipment Operator's desk Fire-extinguishing equipment All rooms l
Control room cleanup filtet Control Room Envelope units HVAC Equipment Rooms 6.4-11 Revision 4
Uc:nsing Doc. Changa Requ:st CN.1979 Rev. _0_
Pags_((of STPEGS UFSAR TABLE 6.4-2 CONTROL ROOM DOSE ANALYSIS Assumptions containment leakage assumptions 0.3% (0-24 hrs)
(Based on a containment free 0.15% (1-30 days) volume of 3.41 x 106 3
fc )
ESF system leakage into the FHB assumptions 8,280 cm3/hr ESF system leakage into the RUST assumptions 1,740 cm /hr 3
Pressurization makeup air inflow parameters:
flow rate 2,000 ft3/ min filter efficiency
- 98.5% inorganic, 2
98.5% organic, 994 particulate Control room envelope clean-up air (recirculation) parameters:
filtered flow rate 10,000 ft3/ min (recirculation air) filter efficisney 954 inorganic, 95% organic, 99% particulate envelope free volume 274,080 ft3 2
envelope unfiltered inleakage 10 ft3/ min Meteorological dispersion factors (including wind speed and direction allowances):
Containment ESF Imakage and Leakage Case Purge Case 0-8 hours 1.06x10'3 sec/m3 1.29x10'2 see/m3 8-24 hours 7.03x10 soc /m3 8.55x10'3 sec/m3 1-4 days 4.45x10 sec/m3 5.42x10'3 see/m3 4-30 days 1.91x10 sec/m3 2.32x10'3 see/m3 1765 cfm is filtered through makeup and recirculation filters; 235 efm is filtered through makeup filters only. Effective filter efficiency for 2
2000 cfm is given above.
6.4-12 Revision 3
A.
Ucensing Doc. Change Request CN-1979 Rey,_Q.
Page & of
' STPEGS UFSAR TABl.E 6.4-2 (Continued)
CONTROL ROOM DOSE ANALYSIS Assumotions (Cont'd)
Occupancy assumptions:
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, control room 1004 1-4 days, control room envelope 60s 4-30 days, 40%..
control room envelope 2reathing rate of operator 3.47 x 10~* m /see 8
Whole-Body Skin Operator dose, 0 30 day period (rem):
Thyroid camma Beta Containment leakage 21.03 1.69 21.52 ESF leakage into the HIB 1.58 6.59x10-5 3.94x10~'
ESF leakage into the RUST 0.62 3.8x10~5 6.1x10-8 containment purging 0.058 6.14x10~5 9.86x10~4 Dizect dose from Containment 0.07 Direct dose from clo~ud of 0.67 3
released fission products Iodine filter loading 2.72x10~8 Total 23.29 2.43 21.52 6.4-13 Revision 3
Ucensing Doc. Ch:ngs Requist CN-1979 Rev.,1)_,
Paga./ef cf STPEGS UFSAR TABLE 6.5 3 INPUT PARAMETERS TO DETERMINE MINIMUM oH FOR SURP SOLUTION RWST deliverable volume, ft' 70,533 RWST boron concentration, ppm
~
3 dOO l Accumulator water volume, each of 3 ftE 1,229 Accumulator boron concentration, ppm 3,000 l Reactor coolant system water mass, Ib 626,000' Reactor coolant boron concentration, ppm"'
1,800 Trisodium Phosphate, Ib "'
11,500 Resultant Solution pH 7.0 t
d 1.
Based upon current fuel management,'the maximum RCS Boron Concentration
^
is 1550 ppm. 1800 ppm is the projected value of 18 month or longer future fuel cycles.
2.
Na3PO.
- 12 H 0 which.contains a minimum of 43% Na3PO.
3 4
6.5-14 Revision 4
Licensing Doc. Chang) Request: CN 1979 Rev. __0__
Page ff8 cf
, STPECS UFSAR TABLE 6.5-4 INPUT PARAMETERS TO DETERMINE MAXIMUM tH FOR.
SUMP SOLUTION RWST deliverable volume, f t' 47,256 RUST boron concentration, ppm 2,800 l Accumulator water volume, each of 3, ft'
~
1,172 Accumulator boron concentration, ppm 2,700 l Reactor coolant system water mass, Ib 626,000 Reactor coolant boron concentration, ppm
~~
0 Trisodium Phosphate "lbm 15,100 Resulting Solution pH 7.5 Assumes that each of' 6 Trisodium Ehos$ hate baskets (-42 ft') is filled 1.
with TSP to the maximum level. The maximum TSP density is 60 lb/ft'.
The specified mass of TSP is based upon Na3
- PO.
- 12H O which contains 2
a minimum of 43% Na3PO.
6.5-15 Revision 4
Lic,nsing Doc. Chang 3 R:quist: CN-1979. Rev. p_
Page_(ef_ cf 4
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT UNITS 1 & 2 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE Figure 6.4-1 Revision 2 STP D-0749A GB e
Ucensing Doc. Change Request CN-1979 Rev.,_0
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OPGP05-ZN-0004 Rev.1 Changes to Licensing Dasis Documents and Amendments to the Operating License CN-1979 Licensing Document Change Request Page _71, of _ l a
UFSAR SECTION 7A Resconses to NUREG-0737 Clarification of TMI Action Plan Reauirements Section HI.D.3.4 Control Room Habitability Requirements Affected Sections:
S.8 Emergency Response Facilities i
UcGnsing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. _9_
Page 11 ef STPECS UFSAR 4
l III.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS e
j Position l
In accordance with Task Action Plan Item III.D.3.4 and control room habitability, licensees shall assure that control room operators will be
}
adequately protected against the effects si accidental release of toxic and radioactive gases, and that the nuclear power plant can be safely operated or shut down under d6 sign basis accident conditions (Criterion 19. " Control l
Room", of Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants", to j
l Clarification s
f (1)
All licensees must make a submittal to the NRC regardless of whether or
{
not they met the criteria of the referenced SRP sections. The new clarification specifies that licensees that meet the criteria of the a
SRPs should provide the basis for their conclusion that SRP 6.4 requirements are met.
Licensees may establish this basis by referencing past submittals to the NRC and/or providing new or additional information to supplement past submittals.
3 (2)
All licensees with control rooms that meet the criteria of SRP sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.2 Identification of Potential Hazards in Site
)
Vicinity, 2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents, and 6.4 Habitability of Systems, shall report their findings regarding the specific SRP sections, as explained below. The following documents should be used 1
for guidance:
(a)
RC 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of Regulatory Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous chemical Release";
(b) --
RC 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accident Chlorine Release"; and, (c)
K. C. Murphy and K. M. Campe, " Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design for Meeting General Design Criterion 19",13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, August 1974.
Licensees shall submit the results of their findings, as well as the basis for those findings, by January 1, 1981. Id providing the basis for the habitability finding, licensees may reference their past submittals. Licensees should, however, ensure that these submittals refleet the current facility design and that the information requested in Attachment 1 is provided.
(3)
All licensees with control rooms that do not meet the criteria of the above-listed references, SRPs, RCs, and other references shall perform the necessary evaluations and identify appropriate modifications.
Each licensee submittal shall include the results of the analyses of control room concentrations from postulated accidental release of toxic gases, control room operator radiation exposures from airborne radioactive material, and direct radiation resulting from design basis accidents. The toxic gas 7A.III.D.3.4-1 Revision 0 j
'UCnsing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. 9_
.Pagg.~/l of STPEGS UFSAR accident analysis should be performed for all potential hazardous chemical ----
releases occurring either on the sits or within $ miles of the plant-site boundary. RG 1.78 lists the chemicals most commonly encountered in the evaluation of control room habitability, but is not all inclusive.
The design basis accident (DBA) radiation source term abould be for the LOCA Containment leakage and ESF leakage contribution outside Containment, as described in Appendices A and B of SRP Chapter 15.6.5.
In addition, BWR facility evaluations should add any leakage from the main steam isolation valves (MS1V) (i.e., valve-stem leakage, valve seat leakage, MS1V leakage control system release) to the Containment leakage and ESF leakage following a lOCA. This should not be construed as altering the staff recommendations in Section D of RC 1.96, Rev. 2 regarding MSIV leakage-control systems. Other DBAs should be reviewed to determine whether they might constitute a more severe control room hazard than the IDCA.
In addition to the accident analysis results, which should either identify the possible need for control room modifications or provide assurance that the habitability systems will operate under all postulated conditions, permitting the control room operators to remain in the control room to take appropriate actions required by CDC 19, the licensee should submit sufficient information needed for an independent evaluation of the adequacy of the habitability ettachment 1 lists the i~ formation that should be provided along systems.
~
with the licensee's evaluation.
1 7A.III.D.3.4-2 Revision 0
Ucensing Dec. Chang) Requ;st: CN-1979 Rev.._Q.
Page 7g cf
~-
STFEGS UFSAR III.D.3.4 ATTACHMENT 1, INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR CONTROL-ROOM HABITABILITY EVALUATION (1)
Control-room mode of operation, i.e., pressurization and filter recirculation for radiological accident. isolation or chlorine release (2)
Control-room characteristics (a) air volume control room (b) control-room emergency sone (control room, critical files, kitchen, weshroom, computer room, etc.)
(c) control-room ventnation system schematic with normal and emergency air-flow rates i
(d) infiltration leakage rate (e)
HEPA filter 'and charcoal absorber efficiencies I
(f) closest distance between Containment and air intake (g) layout of control room, air intakes, containment building, and chlorine, or other chemical. storage facility with dimensions (h) control-room shielding including radiation streaming from penetrations, doors, ducts', stairways, etc.
(i) outomatic isolation capability-damper closing time, damper leakage, and area (j) chlorine detectors or toxic gas (local or remote) i (k) self-contained breathing, apparatus availability (number) 1 (1) bottled air supply (houss supply)
(m) emergency food and potable water supply (how many days and how many people)
(n) control-room personnel capacity (normal and emergency)
(c) potassium iodide drug supply (3)
Onsite storage of chlorine and other hazardous chemicals (a) total amount ~ and size of container (b).
closest distance from control-room air intake 7A.III.D.3.4-3 Revision 0 w.
we v-
.n
.m-m.,,
.m m.
.y7.
w
Ucensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. O Pagg I of STPECS UFSAR (4)
Offsite manufacturing, storage, or transportation facilities of hazardous chemicals (a) identify facilities within a 5-mile radius (b) distance from control room (c) quantity of hazardous chemicals in one container (d) frequency of hazardous chemical transportation traffic (truck, rail, and barge)
(5)
Technical specifications (refer to standard technical specifications)
(a) chlorine detection system (b) control-room emergency filtration system including the capability to maintain the control-room pressurization at 1/8-inch water gauge, verification of isolation by test signals and damper closure times, and filter testing requirements.
STPECS Response The safety design basis for the habitability system for the control room is defined in Section 6.4.
The design of the habitabiliqy system meets the appropriate recommendations of RGs 1.78 and 1.95 and the requirements of GDC 19.
The results of dose calculations for a DBA LOCA release are presented in Section 6.4 The information requested by Item III.D.3.4, Attachment 1, is provided as indicated below:
STPECS UFSAR Item No.
Section (1),(2)(a)(b),
6.4 (d),(e),(k)-(o)
(2)(c) 2.2 (2)(h) 1.2.3, 12.3 (2)(i) 9.4 (2)(j) 2.2, 6.4 (3)(a),(b) 2.2, 9.3 (4)(a)-(d) 2.2 (5)
Technical Specifications 7A.III.D.3.4-4 Revision 0
LJeensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979.Rev. Q.
Page 3 cf STPECS UFSAR S.8 (Continued)
S.8.4 Emereency Operations Facility (EOF)
S.8.4.1 Recuirements n.
The EOF is a licensee-controlled and operated facility. The EOF provides for management of overall licensee emergency response, coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, development of recommendations for public protective actions, and coordination of emergency response, activities with Federal, State, and local. agencies.
When the EOF is activated, it will be staffed by predesignated emergency personnel identified in the emergency plan. A designated senior licensee official will manage licensee activities in the EOF.
Facilities shall be provided in the EOF for the acquisition, display, and evaluation of radiological and meteorological data and Containment conditions necessary to determine protective measures. These facilities will be used to evaluate the magnitude and effects of actual or potential radioactive releases from the plant and to determine dose projections.
The EOF will be:
b.
Located and provided with radiation protection features as described in Table 1 (previous guidance approved by the Commission) and with appropriate radiological monitoring systems.
c.
Sufficient to accommodate and support Federal, S tate, local, and licensee predesignated personnel, equipment and documentation in the EOF.
d.
Structurally built in accordance with the Uniform Building Code.
e.
Environmentally controlled to provide room air temperature, humidity, and cleanliness appropriate for personnel and equipment.
f.
Provided with reliable voice and data communications facilities to the TSC and control room, and reliable voice communication facilities to OSC and to NRC, State, and local emergency operations centers.
7A.S.8-10 Revision 0
Ucensing Doc. Change Request: CN 1979,Rev._9.
Pag 3.2Z of STPECS UFSAR S.8 (Continued) g.
Capable of reliable collection, storage, analysis, display, and communication of information on Containment conditions, radiological releases and meteorology sufficient to determine site and regional status, forecast status, and take appropriate actions. Variables from the following categories that are essential to EOF functions shall be available in the EOF:
(i) variables'from tie ~ appropriate Table 1 or
~
2 of RC 1.97, Rev. 2, and (ii) the meteorological variables in RG 1.97, Rev. 2 for site vicinity and regional data available via communication from the National Weather Service.
h.
Provided with up-to-date plant records (drawinge, schematic diagrams, etc.),
procedures, emergency plans, and environmental information (such as geophysical data) needed to perform EOF functions.
i.
Staffed using Table 2 (previous guidance approved by the Commission) as a goal.
Reasonable exceptions to goals for the number of additional staff personnel and response times for their arrival should be justified and will be considered by NRC staff.
J.
Provided with industrial security when it is activated to exclude unauthorized personnel and when it is idle to maintain its readiness.
k.
Designed taking into account good human factors engineering principles.
S.8.4.2 Documentation and NRC Review The conceptual designs for emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, and EOF) have been submitted to NRC for review. In many cases, the lack of detail in these submittals has precluded an NRC decision of acceptability. Some designs have been disapproved because they clearly did not meet the intent of the applicable regulations. NRC does not intend to approve each design prior to implementation, but rather has provided in this document those requirements which should be satisfied. These requirements provide a degree of flexibility within which licensees can exercise management prerogatives in designing and bu11 din 5 emergency response 7A.S.8-11 Revision 0
)
i 1
1
Licensing Doc. Change Request: CN 1979. Rey.
0._
.Page_73 cf STPECS UFSAR S.8 (Continued) facilities (ERF) that satisfy specific needs of each licensee. The foremost consideration regardin5 ERFs is that they provide adequate capabilities of licensees to respond to emergencies. NUREG guidance on ERFs has been intended to address specific issues which the Commission believes should be considered in achieving improved capabilities.
Licensees should assure that th,e design of ERFs, satisfies these requirements. Exemptions from or alternative methods of implementing these requirements should be discussed with NRC staff and in some cases could require Commission approval. Licensees should continue work on ERFs to complete them according to schedules that will be negotiated on a plant-specific basis. NRC will conduct appraisals of completed facilities to verify that these requirements have been satisfied and that ERFs are capable of performing their intended functions. Licensees need not document their actions on each specific item contained in NUREG-0696 or 0814.
S.8.4.3 Reference Documents (Emergency Response Facilities) 10 CFR 50.47(b) - Requirements for Emergency Facilities and Equipment for.Ols.
~
10 CFR 50.'54(qi and' Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E -
Requirements for Emergency Facilities and Equipment for ors.
NUREG-0660 - Description of and Implementation Schedule for TSC, OSC, and EOF.
Eisenhu.t letter to power reactor licensees September 13, 1979 - Request for commitment to meet requirements.
Denton letter to power reactor licensees October 30, 1979 - Clarification of requirements.
NUREG-0654 - Radiological Emergency Response Plans NUREG-0696 - Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities.
NUREG-0737 - Cuidance on Heteorological Honitoring and Dose Assessment.
7A.S.8-12 Revision 0
1 Ucensing Doc. Chtng) Request: _ CN-1979
.Rev._g, Page.Zt. cf i
STPECS UFSAR
\\
S.8 (Continued)
Eisenhut letter to power reactor license February 18, 1981
' Commission approved guidance on location, habitability, and staff for emergency i
facilities. Request and deadline for submittal of conceptual design of facilities.
NUREG-0814 (Draft Report for Comment) - Methodology for Evaluation of Emergency Response Facilities.
NUREG-0818 (Draft Report for Comment) - Emergency Action Levels RG 1.97, Rev. 2 - Guidance for Variables to be Used in Selected Emergency Response Facilities.
COHJA-80-37, January 21, 1981 - Commission approval guidance on EOF location and habitability.
i Secretary memorandum S81-19 February 19, 1981 -
Commission approval of NUREG-0696 as general guidandi 651y.
STPEGS Response TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)
The TSC is the onsite technical support facility for emergency response. When activated, the TSC is staffed by predesignated technical, engineering, senior management, and other licensee personnel, and predesignated NRC personnel.
During periods of activation, the TSC is staffed continuously to provide plant
' management and technical support to plant operations personnel, and to relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations. The TSC performs the EOF fuhetions for the Alert Emergency class and for the Site Area Emergency class and i
General Emergency class if activation of the EOF is delayed.
Further discussion of the TSC and the TSC staffing requirements is provided in the STPECS Emergency Management Plan (EMP).
Safety Design Bases The equipment and facilities comprising the TSC perform no safety-related functions. The design ensures that any fault or malfunction of the TSC equipment does not compromise any safety-related equipment, components, or structures.
7A.S.8-13 Revision 0
Ucensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. 9 Page.80. Ef l
STPECS UFSAR 1
S.B (Continued)
Power Generation Design Bases
' 1.
Location and Structural Interrity A.
The TSC is located in the Electridal Auxiliary Building (EAB), at elevation 72 feet, within a 2-minute walking distance of the Control Room (CR) (see Figures 7A.S.8-1 to 7A.S.8-4).
I B..
The TSC is structurally designed in accordance with the Uniform Building Code (UBC).
C.
Personnel access to the TSC is controlled.
2.
Size and Soace A11ocatio'n A working space of approximately 75 ft8 per person is provided in the TSC. Human factors engineering standards are' considered in the TSC design. Areas other than those specifically designated work area may be used to contribute to the working space.
3.
Habitability A.
The TSC is provided with sufficient radiological protection and i
monitoring equipment to assure that radiation exposure to'any person working in the TSC will not exceed 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of an i
)
accident.
B.
The HVAC for the 1JC is designed to provide a suitable environment during normal and post-accident operation, including l
protection from post-accident radiological releases. For further l
discussion of the TSC HVAC design see Section 9.4.1.
The TSC HVAC system is normally powered from a non-Class 1E MCC which provides power at 480 V +110 percen*
When normal power is lost, a backup power supply from a non-Claus 10 diesel generator is provided.
i C.
Radiation monitoring,~ cfi_t)R: g e
, and smoke detection capability are provideTin the HVAC supply duct to the TSC.
i Alarm and indicafio'n are provided.
l D.
High. airborne radiation. level in the intake to the TSC HVAC system switches the system to the filer t n recirculation mode of operation. Detection of high o/ e)/
smoke level in the intake to the TSC HVAC system causes automatic isolation of the system.
7A.S.8-14 Revision 0 l
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Page_fL of STPEGS UFSAR S.8 (Continued)
E.
The following emergency items are provided:
1.
Portable air breathing apparatus: 18 individual units 2.
Anticontamination clothing: 18 individual sets 4'.
Coinmunications
'A.
The TSC is provided with cont!.nugus poupuppJtition with the following areas:
1.
Control Room 1
2.
Operational Support Center 3.
Emergency Operations Center i
4.
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel area 5.
NRC " Hot Line" connected to the NRC Emergency Notification System 6.
NRC Health Physics Network telephone system 7.
State and Local Emergency Operations Centers 5.
Plant Records Storare Plant records necessary to perform the TSC functions are available in the TSC. The records available include:
7 A.
Plant design documents such as piping and instrumentation diagrams.,
control logic diagrams, and electrical elementary diagrams.
B.
Radiation Zone drawings I
C.
UFSMt D.
Emergency Operating Procedures E.
, Maps of the Energency Planning Zone 6.
Data Acouisition and Displav The ERFDADS, which is capable of reliable data collection, storage, analysis, display, and communications sufficient to determine plant status, determine changes in status, forecast status, and take appropriate actions, is provided (Section S.4 of this Appendix). The SPDS, required by NUREG-0737, is implemented by the ERFDADS.
7A.S.8-15 Revision 0
l.icensing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. 9,,
PsgeffE.ef STPECS UFSAR i
S.8 (Continued) f The Dose Assessment System provides reliable data collection, storage, analysis, display, and coassunications sufficient to determine site and regional status, determine changes in status, forecast status, and take appropriate actions in accordance with the STPEGS Emergency Plan.
l The ERFDI95 and Dose Assessment System equipment located in the TSC are powered from a non-Class IE, uninterruptable power supply (UPS) capable of 1
maintaining system operation for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and system memory for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Normal AC power to the UPS is supplied from a non-Class 1E diesel generator-backed bus.
.7.
TSC Operational Recuirements The TSC is designed to be fully functional within one hour of activation.
The TSC is designed with an availability Scal of 99 Percent during all plant pressure and temperature conditions exceeding cold shutdown conditions. Activation of the TSC is required as shown below:
1 Plant Status,,,,,,,,,,,,, _ __,_,,,,,,,,,,, _,,,,,,_,,, __&rd.1ya,t i on Notification of Unusual Event Optional Alert Required j
i Activation j
Plant Status Site Area Emergency Required l
Ceneral Emergency Required Other
.As directed by plant management OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)
When activated, the OSC is the onsita' area separate from the control room where predesignated operations support personnel assemble.
The OSC is located in the MEAB (see Figures 7A.S.8-1 and 7A.S.8-5) to l
facilitate support functions and tasks.
The OSC is provided with continuous voice communications with the control room, TSC, and EOF.
Adequate staffing is provided by STPEGS and is identified in the Emergency Plan.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY The EOF is a licensee-controlled and operated facility. The EOF provides for management of overall licensee emergency response, coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, determination of recommended public protective actions, and coordination of emergency response activities with federal, State, and local agencies.
7A.S.8 16 Revision 4
l OPGP05-ZN-0004 Rev.1 Changes to Licensing Basis Documents and Amendments to the Operating License CN-1979 Licensing Document Change Request Page fjl of _
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i.
UFSAR SECTION 9.4 Air Conditionine. Heatine. Cooline, and Ventilatine Systems j
Affected Sections:
9.4.1 Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC Systems 9.4.1.1 Design Bases 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation
Ucensing Doc. Change RequIst CN-1979 Rev._Q_
Pagefg_cf STPECS UFSAR 9.4 AIR-CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTII). TING SYSTEMS The objective of the plant Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (INAC)
Systems is to provide ambient air conditions for personnel comfort, health and safety, and efficient equipment operation and integrity by controlling the thermal environment and airborne radioactivity in the plant. The INAC systems are described in detail in Sections 9.4.1 through 9.4.8.
Parameters of plant INAC Systems are summarized in Table 9.4 1.
INAC Systems components design
' ds.ta are summarized in Tables 9.4-2.1 through 9.4-2.8. - The INAC Systems single-failure analyses are sm=arized in Tables 9.4-5.1 through 9.4-5.8.
Space temperature, pressure, and humidities in the plant during different modes of operation are indicated in Table 3.11-1.
lWAC equipment safety cle.ssification is. summarized.in Section.3.2.
Plant main exhaust air ductwork data are summarized in Table 9.4-3.
The general flow characteristics and system confi uration of IWAC Systems are shown on all the figures between 5
9.4-1 and 9.4.8-1.
9.4.1 Electrical Auxiliary Building IWAC Systems The following systems are included within the Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) IWAC Systems:
Control Room (CR) Envelope IWAC System 2.
EAB Main Area INAC System 3.
Technical Support Center (TSC) IWAC System 4
Essential Chilled Vater System 9.4.1.1 Desien Bases. The systems which comprise the EAB INAC Systems are designed as follows:
1.
CR Envelope INAC System is designed to:
a.
Assure habitability of the CR envelope and permit safe shutdown of the plant as may be required under any normal or emergency conditions.
b.
Maintain ambient temperature conditions to provide operator comfort and to satisfy environmental requirements of equipment.
The design bases of ambient conditions, safety class, and seismie, category are listed in Table 9.4-1 and Section 3.2.
c.
Maintain the CR envelope at positive pressure to minimize any inleakage of possible contamination from the outside.
d.
Satisfy the design requirements of limiting dose to CR operators following the Design Basis Accident (DBA) in accordance with General Design Criterion (CDC) 19 of 10CFR50 Appendix A.
Instrumentation _and controls are provided to detect abnormal conditions such as smoke,()foyle/g e, and high radioactive concentrations in the makeup air. Two leaT t c isolation dampers in series are provided in the outside air ductvork for each main air handling unit (AHU) to 9.4-1 g.This Page Requires Revision N
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Page _6f cf 4
s i
STPECS UFSAR isolata tha c1== elope and stop outside air makeup in the event of i
smoke 9r/t'ofxi[Mdetection at.the.outside air intake.
Operation, monitoring,~and control of these systems are provided in the CR.
l Equipment, motors, a controls with a functions (except for a
outside air, smok,
pbxfc are supplied from Class 1E i
power sources and are feoarated and r7e t to meet the single failure i
criterion. De smoke {fn4ftykif it@ monitors are served by a non-Class i
1E uninterruptible power source (UPS) and are redundant.
s
-n...
Surveillance of airborne radioactivity levels of the outside makeup air i
to the supply system is provided by the CR ventilation inlet air
' ~.
j radiation monitors. On a high gaseous radioactivity or safety injection j
(SI) signal, CR makeup is automatically diverted through CR air makeup filter units.
hese units contain high-efficiency particulate air 1
(HEPA) and charcoal filters.
t de ai i y
a e
i I i S et on
.1 1
his safety-related system consists of three 50-percent-capacity j
redundant trains, powered by three redundant, independent. Engineered l
Safety Teatures (ESF) busses and provided.with chilled water for the AHU from a separate essential ~chille'd water train corresponding to the same divistop. h us the single active failure criterion is met.
The physical separation criteria applicable to the CR Envelope HVAC 3
a System are specified in Section 3.5 for separation and missile protection and in section 3.6 for protection against the dynamic effects i
associa*:ed with postulated rupture of piping. Common supply and return j
air ductwork is used with a crosstie between the three trains and is provided with necassary isolation dampers to isolate the nonoperating i
train.
l In case of fire within this area, provision is made for smoke purge as described in Section 9.4.1.3.
The design of this system also complies with CDCs 2, 3, and 4.
l A high temperature switch is located in the main CR to annunciate an alarm should the space temperature exceed the predetermined setpoint of the temperature switch. Inadvertent closure of a fire damper serving.
3 this area would initiate the alarm. The alarm alerts tfhe CR operator j
and appropriate measures can be taken to manually reopen the failed fire damper to restore the design air flow. Temperature excursions in spaces contiguous to the main CR, yet within the envelope, can be identified by CR personnel or by high temperature alarms located in the rooms (i.e.,
j Relay Room, Computer Room). Should this condition occur, suitable i
measures can be taken to manually reopen the damper.
i Environmental design considerations relating to CR habitability following an accident are discussed in Section 6.4.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52 and Oak Ridge National I.aboratory (ORNL)
,i publication ERDA 76 21, " Design, Constiuction and Testing of High-1 9.4-2 Revision 0 E
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Paga.gf6, cf SIPEGS UFSAR Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Anplication", are used as guides in the detail design of the CR envelope HVAC.
2.
EAB Main Area HVAC System is designed to maintain ambient temperature conditions to provide operator comfort and to satisfy environmental requirements of equipment. The design bases of ambient conditions, safety class, and seismic categories are listed in Table 9.4-1 and Section 3.2.
Equipment, motors, and controls with safety functions are supplied from Class 1E power sources and are separated and redundant to meet the single failure criterion.
This safety-related system consists of three 50-percent-capacity redundant trains, powered by three redundant independent, ESF busses and provided with chilled water for the AHU from a separate essential chilled water train correspcnding to the same division. Thus the single active failure criterion is met.
The physical separation criteria applicable to the EAB Main Area HVAC system cre specified in Section 3.5 for separation and missile protection and in Section 3.6 for protection against the dynamic effects associated with postulated rupture of piping. Supply and return air ductwork is separated by trains, with the exception of common supply / return risers between the three trains which are provided with necessary isolation dampers to isolate the nonoperating train.
In case of fire within this area, provision is made for smoke purge as described in Section 9.4.1.3.
The design of this system also complies with CDCs 2, 3, and 4 l
High temperature switches have been placed in critical areas on each level. These switches are provided with CR annunciation should the ventilation air be interrupted by the inadvertent closure of a fire damper and tha resulting space temperature exceeds the temperature j
switch alarm setpoint. The annunciation alerts dhe CR operator and i
appropriate investigative measures can be implemented to reopen the i
failed fire damper to restore the design air flow. The fire dampers can only effect one train of the HVAC system and the remaining two safety-I related trains are available to perform the syst.em's safety function.
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 52 and ORNL publication ERDA 76-21, " Design, Construction and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application" are used as guides in the detail design of the EAB main area HVAC.
3.
Technical Support Center HVAC System is designed to:
a.
Maintain the TSC in a habitable condition as may be required under any normal or emergency condition. (For the TSC habitability requirements see Appendix 7A, item S.8).
b.
Maintain ambient temperature conditions to provide personnel comfort and to satisfy environm,entalt requirements of equipment.
9.4-3 Revision 0 0003 c
Ucensing Doc. Ch:ng) Request:JN-1979 Rev.,0, Page ff_ cf STPECS UPSAR The design bases of ambient conditions, safety classes, and seismic categories are listed in Table 9.4-1 and Section 3.2.
Maintain the TSC at positive pressure to minimize any inleakage of c.
possible contamination from the outside, d.
Satisfy the design requirements of limiting dose to the occupants following the DBA in accordance with CDC 19 of 10CFR50 Appendix A.
-Instrumentation and_ controls are prov1ded to detect abnormal conditions such as smoke,[goxid 6 dea and high indioactive concentrations in the makeup air. Makeup air 1or the TSC, EAB main area, and.CR envelope is provided from the same outside air intake and monitoring is provided at that point. A leaktight isolation damper is provi_ded_to_ isolate the TSC and stop outside air makeup in the event of smoke @fo)i'c/gajdetection at the outside air intake. Operation, monitoring, and control of these systems are provided at a local panel in the TSC HVAC Room.
Equipment, motors, and controls with essential functions are supplied from a reliable source of power backed up by the TSC diesel generator (DC).
In case of fire within this area, provision is made for smoke purge similar to CR and EAB HVAC Subsystems above.
RC 1.140 and ORNL publication ERDA 76-21. " Design, Construction and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Applica-tion" are used as guides in the detail design of the TSC HVAC.
4 Essential Chilled Vater System is designed to provide chilled water to certain supply AHUs under any normal or emergency condition. For the AHUs being supplied, see Section 9.4.1.2, item (4).
The safety class (SC) and seismic category are listed in Section 3.2.
This safety-related system consists of three 50-percent-capacity redundant trains, powered by threc redundant, independent, ESF busses.
Thus the single active failure criterion is met.
The physical separation criteria applicable to the Essential Chilled Water System are specified in Section 3.5 for separation and missile protection and in Section 3.6 for protection against the dynamic effects associated with postulated rupture of piping.
9.4.1.2 System Descrf ntion. The EAB HVAC System consists of the following four major systems. The areas served by these HVAC Systems are shown on Figuros 1.2-26 through 1.2-30.
1.
CR Enveloce HVAC System serves the CR envelope areas described in Section 6.4.
2.
EAB Hain Area HVAC System serves all the following major areas in EAB.
a.
Battery and distribution panel rooms 9.4-4 0004 Revision 0
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.Page_gg cf STPECS VFSAR b.
Electrical switchgear rooms c.
Cable spreading rooms d.
Distribution panel rooms e.
Power cable vaults
]
1 f.
Motor generator set room g.
Storage rooms h.
HVAC system equipment rooms i.
Miscellaneous electric equipment room J.
Miscellaneous offices i
k.
Radiation monitoring room 1.
Electrical penetration areas m.
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) area n.
Central Alarm Station (Unit 1 only) i 3.
Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC System serves.the following TSC areas within the EAB.
m.
Computer room b.
Communication room c.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) room d.
Operations room e.
Storage rooms g.
Toilets Co' ference and break rooms h.
n
~
The above three systems are independent of each othef with the exception of common outside air intake. The system configuration is shown on Figures 9.4.1-1 to 9.4.1-3 and principal system components are listed and described in Table 9.4-2.1.
4 i
4.
Essential Chilled Water System provides chilled water to the following safety-related AHUs.
1 a.
EAB main supply AHUs in EAB 9.4-5 Revision 0
Licensing Doc. Change R:iquest CN-1979 Rev. 9.
CR envelope ANUS in BAB c.
Electrical penetration space emergency ANUS in EAB d.
Reactor makeup water (RMW) pump cubicle AHUs in Mechanical Auxil-inry Building (NAB) a.
Boric acid transfer pump cubicle AHUs in MAB f.
Essential chiller area AHUs in MAB g.
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) valve cubicles AHUs in MAB h.
Radiation monitor room AHUs in MAB 1.
Spent fuel pool (SFP) pump cubicle AHUs in Fuel Handling Building (FHB)
J.
Containment sump isolation valve cubicle ANUS in FHB
)
k.
]
9.4.1.2.1 Descrintion:
1.
Control Room Enveloom HVAC System is. safety-related and consists of three 50-percent-capacity redundant equipment trains except for the toilet / kitchen exhaust, heatin5, and computer room HVAC Subsyscem which are nonsafety-related. Two of the three trains are required to function during the following modes of operation: shutdown, hot standby, normal operation, postulated accident condition, and loss of offsite power (LDOP). The system is shown on Figure 9.4.1-2.
The following is a description of the components and their function.
1 a.
Main Air Handling Unit j
Each of the three units consists of:
- 1) Profilters The prefilters are provided to protect the hi h-efficiency 5
filters located downstream from coarse particles carried by the airstream. These filters have a 30 percent efficiency, based on the ASHRAE Standard 52 efficiency test.
- 2) High-Efficiency Filters The high-efficiency filters used downstream of the prefilters are provided to supply clean air to the CR envelope. These filters have a 95 percent efficiency based on the ASHRAE 1
Standard 52 efficiency test.
9.4-6 Revision 4
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- 3) Cooling coils Finned-tube coils cool supply air to the required cooling temperature. Drain troughs are provided to collect and remove ;
condensate.
The coil is cooled by chilled water from the Essential Chilled Vater System. The ecoling coils are designed for adequate heat removal capacity to maintain the area at the design ambient temperatures.
l
- 4) Supply Fan The supply fans are centrifugal type with direct drive, single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, fan-l-
cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
I Redundant leaktight isolation dampers are provided in the outside air ductwork to each ABU. During emergency operation (initiated j by the SI and loss of offsite power (IDOP) signal, outside air high radiation, toxic gas or smoke signal) these isolation dampera,1 are closed automatically. In case of outside air high radiation l or an SI signal,' makeup air is provided automatically via the makeup and cleanup filter units. Each AHU is designed to supply,
the CR envelope areas with a continuous source of conditioned and, filtered air.
b.
Return Air Fan The return air fans draw air from the required rooms via the return air ducts and then deliver it to the corresponding main AHU. The return air is mixed with the makeup air to form the total air flow through the main AHU. During smoke purse chase fans exhaust the return air to the outside with 100 percent supply air makeup to the main AHU. The return fans are vaneaxial type with direct-drive, single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, air-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
- c. ~
Makeup Air Filter Unit
(
Each of the three units consists of the following:
- 1) Electric Heater An electric heater is provided to reduce the moisture in the airstream to 70 percent relative humidity in order to protect and maintain the efficiency of the carbon filters.
- 2) Profilters The prefilters are provided to increase the life of the HEPA l
filters. The profilters are designed for 85 percent efficiency based on the ASHRAE Standard 52 efficiency test.
3 1
i
(
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- 3) HEPA Filters HEPA filters are provided to remove radioactive particles from the airstream. HEPA filters are designed to meet performance requirements in accordance with the " standards for HEPA Filters" issued by the Institute of Environmental Sciences (IES) (formerly American Association for Contamination Control
[AACC)), CS-1 1968.
- 5) HEPA Filters A bank of HEPA filters is also provided downstream of the carbon filters to prevent carryover of charcoal particles.from the carbon filters into the airstream.
- 6) Centrifugal Fan Makeup air unit fans are direct-drive, centrifugal type with single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, fan-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
Normally, makeup air which is required to pressurize the CR envelope areas and provide a source of fresh air is supplied by the main AHU supply fan. During emergency operation (initiated by an SI or outside air high radiation signal) the makeup unit is used to filter outside air for makeup. _ The utkeup unit fan delivers filtered air to the cleanup unit.
Makeup air to the makeup units is drawn from a common plenum where outside air is introduced through one of two physically separated air intakes. Only one intake (located in the EAB) is used for makeup air during an emergency. The other intake, which also serves the MAB, is used for 100 percent outside air during smoke purge. The emergency air intake is located on the east side of the EAR at El. 80 ft (Figure 1.2'-29).
The air intakes are designed to withstand the effect of missiles and tornadoes, d.
Control Room Air Cleanup Filter Unit Each of the three units consists of the following:
- 1) Profilters The profilters are provided to increase the life of the HEPA filters. The prefilters are designed for 85 percent efficiency based on the ASHRAE Standard 52 efficiency test.
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- 2) HEPA Filters i
l HEPA filters are provided to remove radioactive particles from l
the airstream. HEPA filters are designed to meet performance requirements in accordance with the IES Standard CS-1-1968.
I l
- 3) Carbon Filters,
The carbon filters are used to adsorb airborne radiciodine l
1 from the airstream.
j
.~
- 4) HEPA Filters A bank of HEPA filters is provided downstream of the carbon filters to prevent carryover of charcoal particles from the carbon filters into the airstream.
- 5) Centrifugal Fan cleanup unit fans are direct-drive, centrifugal type with single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, fan-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
During emergency conditions (SI or high radiation signal) the cleanup air filter units are utilized to filter both outside air from the makeup filter units and part of the return air from the CR envelope. The cleanup units also operate during IDOP, although there is no outside air supply from the makeup filter units. The filtered air from the cleanup units is supplied to the main AHUs._
i e.
Ductwork and Duct Reheat Coils j
The ductwork and duet reheat coils are common to the three equipment trains. Reheat coils are provided in the supply ducts to areas served to control temperature during normal operation.
temper outside air supply during smoke purse in winter (common for CR envelope and EAR main area), and provide heating during plant shutdown in winter. The reheat coils are electric type with temperature controls located in the areas served. The reheat coils are nonsafety-related and tripped by an isolated $1 signal during an emergency condition to prevent inadvertent operation and possible de5radation of safety cooling function.
f.
Exhaust Air Fan A single exhaust fan is provided to exhaust air from toilets and kitchen. The fan is an inline centrifugal type with a belt-drive, single-speed, open drip-proof motor.
The exhaust system operates only during normal operation and has no safety function. Two leaktight isolation dampers are provided in the exhaust duct and automatically closes during the CR envelope emer5ency mode.
g.4-9 Revision 0 9
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Computer Room Air Handling Units The computer room is pressurized by air supplied from the CR envelope main AHU. Heating and cooling is provided by separate nonsafety-related AHUs located in the room.
Two 100-percent-capacity AHUs are provided to condition and recirculate room air. Each AHU consists of the following:
- 1) Filters These filters are provided to maintain a' dirt-free room environment. They are 65 percent efficiant, based on ASHRAE Standard $2.
- 2) Cooling coil Finned-tube coils cool supply air to the design temperature.
Drain troughs are provided to collect and remove condensate.
The coil is served by the TSC chilled water system which is described in Section 9.4.1.2.1. Item 3.
The cooling coil is designed with adequate heat removal capacity to maintain the room at the design ambient temperature.
- 3) Electric Heating Coils An electric heating coil provides heating during winter shutdown conditions.
- 4) Humidifier An electric type humidiffer is provided to prevent relative humidity from dropping below 40 percent.
- 5) Circulating Fan
, A centrifugal fan is provided to supply and return conditioned room air.
The computer room AHUs are nonsafety-related and are served by a reliable source of power backed up by the TSC DC power.
2.
EAB Main Area HVAC System is safety-related except for the heating system (other than ESF battery room heating coils), elevator machine room HVAC system, and electrical penetration area normal HVAC system.
It consists of three 50 percent-capacity equipment trains. Two of three EAB supply fans are rsquired to function during normal plant operation.
2 Two of three EAR equipment trains (supply and return fans) are required to function for design basis accident conditions. The system is shown on Figure 9.4.1-1.
The following is a description of the EAB Hain Area HVAC System components and their function.
9.4 10 Revision 2 8
_.,...-=---.s
I Ucening Doc. Change RIquist: CN-1979.Rev.,_0_.
l a.
Main Air Handling Unit l
Each AHU is designed to supply the EAB main areas with a con-I tinuous source of conditioned and filtered air, and consists of the following:
- 1) Profilters, high-efficiency filters, and cooling coils are y
provided as described for the CR envelope main AHUs. Refer to Table 9.4-2.1 for performance data.
- 2) Supply Fans l
The supply fans are vaneaxial type with direct-drive, single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, air-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced, j
- 3) Electric Heating coils Electric heating coils are provided to temper the supply air
}
during winter operation and during smoke purge. The heating coils are nonsafety-related and are tripped by an isolated SI
}
signal to prevent inadvertent operation and possible degrada-
~
i tion of safety cooling function during emergency conditions.
j b.
Return Air Fans j-j During DBA conditions the return air fans draw air from the required rooms via the return air ducts and then. deliver it to the corresponding main AHU. The return tir is mixed with the makeup air to form the total air flow through the main AMU. During smoke purge these fans exhaust the return air to outside with 100 percent supply air makeup to the main AHU. The return fans are vaneaxial type with direct-drive, single-speed motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, air-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
c.
Exhaust Air Fans Exhaust fans are provided to exhaust air from the battery rooms.
They are vaneaxial type with direct-drive, single-speed, spark-proof, totally enclosed motors.
During all modes of operation the battery rooms are exhausted to the outdoors with an air change rate sufficient to maintain a hydrogen concentration level below 2 percent by volume.
9.4-11
- Revision 1
Lic2nling Doc. Chings Request: CN-1979 Rev. _9, Pcge if of ST{EGS UFSAR d.
Ductwork and Duct Reheat Coils The ductwork and duct reheat coils are common to the three equipment trains. The reheat coils are provided for the occupied areas to inaintain room temperature within comfort limits during normal operation. Reheat coils are also provided for battery j
rooms to maintain room temperatura auttable for the battery operation during normal and emergency operations. The reheat coils are of the electric type with temperature controls located in the areas being served. The reheat coils are nonsafety-related except those for the EST battery rooms which are safety-related.
The nonsafety-related reheat coils are tripped during emergency condition by an isolated SI signal to prevent inadvertent opera-tion and possible degradation of safety cooling function.
e.
Electrical Penetration Area HVAC Subsystem consists of the following:
i
- 1) Ventilation System The electrical penetration areas are supplied with ventilation air from the MAB main supply system. The air is exhausted to the outside by two.100 percent exhaust fans. The supply and exhaust systems are nonsafety-related and serve no safety function. The exhaust fans are of the centrifugal type with direct-drive, single-speed, and have totally enclosed motors.
- 2) Air Handling Units s
Two AHUs one' safety related and the other nonsafety related, are located in each train-related electrical penetration area to recirculate room air and provide cooling during emergency and normal conditions, respectively. Each AHU consists of a fin tube chilled water cooling coil and circulating fan i
(centrifugal type).
f.
Chilled Vater System The EAB Hain Area HVAC System, except for nonsafety-related AHUs in electrical penetration areas, is served by the Essential Chilled Vater System (Section 9.4.1.2, item 4).
The nonsafety-related AHUs are served by the TSC Chilled Water System.
3.
Technical Euncert Center HVAC Evstem is nonsafety-related but complies with the habitability requirements of CDC 19. The system consists of one 100 percent equipment train except for supply and return fans, computer room AHUs, and chilled water system which have 100 percent redundancy. The system is shown on Figure 9.4.1-3.
The following is a description of system components and their functions:
9.4-12 Revision 0
Ucin:ing Doc. Chang) Requist: CN-1979 Rey, _0_
Pegaffk cf STPECS UFSAR a.
Main Air Handling Unit:
- 1) Prefilters, High-Efficiency Filters, and Cooling coils Same as for the CR Envelope HVAC supply unit, except the cooling coil is served by a separate nonsafety-related TSC Chilled Water System described below.
- 2) Supply Fan
~
~
Two 100-percent-c'apacity fans are'proVided. The supply fans are '6f the~ cintrifugal typ*. with direct-drive, single-speed 4
motors. Fan motors are totally enclosed, fan-cooled, and statically and dynamically balanced.
- 3) Electric Heating coil i
An electric heating coil is provided to temper the supply air in winter during smoke purge or plant shutdown.
An isolation damper is provided to shut off the normal outside air makeup to the main AHU on detection of high radiation, toxic gas, or smoke at the outside air intake.
b.
Computer Room Air Handling Units i
The TSC computer room is pressurized by air supplied from the TSC main AHU' Heating and cooling is provided by separate nonsafety-related AHUs located in the room. Two 100 percent capacity AEUs are provided to condition and circulate room air. These units are the same as those for the CR computer room (Section 9.4.1.2.1 Item 1.g).
c.
Return Air Fans Two 100 percent return fans are provided to return the room air to j
the main AHUs during normal operation and exhaust to the outside during smoke purge operations. The return fans are centrifugal type with direct-drive, single-speed, and a totally enclosed motor.
d.
Makeup Air Filter Unit The makeup air filter unit consists of the same components as CR Envelope Makeup units.
Normally, makeup air is supplied by the supply AHU. Upon detection of high airborne radiation at the outside air intake, the makeup filter unit is utilized to filter the outside air makeup and part of the return air. The makeup unit fan delivers makeup air to the supply AHU.
1 0013 9.4 13 Revision 0 i
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Exhaust Air Fan An exhaust fan is provided to exhaust air from the toilets and break room during normal operation. During the isolation mode (F,igh radiation, toxic gas, or smoke at the outside air intake) the exhaust fan is shut down and the isolation damper closes.
The fan is of the centrifugal type, with a direct-drive, single-speed, tc tally enclosed motor, f.
TSC Chilled Water Subsystem The TSC Chilled Water Subsystem supplies chilled water to the TSC AHU cooling coil as well as cooling coils for the main computer room, TSC computer room, electrical penetration area (normal only), FHB Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) area, and HAB radwaste countin5 room.
This subsystem is shown on Figure 9.4.1-5 and consists of two 100-percent-capacity equipment trains with common piping as follows:
- 1) Vater Chiller The two water chillers are the air-cooled condenser type and are provided with all necessary accessories for automatic operation. The chiller cools the chilled water to the design temperature listed in Table 9.4-2.1.
- 2) Chilled Water Pump The two chilled water pumps are of the centrifugal type and are used to circulate chilled water through the cooling coils.
- 3) Expansion Tank The expansion tank is common to the two trains and is provided to allow expansion due to temperature variations in the chilled water system.
- 4) Chemical Addition Tank The chemical addition tank is common to the two trains and is provided to maintain water chemistry in the chilled water system.
- 5) Air Separator An air separator is utilized to reinove air from the system.
Air released by the air separator is channeled into the expansion tank.
_0014 9.4-14 Revision 0
UcInsing Doc. Change Request: CN 1979 Rev._Q, PagtfB cf STPEGS UFSAR
- 6) Chilled Water Piping and Valves The chilled water piping is common to the two trains and is provided with necessary valves for isolating and regulating the chilled water flow, a
L The above TSC HVAC System components are nonsafety-related with the exception of the exhaust fan, duct heat coils, and AHU heating coils, all components are 7
i served by a non-Class 1E reliable power source backed up by the TSC DG.
t d
4.
Emmenth1 Chilled Water System is provided to supply chilled water to j
the chilled water cooling coils in the AHUs given in Section.9.4.1.2, Itua 4.
The system is shown on Figura 9.4.1-4 and consists of three 50 percent 4
capacity equipment trains. Each train is composed of:
l a.
Water Chillers 3
1 There are two water chillers in each train. Each water chiller is i
a centrifugal type with a water-cooled condenser and is provided i
with necessary accessories for automatic operation. The chillers cool the chilled water t.o the design temperature listed in Table
{
9.4-2.1.
1 The alignment of the two chillers in each train varies with ECW j
temperature and/or the status of the Unit. With the Unit in normal operation (modes 1-4) with normal ECW temperatures, both chillers in each train will normally be aligned for operation.
Typically only one of these chillers (in each operating chilled 2
}
water train) will be operating. However, the larger chiller (300
?
ton) in each train has sufficient capacity to meet normal and 8
post-accident loads, provided the 150 ton chiller is realigned to i
prevent convective heat transfer into the chilled water train via i
the idle chiller and the EAB HVAC alignment modified to reduce the l
transient heat load.
In norma 1' operation with
- cold ECW" conditions (below 60*F, with entry and exit allowed between 60 and 69'F), only the 300 ton i
chiller is aligned for operation in each chilled water train. The
,300 ton chiller has sufficient capacity to meet normal and post-i accident. loads. The 150 ton chiller is intentionally rendered i
inoperable to ensure the available load under the worst case i
assumptions is adequate for 300 ton chiller operation.
'1 In cold' shutdown W refueling operation, with normal ECW temperature, either of the chillers in a train can meet the required normal or post-addident load.
i In cold shutdown or refueling operation, with " cold ECW" conditions, either one (but only one) of the chillers is aligned for. operation in a train. Rendering one of the chillers inoperable ensures the required minimum load for the operable chiller is available.
In the unlikely event of ECW temperatures below 42*F with a unit in normal operation, the single set chiller condenser flowrate may~
not. support the full range of loads from minimum to maximum.
Therefore, a dedicated human operator will be stationed to control ECW flow. The existing analysis supports operation down'to 37'F ECW temperature.
9.4-15 Revision 4
3 Ucensing Doc. Change Request CN-1979. Rey, _p_,., Ppge f gf STPECS UFSAR b.
Chilled Water Pump The chilled water pump is a centrifugal type and is used to circulace chilled water through the cooling coils.
j c.
Expansion Tank The exp nsion tank is provided to allow normal expansion due to temperature variation in the chilled water system.
d.
Chemical Addition Tank The chemical addition tank is provided to maintain the water i
chemistry in the chilled water system.
e.
Chilled Water Piping and Valves The chilled water piping is provided with necessary valves for isolating and regulatin5 the chilled water flow.
9.4.1.2.2 Tmtrumentation Aeolication:
l 1.
Control Room Envelone HVAC System:
All fans are operable from the main CR.
Temperature control is provided inside the CR envelope to control space temperatures by controlling reheat coils. Indication of the amount of filter loading for filters associated with the air handlers is provided locally for each of the air a
handlers. In addition, a pressure differential recorder is provided in the main CR for the upstream HEPA filters associated with both the cleanup and the makeup units.
'Ihe following instrumentation is provided in addition to that shown on Figure 9.4.1-2.
i e
Alarms for CR fan trouble i
e Position indication for isolation dampers e
Indication for the operational status of the fans 4
i 2.
EAB. Main Area HVAC System:
Fans are operable from the main CR and the transfer switch panel in the i
ESF switchgear room, with the exception.of the elevator machine, room exhaust fan, j
Room temperatures are controlled by temperature controls located in the various rooms of the EAB. Indication of the amount of filter loading for particulate filters associated with the EAB AHUs is provided at each i
of the AHUs.
1
}
The following instrumentation is provided in addition to that shown on 1
Figure 9.4.1-1.
e Position indication for dampers i
9.4-16 Revision 4 1
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Lictnsing Doc. Change Request: CN-1979 Rev. 9_.
Pageffo cf _
STPE'S UFSAR G
n Indication for the operational status of the fans e
e Alarm for fan trouble 3.
The fans are operable from the TSC local panel. The indication of the amount of filter loading for the AHU and makeup air filter unit is provided locally.
The following information is provided at the TSC local panel in addition to that shown on Figure 9.4.1-3.
Position indication for dampers Indication for the operational status of the fans 4.
Essentini Chilled Water System:
The water chillers and the chilled water pumps are operable at auxiliary shutdown stations and from the main CR.
Each chiller is provided with all necessary accessories for automatic operation. A local panel is provided with each chiller to monitor and control the water chiller. This monitoring includes indications of temperature and pressure.
All chilled water ~sfsteni trains (three) are placed in operation automat-ically upon receipt of an SI signal or a IDOP. Bypass flow around the cooling coils 'is isolated upon receipt of an SI signal. The status of the affected equipment is not changed when the actuation signal is reset.
-~
~~ ' - -
The following instrumentation is provided in addition to that shown on Figure 9.4.1-4.
Pump status lights Chiller status Pumps status on computer Chiller trouble alarms Valves position indicating lights on main control board e
9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation. Continued operation of the safety-related portion of the CR Envelope HVAC System and EAB Main Area HVAC system during all modes of operation is ensured by the following design features in addition to the general features described in Section 9.4.1.1.
1.
Design of system components, except the smoke and toxic gas detectors, meets seismic Category I requirements.
2.
During IDOP, active components such as motors, damper operators, controls, and instrumentation with safety functions (except outside air toxic gas and smoke detectors) are served by their respective indepen-dent ESF power train. The pneumatic dampers are designed to fail in the 9.4-17 Revision 4
Ucinsing Doc. Chang) Requxt CN-1979 Rev._p, Pag)/ 1 cf STPECS UFSAR t
1 safe position (as shown on Figures 9.4.1-1 through 9.4.1-5) during a IDOP. The toxic gas and smoke detectors are served by UPS.
1 Following a LOOP, the CR envelope HVAC equipment operates in the filtered recirculation mode. No makeup air is supplied. In this way, should smoke or toxic gas be present at the outside air intake, no change in system operation would be required.
3.
Redundancy of components ensures that the system meets the single active failure criterion. The system failure modas and effects analysis (IMEA) is presented in Table 9.4.-5.1.
4-The system is adequate to meet the CR envelope habitability requirements as discussed in Section 6.4.
1 5.
The system conforms to CDC 19 as it provides adequate radiation protection to permit occupancy of the CR envelope during or following postulated accident conditions, without the personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body (see Section 6.4 for CR Habitability System).
The makeup air filter unit and CR air cleanup filter unit are capable of removing airborne radioactive iodine from the incoming air and the CR air and limiting it to acceptable levels. A detailed description of the radioactivity filtratior. capability of these filter unit is provided in Section 6.5.1.
Letection of radioactivity in the CR ventilation inlet is provided by l
j radiation monitors, as described in Section 11.5.
Upon detection of high airborne radioactivity at the outside air intake, the makeup air is filtered by means of carbon filter units.~A portion of the recircula-
~
tion air is also filtered.
6.
The CR envelope is maintained at a minimum of 0.125 in, wg positive pressure relative to the surroundin5 area following receipt of an outside air hi h radiation or S1 signai with a maximum makeup air design E
4 value of 2,000 ft'/ min. The penetrations into the CR envelope are scaled or gacketed.
7.
Two redundant radiation monitors are provided to monitor the makeup air; upon high radiation, they alarm and automatically place the makeup units and CR cleanup filter units into operation in order to meet CDC 19 i
8.
In the event of a postulated fire causing smoke in areas confined within the CR envelope boundary EAB Main Area, redundant smoke detectors located within the common return duct will alarm in the CR upon detection of smoke. The operator may then place the appropriate system into' the smoke purge mode of operation (i.e.,100 percent outside air) to purge the smoke from the inside the building as necessary. The return air carrying smoke is exhausted outside by the return air fans by way of isolation and relief dampers. Howevei, this is only a secondary
~
means of smoke purge. The primary means of smoke purge is by portable fans as described in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR).
In the event of smoke reaching the outside air intake, two redundant smoke detectors are provided in the common outside makeup air duct. The smoke detectors are located near the junction between the two air intakes and the common duct to minimize transit time of smoke to the 9.4-18 Revision 4
~
Ucinsing Doc. Change Requ:ct CN-1979 Rev._g_
Page M cf STPECS UFSAR detectors.
The smoke detectors alarm the condition in the CR and automatically isolate the CR by closing the redundant outside air isolation dampers.
The HVAC equipment areas and the rooms in the CR envelope and EAB ara separated by fire walls. Ductwork from equipment areas to the CR, computer room, relay room, and switchgear room are protected by fire dampers.
Fire in any area is isolated by fire walls and fire dampers.
9.
The Essential Chilled Water System, including the water chillers, chiller pumps, and chilled, water piping and supports, is designed to meet the seismic Category I requirements.
Each train is completely isolated from the other trains, and no common piping is provided in the t
Essential Chilled Water System. The system conforms to the codes and l
standards outlined in Section 3.2.
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The HVAC ductwork is designed to seismic Category I requirements and a j
normal operating pressure based on the fan shutoff pressure.
{
h The failure 6f ~nonessent'ial"systeid, struchfresI or' components located close to essential portions of the system will mot preclude operation of the CR envelope and the EAB Hain Area HVAC System.
j h
The system is located in a seismic Catej;ory'I structure that is tornado-missile, and flood-protected.
i 9.4.1.4 Inanection and Testina Reouir r.tz.
To assure and demonstrate
{
the capability of the EAB HVAC System to perform the assigned function, tests are performed to verify proper wiring and control hookup, proper function of system components and control devices, and to perform final air balance of the system.
A preoperational test is conducted with equipment and controls operational to verify that the system operation meets design requirements.
3 To ensure a continued state of readiness of the EAB HVAC System after completion 1
of the preoperational tests, RG 1.52 and the Plant Technical Specifiestions, where applicable, will be followed in the performance of periodic inspection, maintenance, and testing.
the HEPA and carbon filters. Table 9.4-4 describes the testing requirements for 9.4.2 Fuel Handling Buildina Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System i
9.4.2.1 Desten R==Im.
The IRB HVAC System is designed in accordance 1
with the following:
j 1.
The system is designed to:.
i a.
Provida continuous air flow across the water surface of the SFP and controlled ventilation air flow in other FEB spaces. Ventila-i tion air flow is from areas of low to progressively higher radio-activity levels. The system is capable of maintaining a negative j
pressure in the FHB relative to the outside during normal opera-tion and will maintain a negative pressure during accident condi-tions (except when the railway door i,s open).
i 3
9.4-19 Revision 4
- 'Ihis Page Requires Revision
- 1
Uc;nsing Doc. Chang 2 Requesc _ CN-1979 Rev. O Page/f{ cf STPECS UFSAR b.
Provide ambient conditions in the nis, as listed in Table 9.4-1, to ensure a suitable environment for personnel and equipment in the building. The system also purges the moisture and radioactive gases that evaporate from the spent fuel pool.
c.
Hitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident as well as a Ioss-of-Coolant Accident (IDCA) by limiting plant site boundary dose to within the guidelines of 10CFR100. This is accomplished by routing exhaust air from the spent fuel pool and the remairSer of the FHB through ESF filter units containing HEPA filters and j
iodine removal carbon filters if high levels of airborne radione-tivity are detected in the ex'haust air (automatically upon an SI signal).
i d.
The systen; meets / complies with CDCs 2, 5, 60, and 61.
2.
Equipment motors and controls in the safety class portions of the system are supplied with power from Class 1E electric power sources and have sufficient redundancy to satisfy the single failure criterion.
3.
The SC and seismic category of the system components are listed in Section 3.2.
4.
System components and ductwork are protected against outside missiles and dynamic effe'ets of tornado and wind pressure since they are located within a seismic Category I structure and protected by a tornado isolation damper at both the air intake and main exhaust vent.
9.4.2.2 System Description. The FHB HVAC consists of the following subsystems:
1.
Supply Air Subsystem 2.
Supplementary Coolers Subsystem 3.
Exhaust Air Subsystem The configuration of these subsystems is shown on Figures 9.4.2-1 and 9.4.2-2, and design data of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-2.2.
Figures 1,2-39 through 1.2-46 show the location of systems, structures, and cubicles in the FHB.
The system serves the following safety-related areas within the FHB in addition to the various other areas.
1.
Room containing SFP pumps and heat exchangefs (HKs) 2.
Rooms containing valves 3.
Rooms containing HVAC equipment 4.
Rooms containin5 high-head safety injection (1HISI) pumps, low-head safety injection (IllSI) pumps, and Containment spray pumps (Emergency Core Cooling System [ECCS]).
The ventilation subsystems listed above, and their functions during different modes of plant operation, are described as follows.
9.4-20 Revision 4 e
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OPGP05-ZN-0004 Rev.I j
Changes to Licensing Ilasis Documents and Amendments to the Operating Licenze
]
j CN-1979 Licensing Document Change Request Page/.ff of i
SECTION 7 l
TRM Revision i
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i
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i l
ne following pages include the TRM sections which delineate the Toxic Gas Monitoring requirements for STPEGS. The existing requirements are deleted by this Licensing Document Change Request as noted on the included mark-up.
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Pageefef.
i INSTRUMENTATION t
CHEMICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS. __
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 333.7 'Ihree independent Chemical Detection Systems of each Unit shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm / Trip Setpoints adjusted to actuate'at the following concentrations:
a.
Vinyl Acetate 510 ppm b.
Anhydrous Ammonia /
5 25. ppm Ammonium hydroxide /
APPLICABILIT_Y; All MODES.*
ACTION:
With one Chemical Detection System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to a.
OPERABLE status within 7 days or place the afrected channel in its tripped condition."*
b.
With two or more Chemical Detection Systems inoperable, within I hour initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREhfENTS 433.7 Each Chemical Detection System shall de demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an ANALOG and/or DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
- In MODES 5 and 6, ifit becomes necessary to place the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation and if other Technical Specifications (3.7.7
" Control Rooin Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System" and/or Table 33-3, Item 10 " Control Room Ventilation") require placing the system in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode, then in this situation, place the system in the filtered recirculation mode.onLL _
The inoperable system may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of the other systems per Specification 433.7.
South Texas ~- Units 1 & 2 3/43-1 TRM N Delete this page in it's entirety
- 4
OPGP05-ZN-0004 Rev.1 Changes to Licensing Basis Documents and Amendments to the Operating License CN-1979 Licensing Document Change Request Page/g of fpp SECTION 8 References 1.
Onsite Toxic Gas Analysis, NC9015 Revisions 5 & 6.
2.
Offsite Toxic Gas Analysis, NC9006 Revisions 5 & 6.
3.
UFSAR Sections:
2.2.3 Evaluation Of Potential Accidents 2.2.3.1 Determining of Design Basis Events 2.2.3.1.1.
Industrial Facilities 2.2.3.1.2 Transportation 2.2.3.1.6 Plant Site Chemical Storage Protection 2.2.3.2 Effects of Design Basis Events Table 2.2-5 Potentially Hazardous Chemicals Stored at Celanese Chemical Company and on the STPEGS Site Table 2.2-6 Potentially Hazardous Chemicals Shipped from the Celanese Chemical Company.
6.4.1.6 Noxious Gas Protection 6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas Protection 7A IH.D.3.4 Supp. 8 Emergency Response Facilities 9.4.1 Electrical Auxiliary Building IIVAC Systems 9.4.1.1 Design Bases 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation 4.
Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 5.
Design Base Document (DBD) 5V119VB1022 Sections: 3.1.1.2, 3.2.1.5, 4.27.1 - 4.27.6 6.
Design Criteria SV119VD0106 7.
Regulatory Guide (RO) 1.78 Rev. 0 (exception to Seismic Cat. I instruments) 8.
NUREG-0570 Toxic Gas Concentrations in CR Followine an Accident 9.
NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Control Room Habitability 10.
Safety Evaluation by the NRC related to Amendment 7 to operation License NPF-76.
~
11.
Cormspondence ST-HL-AE-2545 Proposed Modification to Toxic Gas Ma.dtoring I
(
--~.-..-,-
i Lic:nsing Doc. Change Request CN 1979 Rev.
0_.
Paga.f0 of _
i An analysis of the remaining on-pite gases was performed using the guidance j
from RG 1.78 and the methodolonJn NUREC-0170 and NUREC/CR-1741.
i of this analysis;how that The resu ta et c a'
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2.h.3.1.7 Picne Mehenine Proteetient Heasures will be taken on the i
, above-ground outdoor STPECS appurtenances to prevent damage to either energized er monenergized structures dich could be subject to a direct ILghtning streka dere receipt of such a stroke could damage critical plant components, including:.
4 1.
Lightning arrester' will be installed on the fenerator transformers and s
i other similar energized equipment to provide a direct coupling to ground l
for lightning stroke-incurred surge current and any followup 60-Hz current.
4 j
At the location cf emel' lightning arrester, an array of buried vertical ground rods or t.he equivalent will be. installed to provide a deep earth coupling with ti:e shortest required length of interconnecting ground
{
cable.
2.
Air terminals and dos.,.
ers will be provided, as required, for critical nonnetallic plant structures not effectively shielded from a direct lightning stroke by an adjacent structure.
Air terminals, as required, will be provided on metallic plant structures which are not otherwise effectively shielded where a direct lightning stroke could damage a strucedre to the detriment of proper plant operation.
3.
Cround rods or the equivalent will be installed as part of the overall plant grounding system and also specifically as stated in item 2.
4, All measures, devices and considerations of lightning protection requirements shall be in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA's) ' Lightning Protection Code - RFPA No. 78',
(Ref. 2.2-10).
2.2.3.1.8 Nydronen Cas Exolosions: An analysis has been performed of the eifects of a detonation involving the hydrogen gas stored in bulk in the on-site BCSF.
Per the guidance of Reference 2.2-19, this analysis assumes that one of the hydrogen cylinders in the BGSF ruptures and its contents are instantaneously released.
The h drogen fully forms a " puff," and the gas 2
f immediately detonates.
The *puti" cloud of the gas was assumed to have a caussian concentration distribution (per the model described in Regulatory Cuide 1.78).
j Dispersion of the hychogen due to winC: and the buoyancy of the j
hydrogen is conservatively neglected.
s 2.2-12 Revision 2
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- l i
--.,---r r-
-mn
-y--
i-- +
w
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