ML20134F775

Submits Rept Containing Brief Descriptions of Changes,Test,& Experiments Approved Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59

ML20134F775
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	02/05/1997
From:	Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9702100145
Download: ML20134F775 (151)

Text

_____

Curutzs 11. CROSE Baltimoir Gas and Electric Company Vice President Calven Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy 1650 Calven Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4455 February 5,1997 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Report of Changes. Tests and Exneriments - 10 CFR 50.59 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company hereby submits a report containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations approved between October 1,1995 and December 31,1996. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, j i

i

/

CHC/NH/ dim

Attachment:

(1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments

[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

cc: (Without Attachment)

D. A. Brune, Esquire H. J. Miller, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire Resident inspector, NRC Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR A. W. Dromerick, NRC J. H. Walter, PSC

~

9702100145 970205 PDR ADOCK 05000317 R PDR

! ATTACHMENT (1) i i I CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l l

REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS j

[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 February 5,1997

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Acitoc Report 1 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docunent ID Revision Status

na,====================== ========

94-8-081-108-R00 64 SWject: RETIRE UNIT 1 & 2 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA) CHANGE MACHINES IN PLACE Alias:

POSRC #: 95-118 A; soc Doc ID: 94-081-005-00 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: McR RIf Doc 10: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Nett # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 081 FUEL HANDLING Ttxt: NRC SUPMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY RETIRES THE UNIT 1 & 2 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA) CHANGE MACHINES IN PLACE. THE REFUELING MACHINE AUXILIARY HOIST, OR THE CASK HANDLING CRANE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CEA HANDLING TOOL TO MOVE CEA'S 8ETWEEN FUEL ASSEMBLIES. THE CEA CHANGE MACHINES WILL BE PLACED IN THEIR PARKED POSITIONS, OUT OF THE WAY TO ALL OTHER MACHINE MOVEMENTS. UFSAR SECTION 9 7 3 3 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION OF THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE AND ITS BASIC OPERATION. THIS UFSAR SECTION WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THAT THE REFUELING MACHINE AUXILIARY HOIST, OR THE CAEK HANDLING CRANE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CEA HANDLING TOOL PERFORMS THIS FUNCTION. UFSAR FIGURE 9 15 IS A REPRESENTATION OF THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE, AND WILL BE REMOVED. UFSAR FIGURES 9 23 AND 9 28 ARE DRAWINGS OF UNIT 2 AND UNIT 2 COMPRESSED AIR STSTEMS. THESE TWO DRAWINGS REFERENCE THE CEA CHANGE MACHINES AS AIR LOADS, AND WILL 8E MODIFIED TO SHOW THE REMOVAL OF THESE AIR LOADS.

THE CEA HANDLING TOOL AND ITS APPLICA8LE PLANT PROCEDURES INCORPORATE ALL OF THE DESIGN FEATURES OF THE ORIGINAL CHANGE MACHINES. THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE W WILL BE PARKED SO THAT IT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. A CALCULATION WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THAT DROPPING THE TOOL DURING USE WOULD NOT RESULT IN A CRACK OF THE SPENF FUEL OR REFUELING POOL LINERS.

THEREFORE, THE USE OF THE TOOL DOES NOT INVALIDATE ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSES.

NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WERE AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE.

THEREFORE, THIS PROPOSED ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESit04.

(CMH)

NMRB018 NUCLEls C1/22/1997 Search Proces2 Ac9 toc Ceport 2 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

_ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ m_. . _. -__ .- _.__ .__--..___-___ __ _ _ _-___ _ . _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __.-_____-_u________u_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ _ _ _ _ _

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Achoc Report 3 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

_ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ . - - - . - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - . _ _ _ _ . - . . _ . - - _ . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ - _ - _ - . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - = - _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

NWR8018 NUCLEIS ~ 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 4 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

ss======================= ======== =

94-8-999-103-R01 64

Subject:

MODIFY EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM TO CONNECT THE $80 DG OC Atlas:

POSRC #:  %-009 AIsoc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmt! # Xmt! Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Othcr refs:

PI'rs Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Tut NRC SUMARY:

i THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES THE EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO CONNECT THE STATION BLACKOUT (580) DIESEL GENERATOR, DG OC, 70 THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUSES IN UNIT 1 (EMERGENCY BUS 11 AND 14). THIS ACTIVITY ALSO ADDS THE RACEWAY AND CABLES NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PART OF DG OC. GENERALLY, THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE PERFORMED DURING A UNIT 1 PLANT OUTAGE.

NEW SSC'S ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY MAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE THE EFFECT OF e THEIR INSTALLATION (E.G., SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF EXISTING STRUCTURES, HEAT LOADS, CABLE SEPARATION) DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS. SSC'S ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT BEC(ME OPERATIONAL UNTIL TESTING OF DG OC IS COMPLETE. EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS INITIATORS CF ACCIDENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE PR08A8ILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS MAS NOT BEEN INCREASED.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO SERVE MITIGATION FUNCTIONS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED, AND ,

CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES PREVIOUSLY CALCULATED REMAIN WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY STATED LIMITS.

INSTALLATION ACTIVITY IS SEQUENCED SUCH THAT ONE EDG WILL BE AVAILABLE To  :

SUPPLY EMERGENCY POWER TO AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES OUS FOR UNIT 1,  !

DURING OUTAGE PORTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY. ADEQUATE ELECTRICAL ISOLATION FOR DG )

OC WILL BE PROVIDED. NO NEW TYPES OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE BEING CREATED  ;

BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT ,

IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. I i

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 5 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED, BECAUSE THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS ON THE MCR AND AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND DETERMINED NOT TO EXCEED THE SYSTEMS' DESIGN HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY. DURING PERIODS WHEN PENETRATIONS IN AREAS PROTECTED BY A HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ARE OPEN, THE HALON SYSTEM WILL BE DECLARED IN0PERA8LE, AND HOURLY FIRE WATCHES AND BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSION WILL BE INSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMH)

.-.-__.._.-.-.---.-___.---____a- _ . - -__ _ . _----._-_.-. _ - - _ . _ _ _ - . _ - - . _ _ _ - - . - - - - - - - - ----__--___x -- .-v - - - - - -s

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A & oc Report 6 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

a =======_============== ======== =

SE00003 0001 64

Subject:

CTMT PURGE LINES MODIFICATION Alias: 94-0204-00 (ESP)

POSRC #: 96-092 Assoc Doc ID: 94-0205-00 Revision To: 0001 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP 94-0205-01 0000 C ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date L

================================================================================= ============ ======

I Other rsfs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment: 1CV1411 CNTMT PURGE AIR SUPPLY VLV 12 1CV1413 CNTMT PURGE AIR EXHAUST VLV 12 Org/Div:

System Code: 060 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HEAT AND VENT Ttxt: ESP 94-0205 IS A MAJOR MODIFICATION WICH WILL REMOVE VALVES 1/2 CV 1611 AND 1/2 CV 1413 AND INSTALL BLIND FLANGES. THESE VALVES ARE THE OUT8OARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE. IN ADDITION, ALL OF THE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR THESE VALVES (E.G., AIR SUPPLY, POWER SUPPLY, CONTROL SIGNALS) WILL BE MODIFIED TO REMOVE OR RETIRE ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. FURTHERMORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE A ,

PERMANENT MEANS TO RIG AND STORE THE BLIND FLANGE DURING PERIG)S IN WHICH IT IS TO BE REMOVED (I.E., MODES 5 AND 6).

THE A8ILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IS ENHANCED BY THE USE OF A MORE RELIABLE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE METHOD OR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT CLOSURE AS REQUIRED 8Y THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT IMPACT THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, ,

NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WHICH RESULT FROM THIS ACTIVITY AND NECESSITATE AN AMENDMENT TO THE LICENSE. AS SUCH SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY THE NRC IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS

_ m _ +

. _ _ . ._ _ -- . = - -. .

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & cc Leport 7 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 MODIFICATION.

LOAD HANDLING ACTIVITIES COMPLY WITH NUREG-0612 AND, IF NECESSARY, NUREG-0554, AND DO NOT REPRESENT A USQ.

Document ID Revision Status

wwmn<===================== ======== ==

SE00005 0000 64

Subject:

HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION IN CONTAINMENT Allas:

POSRC #: 95-123 A1 soc Doc ID: EOP-13.01 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: AVBASIS EOP-13.02 0000 C AVBASIS ES199501398 0000 C ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rrafs:

P;rs R;fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Ttxt: NRC SupMARY:

THIS SAFETY ANALYSIS ALLOWS UFSAR SECTION 14.21 TO BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE REANALYSIS OF THE HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION IN CONTAINMENT DESIGN BASIS EVENT.

THE REANALYSIS CONSISTED OF AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF ALL INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS IN THE DBE ANALYSIS. THIS IS A REANALYSIS ONL"; NO PLANT MODIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY. NO CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE OPERATIUN OR FUNCTION OF: THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS, THE CONTAINMENT VENT / HYDROGEN PURGE SYSTEMS, OTHER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY (OR THE ASSOCIATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS), OR EQUIPMENT EVALUATED IN THE SAR ASSUMED TO BE EVENT INITIATORS.

THE ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS OF CONTROLLING HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION AFTER A LOCA. THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION OF 0.7 V/0, EITHER RECGIBINER WILL MAINTAIN THE HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BELOW 4 V/0, WHEN STARTED APPROXIMATELY ONE DAY AFTER THE POSTULATED LOCA.

IN THE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY EVENT THAT BOT 5 RECOMBINERS FAIL FOLLOWING A LOCA, THE CONTAINMENT VENT / HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION BELOW 4 V/0. PURGE SHOULD BE INITIATED WHEN A GRAB SAMPLE INDICATES THE HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION IS APPROXIMATELY 3 V/0. THIS IS 500N ENOUGH TO ACCOUNT FOR UNCERTAINTY AND TO MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE MARGIN FROM THE ESTABLISHED ACCEPTANCE CRITERION, WHILE MINIM 12tNG RELEASES TO THE ENVIRONS. IN ALL CASES, THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PEAK HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION WILL REMAIN BELOW THE CONSERVATIVE 4 V/O LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. IN ADDITION, THE ASSOCIATED OFF-SITE DOSE IS WELL WITHIN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AND ACCEPTED LIMITS.

NNRe018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Adioc Report 8 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE INPUTS AND ASSLMPTIONS REMIN CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY GUIDE 7, THE SER FOR CONSUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL, THE UFSAR, AND PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THEREFORE, THE LICENSING BASIS IS MINTAINED. THE ASSOCIATED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE RELEVANT EMERGENCY OPERATION AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES WILL BE UPDATE TO REFLECT THE RESULTS OF THE REANALYSIS.

THE PROSABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUFWCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT INPORTANT TO SAFETY PREY:"JSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR L11ALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED. THEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.

(CMM)

. . , _ . . . _ _ _ m . . m.

NMR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Frocesa A&oc Report 9 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docuumt ID Revision Status

=============== ========

SE00007 0000 64

Subject:

SWITCHGEAR HVAC CONTROLS REPLACEMENT (ESP 94-0201)

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-143 AIsoc Doc ID: 94-0201-00 Revisfore To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other refs: '

Pers Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 032 AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT Text: NRC St.5 MARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLtEES THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

THIS MODIFICATION REPLACES THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR HVAC PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEM WITH A DIGITAL ELECTRONIC BASED SYSTEM. THE MOORE PRODUCTS MODEL 348 E FIELD MOUNTED, PROGRAMA8LE CONTROLLER IS USED. IEEE 7 - 4 . 3 .

2 - 1993, IEEE STANDARD CRITERIA FOR DIGITAL COMPUTERS IN SAFETY SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS, WAS USED AS GUIDANCE FOR COPMERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION OF THE CONTROLLER SOFTWARE. EPRI TR - 102323, GUIDELINES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TESTING IN POWER PLANTS, AND ANSI / IEEE C 37 . 90 .1 - 1989, IEEE STANDARD SURGE WITHSTAND CAPABILITY TESTS WERE USED AS A GUIDANCE FOR EMI TESTING OF THE CONTROLLER.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBASILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY SAR ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR.

NMR9018 NUCLEIS- . 01/22/1997 .

Seerch Process A e oc Report 10 10/01/1995 Tmtu 12/31/1996  !

(CDM)

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Document ID Revision Status .

=============== ========

SE00013 0000 64 Sthject: REMOVE ABANDONED SW CROSS CONNECT P! PING SETWEEN tmIT 1 & 2 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS Alias:

i i

I

_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ ____._._.m_ _ _ - _ _ . _ = _ _ _ _ _ . _ ____m._.____ ...__.m_._._.m ___

. . = . . . . . ,_ .- ~c.. _~ ~ .

_~ . . . _ - _ _ - . ...w.. . . . - . _ .-- -. .. . .. - _ . u, NMR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 11 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 POSRC #: 95-118 Assoc Doc ID: ES199501424-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

- - - ===========================================. =============================== ============ ============

Other refs: [

Pers 22fa: ,

Equipmmt:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Ttxt: NRC SLpWERY:

THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES FLAGS FROM THE UFSAR FIGURE FOR " UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM IN THE TUR81NE BUILDING" THAT INDICATE A CROSS CONNECTION TO UNIT 1 AT THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSORS. THE UNIT 1 DRAWING DOES NOT REFLECT THIS CROSS CONNECTION. THE PIPING TMAT IS INSTALLED BUT NOT CONNECTED WILL BE REMOVED. L THESE LINES APPEAR TO MAVE BEEN USED FOR START UP, AND WERE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED.

(CMH) r

- _- __ _ . . - . . . _ _ . . . _ . - - _ _ _ + - . _ _ _ _ . _ -m_ _ . __m m -- . - w - e, - a->-tNw -ww*wr m-ww

NWR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 12 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docunent ID Revision Status SE00015 0000 64

Subject:

REPLACEMENT OF 11 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR Aties:

POSRC #: 96-061 AIsoc Doc ID: 89-0173-06 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP CA0047/ 0001 C DCALC RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmti Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

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Pers Rzfs:

Equipment: 1COMPPA11 11 PA COMPR Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR Tut: SupetARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING NO. 11 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR (PAC) WITH A NEW MACHINE. THE NEW COMPRESSOR HAS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO MEET PLANT AIR DEMANDS AND WILL BE A CENTRIFUGAL VERSUS RECIPROCATING TYPE COMPRESSOR. THE ,

NEW COMPRESSOR WILL ALSO DELIVER OIL-FREE AIR, WHICH WILL ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO ACT AS A BACKUP FOR THE INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS. REPLACEMENT OF THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR ALSO REQUIRES REARRANGEMENT OF THE SERVICE WATER (SRW) COOLING LINES TO THE COMPRESSOR, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF THE EXISTING NO. 11 PLANT AIR AFTERCOOLER (THE NEW COMPRESSOR HAS AN INTEGRAL AFTERCOOLER). THE FUNCTION OF THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR AND INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AIR, SRW, AND PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED,

NNRB018 NUCLEls 01/22/1997 Se:rch Proces:3 A& oc Reoort 13 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUATED IN THE SAR REMAIN VALID. THE PLANT AIR SYSTEMS IS NOT REQUIRED TO PERFORM ANY SAFETY FUNCTION, ANG THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SRW AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTION. A NEW FUSED DISCONNECT SWITCH WILL BE INSTALLED TO ALLOW THE OPTION OF PROVIDING I 480 VAC POWER DURING OUTAGES. THE DESIGN BASIS FOR THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED, SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUATED IN THE SAR REMAIN VALID. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USG) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN UF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Document ID Revision Status ,

SE00017 0000 64

Subject:

CHANGE DRAWING FIG. 9-21 TO REFLECT GRAVITY DAMPERS AND MANUAL DAMPERS FOR THE A8 VENT.

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-131 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501153-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

=======================================================================3m======33 ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers Rafs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 032 AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT Ytxt: NRC SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED AIR OPERATED AUXILIARY SUILDING VENTILATION DAMPERS TO ALLEVIATE MAINTENANCE CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY, AUXILIARY AND WASTE PROCESSING VENTILATION AIR HANDLING UNIT SUPPLY DAMPERS 1 (2) DAMP 5422 AND 1 DAMP 54 23 ARE MECHANICALLY LOCKED IN THE FULL OPEN POSITION. IN ADDITION, WASTE PROCESSING EXHAUST FAN DAMPERS 1 (2) DAMP 5410 AND 1 (2) DAMP 5411 ARE REPLACED WITH GRAVITY DAMPERS. e THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO MAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON EITNER THE AUXILIARY AND WASTE PROCESSING VENTILATION AIR HANDLING UNITS OR THE WASTE PROCESSING EXHAUST FANS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE AFFECTED DAMPERS IS MAINTAINED, EITNER SY REPLACEMENT DAMPERS OR ALTERNATE a MEANS, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT ,

AFFECTED. THE MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISMED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE DAMPERS THEMSELVES AND THEIR DEDICATED CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW FAILURE MODES, AND IN FACT ELIMINATES SOME EXISTING FAILURE MODES THROUGH SIMPLICITY OF DESIGN.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED

NNRe018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 14 10/01/1995 inRU 12/31/1996 SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION MAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR FIGURE 9 21 DEPICTS 1 (2) DAMP 510, 1 (2) DAMP 5411, 1 (2) DAMP 5422 AND 1 DAMP 54 23 AS AIR OPERATED DAMPERS. THIS FIGURE WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

(CMM)

NNR3018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Actioc Report 15 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00025 0000 64 SLbject: REMOVE LAST 2 SENTENCES OF UFSAR SECTION 9.7.3.2 " TRANSFER CARRIAGE" -- REMOVES REQUIRMENT TO PLACE DANGER TAG ON UPENDER Alles:

POSRC #: 95-126 f.ssoc Doc ID: CA00568 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC ES199501787 0000 C ESP Rsf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Oth;r rzfs:

P rs RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

NMR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A m oc Report 16 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ,

System Code: 081 FUEL HANDLING Ttxt: THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES THE LAST TWO SENTENCES FROM THE " TRANSFER CARRIAGE" SECTION OF UFSAR 9.7.3.2. THESE TWO SENTENCES DESCRIBE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: "DURING NON-REFUELING PERIODS, THE FUEL CARRIER IS EMPTIED, THE TRANSFER CARRIAGE LOWERED TO A HORIZONTAL POSITION, AND A RED <

DANGER TAG IS PLACED ON THE UPENDER CONTROL PANEL. THE UPENDER CAN BE OPERATED DURING NON-REFUELING PERIODS ONLY IF NO FUEL MOVEMENT IS CCCURING IN THE SFP." REMOVAL OF THESE TWO SENTENCES FROM THE UFSAR CONSTITUTES A CHANGE TO THE FACILITY PROCEDURES AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED. CRITICALITY ANALYSES WERE PERFGRMED FOR TWO 5.0%

U-235 ASSEMBLIES IN THE UPENDER, WITH A THIRD 5% ASSEMBLY BROUGHT NEAR THE UPENDER. THE RESULTS SHOWED THAT BY PROVIDING A MINIMUM DISTANCE OF NO GREATER THAN 5" OR A MINIMUM BORON LEVEL OF NO GREATER THAN 200 PPM LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN IS NOT POSSIBLE. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ARE IN PLACE WHICH FAR EXCEED BOTH OF THESE REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION DETERMINES THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS IN PLACE WITHOUT THESE UFSAR SENTENCES ARE SUFFICIENT AND NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.

Docunent 10 Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00028 0000 62 Stbject: REVISE UFSAR TO ADD PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW RANGE INSTRUMENTS AS PAM Alias:

POSRC #:  % -133 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501804-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R:,f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

======================================================================================= ============ ============ i ether rsfs:

Pws Rafa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 064 REACTOR COOLANT Tixt: SUfetARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISED THE UFSAR LISTING OF INDICATORS ASS (Y;i ATED WITH THE PAM 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE VARIABLE TO INCLCE THE LOW RA%E PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS 1(2)PI 103 AND 1(2)PI 103-1. THESE INSTRUMENTS COMBINED WITH THE EXISTING PAM PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTtUMENTS MEET THE RG 1.97 REQUIREMENTS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL IDENTIFY Th5 EXISTING LOW RANGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INDICATORS AS PAM 1 QUALIFIED TO THE OPERATORS BY PLACING GREEN DEMARCATION TAPE AROUND THOW INSTRUMENTS. THESE INDICATORS CAN BE USED BY THE OEPRATORS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WIDE RANGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INDICATOPS DURING EMERGENCY OPERATING CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES. SINCE THE INSTRUMENTATION CLASSIFIED BY THIS ACTIVITY ALREADY MET THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTJ TO BE CLASSIFIED AS PAM 1 AND ARE ALREADY CLASSIFIED AS BEING SR 1E LND 50.49 WHERE NECESSARY, THIS

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A&oc Report 17 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 MODIFICATION IS ACCEPTABLE AND DOE SNOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND THEIR BASES.

Doctment ID Revision Status

ra<=a====================== ======== ==

SE00029 64

Subject:

TEMPORARILY SUPPLY POWER SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE AUXILIARIES Alias:

POSRC #: 96-022 AIsoc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR ES199600250-000 0000 C ESP Rsf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date zwa==================================================================================== ============ ============

Other rsfs:

Pers Rifs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Text: NRC SUPMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ADDRESSES THE TEMPORARY CONDITION WHERE THE DIESEL AUXILI ARIES FOR TWO DIESELS ARE FED FROM ONE MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC).

WHILE DG2A IS BEING TESTED, DG12 WILL BE OPERABLE AND AVAILABLE TO EMERGENCY BUS 21. THIS WILL RESULT IN MCC 214R SUPPLYING BOTH DG2A AND DG12 AUXILIARIES THIS LINEUP IS CONSISTENT WITH PLAN SEPARATION CRITERIA, AND SUFFICIENT MARGIN EXISTS IN THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM TO ALLOW FEEDING OF BOTH THE DG12 AND DG2A AUXILIARIES FROM MCC 214R. SAFETY RELATED PROTECTIVE DEVICES PROVIDED ON MCC 214R AND DIESEL AUXILIARIES (INCLLDING MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS) PROTECT THE EQUIPMENT AGAINST ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE FEEDER BREAKER FROM DG2A TO EMERGENCY BUS 21 WILL BE " RACKED OUT", THUS ISOLATING THE DIESEL FROM THE BUS DURING THIS TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION.

THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTION IS NOT INCREASED.

SINCE EQUIPMENT USED TO MITIGATE MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT INCREASED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO BE ACCIDENT INITIATORS. NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS WITP OTHER SSC'S HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY THAT COULD CAUSE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. IN ADDITION, THE DIESEL GENERATORS ARE MITIGATORS OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENTS AND CANNOT BECOME ACCIDENT INITIATORS.

THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (ONE OF WHICH IS DG12, THE " SWING

NWR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 18 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 DIESEL") WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE OPERATING UNIT (UNIT 2) AND ONE DIESEL GENERATOR WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE UNIT IN SMUTDOWN (UNIT 1);

THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMM)

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NMRBOIS NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Actioc Report 19 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 20 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

Document ID Revision Status ma============================ ======== ==e===

SE00032 0000 64

Subject:

INTERNAL VIBRATION M0dITORING SYSTEM UFSAR CHANGE Alias:

POSRC #: 95-118 Assoc Doc ID: 95-031-002-00 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: MCR 95-031-002-00 0000 C ESP QL00069 0000 C QLOG Psf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers Rife:

Equipment: OCPUIVMS INTERNAL VIBRATION MONITORING SYS Org/Div:

System CJde: 031 METEOROLOGY TOWER AND MISC. COMPUTERS TIxt: NRC SU MARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE OBSOLETE INTERNALS VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM (IV MS) FOR CCNPP UNITS 1 4 2. BECAUSE OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH IV MS, OBSOLESCENCE AND LACK OF VENDOR SUPPORT ARE VIEWED AS POTENTIAL THREATS TO CONTINUED PLANT OPERATIC'1. THE IV MS IS A COMPUTER BASED SYSTEM THAT USES A FOURIER TRANSFORM ANALYZER SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DATA ON THE STATUS, EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF CORE / CORE BARREL MOTION. THE REPLACEMENT IV MS IS THE VENDOR'S RECOMENDED REPLACEMENT WITH SIMILAR DESIGN, BUT ENHANCED CAPABILITY AND MAN MACHINE INTERFACE.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON EITHER THE IV MS OR ANY INTERFACING SSC. SINCE THE SYSTEM DESIGN AND

NWR9018 NUCLEls 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 21 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 INTERFACES REMAIN THE SAME TPE ACTIVITY POSES NO NEW FAILURE MODES. BASED ON <

THIS EVALUATION, THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY '

QUESTION A W THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

TMIS EVALUATION MAS BEEN PREPARED KCAUSE SAR SECTI0t! 7 9 2 DESCRISES SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS THAT ILLUMINATE TO INDICATE A840RMAL CONDITIONS. THE NEW =

SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE THESE SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS, BUT INDICATES ABNORMAL ,

CONDITIONS THROUGH ALTERNATE MEANS. SECTION 7 9 2 WILL BE REVISED TO DELETE  !

REFERENCE TO SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS.

(CMM) ,

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r Document ID Revision Status SE00033 0000 64 Sthject: 21 INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER REPLACEMENT (FCR 89 173, SUPPLEMENT 3)

Atlas:

POSRC #: 95-123 AIsoc Doc ID: 89-0173 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR 89-0173-03 0000 C ESP

. . . _ . - _ _ _ . . . _ _ = . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

. ___.-_.m_ _ _ , _ , . _ _ _ ___ _m..-.. . _ _ .. . _,.,_,_,__m-,., ,..,_.,,,,.w, , .m.,-vo__.. ,,. ,_,, , .___..-_e_.

WNR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 Actioc [eport 22 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xatt Date

_ _ - - - ==============.....A..==========================================___...====== ============ ======.._...

Other rtfs:

Pers Refa:

Egsipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR Tcxt: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING 21 INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER WITH A NEW CRYER IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRtMENT AIR SYSTEM. THE REPLACEMENT DRYER IS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THE EXISTING DRYER, BUT WITH A LARGER CAPACITY RATING AND IMPROVED MONITORING CAPABILITY. LOCAL FLOW INDICATOR 2 FI 2081 AND ITS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (2 IA 149) WILL ALSO BE REMOVED UNDER THIS ACTIVITY. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TME BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECMNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

(CMM) i

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.. . - _ _ . . . - . ~ . . - _ .

. . _ . = . . .. . .. .. -

MRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adhoc Report 23 10/01/1995 THRu 12/31/1996

.. . . - .- _ . . - - . ~ . - . .

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A&oc Report 24 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docunent ID Revision Status

========================= = = === m == == =

SE00035 64 Stbject: ENCAPSULATION TUBE SAFETY EVALUATION Alias:

POSRC #: 96-027 A; soc Doc ID: ES199501759-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP G2f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

- === = =============== = ============ = ======== = ======================= = = === = ====== ======= = ==

Other rEfs:  !

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS T;xt: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY SHOWS THAT ENCAPSULATION TUBES, WHICH STORE INDIVIDUAL IRRADIATED FAILED FUEL RODS, CAN 8E SAFELY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL IN ,

THE PERIPHERAL GUIDE TU8ES OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR EMPTY GRID CAGES.

ENCAPSULATION TU8ES ARE A STANDARD A88 - CE DEVICE FOR STORING FAILED FUEL RODS AND FOR CONTAINING SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY Mar..FYING FUEL HANDLING PROCEDURES FM 120, FM 220, FM 330, FM 340 AND FH 350 TO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: (1) 8Y ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ONLY FUEL RODS WITH SUFFICIENT CLAD DAMAGE TO ENSURE NO RESIDUAL GAS GAP ACTIVITY BE STORED IN ENCAPSULATION TUBES IN FUEL ASSEM8 LIES AND THAT UNDAMAGED FUEL RG)S ONLY BE STORED IN THE ENCAPSULATION TUBES IN EMPTY GRID CAGES; (2) FOR ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS STORED IN THE GUIDE TU8ES OF FUEL ASSEM8 LIES, BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL ROD AND ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENTS BE LESS THAN 4 . 35 W/0 OR THAT THE EXPOSURE OF THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS AND ASSEMBLY BE GREATER THAN 1530 MWD / MTU, AND FOR ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS STORED IN THE GUIDE TUBES OF EMPTY GRID CAGES, BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ONLY THE TECH SPEC 5.3.1.1 ENRICHMENT LIMIT OF 4.52 W/0 APPLIES; AND (3) BY '

ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTING THE USE OF HOST ASSEMBLIES IN ISFSI AND THE REACTOR CORE. IN ADDITION, ENCAPSULATION TUBES ARE ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITED FROM BEING PLACED IN THE CENTER GUIDE TUBES OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR EMPTY GRID CAGES TO PREVENT AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE FROM SECOMING WEDGED IN

• THE GRAPPLE OF THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE. ENCAPSULATED FUEL IS ADMINISTRATIVELY PROMI81TED FROM EXTENDING A80VE THE TOP OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL RACKS TO PREVENT THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL ROD FROM INTERFERING WITH THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE OR ITS LOAD. UFSAR SECTION 9.7 WILL BE MODIFIED TO INCLtX)E A DESCRIPTION OF THE ENCAPSULATION PROCESS AND OF ANY LIMITS IMPOSED BY DOSE, CRITICALITY, THERMAL AND EQUIPMENT INTERFACE ANALYSES. UFSAR SECTION 14.18 WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE CHANGE FROM AN ASSEMBLY WITH 176 PINS MAXIMUM TO A WHOLE ASSEMBLY WITH 180 FUEL PINS MAXIdjM LIMITED BY REACTIVITY AND OFFSITE DOSE CONSIDERATIONS. THE TERM " ENCAPSULATED" WILL BE

- - - - . . , . - , ..n. ., -.

-l NMR3018 NUCLEls 01/22/1997  !

Seerch Procesa AdMx: Caport 25  :

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

, CNAIHiED TO " CLAD" IN OFSAR SECTIONS 3.1 AND 3.3.2.1 TO AVOID CONFUSION. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY GUESTION.

(CNN)

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NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Actioc Report 26 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docunent ID Revision Status

============== ========

SE00036 0000 64

Subject:

ACTIVITY - ES 1995 0 1844 - SIXTEEN FIRE DAMPERS Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-007 A1 soc Doc ID: ES199501844-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xiett # Natt Date

- - - = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ============ == =

Other refs:

Pers RIfs:

Equipnent:

Org/Div:

System Code: 120 BARRIERS AND BARRIER PENETRATIONS Ttxt: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES ENGINEERING TO ABANDON IN PLACE SIXTEEN FIRE DAMPERS IN THE PLANT, BY REPLACING EACH DAMPER'S FUSIBLE LINK WITH A NON FUSIBLE STAINLESS STEEL LINK. THIS ACTIVITY IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION CONCERNS. FIRE SEPARATION BETWEEN REDUNDANT COMPONSNTS, REQUIRED BY CALVERT CLIFFS APPENDIK R ANALYSIS, 15 MAINTAINED BY CREDITING OTHER ASPECTS OF PLANT FIRE PROTECTION, INCLUDING THE CONFIGURATION OF THE ASSOCIATED DUCTWORK. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY A FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING EVALUATION, PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERIC LETTER 86 - 10. THE FUSIBLE LINK th EACH DAMPER IS REPLACED WITH A STAINLESS STEEL LINK TO ENSURE THAT THE DAMPER STAYS IN THE OPEN POSITION, TO PREVENT INADVERTANT DAMPER CLOSURE FROM AFFECTING VENTILATION SYSTEMS.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY FOR A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT NO PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE 5AR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICAITONS BASIS SECTION (SECTION 3/4.7.12) IS NOT REDUCED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

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NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 l Search Pcocesa A e oc Report 27 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

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Document ID Revision Status  ;

= - - ==================================  ;

SE00037 0000 64 '

Stbject: UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 INFO CHANGE FOR SWGR DAMPERS 228 AND 228A.

F Alias:  !

POSRC #: 95-123  !

t AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501466 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R2f Doc 10: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date *

======================_===== m e================================================= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pers Rzfa: -

Equipment: >

Org/Div:

System Code: 032 AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT Text: NRC SUPMARY: r TMIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH ESP ES 1995 1466 AND IS PERFORMED  :

BECAUSE UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 (BGE DWG 64 315) AUNILIARY SUILDlWG VENTILATION, REQUIRES CHANGE TO CORRECTLY SHOW TMAT SWITCMGEAR ROOMS VENTILATION FAN 11 (12) HAS A SPLIT DISCHARGE DESIGN WITH TWO SEPARATE GRAVITY DAMPERS, ONE ON EACH FAN DISCHARGE DUCT. THEREFORE, A SECOND GRAVITY DAMPER SYMBOL WITH TAG NUMBER 1 (2) HVAC 2284 HAS SEEN ADDED IN PARALLEL TO 1 (2) HVAC 228 ON FIGURE

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A& oc Report 28 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 9-21. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC SAR DISCUSSION OR DESCRIPTION REGARDING THE FAN 11 (21) DISCHARGE DAMPERS. OTHER THAN FIGURE 9-21, THERE IS NO OTHER SAR DISCUSSION OR DE G IPTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS CMANGE.

THIS CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 IS BEING MADE TO REFLECT NEW COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION FOR AN EXISTING HVAC DAMPER AND TO BETTER CLARIFY THE AS BUILT CONDITION BY SM0 WING FAN 11 (21) MAS A SPLIT DISCHARGE ARRANGEMENT WITH TWO GRAVITY OPERATED DAMPERS 1 (2) HVAC 228 Am 1 (2)

MVAC 228A IN LIEU OF ONE SINGLE DAMPER. THE PLANT MAS HISTORICALLY REFERRED TO THIS ARRANGEMENT AS A SINGULAR DAMPER UNIT, WITN ONE TAG NUMBER 1 (2)

HVAC 228. SHOWING BOTH DAMPERS WITH UNIQUE EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION WILL MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE AS BUILT CONFIGURATION OF THE PLANT.

THE TWO DAMPERS ARE OF THE SAME SIZE AND DESIGN. THE TWO FAN DISCHARGE PATHS RE COMBINE IpseEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THE SUBJECT GRAVITY DAMPERS. THE DAMPERS ARE GRAVITY OPERATED AND RESPOND BY OPENING TO POSITIVE AIR PRESSURE PROVIDED BY THE FAN DISCHARGE. THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL CHANGES BEING MADE TO THE PLANT AND THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE PERFORMANCE OR OPERATION OF THE SWITCNGEAR VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM. ALL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM CONTINUE TO SE MET AND THERE IS NO IMPACT TO ANY OTHER SSC'S. THERE ARE NO AFFECTS ON ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN USQ.  !

(CMH) 1

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i NMR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A & oc Report 29 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

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======================== ========

SE00038 0000 64 Stbject: SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE UPGRADE OF THE EDG ,

1 Alles:  ;

POSRC #: 95-120 l AIsoc Doc ID: 93-0203-04 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat C Assoc Type: ESP R4f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type: '

Sender Matl # Rurtl Date  !

=================================== ============= ==================== ====._...=== =_._......_.  !

Other refs:  !

Pers R2ft:

Equipment I

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NMRB018 CJCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A e oc Report 30 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Text: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF AN UPGRADE KIT ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) NO. 11 (2A), 12 (15) & 21 (28), PROVIDED BY THE EDG SUPPLIER, TMAT INCLUDES REPLACING THE CYLINDER LINERS, PISTONS, SCAVENGING AIR SYSTEM, AND FUEL INJECTORS WITH CO W ONENTS OF AN IMPROYED DESIGN. ALSO MODIFICATIONS OF SOME SUPPORTING SYSTEMS ARE INCLtSED. THE INSTALLATION OF THE UPGRADE KIT FACILITATES AN INCREASE TO THE ELECTRICAL CAPABILITY OF EDG'S NO.11 (2A),12 (IB) & 21 (28). THE NEW RATINGS WILL BE; CONTINUOUS - 3000 KW 2000 MOUR - 3300 KW, 200 NOUR - 3500 KW AND 30 MINUTES - 3600 KW. WITH THE INCORPORATION OF FUTURE LOADS (PLANNED AND POTENTIAL), THE MARGINS WITMOUT THIS UPGRADE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, WITH THE CAPACITY UPGRAGE (FOR EDG's No. 11 (2A), 12 (15) & 21(25) AND WITH THE FUTURE LORDS ADDED,-

POSITIVE LOAD MARGINS WILL BE MAINTAINED ON ALL BUSES.

THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE THE RELIABILITY OF THE EDG IS NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

NO ADDITIONAL FAILURE MrEES OF THE EDG ENGINE ARE BEING CREATED BY TMIS ACTIVITY, AND NO NEW INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS ARE CREATED BY CHANGES COVERED UNDER THIS SAFETY EVLUATION. FURTMERNORE, THE EDG'S ARE ACCIDENT MITIGATORS ARE NOT INITIATORS OF A NEW ACCIDENT. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT MAS NOT BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST IS BEING SUBMITTfD TO INCREASE THE REQUIRED FUEL OIL VOLUME IN THE FUEL O!L STORAGE TANKS. THE CURRENT QUANTITY OF FUEL OIL REQUIRED TO BE STORED (IN DAY TANKS AND FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS) BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS SUFFICIENT SINCE THE EDG WILL CONSt.BIE LESS FUEL AT THE EXISTING RATINGS THAN PRIOR TO THE UPGRADE. ONCE THE NEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE ISSUED, THE LEVEL IN THE FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK MUST BE INCREASED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MINIMUM FUEL DIL REQUIREMENTS. THE SETPOINT ON THE LEVEL INDICATING SWITCH ON THE NO. 21 FUEL OIL STORAGE TAWK WILL BE INCREASED TO SUPPORT THE EDG AT THE MIGHER CAPACITY. THE OPERABILITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. TMUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMM)

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NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A e oc Report 32 10/01/1995 TINtu 12/31/1996 Doctament ID Revision Status mezzzazzazzzzazzzazzz======333 zzzzzzzz mzzzzz SE00039 0000 64 S4 ject: THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION, FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT, THAT THE ADDITION OF 5 - AP IS ACCEPTABLE AS A CHEMICAL ADDITIVE....

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137 Atsoc Doc ID: 95-035-001-00 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 33 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

================================_====================================== ============ ======

Other rsfs:

P;rs Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 035 CHEMICAL ADDITIONS - TURBINE Ttxt: NRC

SUMMARY

THE SCOPE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS LIMITED TO AN ASSESSMENT OF 5 AMINO - PENTAN0L (5 - AP) WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE USED AT CCNPP IN A TRIAL DEMONSTRATION IN LATE 1995 OR EARLY 1996. THE PURPOSE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 5 - AP WOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SECONDARY SYSTEM WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY IMPACT PLANT SAFETY. TO DATE, ETA NAS BEEN USED AT A NUMBER OF OPERATING PWR'S IN THE US AND AMP AND 5 - AP HAVE BEEN USED AT THE W Y L F A POWER STATION IN THE UK WITHOUT DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON PLANT MATERIALS. EPRI STUDIES WITH SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE AMINES MAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT PHYSICAL DEGRADATION OF SYNTHETIC MATERIALS USED FOR SEALS AND GASKETS DOES NOT OCCUR EXCEPT AT EXTREMELY HIGH CONCENTRATIONS (I.E., 50 WT %) SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITLCE GREATER THAN THOSE WHICH WOULD BE MAIN-TAINED IN THE SECONDARY SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE EPRI WORK AND ACTUAL PLANT EXPERIENCE HAS ONLY INCLUDED A SMALL NUMBER OF AMINES, THE RESULTS SHOULD BE APPLICABLE TO 5 - AP BASED ON THE EXPECTED APPLICATION AT SIMILAR, LOW PPM DOSAGES AND SIMILAR DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS (E.G., ACETIC AND FORMIC ACIDS)

IN THE STEAM GENERATOR. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ANY DIFFERENCES IN CORROSION OR MATERIAL DEGRADATION RATES SUCH AS THOSE WHICH CAN BE OBSERVED IN CORROSION PRODUCT TRANSPORT STLA)lES, POSE AN ECONOMIC RATHER THAN A SAFETY ISSUE. IT IS ALSO, THEREFORE CONCLUDED, THAT USE OF 5 - AP WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF A MALFUNCTION.

THE EXISTING CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM CAN BE USED TO FEED 5 - AP INTO THE SECONDARY SYSTEM, THEREFORE THERE ARE NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS. ALSO, 5 - AP IS OF RELATIVELY LOW VOLATILITY, LOW ACUTE T0XICITY, AND LOW FLAMMABILITY AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURES AND POSES A SMALLER RISK THAN THE PRESENTLY USED CHEMICALS (AMMONIA, MORPHOLINE, HYDRAZINE AND ETA). THEREFORE, IT IS FURTHER CONCLUDED THAT 5 - AP COULD NOT CAUSE AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE FROM THOSE WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVALUATED. SINCE THERE IS NO EFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TG USE OF 5 - AP AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY DEFINED IN THIS SAFETY EVALUATION.

CURRENTLY , THE CCNPP UFSAR STATES THAT CHEMICALS (HYDRAZINE AND AMMONIA OR MORPHOLINE) ARE ADDED TO THE CONDENSATE FLOW FOR OXYGEN SCAVENGING AND PM CONTROL. SINCE THIS SAFETY EVALUATION PROPOSES TO ALLOW THF USE OF 5 - AP FOR PM CONTROL, A UFSAR CHANGE IS NECESSARY AND IS INCLLA)ED AS PART OF THE SCOPE OF THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMH)

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - = _ - _ _ -

NMRS018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search ProcesO AcSwn: Report 34 10/01/1995 TNRU 12/31/1996 Doctanent ID Revision Status

-==========.......===========================

SE00040 0000 64

Subject:

UPDATED FSAR 14.20 CONTAINNENT RESPONSE SAFETY EVALUATION Allas:

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 See'ch Procesa A& oc Report 35 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ,

POSRC #: 95-143 Assoc Doc ID: 95-0107 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC CA00093 0000 C DCALC ES199501794 0000 C ESP RJf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sende.- Xmt1 # Xmtt Date

ssa=================s================================================================ ============ ==========

l Other rifs:

Pers R;fa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 083 MAIN STEAM Ttxt: WRC Supe 4ARY:

L THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE REANALYSIS OF THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THE LOSS OF COOLANT AND MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENTS (LOCA AND MSLB), AND THE ASSOCIATED UPDATE TO UFSAR 14.20 AND OTHER AFFECTED PORTIONS OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES. LOCA AND MSLE ARE THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS (DBE'S) THAT ESTABLISH THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN AND DETERMINE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT. THIS ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT ALL CURRENT AND EXPECTED PLANT CONDITIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY BOUNDED BY THE INPUTS AND ASSUMPil0NS TO THIS ANALYSIS.

THE LOCA AND MSLB EVENTS HAVE BEEN REANALYZED BY ABB AND BECHTEL USING I

METHODOLOGY THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE NRC. ABB ANALYZED THE MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE FROM THE RCS (FOR LOCA) AND FR(M THE SG (FOR MSLB). BECHTEL ANALYZED THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THESE EVENTS USING THE MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE FROM ABB AS INPUT.

THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE OF 50 PSIG  !

15 NOT EXCEEDED. THE REANALYSIS ALSO DEMONSTRATES, UPON EVALUATION OF THE J' PEAK PREDICTED VAPOR TEMPERATURE OF 288 DEGREES FARENHEIT, THAT THE TEMPERATURE OF THE INNER SURFACE OF THE CONTAINMENT WALL, OF STRUCTURAL MEMBERS IN CONTAINMENT, AND OF SAFETY RELATED MECHANICAL COMPONENTS IN '

CONTAINMENT WILL NOT EXCEED THE RESPECTIVE DESIGN TEMPERATURES FOR THESE I

COMPONENTS. THE PEAK VAPOR TEMPERATURE FOR THIS ACTIVITY 15 3 DEGREES FARENNEIT HIGHER THAN THE HIGHEST PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED PEAK VAPOR TEMPERATURE (285 DEGREES FARENNEIT). FINALLY, THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES, UPON  ;

EVALUATION OF THE ENVELOPING ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE PROFILES, THAT THE QUALIFICATION OF 10CFR50.49 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS MAINTAINED.

IN ADDITION TO THE UFSAR CHANGES THAT RELATE TO THE UPDATED CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS, THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES DELETING THE REACTOR COMPARTMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS FROM UFSAR 14.20 BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE LEAK BEFORE BREAK TOPICAL REPORT (CEN - 367 - A).  !

(CMH)

L i

.__m.-_ .mm_._ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . _ _ - _ _ . _ . _ . ___._____.______.-_-_.__m-__.________.___________m__________.______._______.___m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________.__________._m_.m_._..____ . _ _ _ _ .

. . . . . ~ =_ -. - . . . . -_. .

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A@oc Report 36 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 L

WNR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A& oc Report 37 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

r i

+

Docunent ID Revision Status -

t SE00041 64 subject: 21 AND 22 SALTWATER AIR COMPRESSOR REPLACEMENT Alias:

POSRC #: W O17 Arsoc Doc ID: 89-0174 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR 89-0174-00 0000 C ESP CA00097 00000 C DCALC CA01383 0000 C DCALC E-88-015 0000 C DCALC RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type: i Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================ ======== ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers RIfs:

Equipment: 2COMPSWAC21 21 SW AIR COMP 2COMPSWAC21A 21 SW AIR COMP A 2COMPSWAC218 21 SW AIR COMP 8 ,

2COMPSWAC22 22 SW AIR COMP '

2COMPSWAC22A 22 SW AIR COMP A 2COMPSWAC228 22 SW AIR COMP 8 2M0405 22 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR i 2M0405A 22 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR A 2M04058 22 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR 8 2M1405 21 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR  ;

2M1405A 21 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR A r 2M14058 21 IA SW AIR COMPR MOTOR 8 l

. . . - . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . . . - - . _ - . _ , _ - _ -__-.--__.__-_-__--_-__.-___._.------._._-_-__-____-______._---_._______~,v_ - _ _ . _ ~ , . . _ ,-.- n,----- -,.- _

NNR8018 Sea ch Procesa A& oc Report 38 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR Tcxt: NRC SLM4ARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING SALTWATER SYSTEM AIR COMPRESSORS (SWAC'S)

WITH NEW LARGER CAPACITY COMPRESSOR $. THE REPLACEMENT SWAC'S ARE TANK MOUNTED RECIPROCATING COMPRESSORS, AS ARE THE EXISTING COMPRESSORS, BUT WILL PROVIDE INCREASED CAPACITY MARGIN FOR SAFETY RELATED AIR DEMANDS. THE NEW COMPRESSORS WILL NOT CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE WAY THAT THE SALTWATER AIR SYSTEM FUNCTIONS.

SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS SUPPORTED BY THE SALTWATER AIR SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THE SAME MANNER. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE SYSTEMS ACT TO MITIGATE ACCIDENTS, NOR ARE ANY POSSIBILITIES OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS CREATED.

THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (US0) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

(CMH)

. . - . . . .. .m... .. . . . _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ .

NNR5018 '

NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Adioc Report 39 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

uv=wa======================= ==== = = ====

SE00042 0000 64 i Stbject: TUR8INE VALVE SYPASS VALVE - DECREASED PRESSURE SETPOINT Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199502106 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R;f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

====================== = ======================================================== ============ ======

i Other rifs:

Pers R fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO TWO PROCEDURES AND THE UFSAR TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE SETPOINT OF THE TBV'S WHEN EITHER TESTING THE TUR8INE VALVES OR FOLLOWING A TURBINE VALVE MALFUNCTION. THE CHANGE IN THE SETPOINT WILL REDUCE THE PROBA8ILITY OF AN AUTOMATIC TRIP. THE SETPOINT IS BEING REDUCED TO JUST ABOVE THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE SO THAT THE TBV'S WILL OPEN QUICKLY TO PICK UP THE LOAD IF NECESSARY, THUS, REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF A TRIP. CHANGES TO THE UFSAR ARE BEING MADE TO MORE EXPLICITLY DESCRIBE THE CHANGES IN THE PRESSURE SETPOINT.

THE CHANGES DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY OF THE PROBASILITIES, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYZED ACCIDENTS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY.

i

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces:a A(9 toc Report 40 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status smus========================= ======== ======

SE00043 0000 64

Subject:

50.59 EVALUATING A SPARE INVERTER AS THE SOURCE OF POWER FOR THE VITAL PANEL Alias:

POSRC #: 95-125 Assoc Doc ID: 90-0099 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0081 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Matl # Xmtl Date

e================================================================================= ============ =r=====

Other rsfs:

Pers Rifs: '

EcpJipment: 11NV1YO3A 120V INVTR 13 Org/Div:

System Code: 018 VITAL INSTRUMENT AC Text: NRC

SUMMARY

THE PROPO9ED ACTIVITY WILL TEMPORARILY CONNECT 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 13 FROM A FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT SPARE INVERTER THAT IS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THIS CONNECTION WILL BE USED DURING THE OUTAGE AND WILL ONLY BE USED ON ONE PANEL AT A TIME. THIS CONNECTION WILL ALLOW ALL THE EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THE PANEL TO REMAIN OPERABLE DURING THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW INVERTER. THE SPARE INVERTER IS SIZED TO CARRY THE ENTIRE LOAD OF THE PANLE DURING ANY PLANT CONDITION. ONCE THE INVERTER IS REPLACED THE PANEL WILL BE CONNECTED BACK TO THE NEW INVERTER, THE NORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

(CMH)

__..______m _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____-____._.____-_._____.m.

WNRS018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Adioc Report 41 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

a. - =============.===== ======== ======

SE00044 0000 64 Stbject: EVALUATE POWERING VITAL PANELS 12 AND 14 FROM THE BACKUP SUS Allas:

POSRC #: 95-125 A1 soc Doc ID: 90-0099 Revision To: 0000 Assen Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR RIf Doc ID: 1-95-0080 Rev: 000 Refet- Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 1-95-0082 0000 TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xstl # Xmtt Date

_.44.e.............................................._....._.......__ ..........._..... ============ ........ ===

Other refs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment: IINV1YO2A 120V INVTR 12 11NV1YO4A 120V INVTR 14 Org/Div:

System Code: 018 VITAL INSTRUMENT AC

, Text: NRC SupW4ARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL TEMPORARILY CONNECT 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 12 OR 14 DIRECTLY TO ITS BACKUP POWER SUPPLY. THIS CONNECTION WILL BE USED DURING THE OUTAGE AND WILL ONLY BE USED ON ONE PANEL AT A TIME. THIS CONNECTION WILL ALLOW ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THE PANEL TO REMAIN OPERABLE DURING ANY PLANT CONDITION. ONCE THE INVERTER 15 REPLACED THE PANEL WILL BE CONNECTED BACK TO THE INVERTER, THE NORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY CUESTION (USQ).

(CMH)

NMR8018 NUCLEIS 01/7.2/1997 Search Proces) A& oc Report 12 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctanent ID Revision Status

- --================ m 3 = = = = =====

SE00048 0000 64 Stbject: REMOVAL OF SRW PIPING DEAD LEGS Alias:

POSRC #: 95-140 Aisoc Doc ID: ES199501141-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Asscc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

====== = =_==== = ======================== = =================- ======= ============ ======

Cther rafs:

Pers RIfs:

Equipment: 1-H822-1157 SRW SYSTEM PIPING 1-H822-1159 SRW SYSTEM PIPING 1-H822-1323 SRW SYSTEM PIPING 1HVSRW-133 11 SRW SUBSYS XCONN 1HYSRW-134 11/12 SRW SUBSYS XCONN 1HYSRW-573 VENT X-CONN HDR BETW 11 A Org/Div:

System Code: 011 SERVICE WATER COOLING Tcxt: NRC

SUMMARY

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL REMOVE DEAD LEG PIPING FROM THE SRW SYSTEM TO AVOID INTERFERENCE DURING THE SERVICE WATER HEAT EXCHANGER REPLACEMENT IN A FUTURE OUTAGE. THREE SECTIONS OF PIPING WILL BE REMOVED UNDER THIS ACTIVITY:

1) THE CROSS CONNECT PIPING UPSTREAM OF THE SRW TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION VALVES (14" HB 22 1323)I

2) THE SUCTION LEG FROM 11 SRW RETURN HEADER TO 12 SRW PUMP (14" HB 221157);

AND

3) THE SUCTION LEG FROM 12 SRW RETURN HEADER TO 11 SRW PUMP (14" HB 22 1159).

THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THE EXISTING PIPING WAS TO PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY FOR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AND TO PROVIDE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICE WATER SUBSYSTEMS. THE PIPING AND VALVES BEING REMOVED PROVIDE NO FLOW DIRECTION OR FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONS. THE NEW CAPS AND SPOOLS SATISFY THE

NMR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997

-Search Process Ae oc Report 43 10/01/1995 TINtu 12/31/1996 REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CEDE. REMOVAL OF THE CROSS CONNECT DEAD LEGS PROVIDES PHYSICAL SEPARATION SETWEEN THE TWO SUBSYSTEMS. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEIED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMN)

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NNR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 45 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

1 r

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00049 0000 64

Subject:

ES199501309, REPLACES THE EXISTING 10" CONCENTRIC, BUTTERFLY VALVE ASSEMBLY WITH A NEW 10" ECCENTRIC HIGH PERFORMANCE BUTTERFLY VALVE ASSEMBLY Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137 Arsoc Doc ID: ES199501309-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type: '

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

_.........======================================================================== ============ =======

Otner rsfs:

Pirs R;fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) itxt: NRC SUPOIARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE SERVICE WATER TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION VALVES, 1 CV 1637 AND 1639, WITH NEW VALVES. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATIOP IS TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY AND ISOLATION CAPA81LITY OF THESE VALVES. THE ,

EXISTING AND REPLACEMENT VALVES ARE A!R ACTUATED BUTTERFLY WAFER STYLE VALVES.

._~ . .... . - -. . - -. . _-.. . - . .

NNat018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 46 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

• THE REPLACEMENT VALVES FIT THE EXISTING PIPING WITHOUT MODIFICATION. THIS '

MODIFICATION DOES NOT CHANGE THE PURPOSE OR THE OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF 1 CV 1637 AND 1639 OR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE VALVES RESPOND TO MITIGATE ACCIDENTS, NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENT.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION, BECAUSE THE REPLACEMENT COMPONENTS ARE OF THE SANE BASIC DESIGN AND QUALIFICATION AS THE EXISTING COMPONENTS AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS.

(CMH) r

. _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _m_-_-_.-_..- _m______. - . ._ _ _ _ _ ___._m_ _ - _ _ ._m . .____m____ ._m_____._.___._____________m.__m_.___._.___-_____-

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Acftoc Report 47 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

Document ID Revision Status w=assawwa===================== ======== ======

SE00050 0000 64

Subject:

GAGGING OF 1 - C V - 5 1 7 1 Atfas:

POSRC #: 95-128 Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xintt Date nex==================================================================================== ============ ============

Other rsfs:

P;rs R;fa:

• Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 012 SALT WATER' COOLING Tcat: NRC SUpW4ARY:

THE ACTUATOR FOR 1 CV 5171 WAS DAMAGED WHILE OPERATIONS WAS MANUALLY OPERATING 17 TO THE t;LOSED POSITION. THIS VALVE IS RELIED UPON TO OPEN WHEN THE ECCS ROOM TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM ACTUATION VALUE. THE UFSAR TABLE 9 16A SHOWS THAT THE VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURiNG ALL LINE UFS INCLUDING ACCIDENT AND EMERGENCY OVERBOARD. ALSO UFSAR FIGURE 9 8 SHOWS THE VALVE AS A REMOTELY CONTROLLED VALVE WHICH FAILS OPEN. THIS ACTIVITY WILL GAG THE VALVE IN THE OPEN POSITION WHICH REPRESENTS A CHANGE TO THE CURRENT DESIGN AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AS PRESENTED IN THE UFSAR. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF PORTIONS OF THE ACTUATOR FOR 1 CV 5171 AND INSTALL A GAG ON THE VALVE TO ENSURE THAT THE VALVE IS IN ITS FAIL SAFE POSITION.

BY GAGGING THIS VALVE IN THE OPEN POSITION, (HE ECCS COOLER FUNCTION WILL BE PRESERVED. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE CAPACITY OR ABILITY OF THE SALTWATER SYSTEM TO PROVIDE COOLING UNDER NORMAL OR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ASSUMING ANY SINGLE FAILURE IN THE SYSTEM. AS SUCH IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS s

_ .- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ ____._____..___.__________________._____._______-__m____._._- _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _

NWR3018 NUCLEls 01/22/1997 Search Process Adioc Report 48 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBASILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY CREDIBLE NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS DEEE D NOT TO REPRESENT AN USG.

(DIN)

NNR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Froces3 A & oc Report 47 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 l

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00052 0000 64 Stbject: VENT LINES FOR DIESEL GENERATORS Alias:

POSRC #: 95-130 Arsoc Doc ID: 92 024-012-00 Revision To: 0003 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Tut: NRC

SUMMARY

ALLOW SEPARATION OF THE EXISTING COMMON VENT LINE FOR THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S (EDG) JACKET WATER COOLING AND AIR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE EXISTING CONSTANT VENT CONFIGURATION WILL 8E SEPARATED TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT VENT PATHS FROM THE RESPECTIVE COOLING WATER HEADERS TO THE ASSOCIATED JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK.

THIS EVALUATION SUPERSEDES 50.59 LOG NUN 8ER 92 s 024182 R02. THIS ORIGINAL 50.59 MAS BEEN MARKED UP AND MODIFIED T3 ALLOW PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODIFICATION, APPROVED IN MCR 92 024 012 01, ON THE #12 EDG. IT WAS NOTED DURING THE POST MODIFICATION TESTING FOLLOWING THIS INSTALLATION THAT THE CONSTANT VENT LINE CONNECTING TNT AIR COOLANT RETURN HEADER TO THE JACKET WATER COOLING EXPANSION TANK CAUSED AIR TO BE VACUUM DRAGGED FROM THE TOP i 0F THE TANK DIRECTLY INTO THE COOLANT RETURN HEADER. IT WAS DETERMINED THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE RETURN HEADER PRESSURE BEING BELOW ATMOSPHERIC. THIS CONDITION WAS CORRECTED FOR THE #12 EDG BY CUTTING AND PLUGGING THE AIR COOLANT RETURN HEADER VENT LINE UNDER MCR 92 024 012 02. REVISION 003 TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED ESP / MCR WILL TIE THE RETURN AND SUPPLY INTERCOOLER VENT HEADERS TOGETHER AND ROUTE THEIR COMMON DOWNSTREAM LINE BACK TO THE EXPANSION

m . . . _ _ __ _. _ . . . . ._ . . _. . . < .m.. . . __ _

i NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 A& oc Ceport 50 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 TAINC. THEREFORE, THis REVISION WILL HAVE ONLY TWO SEPARATE LINES VENTED SACK TO THE EMPANSION TANK, NOT THREE, AND WILL ALLOW THIS MODIFICATION ON ALL i THREE EDG'S. TMIS WILL STILL PREVENT AIR ENTRAINMENT IN THE JACKET WATER

+

COOLING SUBSYSTEM SINCE THE JACKET COOLING SUBSYSTEM VENT LINE WILL STILL BE SEPARATED FROM THE INTERCOOLER CopNe0N VENT LINE.

(ME CONSTANT VENT LINES ARE CATEGORIZED AS SAFETY RELATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CCNPP MASTER EQUIPMENT LIST. THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL UTILIZE PIPING, FITTINGS AND COMPONENTS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO THE MATERIALS THAT WERE SPECIFIED FOR TME ORIGINAL CopWEON VENT LINE. i TMIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFlWED BY 10 CFR 50.59 AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

(CMH) i l

I l

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 Adioc Report 51 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revialon Status

========._... ========

SE00054 o4 Sthject: SAFETY EVALUATION TO SUPPORT NON-MOD 93-099.

Atlas:

POSRC #: 95-137 A: soc Doc ID: ES199500930 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

=============================================u=================================== ======..==== ======

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 045 FEEDWATER Tsxt: NRC SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY IS A NON MOD CFANGE TO SECTION 10.2.2.2 0F THE UFSAR. INCLUDED IN THIS SECTION OF THE UFSAR IS A DESCRIPTION OF TME STEAM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THE FEEDWATER PUMP'S TURBINE. IT 15 MENTIONED THAT AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER IS ALSO A SOURCE, AND IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE. TMIS ACTIVITY DELETES THE REFERENCE TO THE AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER ALWAYS BEING AVAILABLE.

AUXILIARY STEAM IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE SECAUSE, LIKE ALL SYSTEMS, IT MAY BE OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE. THIS DOES NOT IMPACT THE RELIABILITY OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS, NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE SAFETY OF THE PLANT. PER 01-12A ("FEEDWATER SYSTEM"), WHICH IS REFERENCED BY OP-2 (" PLANT STARTUP FROM NOT STAND 8Y TO MINIMUM LOAD"), AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER IS ONLY SUPPLIED TO THE SGFP'S DURING STARTUP TO TARE THE PLANT UP TO 5% POWER.

THIS SOURCE IS ONLY USED WHEN HOT REMEAT IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE OTHER UNIT THEREFORE, IF AUXILIARY STEAM 15 NOT AVAILABLE THE ONLY CONSEQUENCE IS THE DELAY OF A UNIT STARTUP. STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP OPERATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED DURING PLANT OPERATION, THE SGFP'S THEMSELVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, OR BRING THE PLANT INTO A SAFE SMUTDOWN CONDITION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

M IOlI NUCLEI 5 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 52 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

- _ . . _ - . . _ _ - - - - . _ _ . - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - . _ - - _ - - _ - - ._-_------ - -__ -_ - - - - _ - - , _ -- _ o

NNR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Ceport 53 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctanent ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00055 0000 64 Stbject: TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM 11 STEAM GENERATOR Alias:

POSRC #: 95-133 Aasoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Raf Doc ID: 1-95-0158 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmt! # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers R fs:

Equipment:

Orc /Div:

System Code: 064 REACTOR COOLANT Tsxt: NRC SU W RY:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF UP TO FIVE (5) INSULATION PANELS (90 . 6 FT-(SQUARED)) FROM 11 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) WITH UNIT 1 OPERATION IN MODES 3, 4, 5, 6 AND DEFUELED. THE LOCATION OF INSULATION REMOVAL IS IN THE REGION OF THE SG TRANSITION WELDS. ESFAS AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM TESTING WILL BE PROMI8ITED FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ACTIVITY.

NON DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF THE TRANSITION REGION OF 11 SG IS REQUIRED AND SCMEDULED FOR PERFORMANCE DURING THE UNIT 1 1996 REFUELING OUTAGE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE PERFORMED FOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PLANNING PURPOSES TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF EXISTING INSULATION PANELS AND TO ASSESS THE FEASIBILITY OF REMOVING PANELS IN THEIS AREA WITHOUT AFFECTING ADJACENT PANELS. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ONLY BE PERFORMED IF UNIT 1 IS FORCED INTO AN OUTAGE PRIOR TO THE 1996 SPRING REFUELING OUTAGE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF 11 SG TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. THE PROBASILITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO 11 SG (DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPkAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL MEAT LOAD CREA'ED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

(CMH)

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces0 Adioc Repert 54 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 e

1

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NMRB018 NUCLEI 5 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A&oc Report 56 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctment ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00056 64 Stbject: SITE DRAWINGS UFSAR FIGURES 1-1 AND 1-2 (TRANSPORTATION FACILITY, NOF PARKING LOTS, CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL SERVICES STRUCTURE)

Alias:

POSRC #:  % -017 A: soc Doc ID: 61502SH0001 Revision To: 0012 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: 8GEDRWG 61502SH0002 0005 C BGEDRWG ES199502040 0000 C ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date *

w================================================================================== ============ ========

Other rafs:

Mrs R fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Tu t:

SUMMARY

(FOR NRC REPORT)

UPDATED UFSAR FIGURES 1 - 1, SITE PLAN, AND 1 2, PLANT PROPERTY AND BUILDINGS SHOW LOCATIONS OF ADDED OR REPLACED SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES AND CURRENT USES OF EXISTING SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A USQ BECAUSE THE ADDED FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND SHOWN NOT TO BE A USQ SY PREVIOUS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS, OR ARE FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM THE PLANT AND i NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO ANY SYSTEMS USED TO PROTECT THE PLANT FROM ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS.

Doctment ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00057 64 Stbject: SPARE THE EXISTING 4/0 POWER CABLE TO THE 21 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR AND CONNECT A NEW 350 MCM POWER CABLE BETWEEN BREAKER 52 - 2423 AND THE EXISTING 21 PAC. .

Atlas:

POSRC #:  % -009 t Assoc Doc ID: 89-0173-08 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

i.

k

- ---r,- - ,.- u- -

NNRp " NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 57 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

s=================================================================================== ============ =========

Other refs:

Pers Rifs Equipment: 2M8423 21 PA COMP MTR Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR i Text: THIS ACTIVITY DISCONNECTS AND SPARES IN PLACE THE EXISTING 4/0 POWER CABLE '

TO THE 21 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR,(PAC) AND CONNECTS IN ITS PLACE A NEW 350 MCM POWER CA8LE. THE 350 MCM CABLE USES INSULATION AND JACKET MATERIALS WHICH ARE APPROVED FOR USE AT CCNPP AND IS PROPERLY RATED FOR VOLTAGE AND AMPACITY.

THIS ACTIVITY IS IN PREPARATION TO REPLACE THE EXISTING 21 PAC (125 HP MOTOR)

WITH A NEW 21 PAC (200 HP MOTOR) WHICH REQUIRES A 350 MCM POWER CABLE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE CABLE REPLACEMENT, THE 350 MCM POWER CABLE WILL CONNECT SREAKER 52 -24 23 TO THE EXISTING 21 PAC (125 HP MOTOR). THIS CABLE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT INVOLVE A UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

L Doctment ID Revision Status

===================== ======== ====== i SE00058 0000 64 Stbject: THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES DISA8 LING #12 HOT LEG RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD) FOR CHANNEL D OF THE I REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS).

Allas:

POSRC #: 95-140 AIsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: 1-95-0163 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS j l

Sender Xmtt # Xmt! Date l

== _=========================================================================== ============ ============  !

Other refs:

Pers Rsft:

EgJipment: 1TE122HD 12A RC T-HOT ELMNT Org/Div:

System Code: 058 REACTOR PROTECTIVE Tsxt: NRC SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES DISA8 LING A PRIMARY SYSTEM RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD) INPUT TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS). THE SYSTEM AVERAGES THE TEMPERATURE OF THE 11 AND 12 MOT LEG RTD'S FOR FOUR DIFFERENT CHANNELS. THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES ONE RTD FROM ONE OF THE CHANNELS SO THAT THREE OF THE CHANNELS WILL STULL HAVE A T (NOT) AVERAGE (TWO INPUTS) AND ONE CHANNEL WILL HAVE A SINGLE T (HOT) INPUT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE OUTPUT OF THE TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER INTO RPS WILL BE DISABLED. THIS WILL ALLOW THE LOOP INDICATIONS TO BE UNAFFECTED. THIS ACTIVITY WILL MAINTAIN FOUR OPERABLE RPS CHANNELS AND TWO OPERA 8tE SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITORS (SCMM).

THE FUNCTION OF RPS WILL BE UNAFFECTED BECAUSE THE TWO HOT LEGS ARE AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TEMERATURE, THEREFORE SYMETRICAL EVENTS WILL BE DETECTED BY THE SINGLE RTD. THERE ARE NO ASYMMETRICAL EVENTS THAT RELY ON T (HOT) INPUTS TO TRIP THE REACTOR.

NNRs018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Fracess A&oc Report 58 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 BASED ON THE A80VE EVALUATION, THIS ACsIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR '

MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT r RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH) l t

4 l

Docunent ID Revision Status  !

======================== ========

SE00057 0000 64 Stbject: SAFETY EVALUATION FROM ES 1995 00 930 ALLOWS CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 10A.6 t

t.lias:

POSRC #: 95-143  ;

AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501454-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Matl # Xmtl Date

===============================================================_================= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pers Rifs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 028 :UXILIARY STEAM "

Ttxt: NRC SLMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISES THE PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE RATINGS OF A PORTION OF AUXILIARY BOILER DRAIN PIPING. IN SUPPORT OF THIS CHANGE THIS ACTIVITY REVISES UFSAR FIGURE 10 . 6 WHICH IS THE SIMPLIFIED P & ID OF THE AUXILIARY

. - - - y s~.-+.w v wu~ v ee-- - -g-. -. - .w.. - s. ._ _,e4#s.c. .r- r

NMR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 57 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 B0!LER SYSTEM. IW THIS FIGURE A PIPING SPEC CHANGE BOUNDARY BETWEEN G8 - 7 AND HS - 16 PIPING WILL BE MOVED. THE SOUNDARY IS CURRENTLY LOCATED AT A NORMALLY OPEN DRAIN VALVE OFF OF THE AUXILIARY BOILER HEADER, AND IS BEING MOVED TO STEAM TRAP O ST 1C55 WHICH IS DOWNSTREAM OF THIS VALVE.

THIS ACTIVITY IS IN RESPONSE TO RESEARCH DONE FOR ISSURE REPORT IRO 055 308 WHICH IDENTIFIED THAT THE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATINGS FOR A PORTION OF AUXILIARY DOILER DRAIN PIPING WAS GREATER THAN THAT SPECIFIED BY DESIGN DRAWING M 601. SPECIFICALLY, THE PIPING IN QUESTION IS CURRENTLY DESIGNATED AS M8 16 PIPING (FULL VACUUM, 104 DEGREES F) WHILE THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS ARE CLOSER TO G5 7 RATINGS (225 PSIG, 380 DEGREES F). THE PIPING IN QUESTION WAS EVALUATED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE FOR THE HIGER RATINGS, SINCE THE PIPING IS FULLY QUALIFIED FOR THE NEW PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE RATINGS THE PROBASILITY OF MALFUNCTION IS NOT INCREASED. THE PIPING IN QUESTION IS 2* NPS, THE FNERGY RELEASE FROM THIS LINE SIZE IS ENVELOPED BY PREVIOUS HEL8 ANALYSES; THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PIPE BREAK ARE NOT INCREASED, AND WILL NOT LEAD TO A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. SINCE THE AUXILIARY BOILER SYSTEM IS NOT USED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BRING THE PLANT INTO SAFE SHUTDOWN THE PROBA8ILITY OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT INCREASED. FINALLY, SINCE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY BOILER SYSTEM, AND ALL PIPING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, NO NEW TYPE OF FAILURE MODE IS CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMM)

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A& oc Report 60 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

============== ========

SE00061 0000 64

Subject:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (FRV'S).

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-004 A: soc Doc ID: ES199500963-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

OthIr refs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 045 FEEDWATER ftxt: NRC SUPMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRV ACTUATORS FAIL AS IS FEATURE TO ALLEVIATE MAINTENANCE CONCERNS. SPECITICALLY, THE FRV ACTUATOR LOCKING SOLENOID VALVES ARE REPLACED WITH AIR ACTUATED SPRING RETURN BALL VALVES CONTROLLED BY A 3 WAY SV.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED ANO SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE FRV ACTUATORS OR THE FRV'S THEMSELVES. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FRV'S ARE MAINTAINED, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE FEED-WATER CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS ARE NOT AFFECTED. THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSE 9 NO NEW FAILURE MODES.

SASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR FIGURES 714A AND 7148 DEPICT THE FRV ACTUATOR BLOCKING SV'S. THSE FIGURES WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

(CMH)

I mome018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997  :

• Search Procesa A & cc Report 61  !

i 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996  !

I k

r l

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t i

i t

i r

i Document 10 Revision Status l

se========================== ======== ====

SE00062 0000 64

Subject:

ESTABLISH FLUSH FLOW PATH THROUGH 22 MPSI PUMP. i Atlas:

POSRC #: 95-140 & 95-141 Arsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc 10: 2-95-0152 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

======================================================================================= ============ ============ ,

OthIr refs:

Prrs Rtfs:

I

+

t i

l

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A& oc Report 62 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM T&xt: NRC SLBMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS TO ALLOW THE FLUSH OF NO. 22 HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (HPSI) PUMP FROM THE NORMAL SUCTION FLOW PATH. A SECTION OF THE PUMP'S DOWNSTREAM PIPING MAS BEEN REMOVED AND THE WATER FROM No. 21 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT) WILL BE GRAVITY DRAINED THRGJGH THE PUMP'S DISCHARGE FLANGE.

AN APPROPRIATE FLUSH RIG WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE PUMP'S DISCHARGE FLANGE AND WILL DIRECT THE FLUSH WATER TO THE ROOM SLMP. AN OPERATOR WITH DIRECT CONTACT TO THE CONTROL ROOM WILL BE STATIONED AT THE PUMP'S INLET ISOLATION VALVE TO STOP THE FLUSH SHOULD THE SIAS SIGNAL BE ACTUATED OR SHOULD THE LEVEL IN NO.

21 RWT FALL BELOW 462 INCHES OF INDICATED LEVEL (2 LIA 4142 LOW LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT). THE AFFECTED ECCS SUBSYSTEM WILL BE INOPERABLE FOR THE DURATION OF THIS FLUSHING ACTIVITY.

THE REASON FOR THIS ACTIVITY IS TO VERIFY THE CLEANLINESS OF NO. 22 HPSI PLMP INTERNALS. RECENT PROBLEMS WITH DE8RIS IN THE PUMP'S MINIFLOW LINE MAS MADE THE PUMP'S MINIFLOW LINE HAS MADE THE PUMP'S CLEANLINESS SUSPECT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE CH 1 102, SYSTEMS CLEANLINESS, FLUSHING SHOULD BE PERFORMED WITH GRADE A FLUSH WATER. BECAUSE THIS QUALITY OF WATER IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, A WAIVER WILL 8E OBTAINED TO ALLOW THE USE OF SYSTEM WATER TO PERFORM THE FLUSH. THE SI SYSTEM IS EXPLICITLY SHOWN IN UFSAR FIGURE 6 - 10. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS BEING PERFORMED BECAUSE THE SYSTEM AS SHOWN IN THIS FIGURE IS BEING TEMPORARILY ALTERED.

THE REFUELING WATER TANK LEVEL WILL BE MAINTAINED AT OR ABOVE ITS MINIMUM LEVEL BY HAVING AN OPERATOR WHO IS IN CONTACT WITH THE CONTROL ROOM STATIONED AT NO. 22 MPSI PUMP INLET ISOLATION VALVE. SHOULD A S!AS BE RECEIVED OR THE TANK LEVEL DROP TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS, THE FLUSH WILL BE TERMINATED.

THEREFORE WE ARE NOT AFFECTING THE OPERA 8ILITY OF THIS SYSTEM AND THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. ALSO, THE EXISTING MALFUNCTIONS ARE BOUNDING AND THE SYSTEM IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THERE IS NO EFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS ACTIVITY AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS AS$0CIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY.

(CMH)

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 63 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

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WNRe018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Adioc Report 65 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00063 0000 64 Stbject: REPLACE RMS RECORDERS Alias:

POSRC #:  % -011 AIsoc Doc ID: 91-0251 Revision To: 00000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR 91-0251-001 0000 C ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Matl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ====c======= ======

Other refs:

PJrs Rifa:

Equipment: ORR11 AREA RAD MONITORING REC ORR12 RE AREA RAD C0pBION SENSE 1RR11 1 RE AREA RADN MON RECORD 1RR12 RE AREA RAD MON RECORDER 2RR21 2 RE AREA RADN MON RECORD 2RR22 RE AREA RAD FROCESS MON R Org/Div:

System Code: 077 AREA RADIATION MONITORING ftxt: NRC SupMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES RMS RECORDERS 0 RR 11, 1 RR 11 AND 1 RR 21 WITH WESTRONICS MODEL 3200 SERIES RECORDERS. RECORDER POINTS ARE CONSOLIDATED ON

NWRBD18 NUCLL's 01/22/1997 Seamh Frocess A & oc Report 66 10/01/19% THRU 12/31/1996 THE NEW RECORDERS TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF RECORDERS 0 RR 12, 1 RR 12 AND 2 RR 22. FINALLY, SR 1E ISOLATORS ARE INSTALLED TO PROVIDE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE SR CONTAINMENT AREA MONITORS AND THE RECORDERS, WHICH ARE DOWNGRADED TO THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE RMS RECORDERS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE RECORDERS AND ALL OTHER MONITORS ARE MAINTAINED, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE RMS IS NOT AFFECTED. THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURES MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTION 7.5.8 LISTS AS A CATEGORY 3 VARIA8LE; " PLANT RELEASE POINTS RADIATION" WITH 1 R 12 AND 2 R 12 PROVIDING PART OF THE INDICATION. THIS TEXT WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION, USING 1 RR 11 AND 2 RR 21 AS REPLACEMENTS.

(CMH)

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NMRS018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A &cc Report 68 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 l

f f

i P

l L

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i L

6 6

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l Doctsment 10 Revision Status [

======================== ========

'i SE00064 0000 64  !

Subject:

REPLACE 480V TRANSFORMERS U-440-11A AND U-440-15 ,

i Alles:  ;

POSRC #:  % -011 I i

AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501405-001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP F Rzf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

r Sender Matl # Natt Date  ;

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rafs:

Pzrs Rafs: {

Equipment: j t

L F

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 69 ,

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Text: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES CLASS 1E UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U 440 11A AND NSR UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U 440 15. THE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER FOR U 440 11A IS A CLASS 1E, SEISMIC CLASS 1 TRANSFORMER. THE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER FOR U 440 15 IS AN INDUSTRIAL GRADE TRANSFORMER. BOTH NEW TRANSFORMERS HAVE THE SAME ELECTRICAL RATING AS THE OLD TRANSFORMERS. THE OLD TRANSFORMERS ARE OIL FILLED, SELF COOLED AND THE NEW TRANSFORMERS ARE DRY TYPE, SELF COOLED. THE SAR DESCRIPTION IS SEING REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER COOLING METHOD. TMIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

T F

t

+

5

. . _ . . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___ _m - r -_

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 70 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 I

i Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00069 0000 64

Subject:

INCREASE THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE SETPOINT Alias:

POSRC #:  % -027 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501755-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Mf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other refs:

F"trs R:fa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 058 REACTOR PROTECTIVE Trut: NRC SUMARY:

THIS MODIFICATION IMPROVES THE ACCURACY OF THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE BY MOWING THE INPUT OF THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE FROM A POINT UPSTREAM OF THE NUCLEAR C1. LIBRATE POTENTIOMETER TO A PO!'Ai MSTREAM OF THE POTENTI0 HETER (THIS CHANGi PROVIDES DAILY CALIBR'4 TION). THIS MODIFICATION ALSO REVISES THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE SETP0lNT FRCM 13% TO 14% TO GIVE THE OPERATOR MORE MARGIN TO THE LOSS OF LOAD TRIP EWABLE SETPOINT WHEN BRINGING THE TURBINE GI LIN!! DURING START UP (WHILE MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT MARGIN TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT OF 15% POWER). A REVIEW OF THE SAR AND UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCLUDED THAT THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES REMAIN VALID AND NO REVISIONS OF THE SAR ARE REQUIRED.

IT IS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE MODIFICATION TO THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE IT IMPROVES THE BISTABLE ACCURACY, THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BISTABLE IS NOT CHANGED, AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT REDUCED.

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _._ _..m.__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.___.__.___.________m___ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__.___m______ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _______.m_____.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

WeHtB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 A& oc Report 71 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 (CMH) i

NNes018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A&oc Report 72 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 r

i I

?

l J

i i

Doctseent ID Revision Status

============================== = - ===== ====== 4 SE00070 L740 64

Subject:

INCREASE NOT LEG RTO TIME CONSTANT TO 25 SECONDS l Alles:  ;

POSRC #: M-009 AIsoc Doc ID: CA01085 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC ES197502084-000 0000 C' ESP Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

.4#.4.4.....-=========================================================================== ============ ============

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• Pirs Rafa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

i L

i

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A & oc Report 73 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 System Code:

7txt: THIS ACTIVITY INCREASES THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HOT LEG EFFECTIVE TIME CONSTANT FROM 12 SECONDS To 25 SECONDS. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO SUPPORTS A SETPOINT CHANGE WHICH INCREASES THE TOTAL TIME CONSTANT OF THE HOT LEG RTD LAG MODULES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW ANALYSIS VALUE. IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE TIME CONSTANT OF THE LAG MODULES, RESISTANCE COEFFICIENTS WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE EXISTING LAG MODULES. THE IMPACT OF A LONGER RESPONSE TIME HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE SAFETY ANLAYSIS. A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE EXCESS LOAD EVENT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE INSTALLED THERMAL MARGIN PRESERVED BY THE LCOS AND COLR LIMITS BOUNDS THE R0PM FOR THE RE-EVALUATED EXCESS LOAD EVENT.

ADDITIONALLY, THE RESISTANCE COEFFICIENTS TO BE INSTALLED ON THE HOT LEG LAG MODULES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO MEET THE SAME QUALITY REQUIREMENTS AS THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUDES TMAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Docunent ID Revision Status assu===ws===================== ======== ======

SE00072 0000 64

Subject:

50.59 TO ALLOW PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF Alias:

POSRC #:  % -010 Assoc Doc ID: ES199501461-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rsfs:

P;rs RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Ttxt: NRC SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES THE PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTE IN DECONTAMINATION AREA 0F THE MATERIALS PROCESSING FACILITY (MPF) IN PREPARATION FOR OFFSITE SHIPMENT. THE VOLUME OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF WILL BE LIMITED TO TWO 55 GALLON DRUMS (ONE BEING PROCESSED AND ONE STAGE FOR PROCESSING).

PERIODICALLY, LIMITED QUANTITIES OF LIQUID WASTE, INCLLDING MIXED WASTE, MUST BE PROCESSED IN PREPARATION FOR OFFSITE SHIPMENT. CURRENTLY, THIS PROCESSING MUST BE DONE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. IN ORDER TO REMOVE THIS PROCESSING ACTIVITY FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUTED TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF PROCESSING LIMITED QUANTITIES OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF.

THE INITIAL BATCH LIQUID WASTES TO BE PROCESSED IN THE MPF WILL BE PROCESSED TO COMPLY WITH THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE STATE

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 ,

Search Procesa A e oc Report 74 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 l OF MARYLAND AND BGE, DATED MARCH 28, 1995. THIS MEMORANDUM REQUIRES BGE TO ,

MAG GOOD EFFORTS TO DISPOSE OF MIXED WASTE WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME FRAME POSSIBLE AFTER GENERATION.

WHEN REQUIRED, SilBSEQUENT BATCHES OF LIQUID WASTES WILL BE PROCESSED IN THE MPF. THE QUANTITY OF THIS LIQUID WASTE WILL BE LIMITED SO THAT CURIE CONTENT AND BTU CONTENT WILL BE WITHIN THE EVALUATED LIMITS.

THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMH) l Doctament ID Revision Status '

SE00073 64 -

Stbject: SIDE STREAM MONITOR - SW / SRWHX ,

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-033 Arsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: 2- % -0007 Rev: 0 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . , _

t NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Acfioc Report 75 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

us================================================================================== ============ ==e======

Other refs:

Pers Raf3:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Tu t: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION REVIEWS A TEMPORARY ALTERATION TO ALLOW THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR TO BE PLACED IN THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM. THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR MEASURES THE FOULING OF THE SERVICE WATER HEAT EXCHANGER TUBES. THE CURRENT LOCATION IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE HEAT EXCHANGERS ANO THE RELOCATION MAY PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE FOULING MEASUREMENT.

THE TA AND ASSOCIATED PIPING ARE INSTALLED AS SAFETY RELATED - PRESSURE BOUNDARY AND MEET THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXISTING PIPING SYSTEM.

THE CONNECTIONS TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM MAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR ALL POSSIBLE ,

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTA8LE. THE ELECTRICAL POWER IS PROVIDED BY A NON SAFETY RELATED WELDING RECEPTACLE. THE MONITOR HAS NO INTERACTION WITH ANY OTHER SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE RESULTS OF THE FLOODING ANALYSIS OR SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSES. THE 8YPASS OF THE MAXIMUM SSM FLOW (20 GPM) HAS BEEN REVIEWED AGAINST THE POSSIBLE POST ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE SSM CAN BE MANUALLY ISOLATED IN THE EVENT OF A PIPING OR  !

HOSE FAILURE. THEREFORE, THE INSTALLATION OF THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR IN THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER PLMP ROOM IS ACCEPTABLE AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR 8ASES.

(CMH) i

(

w__-..-_ _ _

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Adtoc Report 76 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctament ID Revision Status

_ _ - mzzzzzass====sessssa ======== ======

SE00075 0000 64

Subject:

ALLOW USE OF TEMPORAR" SWITCHES FOR FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM INTERLOCKS Alias:

POSRC #:  % -037 AIsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: 1-95-0141 Rev: Refer Type: TM00 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 1 Sender Xmtl # Xatt Date masazzassezzamazzassazazzzzzzzzzzazzamazzass===essmazz_zszzarsssannssaz=ssans aszzes==sans assessmanssa Oth2r rafs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 070 REFUELING POOL Ttxt:

I I

THIS ACTIVITY CONSISTS OF A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A CONTINGENCY FOR FAILED LIMIT SWITCHES ON THE FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM. IN PREVIOUS OUTAGES, SWITCH FAILURES HAVE CAUSED DELAYS IN FUEL MOVEMENT $1NCE ,

THE SWITCHES PROVIDE VARIOUS CONTROL FUNCTIONS. MANUAL TEMPORA'tY SWITCHES i WILL BE USED TO PERFORM THE FUNCTION OF EACH OF THE LIMIT SWITCHES SHOULD ONE OF THE LIMIT SWITCHES FAIL. IN THIS MANNER, THE ASSOCIATED INTERLOCK WILL BE IN PLACE UNTIL THE OPERATOR CONSCIOUSLY OVERRIDES IT WITH THE SWITCH.

THE SWITCH IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE OPERATOR MUST CONTINUALLY DEPRESS THE SWITCH TO SATISFY THE INTERLOCK.

THE OPERATION OF THE SWITCH WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTION. THE OPERATING INSTRUCTION WILL BE CHANGED TO ENSURE THAT THE MANUAL TEMPORARY SWITCH IS OPERATED ONLY AFTER VISUAL VERIFICATION THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS IN THE PROPER POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE OPERATOR WILL VERIFY THAT HYDRAULIC PRESSURE CHANGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH FULL VERTICAL OR HORIZONTAL POSITION. SINCE THE OPERATOR WILL ENSURE THAT THE INTERLOCK IS SATISFIED, THE PROBABILITY OF A FUEL HANDLING MALFUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SG

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Frocesa A & oc Report 77 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status a .._.a._;;=================== ======== ======

SE00076 0000 64 54 ject: WRNI PDIL CIRCUIT SETPOINT CHANGE AND RELOCATION OF SUR ENABLE ANNUNCIATOR SIGNAL Alias:

POSRC #:  %-018 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199502281-000 '

Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Cate

ne=============================================== =======- === ============ ==========

Other rsfs:

Pers R;fa:

Equipment: 1NID01 WRNI CHANNEL A 1NID02 WRNI CHANNEL 8 1NID03 WRNI CHANNEL C INID04 WRNI CHANNEL D Org/Div:

System Code: 078 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION Tat: NRC

SUMMARY

RAISING THE SETPOINT FOR THE WRNI CHANNELS A, 8, C AND D FOR THE FLUM TRIP 2 (FT2) BISTABLE WILL DELAY ENA8 LING THE PDIL CIRCUIT UNTIL START UP HAS ACHIEVED A STABLE CRITICAL CONDITION. ALSO, RELOCATION THE START UP RATE (SUR) ANNUNCIATION CIRCUIT FROM FT2 TO FT1 8ISTA8LE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SETPOINT FOR THE SUR ANNUNCIATION CIRCUIT. THE FUNCTION OF THE SUR CIRCUIT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING THIS ACTIVITY WILL PREVENT EXCESSIVE ALARMS WHICH DISTRACT THE OPERATORS FROM START UP ACTIVITIES.

(CMH)

~

NMR3018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Ac9 toc Report 78 ~

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 i

7 i

i 2

i

~

I i i

^ Document ID Revision Status i ============================== = = ==== ====== j SE00076 0001 62-

• S4 ject: tMIT 2 WRNI POIL SETPOINT CHANGE  :

4 Alles:

POSRC #: 96-113 ,

Azsoc Doc ID: ES199502281-001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP '

RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Murtl # Mtutt Date

============================= = =======================..... ===- -=== ======....._ ======

o r

i E

m.____ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . . . _ _ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ___-.-m ~ , . . , . - . . < - . .--.+-m-- + . . -.--, ---.-_- _.-- -,-_. ,

NWR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 Adioc Report 79 10/01/1995 TMRU 12/31/1996 Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 2NIO01 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG POWER 2NI002 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG PWR CH B NI 2N1003 2 NI NIS WIDE RANGE LOG PWR INDIC CH C 2NID04 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG POWER Org/Div:

System Code: 078 NUCLEAR INSTRUMEl.TATION Text: RAISING THE SETPolNT FOR THE WRN! CHANNELS A, B, C, AND D FOR THE FLUX TRIP 2 (FT2) BISTA8LE WILL DELAY ENABLING THE PDIL CIRCUlf UNTIL START-UP MAS ACHIEVED A STA8LE CRITICAL CONDITION. ALSO, RELOCATING THE START-UP RATE (SUR) ANNUNCIATION / ENA8LE CIRCUIT FROM FT2 TO FT1 BISTABLE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SETPolNT FOR THE SUR ANNUNCIATION / ENASLE CIRCUIT. THE FUNCTION OF T4E SUR CIRCUIT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING TNis ACTIVITY WILL PREVENT EXCESSIVE ALARMS WHICM DISTRACT THE OPERATORS FROM START-UP ACTIVITIES.

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00077 64

Subject:

CHANGE EOC MTC TO -3.0 Alias:

POSRC 8: 95-015 A1 soc Doc ID: ES199501532-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R:f Doc ID: 50.59 Rev: Refer Type: RL RECORDS LIST Sender Xmtt 8 Xmtt Date

=====================.....====- ===_ _============== ============ ======

Other refs:

Pers G fa:

Eauipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Tcut: NRC SU MARY:

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE MOST NEGATIVE MTC COLR LIMIT FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11 ALONG WITH OTHER NEW CHANGES. A REVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 14 SAFETY ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT THE FOLLOWING EVENTS REQUIRED CONSIDERATION:

1. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION

2. EXCESS LOAD EVENT (MFP)

3. EXCESS LOAD EVENT (NZP)

4. CONTROL ELEEENT ASSEMBLY DROP EVENT

5. EXCESS FEEDWATER HEAT REMOVAL

6. ASTMETRIC STEAM GENERATOR EVENT

7. MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Ceport 80 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

8. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS / EVALUATIONS CONCLUDED THAT CURRENT UFSAR RESULTS (DN8 AND LMR S A F D L's, PEAK RCS PRESSURE, AND OFFSITE DOSES) REMAIN VALID AND TMAT NO CMANGES TO TECMICAL SPECIFICATI0W AND COLR LIMITS, CTHER TMAN THE CHANGE OF THE MOST NEGATIVE MTC LIMIT, WERE REQUIRED.

IN ADDITION TO THE CHAPTER 14 EVENTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BORIC ACID STORAGE TAWK W S PERFORMED.

THAT ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PRESENT TECM ICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTINUE TO YIELD ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. THE EFFECT OF THE CMANGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REFUELING WATER TANK WAS REVIEWED. THAT REVIEW CONCLLSED THAT THE PRESENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTINUE TO YIELD ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

BASED UPON THE A80VE RESULTS AND A THOROUGH EVALUATION OF THE QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO A NEGATIVE 50.59 FINDING, IT WAS CONDLUDED THAT TME MTC AND OTHER NEW CHANGES (I.E., THOSE NOT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED) DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMM)

NWRB018 WC1 F:# 01/22/1997 Search P:xes2 A&oc Report 81 10/01/1995 THRu 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

=============.........========

SE00079 0000 64 Sthject: ALLOW THE USE OF RCP SHAFT CLAMP Alles:

POSRC #:  % -022 Also: Doc ID: ES199600287-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP PIf Doc 10: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

========================================= = =================a-  :============== ============ ======

Other rtfs:

Pers Q3fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 064 REACTOR COOLANT ttxt: NRC SupetARY:

ESP ES 1996 00 287 INSTALLS CLAMPS TO RESTRAIN THE RCP SHAFT lid ORDER TO FACILITATE REMOVAL OF THE RCP MOTOR IN MODES 5 & 6. THE ACTIVITY IS >

NECESSARY IN ORDER TO RESTRAIN THE SHAFT AGAINST AXIAL MOTION THAT WILL I OTHERWISE OCCUR ON REMOVAL OF THE MOTOR WITH THE RCS PRESSURIZED. AXIAL MOTION WILL RESULT IN SEAL DAMAGE AND COULD RESULT IN A BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY.

THE CLAMPS HAVE BEEN ANAtYZED FOR A THRUST LOAD CORRESPONDING TO AN RCS PRESSURE OF SOO PSI CONCURRENT WITH THE DESIGN BASIS SEISMIC EVENT. THE ANALYSIS PROVIDES QUALIFICATION OF THE CLAMP CCMPOWENTS AS WELL AS THE PUMP '

COMPONENTS TO WHICH THE CLAMPS ARE ATTACHED. CLAMP MATERIALS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CODE OF RECORD, ASME B & PV SECTION III SUBSECTION NF, AND STRESS INTENSITIES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVISION 1 0F THE SAME CODE.

STRESSES ARE CONSERVATIVELY LIMITED TO S (M) VALUES RATNER THAN AISC BASED ALLOWABLES TO RECOGNIZE THAT FAILURE OF THE CLAMPS REPRESENTS A DIRECT BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY RATHER THAN AN INDIRECT BREACM IN THE CASE OF NORMAL SUPPORTS FOR CLASS 1 SYSTEMS.

SAFETY EVALUATION SE 000 79 CONCLUDES THAT THE ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). EXISTING ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE SAR ARE NOT

. .x _ . . . .. . _ ..m... . . ...

NNR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 A & oc teport 82 10/01/1995 TNRU 12/31/1996 AFFECTED, AND WO NEW ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ARE INTRODUCED. THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT VIOLATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

(CMH)

Doctment ID Revision Status

===== = ==== = ====== = ====== ======== =e==== ,

SE00080 0000 64 S* ject: TEMP ALT 1 - % - 0014 Alias:

POSRC #: 96-022 A soc Doc ID: 61176SH0003 Revision To: 0012 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

= ===== = == = = = ======= m m ===================== = ========================= = = m m ====== ======= = =

Other r'.fs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS 7txt: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY TEMPORARILY RE POWERS THE #11 CONTROL ROOM MVAC COMPRESSOR FROM 480 VOLT BUS 118 WHILE BUS 11A IS OUT OF SERVICE. TEMPORARY POWER AND CONTROL CA8LES ARE INSTALLED SUCH THAT THE POWER SOURCE AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS ARE UNCHANGED. THE INSTALLATION MEETS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL

i lehme018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 i Search Procesa Admc Report 83 i 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 SEPARATION AND SEISMIC CRITERIA AND ELECTRICAL LOADING WAS REVIEW D SUCH THAT l TME DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE CONTROL RO(NI MVAC SYSTEM IS UNCMANGED. THIS

• ACTIVITY DOES NOT REQUIRE A TECMICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UMEVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMM)

=

i 4

1 s

i I

i I

~

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A@ oc Report 84 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 L

1 i

r t

I i.

?

i L

NNtB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Asoc Ceport 85 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

C NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A&oc Report 86 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

{

Document ID Revision Status

ne======_================== ======== ===

SE00083 0000 64 1 Sthject: PROTECTIVE TRIPS FOR DG 1A - RECONCILIATION Atlas: t POSRC #: 96-028 l AIsoc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type: 4 Sender Xsitt # Xmtt Date

...e.._...__.................................._......._......___._.....__........_..... ============ ===

Other refs:

' P;rs RIfs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ,

Tcat: NEC

SUMMARY

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION UPDATES INFORMATION REGARDING DIESEL GENERATOR PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS PROVIDED IN THE " DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT SACM DIESEL GENERATOR AND MECHANICAL DESIGN REPORT". THE DESIGN REPORT STATES THAT A "HIGH LT COOLANT TEMPERATURE" TRIP EXISTS AS PROTECTIVE FUNCTION; HonEVER, IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN. ADDITIONALLY THE DESIGN REPORT DOES NOT INCLtBE " EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH)," " HT COOLANT TEMPERATURE, HIGH- ,

HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," " LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILURE." AND " ELECTRONIC

• GOVERNOR 24 VDC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS WHICH DO EXIST IN THE ACTUAL DESIGN.

THE VARIOUS PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS FOR THE DIESEL GENERATORS PROTECT THE DIESEL GENERATORS FROM SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE AND AfD IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF ROOT CAUSES FOR MALFUNCTIONS OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR.

CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN REGUULTORY GUIDE 1.9, DRAFT REVISION 3 DATED APRIL 1992, BYPASSING OF SOME OF THESE PROTECTIVE TRIPS HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN ORDER TO PREVENT SPURIOUS OPERATION OF A TRIP CIRCUIT FRGI PREVENTING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FROM PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION. THE

" EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH)," "MT COOLANT TE9FERATURE, HIGH-HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," " LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILURE," AND " ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR 24 VDC

WNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proce u A & oc Report 87 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS ARE BYPASSED UPON A SIAS, BUS UNDERVOLTAGE, OR MANUAL EMERGENCY START SIGNAL AND THUS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH DIESEL OPERATION DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. THE CIRCUITS AND COMPONENTS RELATED TO THESE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS APE SAFETY RELATED, ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS PROVIDED, AND ARE BYPASSED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER PROTECTIVE TRIPS NOT RETAINED UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

ALTHOUGH SHUTDOWN OF THE DIESEL ON HIGH LT COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE IS NOT PROVIDED, AN ALARM AND INDICATION OF HIGH LT COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE IS PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR AND CAN AfD IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF ROOT CAUSES OF MALFUNCTIONS OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR. OTHER PROTECTIVE TRIPS EXIST WHICH PROTECT DIESEL COMPONENTS AGAINST EFFECTS WHICH CAN RESULT FROM ELEVATED LT COOLANT TEMPERATURES.

THEREFORE THE PROBASILITY OF MALFUNCTIONS OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS NOT INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY. SINCE THE " EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH),"

" HT COOLANT TEMPERATURE, MIGH-HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," " LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILUR'i," AND " ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR 24 VDC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCT;0NS ARE BYPASSED DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, THEY DO NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALIATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS.

AS THaC ACTIVITY ONLY AFFECTS THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS DISABLED DURING EMERGENCY OPERATION OF DG 1A, WHICH IS AN ACCIDENT MITIGATOR AND NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR, THIS ACTIVITY DE S NOT INCREASE THE PROBA8ILITY OF AN ACCIDENT.

NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE CREATED AS THIS ACTIVITY 15 SPECIFIC TO THE DG 1A SYSTEM ONLY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBLITY OF NEW ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS IS NOT CREATED.

THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISCUSS THE NUMBER OF REQUIRED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SHUTDOWN AND OPERATING CONDITIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE NUMBER OF DIESEL GENERATORS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATIONS. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INYOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMM) 1 m _.mm_ .____ _ _ .m_____ ___ _-..__.__ . _____ -.__________m_________-___ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ -

t NMR3018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Adioc Report 88 10/01/1995 TNRU 12/31/1996  !

t t

b I

Document ID Revision Status i

=====ae================= ========

SE00084 0000 64  !

Sthject: EXTEND UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 70 21 GWD/MTU '

i Atlas: j POSRC #:  %-028 ALsoc Doc ID: ES199600378-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R2f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date  !

======================================================================================= x.......___. ============ t 4

Oth;r refs:

Pers R2fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 084 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL l Text: EXTEND UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 To 21 G W D / M T U l

NWR5018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Ac9 toc Report 89 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31'1996 PREVIOUS SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMED AN END OF CYCLE SURNUP OF 20 434 Mw/T DUE TO DELAYING START OF REFUELING OUTAGE, THE PROJECTED EOC IS NOW SETWEEN 20 434 AND 21 000 M W /T.

Document ID Revision Status

============== ========

SE00085 0000 64

Subject:

TEMPERATURE CHANGE IN DG 1A SUILDING SWGR ROOMS Allas:

POSRC #:  % -037 Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR Cef Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmti Date

- ==================== - ======================== - ==== - ===================== - == ============ ============

Othir rafs:

Pers Rafs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Text: NRC

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE MIN! MUM INTERIOR DESIGN TEMPERATURE OF THE NON 1E PANEL AND 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOMS TO BE DECREASED FORM 50 DEGREES F TO 32 DEGREES F FOR DG 1A BUILDING HVAC OPERATION IN EMERGENCY MG)E DURING DESIGN BASIS WINTER CONDITIONS (I.E., MINIMUM OUTDOOR TEMPERATURES FO O DEGREES F). THE TEMPERATURE OF THE ROOM DURING NON EMERGENCY MODE OF HVAC IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. VENDOR DOCLMENTS HAVE BEEN SU8MITTED, REVIEWED AND APPROVED TO DOCUMENT THAT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WILL FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY AT THIS LOWER TEMPERATURE.

A CALCULAtl0N HAS BEEN PERFORMED WHICH SHOWS THAT THE DECREASE IN THE TEMPERATURE OF THE NON 1E PANEL AND 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOMS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE ADJACENT ROOMS AT THEIR EXISTING DESIGN TEMPERATURES.

THUS THE EQUIPMENT HOUSED IN ADJACENT ROOMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTCD BY THIS ACTIVITY AND WILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED.

SINCE NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS LOCATED IN THE NON 1E PANEL ROOM AND EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY LOCATED IN THE 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND ADJACENT ROOMS WILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBA8ILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS.

SINCE NO PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO THE PLANT, No NEW INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS ARE CREATED. IN ADDITION, No WET PIPING IS LOCATED WITHIN THESE ROOMS, 50 THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF PIPE FREEZING. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONDENSATION BECAUSE THE VENTILATING AIR BEING HEATED PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ROOMS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL AIR MOVEMENT AND EQUIPMENT INTERNAL MEAT GENERATION,

NMR3018 WUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Aeoc Report 90 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 PREVENTS CONDENSATION FORMATION. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW I MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDE W, MAS NOT BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE AVAILASLE TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATION AND SMUTDOIAI CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION L REQUIREMENTS. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMM)

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NNRe018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A &oc Report 91 10/01/1995 inRU 12/31/1996 i

i i

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i Document ID Revision Status I

============================== ==e===== ====== ,

SE00086 64 Sthject: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY FOR STEAM LINE BREAK FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11 l Alles:

POSRC #:  % -025  !

Assoc Doc ID: CA01335 Revision To: 0000 -Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC ,

CA01336 0000 C DCALC CA01761 0000 C DCALC CA01763 0000 C DCALC  ;

ES199502064-000 0000 C ESP l ES199502064-001 0000 C ESP 1

I

. - _ - ~ .

NWRS018 WUCLEls 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Actioc Report 92 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 R.If Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xatt Date

_ _ ___ m =========================== = ======= = === = ==_====================== = === ============ ======= = ==

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System Code: 058 REACTOR PROTECTIVE Ttxt: THIS 50.59 ADDRESSES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY FOR THE STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSES. FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11, THE USE OF THE CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY RESTORES THE LIMITS ON FXY AND FR TO 1.70. IN ADDITION, THIS 50.59 EVALUATES CHANGES TO THE TM/LP AND APO TRIP SETPOINTS AND THE N FACTOR VS FXYT TRADE OFF CURVE.

Doctment ID Revision Status SE00087 0000 64

Subject:

REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ROTATING ASSEMBLY Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-089 Assoc Doc ID: ES199600480-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R:f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

wn================================= = === = ===================================== ============ ======

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System Code:

TIxt: THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE USE OF A MODIFIED BYRON JACKSON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) ROTATING ASSEMBLY. THE MODIFIED ROTATING ASSEMBLY UTILIZES A WELDED ATTACHMENT VERSUS THE BOLTED IMPELLER TO SHAFT ATTACHMENT IN THE EXISTING ROTATING ASSEMBLY DESIGN. IN PAST INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE, BROKEN CAPSCREWS AND DRIVE P!NS (USED TO BCLT THE IMPELLER TO THE SHAFT AND TO TRANSMIT TORQUE TO THE IMPELLER) HAVE BEEN FOUND ON BYRON JACKSON PUMPS, WHICH LED THE COMPANY TO RECOMMEND AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF LOCKING THE CAPSCREWS (VIA LOCKWIRE).

IN 1906, ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS OF 12A RCP WERE NOTICED AND WERE PARTIALLY ATTRIBUTED TO BROKEN AND MISSING LOCKWIRE. FCR 86-162 ADDRESSED THIS PROBLEM BY REPLACING THE CAPSCREWS AND CHANGING FROM LOCKWIRE TO WELDED LOCKING CLIPS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH FCR 86-162 RESOLVED THE IMMEDIATE CONCERN OF THE BOLTING LOCKWIRE FAILURES, IT DID NOT ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMBALANCES DUE TO THE ROTATING BOLTED CONNECTIONS. THIS ACTIVITY ADDRESSES BOTH OF THESE CONCERNS.

NO CHANGES TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUMP IMPELLER RESULT FROM THIS REPLACEMENT, AND PUMP PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

_..______.m_m___m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ m . - - --- , -v-, ,-- - , .

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 Adioc Report 93 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 CHANGES IN SHAFT THRUST ARE WITHIN THE LINITS OF THE THRUST BEARING. THUS THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESIGN FLOW RATE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MATERIALS USED FOR THE NEW ROTATING ASSEMBLY ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF EXISTING RCP COMFONENTS AND ARE SUITABLE FOR USE IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT. THE STRENGTH OF THE WELDED ASSEMBLY IS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THAT OF THE BOLTED CONNECTION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT FLOW TO THE SHAFT SEAL. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE WEIGHT OF THE ROTATING ASSEMBLY RESULT FROM ITS REPLACEMENT, AND THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE RCP 15 NOT AFFECTED. THE EXISTING RCP 6 SUPPORTS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR USE WITH THE MODIFIED RCP. THUS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.

THE UFSAR DESCRIBES THE LC"5 OF COOLANT FLOW EVENT (ATTRIBUTABLF TO A LOSS OF POWER TO THE RCPS) AND *4E SEIZED ROTOR EVENT (ATTRIBUTABLE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE SHAFT R A LOSS OF COOLING WATER FLOW TO FHE PUMP SEALS) WHICH INVOLVE THE RCPS. IMIS ACTIVITY ONLY REPLACES THE ROTATING ASSEMBLY OF THE RCPS AND DOES NCT AFFECT THE SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE POWER TO OPERATE THE RCPS. THEREFORE, 'AE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF POWER TO THE RCPS IS NOT INCREASED. ADDITIONAU f, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT COOLING TO THE PUMP SHAFT SEALS PROVIDED BY THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OF THE PUMP SHAFT PUMP IMPELLER INTERFACE, AS THE STRENGTH OF THE WELD IS AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE BOLTED ASSEMBLY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR.

SINCE THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE PUMP COMPONENTS REPLACED BY THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT THAT THE EXISTING COMPONENTS, THERE WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT AFFECT 04 PUMP COAST DOWN. THUS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE INITIAL CONDITIONS AND INPUT PARAMETERS USED FOR ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT. FURTHERMORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR CALCULATING THE DOSE CONSEQUENCES GIVEN IN THE UFSAR. PLANT COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO INITIATE MITIGATION EQUIPMENT AND PLANT COMPONENTS CREDITED FOR EVENT MITIGATION ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY AS IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LOW COOLANT FLOW SIGNAL, THE TRIP BREAKERS, OR THE CEAS. THEREFORE, THE CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES ARE NOT AFFECTED, AND THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS.

NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE MADE BY THIS ACTIVITY.

SINCE THE DESIGN FLOW RATE OF Tl!E RCPS IS NOT CHANGED, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITS FOR THERMAL POWER, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, OR HIGHEST OPERATING LOOP COLD LEG COOLANT TEMPERATURE AS GIVEN IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NUMBER OF OPERABLE REACTOR COOLANT SHUTDOWN COOLING LOOPS FOR THE APPLICABLE MODES OF OPERATION. ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH THE RCP SHAFT IMPELLERS ARE BEING REPLACED. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

WNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 A<fioc Report 96 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Docunent ID Revision Status

__======= = =========== ======== ======

SE00068 0000 62

Subject:

DG OC TIE IN TO BUS 21 Alias:

POSRC #:  %-128 Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079-60 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

x=====v=========================== = === m m ==== = === m e m ============ = ======== ============ ===========

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SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES THE EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO CONNECT THE STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) DIESEL GENERATOR, DGOC, TO THE EMERGENCY BUS 21. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO ADDS THE RACEWAY AND CABLES NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PART OF THE PHASE-IN OF THE DGOC.

NEW SSCS ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE THE EFFECT OF THEIR INSTALL.ATION (E.G., SEISMIC ADQUACY OF EXISTING STRUCTURES, HEAT LOADS, CABLE SEPARATION) DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS. SSCS ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL UNTIL TEST!WG IS COMPLETE. EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS INITIATORS

• OF ACCIDENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAS NOT BEEN INCREASED.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO SERVE MITIGATION FUNCTIONS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED, AND CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES PREVIOUSLY CALCULATED REMAIN WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY STATED LIMITS.

BECAUSE NO MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO EMERGENCY BUS 24 DURING THIS ACTIVITY, AT LEAST ONE EDG WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY EMERGENCY POWER TO AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUS FOR UNIT 2, DURING OUTAGE PORTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY.

MODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVING DG1B FROM EMERGENCY BUS 21 WILL REQUIRE DG1B TO BE CUT OF SERVICE. ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME WHEN ONLY ONE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS AVAILABLE TO UNIT 1, WHICH MAY BE AT POWER.

ELECTRICAL ISOLATION CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE OF NUMARC 87-00 IS PROVIDED FOR DGOC. NO NEW TYPES OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE BEING CREATED BY THIS

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 95 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED, BECAUSE: (1) R[QUIREMENTS OF THE CALVERT CLIFFS FIRE PROTECTION PLAN WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN FIRE RATED STRUCTURES ARE PENETRATED; (2) THE ADDITIONAL MEAT LOADS ON THE MCR AND AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEMS (OCCURRING WHEN DG0C IS RUNNING AND THE ADDITIONAL CABLING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING MAY BE ENERGlZED) HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND DETERMINED NOT TO EXCEED THE SYSTEMS' DESIGN HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY; (3) EITHER THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE AVAILABLE OR ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN.

THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Doctment ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00090 64 Stbject: REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM 21 STEAM GENERATOR BLO@0WN PIPING Atlas:

POSRC #: 96 018 Alsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: 2-96-0015 Rev: Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmti Date

=== m ==================================== m m ====== == m m ===== = == m ===== ============ ======

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System Code: 169 INSULATION, PIPE Tcxt: NRC

SUMMARY

A STEAM LEAK HAS BEEN DISCOVERED ON THE SURFACE BLOWOWN LI'.E OF 21 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) AT THE TEE OF THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE. THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM THE SURFACE BLO@ OWN LINE AT THE TEE OF THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE IN ORDER TO REPAIR THIS LEAK WITH UNIT 2 OPERATION IN MODES 3, 4, 5, 6, AND DEFUELED. IT INCLUDES THE REMOVAL OF UP TO TEN FEET (10') 0F INSULATION FROM THE SURFACE BLO@CWN LINE (2" EB 2015) AND ALL OF THE INSULATION FROM THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE (1" EB 2009). TEMPORARY SHIELDING WILL BE ERECTED TO PREVENT DIRECT IMPINGEMENT OF INADVERTENT SPRAY WATER ON THE EXPOSED PIPING, OR ESFAS AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM TESTING WILL BE PROHIBITED FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF 21 SG TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE FS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD CREATED BY THE REMOVAL

NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa At9 toc Ceport  %

10/01/1995 ftNtu 12/31/1996 0F THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELAYED EQUIPMENT.

(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

======================= ========

SE00092 0000 64

Subject:

1. 11 & 12 EDG FUEL OIL FLUSHING OF PIPING Alias:

POSRC #:  %-023 AIsoc Doc ID: EN-1-102 Revision To: 0300 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: NPIP RIf Doc ID: 1-95-0176 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

===============================================- ===================== ============ ======

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System Code: 023 DIESEL OIL SYSTEM Text: NRC SUMARY THIS TA ALLOWS FLUSHING OF TWO DIESEL FUEL O!L LINES (ONE AT A TIME) FROM 11 AND 12 FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS (FOSTS). THESE LINES ARE ALTERNATE FUEL Oil SUPPLY LINES TO 11 AND 12 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) AND ARE NORW LLY ISOLATED. TO REMOVE WATER AND SEDIMENT, THE LINES WILL BE FLUSNED IN ACCOR-DANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TA.

THE SEGMENT OF THE SUPPLY LINE EING FLUSHES IS 2" IN DIAMETER. THE 2" LINES BRANCH OFF FROM THE 3" MAIN SUPPLY HEADER (11 FOST) AND THE 6" MAIN SUPPLY HEADER (21 FOST). THE VOLUME OF EITHER OF THE 2" LINES IS LESS THAN 8 GALLONS. TO ENSURE ALL CONTAMINANTS ARE THOROUGHLY FLUSHED, FUEL OIL SEVERAL TIMES THE LINE'S VOLUME WILL BE FLUSHED. A VACUUM TRUCK, DESIGNED FOR CLEAN-

NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces:3 A & oc Report 97 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ING OF FUEL O!L SYSTEMS, WILL BE USED. THE HOSE FROM THE VACulM TRUCK WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF MANUAL VALVE 11 DF0 152 AND 12 DF0 152. THESE TWO VALVES ARE THE ISOLATION VALVES IN A 1" FLUSH LINE FOR THE INLET STRAINERS TO 11 AND 12 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS. ONE FUEL O!L LINE WILL SE FLUSHED AT A T TIME WHEN THEIR ASSOCIATED EDG IS OUT OF SERVICE. THIS TYPE OF PROCEDURE IS COMMON INDUSTRY PRACTICE FOR CLEANING FUEL OIL PIPING AND TANKS.

THE 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS BEING WRITTEN BECAUSE THE DESIGN OF THE FUEL DIL STORAGE SYSTEM, AS DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 8 0F THE UFSAR, IS BEING TEMPORARILY ALTERED.

THIS TA WILL BE IMPLEMENTED THE UNIT 1 1996 RFO. UNIT 1 WILL BE IN MODES 5, 6 OR DEFUELED AND UNIT 2 MAY BE OPERATING OR SHUTDOWN. CONTROLS WILL ,

BE REQUIRED BY THE TA TO ENSURE THAT THE MINIMUM FOSTS VOLUME AS SPECIFIED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT VIOLATED. FURTHERMORE, THE TA ENSURES THAT THE OPERABLE PORTION OF THE FUEL OIL SYSTEM AND THE OPERABLE EDGS ARE NOT AFFECTED.

THEREFORE, THE POS$181LITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THERE IS NO AFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS ACTIVITY AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY.

(SG)

Docunent ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00094 0000 64

Subject:

TEMP MOD TO REMOVE SHIELD BLOCKS FROM UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT HATLN Alias:

POSRC #:  %-024 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199502150 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R;f Doc ID: 1- % -0015 Rev: 0 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

===w=w===================== = ========================================================= === .......... .

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System Code: 059 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Trat: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE CONCRETED SHIELD BLOCKS LOCATED IN THE UNIT 1 BUTLER BUIDLING IN FRONT OF THE EQUIP.

HATCH TO BE REMOVED UP TO 14 DAYS PRIOR TO THE SHUTDOWN OF U1 FOR ITS RFO.

THE CONCRETE SHEILDING BLOCKS NOW IN PLACE IN FRONT OF THE U1 AND U2 EQUIP.

MATCHES WERE ORGINALLY INSTALLED TO REDUCE THE HIGH NEUTRON AND GA M A DOSES SEEN IN AND AROUND THE BUTLER BUILDINGS FOLLOWING INITIAL STARTUP OF THE

NNR8018 NUCLEI 5 01/22/1997 Search Proces) A & oc Report 98 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 PLANTS. THIS CONCERN WITH HIGH DOSE RATES DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS HAS LARGELY BEEN ELIMINATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW NEUTRON SHIELD SURROUNDING THE RV. THEREFORE, UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO KEEP THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE TO BE ABLE TO KEEP OCCUPATIONAL DOSES ALARA AND TO NOT EXCEED TO 10 CFR 20 LIMITS.

REMOVAL OF THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS MAY RESULT IN A POST-LOCA INCREASE IN ON-SITE DOSE, BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE TO THE OFF-SITE DOSE TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. LIKEWISE, REMOVAL OF THESE SHIELD BLOCKS WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE POST-LOCA DOSE Tfl ANY St EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO OPERATE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SUCH THAT THE EQ OF SUCH EQUIPMENT CAN NO LONGER BE DEMONSTRATED.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT PRECLtDE ACCESS TO ANY PLANT AREA SUCH THAT ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT MAY NO LONGER BE TAKEN.

THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLLDED THAT THERE IS NO LICENSING REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

Docunent ID Revision Status as============================ ======== ======

SE00096 0000 64 Stbject: UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD CORE DESIGN Alias:

POSRC #: 96-029 A: soc Doc ID: ES199501258-002 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

x===================================================_ ______ ======================== ============ ==========

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Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Ttxt: NRC SUP99ARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN, AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONEMTS (UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES) WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A SECOND FULL BATCH OF ER81UM FOR UNIT 1 AS A BURNABLE A8SORBER WAS CONSIDERED. A SAFETY EVALUATION (SE00086 REV 0) TO RESTORE F (R) (T) AND F (XY) (T) LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.70 AND TO REVISE THE LSSS AND LCO COLR LIMITS WAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 MUST BE APPROVED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD (SE 000 97 REV 0 FROM ES 1995 0 1 2 5 8 - 003).

A UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 REFUELING SORON CONCENTRATION OF 2486 PPM 15 REQUIRED.

THESE NEW LIMITS WILL BE INCLLDED IN THE COLR. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES, AND ALSO EVALUATED THE INCLUSION OF UP TO foUR TEST CAPSULES'IN THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 CORE.

RE ANALYSIS OF TPE PRE TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK AND BORON DILUTION (ONLY MODE 6)

.__ . . . . _ _ . . . _ _ . . . .. _ _ . . ._ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . , _ . _ . . . _ . . . . _ . . . . . . _ . .. . _ . _ _ _ . . . . _ . .m 1 NMR9018 NUCLEIS- 01/22/1997 Search Process AcSwc Report 99  ;

i 10/01/1995 Tuto 12/31/1996 EVENTS INDICATED TNAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS ARE MORE LIMITING. THE s RESULTS OF ALL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO IntIT 1 CYCLE 13. IT IS CONCLLDED TNAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CNN) i i

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NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Repor2 100 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

NMRs018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 101 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctment ID Revision Status avs=========================== ======== ======

SE00096 0001 64

Subject:

UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD CORE DESIGN - REVISED REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION Alias:

POSRC #:  % -033 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501258-004 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

======================================================================================= ============ -

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Org/Div:

System Code:

Tgxt: NRC

SUMMARY

t THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONENTS (UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES) WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A SECOND FULL BATCH OF ERBILM FOR UNIT 1 AS A BURNA8LE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. A SAFETY EVALUATION (SE00086, REV 0) TO RESTORE THE F (R) (T) AND F (XY) (T) LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.70 AND TO REVISE THE LSSS AND LCO COLR LIMITS "

WERE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THE SAFETY EVLAUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEM8 LIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 MUST BE APPROVED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD (SE 000 97, REV O FROM ES 1995 0 1 2 5 8 -003).

A UNIT 1 CTCLE 13 REFUELING 8ORON CONCENTRATION OF 2386 PPM IS REQUIRED.

THESE NEW LIMITS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE COLR. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES, AND ALSO EVALUATED THE INCLUSION OF UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES IN THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 CORE.

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}

NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Seerch Process Adux: Report 102 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 RE ANALYSIS OF THE PRE TRIP STEAM LINE SREAK AND SOROM DILUTION (ONLY MODE

6) EVENTS INDICATED THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS ARE MORE LINITING. THE  !

RESULTS OF ALL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. IT t IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED

• SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

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NAR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Advoc Report 103 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

• octament ID Revision Status w __ _ __==== m a========== ======== ======

SE00097 0000 64

Subject:

UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES Alles:

POSRC #:  %-029 Assoc Doc ID: ES199501258-003 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmt! # Xatt Date

- - - - - - = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ============ ============

l Other r6fs:

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Org/Div:

System Code: 084 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL Ttxt: NRC SUPMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS THE USE OF FOUR ABB CCMOUSTION ENGINEERING LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES (LFA'S). THE LFA'S WILL RESIDE IN NON LIMITING LOCATIONS IN THE CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 CORE DURING CYCLES 13, 14, AND 15. DATA FROM THE LFA'S IS INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AND IMPROVED FUEL DESIGNS AND FUEL EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES TO ACHIEVE HIGHER BURNUPS, IMPROVE FUEL RELIABILITY, INCREASE THERMAL MARGIN AND ATTAIN OVERALL BETTER FUEL CYCLE ECONOMICS. DESIGN FEATURES CHANGES INCLUDE A SHORTER FUEL ROD LENGTH, A THINNER CLAD, A LARGER AND HEAVIER FUEL PELLET, AND THE USE OF AIF.'ANCED GRIDS WITH STRAIGHT STRIPS, MIXING VANES AND IMPROVED ROD SUPPORT SYSTEMS. THE LFA'S ARE ALSO HOST TO A DEMONSTRATION OF ADVANCED CLADDING MATERIALS.

SPECIFIC NRC APPROVAL OF A SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE WAS OBTAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ADVANCED ZIRCONIUM BASED CLADDING MATERIALS IN THE LFA'S. THE RELOAD ANALYSES PERFORMED FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 BOUND THE LFA'S. USE OF THE LFA'S IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 WAS FOUND TO NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH) l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __- ._ __m- m m__ _ __-_ - ______ . _.

NNRB018 MJCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Advoc Report 104 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctamt ID Revision Status

o====u===============================

SE00098 0000 64

Subject:

FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS REPAIR Atlas:

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997' Search Procesa A&oc Report 105 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 L POSRC #:  %-025 Assoc Doc ID: 93 068-001-00 Revision To: 0003 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Typer Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

--- ======================================================================,====== ============ ============

Other refs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:  ;

System Code: 068 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Tsut: NRC SupMARY:

THIS ESP (MCR) 93 068 001 ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF AN EP0XY PATCH ON THE TYPE 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS. THIS WILL ALLOW A PRESSURE BOUNDARY TEST OF THE INNER PLY OF THE TYPE 1 BELLOWS. A STRUCTURALLY SOUND INNER PLY WILL [

ENABLE THE TYPE 1 BELLOWS TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. ALSO, THIS ESP (MCR)

ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF A RELIEF VALVE (RV) ON THE INSTRlMENT AIR LINE THAT SUPPLIES BOTH UNIT 1 AND 2 TYPE 1 BELLOWS. THE RV HAS BEEN SIZED TO PRECLUDE THE TYPE 1 BELLOWS FROM EXCEEDING THE DESIGN PRESSURE.

REVISION 3 OF THIS ESP 15 ISSUED TO SPECIFICALLY REMOVE THE SCOPE OF WORK ASSOCIATED WITH ADDING A NEW TEST CONNECTION (COUPLING AND THREADED PLUG)

ONTO THE TYPE 2 BELLOWS OF THE UNIT 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE THAT WAS APPROVED ,

BY REVISION O OF THIS ESP (MCR) AND SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00. THE OUTER PLY OF THE TYPE 1 BELLOWS OF THE UNIT 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPAIRED AND THE INNER PLY PRESSURE BOUNDARY WAS SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURE TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ETP 95 30, WITHOUT THE NFED OF THE NEW TEST CONNECTION 04 THE TYPE 2 BELLOWS. BASED ON THESE SUCN SSFUL RESULTS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO LONGER A NEED FOR IN;TALLATION OF A TEST CONNECTION ON THE TYPE 2 BELLOWS SIDE OF THE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE; THEREFORE, BOTH PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE SCOPE OF THE TEST CONNECTION MODIFICATION BE DELETED FROM THIS ,

ACTIVITY.  ;

hAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 ROO WAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED IN JUNE 1994 FOR THE ESP (MCR) 93 068 001 MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS.

AS A RESULT OF REVISION 3 OF THIS ESP, SAFETY EVALUATION SE 000 98 HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT APPROVAL OF THE REVISED WORK SCOPE FROM THAT IDENTIFIED IN PREVIOUSLY APPROVED SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00. OTHER THAN DELETING TEXT REFERENCE TO THE TEST CONNECTION ITSELF, THIS CHANGE IN SCOPE HAS NO IMPACT ON THE CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS OF SAFETY EVALUAft0N 93 1 068 148 I R00.

REFUELING OPERATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES (THE ONLY APPLICABLE TECH SPECS FOR THIS ACTIVITY) REMAIN UNCHANGED AND ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MEETS CODE REQUIREMENTS AND HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE

Nues018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A4 0c Report 106 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 IT IS NOT IN VIOLATION WITM THE SAR. IT MAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT No NEW FAILURE EFFECTS ARE CREATED. THE DESIGN INPUT REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN ANSI N 45 2 11 MAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND ADDRESSED IN THE ESP (NCR). THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY GUESTION.

(CMM)

.. _ -.c. .. . - . . ~ . - . .. - . . .-..- .

. . - _ . - . . . ~ . . . . - .. .- ,. ~-- .. ~. . . ~ . . _ . - . _ . .

i NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 ,

Serrch Process Advoc Report 107 -

i 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996  ;

i f

t 1

t e

r t

t 4

l i

i E

Doctment ID Revision Status nenne=a=s======================= ======== ======

SE00100 0000 64

Subject:

50.59 FOR DFW CONTROLLER UPGRADE Alles:

POSRC #:  %-027 -

r AIsoc Doc ID: ES199600012-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP

Rzf Doc ID

Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Natt Date  !

=============e====r=======================================......======================= ============ ============ '

f Other refs:

Pers Rifa:

Equipment: 1FIC1105 11 SG FD WTR BYPASS VLV i 1FIC1106 12 SG FW WTR BYPASS VLV  ;

1FIC1111 M FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER i 1FIC1121 M FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER  !

1MIC4516 11 SG FD PP A TURB SPD CNTR I

, I t

+

I i

NNR8018 teerch Process A& oc Report 108

• 0/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 1MIC4517 12 DG F",PMP B TURB SPD CNTR 1PDI4516 11 S/G F*s CV D/P 1PDI4517 12 S/G FW CV D/P Org/ Diva System Code: 045 FEEDWATER T&xt: NRC SU MARY:

TMIS MODIFICATION UPGRADES THE DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL STATIONS THAT INTER-FACE WITN THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, THE BYPASS FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, AND THE FEEDPUMPS. A FOURTM CONTROL STATION WILL BE UPGRADED AND MODIFIED SO THAT IT WILL NORMALLY BE A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR FOR THE DP ACROSS THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE, AND IN ALTERNATE MODE IT WILL BE A BACKUP CONTROLLER FOR THE MAIN AND BYPASS VALVE CONTROL STATIONS. ALL FOUR CONTROLLERS ARE OBSOLETE FISCHER & PORTER (F&P)

CONTROLLERS. THEY WILL BE UPGRADED TO CURRENT F8P MODELS THAT MAVE AN APPROWED MAN MACHINE INTERFACE AND IMPROVED CPU PERFORMANCE. THE REPLACEMENT CONTROLLERS WILL ALSO HAVE THEIR 1/0 SIGNALS FILTERED FOR IMPROVED EMI/RFI COMPATIBILITY.

THERE ARE NO CHAPTER 14 EVENTS OR ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICAil04 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

(CMM)

_ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -- - --____ - _a

NuRs018 M,CLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report .109 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00100 0001 62 Sthject: 50.59 FOR OFW CONTROLLER UPGRADE Alias:

POSRC #:  %-125, Arsoc Doc ID: ES199600012-002 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rzf Doc 10: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other r'4fs:

Prrs RIfs:

Equipment: 1FIC1105 11 SG FD WTR BYPASS VLV 1FIC1106 12 SG FW WTR BYPASS VLV

NMR8018 Search Frocess A & oc Report 110 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 1FIC1111 MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER 1FIC1121 MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER 1 HIC 4516 11 SG FD PP A TUR8 SPD CNTR 1 HIC 4517 12 DG FD PMP S TUR8 SPD CNTR 1PDI4516 11 S/G FW CV D/P 1PDI4517 12 S/G FW CV D/P 2FIC1105 STM GEN 21 FEEDWTR SYPASS -

2FIC1106 STM GEN 22 FEEDWTR BYPASS 2FIC1111 21 FW S/G VLV FLO INDIC C 2FIC1121 22 FW S/G VLV FLO INDIC C 2 HIC 4516 21 FW SGFPT SPD HIC 2 HIC 4517 22 FW SGFPT SPD HIC 2PDI4516 STM GEN 11 FW CV D/P 2PDI4517 STM GEN 22 FW CV D/P Org/Div:

System Code: 045 FEEDWATER Tut: NRC SupmARY:

THIS MODIFICATION UPGRADES THE DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL STATIONS THAT INTER-FACE WITH THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, THE BYPASS FEEDWATER RErULATING VALVES, AND THE FEEDPUMPS. A FOURTH CONTROL STATION WILL BE UPGRADED AND M(DIFIED SO THAT IT WILL NORMALLY SE A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE M ICATOR FOR THE DP ACROSS THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE, AND IN ALTERNATE wrE, IT WILL BE A BACKUP CONTROLLER FOR THE MAIN AND BYPASS VALVE CONTROL STATIONS. ALL FOUR CONTROLLERS ARE OBSOLETE FISCHER & PORTER (F&P)

CONTROLLERS. THEY WILL BE UPGRADED TO CURRENT F&P MODELS THAT HAVE AN APPROVED MAN MACHINE INTERFACE AND IMPROVED CPU PERFORMANCE. THE REPLACEMENT CONTROLLERS WILL ALSO HAVE THEIR I/O SIGNALS FILTERED FOR IMPROVED EMI/RFI COMPATIBILITY.

THERE ARE NO CHAPTER 14 EVENTS OR ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

(CMH)

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces:3 A&oc Report til 10/01/1995 THRu 12/31/1996 i

Docunent ID Revision Status SE00102 0000 62

Subject:

TEMPORARY TURBINE TRIP REMOVAL Alias:

- _ ~ =-. . . _ _ . -. . .. -_. _~ . _. . .- . . . - . . _ _ _ , .- ..

NNR8018 CJCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 A&oc Report 112 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 POSRC #:  %-029 Assoc Doc ID: 631%SH0004C Revision To: 0012 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG RIf Doc ID: 2- % -0020 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xatt Date

================================================================================ ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers RIfs:

Equipment: 2LS1448 219 ES LP FWH TURB TRIP H Org/Div:

System Code: 046 EXTRACTION STEAM Tcxt: SumARY:

THIS 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION EVALUATES THE EFFECT OF TEMPORARILY MODIFYING THE MAIN TURBINE CONTROL TRIP LOGIC. THE SCOPE OF THE PHYSICAL ALTERATION IS LIMITED TO LIFTING LEADS OF 2-LS-1448, TO ENA8LE THE CRAFT TO TROUBLESHOOT A PROBLEM ON THE 218 FEEDWATER HEATER. THE FUNCTION OF THE LEVEL SWITCH WILL BE PERFORMED BY OPERATIONS / MAIMTENANCE PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE TASK. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ALTERATION DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. REVISIONS TO THE UFSAR OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REQUIRED.

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00105 64

Subject:

MODIFY THROTTLE CONTROLS ON CAC INLET CV'S '

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-067 fasoc Doc ID: ES199600308-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

w================================================================================== ============ ========

Other rifs:

Pers R:;fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 011 SERVICE WATER COOLING f(xt: CURRENTLY EACH CAC INLET CONTROL VALVE (CV) IS AN 8" BUTTERFLY TYPE WITH AN AIR OPERA 10R. THE CV IS NORMALLY OPEN WITH THE OPERATOR VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE VIA A THREE WAY SOLENOID VALVE. UPON RECEIPT OF A SIAS THE SOLENOID VALVE REDIRECTS THE SWAC AIR TO THE CV OPERATOR WHICN SHUTS THE VALVE AGAINST A MECHANICAL STOP. THE MECHANICAL STOP, WHICHIS PHYSICALLY INSTALLED IN THE VALVE OPERATOR, PREVENTS THE OPERATOR SPRING FROM FULLY STROKING THE VALVE, HENCE, THE VALVE SHUTS TO THE PREDETERMINED THROTTLE POSITION. UPON RECEIPT OF RAS THE SOLEN 010 VALVE REPOSITIONS TO VENT OFF THE AIR FROM THE ACTUATOR AND THE CV RETURNS TO ITS NORMALLY OPEN POSITION. THE EXISTING THROTTLE SETTING IS BASE DON THE REQUIREMENT OF REMOVING THE HEAT LOAD ASSUMED IN

-. . .. .- .- - ~. . - .

NMR9015 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 113 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE ANALYSIS WHILE MAINTAINING SRW TEMPERATURE LOW ENOUGH TO SUPPORT CONTINUOUS EDG OPERATION.

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES A MORE PRECISE METHOD OF CONTROLLING SRW FLOW TO THE CACS (POST ACCIDENT). THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ADDITON OF A FIC, I/P TRANSDUCER AND VALVE POSITIONER TO THE INLET CV CONTROL LOOP IN LIEU OF THE EXISTING MECHANICAL STOP. IN ADDITION, MANUAL CONTROL OF SRW FLOW TO THE CACS IS ALSO AVAILA8LE WITH THE USE OF A MAND CONTROL STATION.

INTRINSIC TO THE PROPOSED DESIGN IS THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE METHOD CF FLOW CONTROL DURING SIAS. THE EXISTING MECHANICAL STOP SETTING (CURRENT VALVE THROTTLE POSITION) IS BASED ON THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE 0F PUMP PERFORMANCE WHICH RENDERS GREATER RANGE OF FLOW UNCERTAINTY UPON THROTTLE. THE NEW DESIGN UTILIZES THE FEEDOACK LOOP BASED ON THE ACTUAL ,

SRW FLOW TO THE CACS INDEPENDENT OF PUMP PERFORMANCE. THESE DESIGN CHANGES WILL RESULT IN AN IMPROVED SRW CONFIGURATION FOR MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED DESIGN BASIS EVENTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT. .

SINCE THE PROSABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF CACS AND EDGS HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THIS ACTIVITY DOES INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. BASED ON THIS ANALYSIS, THERE IS NO NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES IS NOT REDUCED. i b

Doctment ID Revision Status

mne====:===================== ======== ====

SE00106 0000 64

Subject:

DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT DESIGN REPORT REVIEW Alias:

POSRC #:  % -0045 A1 soc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmt! Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Othir rafs:

Pers Rafs:

Equipuent: ,

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Ttxt: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE REVIEW OF THE FOUR (4) DESIGN REPORTS SUBMITTED l

NMR3018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Actioc toport 114 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 AND APPROVED BY THE NRC (VIA SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS [SERS] AGAINST THE ACTUAL FINAL SACM SAFETY-RELATED (SR) DIESEL GENERATOR DESIGN BEING INSTALLED AT CCNPP. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ADDRESSES THE DIFFERENCES IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW.

Doctament ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00107 0000 64 Sthject: MODIFICATION TO THE MSIV MYDRAULIC RESERVOIR Alias:

POSRC #: 96-040 Assoc Doc ID: ES199600212-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date i

======================================================================================= ============ ============  ;

i Other rsfs:

Pers Rafs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Tsut: THIS ACTIVITY INSTALLS A 3/8" PIPE CONNECTION AT THE TOP OF UNIT 1 AND 2 MSIV NYDRAULIC RESERVOIR. A 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE UFSAR  ;

FIGURE 10-3 WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MYDRAULIC RESERVOIR MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION TO THE RESERVOIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE ACTUATOR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBASILITY OF AN ft ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. 9 THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY l 10CFR50.59.

I 4

Document ID Revision Status l

============================== ======== ====== ['

SE00107 0001 62

Subject:

ALLOW PIPE CONNECTION ON TOP OF MSt.i kESERVOIR Alias:

POSRC #: 96-120 e

r I

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 115 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Assoc Doc ID: ES199600212-000 Revision To: 0001 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers RIfs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 083 MAIN STEAM Text:

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY INSTALLS A 3/8" PIPE CONNECTION AT THE TOP OF THE UNIT 1 AND 2 MSIV HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH ES 199600212 000 AND ES 199600212 000, REV. 0001. REVISON 0001 ALLOWS THE USE OF A QUICK DISCONNECT FITTING AT THE PIPE CONNECTION ON THE TOP OF THE RESERVOIR AND THE DRAIN CONNECTION AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RESERVOIR. THE QUICK DISCONNECT IS ALLOWED IN PLACE OF THE PIPE CAP. A 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE UFSAR FIGURE 10-3 WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE RESERVOIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE ACTUATOR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Docunent ID Revision Status

=== ========

SE00109 0000 64

Subject:

INCREASE CRS AND PURGE ISOLATION VALVE RESPONSE TIME IN UFSAR Alias:

POSRC #: 96-054 Atsoc Doc ID: ES199600817-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Oth;r rsfs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 060 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HEAT AND VENT T4.xt: THIS ACTIVITY INCREASES THE CONTAINMENT SIGNAL RESPONSE TIME IN UFSAR TABLE 7-4 AND THE ISOLATION TIME FOR THE PURGE AIR INLET AND OUTLET VALVES GIVEN IN TABLE 5-3 0F THE UFSAR FROM 7 SECONDS TO 15 SECONDS. THE CONTAINMENT RADIATION SIGNAL IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THE 48" CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ON HIGH RADIATION LEVELS IN CONTAINMENT DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY BUILDS ADDITIONAL MARGIN INTO THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE CONTAINMENT RADIATION SIGNAL STP. THE CONTAINMENT WILL CONTINUE TO BE

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesi Actioc Report 11L 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ISOLATED BY AN AUTOMATIC SIGNAL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IN COMPARISON WITH THE TOTAL RELEASE TIME ASSUMED IN THE ANALYSIS REVIEWED AND ACCEPTED BY THE NRC. WHILE NO INCREASED RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT IS EXPECTED, ANY ADDITIONAL RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY IS INSIGNIFICANT AND WOT RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE MEANING OF 50.59. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SEOO111 64 Stbject: ALLOW OPERATIONS TO GAG OPEN 0-PO-5371 DAMPER UNDER TA 1 - % - 0092 Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-041 Assoc Doc ID: 60723SH0004 Revision To: 0033 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG RIf Doc ID: 1-96-0092 Rev: O Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmt! # Xmtl Date

=======.,================================================================2======== ============ ======

Other refs:

P3rs Raft:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 030 CON 1ROL ROOM HVAC (CNTRL RM & SERV BLDG)

Text: NRC SUPG4ARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO GAG DAMPER 0 DAMP 5371 TO ITS FAIL SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN. THIS DAMPER IS PART OF THE CR / CSR HVAC SYSTEM.

THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS VENTILATION SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF FANS, FILTERS, DAMPERS, HEATING AND COOLING COILS AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH SUPPLY FILTERED AND TEMPERED AIR TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CABLE SPREADING ROOMS AIR CONDITIONS IS REQUIRED IN THESE AREAS TO LIMIT THE TEMPERATURE UNDER WHICH THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM INSTRUMENTATION MUST OPERATE. IN ADDITION, EMERGENCY OPERATION OF THE C / R HVAC SYSTEM IS REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A LOCl TO RECIRCULATE SOME AIR THROUGH A SELF CONTAINED POST LOCI FILTER SYSTEM.

GAGGING OPEN DAMPER 0 DAMP 5371 WILL ALLOW REPAIR WORK TO BE PERFORMED TO PISTON OPERATOR 0 PO 5371. WORK UNDER THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION ( 1 % 0092)

ENSURES A REDUNDANT PATH IS MAINTAINED THROUGH THE RETURN FAN DUCT SYSTEM SHOULD UNIT 11 RETURN FAN BE NEEDED IN A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6.1 BY MAINTAINING THE REQUIRED REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM HVAC SYSTEM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT COOLING TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY IMPACTED AND THAT THE CONTROL ROOM REMAINS HABITABLE FOR OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY AND / OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 150 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 TANIC 15 DESIGNED TO PREVENT DEBRIS AND SEDIMENT FROM ENTERING THE SUCTION -

PIPING BY SLOPING THE FLOOR AWAY FROMTHE SUCTION LINE AND LOCATING THE SUCTION LINE 7.5" ABOVE THE FLOOR. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

Docunent ID Revision Status swm=======================================

SE00164 0001 62

Subject:

Fall OPEN 1(2) CV 1581, 1584, 1589, 1592 Alias:

POSRC #:  % -0156 Azsoc Doc ID: 61058 ASH 0001 Revision To: 0037 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: BGEDRWG 63058 ASH 0001 0040 0 BGEDRWG Raf Doc ID: 1-96 0201 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMCB TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 2-96-0124 0000 TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS DE01%1 0000 DMLS DEPARTMENT MEMD LOGGING SYSTEM Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pirs Rsfs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 011 SERVICE WATER COOLING Ttxt: SUPetARY:

THIS ACTIVITY CHANGES THE POSITION OF (1)2CV1581, (1)2CV1584, (1)2CV1589, (1)2CV1592 DURING SIAS FROM MODULATING TO FULLY OPEN. BASED ON THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION PERFORMED IN TEMPORARY ALTERATION # 2 % 0124, AND 1 % 0201, SRW TEMPERATURE CAN BE MAINTAINED IN THE DESIGN LIMIT PROVIDED THE PRESCRIBED OPERATING LIMITS ARE OBSERVED DURING THE TIMEFRAME THAT THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION IS EFFECTIVE.

Tctst Hits: 103

• • • END ***

NWRB015 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 117 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. TA 1 92 0096 DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE CONCLtBED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

Docunent ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00112 0000 64

Subject:

POWER 11 SPENT FUEL POOL C00LtdG PUMP FROM A TRAIN Alias:

POSRC #:  %-55 A1 soc Doc ID: ES199600927-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

wn==================================================================================== ============ ===========

Other rsfs:

Pers Rifs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

T(xt: SUpptARY:

POWER 11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FROM THE UNIT 1 "A" TRAIN BY CROSS-CONNECTING THE REACTOR MCCS. PUMP BREAKER 52-1411 IS ENERGIZED FROM LOAD CENTER BUS 14A, WHICHIS BACK FED VIA MCCS 104R AND 114R. THESE ARE POWERED FROM LOAD CENTER BUS 118 BY 52-1119. THIS DIFFERS FROM THE NORMAL ELECTRICAL LINEUP IN THAT THESE TWO TRAINS ARE SEPARATE AND THIS PUMP IS NORMALLY POWERED BY THE "B" TRAIN. THIS ACTIVITY SUPPORTS A CHANGE TO 01-27D UNDER PCR % - 1306 AND WILL ONLY BE USED WHILE IN MODES 5 AND 6 WITH 4KV BUS 14 OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE PURPOSES.

BASED ON THE SAFETY EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, INVOLVE A CHANGE IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS / LICENSE

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A & oc Report 118 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 CONDITIONS OR BASES, OR REQUIRE A CHANGE OR ADDITION TO THE UFSAR/USAR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE CREDIT CAN BE TAKEN FOR NUMEROUS DESIGN FEATURES OF THE ELEC1RICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND DUE TO COMPENSATORY MEASURES IN PLACE.

Docunent ID Revision Status uninnue==u====================================

SE00114 64

Subject:

ALLOW USE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP FOR SDC.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-050 AIsoc Doc ID: 60731SH0001 Revision To: 0059 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG 60731SH0002 0031 C BGEDRWG 60731SH0003 0020 C BGEDRWG Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

=============================e=================================================== ============ ======

Othir rafs:

Pira Rafa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052 SAFETY IKJECTION STSTEM Ttxt: SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY IS A PROCEDURE CHANGE TO 01-38 WHICH ALLOWS A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR A LPSI PUMP FOR REACTOR COOLANT CIRCULATION DURING SDC OPERATION. SECTION 9.2.2 0F THE UFSAR DESCRIBES SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, AND INCLUDED IN THAT IS A STATEMENT THAT THE LPSI PUMPS CIRCULATE THE RACTOR COOLANT THROUGH THE SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS.

THE UFSAR IS TO BE REVISED TO STATE THAT A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP MAY ALSO BE USED TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION.

THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DESIGN RATINGS ENVELOPE THE PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE CONCITIONS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, THEREFORE, THE SYSTEM QUALIFICATION IS NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE A MINIMUM SDC FLOW OF 1500 GPM. STP - 073 M TESTS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS IN NEARLY AN IDENTICAL LINE-UP AS SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, AND FLOWS OF 1500 GPM ARE CONSISTENTLY ACHIEVED.

FURTHERMORE, THE STP LINEUP ONLY USES ONE OF THE FOUR INJECTION LOOPS WHILE ALL FOUR INJECTION LOOPS ARE OPEN D'JRING SDC OPERATION. THE AFFECT OF USING ONLY ONE INJECTION LOOP IS TO GREATLY INCREASE FRICTION LOSSES AND HENCE REDUCE FLOW. ALSO, SECTION 6. 10. B. 1 0F 01-38 REQUIRES THAT A MINIMUM FLOW OF 1500 GPM BE VERIFIED WHILE IN THIS LINEUP. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE CONCLIA)ED THAT THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WILL SATISFY THE

. . . - _ - - - . - ~ . .- . .- - .. -. . . . .. _. .. . -

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 Ac9 toc Report 119 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 MINIMUM 1500 GPM FLOW REQUIREMENT. FINALLY, THERE ARE NO MINIMUM FLOW CONCERNS AS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DESIGN FLOWRATE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE 1500 GPM FLOW REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status n==ssve===================aa=== ======== ======

SE00115 64

Subject:

TEMPORARY ALTERATION 1- % -0073 TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION ON THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER, PRESSURIZER MAWWAY COVER, 11 AND 12 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS, 1RV200, 1MOV403, AND 1FW130 TO SUPPORT HOT RETORQUING AND INSPECTIONS Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-053 AIsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: 1- % -0073 Rey: Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Othir rafs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment: 1CKVFW-130 12 SG FW HDR CKV 1HXCVCL/DR11 11 CVC L/D REGEN HX 1HXRC11 11 MAIN STEAM GENERATOR 1HXRC12 12 MAIN STEAM GENERATOR 1Mov403 PWR OP RLF ISOL 1PZVRC11 PRESSURIZER 1Rv200 PZR SAFETY RV Org/Div:

System Code: 041 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) 045 FEEDWATER C64 REACTOR COOLANT Tcxt: NRC SUPMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM VARIOUS  !

EQUIPMENT IN CONTAINMENT IN SUPPORT GUTAGE MAINTENANCE WITH UNIT 1 IN MODES 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 AND DEFUELED. THE INSULATION REMOYAL ENCOMPASSES THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER, THE PRESSURIZER MANWAY COVER, 11 AND 12 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS, VALVES 1 RV 200, 1 MOV 403, AND 1 FW 130 AND CONNECTING PIPING. IN ORDER TO PRECLtBE INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY, IF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM OR ESFAS TESTING IS PERFORMED THAT MAS THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY WHILE THIS ACTIVITY IS IN PROGRESS, THE SPRAY HEADER WILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE DISCHARGE OF THE AFFECTED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP.

THE ABILITY OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION 15 NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. THE PR08A81LITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO THE AFFECTE'*' EQUIPMENT (DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO NOT INTRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECTS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING

Nutt018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A e oc Report 120 10/01/1995 TNRU 12/31/1996 AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCN THAT TME ADDITIONAL n' EAT CREATED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IWACT TME FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

(CMM) t 4

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NNRB018 NUCLEIS , 22/1997 Search Proces2 AcStoc Report 121 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctment ID Revision Status

w============ - ============= ======== =====

SE00116 0000 64

Subject:

ADD PROCEDURE CHANGES TO OI-2B FOR OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.

Atlas:

POSRC #:  % -065 AIsoc Doc ID: UFSAR Revision To: 1900 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: UFSAR Ri.f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

ma=================================================================================== ============ ==========

Other esfs:

P.rs R;fa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

Ttxt: THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) WAS DESIGNED WITH OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AS INDICATED BY THE FOUR " MODES" 0F OPERATION DESCRIBED IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR). FLOW PATH FLEXtBILITY WAS ALSO A PART OF PLANT DESIGN, BUT IS NOT DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION INVESTIGATED WHETHER A CLARIFICATION OF THE " PROCEDURES" DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR INVOLVES AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). THE CLARIFICATION REGARDS THE OPERATION OF THE CVCS WHEN CHANGING THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT.

THE UFSAR CURRENTLY DESCRIBES THE INJECTION FLOW PATH FROM THE MAKE-UP SOURCE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT) AND THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DISCUSSION OF THE VALVE LINE-UP THAT BYPASSES THE VCT AND PROVIDES FOR MAKE-UP DIRECTLY TO THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER (" DIRECT FEED"). " DIRECT FEED" PROVIDES MORE TIMELY REACTIVITY CONTROL " FEEDBACK" SINCE IT INCREASES THE CHANGE RATE OF THE RCS BORON CONCENTRATION. QUICKER " FEEDBACK" IS ADVANTAGEOUS DURING CERTAIN PLANT CONDITIONS.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE

NNR8018 WUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 122 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED. THEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.

Document ID Revision Status

w========================= ======== ==

SE00117 0000 64

Subject:

ADOPT A 46 METHODOLOGY AS ALTERNATE MEANS OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION Alias:

POSRC #: 96-060 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199601058-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rsf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

OthIr refs:

PIra Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 190 MULTI-SYSTEM T(xt: PROPOSED ACTIVITY:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO INCORPORATE THE USE OF THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION UTILITY GROUP'S (SQUG) SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY, HERE IN AFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "A-46 METHODOLOGY", AS AN ALTERNATE MEANS FOR VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND OTHER PLANT COMPONENTS AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE A-46 METHODOLOGY WAS DEVELOPED BY SQUG AS AN INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE RESOLUTION ON UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) A-46 " VERIFICATION OF SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS". THE NRC HAS IDENTIFIED USI A-46 AS BEING APPLICABLE TO CCNPP UNITS 1 & 2. FOR THE RESOLUTION OF USI A-46, THE NRC HAS ENDORSED THE USE OF THE GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE (GIP), REVISION 2 CORRECTED FEBRUARY 14, 1992, AS CLARIFIED SY THE NRC STAFF IN SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 2 (SSER-2) ISSUED MAY 22, 1992. THIS ENDORSE-MENT WAS TRANSMITTED TO ALL A-46 UTILITIES IN SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO GENERIC LETTER 87-02.

ONE OF THE PRIMARY INPUTS USED TO DEVELOP THE GIP IS EPRI REPORT NP- 7149 - D "SUPN4ARY OF THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF TWENTY CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF NUCLEAR PLANTS". THE 20 CLASSES OF EQUIP-MENT IS QUITE BROAD AND ENVELOPES THE MAJORITY OF ALL PLANT EQUIPMENT AT CCNPP. THE USE OF THE ALTERNATE SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHOD AT CCNPP CAN BE USED TO ADDRESS ALL 20 CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND CABLE AND CONDUIT RACEWAYS COVERED BY THE GIP, EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING ITEMS / SYSTEMS:

1. AUXILIARf FEED WATER ACTUATION SYSTEM

2. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTALLED PER FCR

NMR9018 NUCLEls .

01/22/1997 Search Procesa Ae oc Report 123 10/01/1995 TNetu 12/31/1996 87 - 0087

3. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 CATEGORY I (PM1) INSTRUMENTATION

4. RvlMS INSTRUMEIITATION COVERED BY TMI ACTION PLAll ITEM II.F.2-(ALREADY DESIGIIATED PAM1, THEREFORE, COVERED BY No. 3, ABOVE.)

5. ALL SAFETY RELATED ITEMS / EQUIPMENT FOR THE EDG 1A AND ITS ASSOCIATED BUILDING.

FOR TME A00VE ITEMS / SYSTEMS, CCNPP MAS PREVIOUSLY CtNWIITTED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE-344 (1975 OR 1987) FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION PURPOSES. SSER-2 STATES TNA THE NRC EXPECTS THESE PRIOR C005EITNENTS TO BE MAINTAINED. NOWEVER, THAT DOES NOT PRECLtBE FUTURE LICENSE REVISIONS ON THE PART OF CCNPP 70 SEEK RELIEF FROM THOSE CENWIITNENTS. FOR MATTERS RELATED TO VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF ELECTRICAL AND MECMANICAL EQUIPMENT COVERED BY THE A-4 METHODOLOGY A UNREVIEWED SAFETY GUESTION (USG) IS NOT INWOLVED. THE IIRC APPROVED THE USE OF THE A-M METHODOLOGY AT CCNPP IN ITS ISSUANCE OF SSER-2.

THE A-M METIIODOLOGY IS NOT LIMITED TO EQUIPMNT ITEMS ON THE SEISMIC SAFE SMUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL). IT CAN ALSO BE USED FOR ANY EQUIPMENT ITEM (ENCEPT AS NOTED ABOVE) FOR WHICM SEISMIC VERIFICATION IS REGUIRED PROVIDED THE EeulPMENT ITEM IS COWEkED BY THE CIP. THE ALTERIIATE SEISMIC VERIFICATION METNtB APPLIES TO EXISTING EQUIPM NT INSTALLED IN CCNPP AS WELL AS NEW AIID REPLACEMNT EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT "0R NEW AND REPLACEMENT TAIIKS AND NEAT EXCHANGERS. TME CRITERIA IN THE GIP FOR TAIIKS AND MEAT EXCMANGERS ARE INTENDED FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS ONLY, NOT NEW INSTALLATICIIS.

SUIGIARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISES THE PLANT LICENSING BASIS TO PERMIT THE USE OF THE A-M ETHEBOLOGY, AS EM BtBIED IN THE GEIIERIC IMPLEMEIITATION Pet 0CEDURE (GIP),

REVISION 2 CORRECTED FEBRunitY 14, 1992, AS AN ALTERIIATE METHOD FOR VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF MECMAll! CAL AIID ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLAIIT. THE ALTERIBATE SEISMIC VERIFICATICII METMtB APPLIES TO ALL 20 CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT, TAIIKS AIID HEAT EXCHAIIGERS, AND CASLE AND CONDUIT RACEWAYS COVERED BY THE GIP FOR WHICM SEISMIC VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED.

M0 WEVER, THE A-M METM(20 LOGY IS IIOT APPLICABLE TO NEW AND REPLACEMENT TAIIKS AND MEAT EXCMAIIGERS AND EQUIPMENT WMERE CCIIPP MAS MADE PREVIOUS COIGIITMNTS TO THE IIRC FOR SEISIIIC VERIFICATION. THIS IIICLUDES TIIE FOLLOWIIIG ITEMS /

SYSTEMS:

1. AUMILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM

2. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTALLED PER FCR 87 - 0087

3. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 CATEGORY I (PAM1) INSTRUMENTATION

4. ALL SAFETY RELATED ITEMS / EQUIPMENT FOR THE EDG 1A AIID ITS ASSOCIATED BUILDING.

Doctament ID Revisfor) Status

======================== ========

SE00118 64

Subject:

REPLACE THE 4 KV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS

_ _ _ . _ _ . , ~ - . _ -

m_~ , ~ . . . _ _ _ _ . - . . . - . . - - - ----. _ ~ ~ - . ~.- - . - . - . _ - . _ . . m._.. - _ . - .-.-- m . .

t i NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Seerch Process Adioc Report 124 .

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 4

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-004 Assoc Doc ID: ES199501679-001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP [

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type: }

Sender Matl # 10stl Date f e - =============================================================================== ============ ============ t Other rsfs:

Pers Rafs:

Egalpment: l Org/Div:

System Code: 004 ELECTRICAL 4 KV TRANSFOINERS AND BUSES '

Text: THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING 4KV UWERVOLTAGE RELAYS THAT PROVIDE AN

UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL TO ESFAS, WITH NEW SOLID STATE RELAYS. THE NEW RELAYS i WILL MAVE NEW SET POINTS THAT ENVELOPE THE EXISTING SET POINTS AND NEET THE  !

REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THE ELECTRICAL DISTRINUTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL '

INSPECTION (EDSFI). THE NEW SET Po!NTS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL OF THE PLANT SAFETY EQUIPMENT WILL START, RUN, Alm CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER ALL t AllTICIPATED PLANT COWITIONS.  !

THIS ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RELAYS DE REVISED IN t SAR. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALSO REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO BE REVISED TO INCLUDE THE SET POINTS UNDR THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES  !

INSTRLMENTATION SECTION.  !

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY GUESTION.

, v I

Document ID Revision Status t

s=========================== ======== ====

SE00122 0000 64  !

Subject:

CHANGE ICI REQUIREMENT IN UFSAR FOR UNIT 2 CYCLE 11. l Alles: >

)

POSRC #: 96-075 I f

Arsoc Doc ID: ES199601213-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R2f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

sender Matl # Xstl Date

======================================================================================= ============ ============ -

l

. Other rafs:

Pers Rafs:  ;

Egaipment:

Org/Olv:

System Code: 078 NUCLEAR INSTRtMENTATION Text: THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS THE RELAXATION IN THE REQUIRED NL5WER OF OPERA 8LE INCORE DETECTOR STRINGS AND SEGMENTS FRCM 751 TO 40%. AN EVALUA-TION WAS PERFORMED AND COMPENSATING ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENSURE THE VALIDITY OF THE SURVEILLANCE'S PERFORMED USING TNE IllCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM. THE i COMPENSATING ACTIONS INCUDE APPLYING A 1% PENALTY TO THE NEASURED PLNR AND POWER PEAKING FACTORS IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR ANY POTENTIAL INCREASE IN f

i

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 125 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY. ALSO COMPENSATION ACTIONS INCLUDE INCREASING SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY OF THE POWER PEAKING FACTORS FROM EVERY 31 DAYS TO EVEnf 15 DAYS OF MODE 1 OPERATION. THE REVIEW CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSED CHANGE WILL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE PROPOSED CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBA8ILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREASE THE POSSI81LITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY.

Doctment ID Revision Status

==w===================== ========

SE00123 64

Subject:

TEMPORARY TENT IN PROTECTED AREA Atlas:

POSRC #: 96 066 Assoc Doc ID: EN-1-100 Revision To: 0500 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: NPIP R;f Doc ID: 1-96-0109 Rev: Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtt # Xmtt Date

================================================================================= ==========,= ======

Other rafs:

P:ra h ft:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102 PLANT AREAS Ttxt: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF UP TO TWO TEMPORARY TENTS LOCATED BETWEEN THE $$8 ANO NSF INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA.

/

THE PURPOSE OF THIS 50.59 IS TO ENSURE THAT THE TEMPORARY TENTS DO NOT MOVE FROM THEIR PRESCRI8ED LOCATION. INADVERTAW RELEASE OF THE TENTS DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS SUCH AS HIGH WINDS, COULD CAUSE THE TENTS TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH THINGS AS EDG EXHAUST AND PLANT VENTILATION. AND TENT POLES COULD ACT AS TORNADO MISSILES IF NOT SUFFICIENTLY SECURED TO THE GROUND. CONTINGENCIES WILL 8E ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE TENTS ARE ADEQUATELY SECURED FOR MILD WEATHER INCLLDING A MODERATE RAIN. THE CONTINGENCY WILL INCUDE A WEATHER WATCH WHICH WILL INCLUDE AN UPPER LIMIT FOR WIND SPEED AND ADVERSE FORECASTS SUCH AS TORNADOES AND HURRICANES.

UPON NOTIFICATION OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS, THE TENTS WILL BE COLLAPSED AND SECURED WITHIN A PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD.

. - . ._ _ _ . . , _ _ - m. __ _ _ - . ___ _ . _ .

NMRB018 NUCLEI 5 01/22/1997 Search Proces2 Actioc Report 126 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

= ww ======================= ======== ====

SE00124 64 Stbject: GAG OPEN 1 - DAMP - 5372 UNDER TA 1 - % - 0111 Alias:

POSRC #:  % -068 Assoc Doc 10: 60723SH0004 Revision To: 0033 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0110 Rev: 0 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

a=w= ================================================================================ ============ ==========

Other rsfs:

P;rs RIfs:

Equipment: t Org/Div:

• System Code:

Tcut: TA 1 - % - 0110 WILL GAG OPEN CR HVAC RETURN FAN #12 SUCTION DAMPER 0 - HVAC

- 5372. TO ACHIEVE THIS ACTIVITY THE DAMPER WILL BE MECHANICALLY GAGGED OPEN AND THE INSTRUMENT AIR LINE TO THE SOLENOID VALVE WILL BE DETACHED AND CAPPED

. DETACHING THE AIR LINE WILL PLACE THE DAMPER IN ITS Fall-SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN (LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR OPENS THE DAMPER; AIR CLOSES THE DAMPER

). MECHANICALLY GAGGING THE DAMPER WILL ENSURE THAT THE DAMPER STAYS IN A FIXED POSITION (OPEN).

SLMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO GAG DAMPER 0 - DAMP -5372 TO ITS FAIL SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN. THIS DAMPER IS PART OF THE CR/CSR HVAC SYSTEM.

THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS VENTILATION SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF FANS, FILTERS, DAMPERS, HEATING AND COOLING COILS, AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH SUPPLY FILTERED AND TEMPERED AIR TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CA8LE SPREADING ROOMS. AIR CONDITIONING IS REQUIRED IN THESE AREAS TO LIMIT THE TEMPERATURE UNDER WHICH THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROCM INSTRLMENTION MUST OPERATE. IN ADDITION, EMERGENCY OPERATION OF THE CR HVAC SYSTEM IS REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A LOCl TO RECIRCULATE SOME AIR THROUGH A SELF CONTAINED POST-LOCI FILTER SYSTEM.

GAGGING OPEN DAMPER 0 - DAMP - 5372 WILL ALLOW REPAIR WORK TO BE PERFORMED.

WORK UNDER THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION (1 - % -0110) ENSURES A REDUNDANT PATH IS MAINTAINED THROUGH THE RETURN FAN DUCT SYSTEM SHOULD UNIT #12 RETURN FAN BE NEEDED IN A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY SATISFIES THE REQUIRE -

MENT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3 / 7.6.1 BY MAINTAINING THE REQUIRED REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM WILL

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A& oc Report 127 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 NOT BE ADVERSELY IMPACTED AND THAT THE CONTROL ROOM REMAINS HABITA8LE FOR OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PR08A81LITY AND / OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. TA 1 - % -0110 DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRISED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES. THERE -

FORE, IT MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN U S Q.

Doctanent ID Revision Status a

======================== ========

SE00127 0000 64 i

Subject:

ALLOW USE OF U-BEND STA8tLIZERS IN S/G Alias: ,

POSRC #:  % -071 Alsoc Doc ID: ES199601032-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pirs Rzfa:

E @fpment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 064 REACTOR COOLANT Ttxt: DURING THE 1996 UNIT 1 RF0 EDDY CURRENT INSPECTIONS OF THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES, SIX DIFFERENT TUBES WERE IDENTIFIED WITH INDICATIONS OF ,

CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TU8E BUNDLE.

THE TUBES blLL BE PLUGGED AND REMOVED FROM SERVICE. PRIOR TO PLUGGING, THESE TUSES WILL REQUIRE STABILIZATION OF THE DEFECTIVE AREA 0F THE TUBE.

REACHING THIS LOCATION HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE SUNDLE WILL REQUIRE THE USE OF A MUCH LONGER STABILIZER THAN USED SEFORE, SUCH AS THE  ;

FRAMATOME (FTI) U-BEND CABLE STABILIZER THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS MODIFICATION ACTIVITY. SINCE TUSE STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES ARE No LONGER APPLICABLE ONLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE TUBESHEET REGION, BUT NOW EXTEND HIGH INTO THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTIVITY, IT IS NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE UFSAR 4 1 3 2 TO REMOVE "IN THE TUSESHEET REGION" FROM THE STABILIZER DISCUSSION. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION REVIEWS THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF USING THE U-SEND CABLE STABILIZERS TO STABILIZE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES WITH DEGRADATION HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUSE BUNDLE.

THE 'J-BEND CA8LE STABILIZERS ARE LONGER VERSIONS OF THE CABLE STABILIZERS ALREADY APPROVED FOR USE IN THE CCNPP STEAM GENERATORS. THE STABILIZERS WILL BE INSTALLED IN TUBES ALREADY DESIGNATED FOR PLUGGING AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY HAS NO 19 FACT ON THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF THE STEAM GENERATORS OR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RCS OR SECONDARY SIDE SYSTEMS. EACH U-BEND CABLE STABILIZER IS LIGHT-WEIGHT (APPROKIMATELY 25 LBS) AND WILL HAVE AN INSIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR OR TUSE SUPPORTS. THE STABILIZERS HELP RESTORE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF A DEGRADED TUBE WITH i

_ ..._m.._____ - _.__c_..-________._____._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ _ _ . _ _ _ , , . - , - . . , . . _ , < - , em .-r--- r -- - %.= = = - --w

i NMR901S NUCLEls 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 128 ,

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 INDICATION OF CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING. FIV ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED THAT VERIFIED ACCEPTABLE FLUID ELASTIC STASILITY, DISPLACEMENTS, AND VIBRATIONS '

CMARACTERISTICS UWER DESIGN FLOW COWITIONS, EVEN IF TME CRACE CENFLETELY SEVERED TME TUBE, AND THERE WAS NO CONCERN RELATED TO TUBE CONTACT WITH AN IN-SERVICE TUDE. MIGN SECONDARY SIDE FLOW TRANSIENTS (SUCN AS MSLB) WERE ALSO EVALUATED FOR EFFECT ON THE STASILIZED TUBE. VERTICAL NOTION OF A TUBE IS RESTRICTED BY THE ASSOCIATED " BATWING" A M VERTICAL SUPPORTS IN THE UPPER U-BEW REGION OF THE TUOE BUNDLE. SHOULD THE FLUID FORCES BE i SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO DEFLECT THE STABILIZED TUDE AND MAKE CONTACT WITM ANOTMER TUBE ABOVE, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LOADS WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE IN-SERVICE TUBE. IT IS LIKELY THAT ANY DEFLECTION ENCOUNTERED WOULD END AT THE TERMINATION OF THE TRANSIENT AND TME STASILIZED TUDE WOULD RETURN TOWARD ITS ORIGINAL POSITION, BREAKING l CONTACT WITM THE IN-SERVICE TUBE. EVEN IF THE TUDE REMAINED IN CONTACT WITH AN IN-SERVICE TUSE AND THE STEAM GENERATOR WAS PLACED BACK INTO OPERATION, ANY FIV RELATED WEAR WERALD TAKE PLACE OVER A LONG PERitB 0F TIME.

TUOE DEGRADATFON AND/OR TUBE CONTACT WILL BE DISCOVERED BY NORMAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION ACTIVITIES LONG BEFORE IT CAN PROGRESS TO A TUDE FAILURE.

IF THE TUDE ADJACENT TO THE STASILIZED TUBE WERE TO FAIL AS A RESULT 0F WEAR FROM THE STASILIZED TUBE, THERE WOULD BE PRIMARY TO SECOWARY t LEAKAGE FROM THE RCS. THIS WOULD RESULT IN AN EVENT SIMILAR TO THE ONE ALREADY ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR CHAPTER 14.15, STEAM GENERATOR TUDE RUPTURE (SGTR) EVENT. THAT ANALYSIS ASSUMED DOUBLE-ENDED TUBE RUPTURE As A DESIGN BASIS SGTR EVENT AND RESULTED IN MANIMUM 0-2 MOUR SITE BOUNDARY DOSES SUBSTANTIALLY LESS TMAN THE GUIDELINES OF 10 CFR 100.

BASED ON THIS SAFETY EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED TMAT THE USE OF  !

FTI U-5END CABLE STABILIZERS TO STABILIZE A DEGRADED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE I DOES INCREASE NOT INCREASE THE PR08 ABILITY OF A TUBE RUPTURE MALFUNCTION, '

DOES NOT CREATE A SAFETY CONCERN, DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION, NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY ,

QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

============================== ======== = ==== s SE00128 64

Subject:

REMOVE SMIELD 8 LOCKS FROM U-2 EQUIPMENT MATCM Alles:

POSRC #:  %-076 AIsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: 2-96-0035 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMtB TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS sender Matl # Xmtl Date

=================================================mm============== =========== m===m

Other rsfs:  !

Pers R2fs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

?

-.- - _ - . _ _ _ . - - --._. - _. _ . -. _-_ _ ._ - -__ _ - _ _ _ - --- _ ___ _ - _ _ __ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . - ,- - - - , , - ~ -

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A&oc Report 129 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Text: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS LOCATED IN THE UNIT 2 8UTLER BUILDING IN FRONT OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH TO BE RELOCATED FOR UP TO 14 DAYS FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH NOZZLE DIMENSIONS. THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION SUPPORTS A PLANT MODIFICATION TO INSTALL A NEW EQUIPMENT HATCH WHICH WILL GREATLY INCREASE OUTAGE FLEXI81LITY AND COULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN OUTAGE CRITICAL PATH.

THE CONCRETE SHIELDING BLOCKS NOW IN PLACE IN FRONT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT HATCHES WERE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED TO REDUCE THE HIGH NEUTRON AND GAfWtA DOSES SEEN IN AND AROUND THE 8UTLER BUILDINGS FOLLOWING INITIAL STARTUP OF THE PLANTS. THIS CONCERN WITH HIGH DOSE RATES DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS HAS LARGELY BEEN ELIMINATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW NEUTRON SHIELD SURROUNDING THE REACTOR VESSEL. THEREFORE, UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO KEEP THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE TO BE A8LE TO KEEP OCCUPATIONAL DOSES ALARA AND TO NOT EXCEED THE 10 CFR 20 LIMITS.

REMOVAL OF THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS MAY RESULT IN A POST-LOCA INCREASE IN ON-SITE DOSE, BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE TO THE OFF-SITE DOSE TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. LIKEWISE, REMOVAL ,

OF THESE SHIELD 8 LOCKS WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE POST-LOCA DOSE i TO ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO OPERATE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SUCH THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT CAN NO LONGER BE DEMONSTRATED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE ACCESS TO ANY PLANT AREA SUCH THAT ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT MAY NO LONGER BE TAKEN. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO LICENSING REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

Document ID Revision Status

w========================= ======== ==

SE00130 0000 62

Subject:

INSTALL BLIND FLANGE ON RV 115 Alias:

POSRC #:  % -0148 A1 soc Doc ID: M-90-164 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: DCALC RLf Doc ID: 2-95-0140 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

wa================================================================================== ============ =========

Other rEfs:

Pers Rafa:

_ . .m . ,_. m. . . .. . _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ ..- _. . .. . __m._ .__ _ ,__. _ .__ ._

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Actioc Report 130 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 EcpJipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

Text: SUMARY:

THE PURPOSE OF TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 95 0140 IS TO INSTALL A FREEZE SEAL IN THE DISCHARGE PIPING OF VCT REllEF VALVE 2Rv115. THIS VALVE IS BEING REPLACED DURING MODE 5, 6 OR DEFUELED WHEN THE UNIT 2 CVCS WILL BE TAGr4D OUT OF SERVICE; HOE VER, THE DISCHARGE PIP!NG IS IN THE WPS, WHICH IS Co m 0N TO BOTH UNITS CANNOT BE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE.

THE FREEZE SEAL HAS BEEN EVALUATED AS EQUIVALENT TO A SYSTEM BOUNDARY ISOLATION VALVE. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, THAT ARE EQUIVALENT TO SUCH A VALVE, AND WERE DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE '

FREEZE SEAL WILL HAVE NO DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE PIPING SYSTEM. IF LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY TO THE FREEZE SEAL WERE LOST, INTEGRITY OF THE $

FREEZE SEAL WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR AT LEAST 1 HOUR. DURING THIS TIME A BLI W FLANGE WOULD BE INSTALLED ON THE REiiEF VALVE OUTLET PIPING.

THEREFORE, IF THE FREEZE SEAL INTEGRITY W RE N01 RE-ESTA8LISHED, THE BLIND FLANGE WOULD PROVIDE PRESSURE pr%0ARY. ALL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS l OF THE RC WPS PIPING ARE MET, WPE PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED AND MEETS SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR AC;IDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ. j Document ID Revision Status

wa==n=======r============== ======== ===

SE00131 64

Subject:

EVALUATION OF CONNECTING PIPE DRAINS TO FILL EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING Alias:

POSRC #:  %-084 Aisoc Doc ID: ES199601451-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtt Date >

================================================================================= ============ ======

Other rtfs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Tsut: THIS ACTIVITY WILL PROVIDE A MEANS OF FILLING THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING WITH AMBIENT WATER WHILE AT POWER. THIS WILL ADDRESS CONCERNS THAT THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION MOVS COULD BE SUBJECT TO " THERMALLY INDUCED PRESSURE LOCKING" CAUSED BY HOT REACTOR COOLANT ENTERING THE SUMP AT THE BEGINNING OF A LOCA. STAINLESS STEEL TUBING WILL BE USED TO CONNECT TOGETHER THE TWO NORMALLY CLOSED DRAIN VALVE TAIL PIPES THAT ARE LOCATED ON EACH SIDE OF THE CTMT SUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES. WHEN THE DRAIN VALVES ARE OPENED

m _ _ _ . ..

NNRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Seard Procesa A&oc Report 131 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE CONTAINMENT SUMP MOV CAN BE OPENED AND WATER FROM THE RWT WILL FILL THE SUMP PIPING. WHEN THE EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING IS FULL, WATER WILL SPILL FRJM THE EMERGENCY SUMP AND INTO THE NORMAL SUMP. THE HIGH LEVEL ALARM IN THE NORMAL SUMP WILL ALLOW OPERATORS TO KNOW THAT THE EMERGENCY SLBF IS FULL AND CLOSE THE MOV AND THE DRAIN VALVES. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT ALTER THE FUNCTION OF ANY ECCS EQUIPMENT. IT DOES NOT CAUSE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TO BE LOST, AND IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF ANY ACCIDENTS. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

- - ===================== ======== ======

SE00133 0000 64

Subject:

RETIRE IN PLACE O R I 7 0 2 8 AND 0 R E 7 0 2 8 Alias:

POSRC #: 96-096 Assoc Doc ID: ES199600595-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

w==================================================================================== ============ ==========

Other rafs:

Pers R4fa:

Equipment: ORE 7028 MISC WASTE EVAP RM RAD MONITOR ORI7028 MISC WASTE EVAP RM AREA MON ,

System Code: 077 AREA RADIATION MONITORING Tsut: THIS ACTIVITY RETIRES THE AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM FOR 11 MISCELLANEOUS WASTE EVAPORATOR (MWE).

THE MWE IS RETIRED IN PLACE AND ITS AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE MWE AREA RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM ARE THE LOCAL DETECTOR, LOCAL INDICATOR, AND REMOTE INDICATOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THESE COMPONENTS WILL BE DISA8 LED.

THE MWE IS LOCATED WITHIN THE CONCRETE WALLS OF ITS OWN ROOM. SINCE THE MWE IS NO LONGER USED AND THE MONITOR IS SHIELDFD FROM OTHER SSCS, I.E.,

ONLY SERVES TO SUPPORT THE MWE, THE AREA RADIATION MONITOR IS NO LONGER REQUIRED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED TO ALLOW REVISING UFSAR SECTION 7 5 8.

THIS SECTION LISTS AREA RADIATION MONITOR 7028 AS A CATEGORY 3 VARIABLE.

THIS TEXT WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

- 8ASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

t

l NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search loroces2 A & oc Ceport 132 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Doctment ID Revision Status

..............._._._. ======== ======

SE.00134 0000 64

Subject:

SUPPLY TEMPORARY POWER TO THE UNIT 1 POLAR CRANE FROM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BACKED SUS 11A.

i Atlast POSRC #:  %-091 ,

A2 soc Doc ID: 61009 Revision To: 0C30 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG Rif Doc ID: 1- % -0138 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmti # Xmtl Date I

w=ss=================================u============================================== ============ ==========

other rsfs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment: .

Org/Div:

System Code: 005 ELECTRICAL 480V TRANSFORMERS AND BUSES 7txt: THIS ACTIVITY TEMPORARILY POWERS THE UNIT 1 POLAR CRANE FR(M AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BACKED BUS. THE POLAR CRANE WILL BE POWEPED FROM 480 VAC CUBICLE 52 1103 VIA A SAFETY RELATED CIRCUIT BREAKER. THE ADDITIONAL LOAD ,

ON 480 VAC BAS 11A WILL BE A TEMPORARY CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 8-3. THE ALLOWABl.E MODES FOR INSTALLATION ON THIS TEMPORARY ALTERNATION ARE MODES 5, 6, AND DEFUELED. 3 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION IS DESIRED BECAUSE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM r (RCS) WILL BE IN A REDUCED INVENTORY CONDITION DURING MAINTENANCE OF 118 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP. MORE RELIABLE POWER FOR THE POLAR CRANE IS DESIRED TO ALLOW FOR CLOSURE OF THE RCS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.

THE LOADS ON THE SYSTEM MAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE.

THE LOADS ON 480V BUS 11A WILL MAINTAIN THEIR RELAY / BREAKER PROTECTION AND WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE 480V SUS THROUGH A SAFETY RELATED BREAKER.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY OUESTION.

Doctment ID Revision Status

_._... ==========_========== ======== ====

SE00135 0000 64

Subject:

REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS AND INSTALLATION OF THE N-16 MONITORS Alias:

POSRC #: 96-095 fasoc Doc ID: 91-0251-003 Revision To: 0000 Asscc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

i

---.-:-------_--__---. -. - - - . - - - - .~ - .-

.. -_~ - - .

WWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A&oc Report 133 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Sender Xmtl # Matt Date

====______= =========================== = ============________.= m m ============ ======

Other rifs:

Pers R;far Equipment: 1RE5421 MN STM LINE 11 EFF RAD MONITOR 1RE5422 MN STM LINE 12 EFF RAD MONITOR 1RIC5421 11 MAIN STM HDR RAD MONITOR 1RIC5421A 11 M STM LINE EFFL RAD IND CONTROL 1RIC5422 1 RE MN STM HDR RADN MON 1RIC5422A 12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD IND CONTROL 1RIT5421 11 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON 1RIT5421A 11 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON 1RIT5422 12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON 1RIT5422A 12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON 1RRS420 U1 SG11812 MN STM RAD MONI REC 1YX1x5421 1-RIT 5421 PREAMP 1TX1M5421A 1-RIT 5421A PREAMP i 1YX1M5422 1-RIT-5421 PREAMP  !

1YX1x5422A 1-RIT-5422A PREAMP 2RE5421 21 RE MN STM LINE EFFL RA

• 2RE5422 22 RE M STM LINE EFFL RA 2RIC5421 21 RE M STM HDR RADN MON 2RIC5421A 21 MN STM EFFL RAD IND CNTRL 2RIC5422 22 RE MN STM HDR RADN MON 2RIC5422A 22 MN STM EFFL RAD IND CNTRL 2RIT5421 21 M4 STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON 2RIT5421A 21 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON '

2RIT5422 22 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON 2RIT5422A 22 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON 2RR5420 2 RE MN STM RADN MON RECO i Ors /Div:

system Code: 077 AREA RADIATION MONITORING 079 PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING Ttxt: PROPOSED ACTIVITY:

THIS ACTIVITY REP' ACES THE MAIN STEAM LINE (MSL) EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS. i THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR, CONSISTS OF A DETECTOR, RATEMETER AND A RECORDER FOR EACH MAIN STEAM LINE WHICH PROVIDE INDICATION, TRENDING A%D ALARM FUNCTIONS. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS FOR UNITS 1 AND 2.

UNIT 2 DESIGN WILL BE ISSUED WITH SUPPLEMENT 4 A UFSAR CHANGE REQUEST IS INCLUDED WITH THIS ESP TO CHANGE THE SAR TO DESCRIBE 1HE NEW EQUIPMENT AND RANGES.

THE NEW EQUIPMENT IS CONFIGURED AS (TYPICAL):

(FIGURE INSERTED HERE)

SECTION 7.5.8, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION, DESCRIBES THIS ,

INSTRUMENTATION AS PAM-2. THE NEW EQUIPMENT WILL BE PAM-2. BOTH THE EXISTING AND NEW MONITORS SATISFY THE REG 1.97 REQUIRED RANGE (0.1 MICR0 CURIES PER CC TO 10E3 MICR0 CURIES PER CC) FOR THIS VARIABLE.

THE AFFECTED EXISTING EQUIPMENT IS 1(2)RE5421, 1(2)RIC5421, 1(2)RE5422, 1(2)RIC5422, AND 1(2)RR5420. THE NEW RE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE SAME

_ . . _ m __ _ _ _. _ .- _ . . m. _ . ._ __ . _ . . .. ._ _ .

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 134 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 LOCATION OF THE OLD RE (REUSE THE DETECTOR ENCLOSURES). THE NEW RICS AND RR WILL BE INSTALLED ON A TEMPORARY RACK BEMIND 2C26 UNTIL THEY ARE PERMANENTLY LOCATED BY SUPPLEMENT 004 OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE PREAMPLIFIERS AND LOCAL RATEMETERS WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM.

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT. THESE INSTRUMENTATION LOOPS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SR-PAM2.

THIS M(X)!FICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURE MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTIONS 4.3, 7.5.2, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, 11.2, FIGURE 11.4, AND APPENDIX 10A ARE IN NEED OF REVISION TO IDENTIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACTIVITY. THE TEXT AND FIGURE REVISIONS WILL REFLECT THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

Document ID Revision Status

=== = ================== m =====

SE00137 0000 64 S4]ect: TEMPORARY FLOW PATHS IN MISC. WASTE SYSTEM Atlas:

POSRC #: 96 096 AIsoc Doc ID: 60735SH0002 Revision To: 0029 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG R2f Doc ID: 1-96-0089 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

=========== = = = =============================================================== ============ ======

Other rsfs:

Pers Rifs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 071 LIQUID WASTE ftxt: THE TEMPORARY ALTERATION PROVIDES THE DESIGN TO INSTALL A TEMPORARY FLOWPATH IN THE MISCELLANEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (MWS). THE TEMPORARY FLOWPATH WILL REDIRECT THE AUXILIARY BUILDING GRAVITY DRAINS, AND THE PUMPED SUMPS FROM THE INLET OF BASKET STRAINER 0 BS 2199 TO 11 MISCELLANEOUS WASTE RECEIVER TANK (MWRT). THIS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY CONNECTING A TEMPORARY HOSE BETWEEN THE COVER PLATE OF 0 BS 2199 AND THE MANWAY COVER AT 11 MWRT.

THIS TA WILL ALLOW FOR ISOLATION AND REPAIR (WELDING) 0* SfSTEM LEAKS AT 0 MWs 508 AND ASSOCIATED MWS PIPING.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY RESULTS IN A CHANGE TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT'S DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE MWS, SPECIFICALLY UFSAR FIGURE 11-2.

. _ _ _ _m __ . _ _ . . . _ m .__-.m.--. . _ . , - - - - . . . . - m. m_ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . m m_ _ _ .

WWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 135 10/D1/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE TEMPORARY FLOW PATH CONFORMS TO THE DESIGN REQUIRC4ENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CODES AND STANDARDS. THE FLOW FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING GRAVITY DRAINS AND PLMPED SLMPS ARE DIRECTED TO THE SAME TANK AS BEFORE. THE i TEMPORARY HOSE MAS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO ACCupWNI) ATE THE SYSTEM FLOW RATE.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT CREATE A NEW OR DIFFERENT RADICACTIVE RELEASE EVENT. 4 THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIA 8ILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE DESIGN C(I)ES, ,

STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.  !

8ASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED. ,

t t

Doctanent ID Revision Status *

======================== ========

SE00138 0000 62

Subject:

DESIGN FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP COVER Alias:

POSRC #:  % -116 AIsoc Doc ID: ES1995023%-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP R;f Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

========================================= = =================== ======= ============ ======

Other refs:

Pers RIfa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ftxt: ALICE C A R S O N 301 - 417 - 4212 .

(BECHTEL)

SupmARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ADDS A PERMANENT DEBRIS COVER OVER THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION SUMP IN LIEU OF THE EXISTING TEMPORARY DEBRIS COVER WHICH MUST BE ERECTED AT THE SEGINNING OF EACH OUTAGE AND DISMANTLED AT THE END OF EACJ ,

OUTAGE. THIS DEBRIS COVER IS SUPPORTED OFF OF THE EXISTING SCREEN BOX OVER THE SUMP. THE SCREEN BOX HAS SEEN EVALUATED FOR THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF THE %BRIS COVER AND MAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE DESRIS COVER IS DESIGNED SAFETY RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I AND IS FABRICATED FROM STAINLESS

- _~- , . . . . . - . . . . . , , . . .-

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 136 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 STEEL WHICH IS SUITABLE FOR USE IN THE POST-LOCA ENVIRONMENT.

THE DEBRIS COVER HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR ITS IMPACT ON PUMP SUCTION FROM THE ,

CONTAINMENT SLNEP AND HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE DEBRIS COVER IS 1 DESIGNED CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.82 AND IS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOGGING THE SUMP WITH OUTAGE GENERATED DEBRIS. THE COVER MAY ALSO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF GRAVITY DRIVEN DEBRIS FROM CLOGGING THE TOP OF THE SCREEN BOK IN A POST-LOCA ENVIRONMENT.

AS THE DEBRIS SCREEN IS DESIGNED SAFETY-RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN REGULATORY GUIDE 1.82, IS FABRICATED FROM SUITABLE MATERIALS, AND HAS BEEN FOUND NOT TO ADVtRSELY IMPACT THE FLOW FROM THE CONTAINMENT Simp TO THE PUMP SUCTION, THE ADDITION OF THE DEBRIS SCREEN DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSFQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS OR CREATE NEW MALFUNCT!ONS OR ACCIDENTS.

NO CHANGES TO THE NUMBER OF OPERABLE SYSTEMS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE MADE BY THIS ACTIVITY. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY CHANGES TO PIPING OR COMPONENTS IN THE SAFLTY INJECTION OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTLMS AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO ALIGN THESE SYSTEMS TO THE .

CONTAINMENT SUMP WATER SOURCE IN POST-RAS (RECIRCULATION ACTIVATION SIGNAL)  !

OPERATION. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE DEBRIS SCREEN HAS BEEN DESIGNED AND LOCATED AS NOT TO ADVERSELY IMPACT FLOW FROM THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY t RECIRCULATION SUMP TO THE PUMP SUCTION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT l REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  !

SINCE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

we======================== ======== ==

SE00139 62

Subject:

INSTALL 2 RV 4164 Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-129 Assoc Doc ID: ES199601617-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date mum _.uunum..__ m m mmm.uu._uum-mmm_m m,. mumm mummo ============ ============

l Other refs:

Pers R:fa:

Equipment: 2RV4164 21 RWT HEAT EXCHANGE RELIEF VALVE Org/Div:

System Code: 052 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Text:

SUMMARY

NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A & oc Report 137 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 RELIEF VALVES 1(2)RV 4164 ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE CVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FOR 11 AND 21 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANKS HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE DESIGN ENGINEERING FOR THE INSTALLATION OF 80TH RELIEF VALVES WAS PROVIDED UNDER FCR 75 11D8. HOWEVER, ONLY 1RV 4164 WAS INSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FCR CLOSEOUT.

THIS ESP PROVIDES THE DESIGN ENGINEERING TO ALLOW THE INSTALLATION OF 2RV 4164 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY RESULTS IN A LHANGE TO THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE i METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE SSC AS DEXRIBED IN UFSAR FIGURE t 6-10.

IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE TANC CONTENTS FROM FREEZI% IN THE WINTER, A PUMP PROVIDES CIRCULATION THROUGH AN EXTERNAL HEAT E5 HANGER. THE RWT CONTENTS ARE CIRCULATED THROUGH THE TUBE SIDE, NOT WATDt FROM THE PLANT HEATING SYSTEM FLOWS THROUGH THE SHELL SIDE. SURVEILLANCE OF THE TANKS CONTENTS IS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE RWT IS VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE; HOWEVER, THE EXTERNAL HEAT EXCHANGER CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE RWT. RELIEF VALVE 2RV 4164 FUNCTION TO PROVIDE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION TO 21 RWT HX i IN THE EVENT THE TUBE SIDE IS ISOLATED FROM THE RWT WHILE HOT WATER FROM i THE PLANT HEATING SYSTEM IS SUPPLYING THE SHELL SIDE.

THE INSTALLATION OF AN OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION DEVICE IS REQUIRED BY THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CODE OF THE RWT MX. THE RELIEF VALVE (2RV 4164) AND THE ASSOCIATED SETPOINT CONFORMS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIA 8ILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES '

OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVI!Y DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

Doctment ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00141 0000 62

Subject:

REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 Math STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS AND INSTALLATION OF THE N-16 MONITORS.

PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF RATEMETERS AND RECORDERS ON CONTROL ROOM PANELS 2C24B AND 2C26. AND CONSOLIDATION OF DATA POINT RECORDERS.

Alies:

POSRC #: 96-152

NMR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 138 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Assoc Doc ID: 91-0251-004 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmt! # Xmtl Date mammem<=========================mm================================. .......== ============ ====== = ===

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Pers Cefa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 079 PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING Text:

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND MAIN VENT WIDE RANGE NO8LE GAS RECORDERS. THESE INSTRUMENTATION LOOPS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SR-PAM2.

THIS M001FICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURE MODES. SASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY OUESil0N AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECT!aNS 4.3, 7.5, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, 11.2, FIGURE 11.4, AND APPENDIX 10A ARE IN NEED OF REVISION TO IDENTIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACTIVITY. THE TEXT AND FIGURE REVISIONS WILL REFLECT THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION. ALL CHANGES TO THE SAR HAVE SEEN IDENTIFIED IN SUPPLEMENT 003 AND 004 CF THIS ACTIVITY.

Doctment ID Revision Status

= ========= = ============== ======== =====

SE00142 0000 62

Subject:

50.59 FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE LRNI DRAWERS FOR RRS Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0130 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199501044-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP RIf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

========== m m m m ===== = === = ===== = = = ======== = ====================== ============ ======

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Pers Rafs:

Equipment:

Org/Div: m System Code: 078 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION D Text: SupmARY:

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process Aeoc Report 139 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THIS ACTIVITY WILL M PLACE THE U1 AND U2 LINEAR POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAWERS IN THE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM (RRS) FOR CHANNELS X AND Y WITH NEW ANALOG ELECTRONICS DRAWERS PROCURED THRGJGN SPECIFICATION SP 0797 REV 2 FROM GAf544-METRICS (GM). WHILE THE NEW PRNI DRAWERS WILL FIT IN THE SAME LOCATIONS AS THE EXISTING DRAIERS, THE DESIGN

-NAS SEEN MODIFIED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION, A W ENNANCE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRNI DRAWERS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED WHILE AT POWER. N0 LEVER, IF NECESSARY, THEY CAN BE PEPLACED WHILE THE UNIT IS It ANY MODE.

BASED ON THE FACTS THAT THE NEW RRS PRNI DRAWERS WILL PERFORM THE SAME

. FUNCTIONS AS THE EXISTING RRS PRNI DRAWERS, THAT THERE ARE NO NEW ACCIDENTS OR MALFUNCTIONS INTRODUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE RRS PRNI DRAWERS ARE NEITNER AN INITIATOR OR MITIGATOR OF AN ACCIDENT, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTRGMJCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY OUESTION (USG).

Document ID Revision Status

==- ============= ========

SE00143 62 Sthject: EVALUATE TRANSFER OF THROTTLE FUNCTION FROM 2 CV-5208 TO 2 CV-5163 Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-119 AIsoc Doc ID: ES9300001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rzf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Marti # Xurti Date

=========================== = = = ======.......===================================== ============ ===========

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Equipment:

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System Code: 012 SALT WATER COOLING Tcas: THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION WILL TRANSFER THE THROTTLE FUNCTION FOR THE CONTROL OF SALTWATER FLOW TO THE 22 CINEPONENT COOLING W TER NEAT EXCMANGER FROM 2-CV-5205 TO THE ADJACENT VALVE 2-CV-5163. SALTWATER CONTROL VALVE 2-CV-5208 NAS BEEN EXPERIENCING STROKE PROBLEMS. ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM MAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE VALVE BODY WEEDS TO DE REPLACED AND THIS IS ONLY POSS!BLC WNEN THE SALTWTER SYSTEM IS IN OVERBOARD M(BE.

OPEATIONS MAS BEEN EXERCISING THE VALVE DAILY TO ENSURE FUNCTION. TO REMOVE THE BURDEN FROM OPERATIONS CREATED BY THE DAILY STROKING OF THE VALVE, AND TO MAINTAIN FLOW CONTROL SHOULD THE VALVE DEGRADE FURTNER, THE CONTROL FUNCTION OF 2-CV-5206 WILL BE MOVED TO 2-CV-5163. 2-CV-5206 WILL BE FAILED OPEN. THIS WILL MAKE THE ALIGNMENT OF-THE 22 TRAIN MINIC THE ALIGNMENT OF 21 TRAIN. THE 21 TRAIN IS COMPRISED OF AN INLET CV, A LOCKED

L NNR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997' Search Procesa A& oc Report 140 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 I

OPEN MANUAL AND A FLOW CONTROL VALVE. THE 22 TRAIN WILL APPEAR TO HAVE AN INLET CV, A FLOW CONTROL VALVE AND A " LOCKED OPEN" VALVE. IN THIS CONFIGURATION SOTH TRAINS WILL HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY, AND RESISTANCE TO FAILURE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF l A NEW MALFUNCTION OR CHANGE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EVALUATED MALFUNCTION.

THE SALTWATER SYSTEM IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR, THIS IS NOT CHANGED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT IS NOT CREATED AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN +

ACCIDENT ARE NOT CHANGED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT  :

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.  !

Document ID Revision Status [

SE00144 0000 62 Stbject: COVER PLATE FOR CAVITY COOLING FANS INLET PLENEUM DUCTWORK Alles:

POSRC #: 96 117 ,

Assoc Doc ID: 60723SH0003 Revision To: 0016 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG Rzf Doc ID: 2-96-0037 Rev: Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MCDIFICATIONS 2-96-0038 TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtt # Mett Date

......._...................................~......~..m......... ... 2......__....._. ============ ============

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Org/Div:

System Code: 066 CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM Text: SU M ARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS (TA)

WHICH WILL INSTALL A PLATE TO COVER THE OPENING IN THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM DUCTWORK AFTER REMOVAL OF THE UNIT 1 (2) CAVITY COOLING FANS / MOTORS FOR MAINTEhANCE WORK. THIS COVER PLATE ASSEMBLY WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM DUCTWORK PLENUM AT THE INLET SIDE OF THE CAVITY COOLING FAN AND WILL REMAIN IN PLACE ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE MAINTENANCE WORK. PLACING A COVER PLATE ON THE OPENING WILL ALLOW FOR THE CONTINUED USE OF THE CONTAINMENT AIR FANS WITHOUT LARGE VOLLMES OF AIR BYPASSING THE DUCTWORK. THIS WILL ALSO HELP TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF AIR 90RNE RADIDACTIVITY FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE IMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE CAVITY COOLING FAN. THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS APPLICABLE TO THOSE TAS ENVELOPING THE CHANGES DESCRIBED IN THIS EVALUATION.

DURING THE INSTALLATION PERIOD OF THE TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS, THE APPLICAmLE UNIT WILL 8E IN EITHER MODES 5, 6, OR DEFUELED.

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS GENERATED BECAUSE THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM AS DEPICTED ON UFSAR FIGURE 9 20A IS TEMPORARILY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

NMRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Ceport 141 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THERE ARE NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING THE USE OF A DUCT COVER PLATE ASSEMBLY TO BE TEMPORARILY INSTALLED TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THE CAVITY COOLING FANS. THERE ARE NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS CREATED AS A RESULT OF THE SUBJECT TA ACTIVITY. ALSO, THERE IS NO AFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF THE SUBJECT TA ACTIVITY. SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, SINCE NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY Th!S ACTIVITY, AND SINCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES IS NOT REDUCED, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID Revision Status SE00145 0000 62 Stbject: FCR 86-0118, 2A, 18, AND 28 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO BAR MODIFICATION Allas:

POSRC #: 96-0125 AIsoc Doc ID: 86-0118-02 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

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P;rs RIfat Equipnent:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Text: SUMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS 2A, 1B AND 28 TO ALLOW A CONTROLLED CRANKSHAFT ROLL OR BARRING, USING AIR FROM A DIESEL STARTING AIR RECEIVER TANK AS THE MOTIVE FORCE FOR ROTATION. BARRING IC REC 0petENDED BY THE EDG MANUFACTURER TO REMOVE EXCESS LUBRICATING OIL THAT COLLECTS IN THE EXHAUST PORTS AND EXHAUST MANIFOLD AFTER THE ENGINE MAS COMPLETED THE OPERATING CYCLE. THIS CONTRIBUTES TO EXCESS SMOKE AND POSSIBLE FIRES UPON STARTING OF THE ENGINES. DURING THE BARRING OPERATION, THE AFFECTED EDG IS DECLARED INOPERABLE, OUT OF SERVICE. THE HAZARDS, PHYSICAL DIFFICULTY AND EDG UNAVAILABILITY TIME ASSOCIATED WITH MANUAL BARRING MAKES IT DESIRABLE TO " AIR BAR' THE ENGINE, USING THE STARTING AIR SYSTEM.

A NEW BYPASS LINE WITH MANUAL BYPASS VALVES SHALL BE INSTALLED TO ALLOW BYPASSING OF THE EXISTING MANUAL AIR START SOLENOID VALVES, 2 SV 4831, 1 SV 4835 AND 2 SV 4839 ON 2A, 13 AND 28 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS, RESPECTIVELY. THE BYPASS LINE WILL BRANCH OFF THE EXISTING DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR CHECK VALVE TEST ISOLATION VALVE ON THE MANUAL AIR START SUPPLY LINE AND BRANCH BACK INTO THE STARTING AIR SUPPLY HEADERS,

I I

NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proceso Adioc Report 142 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 UPSTREAM OF THE AIR START SOLENDID VENT VALVE FOR EACH DIESEL. THE THROTTLE BYPASS VALVE IN THE LINE EMA8LES A VARIABLE SUPPLY OF AIR TO BE DELIVERED TO THE ENGINE CYLINDERS WITHOUT OPENING THE AIR START SOLEN 0!D VALVE. TNIS, IN TURN, WILL ALLOW AN AIR CONTROLLED BARRING OF THE ENGINE. A PRESSURE GAUGE WILL ALSO BE INSTALLED DOWNSTREAM OF THE THROTTLE VALVE TO ALLOW THE OPERATOR CONSTANT MONITORING OF THE AIR PRESSURE BEING DELIVERED TO THE ENGINE CYLINDERS.

ALSO, A NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE WILL BE INSTALLED TO ISOLATE THE STARTING AIR DRIVEN REAR MAIN BEARING OIL BOOSTER CYLINDER. THIS WILL PREVENT OIL FROM SEING EVACUATED FROM THE O!L 800 STER SO THE ENGINE REMAINS READY FOR AN EMERGENCY START AFTER 8ARRING IS COMPLETE. ENGINE OPERATION IS REQUIRED TO REFILL THIS CYLINDER IF IT IS EVACUATED. A HANDSWITCH AND APPROPRIATE WIRING WILL BE ADDED TO THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY OF THE EDG'S TO PREVENT INADVERTENT STARTING OF THE EDG DURING THE AIR BAR OPERATION AND TO SHUT THE AIR START VENT VALVE TO ALLOW THE HEADER TO PPESSURIZE. THE NEW MANDSWITCH IS ISOLATED FROM THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF THE EDG BY NORMALLY OPEN CONTACTS ON THE EXISTING LOCAL / REMOTE MANDSWITCH.

THE FUNCTION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AND INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN 8 ASIS OF THE EDGS AND PLANT EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED, SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACL' DENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUTED IN THE SAR REMIN VALID. THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE EDGS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THESE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS.

THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE 8 ASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Docunent ID Revision Status

om==co=================================

SE00146 0000 62

Subject:

REMOVAL OF BLEEDER TRIP VALVE AIR ASSIST CYLINDER FOR NEW MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE.

Alias:

POSRC #:  % -119

. ._ _ . . _ . ._ .. . _.. -. ~~ . . ~ . . - - . - . - . - . . ~ . . ... ~. . . . . . , . .. ,_ _ . -

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa Adioc Report 143 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199601899-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Raf Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

t Sender Xmti # Xmtl Date

-==============m.__.m=========================================== ======= = == ============

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Org/Div:

System Code: 046 EXTRACTION STEAM Ttxt: THE REMOVAL OF THE COUNTERWEIGHT ARMS AND AIR ASSIST CYLINDERS ON ANY ONE OF THE 87VS ALTERS THE DESIGN OF THE 8TV AS DESCRISED IN THE OFSAR (FIGURE 10-5 OR 10 10 AND SECTION 5.3.1.2). THIS SAFETY EVALUATION PROVIDES THE BASIS DOCUMENTATION THAT WILL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE VALVE 18A. THE OPERATION OF THE BTV IS NOT CREDITED AS AN ACCIDENT MITIGATOR AND ITS FAILURE TO CLOSE DOES NOT INITIATE ANY ACCIDENTS NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED IN THE CHAPTER 14 ANALYSIS, THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DESCRISED IN THE SAR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Document ID Revision Status

s======================z ========

SE00147 0000 62

Subject:

USE OF PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR AS A BACKUP TO PLANT AIR WHILE IN MODES 1 AND 2 Alias:

POSRC #:  % -0127 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199601829-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmti # Xatt Date

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =========== === = ====

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Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR i Ttxt: SUPMARY: i THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE CONNECTION OF A PORTA 8LE AIR COMPRESSOR TO EITHER UNIT'S PLANT AIR SYSTEM TO ACT AS A BACKUP TO THE OPERATING INSTALLED PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR WHEN THE OTHER INSTALLED PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR IS UNAVAILABLE.

USE OF THE PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR IS INTENDED AS A CONTINGENCY MEASURE TO ,

INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF THE PLANT AIR SYSTEM WHILE ONE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR 15 UNAVAILABLE. USE OF THE PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR AS A CONTINGENCY BACKUP WILL BE ALLOWED IN ANY PLANT OPERATING MODE. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE

. _ - _ . _ _ _ _ - _ . . - _ - _ . _ _ - . - _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ _____- .__---_ - - -- - - - -- . . _ _ - . . . . - . . - - . . - . _ . - ~ _ . - _ -

. . . ._. _ m . -_

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Froces3 Adhoc Report 144 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Document ID Revision Status

' ------~--- ===================== ======== ======

SE00149 0000 62

$4}ect: REPLACE TRANSFORMER U-440-248 Alias:

POSRC #: 96-134 Azsoc Doc ID: E3199600218-001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

e - ============================================================================= ============ =========

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Org/Div:

System Code: 005 ELECTRICAL 480V TRANSFORMERS AND BUSES Ttxt: SUlmARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES CLASS 1E UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U-440-248. THE REPLACEMENT IS A CLA5S 1E, SEISMIC CLASS 1 TRANSFORMER. THE NEW TRANSFORMER HAS THE SAME ELECTRICAL RATING AS THE OLD ONE. THE OLD TRANSFORMER IS OIL FILLED, SELF COOLED AND THE NEW TRANSFORMER IS A DRY TYPE, SELF COOLED.

THE SAR DRAWING IS BEING REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER COOLING METHOD. THIS ACTIVITY DOE SNOT REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

======================== ========

SE00155 62 S@ ject: 8Y PASS THE EDG NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS ON AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL Atlas:

POSRC #: 96-0147 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199600862-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

==================================================================================== ......====== ========c

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1

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ___________.______.____________.-%.- --- - _ _ __ _ _ mm__

l NMR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Procesa A& oc Report 145 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Pers Rifa:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024 ENERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Text:

SUMMARY

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY TO TRIP THE FAIRBANKS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG),18, 2A OR 28, ON ONE OF THE THREE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS (LOW JACKET COOLANT PRESSURE, HIGH JACKET COOLANT TEMPERATURE, AND CRANKCASE PRESSURE) DURING AN UNDERWOLTAGE CONDITION.

IF A TORNADO OCCURRED IN FRONT OF THE EDG DOORS THE AMBIENT PRESSURE WOULD DROP FAST ENOUGHT NOT TO ALLOW THE EDG CRANKCASE PRESSURE TO EQUALIZE PROPERLY. THE CRANKCASE PRESSURE SENSORS WOULD READ A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND ASSUME THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE CRANKCASE PRESSURE THAT WAS DUE TO ENGINE PROBLEM. THE EDG WOULD TRIP AND BE UNAVAILABLE TO SUPPLY POWER DURING THIS ACCIDENT CONDITION.

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES A BLOCK SIGNAL TO THE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS ON THE THREE EDGS. ON A BLOCK SIGNAL FROM THE LOAD SHED VERIFICATION INDICATION RELAY (INDICATION RELAY), WHICH WILL MIMIC AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL, THE FOLLOWING EDG TRIPS WILL BE BLOCKED: LOW JACKET COOLANT PRESSURE, HIGH JACKET COOLANT TEMPERATURE, AND CRANKCASE PRESSURE. THESE EDG TRIPS PROVIDE EQUIPMENT PROTECTION FOR THE ENGINE. IN AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE EDG OPERATE AND NOT TRIP THAN TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC RISK OF DAMAGING THE MACHINE.  !

A MALFUNCTION OF THE RELAY WILL RESULT IN EITHER THE EDG NOT TRIPPING ON A NON-ESSENTIAL TRIP WHEN REQUIRED OR THE RELIANCE ON A TWO CUT OF THREE TRIP LOGIC TO PREVENT NUISANCE TRIPPING IF THE RELAY DOES NOT BLOCK THE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS. THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE EDG DURING AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

r Docunent ID Revision Status

====_______============= ========

SE00157 0000 62

Subject:

EQUIPMENT HATCH RADIATION SHIELDING Alias:

POSRC #: 96-143 Assoc Doc ID: ES199502468-005 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP

-_____.-.__.__.___.-___._-.-__.___-___-----___---_-_-__-__n- , - - - . _ . _ - . - - _ _ _ _ -

__. _ _ . -- - . _ . _ - _ . _ _ ._ .. . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . ._ m _ _ . _ . .

NWR8018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces^3 A& oc Report 146 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = _ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ============ ===========

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Pers RIfs:

Equipment: 1 DOOR 67 CNTMT EQUIPMENT HATCH 2000R67 CNTNT EQUIPMENT HATCH Org/Div:

System Code: 059 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Text: SL#etARY:

THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS OUTSIDE THE EQUIPMENT HATCH OPENING WERE ELIMINATED BASED UPON RE-EVALUATION OF THE MAXIIRJM HYPOTHETICAL LOCA ,

EFFECTS. REVISED THE APPROPRIATE UFSAR FIGURES TO SHOW THE REMOVAL OF 1 THE CONCRETE SHIELD 8 LOCKS FROM THE OUTSIDE OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH AREA.

THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID Revision Status

=

SE00158 0000 62 Stbject: SAFETY EVAL FOR NEW LRNI DRAWERS FOR UNIT 1 AND 2 RPS Alias:

POSRC #: 96-157 Atsoc Doc ID: ES199501044-001 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: ESP Rif Doc ID: SE00142 Rev: 0000 Refer Type: 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

================================================================================= ============ ======

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Psrs RIfs:

Equipment: 1NIDOS CHANNEL A PWR RNG SFTY NI i' 1NID06 CHANNEL 8 PWR RNG SFTY NI '

1N!007 CHANNEL C PWR RNG SFTY NI 1N!008 CHANNEL D PWR RNG SFTY NI 2NIDOS 2 NI POWER RANGE SA*ETY C 2NID06 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C 2N1007 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C 2N1008 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C Org/Div:  ;

System Code: 058 REACTOR PROTECTIVE  ;

078 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION Ttxt: SupetARY:

THIS ACTIVITY WILL REPLACE THE U1 AND U2 LINEAR POWER RANGE NUCLEAR .

I i

6 i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.__._____m____-____.___.___________________m____m_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _.c _ .c - me .

NMR5018 CJCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Process A&oc Report 147 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAWERS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM (RPS)

FOR CHANNELS A, 8, C, AND D WITH NEW ANALOG ELECTRONICS DRAWERS PROCURED THROUGH SPECIFICATION SP 0797 REV 2 FROM GApeu METRICS (GM). WHILE THE NEW PRNI DRAWERS WILL FIT IN THE SAME LOCATION AS THE EXISTING DRAWERS, THE DESIGN HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION, AND ENHANCE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRN! DRAWERS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED WHILE ST POWER. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY, THEY CAN SE REPLACED WHILE THE UNIT IS IN ANY MODE.

BASED ON THE FACTS THAT THE NEW RPS PRNI DRAWERS WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE EXISTING RPS PRNI DRAWERS, THAT THERE ARE NO NEW ACCIDENTS OR MALFUNCTIONS INTRG)UCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE RPS PRNI DRAWERS ARE NEITHER AN INITIATOR OR MITIGATOR OF AN ACCIDENT, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT :NTRODUCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

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SE00160 62 Stbject: UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL PIPING Atlas:

POSRC #: 96 139 A1 soc D x ID: 60484 Revision To: 0008 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG 60736 0028 C BGEDRWG Ra' Doc ID: 1-96-0187 Rev: 0001 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Sender Xmtt # Xmtl Date

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THIS EVALUATION PROVIDES THE ENGINEERING TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF DIRT FROM THE HB-5 UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL PIPING TO INVESTIGATE THE LINE FOR POTENTIAL OIL LEAKS.

OIL SOILED DIRT WAS DISCOVERED WHILE INSTALLING ANODES IN FRONT OF THE #21 DIESEL OIL TANK. IR1 050 755 WAS WRITTEN.TO ADDRESS THIS CONCERN. SYSTEM ENGINEERING WOULD LIKE TO UN EARTH THE OIL LINES TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE DIL LEAK. IN DOING So, THE O!L PIPING WILL BE EXPOSED TO THE AIR AND WILL NOT BE PROTECTED FROM TORNADO AND HURRICANE LOADS. THE SAR DISCUSSES THE ABILITY OF CAT I STRUCTURES AND SUPPORTING COMPONENTS TO RESIST IMPACT FROM MISSILES.

THEREFORE, THERE IS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

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NWRB018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces) A&oc Report 148 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 Document ID Revision Status

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SE00161 0000 62

Subject:

BYPASS LINE FOR 1/2 Mov 651 ADN 652 [

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POSRC #: 96-0157 Assoc Doc ID: ES199600343-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: O Assoc Type: ESP I Rif Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

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System Code: 052 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Tcut: SumARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO INSTALL A BYPASS LINE ACROSS THE UPSTREAM SEAT OF 1 (2)MOV-651 AND 652.

THESE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES ARE THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM SUCTION LINE f

ISOLATION VALVES. THE FUNCTION OF THE BYPASS LINE IS TO PROVIDE A RELIEF PATH FOR THE FLUID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET CAVITY THUS ELIMINATING THE POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURE LOCKING OF THESE VALVES.

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS NEEDED SINCE THE SAR 'S DESCRIPTION OF THE '

SDC IS ALTERED BY THIS MODIFICATION. SPECIFICALLY UFSAR FIGURES 5-10, 6-1 AND 6-10 WILL BE REVISED TO DEPICT THE BYPASS LINE.

THE SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) SYSTEM IS USED TO REMOVE CORE DECAY HEAT AND REACTOR COOLANT SENSIBLE HEAT DURING PLANT COOLDOWNS AND COLD SHUTDOWNS. .

THE SYSTEM ALSO COOLS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY WATER DURING CONTAINNENT SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS) OPERATION POST RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (RAS) AND MAINTAINS REFUELING TEMPERATURE DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS. ADDITONALLY, THE HEAT EXCHANGERS CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING (SFPC) WHENT HE COMPLETE CORE IS REMOVED FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL AND l TEMPORARILY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP).

THE SDC SYSTEM SUCTION LINE HAS TWO HEADER ISOLATIONS VALVES,51-652 AND SI-651. THESE VALVES ARE MOTOR OPERATED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES. MOV 652 IS LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINEMNT NEAR THE ASSOCIATED RCS HOT LEG AND o MOV 651 IS LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING INSIDE THE PENETRATION ROOM.

BOTH VALVES ARE 12" GATE VALVES WITH A SINGLE DISC WHICH IS WEDGED CLOSE, BY THE MOTOR OPERATOR, BETWEEN TWO SEATS.

RECENT INDUSTRY CONCERNS HAS IDENTIFIED THESE VALVES AS BEING SUSCEPTIBLE FOR PRESSURE LOCKING. PRESSURE LOCKING CAN OCCUR VMEN THESE FLEXIBLE GATE

NWR9018 NUCLEIS 01/22/1997 Search Proces3 A& oc Report 149 10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996 VALVES ARE CLOSED AND A MIGNER PRESSURE FLUID IS TRAPPED IN THE BONNET CAVITY AS COMPARED TO THE SYSTEM PRESSURE. ONE SCENARIO LEADING TO TMIS TYPE OF BINDING OCCURS WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED WITH THE SYSTEM PRESSURE AT HIGH PRESSURE FOLLOWED BY A DECREASE IN THE SYSTEM PRESSURE THE MIGNER PRESSURE FLUID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET WILL FORCE BOTH SIDES OF TME DISC AGAINST THE SEATS, CAUSING THE DISC SEAT FRICTION FORCES TO RESIST VALVE REOPENING. ANOTEMR EXAMPLE IS WHEN THE CLOSED GATE VALVE WITH LIQUID TRAPPED IN THE 90 MET CAVITY IS SUBJECTED TO A TEMPERATURE INCREASE.

THE BOKNET FLUID WILL TRY TO EXPAND DUE TO THE TEMPERATURE INCREASE. IF THE VALVE 80 MET IS LEAK TIGHT, THE FLUID CANNOT EXPAND SO THE PRESSURE IN THE BO MET INCREASES. THE RESULTANT PRESSURIZATION OF THE BOWET CAVITY MAY PREVENT THE VALVE FROM OPENING.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUAfl04, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIN AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECM ICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

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SE00163 0000 62 Steject: A8ANDON SAMPLE THIEF IN 1A FOST.

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POSRC #: 97-003 AIsoc Doc ID: ES199601790-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: ESP Rzi Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

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Equipment: 1TKDF010025 1A DF0 STORAGE TK Org/Div:

System Code: 023 DIESEL OIL SYSTEM Tcxt: SUMARY:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO APPROVE ABANDONING A THIEF TMAT WAS LOST IN THE 1A FOST BECAUSE IT IS NOT A SAFETY CONCERN AND IT IS NOT ECONOMICAL TO RETRIEVE IT.

THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE 1A FOST IS TO STORE FUEL AND PROVIDE A SUCTION FLOW PATH TO THE TRANSFER PUMPS. LEAVING THE THIEF IN PLACE IS NOT A CONCERN SECAUSE THE THIEF WILL NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF TME TANK OR IMPEDE THE FLOW PATM TO THE FUEL OIL DAY TANK FOR THE 1A DIESEL. THE THIEF WAS SHOWN TO BE INERT IN THE FUEL DIL TANK ENVIRONMENT. ALSO, THE