IR 05000269/1985035

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Insp Repts 50-269/85-35,50-270/85-35 & 50-287/85-35 on 851007-11.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review & Witnessing of Pre & post-criticality Tests Following Refueling Outage & Info Notice Followup
ML20134A964
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1985
From: Jape F, Mathis J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134A945 List:
References
50-269-85-35, 50-270-85-35, 50-287-85-35, NUDOCS 8511110124
Download: ML20134A964 (6)


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UNITED STATES

[knEfro o,^ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f g REGION ll

.g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323 -

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Report Nos.: 50-269/85-35, 50-270/85-35, and 50-287/85-35 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-237 License Nos.: OPR-38, OPR-47, and

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OPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: Octo r 7-11, 1985 Insp ctor:

J. L. Mathis M hjds#

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AM Date Signed

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A proved by: /r F. Jape, Section Chief haf*

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Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced :nspection involved 40 inspector-hours on site in the areas of reviewing and witnessing pre- and post-criticality tests following the refueling outage, IEN followup and followup on inspector identified ite Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000269 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. Barns, Licensing Engineer J. Collier, Reactor Engineer C. Parson, Engineer Specialist R. T. Repko, Jr. , Engineer 0.. N. Poland, Jr. , Engineer R. Emory, Maintenance Service B. Carney, Maintenance Service Support Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors J. Bryant K. Sasser
  • L. King
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 11, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The inspector i identified one followup item which reflects commitment made by the licensee on August 5, 1985, regarding CRDM Leaf Spring inspection. This will be identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269/85-35-01, CRDM Leaf Spring Inspection - paragraph 8.

" The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio . Zero Power Physics Tests Review (72700, 61702)

Completed test procedure TT/3/A/0711/09, Unit 3 Cycle 9, Zero Power Physics Test (ZPPT), was reviewed. Initial criticality for cycle 9 was achieved at

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2130 on October 6,1985. The all-rods-out critical boron concentration was determined to be within a 250 ppmB of the predicted value of 1607 ppm The inspector reviewed portions of Enclosures 13.1 through 13.9 associated with ZPP Enclosure 13.1 - addressed inverse multiplication plot The licensee performed x2 evaluation before beginning each of the sets of 1/M data listed in the procedure and repeated every four (4) hour In conjunction with Enclosure 13.1, the inspector reviewed IP/0/A/330/3A, CRD Trip Time Test, to verify that the trip time was within the acceptance criteria of 1.20 secon Enclosure 13.2 - Determination of NI Overlap and Sensible Heat was reviewed without commen Enclosure 13.3 - Reactimeter Checkout was reviewed without commen Enclosure 13.4 - All Rod Out Boron Concentration. The licensee measured the Hot Zero Power critical boron concentration with rod groups 1-7 at 100% wd and rod group 8 at 25.0% wd. The measured ARO critical baron concentration was within 50 ppmB of the predicted value of 1607 ppm Enclosure 13.5 - Temperature Coefficient Measurements at ARO Zero Power was performed as part of the startup test progra Review of Attachment 1 of Enclosure 13.5 confirms that the measured moderator temperature coefficient

.153 x 10 * AK/K/F is not in excess of the acceptance criteria of

+0.5 x 10 ' AK/K/F*. This assures that the moderator coef ficient, when extrapolated to above 95% full power per Technical Specification 3.1.7, will not be positive. Also, the temperature and moderator coefficients agrees with their predicted values within 0.3 x 10 ' AK/K/F .

Enclosure 13-6 - Control Rod Group Worth and Differential Boron Worth Measurement. The inspector verified that the measured control rod worths for group 5-7 were within zl5% deviation of the predicted value The results are below:

Predicted Measured Group Worth Group Worth Gp5 1.469 % AK/K 1.4105 % AK/K Gp6 0.944 % AK/K 0.8995 % AK/K Gp7 1.165 % AK/K 1.145 % AK/K In addition to the above, the inspector verified that the measured differential boron worth was not in excess of 1.33%AK/K/100 ppm This limits differential boron worth to the value assumed in the Moderator Dilution Accident analysis in the FSAR Section 15. The differential boron worth was within 15% deviation of the predicted value. The result of the i measured and predicted differential baron worth are as follows:

Predicted differential boron worth = .882 % AK/K/100 ppm 8 l

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Calculated differential boron worth = .889 % AK/K/100 ppmB ,

Therefore, the % deviation = (Pred-meas) x 100'

= (.882) - (.899) x 100 (.899)

= 0.8%

Enclosure 13.7 - Boron sample records were reviewed without comment Enclosure 13.8 - RCS flow measurements were averaged over a fifteen minute i time period for verification against each other -and expected values. The i

measured desigr flow of 114.204% was above the specified design flow in

Technical Specification.

j Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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] Power Escalation Test Witnessing (72700, 61709)

The following portions of power escalation test were witnessed in whole or in part:

> Low Power Testing (LPT)

Low power testing plateau was achieved at 1230 'on October 9,1985.

! After steady conditions were established at LPT plateau, the plant

computer was used to average heat balance data over a 15 minutes

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period. This data was then used to perform heat balance calculations-with off-line programs. These results were then compared to the plant

computer on-line heat balance calculation The results of the heat

balance calculation indicated that the measured design flow at LPT was j above 106.5% design flow.

f Subsequently, the inspector witnessed the power imbalance detector l correlation. Once the desired.LPT level had been achieved, incore and i outcore imbalance data _over a wide range of_ imbalances were gathered.

{ The imbalance was changed by normal startup axial redistribution of j power due to changing xenon concentrations and control rod repost-

tioning. After an acceptable imbalance swing was completed, the data

- was reduced. in such a manner that each set of incore and appropriate out-of-core imbalance data points correspond to approximately the same core power distribution conditions. .All the measured correlation slopes 1were greater than_the acceptance criteria,'0.9 Core Power distribution test was the last portion of LPT performe The licensee verified that reactor power imbalance, Quadrant Power

' Tilt, Minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (MDNBRs), Maximum Linear Heat Rates (MLHR), and Radial and Total Power Peaking Factors do not exceed their respective specified limits. -The extrapolated maximum linear-heat rate at each incore detector level was less than the error -

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adjusted LOCA limit specifie The extrapolated " worst case" MLHR determined by the licensee was below the Technical Specification limit of 20.15 . KW/ft. The extrapolated worst case minimum DNBR, as determined by the licensee was above the Technical Specification limit of 1.3 On October 10, 1985 at 1140, all LPT was complete The licensee escalated and stabilize power into the Full Power Testing plateau. The licensee was at '97.7% power _at the time of the exit meeting. Only portions of FPT had been performe The inspector will review the results of FPT during future inspection No violations or deviations were identified during the witnessing of Low Power Testin . Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713)

The licensee. Start-up Test Reports for Oconee 1, Cycle 9, and Oconee 2, Cycle 8 were reviewed in the Region II office. Both reports were composed of two parts. Part 1 addressed Zero Power Physics Testing and Part 2 address Power Escalation Testin The inspector verified the following: That the report included the information required by appropriate NRC requirements, That test results and supporting information discussed in the report are consistent with design predictions and performanc Whether planned corrective - action is adequate for resolution of-identified problems, Whether any information contained in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrenc On April 21, 1985 at 1340, ZPPT was declared complete for Unit 2, Cycle All acceptance criteria with the exception of the ARO Boron Measurement, were met. The resultant all-rods-out boron concentration was calculated to be 63 ppm higher than the predicted value. This concentration failed the acceptance criteria of 150 ppm, but was.within the Technical Specification limit of ' 1.00 % AK/K. On November 28, 1985 at 2145, ZPPT was declared complete for Unit 1, Cycle 9. All acceptance criteria were me The Oconee 2, Cycle 8 Power Escalation Test was performed per Station Procedure TT/2/A/0811/08. Unit 2 achieved criticality at 1054 on July 9, 1985, and reached 95% FP at 0400 on July 11, 1985. All acceptance criteria-were me The Oconee 1, Cycle 9 Power Escalation Test was performed per Station Procedure TT/1/A/0811/09. As of February 4, 1985, the Oconee 1, Cycle 9

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Power Escalation Test was complete with all acceptance criteria met except for the tilt calculation from the backup incore detectors. The regional base inspector will followup on this during a future inspectio . Followup on IEN 85-38 (92703)

IE Information Notice No. 85-38 dated May 21, 1985, was provided to all utilities with pressurized water reactor nuclear power facilities designed by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem pertaining to loose parts that can obstruct and prevent motion inside of control rod drive mechanism Duke Power made a verbal commitment to NRC during a conference call on August 5, 1985, regarding CRDM Leaf Spring Inspection. The inspector rcviewed the results of Unit 2 and 3 CRDM Spring Leaf Inspection. The CRDM Spring Leaf Inspections were performed in accordance with the procedure MP/3/A/1140/01. All sixty-nine CRDM spring leaf inspection were acceptable for Unit 2, likewise the spring leaf inspection on Unit 3 were acceptabl Unit 1 CRCM Spring Leaf inspection is scheduled to be performed during the upcoming 1986 refueling outag This will be identified as IFI 50-287/85-35-01, CRDM Leaf Spring Inspectio . Followup of Inspector Identified Item (92701)

(Closed) IFI 50-269/83-24-01. Duke Power agreed to submit to the NRC Regional Office by September 15, 1983, a detail report of corrective actions taken to isolate sotentially excessive leakage path during the type A tes The inspector verffied that the corrective action specified were adequately covered in the revised Type A procedure. This closes IFI 269/83-24-0