ML20132A984
| ML20132A984 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132A953 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-96-11, NUDOCS 9612160407 | |
| Download: ML20132A984 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000483/1996011
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-483
License No.:
Report No.:
50-483/96-11
Licensee:
Union Electric Company
Facility:
Callaway Plant
Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O
Fulton, Missouri
Dates:
October 13 through November 23,1996
Inspectors:
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector
F. L. Brush, Resident inspector
Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9612160407 961212
ADOCK 05000483
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Callaway Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-483/96-11
Operation.s
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The .:spectors identified that the component cooling water system normal operating
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procedure did not provide adequate guidance for system operation. The failure of
the procedure to provide adequate guidance was a violation (Section O3.1).
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The licensee identified that an operator inadvertently sent a blended flow of borated
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water to the reactor coolant system rather than the spent fuel pool. The failure to
follow the spent fuel pool normal operating procedure was a noncited violation
(Section 04.2).
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The licensee identified that an equipment operator incorrectly placed a worker
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protection tag on and pulled the closing power fuses for the centrifugal charging
Pump A supply breaker. This was a noncited violation of the workman's protection
assurance tagging procedure (Section 04.3).
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The quality assurance department performed an effective review of the plant
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shutdown and cooldown for the refueling outage (Section 07.1).
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Enaineerina
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The inspectors identified that the component cooling water system Traire A
temperature was below the lower limit specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report
(Section E1.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
The reactor began this inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 8.
On October 12,1996, an unplanned engineered safety features auxilialy feedwater
actuation occurred. The operating main feedwater pump tripped on high discharge
pressure. All systems responded as required.
On November 11,1996, operators closed the main generator output breaker to end
Refueling Outage 8. The refueling outage was completed in 31 days.
Later on November 11,1996, at approximately 15 percent reactor power, a feedwater
isolation occurred which caused a turbine trip. In addition, high vibrations experienced on
reactor coolant Pump B, following the turbine trip, required the operators to shut down the
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reactor.
On November 12,1996, operators placed the unit back on line after plant personnel
balanced the pump. On November 17,1996, the plant reached full power.
l. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of
ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional
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and safety-conscious. Problems that occurred during shutdown (Section 01.2) and
startup (Section 02.1) are described below.
Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed
during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance
requiring control room coordination were properly controlled.
01.2 Inadvertent Auxiliarv Feedwater Actuation
a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding an inadvertent engineered
safety features auxiliary feedwater actuation.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On October 12,1996, during the plant shutdown for tha refueling outage, an
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engineered safety features auxiliary feedwater actuation occurred. The operating
main feedwater pump tripped on high discharge pressure and caused a motor driven
auxiliary feedwater system actuation.
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Control room personnel were performing a control rod drop time test in accordance
with Procedure ETP-SF-STOO1," Control Rod Drop Time Test," Revision O. In order
to support this testing, plant operators realigned the main feedwater system to
prevent automatic actuation of the feedwater system isolation valves and other
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components. The realignment resulted in isolation of the main feedwater system
from the main feed pump discharge check valves to the main feedwater isolation
valves. Main feedwater Pump A was aligned to recirculate to the main condenser.
With the feedwater system in this lineup, pressurizing of the feedwater system
occurred from the combination of system residual heat and some smallleakage
through feedwater heater extraction steam isolation valves. This caused actuation
of pressure switches for high discharge pressure of main feedwater Pump A.
Actuation of the pressure switches tripped the operating main feedwater pump and
caused the auxiliary feedwater actuation.
Plant operator response was appropriate. All safety equipment performed as
designed. The licensee convened an Event Review Team to investigate the facts
and possible causes. The licensee identified a number of corrective actions that will
be reviewed when the inspectors evaluate the associated Licensee Event Report.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's initial response to the unanticipated
motor driven auxiliary feedwater actuation was satisfactory.
01.3 Plant Startuo Observations
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed portions of the reactor startup following the refueling
outage,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The licensee conducted thorough pre-evolution briefings. Operator self checking
was good. Shift personnel used proper communications. The shift supervisor
exhibited good command and control. Licensee management was present in the
control room for major evolutions associated with the startup. Management
exhibited good involvement. The inspectors verified compliance to the Technical
Specifications and Final Safety Analysis Report requirements by reviewing logs,
touring main control boards and reviewing status boards.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1 Inadvertent Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level and Turbine Trio
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a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an inadvertent hi-hi steam
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generator level turbine trip and a plant shutdown required by Technical
Specifications due to high vibrations on reactor coolant Pump B.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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On November 11,1996, with the reactor at approximately 15 percent power, an
inadvertent hi-hi level on Steam Generator A occurred which resulted in a turbine
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trip. Following the turbine trip, a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system actuation
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and a feedwater isolation system actuation occurred. All systems responded as
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required.
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The event occurred while the operators were attempting to stabilize steam
generator levels following closure of the feedwater regulating bypass valves.
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Following the turbine trip, vibrations on reactor coolant Pump B increased to just
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over 15 mils with a rate of increase greater than two 2 mils in one hour.
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The operators entered procedure OTO-BB-00002," Reactor Coolant Pump Off-
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Normal," Revision 8. The operators tripped the reactor coolant pump and shut
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down the plant to Mode 3 as required by Procedure OTO-BB-00002 and Technical
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Specification 3.4.1.1.
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The licensee convened an Event Review Team to investigate the facts and possible
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causes. The licensee identified a number of corrective actions that will be reviewed
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when the inspectors evaluate the associated Licensee Event Report.
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03
Operations Procedures and Documentation
O3.1 Inadeauste Component Coolina Water System Normal Operatina Procedure
a.
Inspection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed normal operating Procedure OTN-EG-00001," Component
Cooling Water System," Revision 14. This was a result of an inspector concern
about system operation.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During a tour of the plant, the inspectors noted that the component cooling water
flow rate to the lube oil coolers for centrifugal charging Pump A and safety injection
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Pump A was above the normal range delineated on their respective flow
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instruments. Additionally, the component cooling water temperature at the outlet of
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the lube oil coolers for these pumps was approximately 50 F. The minimum
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component cooling water temperature in the Final Safety Analysis Report
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operability analysis for the components serviced by component cooling water.
Section 9.2.2.2.3 was 60'F. Section E1.1 of this report discusses the licensee's
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The component cooling water system is comprised of two independent safety
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related trains. Each train, in addition to its safety related loads, could be aligned to
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provide cooling water to nonsafety related components in the service loop. At the
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time of discovery, Train B was in service providing cooling water to the service
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loop. Train A was in service to support earlier operation of centrifugal charging
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Pump A. With centrifugal charging Pump A secured, component cooling water
Train A was not required to be in operation.
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Procedure OTN-EG-1, Step 2.7, stated that, during normal operation, the maximum
component cooling water flow should not exceed 110 percent of the flow listed in
Attachment 1 of the procedure. The basis for the 110 percent value was unclear.
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The attachment only listed minimum component cooling water flows. The table did
not provide a range of flows for the components. During normal system operation,
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the component cooling water system flow through the various components listed in
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the attachment routinely exceeded 110 percent of the minimum value. Additionally,
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the flow sometimes also exceeded the " green band" on the local flow instruments.
During the inspectors' tour on November 12,1996, the inspectors found the
component cooling water flow from the centrifugal charging Pump A lube oil cooler
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to be pegged high on a local instrument. This was above the " green band" upper
limit of 34,500lbm/hr on the local instrument. The minimum flow listed in
Attachment 1 of Procedure OTN-EG-1 was 27,500lbm/hr. The actual flow through
the tube oil cooler exceeded 27,500 lbm/hr by more than 10 percent.
The inspectors identified that the procedure did not adequately address component
cooling water system operation with respect to component flow and temperature
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during normal plant operation. Procedure OTN-EG-OOOO1 was inadequate in that it
did not give information required for proper operation of the component cooling
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system as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This is a violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (483/9611-01).
The licensee was reviewing the engineering flow balance for the system to verify
the throttle positions for component cooling water valves that regulate flow to
various safety related equipment. During the initial review, the licensee believed
that no operability concerns existed.
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c.
Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the procedure for operating the component cooling
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water system was inadequate.
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04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
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O4.1 Refuelina operations
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors observed fuel assembly movement during core offload.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Communications between personnel on the refueling machine, in the control room,
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and at other stations were good. Personnel actions were conservative when
moving fuel assemblies. Foreign material exclusion controls around the reactor
cavity and on the refueling machine were satisfactory.
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04.2 Inadvertent Iniection of Borated Water to the Reactor Coolant System
a.
Jnspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed an event in which a reactor operator inadvertently injected
borated water into the reactor coolant system.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 20,1996, while intending to inject blended makeup flow to the spent
fuel pool, the reactor operator injected the flow to the reactor coolant system.
After several minutes the reactor operator noticed the volume control tank level
start to increase and secured the flow. Reactor coolant system average
temperature decreased approximately 1.3 F as a result of the borated water
addition.
The reactor operator's immediate action was to dilute the reactor coolant system
with 263 gallons of makeup water to restore temperature. There were no other
adverse effects on the reactor coolant system.
The licensee initiated an investigation of the event using the corrective action
process. The inspectors found that the licensee's ir:itial and followup corrective
actions were appropriate.
The inspectors reviewed the procedure for filling the spent fuel pool. Normal
Operating Procedure OTN-EC-OOOO1," Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,
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Revision 11, Step 5.8.9, required that the operator select hard close on the
following handswitches when filling the spent fuel pool with blended flow:
BG-HIS-1108, volume control tank outlet header BGFCV0110B handswitch
BG-HIS-1118, volume control tank inlet header BGFCV0111 B handswitch
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Instead of taking the handswitches to hard close, the operator went to hard open by
mistake. This opened the volume control tank outlet and inlet header Valves
BGFCV0110B and BGFCV0111B, respectively. The opening of these valves
established the flow to the reactor coolant system through normal charging.
The failure to adhere to Procedure OTN-EC-00001 Step 5.8.9 is considered a
violation of the licensee's operating procedures. This licensee-identified and
corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with
Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (483/9611-02),
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the failure to transfer borated water to the spent fuel
pool was due to personnel error. The licensee's actions were appropriate.
04.3 Worker Protection Tao Placed on the Wrona Comoorsnt
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed an unplanned Technical Specification 3.5.2 entry when an
equipment operator pulled the closing power fuses for centrifugal charging Pump A
supply Breaker NB0104. The equipment operator was supposed to pull the closing
power fuses for spent fuel pool cooling Pump A supply Breaker NG0104.
b.
Observations and Findinas
While intending to place a worker protection tag on closing power fuses for spent
fuel pool cooling Pump A supply Breaker NG0104, an equipment operator
incorrectly placed the worker protection tag on the closing power fuses for
centrifugal charging Pump A supply Breaker NB0104. This action made centrifugal
charging Pump A inoperable and placed the plant in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown action
Statement per Technical Specification 3.5.2.
When the equipment operator pulled the closing power fuses for centrifugal
charging Pump A supply Breaker NB0104, the control room received an engineered
safety features actuation system alarm. Control room personnel realized that the
equipment operator pulled the wrong closing power fuses and contacted the
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equipment operator. Control room personnel directed the equipment operator to
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replace the closing power fuses for centrifugal charging Pump A. The licensee
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started the centrifugal charging pump to ensure operability and exited the Technical
Specification Action Statement. The charging pump was inoperable for
approximately 9 minutes.
The licensee initiated an investigation of the event using the corrective action
process.
The licensee identified the following causes:
Failure to perform dual verification of the tag. The equipment operator did
not arrange for a secrand person to verify that the tag was on the correct
component.
Misreading of the component identification number.
Failure to read the noun description of the component being tagged.
Administrative Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310, " Workman's Protection Assurance
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Tagging", Revision 2, Step 4.1.10.3, required that the method and order specified
on the tagout control sheet be followed when hanging tags.
The tagout control sheet for Workman's Protection Assurance 21271, Tag 2,
specified that a tag be hung on closing power fuses for spent fuel pool cooling
Pump A supply breaker. Failure to adhere to this requirement is considered a
violation of the licensee's administrative procedures. This licensee-identified and
corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with
Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (483/9611-03).
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the failure to pull the correct fuses was due to
personnel error. The inspectors found that the licensee's initial and followup
actions were appropriate.
07
Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Review of Quality Assurance Deoartment Surveillance of Plant Shutdown and
Cooldown
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the quality assurance department's Surveillance
Report SP96-084 for a surveillance conducted from October 11,1996, through
October 14,1996. Quality assurance personnel performed observations of control
room activities during shutdown of the plant from Mode 1 to Mode 6 in preparation
for Refueling Outage 8.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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Quality assurance personnel provided a good assessment of the major evolutions
that occurred during the shutdown. Quality assurance personnel observed control
rod drop time testing, the new methods employed for the plant cooldown using all
steam dumps and pressurizer auxiliary spray, and drain down of the reactor coolant
system to 6 inches below the reactor vessel flange.
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Quality assurance personnel found good use of procedures, shift turnover meetings,
pre-evolution briefings, and communications. In addition, they verified compliance
with Final Safety Ant. lysis Report and Technical Specification requirements through
work control database reviews, log reviews, and walkdowns of the main control
boards. Quality assurance personnel also identified observations that were
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appropriately documented for followup.
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c.
Conclusions
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The quality assurance department's review of the plant shutdown and cooldown for
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the refueling outage was good.
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11. Maintenance
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Conduct of Maintenance
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M 1.1 General Comments - Maintenance
a.
Insoection Scooe (62703)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
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Work Document W174699- Replace Reactor Coolant Pump D internals;
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Work Document P402569- Replace Reactor Coolant Pump D motor;
Work Document C557751 - Replace Main Feedwater Pump B discharge
Work Document C557753- Replace Main Feedwater Pump A discharge
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Work Document C580902- Remove Low Pressure Feedwater Heater 2A
vent head and tube bundle;
Work Document C580884- Remove Low Pressure Feedwater Heater 2C
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vent head and tube bundle;
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Work Document C580890-Install Low Pressure Feedwater Heater 2C tube
bundle; and
Work Document C580908- Install Low Pressure Feedwater Heater 2A tube
bundle.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional
and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work packages present
and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system
engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when
required. Housekeeping and foreign material exclusion controls were satisfactory.
M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance
a.
Insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following test activities:
Surveillance Procedure OSP-EJ-00003, Containment Recirculation Sump
Inspection
Surveillance Procedure OSP-EN-P001 A,Section XI - Containment Spray
Pump Operability
Surveillance Procedure MSM-AB-QVOO1, Main Steam Safety Valve Testing
b.
Observations and Findinas
Surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was conducted
satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the
Technical Specifications.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance issues
M8.1 (Closed) Violation 483/95006-01: the licensee failed to orevent the entry of
foreion materialinto safetv-related systems as identified below:
On April 4,1995, the licensee identified a latex glove inside safety injection
system to reactor coolant system check Valve B88949A(483/95006-01al.
On April 20,1995, after the sumps had been inspected and made available
for service the NRC inspectors identified multiple pieces of foreign materialin
the containment emergency sumps (483/95006-01b).
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The inspectors observed foreign material exclusion practices during the refueling
outage and noted only minor problems, in addition, the inspectors accompanied
licensee personnel on the final closecut inspection of the containment recirculation
sumps. The inspectors found the sumps to be very clean.
Ill. Enaineerina
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Conduct of Engineering
E1.1
Comoonent Coolina Water System Water Temoerature and Flow
a.
Insoection Scope (37551)
The inspectors noted that the component cooling water system Train A temperature
was below the lower limit of 60 F specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Additionally, the inspectors noted that the component cooling water flow rate to the
lube oil coolers for centrifugal charging Pump A and safety injection Pump A was
above the normal range delineated on their respective flow instruments. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to these issues.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During a tour of centrifugal charging pump Room A, the inspectors noted that the
temperature of the component cooling water coming from the lube oil heat
exchanger on centrifugal charging Pump A was approximately 50*F. The
component cooling water temperature from safety injection Pump A was also at
approximately 50 F.
Also, the inspectors found the component cooling water flow from the centrifugal
charging Pump A and safety injection Pump A lube oil coolers to be above the
" green band" limit on the localinstruments. Normal Operating Procedure
OTN-EG-1, Revision 14, " Component Cooling Water," did not provide adequate
operating instructions to ensure the component cooling water system was properly
operated with respect to component flow and temperature. Section 03.1 discusses
the operational aspects of this issue.
The lower limit for component cooling water temperature in the Final Safety
Analysis Report, Section 9.2.2.2.3, was 60 F. The inspectors asked the licensee if
the low water temperature could affect the operability of the components serviced
by component cooling water. The licensee did not believe there was an immediate
operability concern based on other in-house design information in addition to the
Final Safety Analysis Report.
The licensee performed a safety evaluation which concluded that the various
components would be operable as long as the component cooling water
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temperature remained above 40 F. The licensee determined that, during periods of
cold weather, the CCW temperature would go below 60 F when operating in the
Mode 1 lineup. Following the safety evaluation, the licensee changed the minimum
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component cooling water temperature in the Final Safety Analysis Report from 60 F
to 40 F.
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The licensee was performing additional evaluations on the effect of high flow rates
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and cool water temperatures on the components serviced by component cooling
water.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the component cooling water system was not being
operated as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report due to an inadequate
procedure. The Final Safety Analysis Report was revised to reflect the allowed
minimum component cooling water system temperature.
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
Review of Facility Conformance to Updated Final Safety Analvsis Report
Commitments
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A recent discovery of a licensee operating their f acility in a manner contrary to the
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Final Safety Analysis Report description highlighted the need for a special focused
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review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the Final
Safety Analysis Report description. While performing the inspections discussed in
this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the Final Safety
Analysis Report that related to the areas inspected. The following inconsistency
was noted between the wording of the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the
plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters observed by the inspectors.
As discussed in Section E1.1, the inspectors identified that a discrepancy existed
between the as-built component cooling water system operation and the Final
Safety Analysis Report.
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IV. Plant SuDDort
R2
Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 Containment Buildina Closecut inspection
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a.
inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors performed a reactor containment building housekeeping and materiel
condition inspection prior to the plant entering Mode 4 following Refueling
Outage 8.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found that the licensee's cleanup of the reactor containment buil ding
was satisfactory. Overall, most areas of containment were clean and free of debris,
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although the inspectors noted a small number of tie wraps, duct tape, screws, wire
and other similar items. The items were not of sufficient size and quantity to affect
safety related equipment during a design basis accident. The licensee removed
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these items during the closeout tour.
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Also, the inspectors noted boric acid crystal buildup on three valves in the safety
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injection system test lines. The licensee cleaned the valves and, after the plant was
taken to normal operating temperature and pressure, reinspected the valves. There
was no sign of additional leakage.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors did not note any items or issues that could have affected safety
related equipment operation.
V. Manaaement Meetinos
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The exit meeting was conducted on November 25,1996. The licensee did not
express a position on any of the inspection findings documented in this report and
did not identify any information as proprietary.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant
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J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support
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H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Licensing Fuels and Site Licensing
G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Training
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M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Health Physics
G. A. Hughes, Supervising Engineer, independent Safety Engineering Group
K. W. Kucchenmeister, Superintendent, Design Engineering
J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance
J. A. McGraw, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering Systems
C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
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D. W. Neterer, Shif t Supervisor
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J. T. Patterson, Shift Supervisor
J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and
Organizational Support
G. L. Randolph, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance
R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Rad Waste
M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control
W. A. Witt, Superintendent, Technical Support
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The above personnel attended the exit meeting. In addition to these personnel, the
inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
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lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-483/9611-01
Inadequate component cooling water normal operating
procedure (Section O3.1)
50-483/9611-02
Failure to follow procedure during boric water transfer to
spent fuel pool (Section 04.2)
50-483/9611-03
Failure to adhere to tagout procedure (Section 04.3)
Closed
50-483/9506-01
Failure to prevent foreign materials from entering safety
related systems (Section M8.1)
50-483/9611-02
Failure to follow procedure during boric water transfer to
spent fuel pool (Section 04.2)
50-483/9611-03
Failure to adhere to tagout procedure (Section 04.3)
l