IR 05000318/2004022

Insp Rept 50-423/85-12 on 850318-0422.Violation Noted: Inappropriate Procedural Control of Testing & Flushing Identified After Evaluations Caused Flooding in Part of ESF Bldg

ML20129A350
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/23/1985
From:	Baunack W, Lipinski D, Mc Cabe E, Mccabe E, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128Q269	List: IR 05000318/2004022 ML20128Q266 ML20128Q298
References
50-423-85-12, NUDOCS 8506040552
Download: ML20129A350 (24)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket N Report No. 50-423/85-12 License N CPPR-113 Category B-Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted: March 18 - April 22, 1985 Inspectors: A s i f& fi3 /22/6 T. elowski, Senior Resident Inspector Date D. xm n vac 1pJnsci,ResidentInspector chtic Dat'e

. W Zbj _lYV W. H. Baunack, Project Engineer ' Dat'e Approved by: b U f/2fl87 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Inspection Summary: Inspection 50-423/85-12 (March 18 - April 22, 1985)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident (177 hours0.00205 days <br />0.0492 hours <br />2.926587e-4 weeks <br />6.73485e-5 months <br />) and region-based (45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />) inspec-tion. The initial parts of the primary system cold hydrostatic test were witnesse Preparations for and performance of the Chemical Addition Tank Drawdown Test were observed. Flooding in the Engineered Safety Features Building, previously identi-fied items, potential significant deficiencies, IE Bulletins and Information Notices, steam generator "J" tube inspection, and preparation for initial fuel receipt were inspected. A meeting with the Waterford town official was hel A violation for inappropriate procedural control of testing and flushing

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Results:

was identified after these evolutions caused flooding in part of the Engineered Safety Features Buildin Otherwise, no unacceptable conditions were foun PDR ADOCK 05000423 G PDR I

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DETAILS 1. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (84-14-03, Subitem C.3), High Strength Bolt Adequac At the Subcommittee meeting on August 28-29, 1984, the ACRS ex-pressed concern about the use of high strength bolts for reactor vessel in-ternals bolting, pressure boundary bolting, primary component supports, and anchor and embedment boltin On September 5, 1984, the licensee made a sub-mittal to the ACRS, with tables listing specifications and size of all primary boundary and component support bolting. In addition, steam generator hold-down bolt and manway closure bolt information was presented to the ACRS in October 1984. Based on a review of associated documentation, phone memoranda, and discussions with the NRR licensee project manager, no additional NRC field inspection reeds have been identifie This item is therefore close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (84-20-04), Valve support H005-CP396738 was welded with uncontrolled electrodes. The licensee has modified the electrode control system, removed the welds in question, and rewelded the valve suppor Licensee QA Inspection Report I-4A03153 documents the repair. The NRC resi-dent inspector examined the weld and found no deficiencie (Closed) Violation (84-20-01), Failure to control low hydrogen welding elec-trodes. The resident inspector witnessed and reviewed licensee surveillance which included weld electrode check s'eets n for the period from March 7 thru

. April 6, 1985. In addition, during inspection tours, observations at various levels of the containment were made of weld rod control with no adverse find-ings. The licensee has color-coded the weld rods for easier identificatio The welder who was involved in the welding violation was dismissed. Reindoc-trination of craft' personnel in the " Control of Welding Material" was docu-mented by the licensee. Inspection of the weld control station identified no deficiencies. The licensee has completed adequate corrective and preven-tive action . Potential Significant Deficiencies in Construction The. inspector reviewed the following reports of potentially significant con-struction deficiencies, Potential Feedwater Check Valve Failure (SD-77) 85-00-10 (0 pen) On March 26, 1985, the licensee reported a Main Feedwater Check Valve deficiency which could result in failure of the check valves to sea During restoration from the steam generator secondary side hydrt-static test, the tack welds holding the dity pivot bushing to the disk were found broken. If the bushing were forced out of its position on the disk, the disk could wobble locsely on its pivot pins and fail to seat. These check valves are provided on each feedwater line to limit blowdown of the steam generators in the event cf a feed line ruptur _ - - - +w-

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e The: applicant is evaluating replacement of the existing cylindrical bushings with a bushing which incorporates an integral retaining-lip.

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This' item is open pending resolution and implementation of corrective

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I Failures of' Diesel Generator Injector Pumps (S0-78)' 85-00-11 (0 pen) On April 1, 1985, the licensee reported potentially significant fail.ures of fuel injector pumps on .the. "B" Colt-Pielstick Emergency-Diesel Generator (EDG). The cause is as yet' unknown. The problem is

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under evaluation by Colt Industries. This item is open pending resolu-tion of the cause of the failures (85-00-11).

~ Violation of Cable Separation Criteria (SD-79) 85-00-12 (0 pen) On' April 8, 1985, the applicant reported the violation of elec-

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trical_ cable _ separation criteria in the Reactor Protective _ System (RPS).

LCables' carrying 24 volt-direct current from RPS cabinets 1, 2,-3, an to. panels 5 and 6 had~been routed via the same cable tray. The cable

installation is being redes _igned to meet the appropriate separation cri-teria. -This item is open pending installation of RPS cables with appro-priate separation (85-00-12).

d. . Weld Control Deficiency (SD-80) 85-00-13 (0 pen) On April 15, 1985, the applicant reported that_ weld fitup inspec-tions had not been specified for skewed geometry weld joints. .This-mat--

ter was initially identified by the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT).

The applicant is evaluating weld designs to determine the scope of the condition. This item is open pending-resolution, determination of safety

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significance, and review for enforcement action after the CAT inspection report is issue g Weld Inspection Deficiencies (S0-81) 85-00-14-(0 pen).On April 15, 1985, the applicant reported a potentially signifi- l cant deficiency regarding the Quality Control inspection of structural- '

steel installations. The NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) identi -

_ fled undersized welds joining 3W14 beams to embedment platds-in the Main

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' Steam. Valve Building (MSVB). Further inspection revealed 96 connections- ,

Ewhich were installed, inspected, and accepted in accordance with the  ;

wrong weld detail. The drawing detail used required a.5/16 inch fillet'

The drawing detail which'was to have

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weld _along one' side of an angl (been used required a 7/16 inch fillet weld ~along 3' sides of an angl Rework is being-accompiished under N&D 11973. This item is open pending completion of rework, determination of. safety significance, and review for enforcement action after the CAT-inspection report is issue .

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' 'IE' Bulletins

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The following IE Bulletins have been received and reviewed by the licensee.

The. licensee has found that the bulletins were not applicable in that they-applied to BWR facilities or Special Material license IEB 74-02, Truck Strike Notification

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'IEB 74-04, Target Rock Safety / Relief Valves

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IEB 74-05,-Shipment of Improperly.. Shielded Source-

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IEB-74-07, Personnel Overexposure-Irradiation Facility

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IEB 74-10, Failures.in 4 inch Bypass Piping - Dresden 2

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IEB 74-14, BWR Relief _. Valve Discharge'to Suppression Pool'

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IEB 75-01, -01A," Through-Wall Cracks in Core-Spray Piping at Dresden 2

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IEB 75-02, Defective Radiographic Exposure Devices and Source Changers-

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IEB 76-01, Isolation Condenser-Tube Failure

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The abo've Bulletins are close '

. IE Information Notices

'The inspectors reviewed one hundred ten (110)~Information Notices for.

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1979,1980, and 1981. ~ A summary of- the licensee's findings is appended as Attachment A. -Certain of these notices remain.open (IFI 423/85-12-06).

'5. . Steam Generator J-Tube Material

. TheLlicensee noted that J-Tube wall thinning.has been found in a number of-plants during refueling outages. 10ne study indicated that the chromium (Cr)

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content in the alloy steel has a significant effect on resistance to wall '

thinning. Tube wall thinning occurred with 0.01% (by weight) of C With

. 0.08% Cr, no J-Tube thinning degradation was eviden Samples:taken from "C" Steam Generator J-Tubes 3, 9, 16, 23,'28,'and 30 pe '

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Westinghouse ~ Procedure SSS 2.7.2 Gen 41, Rev. 1, showed less than 0.03% C The licensee decided to replace all the of J-Tubes. Westinghouse' procedures are available (SSS 2.7.2 Gen 33, Rev.- 2) and the replacement of J-Tubes is

tentatively scheduled in June 1985 (estimated as a 2 week task).

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The inspector will review this area during a subsequent inspection ~(IFI~423/-

F 85-12-01).

ii -# Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hydrostatic Test Review

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' Drain Line Leak

!. .The' licensee's approach to pressurization of the Reactor Coolant System began.'after the RCS pumps were run for mechanical and electrical check-

,; outs. 0n April'20, 1985 at 11:00 a.m., with the RCS at 350 psig, a leak

.was found at a. socket joint.on a 3/8" drain line from the Steam Generator l

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- 1Al shell. -Th'e RCS loop was isolated, pressure was reduced,~ and the'line t was repaired. The inspector examined similar welds on all;four Steam

~Generatoridrain_ lines, and found no similar problems. One drain line is' bent approximately 3 degrees off center. .This was evaluated by the licensee and found acceptable.- The inspector asked the licensee about e' supports for drains. . Support adequa~cy will be re-the inspected . adequacy of-pip /85-12-04).

(IFI'423

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E Solenoid-Operated Reactor Head. Vent Valves

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. During licensee preparations.for the RCS' Hydrostatic Test, the Reactor .

~ Head Vent _ Valves were uperated. Although an open signal is given to only

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. one valve, the normal: sequence of operating the;in-line series. valves-

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. had to be modified to prevent both-valves in series from opening because-

.the system pressure tends to bring the second. valve off its seat. This failure to remain closed when an upstream valve is opened appears to b similar to previously identified outstanding item 50-423/85-05-07. Such

. spontaneous opening of the reactor system boundary is an unresolved item

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? 7.~ Flooding in the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building

, Background Information

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On March 20, 1985, Millstone Unit 3 experienced flooding in the ESF

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building via'an open temporary flush pipe from the Refueling Water Stor-

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. age Tank (RWST). A portion of-the lower level (4'-6" elevation).was-flooded to a depth'of approximately 3 feet. The middle _ level (21'-6"

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elevation) received a heavy spray of water. Other cubicles of the ESF1

- building experienced varying degrees of floor wetting. The NRC Senio Resident-Inspector as well as theLProject Section Chief and Branch Chief-toured the area shortly after the even The initiating event for'th'is incident'did not involve ~a component-fail-

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ure._ Rather, inadequcte cf6 trol and' coordination.of test evolutions i Lindicated. Two evolutions ssing the same. piping,and valves were in pro-

gress. "One was a flush of EPergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping

, from the High Head Safety In asction and Charging. pumps back to the Re-

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fueling Water Storage Tank. The second.was a-Charging pump flow balanc '

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-The following describes the event sequence and the inspector's analysis ~ .

, . Event Description

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Af.ter several-incidents of fouling and subsequent seizing of Quench Spray (containment' spray) pumps due to foreign objects, the applicant deter-

s mined that'the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) had become contamin-ated with dirt and debris. The RWST provides a water. source to_the ECCS_

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and Quench; Spray pumps. Following draining end cleaning of the RWST, a program of back-flushing from the ECCS and Quench Spray pump suctions was implemented to clear the suction pipin On the afternoon of March 20, 1985, a' flush had been completed from the High Head Safety Injection pump suction via charging system piping and a length of temporary piping to the Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST). As part of the flush, the High Head Safety Injection (SIH) pump suction strainers had been removed. The strainer removal and reinstal-lation was to be accomplished in accordance with an Automated Work Order (AWO). The work order tagged the High Head Safety Injection combined suction stop valve from the RWST (3SIH*V8806) as being required to be positioned under the Flushing Engineer's cognizance. Valve 3SIH*V8806 and the RWST master stop valve (3SIL*V1) had been shut to provide isola-tion for the removal of the suction strainers and the installation of temporary flush piping. Following those pre-flush modifications, valve 3SIH*V8806 was opened to establish the flush path. The flush was com-pleted satisfactorily and restoration had begun. Temporary flush piping had been disassembled but valve 3SIH*V8806 had been left open. .Since-the RWST master stop valve (3SIL*V1) was shut, the work area and open piping were still isolated from the RWST. Post-flushing restoration was interrupted to pump water from the DWST to the RWST via the temporary piping. That pumping was for the purpose of reducing the water level in the DWST to permit additional flushing from other path .While the restoration from the flush was halted to reduce DWST water level, the Startup Engineer responsible for balancing flows.between the Charging pumps attempted to begin his test. The Startup Engineer initi-ated the action which should have resulted in the SIH pump suction stop

, valves (3SIH*V8923A,-3SIH*V8923B) being shu The associated communica-tion path was from the Startup Engineer to the Flushing Director to the Flushing Engineer to the Supervisory Control Operator-(SCO) in the con-trol room. Also, the Startup Engineer presented his flow balance test

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valve lineup to the Startup Coordinator, who passed it to the SCO. The

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SCO received the request to shut the SIH pump suction stop valves at about the same time as he received the flow balance test valve lineu An operator was dispatched to establish the flow balance test valve lineup and opened the RWST Master Stop Valve (3SIL*V1). Doing so estab-lished c flow path from the RWST through the RWST Master Stop Valve, then through the Combined SIH Stop Valve (3SIH*V8806), then through the "A" SIH Suction Stop Valve, and out the open piping at the SIH pump strainer When the consequent flooding in the ESF building was. encountered, the Master RWST Stop Valve was shut. The flooding stoppe Potential Contributing Factors

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The Startup Coordinator did not identify the conflicting conditions (open temporary piping) between two evolutions on ECCS suction pip-ing. No program or tool (such as an interrelated system " road-map" l

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drawing marked to show changes and. valve positions) existed to-aid the Startup Coordinator in resolving possible conflicts in test evolutions. Had the Startup Coordinator had current knowledge of; valve' positions and temporary piping status, valve positioning.for the two tests may have been coordinated to avoid the flooding even .

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The Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P& ids) used in the control. room depict individual systems and show interfaces with other systems-

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by arrows and notes referring the user to other drawing No method-existed to graphically illustrate inter-system status, particularly the position of key manual valves and temporary modifications, for-quick and ready reference in the control. room.' Had a display shown

that the High Head. Safety Injection suctio'n piping could~be open

to the atmosphere and that valves which should have isolated the opening could also be open, the SCO may have been alerted to-the - ,-

potential for~ water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to be

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introduced into-the pipin The Supervisory Control Operator had granted' blanket authority to f, ~

. position manual valves and to install and remove temporary equipment

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, 'and piping'as necessary to conduct testing. Had the SCO retained supervisory control.over!the evolutions lin progress,-the sequence .. ,

of. valve manipulations may have been controlled enough'to' avoid the flooding even ~

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The component: tagging program permitted the hanging of a BLUE tag

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specifying an indefinite valve position controlled by the Flushing Engineer on a valve (3SIH*V8806) required to isolate a portion of a fluid system so that the system could be' opened and temporary-piping removed. Thativalve was-left open while the system was ope :Had a valve tag clearly specifying the required valve. position (e.g.,. SHUT) been used, the. flooding event may have been avoidedc

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While Nomenclature such as 3SIH*V8806 is well suited to purchase orders and installation procedures, such nomenclature can conplicate valve' operating evolutions. Had the valves also been. identified ~

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by descriptive titles .such as " Combined' SIH Suction Stop Valve,"

. better correlation of valve position plans and their implications

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could-have'resulte Similarity to a Previous Event'

In this event, there was flooding in a building housing safety-related equipment due to interaction between two~related activities. In an

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. earlier event on October 22, 1984, salt vater was introduced-into the- ,

auxiliary.feedwater system from the service water system (see Inspection-

-Report 50-423/84-22, Paragraph 10). The October 1984 event involved operations in two related systems and a flow path through a temporar piping spool piece which is not normally installe I i

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~ Licensee Conclusion

The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) synopsis.of this even't states "...PORC review of. this AWO (Automated Work Orde:4 identified r

adequate startup/ operation / administrative controls for coupletion of the

above. tas PORC noted the root-cause was.the inadvertent failure to follow.the AW0'which would have restored the integrity of the system..."

fl Inspector Findings -

.Had procedural controls over.the flushing and testing' activities in pro-gress been sufficient and adhered'to,.the activity interaction which caused flooding in:the Engineered Safety Features Building would have

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,been prevente The fact that flooding _ occurred demonstrates.that-the

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. procedures,-as applied, were.not appropriate to the circumstances. This

.is a violation (50-423/85-12-03). : Preparations'for' Initial Fuel. Receipt

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' Prior to' receipt of initial fuel onsite, a. number of mechanical and -electrical ~

operability checks of: fuel cranes and elevators as documented in Phase .I

' testing must.be acceptable. The.' inspector' reviewed the test'results to verify

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that' adequate testing was accomplished p'er regulation-guidance and material licensee commitments. The following' test-results were reviewed:

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. Spent Fuel Bridge Crane, T3303-1E10, Revision 0, approved August'10, 1984. Test results approved April 18,-198 New Fuel Elevator, T3303-1E07, Revision 0, approved-October 12, 198 ~ Test results approved April 22, 198 '

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Reactor Fuel Handling Tools, T3303-1M05, Revision 0, approved March 20, 1985. -Pertial. test results approved April 19, 198 '

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Items identified as requiring resolution included the speed of the~new fuel

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elevator and full completion of T3303-1M05, which requires continued testing of movement of test elements into the core prior to completion of' testin All test concerns were documented as test unsats by the licensee'and are to be cleared: prior to fuel loading into the core. -Licensee actions on these Titems-will be reviewed incident to normal inspectio ' Meeting with Town of Waterford Official On' April-10,_1985, the senior ~ resident inspectors and the resident.-inspector

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for Units 1, 2, and 3 met with Mr. L. Bettencourt, First Selectman of Water-j  ; ford, Connecticut. . Subjects' discussed included status of the plants, inspec-

) . tions' planned,. allegations', emergency preparedness plans, and. testing status'.

f A request for an onsite visit to Unit 3 was discussed.'

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9 l 110. Chemical Addition = Tank (CAT) Drawdown Test The Chemical Addition Tank'is used to maintain containment sump and spray nozzle pH.within design limits. . The maximum spray pH is limited to less.than or equal:to 10.5 under accident conditions. In order to assure a balanced 1 .

> drawdown of the CATzand the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), two tests are. performe .

The inspector's initial review of test Procedure T3309-P002, Quench Spray System Chemical Addition Tank Drawdown Test, is documented in NRC Report 50- 1 423/85-05. The licensee has submitted a proposed change to the FSAR that re-flects.the changes to system testing. The inspector witnessed one phase of-the CAT Drawdown Test on March 26. The test simulated a single failure of one quench spray pump to operate. Both trains of ECCS injection were aligned-(2 charging pumps, 2 safety injection pumps, and 2 residual heat removal pumps) to draw water from the RWS One quench spray pump was aligned with

both of the CAT parallel block valves ope The test was observed from the initiation'of the Safety Injection Signal at 8

57 p'm. The inspector observed the start of.all the required ECCS pumps

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and the computer data output of CAT and RWST levels,' pressures, and key para-meter A balanced level was maintained with minor variations (il foot).

Evaluation of test results has not been completed by the-licensee (IFI 50-423/85-12-05).

The test crew was briefed prior to the tes Stations at the' Control Board and at the various pump cubicles were maintained-by the' licensee. Data col-1ection as observed by the inspector was satisfactory. .One area of concern was the number of. observers and standby personnel occupying the coatrol room.-

At one point the inspector noted 48 people in attendance. The inspector had no further questions on the performance of this test.' The stationing of standby personnel in~ areas other than the control room was discussed with the^

licensee. Control room access will be further reviewed by the resident in--

spector incident to routine facility tour . -Unresolved-Items-Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order-to ascertain whether they are acceptable or not. An unresolved item identi -

fied during this inspection is discussed in Detail <

- 1 Exit Meeting At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were. held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this in-spection. No proprietary information was identified as being in the inspec-tion coverage. At'no time during the inspection was written material provided '

to the licensee by the inspecto .

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ATTACHMENT A STATUS OF'INFORMATION-NOTICES IE N Discussion 79-02- This notice provides information concerning an alleged theft of low-enriched uranium from a General Electric plant. This notice does not apply to Millstone 3. When fuel is received onsite, routine NRC inspec-tions review associated security measures. This~ notice is close _This notice describes a degradation of engineered safeiy features. The licensee reviewed the Millstone 3 power supplies and determined tha similar design deficiency does not exist. This notice is close :79-06 This notice describes a nonconservative calculational technique within a. computer program for seismic analysis of safety-related piping. .Sub-sequently, IE Bulletin 79-07 was issued on the same. subject. The licen-see's response to this IE Bulletin closes this notic ~

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79-07 This notice describes the rupture of a radwaste-tank. . Two problems-led to the tank failure (the tank vent-had become plugged _and corrosion had weakened the tank). The licensee has reviewed this notice and_ determined that their tank material (Incoloy 825) should prevent corrosion. Also, overflow. lines are heat traced to' keep the overflow path clear. _ A clear -

-overflow line will prevent borated water from reaching and subsequently plugging the vent. This notice is close This notice describes interconnection of contaminated systems with ser-vice air systems used as the source of breathing air. - Licens'e'

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e review determined the problem was not applicable. At Millstone _3, breathing air is.provided by the instrument air system, which is not used for backflushing of filters or resin beds. ..This notice is close ~

179-09 This notice describes a contaminated resin slurry spill which ' occurred while transferring resin from a holdup tank to a shipping containe A number of factors contributed to this event. The licensee has reviewed this notice and, to verify the adequacy of the oper~ating waste-transfer procedure, has-devised a Phase II Startup Test which will include veri-fication of the waste transfer procedure. This r.atice remains open pend-ing test completio This notice describes circumstances where certain Bergen-Paterson Cor-

. . poration Pipe-Support Part 2000 rigid rod struts do not meet design  ;

criteria. The licensee conducted a review and determined no struts of

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the type described are used or planned for use on Millstone 3. This 1 a

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IE No; Discussion l79-12 _

This notice describes attempted damage to new fuel assemblies. The and-12A' licensee has concluded that existing security measures are' adequate to protect new fuel onsite when it is received. ~This notice is close '79-13- This notice describes a low water level condition in the core shroud area of a BWR as a result of closing all five recirculation pump discharge valves. -The-licensee reviewed this notice'and determined it is'only applicable to BWR facilities. This notice is close ' 79-14 This notice-describes quality assurance requirements which are required to;be. applied te Class 1E electrical cable trays and their. support sys-tems. The iscensee reviewed this notice and determined that their cable'

tray specifications 3413.800-978 and 2413.700-979 require a Quality As-surance Program which complies with.10 CFR 50 Appendix B. This notice is close t?9-15 .This_ notice describes an operational deficiency that could have resulted

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s in the emergency feedwater system remaining isolated during power opera-tion.- The licensee-initiated a commitment (Commitment No. 003144) which requires procedures to be reviewed to ensure that all bypasses'are cur-rently documented and operators to be trained not to bypass a safety system under routine conditions without proper procedural controls. This notice remains open pending completion of licensee action This notice forwarded the TMI-1 Bulletins to research and test reactor It is not applicable ~to Millstone 3. _This notice is close This-notice describes source holder assembly damage from misfit between-

, the assembly and the reactor upper grid plate. The licensee contacted

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Westinghouse,-- the core designer, on this matter and concluded that the-condition does not occur at Millstone 3. .This notice is. close .

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79-18 This notice- pertained to Skylab. Reentry and notified the utility tha licensed nuclear power plants in the reentry corridor will be notified

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within 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before reentry occurs. 'No licensee _ action is.re-

= quired. This .iotice.is close 'This' notice describes pipe cracks in stagnant borated water systems'at PWR plants. Subsequently, Bulletin 79-17 was issued on-the same issu This notice is-closed by the licensee response to the Bulleti This notice describes the NRC enforcement policy as _it relates t' o.NRC '

licensed individuals. The licensee management issued a memorandum which requiresLthat each licensed operator receive a copy of this IE Informa-tion Notice.- This notice remains open pending notification by.the-lic-ensee that.the operators are_ aware of the polic . . . . . _ __

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Attachment A 12

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IE N Discussion

- k 7 79-21 This notice identifies the regulatory requirements for packaging, trans- 1

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portation, and disposal of radioactive material. Bulletin 79-19 was q

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later issued on the same subject. This notice is closed based on the

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licensee's reply to the bulleti j

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79-22 This notice discussed the possibility of nan-safety grade equipment sub-je::t to an adverse environment impacting the performance of protective i

- functions by safety grade equipment. Stone and Webster performed a study 3 of contrcl systems referred to in the information notice and concluded 1 g the current design and controls will enable control room operators to

-

adjust for malfunctions that are the concern of this notice. This notice d

is close j

-

79-23 This notice describes emergency diesel generator lube oil cooler failures.

a The licensee contacted their emergency diesel generator manufacturer'and e

- determined the lube oil coolers supplied to Millstone 3 are not suscept-y ible to the failures described in the notice. This notice is close d This notice describes a potential overpressurization of the containment

-

79-24 U

= of a PWR plant after a main steam line break if the auxiliary feedwater

-

system continued to supply feedwater at runout conditions. Licensee analysis showed the Millstone 3 design was such that such containment y

-

overpressurization would not occur following a main steam line break.

r This notice is closed.

?

.

"

79-25 This notice describes a reactor trip (at Turkey Point 3 and 4) which

" resulted from inadequacies in administrative controls over temporary procedures for plant changes and modifications. The licensee concluded

-

that adequate procedures are in place to control temporary changes and -

--

=:

modifications at Millstone 3. Procedure adequacy is also covered by _

_

routine NRC inspection. This notice is close J

79-26 This notice describes a containment integrity breach which resulted from 3 _

_

- the inadequacy of the procedures addressing proper use and positioning 'E

-

of valves. The licensee has an administrative control procedure ACP-QA- -

2.12, " System Valve Alignment Control," which they feel contains suffi- i h

~ cient independent control measures to preclude valve mispositionin * This procedure has been in use at both Millstone 1 and 2 and is a pro- ]

cedure which -includes numerous improvements which have resulted from .

$ experience in its use. _ Other valve mispositioning concerns will be ad-g dressed in review of the licensee's reply to Violation 50-423/85-12-0 [ This Information Notice is close {g C 1 E

- # -

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__ -____-_-_ _ -

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.

Attachment A- 13

. IE'N Discussion

' 79-27 This notice' describes steam. generator tube rupture events at two PWR plants. The-licensee reviewed this notice and wrote a commitment to-

.use the information provided in the preparation of emergency procedures and in the training of operators. A subsequent event at Ginna led to additional emphasis-on tube rupture procedures. Millstone 3 emergency procedures have been~ prepared in accordance with current guideline This notice is close :This notice' describes overloading of structural elements due to pipe support load Subse

" Masonry' Wall Design,quent a, this

' was issued. This noticenotice, IE Bulletin is closed based onN the 80-11,

,

licensee s response to the bulleti This notice describes a loss of reactor coolant system instrumentation-

, as a consequence of a failure of a static transfer switch to transfer to an alternate supply. The licensee has reviewed the notice and has determined Millstone:3 can achieve a cold shutdown condition without the use of'any non-Class l1E power. All.the equipment ~ required to achieve

'

.a cold shutdown is redundant and is powered from redundant Class IE buses. This notice ~is close ,

-

j

)

79-30 :This notice concerns reporting information to the NRC in-accordance with R 110 CFR 50.55(e)=and Part 21 requirements. The licensee reviewed this notice and determined that both NUSCO and Stone and Webster procedures 1 adequately address the concerns of this notice. This notice is clcse . 79-3 This ' notice describes instances in which incorrect amplified response-spectra had been~used as input to the analyses of some piping. The -

' licensee reviewed this matter and determined all Seismic Category : piping systems designed to date have been analyzed using the letest

' applicable amplified response spectra. -This notice is close '

- 79-32 This notice describes a 'ossible p generic problem for BWR-4 plants and-possibly some earlier designs. The problem concerns the routing of high

" pressure coolant injection system and automatic depressurization systems l

,- cables in the'same cable' tray. .The licensee determined this~was~not- l

applicable-to Millstone'3. This notice is close l

~

. . 79-33 . This- notice discusses improper closure.of primary containment equipment

. ,

-access hatches; The licensee has issued a commitment (No. 3251) which I officially. enters information provided-in this notice into the estab-lished commitment follow program. This notice remains open pending- H

, license.e implementation of=the commitment.'

~

- .

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i i

.

4

- _ _ _ . - - _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ . - - -

F'

.

,

s

' Attachment A- 14

_

IE N Discussion

?

79-35- ;This notice informs the licensee about an enforcement action which re-sulted fromfa weakness in-the control of maintenance and essential .

equipment; The: licensee reviewed.this notice and concluded that~ their - :1

requirements for identifying LCO's .in the Work Orders Procedure!and the: -)

' '  : Log Book Requirements are sufficient to control maintenance and essential {

' equipment. This notice is close I

..

'

79-36 This notice describes a computer code defect which could result in in-correct stress analysis for one end of piping elbows. The licensee

~ ' reviewed this notice and determined the error can only occur in~ calcula-

' tions'by the NdPIPE code where'the B31.1' Code prior to Summer 1973 ad-

-

idenda-is' applicable. -B31.1 analysis performed for_ Millstone 3 were for post-Summer 1973 addenda. _Therefore, pipe stress' work performed for

, Millstone.3'was not effecte This notice is closed.-

' 79-37, This-notice' describes circumsta'ces n related to recently discovered stress i

corrosion cracking in Westinghouse 1800 RPM low pressure turbine disc M111 stone'3 uses a General Electric turbine and this notice is not ap-plicabl e.- This notice..is close J

'80-01~- This notice describes two recent' fuel handling events. The license .re' viewed this notice'and dP. ermined the physical differences'between

,' . Millstone 3 and the facility described make it-impossible for these types q

!

.of events to occur at' Millstone 3. This notice'is" close '

~ 80-0 _This notice describes 8'x'8 R water rod lower 'end plug wear in GE fuel

-

.

assemblies. This notice is BWR specific and does not apply to Millstone

,

3.-'This notice is close : 80-03 This notice describes main turbine electrohydraulic control (EHC) system - ,

problems with a MK 1 EHC system. The' licensee reviewed this notice and

_

determined it'was not applicable to Millstone 3. Millstone 3 has an EHC'

Mark II system with a standby operating mode. The standby mode wil allow maintenance-of.the EHC control circuits without encountering the

-

problem described in.the notice. This notice is close This notice describes-BWR fuel burnup in excess of limits. It is BWR'

- specific-'and does not app _ly to Millstone 3. This notice is close . 80-05 This notice describes chloride contamination of safety related piping.-

and components during the application ~of "Duraspray," .a fire retardant coating. The licensee reviewed this notice and determined that the use of "Durasp'r ay" is permitted at Millstone 3 'under-Specification 2199.090--

937, Fireproof Coating. Requirements for' masking or protective covering of stainless ~ steel, aluminum, and copper during fireproofing and cleaning-in: case of. accidental overspray of any fireproofing material'were added to the1 specification. .This notice' remains open pending licensee' deter-mination of whether any safety-related component was adversely affected

~

by Duraspray before the revised measures were applie a

_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

.- . - . - _ . .

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.

Attachment A 15 IE N Discussion 80-06- ~ This notice informs the licensee of the reporting requirements of the new Section 50.72 " Notification of Significant Events," to 10 CFR Part 50. The licensee has prepared administrative procedures which reflect the current reporting requirements. This notice is close ' This notice describes fatigue cracks which had been found in various Pacific Pumps. The licensee investigated this matter and will proceed with the Westinghouse recommendations in_the operation of these pump Included in the licensee's program is a comprehensive vibration monitor-ing program. This notice is close This notice describes a problem identified in States Company' sliding link electrical terminal blocks. The licensee determined that States sliding link terminal blocks are not used at Millstone 3. This notice is close This notice describes a possible health hazard from certain amoeba found in closed cooling systems. Millstone 3 uses an open seawater cooling cycle.~ This. notice is not applicable and is closed.

.

80-10 This notica describes. an event which occurred at Crystal River as a re-sult of a partial loss of a non-nuclear instrument system power supply during operation. The licensee reviewed this notice in conjunction with NRC Bulletin 19-27. The results of the review show Millstone 3 can achieve a cold shutdown condition without the use of any non-Class'1E power. The station design incorporates Regulatory Guides 1.139 and-1.5 Since all the equipment required to achieve a cold shutdown is redundant and is-powered from redundant Class 1E buses, the single failure cri-terion is satisfied. This notice is close This notice l describes an event in which both the pressurizer power oper-ated relief valve and block valve opened due to failure of a light source in a Sigma Bistable at Hadaam Nec The licensee determined this type of bistable is not used at Millstone 3. This notice is close This notice describes a potential defect.in the cam followers of General Electric Type SBM control switches._ The defect is limited to switches manufactured prior to 1976. This notice was also the subject of a Stone and Webster Problem Report, issued prior to the notice, in response to a General Electric Service Advisory Letter. This Problem Report provided for- preparing an inventory list of all date codes for relays and switches in QA Category I and selected QA Category II Panels, MCC's, and load-

' center This data base was established to facilitate current and future corrective actions to identified problems. This notice remains open pending licensee determination of whether defective cam followers are used or kept as spares at Millstone . .-

~ Attachment A~ 16

--IE N ' Discussion

'80-14~' This notice deals with " Safety Suggestions from Employees," and provides

.information regarding the practices followed by NRC inspectors when they receive expressions of concern related to safety from plant-employee The licensee posted this notice on~the employee bulletin boards. This notice is close " This notice describes two events in'which main steam swing disc check-

.and-isolation valves failed to close due~to excessively tight shaft packin ~

Millstone 3-does not use main steam check valves but has main steam isolation trip valves which will stop flow from either directio 'This notice is close '

80-1 This notice describes potential hazards associated with interchangeable-parts.on Spec 2-T and Gamma Pipeliner Locking mechanism The-licensee e valuated this notice and determined that use of this equipment is not-authorized at Millstone 3. This notice is close . This notice provides information concerning a smuggling device'that can preciude detection of weapons by security X-ray machines. The license . routed thisEnotice to station services for incorporation into-security W ocedures. Also, security measures are routinely inspected at operating-facilities, including Millstone 1 and 2. This notice.is close '

~

80-19- This' notice provides information related to the recall of BioPak 30P and 60P-Respirator The licensee determined this equipment:is not used-onsite. -This notice is close '~ :This notice describes a loss of. decay heat. removal capability at Davis-

-

Besse 1 while in a refueling mode. The licensee has reviewed this even Included in the. review are various decay heat removal methods, diversity- a

~o f-power' supplies, instrument' train separation, and-logic channel power supplies, and also, the recommencations for Technical Specifications re-quiring two heat removal methods while in the refueling mode. This )

. notice remains'open pending' completion of. licensee action q 80-22 This notice describes a contamination control breakdown which resulted R in releasesof radioactive materials to unrestricted areas. .The licensee reviewed this notice and determined station administrative control pro-cedures an'd waste removal practices will be reviewed'for adequacy by

, Station Services. Radiation control procedures are scheduled for NRC review prior to startup. This notice remains open pending licensee and

,

-

i NRC' review of the prccedures and practice l

.

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Attachment A 17 IE N : Discussion 180-23 This. notice describes a loss of suction on the emergency feedwater pumps -

due to flashing in the suction line during a loss of offsite powe Millstone 3 auxiliary feedwater system does not have any direct connec-tions to the~ main feedwater system. The primary source of steam genera-

' tor feedwater during a loss of. power. event is the demineralized wate storage tank which is exclusively us'ed for the auxiliary feedwater syste Therefore, the event described in the notice _does not apply to Millstone

'3. ._This notice is close This' notice provides an edited and updated version of the low-level radioactive waste burial criteria which were provided in Information Notice 79-21. The' licensee's actions relative to packaging, transpor-

- tation, and disposal of: radioactive material is described in their re-sponse to Bulletin 79-19. This notice is close 'This notice describes certain transportation incidents which occurred during the transportation of Pyrophoric Uranium. 'This notice _does not apply to Millstone 3. This notice is close 'This notice describes the licensee's responsibility _for the review and _

evaluation of contractor and subcontractor,QA programs. . At Millstone 3, Quality Assurance Directive.4.3 and Quality Standard 18.1 require review of contractor.QA~ programs. Following system turnover, contractor QA' program review is transferred to NUSCO. The NUSCO program has been reviewed ~and found .to be acceptable. This-notice is close This notice describes severe corrosion. damage which.was_found on a numbe of reactor coolant pump closure studs. cThe licensee' performed a detailed review of this occurrence. The following actions have been taken:

(1) closure stud an'd-nut materials have been verified; (2).use of lubri-cants is controlled;_(3) maintenance and inspection has been procedurally-

-

. addressed;.and, (4) removable insulation has been installed for. ease in

inspection. -This notice is closed, m

~' ~

80-28 This notice clarifies 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting. requirements.' The lic-ensee' determined that a NUSCO Generation Construction Procedure and a Stone and Webster Engineering Assurance Procedure adequately address'the-concerns of the notice. This notice is close .This notice describes failed Terry Turbine. steam inlet flange ~ studs.-

The licensee ~ performed a detailed evaluation which included contacting

.the turbine vendor. The flange studs were verified to be adequate (ASTM A 193,1 Grade B7, not AISI C-1117). In addition, precautions.were taken with the layout of-.the steam supply piping to the turbine to prevent

, water slugs'which may' contribute to stud failures. This notice is close >

w w w wee *~rv _

,

,, . .

,

_

' Attachment ~A 18 IE N Discussion

[80-30 This_ notice describesTa potential for unacceptable interaction _between

'

lthe control rod drive scram function and non-essential control air at

.certain'GE BWR facilities. The notice is applicable only to BWRs. This M -

,

notice ~is close ? jThis notic~e' describes maloperation of Gould-Brown Boveri 480 volt cir-cuit breakers. .The Millstone 3 circuit-breakers had not'been manufac-tured at the time the. notice was written. The required modification was-

made by the_ manufacturer on the circuit breakers supplied to the facil-ity. This notice is closed!

?80-32 This notice provides clarification of certain requirements for exclusive

.use shipments of radioactive materials. The licensee's action relative to packaging,.. transportation, and disposal of radioactive material is described in their response to Bulletin 79-19. This notice is close This notice deals with the determination of teletherapy timer accuracy and does not apply to Millstone 3. This notice is close This notice describes two instances of Boron dilution of the reactor coolant system as a result'of high pressure washing of the steam. genera-tor tube sheets. The licensee reviewed this notice and issued a commit-a ment'(No. 003056) to prepare a washdown procedur This notice remains open pending procedure issuance.

' 80-35 This notice deals with dislodged Iodine-125 implant seeds used in-the c treatment of cancer. It is not applicable to Millstone 3 and is closed.

-

80-36: This notice describes the failure of Vascomax 250 steam generator' support p

"

bolting. Vascomax~250 bolting is not used at Millstone 3. This notice is closed.

..

i 80-37 This: notice describes containment cooler leaks and reactor, cavity flood-ing at Indian Point 2. .The licensee reviewed this event and determined'

,_~ that Millstone 3 has'no open cooling water. system inside containmen l Millstone 3 has-three containment building su:tp pumps, each having

~

!

(1)-control room annunciation when power _is not available;L(2) automatic l startup on a high level signal from sump level transmitters; (3) indica--

tion on'the main plant computer as to operating mode; and, (4) indicating lights showing pump operating mode. 'The licensee concluded that there i's no such problem at Millstone 3.~ This notice is closed.

,

'

80-39 This notice describes the malfunctioning of solenoid valves manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation. The licensee. determined that the'

~

.

. valves identified have not.been used and are not planned for use in a'ny r- Millstone 3 equipment. This notice is closed.

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^

1

-.-,_ ~- . L . .. . ._..;....L_ , - _ , _ , , . , , - . , . . ~ - , - , , , r., s.4 , J

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.

Attachment A 19 IE N Discussion 80-40 This notice describes the spurious opening of a Target Rock Safety-Relief

-

Valve on a BWR facility as a result af excessive nitrogen supply pres-

~

sure. 1This notice is not applicable to Millstone 3 and is close This notice describes the failure of a 14-inch Velan swing check valve on the heat removal u tem at Davis-Besse. Millstone 3 does not use-Velan cbc.ck valves. Ttds notice is close This notice describes the effect of radiation on hydraulic snubber flui Millstone 3 uses GE Fluid #SF-1154 which GE states is substantially bet-

.ter than the~#F-50 fluid described in the notice. A commitment (#5059)

was made for preventive maintenance procedures to change the hydraulic fluid in accordance with recommended time spans. This notice remains open pending implementation of the commitmen This notice describes the failure of continuous water level-monitors for the. scram discharge volume at Dresden This notice is specific to BWR's and is not applicable to Millstone This notice is close This notice describes events in which the ECCS system was inadvertently or prematurely aligned to.the recirculation mode of operation. Millstone 3 does not have automatic switchover to the recirculation mode. The events described could not occur at this plan This notice is close This notice describes the potential failure of BWR backup manual scram capability and is not applicable to Millstone This notice is close This notice identifies failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays with Lexan coil spools. Millstone 3 HFA relays were changed to a different GE " Century Series" coil spool. This notice is close This notir9 describes regulations associated with the' transportation of radiography devices. The licensee determined that Stone and Webster complies with the transport requirements for radiography devices. No action relative to this notice was required. This notice is close _ This notice f)rwards a checklist for notifications of significant events in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee has included the informa-tion forwarded by this notice in Procedure EPIP 4212, Incident Communi-cations. This notice is close This notice describes cracking in the main steam lines at Surry Unit The licensee reviewed this notice and initiated a commitment (No. 3083)

to incorporate ISI inspections of the suspect areas into the ISI progra This notice remains open pending implementation of that commitment.

e

, - ,,- .

, .

'

Attachacat A~ 20-IE N Discussion 81-05; <This~ notice describes'a degraded DC system (at Palisades) which resulted'

from personnel opening the breakers from both station batteries to.their; 125 volt DC buses. The licensee reviewed this event and issued a com-mitment (No.-106013) to annunicate battery breakers. Also,~a commitment

_was. issued (No. 003149) to address"this concernLin the 125 VDC alarm re-sponse. procedure. .This notice remains open pending implementation of the licensee's commitment '81-0 This notice' describes ITE circuit breakers failures due.to a tripping-

-

coil wire having slipped out of its _ terminal. The licensee reviewed this

. notice and contacted the breaker manufacturer to verify the problem did

.not exist at' Millstone.3. The breaker manufactu'err noted the breaker in question had been in service.for 10 years and that no similar problems

-

.had been identified. The current' method of wire termination is con-sidered satisfactory by the licensee. This notice.is close *

81-07i This notice describes'a problem identified with soluble purge-dam mate-rials.used'during inert gas welding. Specifically, dam material con-

'taining Polyvinyl Alcohol film was identified as becoming insoluble in water.when heated above 300. degrees F. The' licensee reviewed this notice-and determined that water-soluble dams receive little use at Millstone

> 3,-that when they have'been used, "Dissolvo" WLD-35 and WLD-60 were used and these'do not co'ntain Polyvinyl Alcohol f_ilm. -In addition, welding ~

procedures have been changed to specify the'use of acceptable dams and-to ensure dams do not' reach 300 degrees =F. This notice is' close .81-08 This notice describes the' failure of motor-to-shaft keys on Limitorque

-

.;

.SMB-4 valve operators. In addition, the licensee was~ notified by West--

~

-

_inghouse that the same problem may exist in other Limitorque model ~

Also,.on September'3, 1982,_the licensee reported a significant defi-ciency on this same subject. 'In' response to Information Notice 81-08,.

-the licensee determined no' safety-related valves had been installed, all affected non-safety-related motor operators were identified and replace-

-ment keys crdere'd,.and'other motor operators which will be shipped will have replacement keys. : Final resolution of the significant deficiency was addressed in a letter to the NRC dated: June 10, 1983. This notice-

~

Lis closed.

-"x 81-09~ This~~ notice describes a degradation.of the residual heat removal system (at Beaver Valley) which occurred as a -result of the. water level dropping below the hot' leg midpoint during an outage. Millstone 3 will have an improved level detector for use when the vessel head is remove Addi-tional information is provided.in the closeout for Information Notice 80-20. ~This notice is close l

!

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...

Attachment A~ 21 IE N Discussion 81-10 _This notice describes an event in which a single valve in the RHR system was mistakenly opened. This resulted in'a-rapid primary system repres-surization. A total of 110,000 gallons of water sprayed into the con-

.tainment. The licensee reviewed this event and determined that adding check valves in the containment recirculation system would provide added assurance against this type of occurrence. In addition, a commitment (No. 003002) was initiated to write an ECCS initiation procedure during

-

RHR operation. This notice remains open pending implementation of lic-ensee commitment This notice describes a condition in which-the installation of an alter-nate rod insertion solenoid valve could cause insertion of control rods without associated closure of the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves. This notice is specific to BWR's and is not applicable to Mill-stone 3. This notice is close ~This notice provides guidance on an order issued regarding automatic control and rod insertion on low control air pressure. This notice is specific to BWR's and is not applicable to Millstone 3. This notice is close This. notice pertained to a jammed source rack in a Gamma Irradiator and was not applicable to Millstone This notice is close .81-14 This notice describes a potential overstress of shafts on Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly. Valves with expandable T-ring The licensee evaluated this notice and determined that this valve design is not used at Mill-stone 3. This notice is close ~ This ' notice describes a degradation of autoinatic ECCS actuation capa-bility by isolation of instrument line The licensee's Administrative Procedure ACP-QA-212, System Valve Alignment Control, specifies double verification for associated instrument valve This notice is close This notice describes certain BWR control rod drive system malfunctions and does not apply to Millstone 3. This notice is close Not promulgate This notice describes excessive radiation exposures to the fingers of three individuals during cleaning.and wipe testing of radioactive sealed sources at a sealed-source manufacturing facility and does not apply to Millstone 3. TFis notice is close This notice describes a loss of certain parts while floating a TV camera,

~

l suspended from a foam float, down the reactor coolant system hot leg !

l' This notice was routed to all Millstone 3 department heads for informa- '

tio This notice is close I 1 ..

. _ _ _ _ _ ._

oy, .

~

Attachment A '

g

[ 'IE N Discussion

'81-20; .This notice describes D. G.;0'Brien Company electrical penetration fail- ,

ures identified during simulated aging and LOCA testing sequences. The El.icensee determined that D. G. 0'Brien Company electrical penetration assemblie's are not used at Millstone 3. 'This notice is close .81-214 This notice provides . followup information on IE Bulletin 81-03, " Flow Slockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Corbicula-(Asi-atic Clam)..and Mytilus (Mussel)."- The licensee's response to'this'bul-

-letin describes their actions on this matter. 'In addition, the licensee'

has (1) determined the same methods used to detect fouling by Asiatic

. Clams will detect fouling due to other shellfish; (2) Millstone 3 will

'

be continuously chlorinating _ service water and does not expect-the bio-fouling problems' detailed in this notice; and, (3) a commitment (N ).has.been issued to' inspect service water heat exchangers after a' '

prolonged outag This notice is close ,

. 81-22 This notice provides information on recent amendments to Chapter.18 o the Atomic Energy' Act of 1954 that should be bro'ught to the attention

-

of all persons involved in NRC licensed activities. This notice wa circulated to all Unit 3 staff. This notice is close ; This. notice describes fuel assembly damage which occurred when two air; lines and an electric cable tangled and caught the gripper. tube or switc This allowed lateral movement.of the manipulator ~ane'before the fuel assembly was in the: full up position. Millstone refueling '

bridge has twoL" fuel hoist-up position" interlocks. A trip switch fo full up positioning and a computer controlled interlock counts pulses-corresponding to the number of turns the lift winch undergoes for the-

-full'up position,to be-reached. -The licensee' concluded that these two means of position-indication are sufficient to prevent'this type.of-occurrence'at Millstone 3. ~This notice is' close This notice describes auxiliary feedpump turbine journal b' earing damage; resulting from a failure to maintain a proper oil level in the bearing j reservoir. The licensee reviewed this notice and determined it' applied ;

to Millstone 3. A commitment (No. 3176) was issued to'designia log sheet to monitor oil level. This notice remains open pending implementation of the-commitmen ;81-25 This notice describes a reactor scram and loss of redundant safety sig--

nals as'a-result of an open equalizing valve on a level transmitte The license ~e reviewed this event and determined that Administrative Pro- !

cedure ACP-QA-2.12, System Valve Alignment Control, adequately addresses j these concerns. This notice is close ;

I r .. +

a 3 .. ...

'

_

,u Attachment A 23 'IE N ' Discussion

'

81-26 ThisEnotice provides a compilation of health physics information item The licensee reviewed these items and issued commitments for the follow-ing: issues which applied to Millstone 3: (1) update Administrative Pro-

'cedure ACP-2.09,-Enclosed Volume Work Practices, to include Millstone-3 (commitment No. 3108); (2)~ develop a Millstone 3 containment entry pro-cedure containing notice' guidelines-(commitment No.L3181); and,~(3) mini--

mize personnel ' exposure to DOP in filter testing (commitment No. 3182).

This notice remains open;pending completion of licensee action This notice pertains'to. accumulation of flammable gas mixtures (hydrogen /

-

oxygen) in waste gas decay tanks. This situation occurred at San Onofre

-

1 due to leakage of instrument air into the plant nitrogen system. This

accumulation subsequently ignited. Millstone 3 does not have any cross-

-connect lines between the instrument air system and the nitrogen system, which is used.for cover gas and purging for the hydrogenated tank .Therefore, the accumulation of flammable mixtures could not occur in a Jmanner similar to-that which occurred at San Onofre. In. addition, con-tinuous monitoring of oxygen and hydrogen will be provided on the process gas receiver tank of the-gaseous waste system and will alarm when unac-

~

ceptable: concentrations exist. This' notice is close LThis notice describes several recent mechanical failures of main steam-isolation valves at some BWR facilities. The licensee reviewed this

,

>

notice and determined the construction of the Sulzer valve used rt Mill -

stone 3 precludes the described mode of failure. This notice is close This notice describes equipment failures during qualification testin The licensee reviewed this notice and determined that five of the tests-were on equipment not used~at Millstone 3. For the remaining equipment,-

-

manufacturers were contacted and resolutions to the identified problems sough Overall environmental qualification of equipment for Millstone '

3 is. governed by the requirements of 50.49. This notice remains open pending completion of licensee action This notice describes recent: occurrences with Velan Swing. Check' Valves.,

The licensee reviewed the notice and determined Velan. Swing Check Valves-

are not used at Millstone This notice is close This notice describes the failure of safety injection valves to operate against-a differential pressure. The licensee performed an investigation of the applicability of this notice to Millstone Two valves were o identified with similar applications or design. These valves are 4-inch SIS valves'and 14-inch feedwater. system valve The SIS valves received a full differential pressure shop performance / operating test. ~The 14-inch feedwater system ~ valves close against the differential pressure, use'a different hydraulic operator, and had supporting tests done on a similar valve. .For these reasons, the problem described in the notice does not exist at Millstone 3. This notice is close ,

,a

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? 1

' V.j ..

!# # < Attachment A 24

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~

IE N ~ Discussion-

'81-32- This notice deals with the transfer and/or. disposal of spent generators manufactured by a major. supplier of radiopharmaceuticals. This notice

~does not apply-to Millstone 3. _This notice is close ' This notice: requested licensees with Atwood and Morrill valves to. verify that the: locking plates are bent sufficiently to perform their locking

. function. This notice is not applicable to Millstone ~ 3 -because locking

,

plates or tabs are not used. This notice is close : This notice describes the inadvertent actuation of-the Maine Yankee prompt notification system when routine State Police radio pager signals-energized the fixed sirens. The Northeast Utilities systes. utilizes a Lcoded FM digital.. signal as opposed to the coded AM signal used at Maine

, . Yankee. The'FM signal system is considered to be less susceptible to

such problems. -This' notice is close .

81-35 -This notice describes certain check valve failures which occurred on '

LCrane Company valves, Mission Manufacturing Company _ valves, and Anchor Darlink swing check valves. ~The licensee evaluated this notice and de-termined: (1) no Crane Company valves are used or are planned to.be used;.

(2).'no Mission Manufacturing Company' valves'are used or are planned to; be used; and, (3) no Anchor Darling swing check valves are used, only

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tilting disc check valv"s. The design of this valve precludes the prob-les reported. This notice is close This notice describes problems experienced with a Robertshaw'Diaphrage control valve installed'in the Terry Turbine' mechanical.overspeed complex

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in the HPCI system'at Hatch 1. The Millstone 3 Terry Turbine on~the .

auxiliary feedwatec system uses a mechanical overspeed. trip, not a mechanical-hydraulic overspeed. Consequently, the problem-described

'does not apply to Millstone ~3. This notice is close ~ This notice describes unnecessary radiation exposures during events in-Lvolving thickness and level measuring devices. The licensee reviewed this notice and determined it was not applicable to Millstone This notice is close This notice deals with the distribution of L test samples of low levels

.of radioiodine 'h water to verify laboratory capabilities to quantify low levels of I-lil in water. This was a one time test-and was not ap- .

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plicable to Millstone This notice is close !

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