ML20128B579

Forwards Draft Negative Consent Paper for Commission, Including Notice for Proposed Rulemaking & Draft Regulatory Analysis,On Minor Mods to Nuclear Power Reactor Event Reporting Requirements

ML20128B579
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/10/1991
From:	Novak T NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To:	Jordan E Committee To Review Generic Requirements
Shared Package
ML19341G314	List: ML20127C396 ML20128B484 ML20128B505 ML20128B537 ML20128B565 ML20128B579 ML20128B592 ML20128B620 ML20128B639 ML20128B656 ML20128B681 ML20128B686 ML20128B849 ML20128B857 ML20128B869 ML20128B915
References
FRN-57FR28642, RULE-PR-50 AD03-1-008, AD3-1-8, NUDOCS 9302030102
Download: ML20128B579 (30)

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DEC 10 tggt MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements FROM: Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED HINOR RULEMAXING TO MODIFY OPERATING POWER REACTOR EVENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ---10 CFR 50.72 AND 50.73 Enclosed is a Negative Consent Paper for the Commission, including a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking and draft Regulatory Analysis, on minor modifications to nuclear power reactor event reporting requirements. .We are submitting this s package to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) for information and determination of whether or not to review the proposed rulemaking. This proposal has been coordinated with RES and NRR. .

When approving the rulemaking activities, the ED0's' directive to us was to ensure a timely publication of the final rule and to minimize resource expenditures. Due to the expedited schedule, we respectfully suggest that the CRGR defer its review until after the comment resolution; i.e., the final rulemaking ~ stage. We would appreciate your letting us know'the CRGR's -

decision as soon as practical.

This proposed minor rulemaking would amend.10_CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" and 10 CFR ~ -

50.73, "-Licensee Event Reporting System."' Based on the staff's1 review and - '

analysis of the reactor operating experience over the'past-7 ' years, the industry comments received during the NRC's, Fall'1990 Event Reporting Workshops, and-the staff comments on " Event _ Reporting Systems.10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 -- Clarification of NRC Systems and Guidelines for Reporting," NUREG-:

1022, Revision 1-(Draft),weareproposingchangesto50.72(b)(2)(ii)and 50.73(a)(2)(iv).. Specifically, the proposed changes involve-relaxation of current reporting requirements primarily for invalid 'actuations of certain-

- engineered safety features (e.g., reactor water cleanup system, control- room emergency ventilation system). -Review of these events.over a period of' several hundred reactor-years of operation has ' identified no' safety concerns and has provided little useful_ information upon which to assess plant performance. Relaxing the requirement'for a limited set of specifically defined'.ESF actuations will reduce the industry's reporting. burden and the NRC's response burden in event processing,. review and assessment so that'the-resources can be applied to safety-related activities. Deletion of these-reporting requirements will have essentially no impact on the NRC'.c ability to -

fulfill its mission to ensure public health and safety.

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1 Edward Li--Jordan: ---- 2--

If you havef any questions i or. wish to: discuss-this matter!further please- -

contact'me or the AE00~ staff contacts:" Raji Tripathi (X24435), for:-10l CFR 50;73? -

and_ Ericleiss _'(X29005) for -10 CFR 50.72. -

-Q _ _

ThomasM._Novak;:Directori Division of Safety' Programs Office:for Analysis' and-Evaluation of Operational Data;

Enclosures:

-As stated.

. Distribution: See Page 3 a

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Diatribution(w/oenclosures):

E. Jordan D. Ross T. Novak L. Spessard V. Benaroya P. Baranowsky J. Rosenthal G. Zech T. Murley, NRR E. Rossi, NRR R. Woodruff, NRR S. Treby, OGC G. Mizuno, OGC E. Beckjord, RES W. Morris, RES R. Baer, RES M. fleishman, RES M. Taylor, OEDO J. Bateman, OED0 T. Martin, R1 S. Ebneter, RII A. Davis, RIII R. Martin, RIV J. Martin, RV Distribution (w/ enclosures):

J. Crooks E. Weiss R. Tripathi M. Harper M. Padovar AE00 R/F CSP R/F TPAB/RF

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4 hodecisionag f_qn The comissioners ff_qn James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations Sub.iect: PROPOSED HINOR RULEMAKING TO H0DIFY OPERATING POWER REACTOR-EVENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 10 CFR 50.72 AND 10 CFR 50.73

Purpose:

To obtain Commission approval for )ublication of a Federal Reaister notice of proposed rulemacing.

Backaround: The staff'.s reactor operating experience review over the past 7 years has shown that some unnecessary reporting exists. In addition, there is a disparity and diversity among the licensees in understanding the intent of the existing event reporting rules-and, therefore, in their applications. The NRC Regulatory Impact Study (Draft NUREG-1395) indicated a need for clarification of the intent of the rules and for additional guidance on event reporting.

In the Fall of 1990, in four workshops on event reporting, organized by AE00, NRR and NHSS, the staff interacted with licensees and industry-supported organizations to obtain feedback on their experience with event reporting under the existing rules. Subsequently, a task group (AE00, NRR, OGC, ADM) was organized to provide clarification of the intent of

Contact:

Raji Tripathi, AE0D (301) 492-4435 Eric Weiss, AE0D (301) 492-9005 1

4 Prodoc!siond the current rules to improve the uniformity and completeness of operating reactor event reporting.

In September 1991, AE0D issued for coment a draft NUREG-1022, Rev.1, ' Event Reporting Systems 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73-

-- Clarification of NRC Systems and Guidelines For Report-ing," which contains improved guidance for event reporting, compiled by the task group. The staff's continuing examination of the reported events during development of this document indicated that certain types engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations,of invalid are not important to safety, and any resources expended in reporting these events could-be better spent in other saft.ty-related activities. However, the staff could not expand the scope of the guidance document to include modifications to the 1

(1) Actuation -- Actuation of a component of an engineered safety feature-(EST) or reactor protection system (RPS) is defined as either:

(a) Receipt of a signal (s) in the plant's protection system sufficient to satisfy the protection channels' coincidence logic necessary to activate the ESF or the RPS (system or component), independent of whether or not the ESF, or the RPS, or the component oporates; or (b) deliberate or inadvertent action (s) (manual or automatic) or plant condition (s) that activates the ESF or the RPS (system / component),

without the protection channel coincidence logic being satisfied (e.g., manual actuation of a safety injection pump, an electrical jumper being used to start an emergency diesel generator, or set-point drift causing a boiling water reactor main steam safety / relief valve to open).

(2) Valid ESF or RPS actuations are those that are:

(a') automatically initiated by the measurement of an actual physical system parameter that was within the established set-point band of '

the sensor that provides the signals to the protection system's logic (whether or not the ESF/RPS _ functions properly or a need exists);or (b) manually initiated in response to plant conditions.

(3) Invalid actuations are other than those that are considered to be

" valid" as defined above. Examples of such events include those initiated by spurious voltage spikes, inadvertent manual actions (e.g.,

bumping cabinets, misplaced jumpers, actuating wrong switches),

equipment failures, or radio frequency interference.

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Prodoetstonal existing reporting requirements. Neither was it possible to incorporate this document, by reference, in amending the '

existing rules. Consequently, we were advised by 0GC to keep the two issues separate -- let the guidance document clarify the intent of the existing rules, but initiate a separate rulemaking activity to modify the current reporting requirements to relax the reporting of selected types of ESF actuations.

Discussion: Enclosure I contains the proposed rule to make minor modifications to the existing reactor event reporting requirements. The proposed rule will have minimal impact on the NRC's ability to fulfil its safety mission because the deletion of the specified reporting requirements pose little or no safety concerns. This reduction would also be consistent with the objectives and the requirements of the-Paperwork Reduction Act.

The following are the points considered in the proposed amendments to the existing regulation -

In 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) and 50.73 (a)(2)(ivl, the existing rules require reporting of an event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS), except when the actuation resulted from or was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Based on reviews that' indicated the frequencies of such occurrences at the majority of the plants is low, the staff proposes to make additional relaxations to event reporting as follows:

. The first category excludes those events when an invalid actuation occurs while the system is already properly removed from service.

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. The second category excludes events that involve invalid actuations after the safety function had already been completed (e.g., an invalid actuation of the RPS when all rods were fully inserted, or an invalid containment isolation signal while the containment isolation valves were already closed).

. The third category excludes events involving invalid cctuation, isolation, or re-alignment of a limited set of,ESi iystems, subsystems, or components (i.e., when an invalid actuation, isolation, or re-alignment of only the RWCU system, or any of the following four l ventilation systems: CREV system, reactor building i

ventilation system, fuel building ventilation system, auxiliary building ventilation system, or their equivalent ventilation systems occurs).

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. The fourth category excludes events that' involve actuations of ESF components (which have.both

. protective (ESF) and non-protective (non-ESF) actuation circuitry) when the actuation results from a 4 signal originating in-the non ESF circuitry. For instance, in a boiling water reactor, if an RWCU system isolation occurs because of a high pressure signal, the incident is reportable because the signal originated from the protective (ESF) circuitry.

However, if the RWCU isolation occurs because of a non-ESF high temperature signal, the event is not-reportable because the signal originated in the non-ESF circuitry. Although the same system components respond in both instances, in the latter case the triggering mechanism was intended only to protect the-RWCU system resins from damage. However, unplanned reactor shutdowns originating from any source (i.e.,

from the RPS as well as other anticipatory or non-RPS-signals) continue to be reportable.

The intent of the rule change, however, is that any' invalid actuations of other ESFs (such as- emergency core cooling system isolations/actuations; containment isolation valve closures that affect cooling systems, main steam flow, essential support systems, etc.; containment spray actuation; and, residual heat removal-system isolations),

not excluded above, will still continue to be reportable.

Furthermore, licensees will also continue to submit LERs if a deficiency or condition associated with any of the invalid ESF actuations of the RWCU or the CREV systems (or other equivalent ventilation systems) satisfies any reportability criteria under 50.72 and 50.73.

Resource u We estimate the resource commitment of 1.0 staff-year for AE00 and 0.5 staff-year for other NRC offices to prepare, review and approve the rule changes. The proposed rule changes are expected to result in about a 5-10 percent re-duction in the number'of LERs, i.e., about _150 iERs each year. Similar savings are estimated in the 50.72 notifica-tions.

The incremental co>t reduction to industry is about $2600 per event- for both 50.72 and'50.73 reports. For the NRC, the reduction in processing cost from a 5 to 10 percent reduction in 50.72 notifications would be negligible, be-cause the entire duty officer staff would remain the same, and the screening of these relatively unimportant events by NRR would not affect total event screening effort signift-cantly. There would, however, be cost savings for NRC due to a reduction in LER screening, coding and processing. The incremental cost reduction to the NRC in LER screening and 4

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processing is estimated to-be about $2400 per LERb Recommendation:- Unless the staff is instructed to the contrary _within 101._.. k

_10 days CFR from the date 50.72-and of- this 50.73 will pger, the enclosed

issued as_a proposedamendments rule.-~ to  ;

Coordination: The office of General Counsel has no legal._ objection. '

e James M. Taylor, 2 Executive Director for Operations Encisoures:

1. Federal Reaister' Notice

2. Draft Regulatory Analysis A

Distribution:

Commissioners OGC OCA DIG REGIONAL OFFICES -

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ENCLOSURE 1 PredocM0s IAE12-1.1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 50 RIN 3150 AE12 Minor Modifications to the Nucicar Power Reactor Event Reporting Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) proposes to amend its i

regulations to make minor modifications to the current nuclear power reactor event reporting requirements. The proposed changes-would apply to all nuclear power reactor licensees, and delete reporting requirements for some events that have been determined to be of little or no safety significance. This rule change will re' duce the industry's reporting burden and the NRC's response burden -in -

event review and assessment. The preposed rule changes will have minimal impact on the NRC's ability to ensure public health an' safety.

DATES: The coment period . expires 75 days following publication ' in the federal Register Coments received titer this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure consideration only for coments received on or before this date.

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IAE12 11 ADDRESSES:- . Mail written coments ' to: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DC 20555, ATIN:' Docketing and. Service Branch.

Deliver coments to One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike,'Rockville, MD, between 7:30 am ar.d'4:15 pm on Federal workdays.-

Comenters are encouraged to-submit, in addition to the original paper copy, a copy of their coments in an electronic format on 1BM PC DOS compatible-3.5- or 5.25-inch, double-sided, diskettes. Data flies should be provided-in Wordperfect 5.0, or 5.1. ASCII code is also acceptable, or if formatted text isL required, data files should be submitted in IBM Revisable Format -Text Document-Content ArchitectGit: (Kt1/DCA)'f9 mat.

Copics of the environmental assessment, the draft regulatory. analysis and the finding of no significant impact, and the supporting statement submitted'to OMB, and coments received may be examined at: The NRC Pubite Document Room,2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION C0KTACT: Raji Tripathi (10 CFR 50.73) or Eric Weiss (10' CFR 50.72), Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data,:U.S. Nuclear Regulat6ry Comission, Washington DC. 20555, Telephone (301) 492-4435 and:492-9005, resp'ectively. ,

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Prod 0cisJoml fAE12-Il SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATI0H:

BACKGROUND The Comission is proposir.g minor changes to the current nuclear power reactor event reporting requirements contained in 30 CFR 50.72, "imediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors," and it. CFR 50.73, " Licensee Event Reporting System," as part of on-going activities to improve its regulations.

In this regard, various reviews by the NRC staff of operating experience and the patterns of licensees' reporting of operating events since 1984_have indicated that the reporting of certain types of events are not contributing to -

the operating base and is no longer necessary. Such unnecessary reporting is consuming both resources in preparation and review that would be better applied elsewhere.

Over the past several years, the NRC staff has increased its attention to j event r'eporting issues to ensure uniformity, consistency and completeness in event reporting. As a result, in September 1991, AE00 issued for coment a draft NUREG-1022, Revision 1, " Event Reporting Systems 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 --

Clarification of NRC Systems and Guidelines For Reporting," which contained-improved guidance for event reporting, compiled by the Task Group. The NRC-1 A free single copy may be requested by writing to the Distribution and Mail Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington DC 20555. A copy is also available for inspection or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower level), Washington, DC.

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4 NOCISi0nal IAE12-11 staff's continuing examination of the reported events during development of this document indicated that certain types of invalid engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations' are not important to safety, and any resources expended in reporting these events could be better spent in other safety-related activities. In addition, the staff determined that for the same reasons ESF equipment actuations need no longer be reported if the actuations occurred from non-ESF signals.

Based on the NRC's' evaluation of both the reported events since January 2

(1) Actuation -- Actuation of a component of an engineered safety feature (ESF) or reactor protection system (RPS) is defined as either:

(a) Receipt of a signal (s) in the plant's protection system sufficient to satisfy the protection channels' coincidence logic necessary to activate the ESF or the RPS (system or component), independent of whether or not the ESF, or the RPS, or the component operates; or (b) deliberate or inadvertent action (s) (manual or automatic) or plant condition (s) that activate the ESF or the RPS (systerq/ component),

without the protection channel coincidence logic being satisfied (e.g., manual actuation of a safety injection pump, an electrical jumper being used to start an emergency diesel generator, or set-point drift causing a boiling water reactor main steam safety / relief valve to open).

(2) falidESForRPSactuationsarethosethatare:

(a) automatically initiated by the measurement of an actual physical system parameter that was within the established set-point band of the sensor that provides the signals to the protection system's logic (whether or not the ESF/RPS functions properly or a need exists); or (b) manually initiated in response to plant conditions.

(3) Invalid actuations are other than those that are considered to be

" valid" as defined above. Examples of such events include those initiated by spurious voltage spikes, ir. advertent manual actions (e.g.,

bumping cabinets, misplaced jumpers, actuating wrong switches),

equipment fadures, or radio frequency interference.

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W0dsl0g fAE12-11 1984, when the existing rules first became effective, and the comments received during the Event Reporting Workshops, some needed improvements in the rules were identified. For instance, it was determined that some events only involving invalid ESF actuations are of little or no safety significance but are currently reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) and 50.73 (a)(2)(iv). Events in this category are invalid actuations of, for instance, the reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system and the control room emergency ventilation (CREV) system, which actuate various system components, but pose no safety concerns.

The original Statements of Consideration for the current event reporting l regulations,10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, indicated that ESF systems, including the reactor protection system (RPS), are provided to mitigate the consequences of a.

significant event. Therefore, ESFs should (1) work properly when called upon and (2) should not be challenged frequently or unnecessarily. Those Statements of l

Consideration also indicated that operation of an ESF as part of a pre-planned operational procedure or test need not be reported. The Comission also noted that ESF actuations, including reactor trips, are frequently associated with significant plant transients and are indicative of events that are of safety i i

significance. At that time, the Comission also required all ESF actuations, including the RPS actuations, except as noted, -- manual or automatic, valid or invalid -- to ha reported to the NRC by telephone within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of occurrence followed by a written Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days of the incident, j The reported information is used by the NRC in confirmation of the licensing f

bases, identification of precursors to severe core damage, reviews of management control systems, performance indication, and the identification of actions to 5

fl0docigfy IAE12-11 minimize unnecessary actuations of safety systems.

However, after a review of several hundred reactor-years of reactor opera-tional experience, the NRC staff has determined that a certain set of invalid ESF actuations have not provided safety significant information necessary for the NRC to be able to meet its mission to ensure public health and safety, and any re-sources expended in reporting such events could be better spent on other safety-related activities.

Relaxing reporting requirements on certain ESF actuations, primarily invalid actuations, could save both the industry and the NRC resources. The Commission emphasizes that not all invalid ESF actuations are being relaxed from reporting. The relaxations in event reporting requirements as contained in the proposed rule apply only to a limited set of specifically defined invalid ESF actuations. Such events, for example, include invalid actuation, isolation, or ro-alignment of a limited set of ESF systems, subsystems, or components (i.e.,

when an invalid actuation, isolation, or re-alignment of only the RWCU system, or any 6f the following four ventilation systems: CREV system, reactor building ventilation system, fuel building ventilation system, auxiliary building -

ventilation system, or their equivalent ventilation systems occurs). Such actuation / isolation /re-alignment events are of minimal safety significance ,

because they result in the system being in the safe condition, and contribute little to operating experience data. However, invalid actuations of other ESFs such as emergency core cooling system isolations/actuations; containment isolation valve closures that affect cooling systems, main steam flow, essential 6

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4 PredecMM fAE12-11 support systems, etc.; containment spray actuation; and, residual heat removal system isolations will still be reportable. In the proposed rule, in addition-to the specified invalid ESF actuations, other ESF actuations are being excluded.

The Comission, however, considers it prudent to emphasize that if an invalid ESF actuation reveals a defect in the system such that it failed or would fail to -

perform its intended function, the event is reportable under other requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. To be specific, invalid ESF actuations which reveal a condition or a deficiency that may have actual or potential safety significance, such as an adverse impact on safety-related equipment and conse-quently on the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or a significant radiological release or potential exposure to plant personnel or the general public, or. a compromise of control room habitability, continues to be reportable, invalid ESF actuations that are excluded by this rule change, but occur as a part of a reportable event, should continue to be described as part of the reportable event. Nothing here should be interpreted as precluding a complete, accurate and thorough description of an event when it is reportable under these or any other reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73.

The NRC is proposing to relax only the event reporting requirements. Any anomalies that are excluded from reporting would need continued ' licensee attention under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing. Plants." for example, based on the NRC's review of reactor operating experience, the potential exists for increased 7

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Prodschd IAE12-11 occupational radiation exposures associated with the licensees' event investigation and recovery of the RWCU system following invalid isolations.

Therefore, licensees must continue to take steps necessary to minimize undue isolations of the RWCU system and to reduce the potential for unnecessary occupational exposures. Also, invalid CREV isolations continue to need to be minimized so that the control room operators are not distracted from attending to events of greater urgency.

Description Relaxing the requirement for reporting cf ESF actuations that are of little or no safety significance will reduce the ir.dustry's reporting burden and the NRC's response burden. As noted earlier, the proposed rule will have minimal impact on the NRC's ability to fulfil its safety mission because the deletion of certain reporting requirements pose little or no safety concerns. This reduction would also be consistent with the objectives and the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. The following are the points considered in the proposed amendmedts to the regulation:

1. 10 CFR 50.72 a_nd 50.73 In 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) and 50.73 (a)(2)(iv),

the exi:: ting rule requires reporting of an event or condition that results in a manual or automat.ic actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, except when the

, actuation resulted from or was part of the pre-planned sequence during testing i or reactor operation. The NRC proposes to.make additional relaxations to event reporting as follows:

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Pedochional' fAE12-11

. The first category excludes those events when an invalid.ESF or RPS..actua-tion occurs when the system is already- properly removed from service.

. The second category excludes events that involve ? invalid ESFL orL RPS actuations after the safety _ function had already been completed (e.g., an invalid actuation of the RPS when all rods are fully inserted, or an invalid _ containment isolation signal while. the containment isolation- -

valves were already closed).

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. The third category excludes events involving invalid actuation, isolation, or re-alignment of a limited set of ESF systems, subsystems, or components-(i.e., when an invalid actuation, isolation, or re-alignment of only. the RWCU system, or any of the following four _ ventilation systems:. CREV -

system, reactor building ventilation system, . fuel building ventilation .

system, auxiliary building ventilation system, or. their equivalent -

ventilation systems occurs).

. The fourth category excludes events that involve actuations of ESF compo- I nents (which have both protective ~(ESF) and non-protective- (non-ESF)

, actuation circuitry] when the-actuation results from a signal originating in the non-ESF circuitry. For instance, in a boiling water reactor, if an-RWCU system isolation occurs because of a high pressure signal, the-incident is reportable because the signal originated-from the protective

. (ESF) circuitry. However, if the RWCU isolation occurs because of a non '

ESF high temperature signal, the event is..not reportable because the-9 Y

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ .__ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ = _ _ _ _ - _ _

Predocirjonal IAE12 11 signal originated in the non ESF circuitry. Although the same system components respond in both instances, in the latter case the triggering mechanism was intended only to protect the RWCU system resins from damage.

However, the Comission remains interested in unplanned reactor shutdowns originating from any source (i.e., from the RPS as well as other anticipatory or non RPS signals) as these events involve transients. Such events continue to be reportable.

The intent of the rule change, however, is that any invalid actuations of other ESFs (such as emergency core cooling system isolations/actuationst containment isolation valve closures that affect cooling systems, main steam flow, essential support systems, etc.; containment spray actuation and, residual heat removal system isolations), not excluded above, will still continue to be reportable. Furthermore, licensees are still required to submit LERs if a deficiency or condition associated with any of the invalid ESF actuttions of the RWCU or the CREV systems (or other equivalent ventilation systems) satisfier sny reportability criteria under 50.72 and 50.73.

Impact Relaxing the current requirement for reporting invalid ESF actuations will reduce the industry's reporting burden and the NRC's response burden. This reduction would be consistent with the objectives and the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. The proposed rule changes will have minimal impact on the NRC's ability to fulfil its mission to ensure public health and safety 10 y 9 ,,9 + r. == =a -* - - * -+

Prododdonal IAt12_ll l

because the reporting requirements that the NRC proposes to delete have little or no safety significance.

It is estimated that the proposed changes to the existing rules will result in about 150 (or 510 percent) fewer Licensee Event Reports each year. Stallar reductions are expected in the number of prompt event notifications reportable under 10 CFR 50.72.

The licensees are encouraged to submit their estimates on impact of the proposed rule change as coments.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Comission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule change, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The proposed rule relaxes current reporting requirements for certain invalid engineered safety feature actuations which, based on the NRC staff's review of several hundred reactor-years of operational experience have been determined to be of little or no safety significance. The environmental assessment and finding of no impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact, and the 11

hodoc1slonk IAE12.11 regulatory analysis are available from: Raji Tripathi, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear regulatory Comission, Washington, i

DC 20555, telephone: (301)4924435.

Paperwork Reduction Act :tatement This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980(44U.S.C.3501etseq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Hanagement and Budget for review and approval of the Paperwork requirements.

Relaxing the current requirement for reporting invalid ESF actuations will reduce the industry's reporting burden and the NRC's response burden. This reduction would be consistent with the objectives and the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. The proposed rule changes will have minimal impact on the NRC's ability to fulfil its mission to ensure public health and safety because the reporting requirements that the NRC proposes to delete pose little

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or no safety concerns. It is estimated that the proposed changes to the existing rules will result in about 150 (or 5-10 percent) fewer Licensee Event Reports each year. Similar reductions are expected in the number of prompt event notifications reportable under 10 CFR 50.72.

Send coments-regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this-collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to the Information and Records Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,, Washington-12

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IAUhl1 DC 20555; and to the Papemork Reduction Project (3150- ) Office of Hanagement and Budget, Washington DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed j rule change. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Connission. The draft analysis is available for inspection in the PRC Pubile Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower level), Washington DC.

Single copics of the draft analysis may be obtained from: RajiTripathi, Office-for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-4435.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C. 605 (B)), the Connission certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a

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significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants.

The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of 'small entities" set forth in the Regulatory flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Smail Business  ;

Administration Act in 13 CFR Part 121.

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Pt0&dJd IAE1211 Backfit Analysis As required by 10 CfR 50.109, the Commission has completed an assessment of the need for backfit analysis for the proposed rules. The proposed amendments include relaxations of certain existing requirements on reporting of information to the NRC. These changes neither impose additional reporting requirements nor require modifications to the facilities or their licenses. Accordingly, the NRC has concluded that the proposed rules do not constitute backfit and, thus, a backfit analysis is not required.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 i

1 Antitrust, Classified infonnation, Criminal penalty, Fire prevention, ,

Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuc1 car pwer plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and record keeping. -

for the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1964, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50.

14

Prodocb!0nal IAUhll  !

PART 50 DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES ,

1. AVUl0RITY: Sections 102,103,104,105,161,182,183,186,189, 68 Stat.

936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282);

secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244,1246(42U.S.

C.5841,5842,5846).

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95 601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101,185, 68 Stat. 936, 955, asamended(42U.S.C.2131,2235);sec.102, Pub.L.91-190,83 Stat.853(42 U.S.C.4332). Sections 50.13, and 50.54(dd), and- 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec.102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S. C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S. C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97 415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80 - 50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix Falsoissuedundersec.187,68 Stat.955(4rU.S.C.2237). ,

Forthepurposesofsec.223,68 Stat.958,asamended(42U.S.C.2273);

Sections 50.5, 50.46(a) and (b), and 50.54(c)_ are issued under sec.161b, 68 I Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.;.C. 2201(b)); Sections 50.5,50.7(a),50.10(a)-(c), 3 50.34(a) and (e), 50.44(a)-(c), 50.46(a) and (b), 50.47(b), 50.48(a), (c), (d),-

and (e), 50.49(a), 50.54(a), (1), (1)(1), (1)-(n), (p), (q), (t), (v), and (y),

15 I

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l Prodoch!0nd I fAE12-11 50.55(f), 50.55a(a), (c)-(e). (g), and (h), 50.59(c), 50.60(a), 50.62(b),

50.64(b), 50.65, and 50.80(a) and (b) are issued under sec. 1511, 68 Stat. 949, i asamended(42U.S.C.2201(1));andSections50.49(d),(h),and(j),50.54(w),

(z), (bb), (cc), and (dd), 50.55(e), 50.59a(b), 50.61(b), 50.62(b), 50.70(a),

50.71(a)-(c) and (c), 50.72(a), 50.73(b), 50.61(b), 50.62(b), 50.70(a), 50.71(a). l (c) and (e), 50.72(a), 50.73(a) and (b), 50.74, 50.78, and 50.90 are issued under sec.1610, 69 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

2. In 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph (b)(2)(ii) is revised to read as follows:

"Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESf), including the reactor protection system (RPS),

except when:

(A) the actuation results from or is part of a pre-planned sequence during 16 sting or reactor operation; or (B) an invalid actuation occurs:

(1) when the system is properly removed from service, or (2) after the safety function has been already completed, or 16

- - . =. - - - - . . -. _

. . . t. t Onal fAElt1] . ,

(3) that involves actuation, isolation, or-re alignment of only.the b

reactor water clean.up system, or any of the following four; [

ventilation systems: control room emergency ventilation system, -!

reactor building ventilation system, fuel building ventilation system, and auxiliary building ventilation system, or ~ their equivalent ventilation systemst or (C) the actuation involves ESF (except the RPS) components and results from a  ;

sional that originated from non ESF (e.g., control) circuitry." ,

3. In 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(iv)-is revised.to read as follows:-

"Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of an-engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS),  !

except when: .

(A). the actuation resulted from or was part of a pre-planned sequence'during:

testing or reactor operation; or -

(B). an invalid actuation occurred and i

-(l)~ the system was properly-removed from service, or i

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,..r-- .,--,..g., & i ,4,, --..-y, s,m.. .- ,,.m,p. r Y . ,. v._,.-[,' ...4ryu, , ,.ny,..%., ~.s',m~,. wc . . ., -

O IAU2dl (2) the safety function was already completed, or (3) involved actuation, isolation, or re-alignment of only the reactor water clean up system, or any of the following four ventilation-systems: control room emergency ventilation system, reactor building ventilation system, fuel building ventilation system, and auxiliary I

building ventilation system, or their equivalent ventilation systems; or (C) theactuationinvolvedESF(excepttheRPS)componentsandresultedfrom i

a signal that originated from non-ESF (e.g., control) circuitry."

Dated at Rockville, MD, this day of , 1991.

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James H. Taylor, i

Executive Director for Operations i

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ENCLOSURE 2 6

Regulatory Analysi. DRAFT The NRC staff has prepared a draft regulatory analysis of this proposed rule change. The analysis examines the costs and benefits o't the alternatives considered by t.he NRC. The following is the draft analysis:

1. Statement of the Problem The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations on reporting of operating reactor events. ,

Specifically, the affected regulations are 10 CFR 50.72, i "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Huclear Power Reactors", and 10 CFR 50.73, " Licensee Event Report System".

Currently, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 require that NRC licensees for nuclear power reactors report any event or condition that involves actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESP),

including the reactor protection system (RPS), except for actuations that resulted-from and were part of-a preplanned sequence during testing or during reactor operation. The events are required to be reported via a telephone within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of discovery pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) and within 30 days in a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR

50. 73 (a) (2) (iv) . Approximately-40 percent of the LERs (over 800) received annually involve ESF actuations; a similar number of telephonic-event notifications are also made.

Based on the-review of reactor operational experience since January 1,1984, when the current 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 first became effective, the NRC staff has determined that the reporting of certain events of little or no safety significance constitutes a large number of reports. Examples of events in this category include invalid actuations of certain ESFs, such as isolations of the reactor water cleanup system, actuations of the control room emergqncy ventilation system, and invalid RPS actuations when the-

-reactor is already shutdown. The staff has concluded that reports on these events are not necessary for the NRC to perform its safety mission. Therefore, the staff proposes to relax reporting of certain events of little or no safety significance, deferring to licensee oversight. -

The proposed rulemaking action-is consistent with and responsive-to NRC findings from the Regulatory Impact Survey, NUREG-1395,

" Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities", Draft Report, March 1990.

2. Obicctives i.

The present reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 require reporting of all ESF actuations, including the RPS system, except for actuations that resulted from and were part of a preplanned sequence during testing or during reactor operation. '

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I O

DRAFT The proposed changes will eliminate the reporting requirements on certain types of events that are now reportable and have boon determined to be of little or no safety significance. This relaxation will not hamper the NRC's ability to meet ite mission to protect public health and safety. ,

3. Alternatives No other reasonable alternatives were identified. The only alternative to the proposed actio'. is for the NRC to take no action at this time.

4. Egnnngutngen .

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a. Costs and Benefits of Alternatives j The only reasonable alternative to the proposed action identified is to tako no action; the incremental costs and benefits of that alternative are zero. Ilowever, taking no action would result in continued reporting of ovents that are not needed for the NRC staff to fulfil its safety mission, and consequently i unnecessarily consume both NRC and industry resources. ,

The principal benefit of the proposed amendments is a reduction j in the efforts expended by both the NRC and the licensees on  ;

issues of little or no safety signif'.cance. This will free both NRC and licensoo resources that could bo better spent on issues of greater importance. Based on review of past LER data, the-proposed rule changes are expected to result in about 150 (or 5 to 10 percent of the total) fewer LERs. The same reduction is i-expected in the number of immediate event notifications. p I

The cost of the proposed action consists of the cost of the rulemaking effort by NRC, and the potential costs of rewriting procedures and personnel training provided to the their staffs by I the li.consees. Cost savings for both the NRC and the industry i are shown in Table 1 below. NRC costs were calculated in i accordance with the guidance in NUREG/CR-3568, "A Handbook for .

Value-Impact Assessment," and general cost-benefit methodology.

It was assumed that industry expends 50 staff-hours for cach of tnese relatively simple LERs, and about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for each 50.72 notification. At $48 por hour, the incremontal cost to industry is therefore about $2600 for both reports. For NRC, the processing cost reduction due to a 5 to 10 porcent reduction in 50.72 notifications would be negligible, because the entire duty officer system would remain the same, and the screening of these .

relatively unimportant events by NRR would not affect total event screening effort significantly. There would, however, be cost savings for NRC due to a reduction in LER processing, review and assessment. Assuming that NRC expends 50 staff-hours for evaluating each LER, at $48 per hour, the incremontal cost to the NRC is therefore about $2400 per LER.

,s. * .

I DRAFT Table 1. Estimated Incremental Impact Based on an  !!

Estimated Annual Reduction of 150 Licensee Event Reports Costa Annual 30-Year Present Total Costs Worth Factor. Costs Over ,

Based on a 5% Real 30 Years-p_iscount_ Rata i

Industry Cost $390,000 15.4 $6,000,000

($2600 per report)

NRC cost ($2400 per $360,000 15.4 $5,500,000 report) .

The proposed rulemaking could save both the NRC and industry over

$350,000 a year, or over $5,500,000 each over the next 30 years (present worth; 5 percent discount rate). The cost of the j rulemaking itself would require about 1.5 NRC-staff-years, reducing the cost savings by about $150,000 the first year. Tn addition, the cost savings for NRC may be somewhat less, because the types of LERs to be clininated are ones for which review and assessment would be less than that for the average LER.

Assuming the cost of rewriting procedures is about $3300 per licensee, the result would be to subtract about $260,000'from the industry cost savings the first year. The cost of personnel training provided to their staff by the licensees is more difficult to determino. Since the rulemaking will decrease reporting requirements, it is hoped that training would be minimal and cost less than the first year's savings.

NOTEt(******** Estimates of reduction in the licensee burden will  !

be solicited through the Federal Register Hotico.******************)

b. Impacts on Other Requirements Because the LERs and immediate notifications to be eliminated are of little or no safety significance, the action will not have any impacts on other NRC programs or requirements, licensee operations or other activities.  ;

c. Constraints i There are no known constraints (Icgal, institutional, scheduling, enforceability, or policy) on the industry or on the NRC for the proposed action.

5. Recision Rationals t

The proposed changes will eliminato some existing reporting l requirements. There should be a reduction of approximately 150-i L. _. _ __ , . - - , . , , _ . . ~ _. _ _ - _ _ - - ,

E o

.*at-DRAFT telephonic event notifications and LERs per year Cabout 5 to 10 percent of the yearly total), due to the eliminatLon of reporting of_certain ESP actuations. The extent of the changes will vary from licensee to licensee. We expect that the total number of reports and the associated information that needs_to be prepared by_the licensees, and subsequently reviewed by the NRC, will.

decrease moderately.

6. Implementation

a. Schedule for-Implementing the Proposed Requirement The final rule is expected to be published approximately nine months after publication of the proposed _ rule, or about February 1993. The new rule would become effective one-month later.

Regulatory guidance will be provided by the latest revision of NUREG-1022, " Event Reporting Systems, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.7 '

ClarificationofHRCSystemsandGuidelinesforReportingM,f, _

This NUREG will be re/ised to reflect completion of'the -i rulemaking action proposed above, and the-revised NUREG .

publication will be synchronized with the final-rulemaking t changes to 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.

b. Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed. Requirements No effect on other NRC requirements is anticipated. The rulemaking Will be coordinated with the insuance-of a revision of NUREG-1022, as discussed-above. The rulemaking and guidance revision are complementary.

The NRC staff-requests public comments on-the draft. analysis which may_be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

t

' Copies of the latest revision of NUREG-1022'may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,_U.S. Government' -

Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, D.C.: 20013-7082.

Copies are also available from the National Technical ~ Information^

Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA=22161. .A copyLisz also available for inspection or copying for a fee at-the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 -L Street,. NW. - (Lower Level) ,

-Washington, DC.' ,

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