ML20127M425
| ML20127M425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1993 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127M408 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-930131, NUDOCS 9301280202 | |
| Download: ML20127M425 (565) | |
Text
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4 t PLANT DESIONER'S 4 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT INFORMATION PLAN For the ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" 4 January 1993 . ABECE SWIEM 80+ 9301280202 930118' PDR ADOCK 05200002 A PDR
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l } i } i N .IMitMBX l PIANT DESIGNER'S i OPERATIONAL SUPPORT INFORMATION (OSI) PIAN For the ABH CE SYSTEM 80+" l , I ! PURPOSE } . I 1 This plan describes the System 80+ plant designer's program for developing operational support information in a time phased fashion from design through construction to plant j operations and conveying this information to a plant owner / operator. l SCOPE l The plant designer's OSI Plan specifies the categories ofinformation to be developed during the appropriate phases of design, procurement, construction, startup, and initial operation. It also identifies a hierarchial structure of the information that will be developed. The ) elements of the OSI with its information hierarchy are shown in Figure 1. ! The information hierarchy includes: l l PLANS- Plans are the highest level documents. They establish goals and objectives for i the development and implementation of an activity. A plan also outlines a ! time phased sequence to be followed to successfully implement a program. ! GUIDES - Guides provide specific design information, requirements and bases necessary
- for implementing a designated portion or aspect of plant operations.
l GUIDELINES Guidelines provide the equipment specific sequences, actions, or guidance f necessary to execute a process, perform a function, or manipulate equipment
- in accordance with the intentions of the designer and within the bounds of the
- design bases. These form the basis for development of detailed procedures.
! PROCEDURES --Procedures are the actual step-by-step instructior.s that implement l procedure guidelines in an integrated fashion for a specific application. L Procedures are the terminallevel documents in the OSI program and are the end product developed and used by the owner / operator. - j Elements of the OSI are expected to be developed to suppon design certification of the l System 80+ plant. Other elements _would be developed during the detailed design process L which may run concurrently with and continue after design certification.' Additional i 1 -1 . ABB42 SEEM 80+ l e
, - . . . , . , . _ . . , , , . - , , _ , . . , .,,c, _ . , ~ . - . _ _ . , , , , , -m . - _ ~ . . . - . . . . , , - - - . . , . . . . - - . . - . . . . . . _ . - - , , , ,
PREIJMINARY f elements would be developed only after an operator applicant files a license application. In general, each element of the OSI would be updated, as required, as the detailed design progresses, equipment and components are speciFed, and as-built information becomes available. The plant designer's OSI is consistent with and complements the infonnation provided in regulatory documents, industry standards, and general guidance used by a plant i owner / operator to develop and execute an acceptable plant operations program. The OSI is based on guidance provided in the NPOC Strategic Plan and documents issued by INPO, i i NUMARC, and EPRI. The OSI program does not specify the scope or content of a plant owner / operator's operations program. It does, however, insure that the plant designer's guidance and insights, as well as, operational constraints of the design are transferred to the l plant owner / operator. OSI PROGRAM The plant designer's OSI program spans the period from initial design of the System 80+ plant to initial operation. l Early in the design process, higher level and less detailed information is required to relate the design bases to operational require' 1ents. Plan and guide level documents developed by the designers are sufficient to supp st this requirement. Guidelines are Senerally developed later in the detailed engineering design phase and are completed when equipment specifications, system parameters, and plant arrangernents are essentially final. . ! Detailed procedures are prepared by the plant owner / operator during the construction and l preoperational phases. The detailed procedures must include the guidance, insights, and operational constraints provided by the plant designer. Each OSI category identified in Figure 1 has as its basis a plan that describes information to be provided and interfaces to other plans, programs, or operations related elements. The topical elements presently identified to be part of each information plan are outlined in i Appendices A through F. The content and format of the guides, procedure guidelines and procedures developed as part of the OSI program will be based on the guidance provided in regulatory directives and industry standards. This will include the development of writer's guides in those areas where they are appropriate and/or are required. 2- ABIKE SYSTEM 80+ i I i-t
PREI.IMINARY ECilEDUIE
'Ihc initial plan for each category of OSI is expected to be developed prior to Final Design Approval (FDA). The plans will subsequently be updated, as required. Specific time flames for development of information for each element will reflect the need for the information.
l l l l l
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3- ABIRT, SWIM 80+
PREI,IMINARJ APPEND _IX_A f PLANT DESIGNER'S CONSTRUcrION INFORMATION PIAN FOR TIIE SYSTEM 80+ Tonical Oittlhtt AREAS ADDRESSED
- 1. Equipment Delivery, Receipt, Acceptance and Storage
- 2. Code Compliance (including code stamps)
- 3. Component and System Installations
- 4. Walkdowns
- 5. Construction Verification
- 6. System Turnover To Startup Engineering
- 7. Preventive Maintenance During Construction
- 8. Field Modifications
- ITAAC Considerations
- Equipment Failures
- Spare Parts Qualification
- Standardization Preservation
- 9. Equipment Protection Program
- 10. Surveillances and Inspections During Construction
- 11. Spare Parts Program
- A ABBCE SYSint 80+
PREIJMINARY APPENDIX A (Continued) PIANT DESIGNER'S CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION PIAN FOR THE SYSTEM 80+ Interfaces e Plant Information System (Plant Design Data Base)
- Adverse Systems Interactions (ASI) e Vendor Documents for Equipment l
s k i f I i i l 1 i i i i l I i i i l i-l I
- A Assa snmtM m+ .
l i - --. .- . . . . . _ . - ._ . - -
PREIJMINARY APPENDIX B PIANT DESIGNER'S SECURITY INFORMATION PIAN
- FOR Tile SYSTEM 80+
Tonical Outline AREAS ADDRESSED
- 1. Physical Arrangements.
- Protected Area Access
- Design Provisions for Physical Security e Equipment Separation .
- Security Zones e Detection ard Alarm Systems
- 2. Secured Electrical Power
- 3. Site Communications
- 4. Security Illumination
- 5. Qualification Testing of Facilities Interfaces
- Site Emergency Planning
- Surveillance, inspections and Maintenance of Security Systems
- Security Training
- PRA Insights to Security
- Security related information may have restricted distribution.
.A3 ABB CE SE*IM 80+
,m_ a____
1 l r i PRf:IJMINARY f. i ! APPENDIX C i ! t PIANT DESIGNER'S
- STARTUP INFORMATION PIAN ,
FOR THE SYSTEM 80+ e i s Toolcal Outline P AREAS ADDRESSED
- 1. Startup Phases
- Turnover From Construction i e Pre requisite Testing i e Pre operational Testing
- e Fuel Load i
e Post Fuel Load Testing i e Turnover to Operations i l 2. Regulatory Requirements with Cont.aitments
- Commitments Made in Response to Regulatory Review l
l 3. Industry Standards e Provisions For Code Inspections l 4 Division of Responsibilities For Startup ,
- 5. Conduct of Testing
- Test Results Review and Approval e Modifications
!
- Field, Design and Temporary Modifications
- Equipment Failures o Adverse System Interactions (ASI)
.
- Surveillance, Inspection and Maintenance ,
l e ITAAC Considerations ! - A-4 AB5G SWIM 80+ 1
, ,,..,e--- -
-e e - ~ - . . - , . . . , -- - - - , , e r nr,.,.-- ,--
1 i j I l PRE!JMINARY J APPENDIX C (Continued)
- PLANT DESIGNER'S i STARTUP INFORMATION PLAN FOR THE SYSTEM 80+
i j AREAS ADDRESSED
- 6. Testing Sequences
- 7. Test Guides, Guidelines, and Procedures
- I
, o Component Testing e Integrated System Testing , o Pre Service Inspection (PSI)
- 8. Special Test Equipment
! Interfaces 1 !
- Operating Procedures l e Maintenance Procedures i e Technical Specifications i e Control Room Simulator i e Plant Information System (Plant Design Data Base) j- e PRA Insights e Design Reliability Assurance Program (DRAP) e Operational Reliability Assurance Program (ORAF) l i
J t t 1 4 A
-A5 ,
ABBG SnM 80+ l
. . . . . . _ - . _ - - _ . _ _ - - _ . - ~ .
i i i 4 fgf_JJMINARY i i APPENDIX D 4 , PIANT DESIGNER'S
- OPERATIONS INFORMATION PIAN l FOR THE SYSTEM 80+
1 i I i ! Toolcal Outline j i ! i l' AREAS ADDRESSED l 1. Staffing Analysis e Shift Staffing < e Operating Crew Staffing 1 .
- Main Control Room Staffing
- Remote Shutdown Panel Staffing ,
- 2. Operating Guides, Guidelines and Procedures
$ e Normal Operations l e Shutdown Operations e Abnormal Operations e Emergency Operations , o Severe Accident Evolutions e Surveillances
- Administrative Interfaces
- Adverse System Interactions
- ITAAC Considerations e Technical Specifications
- Training and Control Room Simulator e Human Factors Program Plan e Plant Information System (Plant Design Data Base) o PRA Insights e Plant Designer's Operational Guidance, Insights, and Constraints-
. - A ABB-CE SMEM 80+ j
. . - . _ . . . _ = _ _ _ - _ - . - . . - . . .- . . . - - _ _ . - - - - -
4 ~ IRFLIMINARY 1 APPENDIX E l PIANT DESIGNER'S i MAINTENANCE INFORMATION PIAN 4 FOR THE SYSTEM 80+ Toolcal On11Lqt l 4 I i
- AREAS ADDRESSED
- 1. Staffing Analysis e Shift Staffing -
e Operating Crew Staffing e Main Control Room Staffing .
- Remote Shutdown Panel Staffing
- 2. Maintenance Guides, Guidelines and Procedures
- In Service Inspections
- Surveillance and Inspections
- e Preventive Maintenance
- o Corrective Maintenance
- 3. Equipment Manuals
- 4. Conduct of Maintenance l
- Design Modifications i e Equipment Failures l e Spare Parts l- e Temporary Modifications
- 5. Special Tools and Equipment List
- 6. Material Receipt, inspection, Handling and Storage of Components and Parts.
- 7. Lubricants and Preservatives
. A ABBC SWIEM 80+
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y- y- --e, new w -- = - , - - - < -- prrw y= n --
PRFJJMINARY APPENDIX E (Continued) PLANT DESIGNER'S MAINTENANCE INFORMATION PIAN FOR TIIE SYSTEM 80+
- 8. Outage Management Insights Interfaces e Reliability Centered Maintenance (Reliability Assurance Program) e ALARA Program o Training (including Component Mockups, as applicable) e Technical Specifications e Plant Infonnation System (iiant Design Data Base)
- Design Reliability Assurance Program (DRAP) o Operational Reliability Assurance Program (ORAP) e Human Factors Program Plan i 'l 5
l i i 1
- A ABECE SnMt 80+
l, PREIJMINARY a APPENDIX F t PLANT DESIGNER'S i TRAINING INFORMATION PIAN
- FOR THE SYSTEM 80+
4 Toolcal Outline i ) AREAS ADDRESSlH1 1 . 1. Training Guides, Guidelines, and Procedures o Operations Staff
- e Maintenance Staff
, o Startup Staff .
l
- Technical Support Staff
, 2. Training Aids and Facilities i e Training Areas
- e Control Room Simulator
- e Component and System Mockups
- 3. Training Staff l
- 4. Simulator Verification Program 5, Training Materials
- Vendor Manuals o System Descriptions Interfaces
- Interfaces To All Aspects of Plant Startup and Operations e Plant Information System (Plant Design Data Base) 1
- A ABB CE SYFIEM 80+
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4 FIGURE 1 1 PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT QE , i DPERATIONAL SUPPORT INFORMATION i , BASES FOR OSI PROGRAM
. Funcdonal Requiremerits OSI PROGRAM PLAN = C-gaSystem Descdpions e Operations and Maintenance Characteristics e Relialility Assessments
= Pnkablinic Rhk Amessnew (FRA)
. Performance Testing'
- I I I I I I ,
CONSTRUCTION TEST OPERATING MAINTENANCE TRAINING SECURITY INFORMATION IFFORMATION . INFORMATION . INFORMATION PROGRAM INFORMATION . PLAN 1 PIAN PIAN PIAN INFORMATION. PLAN PIAN
- DESIGN -
CERTIFICATION' CONSTRUCriON TEST ' OPERATING MAINTENANCE TRAINING SECURITY
. GUD7?T GUIDES GUIDES GUIDES PROGRAM GUIDES GUIDES J
FIRST-OF-A-KIND l ENGINEERING
- CONSTRUCTION TEST OPERATING - MAINTENANCE PIANT
. INSTAL 1ATION . PROCEDURE PROCEDURE PROCEDURE SPECIFIC GUIDELINES ' GUIDELINES GUIDELINES GUIDELINES TRAINING PROGRAM l GUIDELINES 2 I l CONSTRUCIION AND i START-UP PHASE
- CONSTRUCTION ~ DETAILED PIANP PLANT TRAINING SECURITY i
~ INSTALIATION TEST SPECIFIC SPECIFIC MATERIALS PROCEDURES ; PROCEDURES . . PROCEDURES OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE & SIMUIATOR
' PROCEDURES PROCEDURES VALIDATION PROCEDURES
- APPROXIMATE PHASE WIIEN INFORMATION WOULD BE DEVELOPED i -- - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - _ - - - -
l i ATTACHMENT 4 SYSTEM 80+ EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES
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I i
' DESIGN ' DIFFERENCES IN SYSTEMS DESIGN DIFFERENCES THAT AFFECT THE EPGs OR COMPONENTS SAFETY' INJECTION SYSTEM (SIS)' THE SIS CONSISTS OF FOUR HIGH PRESSURE PUMPS WITH HIGHER SHUTOFF HEAD, (ALL' HIGH PRESSURE NO LOW FLOW AND DIRECT VESSEL INJECTION. THESE PUMPS TAKE SUCTION ON IRWST PRESSURE PUMPS, IN CONTAINMENT HENCE NO SWITCHING TO CONTAINMENT SUMPS IS REQUIRED. SINCE THERE ARE _l
- REFUELING i WATER STORAGE TANK) NO LPSI PUMPS, MO SWITCHING OF SUCTIONS, THE OPERATOR DOES NOT HAVE !
(IRWST). TO VERIFY THE . FOLIDWING: RAS HAS OCCURRED, LPSI PUMPS HAVE SHUTDOWN AND PROPER HPSI PUMP FIDW DURING RECIRCULATION.
-1 DUAL CONTAINMENT AND ANNULUS IF CONTAINMENT SPRAY IS ACTUATED (OR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS ABOVE THE VENT SYSTEM. SETPOINT) THF OPERATOR MUST VERIFY THE ANNULUS VENT SYSTEM IS
- ENERGIZED AND OPERATING PROPERLY. , SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM THE RDVs PROVIDE FEED AND BLEED COOLING CAPABILITIES. THE 9YSTEM WHEN f (SDS) CONSISTS OF RAPID INITIATED WILL QUICKLY REDUCE RCS ' PRESSURE SUCH THAT SAFETY INJECTION DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES (RDV) PUMPS CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR AND REACTOR COOLANT ' GASEOUS ACTION HAS BEEN ADCYD TO ENSURE THE RDVs ARE OPERATED ONLY WHEN I VENT SYSTEM.(RCGVS).- . JUSTIFIED. THE OPERATOR MUST INITIATE COOLING TO THE IRWST DURING THE l FEED' AND BLEED OPERATIONS. THE RCGVS IS USED THE SAME AS IN THE SYSTEM < 80 DESIGN.
?sLTERNATE AC SOURCE PROVIDE HELP DURING LOSS OF 'OFFSITE ' POWER (LOOP) AND STATION BLACKOUT (SDO) . THE OPERATOR ENSURES THE AAC STARTS AFTER A LOOP AND ENERGIZES THE PERMANENT NON-SAFETY BUSES. IF EMERGENCY DIESEL FAILS TO START, THE OPERATOR CAN MANUALLY REALIGN THE AAC TO SUPPLY POWER TO ONE PERMANENT NON-SAFETY BUS AND ONE DIVISION OF VITAL AC BUSES.
' HYDROGEN IGNITORS . OPERATOR MUST ENERGIZE THE HYDROGEN IGNITORS WHENEVER CONTAINMENT l
. HYDROGEN MONITORS INDICATE H2 CONCENTRATION IS ABOVE THE SETPOINT. THE IGNITORS GIVE A CONTROLLED SMAL'. BURN IN CONTAINMENT INSTEAD OF A i LARGE BURN THAT CAN CHALLANGE CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE. I
.I
! CONTAINMENT SPRAY'. THE OPERATOR MUST VERIFY 'CS PUMPS START ON ' SIAS. IF CONTAINMENT l ! PRESSURE IS BELOW THE SETPOINT THE OPERATOR MUST VERIFY THE SPRAY ! [ HEADER ISOLATION VALVES ARE CIDSED. IF PRESSURE EXCEEDS SETPOINT THE-OPERATOR MUST VERIFY THE SPRAY HEADER VELVES ARE OPEN-
- DESIGN, DIFFERENCES THAT.DO NOT.. USES TWO CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS EACH HAS A HIGHER FIDW RATE THUS *
. ' IMPACT EPGs OR OPERATOR ACTIONS HIGHER TOTAL CHARGING FLOW. A LARGER PRESSURIZER TO RCS RATIO TO HELP ; DIRECTLY DURING TRANSIENTt.. A LARGER STEAM GENERATOR TO PROVIDE MORE SECONDARY MASS.TO HELP IN FEEDWATER. TRANSIENTS.
2
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i J
$5'
- N of kc.bir rr e Update
{.SbnPTAs)asof10:30_EDTJuly_15, 1991: ] ; i ' t i- ^ INSTRUCTIO*d STEP CONTINGENCY. STEP l' 1. VERIFY that all of'the 1.1 IF any Instruction ! following-criteria are Step 1: criteria _are-satisfied:- NOT verified,: THEN TRIP - the rMetor- ,
- a. All-CEAs are fully inserted manually.
I, OR E Only'one CEA is NOT 1.2 IF' Instruction ' i fully inserted, Step.1. criteria-
~
are satisfied, ! b. Reactor power is lowering, THEN-GO TO-
- c. Reactor startup rate is '/
j negative. 1.J OPEN Reactor Trip l 1,-breakers locally. 4
- 1. A - IF Instruction
{ 7 Step 1-criteria
! ' are satisfied,._
A ce % Qtog g., - THEN GO TO Instruction l Step 2.. [ l. 3 f%uwd\y T,'(=h x e4e.%r 7 4 5,m j h *.tw v p. h p o b % io 1./ OPEN all CEA Motor ( Generator Input i 5 y shm To og><v N. w cede and output-breakers.-
\(% % Gev<,s%c a# p r
( t o.shto y" 1 9 IFtInstruction
- 9 Step -1 criteria:
are satisfied, ,
. l . 'i. f 4' Tu rhe ti.w sn y )
~
- THEN GO TO Instruction
- c. ,ih ris as %rt, NA ' . Step 2. ,
~
- Ul tf M C o To Lst<^ti'N 1.7' INITIATE Emergency, S n.p A ,- 9 Boration.-
1.8 GO-TO Instruction-10 Step;'2. ( (GUIDELINE CONTINUED)' l 4 4 i r- y . = - - - - - ,e--,r,- < e, ,.
CONTINGENCY STEP INSTRUCTION STEP 2.1 TRIP the main turbine,
- 2. VERIFY that the main j
turbine tripped. 3.1 OPEN the generator
- 3. VERIFY that the generator output breakers.
output breakers are open, 4.1 IP at least:
- 4. VERIFY that:
Non-safety load Non-safety load 4.16 KV Bus X 4.16 KV bus X is energized. is energized AND OR Non-safety load Non-safety load 4.16 KV bus Y is energized. 4.16 KV Bus Y is energized, J THEN GO TO Instruction Step 5. 4 2 INFORM CRS that the event is complicated by l a Loss of offsite I Power. 4.3 GO TO Instruction Step 5. 5.1 IF at least:
- 5. VERIFY that:
Permanent Non-safety Permanent Non-Safety Load 4.16 KV bus X is Load 4.16 KV bus X energized i is energized OR AND Permanent Non- safety i Permanent Non-Safety Load 4.16 KV bus Y is Load 4.16 KV bus Y energized, is energized. THEN GO TO Instruction Step 6. 5.2 INFOP11 CRS of status of Permanent Non-safety 4.16 KV buses. 5.3 GU T6 CohElhdjeMcy" Step 6.1. (GUIDELINE CONTINUED)
INSTRUCTION BTEP CONTINGENCY BTEP
- 6. VERIFY that: 6.1 IF:
Safety Load Division I Safety Load Division I energized via Permanent is energized, Non-Safety Bus X, AND AND Safety Load Division II Safety Load Division II is energized, energized via Permanent Non-safety Bus Y. THEN NOTE which Division (s) is/are powered by Emergency Diesel Generator (s), s 6.2 IF: Safety Load Division I is HQI energized AND Safety Load Division II-is EQI energized, THEN INITIATE actions to energize Safety Load Division I or Safety Load Division II from Alternate AC power supply 6.3 IF at least: Safety Load Division I is HQI energized OR Safety Load Division II is EQI energized, THEN INITIATE actions to investigate cause of lack of power to affected safety load division. 6.4 GO TO Instruction Step 7. i l l (GUIDELINE CONTINUED) i 1 4 l
- - . - . - . -. . - - - -. - - - . . - - = . ..~ . . . . . - - . = - .. - . _ -. --
i 4 i s INSTRUCTION STEP CONTINGENCY STEP 4 7. VERIFY that: 7.1 IF at least
- 4 l, 480V Safety Bus A 480V Safety Bus A and j is energized 480V Safety Bus C are
- AND energized 480V Safety Bus B OR -
l 3- is energized 480V Safety Bus B and AND 480V Safety Bus D are i 480V Safety Bus C energized, j is energized THEN GO TO Instruction
~
j AND
- 480V Safety.BusLD Step 8.
j is energized. l 7.2 NOTIFY CRS of the lack i of minimum required l invertor power. l 7.3 CHECK the voltage and l i
- amperage readings on station batteries l that are directly j
2 supplying vital DC power. l-i ' 7.4 GO TO Instruction Step 8. i i
. 8.1 TAKE manual control'
- 8. VERIFY that all1of the i following Inventory-Centrol of the Pzr Level i Criteria are satisfied: Control Systcm..
4
- a. Indicated Pressurizer level 8.2LINITIATE attempts to
- is in band of (Note A), restore and maintain
- indicated Pzr level
- b. Indicated Pressurizer-level within-limits of ,
is trending.toward band of (Note B).- (Note B), 8.3 GO TO Instruction i c.-Indicated Subcooled Margin Step 9.
- is at least (Note C).
1 4 (GUIDELINE CONTINUED)- 4 s d p- - w m-t _ y ,,,. ,--- - -%e-,- ,, m,ww-%,w.ww,. ,,,,..p.,4,,,,ew ,w,,- 4.,e, .,m w we a 9w.,y c..-
_ __ . _ . _ _ . _ . - . _ . _ . . . . _ _ - . _ . _ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - _ . _ . _ i- , c I a i i i j INSTRUCTION STEP . CONTINGENCY STEP J-i 9. VERIFY that all of'the 9.1 IF indicated'Pzr l following Pressurc Control pressure.is. .
- Criteria are satisfied
- greater than (NOTE F),- .
THEN GO TO Contingency = i a. Indicated Wide Range ._ Step 9.6. r Pzr Pressure between (Note D), i 9.2 IF indicated Pzr
- b. Indicated Narrow Range .
pressure is 1 Pzr Pressure between (Note D}, (Note G) OR:less,- I THEN VERIFY presence of
- c. Indicated Wide Range SIAS annunciators.
j Pzr Pressure trending ! towards (Note E), 9.3 IF SIAS annunciators = s NOT actuated, j- d. Indicated-Narrow Range THEN manually INITIATE Pzr' Pressure trending SIAS. j towards-(Note E). t 9'.4 IF-indicated Pzr [ i pressure is (Note H) OR less, ) 'THEN ENSURE that at ! least-one RCP in each i loop;is tripped.. l '9.5-GO TO-Instruction ! Step 10. { '9.6 INITIATE: manual: control !- of.Pzr spray and-heater ! systems. i . r 9.7 ATTEMPT to restore andL i maintain ~ indicated Pzr L pressure within limits-j of (Note'E).- , i o I 9.8-;GO TO Instruction- ! Step-10.
~
u l l (GUIDELINE CONTINUED)- i t 1-L -
....n.... . -.- ._ - c,. . ~ w
1 i CONTINGENCY STEP INSTRUCTION STEP i- 10.1 .IF. indicated Margin is less Subcooled than f 10. VERIFY that all of thefollowing core heat (Noteremoval C), conditions exist: THEN GO TO Instruction Step 11.
- a. At least one RCP is operating, 10.2 VERIFY indicated l T(cold) lowering.
is stable or
- b. The indicated difference i between T(hot) and T(cold) i is equal to or less than 10.3 VERIFY difference
! (Note I), between indicated l T(hot) and is indicated less than. i c. Indicated Subcooled Margin T(cold) l is at least (Note C). (Note J). 10.4 VERIFY difference i ~ between indicated T(hot) and Representative CET is i less than (Note K). 4 ! 10.5 GO TO Instruction ~ Step 11, 9 ! 1 ! 11.1 ENSURE EFAS l
- 11. VERIFY each S/G's level actuated.
l greater than (Note M}. j 11.2-GO'TO Instruction Step 12. 1 1 l 12.1 ENSURE EFAS
- 12. VERIFY that at'least one actuated.
r Main Feedwater train or at- ) least one Emergency Feedwaterj 12.2 GO.TO Instruction - i train.is supplying at least Step _13. i -. one steam generator. l' 1 s' l
- (GUIDELINE. CONTINUED) w -w<- - - er ~ - , ,, ,- w-ww,r---n- , w--y e ,,e
k i j J ,$ CONTINGENCY STEP ! INSTRUCTION STEP ~ 13.1 CONTROL manual
- 13. VERIFY Main Feed Water and-f and S/GS/G #2 levels #1 level equal -Auxiliary j FeedwaterJSystems.
1 to or less than-(Note N). } 13.2 INITIATE restoring i bothESteam Generator i levels to between I (Note M) and l-i
' (Note O). f.
s
- 13.3 GO TO Instruction Step 14.
i
- f 14.1 IF vacuum onimain VERIFY T-average is less condenser is l
14. than (Note P) AND'S/G maintained, (. pressures less than- THEN OPERATC Steam (Note R). . Bypass Control l System to maintain- ,' lT-average between i (Note _S). i 1 14;2 IF vacuum on main
- condenser is NOT maintained, f
i THEN manually 4 OPERATE each Steam Generator's-l -Atmospheric Dump i . Valves-: ( ADVs) E to l- maintain T-average { between-(Note S). 14.31GO TO Instruction i
. Step ' 15. .
1. e i i $~ 4 l h
.(GUIDELINE CONTINUED) e
_a .-- - . _. . - - ._...___--__.._._._.a_... ...__v._.--
i I INSTRUCTION STEP CONTINGENCY BTEP ,' 15. VERIFY T-average is 15.1 ENSURE SBCS valves , Greater than (Note T) are closed. 2 OR operator-controlled l S/G steaming is in 15.2 ENSURE ADVs are ' 4 progress. closed. 15.3 ENSURE Reheater isolation valves ' are closed. 1 15,4 IF both S/G levels are stable OR ' lowering, i THEN GO TO Instruction Step 16. 15.5 STOP all Main Feed Pumps.
~
15.6 INITIATE restoring both S/G 1evels ' to between (Note M) and { Note O). i 15.7 GO TO Ins'.ruction Step 16.
- 16. VERIFY each S/G's 16.1 ENSURE Main Stean
( i pressure greater than Isolation Signal (Note U). (MSIS) ac..at.ud. l 16.2 GO TO Inhiruction . Step 17. l l-l' {' l l l i (GUIDELINE CONTINUED) l l I r
a 1 4 CONTINGENCY STEP INSTRUCTION STEP 17.1 IF SIAS NOT
- 17. VERIFY Containment actuated,
< Pressure is less than THEN initiate SIAS
' 2.7 psig. 17.2 ENSURE CIAS actuated. 7.7 ENSURE at least t one Containment Spray Pump , Status Light (CSP-1 OR CSP-2) is ON. 17.# ENSURE Annulus I ' f Ventilation System is actuated. 17 7' ENSURE at least l I 4. three of four Containment Recirculation Cooling Units in operation. 17.( IF Containment 7 Pressure is less than (Note W) on three or more channels, , THEN GO TO s Instruction Step 18.
- s' i 7.7 ENSURE CSAS 3 actuated.
(Contingency Steps Continued) (GUIDELINE CONTINUED) 4
,, ,,e-- ..+ru ,e-r. ,- ,,,,n4, - m.r,-w. -
** e yrv a +-wr-- n-4
I l l i i e 1 l
'l INSTRUCTION STEP CONTINGENCY STEP I 17 8 VERIFY that at
- least one Containment Spray ]
train-has flow I equal to or ; greater than-(viote X). (F-338 OR F-348) 1 17.9 GO TO Instruction Step 18. f -g
- 18. VERIFY indicated 18.1 ENSURE CIAS
- Containment Area actuated.
Radiation Lc.vels
- are less than (Note Y). 18.2 GO TO Instruction Step 19.
- 19. VERIFY that all 19.1 NOTIFY Control Secondary Plant Room Supervisor Radiation Monitors are of which i not in alarm condition. Secondary Plant radiation monitors are in alarm condition.
f
- 19.2 GO TO Instruction l Step 20.
l l
- 20. VERIFY that Containment 20.1 ENSURE at least .
- Average Temperature three of four
- is less than or Containment equal to 100F. Recirculation l Cooling Units
- are in operation, l
i 20.2 GO TO Instruction Step 21. t 1 (GUIDELINE CONTINUED) l
a CONTINGENCY STEP INSTRUCTION STEP 21.1 Steps IF Instruction 1 through
- 21. CHECK that all safety function criteria of 20 have been Instruction Steps reviewed, 1 through 20 THEN GO TO are satisfied. Instruction Step 23.
21.2 Steps IF Instruction 1 through , , 20 have not all been reviewed, THEN GO TO Instruction Step 1. 4 1 22. GO TO Reactor Trip Recovery EPC.
- 23. IDENTIFY appropriate follow-on EPG. (Refer to Attachment 1, Diagnostic Aid Flow Chart.)
- 24. GO TO ider tified follow-on EPG.
(END OF GUIDELINE STEPS) i l l l t I
ALWR EPG NOTES (Updated as of 11:45 AM, July 15, 1991) Note A: This indicated pressurizer level band fully considers the inherent inaccuracies of the instruments at normal hot standby conditions. The lower limit is the minimum indication that
" demonstrates that there is an actual subcooled liquid volume in the Pressurizer. The upper limit is the maximum level where operators can still have confidence that normal pressurizer operation is effective rather than solid plant pressure control.
Note B: This indicated pressurizer level band is that band the automatic ope ratit.. . of the Pressurizer Level Control System is designed to restore and maintain from hot standby conditions to 100% power operation. The lower limit is designed to ensure that all of the pressurizer heater wells are covered by subcooled liquid. Note C: This indicated subcooled margin is based on maintaining at least some degree of subcooled conditions at all points in the RCS-at or below the reactor vessel's hot leg nozzles. Note D: This indicated Pzr pressure band following a reactor trip reflects a plant response that does not result in an automatic SIAS and does not result in the lifting of any primary pressure relief
- valves. The values provided take inherent instrument inaccuracies at hot standby conditions into consideration. CESSAR
^ Table 7.3-5 shows a nominal SIAS setpoint of pressurizer pressure at 182S psia. (This table also shows that during primary cooldown following reactor trip tht this stpoint can be manually lowered as primary pressure is deliberately reduced. During plant startup, this setpoint is automatically raised as primary pressure is deliberately increased. ) CESSAR Section XXXXX states the lowest primary safety relief valve setpoint is XXXXX. , Note E: This indicated Pzr pressure band is that expected from the design response of the automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control System response immediately following a reactor trip from 100% power conditions. As such it includes the range of pressures that are expected from 100% power to hot standby conditions. Note F: This is the nominal Safety Injection Actuation Setpoint. This value is specified as 1825 psia in CESSAR DC Table 7.3-5, Amendment I, December 21, 1990. This setpoint should already include compensation for inherent instrument inaccuracies and conservative estimates of inntrument inaccuracies resulting from post-trip harsh containment atmospheric conditions. l l
1 i ALWR EPG NOTES (continued): Pg. 2 Note G: Reactor Coolant Pump Trip 2/ Leave 2 Pzr pressure setpoint where first two pumps are tripped. (More information needs to be added to this note.) Note I: The expected difference in indicated values of T(hot) and T(cold) during continued fotced circulation conditions at hot standby conditions that immediately follow a reactor trip from 100%
- power conditions.
Note J: The maximum acceptable difference in T(hot) and T(cold) during natural circulation conditions. As natural circulation is being established, the operation of the Steam Bypass Control System and secondary relief valves should prevent T(cold) from rising. At the same time T(hot) rises to the point that the density difference across the primary side of the steam generators creates a gravity driven primary flow cycle. In the process of establishing this-driving force, T(hot) should by design not have to rise at a rate ' or specific temperature any greater than those that result in a maximum change in primary pressure that can be controlled by the pressurizer without the use of normal pressurizer spray. This in turn results in reducing possible challenges to the primary pressure relief safety valves. Note K: This is the maximum expected difference between indicated
- loop T(hot) values and the Representative CET value provided by the plant computer during forced circulation conditions. It serves as a confirmation that normal post-trip forced circulation in the PCS is occurring.
Note M: This is the nominal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Setpoint. This value is specified ac XXXX in CESSAR DC Section XXXX. This setpoint already includes compensation for inherent instrument inaccuracies and conservative estimates of instrument inaccuracies resulting from post-trip harsh containment atmospheric conditions. Note N: This is the S/G level discussed in CESSAR DC Section XXXXX that reLults in automatically stopping Emergency Feedwater flow to either steam generator. This indicated setpoint includes corrections for inherent instrument inaccure'cies and conservative estimates of the instrument inaccuracies resulting from post-trip harsh containment conditions. Monitoring this lcvel helps prevent excessive moisture carryover into main steam ' lines and main steam control valves (Main Steam Isolation Valves and Atmospheric Dump Valves and the upstream isolation valves for the Atmospheric Dump Valves.)
i l 1
)
ALWR EPG NOTES (continued): Pg. 3 i Note 0: This is the indicated steam generator downcomer level that the Main Feedwater Control System is designed to maintain at 100% power operations. When inherent instrument inaccuracies and the 1 3 conservative estimates of instrument inaccuracies resulting from harsh containment conditions are fully considered, this indicated value insures that the entire steam generator tube bundle is submerged in at least saturated liquid phase and assures that levels are not so high as to result in excessive moisture carryover. Note P: This is the highest indicated value of T-average (computed ' f rom indicated T(hot) and T(cold) that is expected by de.,ign during the automatic post-trip response of the Steam Bypass Control System. This is a value that should result in preventing any of the secondary or primary relief valves from lifting. Note R: This value is the saturated secondary steam pressure . corresponding to that resulting from automatic SBCS operation when T-average is a'c the highest expected value during design. operation of the SBCS. Note S: This is the indicated range of calculated T-average expected during design operation of the automatic Steam Bypass Control System immediately following a reactor trip from 100% power conditions. I Note T: This is the lowest indicated value of T-average (computed from indicated T(hot) and T(cold) that is expected by design du-ing
- the automatic post-trip response of the Steam Bypass control System. This is a value that should result in preventing any l unnecessaq( actuation of the Main Steam Isolation Signal as a l
> result of SBCS automatic operation. This indicated value should be high enough to allow operators to have sufficient reaction time to at least attempt manual SBCS control before a MSIS occurs. l 1, l Note U: This is the nominal Main Steam Isolation Signal Setpoint. Th".s value is specified as XXXX in CESSAR DC Section XXXX. This setpoint already includes compensation for inherent instrument inaccuracies and conservative estimates of instrument inaccuracies resulting from post-trip harsh containment atmospheric conditions.
--oc g. .m_,4
ALWR EPG NOTES (continued): Pg. 4 Note V: CESSAR DC Table 7.2-4, Amendment I, December 21, 1990 i provides a nominal high containment pressure setpoint for an RPS reactor trip signal of 2.7 psig. This infers that the normal Containment cooling and recirculation systems are designed to maintain indicated Containment pressure at or below 2.7 psig during power operation (and hot standby and therefor uncomplicated post-trip conditions). This value should include a compensatory factor i for normal post-trip instrument inaccuracies. , CESSAR DC Table 7.3-5, Amendment I, December 21, 1990 also shows that indicated containment pressure signals of 2.7 psig or greater thould result in automatic SIAS (and therefore CIAS) as well. Note W: This is the nominal Containment Spray Actuation Signal Setpoint. This value is specified as XXXX in CESSAR DC Section XXXX. This setpoint already includes compensation for inherent instrument inaccuracies and conservative estimates of instrument-inaccuracies resulting from post-trip harsh containment atmospheric conditions. If this indicated containment pressure has not been reached on at least two of four channels, then automatic containment spray flow is not designed to occur. Note X: This is an indicated Containment spray flow rate that i demonstrates that at least the minimum design base flow rate of 5000 gpm actually exists when containment spray flow is required. This value should include a factor to compensate for the inherent inaccuracies of the flow instrument. This value is discussed in CESSAR DC Table 6.5-1, Amendment I, December 21, 1990. Note Y: CESSAR DC Section XXXXX describes this as the Containment . Area Radiation Level setpoint that results in automatic isolation of select containment isolation valves as described in CESSAR DC Section XXXXX. CESSAR DC Section 6.2.4.3 states:
" In addition, penetrations which provide an open path between the containment and the outside containment envirionment are isolated on high containment radiation as well as CIAS."
4
i l ALWR EPG NOTES (continued): Pg. 4 Note Z: This is the expected maximum containment average temperature during the plant's response to an uncomplicated reactor trip. This value is based upon it being described as the maximum containment temperature resulting from proper operation of normal containment cooling and recirculation systems during power operations. See CESSAR DC Section 9.4.6.1, Amendment I, December 21, 1990. This section states in part:
"The containment recirculation cooling subsystem is designed to maintain the average containment air temperature between 60F and 110F during normal plant operation with three of four cooling units operating and one in standby..."
l l l l l { t l
..y -
ATTACHMENT 2 i
)
8
1 i I i l DIAGNOSTIC FLOWCHART j POSTTRP SAEDMTE ACTIONS COMPLETE i 1 4 REACTMTY NO POWER No SAFETY FUNCTm AVAILABLE TO CEA p.7 (880) MET 7 INOCATIONS7
\
! M YES 1r IWLEM!NT 1f r I EOP 8 (FRP) 2 -J r I , TA N AT LEAST ONE NO AT LEAST NO AUXLIARIE3 \ W ? FAFETY FUNCTION ONE VTTAL #(V BW > 125V DC BUS Ti%lN > EOP4 (F7t') ENER3!2ED7 ENERGCED7 MET 7 I i YES YES YES l ! if. lf I CONSIDER CONSIDER EOP4 (FRP) EOP 7 (SBO) I ( )f t
, ) g J >
r- ' Mm .. g i
l DIAGNOSTIC FLOWCHART A Y _,, , emen so , so m = CensoeR i SAFE'sY FUPCDON PRESSURE LESS COND ON M8 EOP4 (LOCA) y THAN 300 PGA7 g ust i WS YES YES CONSOER ECP4 (SGTM) lI y - II SS
- Consoen suscowNa LEss pgg THAN 3dr M
/
;- v EOP4 (LOCA) ,
t r m
, m e
_ s' l w an l. l
1 J j DIAGNOSTIC FLOWCHART i B s 1 f HEA
\ VAL NO AT L N M CONstOCR m ONE S,0 HAS e ,
i SAFETY K N EOP 3 (LCM) MET 7 FEED FLOW 7 l l I WS 4 YES 7 i MD NO AT LEAST NO AT LE.AST ONE NO THPPED DUE TO ONE RCP EV VITAL SUS l fMf4lNQ1 ENERGrZED7 y YES [YES WS Y-
- f -)(
CCESIDER CONSIDER ! Y EOP 2 (LOOP) EOP 7 (380) I Y
) r r m RCS NO -
! Se bD OR NO 8N SU8COOUNG LESS 7 , ; COND OFFGAS EOP4 (ESDE)
?HAN 37 F7
- e v
"' lf **
V CONSIDER CONSIDER EOP4 (SGTR) EC#4 (LOCA) l c.
~f f , >
lf l 00 TO C
4 I DIAGNOSTIC FLOWCHART C 1 CONT EPN m ETTHER ' m PR N ER NO SAFETY FUNCTON g p 5 PRESS OR LEVEL 3 W3 YEB yea ccmoeR ECP4 (LW f
)f' SU GSS DE)
THAN 30' F7 I
' g '
WS (
.s . J I
CCNSIDER EOP 5 (LOCA) l 1 - AT LEAST ONE NO COML)ER 4KV VITAL BU3 gop,y($go) ENERGtZEDT
)I Y YES CONSIDER EOP 2 (LOOP) ]
1f J
- a - > - , ,
[ V 00TO D
DIAGNOSTIC FLOWCHART D
-. . =. . =. . _
> = = -> ==,- -- j
.E' @/, t YES
- If ll CONSOER AT LEAST ONE NO 3 4KV VITAL BUS I ,;^
EOP4 (SOM 5"5 ' if i] ves Y i If h c.S. c-ma b EOP 2 f OOP) EOP-7 (SBO) 3r y E
- 21 c >
glj 7 ! !I 1 0 Au. no e m NPuMFRT 84= - EvEm ===S POssa.si
> .0,4 (,Rg3 h urtt 4j f
y* 1r*
.numen ""=d"c"5
" Arm 2n, M""
4 ,l l
. COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page of Revision
- i REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY GUIDELINE
)
Prepared by COMBUF :^ M "CIICERI M NC, . Act:3e c-t - . . J. O rc u p - ABB C.om%usTroN CNCD:mtrwc Ivc, RT 41 g4gg := , 23 i
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
) GUIDELINES Page 2 _ , , -
1 Revision # P_URPOSE This guideline provides the operator actions which must be accomplished subsequent to a relatively uncomplicated reactor trip. The actions in this guideline are necessary to ensure that the plant is placed in a stable, safe conditior. The goal of the guideline is to safely establish the plant in a mode 3 condition (hot standby) while minimizing any radiological releases to the environment. If necessary, the RCS may be cooled and depressurized. ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed a,3p
- 2. Plant conditions indicate that an uncomplicated reactor trip has occurred.
)
EXIT CONDITIONS
- l. The diagnosis of an uncomplicated reactor trip is nc^ confirmed E
- 2. Any of the Reactor Trip Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfied .
. E
- 3. The Reactor Trip Recovery EPG has accomplished its purpose by satisfying M of the following:
- a. All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- b. RCS conditions are being controlled and maintained in a mode 3 or 4 condition (hot standby or hot shutdown).
- c. An appropriate procedure to implement has been provided and administrative 1y approved.
RT 42 b - - - w; 2 l
t COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR Trip RECOVERY l 3 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES , page.3.__ of to Revision M ESTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Ensun Standard Post 1.
Trip Actions performed. ,
*2. Confirm diagnosis of 2. Rediagnose event and uncomplicated Reactor Trip exit to appropriate by verifying Safety Function Optimal Recovery Guideline Status Check acceptance or to Functional Recovery criteria are satisfied. Guideline.
- 3. Verify pressurizer level is: 3. Manually operate charging a.go to 7o] and letdown to restore ana and maintain pressurizer
-b. trendihto o to l$c% levelf1&Jto.300"[
.30's LM
) -h4 4 4 Verify pressurizer press'ure is: 4. Manually operate pressurizer
- a. fR60 to MO heaters and spray to Ciao 5gndsiaf control RCS pressure:
q b. trending to 2225 to 2300 psia y a. 2225 to 2300 psia ang
- c. within the Post Accident P-T ag limits of Figure 4-1. b. within the post Accident P-T limits of Figure 4-1.
/' t 5. Verify turbine bypass system 5. E condenser vacuum is lost,
/# ~ 'is controlling RCS T,y, turbine bypass system is
$25 to 535'FJ. , unavailable, or the MSIVs are closed, Then use the atmospheric dump valves to controlRCST,y,{525to 535'FJ
- Step Perfonned Continuously RT 4-3 G-R ^ . 0;
i i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
.) GUIDELINES page 4 of to Revision 4 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 6. Ensure at least one 6.
, steam generator has level being maintained or restored in the normal band using 4
,,( u
,. fmain,sfe r P,py pr-= y_sm.vseucy yf ,-
M " ahl fec A w d.v. f
- 7. Evaluate the need for a 7.
plant cooldown based on:
- a. plant status
- b. auxiliary systems availability
- c. cpndensate inventory.
I
- 8. E a plant cooldown is necessary, 8.a. Maintain the plant in a
) Then exit this guideline and stabilized condition, implement the appropriate j s n ,
plant cooldown procedure. b / Exi t to'fappkria'tf sp a n,d , pro- , , I
, cedufeds,direcgedby{Piant s
. Te'ttmical Supportcent'er). /
When the steps of the Reactor Trip Recovery Guideline are complete, the pl' ant should be in a condition where all of the SFSC acceptance criteria are satisfied, and the entry conditions of an appropriate procedure are satisfied. In most casas, the plant will be maintained in hot standby or directed to be cooled down to mode 4 or 5 condition. E_Np
)
RT '4
,- .LE.tW : -%:. C T-
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE I GUIDELINES Page 5 of 2 Revision W SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION I This section contains items which should be considered when implementing EPGs and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented as precautions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training program.
- 1. Pressurizer level should be closely monitored since it normally decreases to, or near, the_ pressurizer heater cutoff level following a reactor trip'(Reference 15[1). # *" !
CoM'utin fyg Nuclee Gyl **7(8'/*rf rkem wly iptem(1980', to 7e~ ' b/'*Cd skQ ofec An, ' l C&-I.1L8. Cwbutw Cr's vy, WhdWs cr ' ] 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluating plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities.in a particular instrument reading. Instrumentation readings must be corroborated when
' one or more confirmatory indications are available (References 15.24).
c, ne, . < con "rm -x u nn w r se sw tw ty wr ~<l SLt-;w. 41.e -a^ M'est, vs. sr.le~ key ler'*, C. ~ uus, J.rl, n n.
- 3. A plant cooldown and entry into shutdown cooling.(if necessary) should be
) conducted prior to depleting the condensate storage.
4 4 During all phases of the cooldown, RCS temperature and pressure should be monitored to avoid exceeding a cooldown rate greater than Technical Specification limitations.
- 5. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is ,
_. apparent. Systems placed in "panual"-must be checked frequently to ensure pe e. proper operation Reference 15.34). ') p,stous cmo), s c zw/ H) - * *ll') . v.s . Ms,1.
- r. sos or rm.L.A*+t* //~ Aytw% ,,
ty h tm %.Mr.ni Wa u bf t~' b. 4
- 6. If the initial cocidown rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, then
- there may be a potential for pressurized thermal. shock (PTS) of the reactor vessei (Reference 15.8). Post accident pressure / temperature shouldbemaintainedwYhinthelimitsofFigure4-1.
dm J :ti., Ery% A yo.4 i/ f1'),
- hm*w 74 -#l fA *' A
c4 - N/JD - 19 6 Le v. c, C anTHr.> Grf, am s ,i W. </ter, c 7. s
)
RT 4-5 CQL442 % . 203 -
i j d i- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE - ! i REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE - i 1 GUIDELINES p g.._L Of 12. Revision 03 l l
- 1. -
h FIGURE 4-1 TYPICAL POST ACCIDENT PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS (2) j 2500 - I g i i i 7 2400 2300. LOWEST SERVICE
'/
l 1000F/ HOUR .i TEMP % COOLDOWN / i
/
i
~
2000 - NOTE 1 / ., i Q f r~, l l 5 (200*F) [
\, E, -Y
! - E 1500 -
/ -
! 3 /
; d 0
): E /
! 5 /
- u /
l $1000 / RCP NPSH ., a '. gu/ t A ' E
- a. :/
/
l p%W j (200F] fw' j C arc l.
. 7. SHUTDOWN (0c) ,
4 500 - [ COOLING _ a . { l ( l l 0 f 100 200 300. . 400 500 600 , RCS TEMPERATUR E, 'F l 4 ' NOTES:(1f THIS CURVE SUPERSEDES THE 100'F/ HOUR COOLDOWN CURVE ANYTIME THE RCS HAS EXPERIENCED AN UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN i WHICH CAUSES RCS TEMPERATURE TO GO BELOW 5000F
+
l - (2) THESE CURVES MUST bE ADJUSTED FOR INSTRUMENT INACCURAClES i . 1 [ . RT 4-6 CEN-152 Rev. 03 f _ _ . - , . - a -.-= = ,, .w , ,+..,,e-..es-w mg . , - , ._m,-w-g_ym,g .w -.ser n - a - e - + ,wm n - yn+y,wv-,y g,qvy. .v. g r,e y
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR. TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page 7 of 20 Revision +3 l SAFETY T'JNCTION STATUS CHECK i
l Safety Function Acceptance Criteria l
- 1. Reactivity Control 1.a. Reactor power decreasing 4
anc
- b. [ Negative b rtup Rate [
and
- c. No more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
1 4 4
- 2. Nintenance of Vital Auxiliaries 2.a. Mein turbine tripped (AC and DC Power) _and
- b. Generator output breakers open
- and gg.m , F
- c. At least one I[4.16kV) i AC D is available cI. At lusrcue 133 kv m'l *"*- H lla kv 4,.4t_4ea,a_one non it:) [s . g AV.]
i hloN s'a.hTy bo w& bwe PmmewT g tg3/ g.,M. ET ncn_e et t:1 (1 16 l Neu sd.Ty bus an Nanakk . Mj % bu3-ert evailab4b'
~
and k-=d -er Yd9-C e b i kV.a.sT O N t hiviS \ctJ o f VWa\ Qo y g c, d .. ,_. ___.a. -, a....< ! h *
' T."
(" (bo% c,byy.)g ,,A tb4 SMslow 1..A c ,#<
} wg e .g, i} CC C0 tr;l POW 0 r-
' (A n c.l. -and--
-ii) 'h; Operation O' It 10:&t f, AT leasTone diss\ow of V,h\ uf VDC. .en: 1pn ..1 t .,! t:1.gg
{ 60 eksuud 5
- 5 * #
EftT#00I Ch200 I' papereE~ b e - E F t '
- o. r e_
i RT 47 J6!st3L . _,u_,,,03 i
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY
., EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 8 of 2 Revision
- 4 SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK !
4 Safety Function Acceptance Criteria i
- 3. RCS Inventory Control ho'6fo7ad I 3.a. Pressurizer level is g h e- N 5:2 l 21!2 4
s b. Charging and letdown are l restoring pressurizer level to n i
- c. The RCS is least[20'Fg subcooled 4
d.[oreactorvesselvoidingas indicatedbytheRVLMS/ 1 j 4. RCS Pressure Control 4.a. Pressurizer pressure is: hjY///,kN i) o psiaf fy((ff.h 11)trendingto[2225to 2300 psia}' and -
- b. Pressurizer heaters and spray are controlling pressure within P-T limits of Figure 4-1.
4 i RT 4-8 - En .;& _ C2
COMBUST!ON ENGINEERING TITLE I EMERGENCY PROCED'URE GUIDELINES Page3 4 of lo Revision d - SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK kJipun
- Safety Function Acceptance Criteria ,Ti - Tc e T 5.a. Tg-T cis less thad 10*F 'f.t-
} 5. Core Heat Removal fL\.. ft a_nd C $,, '
- b. The RCS is at least 20'%
subcooled.
~
.)
,r !
- 6. RCS Heat Removal 6.a. At least one SG has level: l, i) within normal level band J with feedwater available to 4 maintain level or ii) being restored by feedwater Flow ouL \nc.,ea s\y9 Lsuet .
)
and , b. RCS T,y, i[f525to535'F[ . 7. Containment Isolation 7.a. Coltainment pressure less than hl.S pi [ ,,l.F PSTej] ___.'and ' b. o containment area radiation monitor larmin[ and
- c. No steam plant acti, dy-ehrms.
rad:n%w moviTorJ Arc Akym t,rv$
- RT 49 C ;5?%, ,13 d
I { 1 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE l REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
)
GUIDELINES Page to of-lo Revision
- SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK Safety Function Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Containment Temperature & 8.a. Containment-temperature less than Pressure Control
{-(120'f.) and
- b. Containment pressure less than 1.E P;4 s C .12- 1
'ja t -p
[ /.3"h 8) i
- 9. Containment Combustible Gus 9.a. Containment temperature less than Control
[120'F[ en
- b. Containment pressure less than
) htiRVN 42- i-> ')
C\nsQ RT 4-10 OE" "2 A. 03
4 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss OF ALL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page 1 of 3' Revision 7 '
i i i l l j LOSS OF ALL FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY GU10ELINE i s a I J Prepared by COMBUST!nN FNCfNEED!NC, j C, 4+ k - f (-i- ; d m "r;;p 4 LOAF a.1 c/ L its u .v 61
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss of ALL
- FEED),ATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES
__, . -xe Page 2 og 31 gevision ,3_ Purpose 1 l This guideline provides operatcr actions which must be accomplished in the e, ent of a Loss of All Feedwater (LGAF). The actions in this guideline are i necessary to ensure the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition. The goal of this guideline is to safely establish the plant in a condition which will 4 allow the implementation of an appropriate existing procedure: shutdown cooling, hot standby, or hot shutdown; or a procedure provided by the (plant Technical Support Center or the Plant Operations Review Connittee]. Radiological releases to the environment will be minimized and adequate core cooling will be maintained by following this guideline. This guideline provides technical information to be used by the utilitie: in developing a plant specific procedure. a l Entry Conditions
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been perfonned 3
a, nd ] 2. Plant conditions indicate that a Loss of All Feedwater event has occurred. Any one, or more, of the following may be present, i j a. Decreasing steam generator water level or low level alarm, i b. Main feedwater pump trip alann, j c. Low main feedwater pump flow (possible high fiow for a feedwater line break).
- d. Low m in feedwater pump suction pressure.
-e. [0ther ph-t spui'iw apswaa , in m c--here].
i i 2 i LOAF 8-2 C[ET;*-+4W
l l COMBUSTION ENGINEERING. TITLE Lo$s of Alt FEE 0 WATER REC 0VEPv
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 3 of 31_ Revision 8 Exit Conditions
- 1. The diagnosis of a loss of All Feedwater event is not confirued.-
E
- 2. The feedwater line break is not isolable from the steam generator.
E
- 3. Any of the Loss of All Feedwater Safety function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfied.
E 4 The Loss of All Feedwater EPG has accomplished its purpose by' satisfying A_LL of the following:
- a. All of the Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- b. P.CS conditions are being controlled and maintained in hot standby, hot shutdown, or cold shutdown,
- c. An appropriate, approved procedure to. implement exists or has been approved by the [ Plant Technical Support Center or the Plant OperationsReviewCommittee].
d 1 4 i i 4 n' LOAF 8-3 r ru - - m e;:- 3
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE LOSS OF ALL l FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 4 of .3L Revision * - INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS , 1
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip Actions 1. l per fonned.
*2. Confinn diagnosis of Loss of All 2. Rediag;og event and exit Feedwater by verifying Safety. to either appropriate Function Status Check acceptance Optimal Recovery Guideline criteria are satisfied. or to the Functional Recovery Guideline.
- 3. Trip all RCPs. 3.
- 4. M a feedwater line break is suspected. 4 H the feedwater line break Then isolate the break and continue is M isolable from the with the actions of this guideline, steam generator, Then exit this guideline and imple-ment the Excess Stean Demand Event Optimal Recovery Guideline,
*5. Attemottorestore(main)pA d/or- 5.
gjgy[feodwatersystemsto operation. , i i
- Step Performed Continuously.
1 i 4
^
LOAF 8-4 CFr :~2
- 03 I
4
1 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss of Att FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 4 GOIDELINES Page 5 of 31 Revision 8 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*6. If feedwater to at least o.ne steam 6. If feedwater has been re-generetor has NOT been restored, stored to at least one Then perform steps 7 through 9. steam generator, Then go to step 10.
I f+' ty W9
- 7. H { maingor auxili;ry$ feedwater has . 7.
NOT been restored, Then do the following: . a. isolate steam generator blowdown, j secondary sampling, and any non-vital steam discharge agg
- b. contin actions p
to restore (main,[or auxiliary} feedwater, emerwey
- 8. fDepressurizethesteamgenerator(s) 8, in order to establish an' alternate, low pressure feedwater source.to at
, least one steam generator . 4 i s
- Step Performed Continuously ,
4 4 4 h LOAF 8-5 l; L i?2 ^c.= T ~ i
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 6 of 31 Revision 88 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- '9. Verify adequate RCS heat removal via 9.
thE steam generators by:
- a. fatleastonesteamgeneratorhas a. f M both SG wide range
} wide range level greater than or levels are less than f equalto15%$, [15'} Then implement the d FRG and initiate eme+- s b. RCS Tc temperatures are stable R . ., ;; n ;ci,...;(DCS ] ordecreasing{. and Core Heat Removal successpathHR-4}f. S.E ] b. [HRCSTctemperatures j increase [5'F}or greater, Then implerect i the FRG and initiate ! re:: ' ' ;b ;;;'i,; (RCS and Core Heat Removal success path HR-4(( 5 l' s 4 I
- Step Perfonned Continuously 4
+ LOAF .8-6 C:' '.:: ~. %.
,e s 4 A-- . 4m_ _--M.fa wA- _ - 2 J.A+ . - .A .*M -a.A - - 4 da A3_4h, -4
,,,_ .- x 4.am.A,J 1A.s .g..a--.A-' . S i
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING- TITLE Loss 0F ALL ~l FEEDWATEP RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 7 of 31 Revision * ; CONTINGENCY ACTIONS ESTRUCTIONS 1
- 10. { H feedwater is restorad, Then 10. )
p0rf0- th f0ll0ain; 16 pi sve1Tt steem generate 'eed -ing damage: I 2 If SC '.;;ti, leucl ja couve Eng f#ed ring. Thea :tep -edand:rt-feedwater namne raetnre SG_ { 10;:1, :nd maintain le.cl in i the nam:1 le el Lendr b J'4nd4cated:te:rgeaer' tor watar 1 eve! f: b;10.; the feed rtng. The" de th feli c.i eg i)
~
StDP isdundant feedratt- . rm ane and 14m4t feedgatar j fl0a 70te tc, 150 Sp'" p07-affae+ad Etetr generator e until an i n r.. e a_ m_ e_ in a_ ( r_. IGxgl hat heen ektert3d, i Or until contintiotte, feed. 4 water finu +n the $G h35 . been maints4nnd (c #i g minucca. 97 Modulate feedwater flow rate as necessary to restore
; and maintain SG water level inthenormallevelband}.
- Step Perfonned Cont (nuously 4
LOAF 8-7 Cr 12W M3
4 COMBUSTION ENGINEENNG TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY . EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUl0ELINES Page 8 of 32 Revision 8 IN37RUCT10NS C0flTINGENCY ACTIONS J 1
- 11. Ensure automatic or manual control 11, g condenser vacuum is lost of the turbine bypass system is or the turbine oypass maintaining RCS T,y, < [545'F). system is not available.
Then operate atmospheric dump valves to_ control ) RCS T,y, < [545'F).
*12. Ensure the available condensate 12,
) inventory is adequate per Figures 8-3 and 8 a.
*13. Verify charging and letdown are 13, g nually corarol charging i
automstically maintaining or and letdown to restore / ! restoring pressurizer level maintain pressurizer level i [J!ito245). [ g to 3iT"?
7c% 7 o *4 l
i i. k i 1- , i t 1 i
- Step Performed Continuously t
l LOAF 8-8 -C.F H ... , , , 33
d
; COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERv EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 9 M 31 Revistor) *
~ INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*14 Ensure pressurizer heaters end 14. y RCS subcooling. greater
- spray are n.aintaining or restoring than P-T limits or cooldown pressurizer pressure within the rategreaterthan(100*F/
limits of Figure 8-1. Hr), Then do the followiag as appropriate:
- a. stop the cooldewn,
! b. manually control pressurizer j
- spray to restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Figure 8-1,
- c. attempt to maintain the 1
plant in a stable i pressure-temperature
- configuration or ,
continue to coolde,cq l within the limits of i Figure 8-1,
- d. M overpressurization due to 1FSI/ charging flow, Then throttle 'or i secure flow (refer to stop 19)'and manually control letcown to restore and maintain-pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 8-1.
- Step Performed Continuously LOAF 8-9 CEP .:: 1 03
l ) TITLE COMBUSTION ENGINEERING gF a EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page to of 31 Revision # i INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4 *15. Verify natural circulation finw 15. Ensure proper control of in at least one loop by E of steam generator feeding j the following: and steaming (refer to
- a. loop AT (Tg -T c ) less than steps 10 and '1) and RCS nomal full power aT, inventory and pressure l
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures control (refer to steps
~ constant or decreasing, 13 and 14). c, RCS subcooling is at least (20'F]
- d. no abnormal difference
- [ greater than 10'F] between ,
TH RTDsand(CoreExit Thermocouples).
*16. Evaluate the need and desirability 16. If RCP operation Ng of restarting RCPs. Consider the desired Then go to following: step 21.
- a. adequacy of RCS and core heat removal using natural
- circulation, b, existing RCS pressure and .
temperatures,
- c. the need for main pressur-
, izer spray capability,
- d. thedurationof[CCW}
interruption-t, RCPs,
- e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures.
- Step Perfomed Continuously LOAF 8-10 CEH ;;; ~. 03
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss 0F Al,L ; FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES . Page il of ll. Revision
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*17. Determine whether RCP restart 17.j,fRCPrestartcriteria criteria are met by ALL of the NOT satisfied. Then following: go to step 21.
i
- a. electrical power is avail-able to the [RCP bus),
- b. RCP auxiliaries f[f M }t b t , C ' N 3' to maintain { seal injection?,
$ bearing, and motor cooling are operating, and there-are no j high temperature alarms on the selected RCPs, j c. at least one steam generator
] is available for removing
- heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow),
, d. pressurgzgerlevelisgreater than[2M"]andnotdecreasing,
- e. RCSsubcoolingatleast[20*F]
e basedon[averageCETltemp-
- erature (Figure 8-1),
)' f. [other criteria satisfied per fiCP operating instructions]. - 4 4 i
- Step Performed Continuously
't a
2 1 LOAF 8-11 ^' C-Z^.
COMBUSTION ENGINEER!NG TITLE LOSS OF AL'. FEEDWA'ER RECCVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES _ Page 12 of 3' Revision
- 1hSTkoCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i *18. If RCP restart desired and restart 18. Go to step 21, criteria satisfied, Then do the following:
- a. start all available charging pumps. I' pressure less than
, [1300 psia), Then MPS! pumps I
may be operated,
- b. start one RCP in each loop,
- c. lensure proper RCP operation by monitoring RCP amperage andNPSHf,
- d. operate charging (and JFSI) d pumps until pressurizer level greaterthan((dh']andSIS termination criteria met
- (Refer to step 19).
4 i
- Step .or: formed Continuously LOAF 8 12 cr ',;:_ 2,vr :0 4
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING- TITLE LOSS OF ALL i FEEDWATER REC 0VEP.y EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page 13 of 31 Revision +>- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i
*19. E !FSI pumps are operating, Then 19. Continue MPSI pump ;
they may be throttled or stopped, operation. ; one pump at a time, if Ay of the following are satisfied:
- a. RCS subcooling at least
[20'F]basedonhverageCETk l temperature (Figure 8-1),
- b. pressur,igerlevelisgreater than[14B")andnotdecreasing,
- c. at least one SG available 4 for RCS heat removal (ability for feed and steam flow).
- d. ktheRVLMSindicatesaminimum level at the top of the hot legnozzles[.
*20. H criteria of step 19 cannot be 20.
maintained after MSI pumps throttled or stopped, Then 95! pumps must be restarted and full W SI flow restored.
- 21. Evaluate the need for a plant - 21.
cooldown based on:
- a. plant status,
- b. auxiliary systems availability,
- c. condensate inventory (refer to Figures 8-3 and 8-4).
- Step Perfortned Continuously LOAF 8-13 CGA T.. . .- C .'
J COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss cr Att EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page 14 of 31 Revision $_
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 22. E a plant cooldown is desired. 22. a. Maintain the plant in a Then perfom steps 23 through 28. stabilized condition, i
j b. Exit to appropriate !- procedure as directed by(PlantTechnical l SupportCenter). f I *23. Borate the RCS to maintain 23. j shutdown margin in accor-2 dance with Technical Specifi-cations. i i 24 Comence an orderly plant cool- 24 f down, using forced or natural circulation, in accordance with 1 Technical Specifications. Reduce RCS temperatures by the f following:
- a. If the condenser is available, i Then cooldown using the turbine bypass system, i 9.C
- b. E the condenser or turbine
- bypass system g i available.
Then cooldown using the atmospheric dump valve (s).
- Step Performed Continuously J
LOAF '8-14 &nC': 0;- 1
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE tcSs 0F Att FEf0tlATER RECOVEP.Y E'tERGENCY PROCEDURE . GUIDELINES Page 15 of 31 Revision 4 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 25. Bypass or lower the automatic 25, initiationsetpointsof[MSIS, CIAS, 2 , and SIAS] as the cooldown and depressurization proceed.
*26. If pressurizer pressure reaches 26.
h psia), Then isolate, vert or drain the safety injection tanks (SITS).
*27. finitiate low temperature over- 27, pressurization protection (LTOP) at Tc $N'F {.
*28. When the following SCS entry *28. E the RCS fails to depres-conditions are estab1fshed:gg surize, Then a void should
- a. pressurizer level > [ TOC'] and be suspected, cor.stant or increasing, voiding in the RCS may
- b. RCSsubcooling>[20'F], be indicated by any of
- c. RCSpressure<[Npsia], the following indica-F], tions, parameter
- d. RCSHT 2[
- e. [ctt.ccphnty::ific-critecie changes, or trends:
incrtP. crc],- 1) letdown flow Then exit this guideline and initiate greater than SCSoperationper[ operating charging flow, instructions]. (Continued On Next Page)
- Step Perfonned Continuously t0AF 8-15 C "L 'J2 ' - - +3
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE - LOSS or Att FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 16 of 31 Revision *$ INSTRUCTIONS C0hTINGENCY ACTIONS i f 18. *28 (Cont'd) l 11) pressurizer level ; increasing signi- l ficantly more i than expected while operating pressurizer spray, ] iii) {the RVLMS indi-i cates that void-ing is present in the reactor l vessell, iv) (HJTCunheated 4 thermocouple j temperature indi-cates saturated conditions in the l reactor vessel upperhead), i Wr incit a- - , sie.sh M (Continued On Next Page) }
- Step Perfonned Continuously T
LOAF - 8-16 [FN :- M 3
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING L0s5 0F ALL TITLEr ,EE0 WATER RECOV EMERGENCY PROCEDURE' GUIDELINES Page 17 of 31 Revision E_
, INSTRUCTIONS 0 C_0t!TINGENCY ACTIONS J
j 28. *28. (Cont'd)
- b. E voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure, Then attempt to eliminate q the voiding by:
! i) verify letdown is isolated, 3 D.$ ; ii) stop the deoress-j urization, e.D.$
lii) pressurize and depressurize the RCS within the
- limits of Figure j 8-1 by operating j pressurizer heat-a ers and spray or JESI and charging
- pumps. Monitor pressurizer-level fan'd-theRVLMSl
( for trending RCS ! inventory.
- St ' Perfortned Continuously . (Continued On Next Page)
LOAF 8-17 .GE h i T. o . O
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITI.E LOSS OF ALL FEIOWATER P.ECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page 18 of 31 Revision V INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 28. *28.(Cont'd)
- c. H depressurization of the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible, aj void-ing is suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes, Ihen attempt to eliminate the voidirg by:
- 1) cool the suspected steam generator (by steeming and/or blowdown, and feeding) to con-dense the steam generat:r tite void,
*. D.$
ii) monitor pressur-izer level for trending RCS inventory. (Continued On Next Page)
- Step Perfonned Continuously LOAF 8-18 CE3-;3I ^..,0-
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toS$ or Att FEEDWATER PEC0VERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE - GUIDELINES Page 19 of 2) Revision
- INSTPUCTIONS CONT!NGCNCY ACTIONS
- 28. *28. (Cont'd)
- d. Ifdepressurizationof the RCS to the Sf5 ertry pressure is still not possible. Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- 1) operate the fpressurizervent orthe{ reactor vessel head vent
, to clear trapped non-condensible gases.
I in$ ii) monitor pressur-1rerlevel[and/- ortheRVLMSIfor trendir.; of RCS inventory.
- e. Centinue attempts to establish SCS entry conditions, or exit this guideline and ini-tiate an appropriate procedure as directed by(PlantTechnical SupportCenter).
- Step Performed Continuously L.
LOAF 8-19 Tu. Of+5" 03 ]
)
i i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss or Att FEEDWATER RECOVERY j EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
; GUIDELINES Page 2o of 32 Revision ?_ _
- ine Loss of All Feedwater Recovery Guideline has accomplished its purpose if
} RCS conditions are bing controlled in hot standby, hot shutdown, or cold shutdown with all of the sFSC acceptance criteria satisfied, and the entry , conditions of an appropriate, approved procedure are satisfied. ; 1 EE 1 ) .1 i i 1 4 1 4 4 5 1 LOAF 8-20 C r .'. " * ;- 43
I COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss or att i FEECWATER RECOVI: V i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ; 4 GUIDELINES Page 22 of lL Revision * ) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
- i This section contains items which should be considered when implementing EPGs
'l and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented as preceu-tions, cautions, notes or in the E0P training program. ; i ! 1. The operator should not add feedwater to a dry steam generator if anotter
- steam generator still contains water. Re-establish feedwater only to t*e j steam generator that is not dry. If both steam generators become dry, refill only one steam generator to reinitiate core cooling.
4 1 2. During all phases of the cooldown, monitor RCS temperature and pressure l l to avoid exceeding a cooldown rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations. ,
- 3. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is l apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation. (Reference 15.34)
] ! 4, All available indications should be used to aid ir evaluating plant j conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one er more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24), a
- 5. If the initial cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits,
, there may be a potential for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) of the l reactor vessel (Reference 10.8). Post Accident Pressure / Temperature l Limits of (Figure 8-1) should be maintained. .
- 6. Solid water operation of the pressurizer should be avcided unless (20'F7 of subcooling cannot be maintained-in the RCS (Figure 8-1). If the PCS is solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup P
- cooldown to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions.
- LOAF 8-21 C =is ; - E - -
-, -- , ,m~ E- r. . .-, - . - - - . #
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE tcSS OF Att FEr0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE i GUIDELINES Page 22 or 3i a vision p
- 7. Minimize the number of cycles of pressurizer auxiitary spray whenever the temperature differential between the spray water and the pressurizer is greaterthan[200'F)inordertominimizetheincreaseinthespray nozzle themal stress accurr11ation factor. Every such cycle must be recorded in accordance with Technical Specification Limitations (Reference 15.10 & 15.25).
. Monit quen tar para ters s ce a sus J P s ma urst he t ru e di .)
2 9. Natural circulation flow cannot be verified until the RCPs have stopped i coasting down after being tripped.
- 10. During natural circulation, verification of an RCS temperature response to a plant change cannot be accomplished until approximately 5 to 15
. minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times (Reference , 15.11).
- 11. Af ter the required shutdown boron concentration is attained in the RCS, makeup water added to the RCS during the cooldown should be at least equal to the RCS boren concentration to prevent any dilutien of RCS boren l
concentration.
- 12. Once the pressurizer cooldown has begun, pressurizer level indication -
decalibration will occur. The indication on the nomal pressurizer level indication will begin to deviate from the true pressurizer water level. The operator should use correction curves to find the true pressurizer level. A cold calibrated pressurizer level indication is also available 1 for lower pressurizer temperatures. LOAF- B-22 CN
. ~ > , +.-y-,, -~e my . - - , ~ q,,,~-m , ,m,- ,---
1
^
1
! ! COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE LOSS OF ALL
. FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 23 of 32 Revision *
( - - .-
- i E 'r, i ., void cxists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are not operating, the t Evt.N5 provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel liquid inventory.
When a void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are operating, it is i not possible to obtain an accurate reactor vessel liquid level indication j due to the effect of the RCP induced pressure head on the RYLMS. 1Pe frdiceted M ai alt: 2 4 'f": for diffarant AVLMS dei y' .acc these d l tHW n Infonnation concerning reactor vessel liquid inventory trending may still be discerned. The operator is cautioned not to rely solely on the RVLMS indication when RCPs are operating. j 14 The operator should continuously nonitor for the presence of RCS voiding i and take steps to eliminate voiding any time voiding causes heat removal or inventory control safety functions to begin to be threatened. Void j elimination should be started soon enough to ensure heat refaoval and inventory control are not lost. 4
- 15. It is desirable to have all electrical equipment available in order to
- most effectively mitigate and recover from a Less of All Feedwater event.
i Therefore, if any vital AC or DC bus is de-energized, operators should attempt to restore power to the vital AC or vital DC bus (es). This
; action is taken even though the loss of one vital AC or DC bus will not
] prevent the operators from performing all necessary actions in the loss of All Feadwater ORG. l i j LOAF 8 23 hE ' a . ^h
, ,,-a , - , - , < , , , , ,a --. e 4 , - - - , - . - . , - , - - - - - -
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss or att FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 24 of 3i a,yision ,, r j FIGURE 8-1 TYPICAL POST ACCIDENT PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS (2) j i 2500 - i i [ 2400 - LOWEST SERVICE [ 2300 -, 1000F/ HOUR / , $*h TEMP % COOLDOWN
/ I
) / 2000 - NOTE 1 / .
Yt O
\4l 0 [
0
$ (200 F] [
2 Y
- e 1500 -
/ -
. H /
- E /
5 / u / goon RCP NPSH
/
s I (200F]
! SHUTDOWN [00) 500 j/ [ COOLING s
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 RCSTEMPERATURE,OF 0 NOTES (1) THIS CURVE SUPERSEDES THE 100 F/ HOUR COOLDOWN CURVE ANYTIME THE RCS HAS EXPERIENCED AN UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN WHICH CAUSES RCS TEMPERATURE TO GO BELOW S000F (2) THESE CURVES MUST BE ADJUSTED FOR INSTRUMENT INACCURACl,ES 8-24 ::" if . , 21 t,0AF
1 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss or Att FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page is of 31 Revision er flGURE 8 2 III , TYPICAL ACCEPTABLE $15 Ft.OW vs RC$ PRES $URE '
; INJECTION M00E423 i j 2300 i , , , , , , , , , , , i l
1200 . 1 21H . . 2000 ,. .
$1A$
1700 . NOTE (3) lege . . 1600 . .
, 1400 - -- -- ---------%
E i i1300 p
=
U 1300 , E a: 1100 . 4
$1000 Q
w 000 . / E 000 .
~.
100 . . M . . 606' .- . 400 . , . I 300 . ,-' . f gg, ,, ,
~.
100 - 200 400 600 000 1000 1200 1400 1000 1000 2000 2200 2400 2500 FLOW GPM NOTES: (1) SEE IMPLEMENT Afl0N SECTION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PLANT SPECIFIC CURVE
. (2) FOR HOT AND COLO LEO IMJECTION MODE.THE LPSI PUMP 1 ARE NOT REQUIRED TO IE OPERATINO.THE HP$l PUMP FLOW l$ OlVIDED EQUALLY
- IEtwtEN THE HOT AND COLO LEOS (3) BELOW SI AS PRESSURE.$AF ETY INJECTION SYSTEM ($18) PUMPS WILL BE OPERATINO IUT THERE WILL 8t NO INJECTION FLOW UNTil $YSTEM PRES $URE F ALLS SELOW THE SHUT 0FF HE A0 0F ANY $15 PUMP LOAF 8 25 C M4 1 03
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE L0ss Or ALL , i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Pase u of " Revision z-FIGURE 8 3
; TYPICAL FEEDWATER CAPACITY VER$US T!PE REMAINING
; UNTIL $ HUT 00WN COOLING REQUIRED
@0 , , , , , , ,
360 -
- 320 - -
i l 280 - - I 3 9
/
!+ 240 -
,o .
, 5 '
i - - k200 S D [ x
/y 1
l iso - - S 120 . . so . i M ~ - I i e I e I 1 0 4 8 12 16 20 .24 28 32 TIME REMAINING UNTIL SHUTDOWN 4 COOLING REQUIRED (HRS)
's LOAF 8 26 e ::~ ^. 20
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss or Au ' FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY
-' i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page_24 or 31 g,y;, ion ,
i FIGURE 8 4 TYP] cal. FEE 0 WATER REQUIRED FOR $ENSIBLE HEAT REMOYAL T COLO(REQUIRED)VSTCOLD (!N!TIAL) l i 4
@ ~
3 4
; ~
~
TOOLD REQUIRED = 300'F j ,' 5
- s 3600F S
a: 3 20 400*F q U 10 - 4608F _ j . l g 1 I I g 520 480 440 400 300 320 280 540 INITIAL TCOW(*FI I 1 8 27 C " '.;: ^ - F 1.0AF
- , - -. - - . . . . - __-_r - _, . ._
~ COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE toss or 4tt FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES page 2e. of n. Revision m ; SAFETY FUNCTICN STATUS CHECK a Safety Function Accectance Criteria
- 1. Reactivity Control 1.a. Pesctor power decreasing a n,d, 1
, b.(NegativeStartupRatej l *- ".1 i c. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
- 2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries 2.a. Main turbine tripped (AC and DC Fower) and .
- b. Generator output breakers open 4
' and ge,; c y '
- c. At least one[ vital
[4.16kV: AC e r is available ,. ' L*$ y.,tst "
- d. At least one se e n of elec.
4 trical DC power is available . for: i) DC control power and ii) The opgigof at least onek?0voltvitalAC 3 instrument channel. 4 LOAF 8 28 :GCi : "... :2 i
-_ . _ ~ _ . . - _ , - - . _ . ._. . . _ , _ , - , _ , -
.-. e - ,
. . . _. . .~ . _
4 COMBUSTION ENGikEERING TITLE Loss OF Att
! FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Page 29 of 31 Revision #
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK j Safety Function Acceptance Criteria 1
- 3. RCS inventory Control 3.a. Cnarging and letdown are maintainingorrestgirg g.,
pressurizer level (M to E") I and l b.TheRCSisatleast(20*F] subcooled and 4 2 c.kTheRVLMSindibesthecore iscovered{. 4 RCS Pressure Control 4 Pressuriter heaters and spray are maintaining or restoring
- pressuriter pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure 8 1.
S. Core Heat Removal 5. TH RTD(andaverageCoreExit Thermocouple)temperaturesless than(600'F). LOAF 8-29 CE t' '. : " ; 0 3-J
, e - - .--
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE Loss of ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page 30 of 31 Revision
- SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK Safety Function Acceptance Criteria
- 6. RCS Heat Removal 6.a. RCS T,y, is c (M]
and
- b. 1) fAtI t one steam generator has wide range level > 15%,
and ii) RCS T temperatures are e stableordecreasincl.
- 7. Containtnent Isolation 7.a. Lontainment pressure less than
[1.5psig) a2d
- b. {No contairenent area radiation monitors alaming[
a, n,g
- c. No steam plant activity monitors alaming.
I LOAF 8-30 Cl.s+ n : 1 M-- l 1
1 I i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE LOS$ OF ALL (EEDWATER REC 0 VERT ] EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 32 of 32 Revision .2L._ , j SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK i SafetyFunctg Acceptance Criteria l i 8. Containment Temperature and 8.a. Containment temperature less than 1 Pressure Control [120'F] 3D$
- b. Containment pressure less than
) '
' (1.5psig].
- 9. Containment Combustible 9.a. Containment temperature less than 4
! Gas Control (120'F) anj
- b. Containment pressure less than l
[1.5psig].
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i , 1 i 1 1 i s Attachment 1 provides a plan addressing the requirements of Element 8 of the itRC HFE Program Review Model (PRM). Attachment 2 documents the bases for the System Description for Control Complex Information System for Nuplex 80+. It is provided to meet the commitments of the September 10, 11, 1992 human factors meeting. i Attachments 3 and 4 provide information which should allow closure of Element 7 of the NRC HfE PRM. Per agreement with the llRC Attachment 4 is a markup of existing EPGs to reflect the System 80+ design. 1
- Attachment 5 provides responses to the following DSER Open items:
I 18.5.1 1 . 18 ~ ' ! 18.o 1 18.8.1-1
; 18.8.1-3 ! 18.8.1-4 18.8.1-5 18.8.2 18.9 1 18.9 2 18.10 l
i i I d a l
-l l
l 4
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t.q ATTACHMENT 1 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING VERIFICATION AND VAllDATION PLAN NPX80 IC-VP790 03
i HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PLAN FOR NUPLEX 80+ NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Revision 00 ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. Nuclear Power Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Issue Dat<*
RECORD OF REVISIONG NO. DATE PAGES PREPARED BY APPROVALS INVOLVED 00 ALL l NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS gjetion Title Pace RECORD OF REVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.0 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.0 BCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.0 REFERENCES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.0 . DEFINITION 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 e 5.0 NAMA9EKENT_OF V67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1 V&V PLAN REVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2 EVALUATION OF V&V RESULT 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3 V&V REPORT STRUCTURE AND CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4 MANAGEMENT REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.0-V&V TA8K MET 6 . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.1 AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS AND AVAILABILITY VERIFICATION 12 6.1.1 Entpose . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 12 6.1.2 Esp,33- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.1.3 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 13 6.1.4 Nothodoloav . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1.5 Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2 SUITABILITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2.2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2.3 Resources . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 17 6.2.4 Nethodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2.5 Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3 VALIDATION . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3.1 EMrpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3.2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3.3 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.3.4 Methodoloav . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.3.4.1 General Description . .. . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.3.4.2 Plant Accident, Abnormal, Normal, and HBI.
and I6C Equipment Failure Operating sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 21 6.3.5 Criteria . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 22 7.0 BCHEDULE & MILESTONES . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . .. 27 7.1 AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS & AVAILABILITY VERIFICATION SCHEDULE & MILESTONES . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . 27~ 7.2 SUITABILITY VERIFICATION SCHEDULE & MILE 8 TONES . . . 29 7.3 VALIDATION SCHEDULE & NILESTONES .. . . . . . . . . 31 8.0 NTE V6V ADNINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . 1 . . 33 S.1 FINDINGS REPORTING-E RESOLUTION POLICY , .. . . . . 33 NPX80^.'C-VP790-03 Rev 00 3
l j i l TABLE OF CONTENTS Rection Title EggA
! #s2 "'ASK ITERATION POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 ; 8.3 CONTROL PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4 8.4 flDIDELINES, PRACTICES, & CONVENTIONS . . . . . . . . 33 i
APPENJ!IX_& NUPLEE 80+ QEjIGN TEAM _ EVALUATION . . . . . . A-1 LIST OF FIGURES 1 4
, Figure 7 1 AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS & VERIFICATION PROCESS . 28 '.
- Figure ?.3 SUITABILITY VERIFICATION-PROCE85 . . . . . . . 30
] Figure 7.3 ALIDATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 i i 4 I ll i l 4 I j I NFX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 4 m_-
ABBREVIATIONS ABB-CE Asea Brown Boveri - Combustion Engineering ATWS Anticipated Transients Without scram CCS Component Control System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRT Cathode Ray Tube CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal DIAS Discrete Indication & Alarm System DPS Data Processing System-EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal EPG Emergency Procedure Guidelines ESDE Excess Steam Demand Event ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features Component Control System FTA Function & Task Analysis HFE Human Factors Engineering HRA Human Reliability Assessment HSI Human-Systems Interface I&C Instrumentation and Control I&Cs Indications, Controls, and Alarms IPSO Integrated Process Status Overview LOAF Loss of all Feedwater LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MCR Main Control Room MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal PGICR Procedure Guideline Information & Control Requirements PRA Probable Risk Assessment RCS Reactor Coolant System RSA Remote Shutdown Area RSP Remote Shutdown Panel RSR- Remote Shutdown Room SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal TOI Tracking-of-Open-Issues (database) VAC Volts Alternating Current VDC Volts Direct Current V&V Verification and validation NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 5
1.0 PSEPOSE The Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Verification and Validation (V&V) Plan for Nuplex 80+ describes how the HFE V&V is managed, adminictered, and performed. Additionally, the V&V analysis criteria, methodology, required resources x (e.g. Emergency Procedure Guidelines, normal and abnormal optrating sequences, I&C design requirements, HSI hardware including a full scope simulated mockup, etc.), schedule for activities, and milestones are provided. Specifically, the HFE V&V Plan meets the design process requirements and criteria for availability verification, suitability verification, and validation of the ensemble as defined in Sections A-3.6, A-3.7, and A-3.7 of the HFE Program Plan (Reference 1). The HFE V&V Plan addresses the requirements of Element 8, , Human Factors Verification and Validation of the draft NRC Program Review Model (Reference 3). The intent of the criteria in Element 8 have been met. This includes: 1) the design commitment of thoroughly evaluating the HSI as an integrated system using HFE evaluation procedures, guidelines, standards, and principles, 2) Inspection / Test / Analysis including the following: method for implementing HFE V&V, documentation of analyses and findings, and review by the Nuplex 80+ Design Team, 3) Design Acceptance criteria including the following: 1) General Criteria, 2) Implementation Plan, 3) Analysis Results Report, and 4) Huplex 80+ Design Team Evaluation Report. HPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 6
i' i i i 1 2 . 0 g g.Q 1 3 l , I The HFE V&V plan applies to all Human System Interface (HSI) l
- in the Main Control Room (MCR), Remote Shutdown Area (RSA) l l and those control stations specified in the Emergency j i Procedure Guidelines (EPG). V&V in not performed on t
- procedures nor the HSI and procedure ensemble. This is j performed as a-col Applicant task. ,
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- 3.0 PEFERENCES
- 1. Human Factors Procram Plan for the System 80+ (TM) Standard i Plant DesiaD, NPX80-IC-DP790-01, Revision 01, December 15, 1992.
- 2. Guidelines for Control Room Desian Reviews, NUREG-0700, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1981. i 3. HFE Procram Review Model and Accootance Criteria for Evolutionary Reactors, Draft, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1992. ! 4. Nuolex 80+ Verification Analysis Report, NPX80-TE-790-01, Revision 2, December 1989. j , , S. Simulator Performance Measures. Final Report, CE-NPSD-514, j Task 572, Combustion Engineering, Inc., December, 1988. I
- 6. Human Factors Encinserina Standards, Guidelines, and Bases
- for System 80+,-NPX80-IC-DR-791-02, (Draft).
, 7. Office of the Federal Register (1992). Code of Federal-i Reculations. Title 10. Chapter I - Nuclear Reculatory j Commission (10 CFR Parts 0-199).
- 8. Detailed Control Room Desian Review Sucolemgntal Report, San
~ Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3, Volumes 1 & 2, SCE Document No. M37328, January 1986.
- 9. Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Revision 1, 1984.
- 10. AdvancqdJdgnan-System Interface Desian Review Guideline, 1 NUREG/CR-5908, Draft, 1992.
! 11. Computer Generated Displav System Guidelines (Vol 1 ant 21, j EPRI NP-3701, Electric Power Institute, 1984. i
- 12. IEEE Guide to Evaluation of Man-Machine Performance 3D Nuclear Power Generatina Station Control Rooms and Other
- Perioheries, IEEE Std 845-1988, IEEE, 1988.
4 l 13. Desian for Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Plants, IEC 964, Bureau Central de la Commission Electrotrotechnique Internationale, 1989. 4 d i NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 8
4.0 DXIJEITIONS Availability - Verification of task performance capability such that the necessary indications and controls to accomplish a defined set of tasks (e.g., emergency operating procedures) are afforded in a specified work area (e.g., a control rooru), per Section 3.2.2 and 3.7.2 of NUREG-0700 (Reference 2). Features - HCR console annunciators, displays and controls are implemented using Video Display Unit (VDU) devices and backlit component control switches on each control console panel. The following applications are standardized Human-System Interface (HSI). features that utilize consistent operating conventions at Nuplex 80+ control panelst DPS Display Hierarchy DIAS Alarm Tile Displays DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays DIAS Hultiple Parameter Displays CCS Process Controller Displays CCS Switch Configurations HFE Soecialists - Individuals with credentials in the area of Human Factors Engineering equivalent to 1) at least two years of successful graduate-level study of applicable subjects, plus a year of related design experience; or 2) five years of related design experience; 3) or any evenly proportioned combination of 1) and 2). Human Factors Enaineerina (HFE) - The application of Human Factors Principles and methods to practical engineering and design problems; as distinguished from research and theoretical development. Human-System Interface (HSI) - The operator's point of use of a controlled system in terms of indication and control; with particular emphasis on its organization, and the resulting human performance-related constraints. Indication and control Features - General denotation for information output (i.e., from plant systems to humsn operator) and action input (i.e., from human operator to plant systems) features of the HSI systems, respectively, without regard for specific implementation. operations Experts - Currently or formerly licensed reactor operators with operating experience on similar plants. NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 9
Procedure Guideline Informatlyn & Control Reauirements (PGICR) - A summarization of the procedure-based parametric requirements for display and control variables identified by the PTA. Summaries are sorted from the PTA data base for each variable. For example, characteristics for
" pressurizer pressure" are summarized for each distinct gross function where pressurizer pressure is used.
Characteristics include the following areas: device type, range, accuracy, and units. Resoonsible Manaaement structure - The organizational and management structure responsible for the directior, and integration of HFE in the design of the proposed plant. Suitability - Verificatior of task performance capability such that the HSI design items are individually acceptable (i.e., are Usable, or suitable for their intended use) in terms of applicable HFE Design Guidance, per Section 3.2.2 and 3.7.2 of NUREG-0700 (Reference 2). System I&c Inventory - This inventory includes instrumentation characteristics (e.g. device type, range, accuracy, units, etc.) for all instrunentation, controls, and alarms needed (from the system design engineers _ perspective). This inventory is generated by the individual system cognizant engineers. Ucable - Operable, maintainable, testable, inspectable, efficient, effective, etc.; i.e., sufficient to support the operator's specified tasks. Verification - Availability and Suitability analyses; part of the design process (along with validation) by which HSI design sufficiency is confirmed (per Section 3.7 of Reference 2). Validation - Evaluation of the dynamic operating ensemble demonstrating trained operators' ability to successfully perform their anticipated (i.e., procedural) role in the afforded task environment (i.e., the control room design) under anticipated operating conditions (the Validation scenarios). Part of the design process (along with Verification) by which the HSI design sufficiency is confirmed (per Section 3.8 of Reference 2). NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 10
i t 5.0 MANAGEMENT _OF__V6V The Responsible Management Structure of HFE V&V is i j integrated into the Human System Interface (HSI) design l i process as described in Reference 1. The responsible i management structure will be responsible for the following:
- 1. the development of the HFE V&V Plan;
- 2. the implementation of the HFE V&V Plan; 3
- 3. the final disposition and resolution of all findings j identified during the V&V activities.
5.1 V&V PLAN REVISIONS Revisions to the HFE V&V Plan are administratively controlled. 5.2 EVALUATION OF V&V RESULTS Findings and associated resolutions identified during the j V&V tasks, as exemplified in Reference 4 will be itemized i and documented in its associated V&V report. The V&V report will be sent to the Nuplex B0+ design team for review and a comment. The Responsible Hanagement Structure of HFE V&V j will ensure that all comments are resolved. . 5.3 V&V REPORT STRUCTURE AJD CONTENT ! V&V analysis reports shall be structured in accordance with i ABB-CE internal oocumentation format requirements. The HFE V&V analysis reports shall include sections or appendices containing the following information: purpose, scope, references, resources used during the analysis, analysis 4 methodology, analysis criteria and metrics, completed analysis checklists or data sheets, recommendations, f resolutions, and a list of discrepancies entered into the Tracking-of-Open-Issues (TOI) database. 5.4 MANAGEMENT REVIEW i . The ABB-CE document review and comment process and document . distribution process ensure that the results of the HFE V&V activities are received, reviewed and commented on by the Nuplex 80+ design team. An internal procedure described in j Reference 1 requires all human factors and man-machine 1 interface documents for Nuplex 80+, including V&V documents, to be distributed in accordance ABB-CE internal distribution requirements. i NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 11 e- ,e----- - - - v - - _ .. _ , , , , , -,y m,-,,,,-,--,,,-,,-.m ,-,,.,-wr_,_,,,,,-,.-.,,,m . , , _ - ,
I a i' 6.0 YEV TASK METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA 4 6.1 AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS AND AVAIT. ABILITY VERIFICATION 4 6.1.1 EMEP15_t l The purpose of availability analysis and availability verification is to
- 1. to ensure operator tasks can accomplished with available HSI information and controls; ,
j 2. to ensure that EPG tasks and critical tasks l identified in the Probable Risk Assessment (PRA) can l be accomplished with the fixed location MCR HSI
- alone;
- 3. to ensure that all federally mandated-I&C features 1
are included in the MCR and RSR. Availability analysis and availability verification takes part in two phases (see Figure 7.1): i The ourpose of Phase 1 (Availability Analysis) is to . 4 assure that the comp 1ste set of the following three ! types of requirements are included in the System I&C - i Requirements (as defined in section 4.0): 1) Procedure Guideline Information & Control Requirements (PGICR) (as ^ defined in Section 4.0) as specified in the Functional Task Analysis, 2) Federally mandated indication and control requirements, and 3) the minimum inventory of i fixed location alarms, controls, and indications necessary to carry out the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPG) or critical tasks identified in the PRA. The ournose of Phasc 2 (Availability Verificaticr' i: to compare the as-designed HSI to the checklist produced by the Phase 1 analysis. this includes:
- 1. verifying and documenting that all System I&C Inventory are available in the HLI, design; 4
- 2. identifying candidate HSI indications or controis-4 for removal or relocation.
6.1.2 Scope i Phase 1 (Availability Analysis)'will be performed as a single task and compares the System I&C Inventory for the panels in the Main Control Room (MCR), Remote Shutdown Area (RSA), and those control stations NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 12 4
l l specified in the EPG to the following: 1) Federally mandated requirements, 2) Procedure Guideline Information & Control Requirements (from FTA), and 3) minimum set of fixed location alarms, controls, and indications needed to complete the EPGs and critical tasks identified in the PRA. Phase 2 (Availability Verification) will be performed on the liSI for all of the panels in the MCR, RSA and those control panels specified in the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPG) usir- the availability checklist developed in phase 1. 6.1.3 Resources The fo}1owing resources will be available: individual panel design reports containing the MCR and RSA data bsse inventory elements. The MCR inventory elements used for the verification shall include device type, units, and range, scale precision, and e.ccuracy in a data base; PGICR will come from the PTA;- minimum inventory of fixed location alarms, controls, and indications carry out the EPGs defined in CESSAR-DC; System I&C Inventory will come from a controlled System 80+ project document or data base; a qualified HFE specialist will be available to direct and review the analysis. 6.1.4 Methodoloav As exemplified in Reference 4 the following methodology is used: PHASE 1 METHODOLOGY (AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS) The following takes' place (see Figure 7.1):
- 1) A list of all Federally mandated Indication and Control requirements in 10CRF50.34 will be compiled based on criteria in Section 6.1.5. Each Indication and Control.from the compiled list will be confirmed to be in the System I&C Inventory;
- 2) A list of all fired location alarms, controls, and indications required to complete the EFGs will be NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 13
used. Each Indication and Control from the compiled list will confirmed to be in the System I&C Inventory;
- 3) The FTA produces a list of PGICR. This PGICR will be confirmed to be in the System I&C Inventory.
The comparisons will be reviewed to identify instrumentation that may be necessary for the above requirements but were not included in the System I&C Inventory. System I&C Inventory findings and resolution are sent to the System I&C Inventory for final resolution. When the System I&C Inventory includes all three types of requirements, an availability checklist is developed to be used in phase 2, availability verification. Whnn all required HSI are included in the System I&C Inventory, an availability checklist will be generated. The requirements-to-inventory mapping, findings, explanations (if necessary), resolution, and final availability checklist will become part of the availability analysis report. EHASE 2 METHODOLOGY (AVAILABILITY VERIFICATIONi The availability checklist will be used to evaluate The MCR, RSA, and those control stations specified in the EPG HSI (as defined in the panel design reports) for completeness. Discrepancies between the design HSI and the availability checklist will be formally evaluated and resolved. This analysis will identify findings such as missing required panel HSI, and 2) unnecessary panel HSI. The findings and a resolution will be documented. Any resulting changes to the design will be sent to the TOI data base for eventual inclusion in the HSI panel report (s). The process will be repeated until the HSI panel designs match the availability checklist. The findings, explanation (if necessary), and resolution will become a part of the availability verification report. 6.1.5 Criteria Phase 1 Availability Analysis Criteria
- 1. All of the required Federally mandated Indication and Control features listed below are included in the System I&C Inventory:
a) Integrated display of safety parameter indications; 10 CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (iv) . I l NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 14
l 4 ) j- b) Indication of the Bypassed.and Inoperable Status of Safety Systems; 10 CFR j 50. 34 (f) (2) (v) . 4 c) Indication of relief and safety valve
- position; 10 CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (xi) .
i , d) Indication of auxiliary feedwater system flow; 10 CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (xii) . e) Control of auxiliary feedwater system initiation; 10 CFR 50.34 - (f) (2) (xii) .
- f) Indication of containment pressure; 10 CFR 3 50.34 (f) (2) (xvii) .
i- . g) Indication of containment water level; 10 CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (xvii) , j h) Indication of containment hydrogen i concentration; 10- CFR- 50.34 (f) (2) (xvii) . b i) Indication of containment (high level)'
- radiation intensity; 10 CFR
-50. 34 (f) (2) (xvii) .
y j) Indication of noble gas effluents at-
- potential accident release points; 10 CFR
! 50. 34 (f) (2)'(xvii) .. i k) Indication of inadequate core. cooling; 10 l - CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (xviii) .
- l) Post-Accident Monitoring Indications; 10 CFR
{ 50. 34 (f) (2 ) (xix) .1 , m) Indication of in-plant radiation and j- . airborne activity; 10 CFR , 50. 34 (f) (2) (xxvii) ; J l 2. All-of.the= fixed: location alarms,-controls, and 4 4
. indications ~ identified in CESSAR-DC-needed to complete the EPGs'and. perform critical. tasks = ,
l identified in the PRA are included and-. identified'in j -the System I&C Inventory.as a: fixed-location alarm; 4 control or indication;
- 3. All of the PGICR' identified in the FTAJare. included F in the System I&C Inventory; l
- 4. System I&C Inventory.
1 -l NPX80-IC-VP790-03~Rev 00' 15 l
! Phase 2 Availability Verification Criteria
- 1. All System I&C Inventory items with appropriate characteristics are found on HSI designs; j
j 2. There are no HSI that have no operational basis. ! 6.2 SUITABILITY ANALYSIS l 6.2.1 Eurp_e.33 I Suitability analysis addresses the issue of whether the l form and arrangement of'HSI indications and controls supports operator task accomplishment._ It roughly spans-l the gap between the' questions of "is the needed i information, and only the needed information, present?" 3 (Availability) and "does the design, in terms of actual operators, using the full control room,-the actual procedures, the real plant dynamics, etc. actually work together as a whole?" (Validation). Suitability therefore-overlaps somewhat with both these areas of evaluative effort.- The suitability analysis is performed using two different approaches, 1) a top-down
- approach, and 2) a bottom-up. approach.
, The " top-down" approach attempts to evaluate the
- appropriateness of the design selections in the context
- of the big picture. This view considers the overall system design, the nature of real-world operator tasks, and the integration of the parts of-the man-machine interface into a coherent and easily used whole.
The " bottom-up" approach uses the control room design j review guidelines found in NUREG 0700 (Reference 2)-and j the HFE Standards, Guidelines and Bases'(Reference 6) as ', a set of accepted and' established criteria. . These ~ , criteria are particularly useful_for identifying _ l individual item discrepancies, such as inadequate Jetter sizes or lighting : levels,- where genuine specifications j exist.
, There is substantial but not complete overlap between the results of the two methods. This is to be expected,_
, because they both are directed towards the same system-and overall goals; it also indicates that the two approaches together are more complete than either one alone. i f.2.2 Scope 't Suitability analysis will be performed on all HSI features'in the MCR, RSA and those control stations NPX80-IC-VP790-03 Rev 00 16' ) 4
s ) i i A2 COMBUSTION ENGINEERINGM S S Et. TITLE ' L0ss OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY i
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ;
GUIDELINES Page 2 of 54 Revision D ) i l 4 4 l 1 .i 4 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT i i RECOVERY GUIDELINE i l b . 1 l 3 i l 4 1 i i
- Prepared by .
Mb-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
-fer the f I C-ncr Croup-t i
1 4 2 4 5-1 CE!' S Is; . OF , LOCA i i l
.. .- ~- . - - .-- . . _ _ - _ . . .- -- . -
, ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING syssee TITLE Loss-or Coolant-ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES Page 2 of 54 g, vision 'pg PURFOSE This guideline provides operator actions.which must be accomplished in the ! event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The actions in this guideline are necessary to ensure that the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition. The , goals of this guideline are te mitigate the eftects of a LOCA, to isolate the . break, and.if this is not possible, to establish either long term core cooling-I using the safety injection system or core cooling using the shutdown cooling system. This guideline achieves this gosi while maintaining adequate core I cooling and minimizing radiological releases to the environment. This a j guideline provides technical infonnation to be used by utilities in developing 4 a plant specific procedure. ENTRY CONDITION, . j
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed l- and l 2. Plant conditions indicate that a Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred.
Any one or more of the following may be present: i
- a. Pressurizer level low (for a break in the pressurizer, the level may I
behigh). g g ,, g, 4 yh ht g,a 5'ig . b. Safety injection system (515) actuated automaticallyf yCSFAS.
- c. Increase in containment pressure, temperature.' radiation, humidity-and t sump level,
- d. -Figh :;ur ;h tark 1:";el, temperature. : p : tu-e ~C.RvJST 'TJAP i
- e. [0ther pl = t speci'i; 3 pter , "
- erthere.)
kreswmte.< - pt ewa, 4-E hms i Jsca h % d vo'id g
$ lo55 of subc.ooM % g dc h_d hj- Iuhmole.d koga 4,b.
4 LOCA 5-2 iCO: Z: N , . 0 3 --
S' ABB -c0MBUSTION ENGINEER!NG W5 80-t TITLE g Cg EMERGENCY PROCEDURE-GUIDELINES Page 3 of 54 Revision 1 EXIT CONDITIONS
- 1. The diagnosis of a (oss of Coolant Accident is not confirmed.
2.C $ 2. Any of_ the loss of Coolant Accident Safety function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfied, or j 3. The loss of Coolant Accident EPG has accomplished its purpose by satisfying A3 of the following: ]
- a. All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- b. Shutdewn Cooling System Entry Conditions are satisfied, or the break j has been isolated, or the RCS is in long term core cooling.
- c. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists or has been approved by the [ Plant' Technical Suphort Center or the Plant i Operations Review Comittee).
4 i e J 4 LOCA 5-3: - C D: ::: "c . i
i i l ABB- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sysso+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY :
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 4
GUIDELINES Page 4 , of 54 Revision M INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip Actions 1.
performed, i i
- 2. Confirm diagnosis of Loss of Coolant -2. Rediaonose event and exit i Accident by: to either appropriate j a. verifying Safety function Status Optimal Recovery Guideline 1 Check acceptanse criteria are or to the Functional satisfied, Recovery Guideline.
and b referring to the Break Identifi- ] cation Chart (Figure 5-2), and - c.[samplingbothsteamgenerators i for activitygwoq ,Jh-. s. rW sy,% , f * *~ ** s ~r.s.~.riur. nw {
- 3. If pressurizer pressure decreases to
- 3. If pressurizer pressure ts2s oc cochm+ pre asre.
4 or below [Wpsi a), lr: v:r i fy ;r. -- dgeases to or below AON2bitk M 9*'S f "" [ N psia) and an SIAS has j ven% ari S t As and Ct A5 65 NOT been initiated-l Ac. b & d . automatically, Then nianually initiate an S!AS. l 14' Cneht.sm+ yte.ssare M c %se.s "to .d
\e_qs+ Q."1psg 465 L g C.t As 65 od W I
w % A d b % % \\ l w h e h e. o C\As. 4
- Step Performed Continuously
~ LOCA S -CD M "r " 3-
ABO,- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sp so+- TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 5 of 54 Revision M l INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS l
- 4. Ensure maximum safety injection and 4. E safety injection
. charging flow to the RCS by'the and charging flow M following: maximized, Then do the a, start idle SIS pumps and verify following as necessary: ] j SIS flow in accordance with a. ensure electircal power Figure 5-3, to valves and pumps and b, ensure correct SIS b, start idle charging pumps 8 valve lineup, "C "5 5* e t c. ensure operation of i necessary auxiliary j systems, i
- 5. M pressuri g pressure decreases to 5. Continue RCP operation, less than [4GGG psia] following an '
SIAS, Then ensure all four RCPs are tripped.
- 6. [ Verify RCP cperating limits are 6. [ Trip the RCP(s) which do l satisfied]. not satisfy RCP operating limits].
i
- 7. Record ihe time of day. 7.
d i 4.
- Step Performed Continuously 4
l
. LOCA 5-5 -CEP 152 "r: 03
i 3-A8e,-COMEJSTION ENGINEERING 598o+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 6 of 54 Revision Y INSTRUCTIONS- CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4
- 8. Attempt to isolate the LOCA by 8.
performing the following:
- a. [ M g ssgrizer pressure is less a. L p 2492 psia, Then ensure the cJvi.s, i chac the areclosed), -_.m,4-
" ^
- b. verify letdown line is isolated, g.V. manually isolate let-
! down,
- c. verify sample lines are isolated, &r, manually isolate sample lines, d.[verifynoleakageintoCCWsystem - c4. [g RCS to CCW 1eak is by CCW radiation monitor NOT alarm- evident, Then attenpt to locate and isolate
- ing and no abnormal increase in CCW__
surgetanklevel], _ l e a k) ca.n cl Y"'f 'P'*k Rc.f ' 5 ! e. there are other pospHrT ' g, ig %(h source leaka 1. hat can be pqp,f dep ressue tdod i a., rapidly a e .. . > isolated, Vedve.s . [ ' T . w rt that infor.ation i e). c g, cAn%,di meda4c. ce.nc 4er y oo\ce 3 As v e k e.s .
.9. Verify LOCA NOT occurring _outside of 9. -H LOCK 6+ occurring outside
- containment by the following
- of containment, Then do the
- a. auxiliary building radiation alarms following: ,
NOT alarming, a. attempt to locate and
- b. no unexplained increase in auxiliary isolate leak, building sump levels, b. isolate.the auxiliary
- c. . % une s ph e.d mc.r eco e. M- building _per[ plant-
- i <;ab s p he.c e- sep \*V t h . specific instructions),
i ..3
.g tostepA j
e,Ne.5%)oseclca ort. c p se} dep re.s swe i s Se vdve5
-g. ge,.Q re.aekes c A A sas ,Jes* 'r a\* es arc c \os tN
- Step Performed Continuously-i LOCA S-6 -CN C % 03-3-
, ,- . - , - .. , -- ~ -,- , .,
a TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ABB bOMBUSTION ENGINEERING SYS &+ ACCIDENT RECOVERY ! EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Page 7 of 54 Revision .E i INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS' /
*10. H containment pre sufe greater 10. Ensure normal containment than or equal to - . . ,, Then equipment cooling / air ensure the following: recirculation systems operating.
j a. containment isolation is actuated a. M containment isole-automatically [fkni.-5Wi:- tion does not occur f automatically or all 4 csthed of en:ur" ...qate 4 cant # - ivo inscrted containment isolation M [r m & EsF pc mea. valves are not in their accident positions, a n.$ l b, all available containment ret. ire..dchon ko Then manually initiate i
- r 3 ..q ie. ;;;b:-r-operating containment isolaticn- .
$ dr th; c;rg:ng m:' , [ plant specific method i
- and of manual containment 3
e normal containma isolation insertion l j equipment cov a r recir- here). ! cul ' .. ystems are opera 1 v. 4
*11'. If containment pressure is less than 11,
[.3.0 psi + I:$$NN.g3,Thencontainment!: D . ' E may be , m. m -m ~,..., m. i gu r; tic:L _ 5hr.J e. ne.c.csse.,1, e i.
- Step Performed Continuously i
' LOCA' S-7'- --CO. 1:: N. C:
-- -+vy w,, n-w -- w rw+mnm -.+s,- + -- p n. pw
e ~_, l I ABS-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 345 Bo+ TITLE LOSS OF C00usi-ACCIDENT RECOVEP,Y
- EMERGENCY P.ROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 8- of 54 Revision .$
- INSTRUCT 10t
- 5 . CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 12. M containment pressure is greater 12. q, 4 g{ q4& _
l than or equal to C2fbest;d, Then do j a the following: O'6 P' *3 N
- a ensure containment spray actuation, b
- b. ensure adequate containment j temperature-pressure control by one of the following: all i) :: lar tve-a containment tect 5 and
.1.., em\.3 unting y .rc. +5 cain- re.
6 c .m . r u .; rA
/
i atleasttwocontainment)4 y coole , operating ' dhe j emergency mo .nd at least one con nment spre ader- ' vering at least';b5R gp. or-1 iii) two containment spray headers , j' delivering at' least M gpm],@ #b ' and I
- c. ' ts which utilire e . a -
hydrogen r " rs should take steps ave the rec , ners e available and aligned to se].
~
C. Tak oc: hoc 4. e\c4c.e. esb ad c. ,
&b eve, e.e, r %.c.o & ^ v s to S e r v i c. e.
, \f % CL \ C. C%ft' r' @ L -
i
- Step performedContinuously 6 . N E.r 83 cu % Q ve.nh\shi .5yS h e,m mityST'W o " M
v w h w. TysN M O ore-ro.h3 l LOCA 5-8 .C N ::: "a OL 1 e
..r -_ ,w , , .c.,. m.- . . . - - e - -- i
's 4
ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S15 80+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES Page 9 of 54 Revision M 4 , INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- *13. E containment spray system is operat- 13. Continue containment spray ing and containment pressure is less system operation, t'han M , Then containment spray j may be terminated. Upon termination the CSS must be aligned and reset for-automatic operation [or manual i restart)f And da- ^ ^^M s WMc bod Sj gte.- secw e.cl .
*14. Place the hydrogen monitors in service 14.
l *15. Verify containment hydrogen concentra- 15. Operate hydrogen
- tion is less than [0,5%). recombiners until contain.
ment hydrogen concentration is less than [0.5%). a l
*16. Monitor containment radiation-level 16. containment radiat p
'- and provide input to [ Plant Technical levels high g Support Center) for evaluating the- operate t odt Removal impact ofpotential environmental S y m]. ! releases. f *17. M the [ Plant Technical Support 17. ! Center) has reviewed and recommended I hydrogen purge system-operation, N k e. NIhkE0[sn rec.c b.a c qs+e%(@$) system in accordance with [ plant specificoperatinginstruction).
- Step Performed Continuously LOCA .5 JP M 2 '" - 02
] _ m . . - - _ _ , . J
- - - - - . - . - ~ - - - - -. _ .--.
ABB> COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sys So+ TITLE LOSS.Or COOLANT
^' * " "' *
. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 3 GUIDELINES Page 2 of 5' Revision _.,1 lNSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 18.When[ Plant-TechnicalSupportCenter] 18.
has reviewed and recommended term-
- ination of hydrogen purge, Then
- terminate' operation of the hydrogen
- purge system.
I ! 19, If the LOCA NOT isolated, Then 19. If the LOCA has been perform steps 20 through 42. isolated, Then perfonn - steps 43 through 61. 20.'If the LOCA has NOT been isolated, 20. 3 Then perform a rapid cooldown to
- a. SCS entry conditions at a rate within
] Technical Specification.L.,imits by (listed in preferred order):
- a. H the condenser is available.
[ Then cooldown using the turbine-bypass system, E I
- b. H the condenser or turbine bypass system E available, Then cooldown using the i atmospheric dump valves.
i *21.' Maintain steam generator' levels in 21. 2 the normal band th oighout the cool-down using (main,p<r o = gee.1w.-J feedwater.
- Step Performed Continuously LOCA 5-10 +;ii-15; 6 e i
- s J
.j h'
ABb-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sys &+' TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDl!'E
- GUIDELINES Page 12 of _S.i Revision )
INSTRUCTION _S , CONllNGENCYACTIONS
*22. Ensure the available condensate 22. ,
l inventory is adequate per Figures
> 5-4 and.5-5.
j '23. When pressurizer leve1 1s greater 23. Continue to operate all j than or equal to k ]7 , Then ensure :available charging and
- charging and letdown, and the 515 515 pumps for maximum l (unless SIS termination criteria available flow. ,
i met) are being operated to main-tain pressurizer level [her44t"). l 4 I c to '7 0'l.
- 24. Deoressurize the RCS to < W ctg 24
- by using the following
- Hoo PMS-l a. pressurizer spray.
E
- b. control of charging and letdown.
1-
- c. operating / throttling l
pumps e
- d. ug,o recac.Mo r C o o\4d <
i Scc v w+ 515 " 1 I i A j
- Step Performed Continuously 1
i i S-11 -CCL H2 N n' LOCA k
- . . . . . _ . 1, . ,
4L ', ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 445 Bot TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY L EMERGENCY PROCED.URE GUIDELINES Page 2 of 54 Revision ] 4 ) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS f *25. Maintain RCS pressure within the Post *25.1,f RCS subcooling Accident P-T limits of Figure 5-1. greater than P-T limits or cooldown rate greater than' [100'F/Hr.),Thendothe I following as-appropriate:
-a, stop the cooldown
! b, depressurize the' plant using(mainorauxiliksge
. .- ruado, c,w ary) spray to restore V and maintain pressur-1 izer pressure within-I the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure 5-1.
f *
- c. attempt to' maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature
- 4) - configuration or con-
! tinue to cooldown i 4 within the limits of f Figure 5-1. A d.Ifoverpgurization .
-duetoy2:834 charging j flow, Then throttle or j secure flow (refer to j step 31 and manually ;
control letdown to restore and maintain pressurizer ^ pressur_e within the limitszof Figure 5-1. ! -* Step Performed Continuously LOCA 5-12 % -152 Eev. 03 -
4 f ABB - COMBUSTION ENGINEERINGYS SBot TITLE LOSS or COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
{ GUIDELINES Page 23 of M Revision W 9 i INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i *26. If RCPs are NOT operating, Then 26 a. If RCP operation E I evaluate the need and desirability desired Then go to f of restarting RCPs, Considct the step 29. following: E
'I
- a. adequacy of RCS and core heat b. If at least one RCP removal using natural is operating in each
{ j circulation, loop, then go to step
- b. existing RCS pressure'and 31, temperatures, j c. the need for main pressurizer spray capability, d,thedurationof[CCW) inter-ruption to RCPs,
- e. RCP seal staging pres,sures
. and temperatures. 1 8 4 1 1 4 4 i
- Step Per' formed Contiavously LOCA -S-13 -COm:0N M
i
- i. ,
+ ABB- c0MBUSTION ENGINEERING 5156t TITl.E g Cg EMERGENCY PROCED.URE -- GUIDELINES Page 24 of 54 Revision I 4 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i
*27. Determine whether RCP restart 27. Go to step 29.
criteria are met by M of the
- following
3
- a. electrical power is available I tothe[RCPbus),
j' - b. RCP auxiliaries ([CCW)) to main-tain [ seal injection), bearing, j and motor cooling are operating, l and there are no high temperature , alarms on the selected RCPs, 3
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from.
the RCS (ability for feed and I steam flow),
- d. prggurizer level i_s greater than j [ M and not decreasing, '
- e. RCS subcooling at least [20'F]
! basedon[averageCET] temper-ature (Figure 5-1), { f.[othercriteriasatisfiedperRCP operatinginstructions). 4 4
- Step Performed Ccntinuously
. I LOCA 5-14 -C:n:E?o~ 03 4
ABB, - COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S15 sop TITLE Loss of COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 15 of 54 Revision X INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 28. Go to step 29.
*28. H RCP restart desired and restart criteria satisfied, Then do the following:
- a. start all available charging pumps. M pressure less than
[1/00 psia), Then M1 pumps may be operated,
- b. start one RCP in each loop,
- c. [ ensure proper RCP amperage and NPSH], g d.operatecharging(andD%Qpumps until pressurizer level greater than [ ' Q.mWf1L,s u u ;e tien eMteria % Refer to step 31).
*29. H no RCP3 are operating, Then verify 29. Ensure proper control of natural circulation flow in at least steam generator steaming one loop by AM of the following: and feeding (refer to steps
- a. loop AT(T g - T C) less than normal 20 and 21) and RCS inven-full power cT, tory and pressure control *
- b. bot and cold leg temperatures (refer to steps 23 and 24).
constant or decreasing,
- c. RCS subcooling at least [20*F] based on [ average CET] temeprature,
- d. no abnormal difference [ greater than10*F]betweenT gRTDs and
[ average CET] temperature.
- Step Performed Continuously LOCA 5-15 -C E h - M : ~.. 03 ;
i l l
TITLE L0ss OF c0OLANT-ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERINC 5156-t-. ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY. PROCED.URE GUIDELINES Page 26 of 54 Revisien .3 : ' INSTRUCTIONS- ' CONTINGENCY AC/10N$
'30. H no RCPs are opera' ting and 30.
singie-phase natural circulation i can g be tri;.intained, Then break flow and two-phase natural circula-t'on can maintain the heat removal process, The operator should ensure the following:
- a all available Mag
- pumps-
-- . a- 515 flow per Figure 5-3, and
- b. steam generator steaming.and a feeding are properly controlled (refer to steps 20 and 21), '
and c.[averageCET) temperature.is less 4han superheated. 3-j
- Step Performed Continuousl/
3 i LOCA 5-16 -CO,- E: *: 0?- 4
-% er
4 l AP;B-c0MBUSTION ENGINEERING SYS8o+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. RECOVERY l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ! L GUIDEuNES Page 17 of 54 Revision > ,? I i INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS pumps are operating, Then they 31. Continue _ pump:
'31. M o may be throttled or stopped, one pump. operation, at a time, if ALL of the-following are satisfied:
a.RCSsubcoolingatleast(20*F)_ basedon(averageCET) temperature { 4 (Figure 5-1), j b.pregrizerlevelisgreaterthan.
-[ii@")a1dnotdecreasing,
- c. at least one steam generator is l
available for removing heat from l
-the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow),
d.[theRVLMSindicatesaminimumicvel atthetopofthehotlegno221es). I '32. D urizer pressure is greate + n 32. Cent LPSI pump [200 psia)an . r ,- , hen any operation v recircu-y* 3 51 pumps may e 6 ,. d. on has occurred. i
*M. M the criteria of step 31 M cannot Kr e
- be maintained after SIS pumps throttled or-stopped, Then appropriate SIS pumps must be restarted and full SIS flow N
$ restored. + 4 4
- Step Performed Continuously _
d 1-LOCA S-17 C ," 1;: "r S 1, - n i
. ~ _ _ . . - _ _
s i MI6-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 515 8m TITLE Loss OF CootANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page 18 of 54 Revision g INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS runn,nc3 and. are =
3f,[1_fthechargingpumpsare4aking t 3f, e suction from a concentrated boron % ] f source.1 Thy realign suction to a o 15 : t . other suitable sourceh/6T within one hour after the start of e% %Irc 4 we,c.d. E r
- thelossofCoolantAccident]. Cohaa.d o f ernho n Tn- c.ns~~+ FJ d4 W<Au W ms %v. Ccbas-U
*3 . Monitor [-rch;lin; wets t;nk (N'T)-] 3 , Maintain CAWr] level level and verify #E f+ N Y h sump greater th M 0%] by levhNcr'e#Ns'as a el replenishment from avail-
- S' decreases. able sources.
*3 , l_f break is inside containment & 3 breakisinsidecontai[
-[RWT] -1 Q ], Then.-vefffy men'(and recirculatio does i LPSI pumps antbee ircula- E oc rwhen(R level ,.
i nitiated, <[10%), en s p LPSI 4 g g g ggfT pumps, manu initiate recircul on otely or L eNe.\ j S p ill cVe e OC C urs locall with one , S_ train Mow n4 ho\dvP Vo\e at time,[andclose WT E nk -b de_ TR.WST. tiet valves to the SIS , , a R p \e.4. u k % <-. ~I RWs~r M m ava,s\u\. (<_ S owr c.e.S . 1 i
- Ste;, Perfonned Continuously I
LOCA 5-18 C % 1:2 Rev. G3 4
-i l
)
AE8- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sys so+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT l ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE .
. GUIDELINES Page 2S of 54 Revision T
{ INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*K. owg[30 mp k, a . HPSI flow <[30 gpy)
.du.rlarretTiTu'la t1o i. per ump during /
recirctR tion, hen 4 turn off o/ charging pump at tim ntil l HPSI lowg[30gp,, per 1 p "P .
. a,,nf
- b. h minimum HPSI flow /
b ot met with'sil l charging pumps off, Then turn b(f one HPSI pump at,a' tim'e ntil ! HPSI , #10w 3[30 g yrpump. N 34 31,
)6". Bypass or lower the automatic S6.
- initiation setpoint of [MSIS) as the cooldown and depressurization i
3h, proceed. Wa
*3/ When u r epressure u e,reaches
%presswe.s.c pressurizer
~ . 4peu.are
_ 3 renek[625 pom] rdige Y [4ooWu psia], Then isolate, vent or
- drain the safety injection _ tanks
, (SITS).
- _
- Step Perf6rmed Continuously LOCA 5-19 - C D: 152 kv 'E--
ABS- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 9{58ct TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 20 of 54 Revision J INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*k.[Initiatelowtemperatureover- N.
pressurization protection at T e 2y.St[]. h t g *) 4/.At[2-4 hours)afterstartofLOCA, 4f. $ both SG wide range M at least one steam generator is levels are <15%, The:i available for RCS heat removal, implement the FRG and Then do the following: initiate crx - U n;gh-a. direckstpblishsimultaneoushotand s e.9e.1 A c h [RCS and Lore Heat N injection (unless SCS RemovalSuccessPathHR-4)} operation can be established or before the [4 hour] time limit), [H RCS T temperature in-a_n n d creases S*F, or greater
- b. maintain steem generator. heat Then implement the FRG and removal and continue RCS cool- inftiate c:a; P ; 25.i-down (refer to steps 20 and 21). cee4seg (RCS and Core Heat
- Removal Success Path HR-Al).
- Stop Performed Continuously LOCA S-20 C:t 'J: %, CO i 1
v TITLE toss or COOLANT AEA-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING SW so+ ^""'"* EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page _?.L of _E Revision N INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*df.WhenthefollowingSCSentry 4f.IfSCSentryconditions can NOT be established, conditionsareestablisgad:
a, pressurizer level >[3 8.,) and then do the following as constant or increasing, appropriate:
- b. RCS subcooling I [20*F], a. maintain natural
- c. RCS pressure f [L%f*izt], %0 Psia circulation (refer to
- d. RCSg T I C%Kup,, 36 cT steps 29 and 30),
- e. RCS activity levei within [ plant b. maintain simultaneous specificlimits], hot and cold leg
- f. [other plant-specific criteria injection (refer to inserthern], step 4 D),
a Then exit this guideilne and initiate c. ineintain recirculation SCSoperationper[ operating (refertosteph), instruction]. Include en special d. H the RCS fails to precautions or procedure modifications depressurize and from the [ Plant Technical Support voiding is suspected, Center or Plant Operations Review Then moaitor for voids Committee]. by the following indi-cations, parameter changes, or trends: i) letdown flow greater than charging flow, ii) pressurizer level increasing signi-ficantly more than expected while operating pressurizer spray iii) [the RVLMS indi-
- Step Performed Continuously (Continued On Next Page)
LOCA S-21 =::t '.:: ";, :
AE8-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 515 ao+ TITLE L0ss OF C00LANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY ' EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 22 or s4 geyision , y ,,. INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*4 f.(Cont'd) 4f.
cates that void-ing is preserit in the reactor vessel), iv)(HJTCunheated thermocouple temperature indi-cates saturated conditions in the reactor vessel-
- upper head),
v) -[other indica-tions insert s aere),
- e. H voicing inhibits RCS depressurization to SC5 entry. pressure, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
i) verify letdown is isolated.
-ii) stop.the depres-surization lii) pressurize and depressurize the RCS within the limits of Figure
- Step;PerformedContinuously (Continued On Next Page) l l
1 i LOCA 5-22 ::h-Z: T. c . 03-y y , ,w, n -.i,v. ,2
i
, s . Aea-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sy5 eo + TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT-
- ACCIDENT RECOVERY i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Page 23 - of 5' Revision d i
l- INSTRUCTIONS' CONTINGENCY ACTIONS s g l 47 -*4/.(Cont'd) 5-1 by operating pressurizer heat-ers and spray or HPSI and charging pumps. Monitor l pressurizer level [andtheRVLMS) l for trending of RCS inventory. f, g depressurization of ,
, the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still
- not possible, and void-ing is suspected to exist in the steam gen-
.erator tubes, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
i) cool the suspect-ed steam genera-tor (by. steaming and/or blowdown, and feeding) to condense the steam generator
- tube void,.
-and
' Step Perfomed Continuously (Continued On LNext Page)
LOCA' 5-23 . C C' M2 ^: OL
AMCOMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5pso, TITLC L0ss OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 24 of 54 Revision) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
\
4/, '4/.(Cont'd) ii) monitor pressur-izer level for
-* tending RCS inventory.
g,J_fdepressurizationcf f the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible, then , attempt to eliminate the-voiding by:
- 1) operate the
[pressurizervent orthe) reactor vessel head vent
-to clear trapped non-condensible.
gases, and ii) monitor pressuri-zer level [and/or . the RVLMS) for trending of RCS inventory.
- Step Performed Continuously 4
LOCA 24 - - ::,. J: T c. C;
a ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5pso t- TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT REC 0vrj_y EMERGENCY PROCEDURE < GUIDELINES Page 26 of $4 Revision 1 INSTRUCTIONS 'ONTINGENCY
. ACTIONS v s 47.IfLOCAisisolated,Thenper. 47 fonn steps 44 though 61.
3 ST. . . J S r_
- f 4/. 1_fj$4f pumps are operating, Then they 4/. Continue M , pump raay be throttled or stopped, one pump operation, at a time, if Ag of the folicwing are.
satisfied: . a.RCSsubcoolingatleast(20'F) basedon(averageCf.7) temperature (Figure 5 1),
- b. nressurizer level is greater than N (JM 9 and not decreasing,
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from '
theRCS(abilityfor}eedand steamficw),
- d. [the AYLMS indicates a minimum -
level at the top of the het leg nozzles). 4 5. _ ssurizer pressure is Te'r - 45. hnn,-44!g than [200 psn M n ntrolled, . nee n ion. Then eting LPS pu Q
.N" '
' Step Performed Continuously
^
LOCA 5-25 -Ct d i n Fu . 00 - b iiiiig-
AF:& COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S45 So+ TITLE L0ss 0F COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVEP,Y EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page.2L of 54 Revision J INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
'4). M criteria of step 4 (41116 cannot be 4 f.
maintained af ter $!$ pumps throttled or stopped, Then appropriate $15 pumps mustberestyedandfull515 flow restored.
$ ove. A 9 c t> *tf. Control charging'and letdown, and t%p 4 g RCS subcooling of at (unless $15 termination criteria met) least [20'F) can N,0_T T
be g to restore and maintain pressuriter maintained, Then [.'#.:*) rnay level [-4-4W4P). be exceeded to restore RCS U U$c '78 subcooling.
- 4. Depressurize the RCS '.o < [300 psia) ' Af.
by using the following:
- a. pressurizer spray, E
- b. control of charging and letdown E S _T'
- c. operating / throttling ,bM4- pumps ,
or
- eq vokss$ ( wCker toot %st go w+ sW%
*5tep Per' formed Continuously at LOCA 5 26 ::" F 2 ' %
1 1 i l 1 - - - i ~ TITLE L0$$ OF COOLANT i ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5tsEb+ ' ACCIDENT RECOVERY i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Page " of 5' Revision - ) 4 INSTRUCTIONS CONTING1N1YACTIONS l 7 ? 2 *4/. Maintain pressurizer pressure within of. RCS subecoling greater then - . the Post Accident P-T limits of P.T limits or cooldown rete I ! Figure L 1 by greaterthan(200'F/Hr), i i Then do the following as appropriate:
- a. stop the cooldown f
i b, depressurire the plant ' a j using[mainorauxili-l g arylspraytorestore foM gubf and maintain pressu- j W as I o5e
'o\s # Q rizerthepressure within J- y $9 Post Accident P T
- sen 2 limits of Figure 5-1. l
~'
- c. attempt to maintain'the l-plant in a stable pres-j sure-temperature con- ,
!' " figuratinn or continue to cooldown within the limits of Figure 5-1. l j d. if overpr suriration e
charging due to .
+
j{ flow, Then throttle or i . secure flow (refer to I stepd)andmanually I
- i. control letdewn to
' restore and maintain pressurizer pressure , 4, within the limits of Figure 5-1. i . .
- Step Performed Continuously 1
i LOCA 15-27 .-c[ii. ;;; T. e O' 4 e w, w e,w -m -m m g-- * * ' v 4 '*" = #*
AevcOMBUSTION ENGINEERING SYS &i r TITLE LO$$ OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES Page 28 of 5_.i Revision )
- r 1NSTRUCT10NS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I NY %
*$0. Maintain steam generator levels !th in the nomal band, using (mair.
, ff*r4 orauili;g-)feedwater.
- emigenci wi 41 -
+M. rnsure the available condensate M.
inventory is adequate per Figures e 5-4 and 5-5.
'5/.BoratetheRCStomaintainshutdown $f.
margin in-accordance with Technical
$pecifications, in.g Prevent boren dilution by pressurizer outsurgebythefollowing(listedin '
preferredorder): a, borate the entire RCS (including the mass in the pressurizer) to cold shutdown conditions. . E vf oadd\< b.use[mainorauxiliary)'Aprayte g increase and maintain pressurizer boronconcentrationwithin(50 ' ppm)ofRCSboronconcentration.. l l l l
- Step Performed Continuously l
l. LOCA 5 28 4t" nrRo. 0.b
, _ . . _ . _ .._.;.._-_.z__ . - . _.
.._,_.a-#.._ .___.-.m.-._o..=.. .-,,_-m. ..u-__
4 i, 1 4 1 ABEL-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5p so.,. TITLE Lo$$ OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVfRY i a EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES page 29 of 54 Revision K lh5TRUCT10NS CONTINGINCY ACTIONS 1 s 1 1 5/. Perform a controlled cooldown in 57 l accordance with Technical Specifi. cations by (listed in preferred , ) crder): i a. turbine bypass system t
- i. .o. r .
l b. atmospheric dump valves. ] t- - t. . . j *$/.IfRCPsareNOToperating,_Then 5/. a. E RCP operation NOT
- -evaluate the need and desirability desired, Then go to of restarting RCPs. Consider the step $7. ,
following: or - ) j a adequacy of RCS and core heat b. M at least one RCP j removal using natural
- is operating in each j circulation, loop, Then 90 to step f b. existing RCS pressure and 58.
tempera, teres, l
- c. the need for main pressurizer
- spray capability, l
d.thedurationof.[CCW) inter. l ruption to RCPs, , l' e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures. i- -
- Step Perforred Continuously-l _ -
LOCA 5 29' -CD :52 5 ^: - i l c i
l ABS-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 51s so+ TITLE Loss or COOLAN
##' ' '"' " "T "'
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 30 of 58 Revision) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
'ff. Detem ne whether RCP restart criteria $!.Gotostep -I are met by y of the following; l
- a. electrical power is av611able to j the(RCPbus), . l b.RCPauxitiaries([CCW))tomaintain
[sealinjection), bearing,andmotor cooling are operating, and there are no high temperature alarms on the selected RCPs,
- c. at least one steam generator is i available for removing heat from ,
the RCS (ability for feed and - steam flow).
- d. pr,e,s,surizer
, level is greater than (I+&") and not decreasing, e.RCSsubcoolingatleast[20*F) ',
! based)n[averageCET) temperature (Figure 5-1), f.[othercriteriasatisfiedperRCP operatinginstructions). l l-i y l
- Step Perfomed Continuously LOCA 5 30 - C:P ? oae n1 -
l -t t 4
= - -,w. ,, . - , - em.--,4%+,#- , .- ,,.y- .,,e.< .,, , _,,.m.., , ,,,,4 .. , , , . , . .
,,ym , ,.,,,,s,.., , _ . - . ,
i i i t i ABSCOMBUSTION ENGINEERING sysso+ TITLE L0ss Or COOLANT i ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 32 of 54 Revision J l t t INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- S[.j,fRCPrestartdesiredandrestart SkGotostep'[
! criteria satisfied, Then do the following: ! l a.Startallavailablechargingpumps. i If pre vre less than (1/00 psia), Then )- pumps may be operated. l 1 b. start one RCP in each loop, l c.[ensureproperRCPoperationby } monitoring RCP emperage dNPSH),- j d. operate charging (and jiNf) pumps .l I until prest,urizer level greater i than[lkf(andHPSItermination criteria met. Refertostep4f). l ' e 3
- Sf<.ynoRCPsareoperating.Thenverify ST Ensure proper control of
! natural circulation flow in at least RCS inventory and pressu j- one 1.oop by M of the following: control (refer to steps [re 2 a. loop iT(T H - T ) less than normal and 4b and steem generator C full power AT, feeding and steaming (refer
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures tostepshand5f).
constant or decreasing, } c,RCSsubcoolingatleast(20'f) i basedon[averageCET) temperature, j d.noabnormaldifference(greater l than10'F)betweenT RTDs g and 4 [averageCETtemperature). i-
' Step Performed Continuously
^ ' 2 LOCA - 5 31 _C W G ned 4 e E g +--+w- ~ y, --wae--m v n~-- - -.w--n-,w--w, ,r--en--,--+m. , - - - -- r-- rc e e-s- s-we. m r, <
ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 51580+ TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 32 of 54 noyigion p CONTINCENCY ACTIONS j JNSTRUCTIONS Sf. Bypass _orlowerthaautomatic Sp'. initiationsetpointsof[MSIS.CIAS, 9mS.andSIAS)asthecooldownand depressurization proceed. 9 7 i 'S7. If pressurizer pressure reaches fg. I hIpsia),Thenisolate,ventor drain the safety injection tanks (Slis).
- [ Initiate low temperature over. 'e pressurizationprotection(LTOP)at T
c <3'F). w
- k.WhenthefollowingSCSentry *h.JftheRCSfailsto conditions are established: g depressurize, Then a void a pressufi zer level > [MC) and should be suspected.
constant or increasing, a. voiding in the RCS may b.RCSsubcooling1(20*F). be indicated by any of
- c. RCS pressure < ( U psia], the_following indica-
- d. RCS TH<[ F), tions, parameter e,RCSactivitylevelwithin[ plant changes, or trends: ;
specificlimits), f.[otherplant-specificcriteria inserthere) 1 hen exit this guideline and initiate (Continued On Next Page) SCSnperationper[operatin0 instruction). Include any special precautions or
-(Continued On Next Page) '
' Step Performed Continuously LOCA S-32 - C L" ' R 6 , C 3
i N : I ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING qs 43o, TITLE g'gCg EMERGENCY PROCEDURE g GUIDELINES Page 38 of 54 Revision A 1 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS d 44,(Cont'd) 4. procedure modifications from the ft Md (Plant Technical Suppert Center or PlantOperationsReviewCommittee). 1)letdownflow , greater than J charging flow, ii)pressuriterlevel increasing signi-ficantly more than expected
, while operating pressurizer spray, iii)[theRVLMSindi-cates that void-l-
ing is present in the reactor-vessel), iv)-[HJTCunheated thermocouple , temperature indi-cates-saturated conditions in the reactor vessel-upperhead), ' v)[otherindica-tions insert i here).- ,
' Step Performed Continuously (Continued On Next Page) t LOCA 5-33 -- C P :: ;,cv, c:-
- - _ , , , , . . . . - - . -.-_ ~ . , _ - , - - . . . . . . , . . . . . . . - . . . _ . < - _ . . ~ . . . _ , , _ - ._.,,,,1, . . . , . , - - - . - , . . , , . - . , . . .
ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING syg g+ TITLE LOSS Or Co0LANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 38 of 54 Revision.2 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS (Cont'd)
- b. If_ voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure. 1 hen
, attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- 1) verify letdown is isolated, a!Ld ii)stopthedepres-surization.,
a_np i iii) pressurize and
' depressurire the RCS within the ,
limits of Figure 5-1 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray or 13551 and charging pumps, i Monitor pres-4
- Step Perfornied Continuously (Continued On Next Page) l .
l LOCA '5-34 C" M ? D~ *?-
1 ( l l i ABB'-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING sys e, TITLE LOSS or Co0LANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES Page 21.of !8 Revision._.bi 1 ) 1 j I INSTRUCTIONS CONTING(NCY ACTIONS f * (Cont'd) "] l { surizer level [andtheRVLMS) for trending of , i RCS inventory.
- c. If depressuritation of
) thelRCStotheSCS j entry pressure is still
- not possible, and voiding'is suspected to-
- l. ,
exist in the steam gen. erator tubes, Then 4 attempt to elininate the voiding by: i) cool the suspect-- , j - ed steam genera. [ ter (by steaming and/or blowdown. ' and feeding) to condense'the . steam generator
' tube void, y_ i
- 11) monitor pressur-12er level for trending RCS inventory.
" Step Performed Continuously (Continued On Next Page)
.1 LOCA 5-35 OL
-C:t 'MN=
7 . .- - - - -. 1 1 1
~,
Am-c0MBUSTION ENGINEERING SYS6bt TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ] GUIDELINES Page 36 of 54 Revision _.X. INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS (? s'7
- pf. *)r. (Cont'd)
; d,jfdepressurizationof } the RCS to the SCS i*
entry pressure is still i not possible, Then j attempt to eliminate j the voiding by: I i) operate the [ pressurizer +>ent ) i orthe) reactor i vessel head vent 3 to clear trapped 4 6 non-condensible j- gases, 1"$ ii) monitor pressuri-zerIcvel[and/or
-the RVLMS) for trending of RCS inventory. ,
1 4 i N
- Step Performed Continuously I
i i s LOCA S-36 C D' ' E ? e e., n2
1 i l AB8-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S3s g+ TITLE toss or COOLANT
^" ' ' " ' " ' ' "
[ EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 9 of 5d Revision ._.h l i s ,'t j The LOCA Guideline has accomplished its purpose if the plant is in a condition ! where all of the Safety function Status Check acceptance criteria are being ) satisfied, and the RCS is either in long term core cooling (i.e., recirculation through the $15), the break has been isolated, or SCS entry conditions are satisfied. Further recovery actions must be identified by thc [PlantTechnicalSupportCenter). END , j 1 N f l i-i 1 4 i j i P T LOCA $.37 -C;' F ? ": 03-O e m + -. ,.-- ..~ . ,. .y ,.h,. . . - , . . ., , -.,-,,.--sy y c.-3
~
AG6 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S35 g+ TITLE Loss or COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page 38 of 5' Revision ._)
$UPPLE M IARY INFORMATION This section contains items which should be considered when implementing EFGs and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented 65 preceu-tions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training progrem.
- 1. During all phases of the cooldown, monitor RC$ temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a maxinum cooldown rate greater than Technical Speci-fication Lirnitations.
- 2. Do not place systems in "rnanual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 3. All available indications should be used to aid in the evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a partic-uler instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or rno're confirmatory indications are available (References 15.24),
4 If there is a high radioactivity level in the reactor coolant system, then circulation of this fluid through the SCS or th av result in , high area radioactivity readingssubs in the
- ; ,7
[-au:pkcre.e The C,VCSbi'di g .co* activity level of the RCS should be determined prior to initiating SCS or letdown flow (Reference 15.12).
- 5. ror small breaks in the RCS where the steam generators are important for heat removal, one steam generator must be used for this purpnse even if primary to secondary leaks are detected. Use the unaffected steam generator, or the least affected steam generator, if both have primary to secondary leaks (Reference 15.9).
LOCA 5-38 C O: M2 ^: i
i i i 5* i ABB. COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Sys ec+ TITLE gr Cgt i l i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE .
- GUIDELINES Page 39 of 58 Revision.2 !
t~ 1 ! [f o p e wh. = c f **k c on .. . 4 e e s. d m(
< W w 6 ea m s n e - d
%6 fe4 ve. W 6 4 1 raw bg e premHure', h1,c Juu4*4Wdk Or - 3. y.r. u.g
- 6. tor-4oJtd be ceut!cned age.n.f.e.ru t 4+th9 4Mt-e:enve44c44e-+hev44-not h t4:r unlesHA-49te e tic "AS--i!---re-59 *' '
l -quir+d a nd ! a edequate c Mteia~ert 59"'" isvet eritt! (4adic!t4" e' !O" j V de cratei" ea+ L . l
- i j 7. If the initial cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, then j
- there may be a potential for pressurized therinal shock (PTS) of the
! reactor vessel. Post Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits should be I maintained within the limits of figure 5-1 (Reference 15.8). .l l l 8. Minimize the number of . auxiliary spray cycles whenever the temperature , j differential between the spray water and the pressurizer is greater thah , [200*F]inordertominimizetheincreaseinthespraynozzlethermal l I stress accumulation factor. Everysuchcyclemustberecordedinaccord-l ance with Technical Specification Limitations (References 15.10&15.25). ' l l 9. High cordainment temperature conditions may adversely impact the accuracy i ofinstrumentswhosetransmittersarelocatedinsidecontainment.(e.g., pressurizer level and pressure, steam generator pressure and level. RCS loop RTDs) and may irnpact the continued availability nf equipment located , l in containment. .
- 10. Verification of an RCS temperature response to a plant change during natural circulation cannot be accomplished until approximately [5 to 15) minutes following the action due to increased loop c,scle times j (References 15.11 & 15.12).
- 11. Solid water operation of the pressurizer should be avoided unless [20'f]
of subcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS-(figure 5-1). If the RCS - j is solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining, and any system heatup-or cooldown, to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions. l 4 l. LOCA 5-39 -C ui-i 2 "; 9
'l ABS, - COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5% ax TITLE gF C f gp EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES page 40 of 54 Revision ._$
I k
- 12. Hot leg and cold leg RTD temperature indication may be influenced by j
] charging pump or SIS injection water temperatures. Use multiple RTD I indications (and/orCETindications)fortemperaturewheninjectionis j occurring (Reference 15.11). I , 13. During the process of establishing entry conditions (RCS pressure and temperature) for SCS operation, it may be necessary to eliminate or l reduce the site of the steam void in the reactor head. Ensure sufficient I condennte availability to continue steam generator heat removal until I the RCS pressure and temperature are reduced sufficien'tly, and SCS i operation is accomplished (Reference 15.11). j 14 When a void exists in the reactor vessel, and RCPs are not operating, the l RVLMS provides an accurate indication of Feactor *;essel liquid . inventory. 1 % 1 When a void exists in the reactor vessel, and RCPs are operating, it is not possible to obtain an accurato reactor vessel liquid level indication I due to the effect of the RCP induced pressure-head on the RVLMS. The.
~
4 44c a sd.a v e4 2 W . " ^=T 7 ' - -Tomea6e,e swj++ torrs . Infonnation concerning reactor vessel liquid inventory trending may still be discerned. However, the operator is cautioned not to rely solely on the RYLMS indication when RCPs are operating (Reference 15.15)f cud du uwe-. Oh M%s 8 kevel 'M(Me n 1
't f cr % d a W e .
- 15. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS voiding
- and take steps to eliminate voiding any time voiding causes'the heat ,
j removal, or inventory control, safety functions to begin to be threatened. Void elimination should be started soon enough to ensure N heat removal and inventory control are not lost (Reference 15.14).
- 16. For those plangs which use the Containment Sgy Sgtem (C$$) ,M %d C. reb 5PMJo?-$*. M T W p$ p p ;ffm p g $ g v g CSS l may be desirable in the event of an iodine-buildup in containment.
Since iodine may be released to the containment atmosphere at various i LOCA 5-40 -fu- G b.P a
- - , . , . . - . ,e- ., ,,,uw , . , . - . , - . , .
AB&- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING '535 so+ TITLE Loss or CootAni EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
^"*"'"'*
GUIDELINES __ Page 11. of 58 Revision 'M l l times following event initiation, (e.g., released directly frsm the core I to a large LOCA, reevolved from iodine plated out on containment
)
surfaces; or released during reactor vessel venting to the containment) and since the CSS is activated automatically on containment pressure, its actuation may not correspond to the time of peak c .inment iodine levels (ifitisactuatedatall). The CSS may be run to reduce ! containment airborne iodine to acceptable or minimum levels unless the following indicate otherwise: A t'IbJhT, MT or rweb coJoy sap 4 *DE #FN/ (1. If there were a leak in%%4teeet tika ; ump ..:t:E h e , it mightstney m.%y ' be more desirable to leave the iodine atmospherically suspended.
- 2. If sump water is highly radioactive, it may not be desirable to circulateitoutsidethecontainment.)
I
--{hr -these-4M4-efr4*9-Q&444ne r -&t :y be n:c::::ry toMher 4ac4+4&e--
--+vmp-water-pA(hoyond-that-achieved by tritodh;r phnphete-4*-tWg).
-to increase long.ts m (f hours.. post.LOCA) 4odine ratantier in the-sump,
.An4tur.nau method-of-addiag e pu buf fer (typicelly todium hydrnride) it 4y-estat44 thin 9-a - f! owpa th "4th the "harnina cu m 1, For those plants which use charcoal filters in the containment fan coolers for iodine removal, operation of the filtered fan units may be desirable in the j event of an iodine buildup in containment.
VAw&S
- 17. Small breaks located at the top of the pressurizer (e.g., stuck open404 or safety relief valve) will result in flashing and steam production in the reactor vessel and hot legs. This steam will flow towards the break through the pressurizer surge line and oppose the draining of the pressurizer liquid. Thus, the liquid level.in the pressurizer may increase or exhibit erratic behavior due to.the competing steam-water
! counter current flow condition._ A similar behavior may be observed if l the break is in the surge line. i LoCA 5-41 -C C U M k; 03 - l
, , , . - ~ . - - . , , - , . . , - . . . - ,-
)
Asa-coususTioN ENGINEERING S3s so, TITLE Loss or C00Lui
^ " " ' "'
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES p.g. 42 og sa g ,y;, ion y i j
l l l
- 18. Operation of any equipment in the containment building when containment '
~
hydrogen'concentrt. tion 1(4%)shouldconsiderthepossibilityofhydrogen ignition (Reference 1$ 16). Consideration should be given to the following:
- a. The importance to safety of equipment operation,
- b. The urgency of equipment operation, )
- c. The use of alternative equipment located outside containment,
- d. The current hydrogen level and the anticipated time to reduce H2*(4%]'
- 19. [Any cautions provided by the hydrogen recombiner vendor concerning operation of the recombiner with a degraded containment environment shouldbeinsertedhere). '
- 20. Measured containment hydrogen typically represents a value of hydrogen in "
units of percent by volume of dry air. The measured hydrogen will typically,. indicate higher than the. actual containment' hydrogen for a steam / air mixture inside containment. The indicated value-should, therefore, be corrected to account for any steam / air mixture inside containment (Reference 15.16). -
- 21. Combustion Engineering plants are designed with redundant electrical- ~
equipment. Therefore, the loss of one vital AC or DC bus will not prevent the opdrators from performing the actions of this guideline.- However, it is desirable to have a complete.. complement of electrical equipment to mitigate and to' recover-from an event. Therefore, the-operators should attempt to restore electrical power to any lost l vital AC or vital DC bus (es), tnya.it= n L 22, Ouring e ' H
, at least eacXS! pump-should.be operating;at all time $ unless )('51 termination criteria are met.
LOCA- 5-42 -Gy. i SE '; '-er-,,--e v y- .- - - + - , w -muu s -r+ ey n ,+-e- --A y> r,e w w.--,,w-+ -rw.-e- -- ,e *rwr- m.m.,e,r-,ue-et--r- ~,+++-,-,%, -- , - .
TITLE Loss or Coot.wT ABS COMBUSTION ENGINEERING S15 904- ACCID (NT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page '3 of 54 Revisl0n $ y ~~- FIGURE S-1 _ TYPICAL POST ACC ENT PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS (2)
~
2500 ' 3 3
/ 8 2400 - LOWEST f 2300 -
SERVICE 1000F/ HOUR / TEMP % 'COOLDOWN
/
2M - NOT E 1 / D
/
0 4 [200 F) ! N Y iis00 -
/ -
B . / e / e / 0 /
@$g _
/
RCP NPSH y B /
'(20 0F)
! SHUTDOWN (001 gno ,
/ / COOLING _
s 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 RCS T EMPER ATUR E. F NOTES:(1) THIS CURVE SUPERSEDES THE 100 F/ HOUR COOLDOWN CURVE ANYTIME THE RCS HAS EXPERIENCED AN UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN WHICH CAUSES RCS TEMPER ATURE TO GO BELOW 5000F (2) THESE CURVES MUST BE ADJUSTED FOR INSTRUMENT INACCURACIES
- r---
LoCA 5-43
TITLE toss or CootA,n ffe COMBUSTION ENGINEERING i 9s eo+ ACCIDENT RECOVEP~v EMERGENCY PROCEDURE . GUIDELINES Page dd of .14. ReviSlon ,' flGURE 5-? BR EAK IDENTIFICATION CH ART i PRESSURIZE,R LEVEL CHANGING AND PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RAPIDLY DECRE ASING
# INSERT SUBCOOLING INCREASING OR ONE
" OR BOTH SGslNDICATE PRESSURE LOW YES . NO oMAY BE SLOW IN THE CAS OF SMALL BRE AK LOCA lf CONTAINMENT OR STUCK OP E N 'O RV y -v EXC ESS ST E AM '
PRIMARY DEMAND EVENT SIDE (ESDE) BREAK P P YEe ONT AINM EN NO YES ONT AINME NT NO PRESSURE PRE SSUR E INCREASING INC R E ASING 0 r a yre ACTIVITY IN NO ST E AM P L ANT v v v v v ESDE IN ESDE OUT OF LOC A INSIDE SGTR UT SID CON T AINMENT CONT AINMENT CONT AINM ENT CONT AINM ENT i1 LOCA 5 44 =t as- M : O.
j_ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ t A8B COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TySBo+ TITLE Loss Of COOLANT I ACCIDENT REC 0VERf
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE i GUIDEUNES _ -
Page e of 5' Revision.h!'. l i ( i Lf.lGURE 5 1.J- Ill j TYPICAL ACCEPTABLE SIS FLOW vs RC$ f RES.$URE - i INJECTION M00E(2) ,
. 23C0 . . i . . . i . . . i e
. t i 2200 ,.
1 2100 - } l 2000 . ,
' I INO ~ f
, .f.l.A$ 1800 - i ! l . 1700 . NOT I (3) ! 1660 . / t 1600 . l
,.1600 c------------ --- -%
1 2 : I g1100 . j n L i I N 1200 . f I i < g ' g1100 f a w
. t
@1900 M:M g . .
i a- , 600 . 100 . ! 600 i 500 . ) 400 i' 300 .
~
200 . i d )- 100 .. f I t' ' ' ~' i ' i i i 1 O 200 400 800 800 1000 1200 1400 1000 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600-f L OW, G PM i I NOTis: lH Stt lMPtiMENT ATl0N SECT 10N f 0A DEVELOPMENT OF PL ANT SPECIFIC CURVE
. (2) FOR HDT AND COLO L10 INJECTION M001.THE LPSIPUMP$ ARE NOT
" - REQUIRtu TO BE OPERATING.THE HPSI PUMP FLOW 13 Olvl0tD LOUAltY - 8tTWEENTHE HDT AND COLO t!GS i (2) 8tLOW 51A$ PRES $URL. $AFITY INJECT 10N SYSTIM t$1SI PUMPS WILL 81 OPER ATING IUT THERE Witt Rt N0 INJiCTION f LOW UNTIL $YSTEM FRl!$URf'
% i Att$ etLOW THE SHUT 0F F Hi A0 Of ANY $ll PUMP ~
i LOCA 5-45) I 1
--.....+--.Mmerm~,mve- .-rer-.r.. 4 ve, =,ww, -- --.-rv.- -m-.4 -,-, ,- -, . , , * - ' w r, v.--,,,,~w, v - -r--. +.-*vr-v v'e s
~,
TITLE Loss or COOLANT A6B@MBUSTION ENGINEERING SYSoo+ ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page_d.E.of 54 Revision M hlGURE5-4) TYPICAL FEEDWATER CAPACITY VERSUS TIME 'lNill SHUTDOWN CDOLING REQUIRED 1'
@0 , i i i i i i
u-320 . 280 - i 200 =
/ .
U 200 - 9 % 5
=
!a 100 _ /+ * -
5 120 _ 80 - m - 1 1 1 1 1 I t 1 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 0 TIME REMAINING UNTil SHUTDOWN COOLING REQUIRED (HRL) 5-46 .eE+-41? Pev. 03 LOCA
Asg. COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5% eo +. TITLE goygC00gp EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 47 of 54 Revision 2C ; {f!GURE5-5) TYPICAL FEEDWATER REQUIRED FOR SENSIBLE HEAT REMOYAL TCOLD(REQUIRED)Y5TCOLD (lNITIAU 7 50 i i ! I I I I l t 40 i ~3
- 3 -
'o
~
30 - TCOLD REQUIRED - 3000F i 3500F g
~
cM - g 400*F ; ! t
" to _ 45tPF -
4 g i f 1 1 520 480 440' 400 360 320 28'
- 560 l [ INITI AL TCOLDI II l -
s LOCA. 5-47 CE" T
- 4
, . =.. . . - - - -
l ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 59 so+ TITLE Lo$s or COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ! GUIDELINES p.g. 48 of s4 n vision ,._3 1 J I j SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK 1 ) Safety Function Acceptance Criteria. j- 1. Reactivity Control .1.a. Reactor power decreasing 3 and j b.fNegativebrtup.Ratef s
- c. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech
{ Spect. l 4 l l
- 2. MaintenanceofVitalAuxfliaries -2.a. Main turbine tripped j_ (AC and DC Power) ,a_n d 4
- b. Generator output breakers l cpen and j c. At least one .rs4e4 cbv; mon crF VtM l [4.16 kv) AC W is 4
available . div'ts'i.n 1
- d. At leatit one M of elec-
- 'trical DC power is available i for
l i) DC control power and- ] ii) Tge optQ %hera C, on of at least oney 20 vo t vital AC.
' instrument channel.
1
- 1. ,
, t.0CA 5-48 4 :' ::: L . 0;"
i :-
J 4 v Asa-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING Si 5, Bot TITLE Loss of c00LANT 4 ACC1 DENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE i GUIDELINES Page 49 of 5' Revision k 1 4 1
- j $AFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK 4 i
! Safety Function Acceptance Criteria
- 3. n RCS]nventqCy_.Lont rol- 3.a.,I[LOCAis o ak .. Thin"
- ensure
- 1) charging and letdown, and
- 515 flow (per Figure 5 3) f maintaining or restori g .
pressurizer level [M-ttr 707,W] (unless SlS termina. tion criteria met') and
- i ti) theRCSisatleast[20*F] '
subcooled
- and i iii) (the RYLMS indicates thet***' 85
{ 1 fk'lrt d'%Mf" , E 2 b. If LOCA NOT isolated, ,T,hy f ensure: ,; _.,
- i) allavailableeggjng l pumps are operating and.the l SIS pumps are injecting l water into the RCS per Figure 5-3, and
-ii) (the RVLMS indicates -the L.Mit ALA c'W_ **M *a_ l,, .
l. LOCA 5-49 --C D; 4 5 2 f.v . A s -aw+-r w-- m---- .me-.- ,y~.- , eg e , -,yw a-v e * + . , -- +A y.- -
ABS-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5% Bo t TITLE LOSS OF COOLANT i EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 5 of 51 Revisien2 ! 1 l l SAFET" *" . ION STATUS CHECK Safety Function Acceptance Criteria
- 4. ACS Fressure Control 4.a. Pressurizer heaters and spray, ;
or charging pumps and SIS pumps, i are maintaining or restoring
. pressurizer pressure within the i limits of figure 5-1.
E
- b. all available charging pumps are-operatingandthe$15 pump (s)are injecting water into the RCS per Ffgure5-3.(unlessSIS terminationcriteriaaremet).
- 5. Core Heat Removal 5.- T g RTOand[everageCET[
temperatures-less than super-heated. 4 P G -- L OC A 5-50 CEF " 1. v . U.i
i AB6 - COMBUSTION ENGINEERING P S > eo+ TITLE Loss or COOLANT
^"' '"' "
- l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 51 of 11 RevisionU i
] 1 i
- SAFETY FUNCTION STAT'JS CHECK l i
j Safety function Acceptance Criteria , i i j 6 RC$ Heat Removal 6.a.[Atleastonesteamgeneratorhas [ widelevelf15%] s and b RCS T temperatures are stable or c decreasingl 4 l 4 4 LOCA 5-51 4"M "-M- ,
, m-,e'->s-ve- --m. v i--r , -,-,-,,-s ,e,-m.. -
,-w-w- -,,n-,-,v-r-,. ..,w,,---,e--m- --sg .w. -
- w. ., .-
i ABB -COMBUSTION ENGINEERING so so+ TITLE Loss of C EMERGENCY PROCEDURE "*
#"' '"' ootAni l GUIDELINES Page S? of 54 Revision 1
s
. SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK i
Safety Function Acceptance Criteria e , 7. Containment isolation i I, 7 a. No steam plant activity monitors 1 alarming i d b. f 1) Contaigmentpressurelest than[ h)
., or **
- ii) - ClAS present or manually initiated aj i c.
- 1) [No containment area radia.
tionmonitorsalarming) or ii) C]AS present or manually initiated 1 i LOCA l-
'5-52 - :" ;;; N ., 03 -
AE8- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 5p act TITLE Loss or COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE j GUIDELINES Page 53 of 54 Revision J SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK Safety runction Acceptance Critet B. Containment Temperature 8.a. 1) Containment temperature less
& Pressure Control than[240*F]
and ii) Containment, pressure less than ]
"M \' S i ent cooiing sys te,#
\s i perating in one of the roll g configurations
[i)T e fan coole / in the emer y moct ii) At least gfancoolers in th emerge y mode and at ast one con ainment ray header celive ing at . least 1500 gpm h ti+) Two conta ment spray headers eacn delivering at least
.15Cegpm].
(Gooo A e.ed bWh %)o#5yer,e 5 is cy.,J.uy w M h A n d a gror=r< C ") rsk LOCA 5-53 COU1 : ": M _ 3 l
4 ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE 5980+ toss or EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ^" * "'co0LANT """' GUIDELINES Page 54 of Si Revision __ ___
- SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK --
I Safety function i A: J '*gnce Criteris' ._ 4 9. I Containment Combustible Gas
- Control 9,a. Hydrogen' concentration less then 4 [0,5%).
.o r.
! b. i i) [Allavailablehydrogen I recombiners energized] i and i 11) Hydrogen concentration less e than[4:], , -or
- c. Hydrogenhyb, ystem operating i in accordance with [ plant i
j specific operating instructions), I' I
- j. . ,
I i q. i i l 4 . LOCA ! 5-54 ^
-CE" 15: '; 0'
- I
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
) GUIDELINES Page 1 - of 35 RevisionEf i
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE REC 0VERY GUIDELINE a ! ) i Prepared by I two. .e, , m, m e , m ,- n , u g h- , C-- fr- ~ " qu o I 't 4 i
)
SGTR 6-1 %t.L.cz=-*wrM
i I COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE REC 0VERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 2 og as Revision s PURPOSE i 1 This guidelire provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). The actions in this guideline are necessary to ensure that the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition. The goal of the guideline is to safely establish Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions while minimizing radiological releases to the environment and
- maintaining adequate core cooling. This guideline provides technical infomation to be used by utilities in developing a plant specific procedure.
ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed.
] 1 and
- 2. Plant conditions indicate that a steam generator tube rupture has
, occurred. Any one or more of the following may be present: l a. Air ejector high activity alam,
- b. Steam generator blowdown high activity alam.
, c. High activity and conductivity in steam generatnr liquid sample,
- d. Increasing steam generator level.
-e . [Other-phnt--spec +f4c-spp toms , - i ns e r t4ere r}-- ,
4 i e SGTR 6-2 -CO' Z:'WNM
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR , TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY ! ~ EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 3 of 35 Revision 83' EXIT CONDITIONS l
- 1. The diagnosis of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture event is not confinned.
E
- 2. Any of the Steam Generator Tube Rupture Safety function Status Check l acceptance criteria are not satisfied.
E q 3. The Steam Generator Tube Rupture EPG has accomplished its purpose by 2 satisfying ALL of the following: a, All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- b. Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions have been established. '
) c. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists or has been approved by the [ Plant Technical Support Center or the Plant
- Operations Review Committee].
1 l ( 4
)
^ SGTR 6-3 -CE" M Rev M
i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 4 of 35 Revision F INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip' 1.
- Actions perfomed.
- 2. Confim diagnosis of a Steam 2. Rediagnose event and exit l
Generator Tube Rupture by: to either appropriate
- a. verifying Safety Function Optimal Recovery Guideline l Status Check acceptance or to the Functional criteria are satisfied, Recovery Guideline, and i
- b. referring to the Break Identification Chart -
(Figure 6-2),
- and
)
- c. { sampling both steam generators for activity}.un~ra
- 5**f'"5 5 7-m
- 3. H pressurizer ressure decreases 3. E pressurizer pressure toorbelow[1 psia],Then de}rejsestyrbelow
! verify an SIAS is actuated. [1600 psia),an SIAS has NOT been initiated
- automatically, Then manually initiate an SIAS.
4
- Step Performed Continuously i
SGTR 6-4 4EN-1$2Mev .4-
I l COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
)
GUIDELINES Page 5 of 35 Revision M INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 4. Ensure maximum safety injection 4 I_f, f safety injection and and charging flow to the RCS by: charging flow NOT maximized, Then do the
- a. start idle SIS pumps and following as necessary:
1 verify SIS flow in accordance with Figure 6-3, a. ensure electrical i power to valves and and pumps, l b. ensure correct SIS
- b. start idle charging pumps valve lineup,
- c. ensure operation of necessary auxiliary systems.
1
- 5. H pressurizer pressure 5. Continue RCP operation, pecresestolessthan 9
[ b psia] following an SIAS, Then ensure two of four RCPs l are tripped.(in opposite loops). I i
- 6. fVerifyRCPoperatinglimitsare 6. { Trip the RCP(s) which do satisfiedf. not satisfy RCP operating limits}.
)
- Step Performed Continuously SGTR 6-5 %" " 2 "r: n3
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 6 of 35 Revision N INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 7. Verify RCS hot leg temperature is less 7. Cooldown the RCS to a hot than [525'F) in order to minimize the leg temperature of less possibility of lif ting steam generator than [525'F] by (listed in safeties after isolating a steam orderofpreference):
generator, a, operation of the tur-bine bypass system, E
- b. E the condenser or
' turbine bypass system
- not available, Then by operation of the atmospheric dump )
valve (s).
- 8. Maintain steam generator level (s) in 8.
, .srtup the normal band using (main or
^
emersency} an444an feedwater. I
- 9. Determine which steam generator has 9.
the tube rupture by performing the following:
- a. sample steam generators for activity,
- b. (monitor main steam piping for activityf,
- c. monitor steam generator levels, i --d . [other@ntapecific liidica t ivus ,
ittsert-here3 SGTR 6-6 -EEN-M2 Rev, 43-
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE REC 0VERY J EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ' GUIDELINES Page 7 of 35 Revision or INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1
- 10. When RCS hot leg temperature is less 10.
than [525'F], Then isolate the steam generator with the higher activity, i higher radiation levels, or increasing j water level by perfonning the following: a, close the MSIV, a. locally close MSIV,
- b. verify closed, or close the MSIV b. locally close MSIV by-I bypass valve, pass valve,
- c. [Raisethesetpointforthe c. fMaintaintheaffected associated ADV to[950 psia] SGpressures[950 psia]
; by:
i) manual operation of the associated ADV ii) local operation of theassociatedADVJ
- d. close the main feedwater isolation d. locally close main valve, feedwater isolation valve, ggy amep$
l e. {close the auxU.iary feedwater e. flocally close MW iso-isolation valve (s) including the lation valve (s) and steam driven pump steam supply steam driven pump steem valve associated with the steam supplyvalvej, generatorbeingisolated),
- f. isolate steam generator blowdown, f. locally isolate SG blow-down,
- g. close vents, drains, exhausts, and 9 locally isolate vents, i bleedoffs from the steam system, drains, exhausts, and
- h.- [etherW-speci fic items-tnsert-bleedoffs.
-here) .
, SGTR 6-7 CEJ4-152-Revr03 -
( COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR ! EMERGENCY PROCEDURE . GUIDELINES Page 8 of as Revision # INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
! 11. Verify the most affected steam 11, 1_f the wrong steam gener-4 generator is isolated by checking ator was isolated. Then l
the following: unisolate that steam gener-
- a. activity levels, ator and isolate the most
- b. radiation levels, affected steam generator
- c. possible steam generator level per step 10.
- increase.
*12. Decrease and control RCS pressure 12.
by using main or auxiliary spray, operation of charging agd letdown,
.) or throttling of .MP91 pumps (refer to step 15), in order to control pressurizer pressure within the following criteria:
- a. lessthan[1000 psia],
and b, approximately equal to isolated steam generator pressure (150 psi). 4
- Step Performed-Continuously SGTR 6-8 -CE"-152 Cev. 03
~
l l COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR l TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ' GUIDELINES Page a of - 25 Revision af_-. INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*13. Maintain the RCS within the accept- 13. If RCS subcooling greater able Post Accident Pressure-Temperature than P-T limits or cooldown limits of Figure 6-1 by the following: rate greater than
- a, controlling RCS heat removal via [100*F/Hr),Thendothe the unisolated steam generator, following as appropriate
and a. stop the cooldown,
- b. control of RCS pressure b, depressurize the plant (refer to step 12). using[mainor auxiliary) spray to restore and maintain i
pressurizer pressure within the Post Acci-i
} dent P-T limits of Figure 6-1,
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or continue to cooldown within the limits of Figure 6-1,
- d. If overprgurization
. due to Hit *I/ charging flow, Then throttle-or secure flow (refer to step 15) and manually control let-down to restore / main-tain pressure within the P-T limits of Figure 6-1.
*Steo Performed Continuously tr.To en ersia c o n-. n'
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page to of 35 Revision # INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
*14 Maintain the isolated steam generator 14. Restore the isolated steam level within the indicated range generator level to the by the following: indicated range by the
- a. periodic draining to the { radio- following:
activewastesystem[ a. drainingtothe(radio- ~
- b. dump steam from the affected activewastesystem) steam generator to the condenser. b. reduce RCS pressure below the isolated steem generator pressure.
-c. [jf-t4mc and circum - )
stances-permit, Then-4sta4 snubbee-ptoning-
. par--plant-4pec4 f4+-
.pra edure @
4 i t
$GTR 6-10 CE4-452- Rev na
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE REC 0VERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE i GUIDELINES Page 22 of 3 5 Revision # INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 5d ns
*15. If188H pumps are operating, Then they 15. Continue 4P44 pump nay be throttled or stopped, one pump operation.
at a time, if ALL of the following are 4 satisfied: j a. RCS subcooling at least [20'F] based on [ average CET] temperature (Figure 6-1),
- b. pgegs,gizer level is greater than
.[-10C9 and not decreasing,
- c. the unisolated steam generator is aveilable for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and.
steam flow).
- d. {theRVLMSindicatesaminimumlevel atthetopofthehotlegnozzles).
~
- f15. H P essur4
- er peaunen it greatar than 16.rantinue4PS-Ipuhp (2OO-ps and-cedir+Medr--Then-any ' ppent4A ,
opSndna LDSI pumns ==y be stopped.-- Ib ff
*}T. E criteria of step 15 am er cannot be JT.
4 maintained af ter SIS pumps throttled or i stopped Then appropriate SIS pumps must be restarted and full SIS flow restored. b
- Step Perfomed Continuously
.w i k 6-11 -CfN-152 -Rev.
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 12 of 35 Revision M INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 87 /7
*M. _Controlchargingand_ letdown,and j#, H RCS subcooling of at p
M (unless H EI termination least[20*F]canNOTbe criteria met) to restore and maintained,Then[24h] maintain pressurizer level may be exceeded to restore
.{354c P S*]. RCS subcooling.
[Io2c 70 $*] 18 /2
*M. H RCPs are NOT operating, Then Pf. a . H RCP operation NOT evaluate the need and desirability desired, Then go to of restarting RCPs. Consider the step K.
following: SI
- a. udequacy of RCS and core heat re- E
)
moval using natural circulation,
- b. existing RCS pressure and b. E at least one RCP temperatures, operating in each loop,
- c. the need for main pressurizer Then go to step M.
spray capability, #
- d. the duration of (CCW) interrup-tion to RCPs,
- e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures.
- Step Performed Continuously SGTR 6-12 C{ii-152 . Re v . 03 ,
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 23 of 35 Revision # INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS ii 87 11
- 20'.
. Determine whether RCP restart criteria M . Go to step 27.
- are met by ALL of the following
- a. electrical power is available to theJRCPbus},
, b. RCPauxiliaries(JCCWJ)tomaintain (sealinjection), bearing,andmotor cooling are operating, and there - are no high temperature alams on the selected RCPs, 4
- c. the unisolated steam generator is -
i available for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow),
- d. pregurizerlevelisgreaterthan
[240*]andnotdecreasing,
- e. RCSsubcoolingatleast[20'F]
i based on [ average CET) temperature (Figure 6-1),
- f. fother criteria satisfied per RCP 4
operating instructionsf. 4 i
- Step PerforTned Continuously.
SGTR 6-13 4CN-152 hv. - OP
/
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- GUIDELINES Page 24 of 35 Revision #
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4
%c so zl
*21'. H RCP restart desired and restart M . Go to step 22 criteria satisfied, Then do the following:
- a. start all available charging gu s q Mpressuregssthan 1" psia), Then Misrl pumps may be operated,
- b. start one RCP in each loop,
{ c, .{ ensure proper RCP operation by monitoringRCPamperagegndNPSHj,
- d. operate charging (and 9tfr!) pumps
) untilpgssurizerlevelgreater then[400)andSIStermination criteria met. (Refer to step 15).
51 z)
*22. H no RCPs are operating, Then verify 2?. Ensure proper control of natural circulation flow in at least steam generat:,r steaming one loop by ALL of the following:
efer to
- a. loop AT(Tg - TC ) less than normal andfeging({h),andRCS steps 24 and 2 full power AT, pressure and inventory l b. hot and cold leg temperatures (refer to steps 12 and 18).
constant or decreasing, '7
- c. RCS subcooling at least [20*F]
based on faverage CET) tempersture,
- d. noabnormaldifference[ greater than10'F]betweenT H sTDs r and (Core Exit Thennocouples).
- Step Perfonned Continuously SGTR 6-14 CEii-152 Rev. 03
.J -- - - - /
I COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR I TUBE RUPTURE RECOVERY
)
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
\
GUIDELINES Page 25 of 35 Revision #
]
I INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o st
- 23. Sample the RCS periodically for 23.
radioactivity and boron concentration. Calculate and add sufficient boron to i the RCS to raise the entire RCS (including the pressurizer) to the shutdown margin required by Technical Specifications.
- ) 23
- 24. Perform controlled plant cooldown, ,24 using forced or natural circulation, '
in accordance with Tecnnical
} Specifications. Reduce RCS tempera-
, tures by the following: 4
- a. H the condenser is available.
Then cooldown using the turbine bypass system, Ef
- b. H the condenser or turbine bypass system NOT available. Then cooldown using the unisolated steam generator atmospheric dump valve.
'l W W
*25'. Maintain unisolated steam generator 25.
levelinthenormalbgd4hrgughgu,t the cooldown using fmain,or ata44kary) feedwater. i
}
- Step Perfonned Continuously SGTR 6-15 {D! 152 Rev. 03
i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RJTURE RECOVERY y EMERGENCY PROCEDURE - GUIDELINES Page is og as Revision d 4 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i 25 25 , *26. Ensure the available condensate 26. inventory is adequate per Figures M and 9-t. l d 5'9 0* 16 i 2T. Cool and depressurize the isolated 27. steam generator as the cooldown proceeds by one of the following methods: ,Starhr a.- feed an leedusing[ main,or .' emer . , aux 4 ry feedwater and blowdown,
- b. steaming the isolated steam l ) generator to the condenser (if available) or to atmosphere,
--c.---{other plent overffic NthTdr-ksert-here3 d 27 4 *28.
, Samole the condensate and other con- 28.
- necting systems, including turbine building sumps, for activity.
2F 2e ! *29. Monitorthe[turbineandauxiliary) 29. H radiation monitor read-building ventilation radiation ings are excessive, Then monitors and any other applicable take corrective actions in radiation monitors. accordance with Technical Specifications.
)
- Step Perfonned Continuously SGTR 6-16 -CEN-152 Rev. uJ
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE STEAM GENERATOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 17 of 35 Revision #f INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4 2 27 6
- 30. Bypass or lower the automatic initia- 30.
tionsetpointsofJMSIS,CIAS, CMS, andSIASJasthecooldownanddepressur-ization proceed. -
& pressstater presset rea des C Mf rif ) , re h n M %{et my
- b. RCSsubcooling>[20*F], be indicated by any of .
- c. RCS pressure < [ E psia], the following indica-
- d. RCS T H 1 [ re-F], tions, parameter g [other-plant spec 44c-criterta- changes, or trends:
- Step Perfonned Continuously (Continued On Next Page)
- Step Perfonned Continuously SGTR 6-18 -CEii-152 Kev. 03 ~
- b. If voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure, Then
- attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- Step Perfomed Continuously (Continued on Next Page)
- 31. *E . (Cont'd)
- c. H depressuri:.ation of the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible, and void-ing is suspected to exist in the steam gen-erator tubes, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- Step Perfomed Continuously SGTR 6-20 -CCN-152 Rev. 05
- 33. *33'. (Cont'd)
- d. H depressurization of the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- e. Continue attempts to establish SCS entry corditions, or exit this guideline and initiate an appropriate procedure as directed b,t [ Plant Technical SJpportCente-].
- Step Perfomed Continuously B
- 1. To minimize the unmonitored release of radioactivity, use of the atmos-pheric steam dump valves en the affected steam generator should be minimized.
- 2. To reduce the release of potentially radioactive s.,
- monitored to avoid exceeding a maximum cooldown rate greater than Tech-nical Specification Limitations.
- 4. Automatic feedwater modulation may mask the expected steam generattsr level increase due to a steam generator tube rupture.
- 5. If the faulted steam generator has been isolated and the cooldown is
- proceeding via natural circulation, an inverted AT (i.e., Tcgreater than
- 7. All available indication should be used to aid in diagnosing the event since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confimatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 8. If the initial cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, there may be a potential for pressurized themal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel (Reference 15.8). Post-Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits of Figure 6-1 should be maintained.
- 9. Solidwateroperationofthepressurizershouldbeavoidedunless[20'F]
- 10. Minimize the number of cycles or pressurizer auxiliary spray whenever the temperature differential between the spray water and the pressurizer is greater than [200*F] in order to minimize the increase in the spray nozzle themal stress accumulation factor. Every such cycle must be recorded in accordance with Technical Specification Limitations.
- 11. If restarting reactor coolant pumps, consideration should be given to choosing pump combinations which will maximize pressurizer spray flow.
- design
- under these conditicas. Information concerning reactor vessel liquid inventory trending may still be discerned. However, the operator is cautioned not to rely solely on the RVLMS indication when RCPs are operating.
- l
- 18. When restarting RCPs, it is preferable to first start an RCP in the loop with the operating SG, This will avoid the confusion which could occur from a temporary reversal of TH and Te inaications in the operating loop and allow for slower mixing of inventory from the isolated loor..
- 19. When indicated SG water level is excessively high (200Q or greater) the l
- 20. If there is a conflict between isolating a SG and maintaining adequate heat removal, then mainta.in RCS heat removal via the least affected SG.
- 21H .. .
- n. -
- F ALLS lELOW THE SHUT 0FF HE AD OF ANY $l$ PUMP SGTR 6 29 '01-152, Revr 03- -
- _
- gm -
- 1. Reactivity Control 1.a. Reactor power decreasing and b fNegative Startup Rate) and
- c. No more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
- b. Generator output breakers open
- c. At least on v"YfaY .16 kv]
- d. At least one tf4 Fin of electrical DC power is available for:
- 1) DC control power and 11)Thgogat,ionofatleast one 120 volt vital AC instrument channel.
- 3. RCS Inventory Control 3,a, H pressurizer level is [ & to 3M"),Then:
- 1) charging and letdown, and
- b. E gr4ssurizer level is less than
- b. all available charging pumps are
- 6. RCS Heat Removal 6.a. The unisolated steam generator
- 1) within the nomal level band with feedwater available to maintain level 4
- b. RCSHT islessthan[S2S'F) a.nd J c. RCS temperature is controlled oy turbine bypass system or ADVs.
- 7. Containment isolation 7.a. Containment pressure less than
- b. {No containment area radiation monitorsalarming),
- c. No abnomal increase in containment sump levels.
- 8. Containment Temperature and 8.a. Containment temperature less than
- b. Containment pressure less than
- 9. Containment Combustible 9.a. Containment temperature less than ,
- b. Containment pressure less than
- 1. The standard Post Trip Actions have been perfomed a!Ld 2.a. Plant conditions indicate that a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred. Any one or more of the following may be present:
- b. A station blackout event has occurred, and at least one[ , vital [4.16 AC buw has been restored.
- 1. The diagnosis of a Loss of Offsite Power is not confimed E
- 2. The diagnosis indicates that in addition to the Loss of Offsite Power, a break in the primary or secondary system, or a loss of all feedwater has occurred h E
- , ir or 4 Novital(125V)DCbusesenergized.
- 5. Any of the loss of Offsite Power Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfi,ed E
- 6. The Loss of Offsite Power guideline has accomplished.its purpose by i
- a. at least one non-vital (fcG kV) electrical AC bus is energized j b. all Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied
- c. RCS conditions are being controlled and maintained in hot standby.
- d. an appropriate crocedure, which has been approved by the [ Plant l
- wc,v v .,..--r w ,w ..=
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip Actions 1.
- 3. Veri f y vital 4.16 kV AC f. If no vital 4.16 kV AC powered components are ,y buses are energized then available by the Verify at least one following: permenant non-safety bus :
- a. at least one vital and attempt to energize 4.16 kV AC v sin one vital -AC division p
- b. loads ll' vital have 4.16 AC division or non- -
- 4. Ensure at least one 4. Exit this guideline and .
- 5. Ensure that a11 5. Op49 a r f'dP* h U "
- 6. Verify RCP seal cooling. 6. 11 RCP seal cooling has been lost Ihn.D restore ,
- a. RCP controlled bleedoff is unisolated,
- b. the non-critical ccw ,
- a. level being restored or maintained
- iii) main steam safety valves i '/
- a. the pressurizer level control i system is maintaining or 'restoring pressurizerlevel(1%-te~#Mm l b.RCSsubcoolingatleast(20'F)
- RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ll GUIDELINES Page L of.2.9. Revision 13 1
- b. depressurize the plant 1
- W sr At Lus & am Aty,,, m a s, .
- a. adequacy of RCS and core heat removal using natural circulation,
- b. existing RCS pressure and t. y :t '::st one PCP O temperatures, openting in nG Lg,
- c. the need for main pressurizer spray Then 90 te 54ep-44.
- e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures.
- a. electrical power is available to the[RCPbus),
- c. at least one steam generator is availe'le for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam i flow),
- a. Start all available charning pumps.
- b. start one RCP in each loop, c.[ensureproperRCPoperationby
- d. operate charging (and # St) pumps
- until pressurizer level gre6ter '
- a. RCSsubcoolingatleast[20'F) basedon(averageCET) temperature (Figure 9-1),
- b. prgurizerlevelisgreaterthan
- c. a$ea)stonesteamgeneratoris available for removing heat from th? '
- d. (theRVLMSindicatesaminimum I
- 7. maintained after WS! pumps throttled '
- a. loop AT (Tg - T g) less than normal step f) and RCS inventory '
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures tostepsbandh),
- a. plant status,
- b. auxiliary systems availability,
- c. condensate inventory (refer to Figures 9-3 and 9-4),
- b. Exit to appropriate procedure as directed by(PlantTechnical SupportCenter).
- b. Prevent boron dilution by pressurizer 1
- 1) borate to raise the entire RCS (including the mass in the pressurizer)tocoldshutdowri 4 conditions, a
- accordance with Technical Specifi- "* .
- b. steam generator steaming via 4
- l LOOP 9-13 -CCGisi M~
- 4. Stop the cooldown
- b. depressurize the plant using(mainorauxi-liary)spraytorestore and maintain pressurtzer pre.*"re within the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure 9-1.
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or con-tinue to cooldown with-in the limits of Figure '
- d. E overpressurizatin due to #/SI/chstging flow. '
- a. charging and letdown, or l
- b. V S! pumps i
- d. Bypass or lower the automatic h initiationsetpointsof(MS!S.CIAS,
- 1 I
- a. pressurizer level >h) and should be suspected.
- c. RCS pressur 3(I00Y), the following
- instructions). ii) pressurizer level
- ' increasing i
- 6. M.
- b. M voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure.
- Step Performed Continuously (Continued on Next Page)
- c. M depre::urization of '
- 1) cool the suspected steam generator (by steaming and/or blowdown, and feeding) to condense the sttam generator tube void, and.
- d. I,f depressurization of the PCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible. Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- e. Continue attempts to es-tablich SCS entry con-ditions, or exit this guideline and initiate ,
- Step Perfomed Continuously LOOP 9-20 CE ur -sev. 03 I l
- 1. Natural circulation flow cannot be verified until the RCPs havs arctped coasting down after being tripped.
- 2. During natural circulation, verification of an RCS temperature response to a plant change cannot be accomplished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times (Reference 15.11).
- 3. [If possible, interruption of the c mponent cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals should not exceed U minutes. Extended loss of CCW flow may make inspection of the seals necessary).
- 5. Once the pressurizer cooldown has begun, pressurizer level indmtion decalibration will occur. The indication on the normal pressurizer level indication will begin to deviate from the true pressurizer level. The operator should use correction curves to find the true pressurizer water level. A cold calibrated pressurizer level indication is also available for lower pressurizer temperatures.
- 6. Minimize the number of cycles of pressurizer auxiliary spray whenever the temperature differential between the spray water and the pressurizer is greater than [200*F] in order to minimize the increase in the spray cozzle thermal stress accumulation factor. Every such cycle must be LOOP -
- 7. If cooling down by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e.. T ehigher than T H) might be observed in the idle loop. This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the
- 9. When a void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are not operating, the l RVLMS provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel liquid inventory, j ( '
- 10. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS voiding and take steps to eliminate voiding any time voiding causes heat removal l or inventory control safety functions to begin to be threatened. Void elimination should be started soon enough to ensure heat removal and
- inventory control are not lost-(Reference 15.14).
- 11. Hot-leg end cold leg RTD temperature indication may be influenced by SIS i injection water temperatures. UsemultipleRTOindications[and/orCET indications)fortemperaturewheninjectionisoccurring..
- m. , ,
- D 1000 - RCP NPSH
- is00 . .
- m -
- 0 , , , /, , , m . , ,
- _
- 1. Reactivity Control 1. a. Reactor power de-creasing E$
- 6. n__,f C. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
- 2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries 2. a. Main turbine tripped (AC and DC power) af
- c. At least one etah 'icrJ
- d. At lea one D of electrical DC power is available for:
- 3. RCS Inventory Control 3. a. Charging and letdown are maintaining or restorig pressgizer level (Sttotit!")
- b. RCS subcooling is at least(20'F] based on[averageCET]
- 5. Core Heat Removal 5. a. RCS subcooling is at least[20'F]basedon
- b. The RCS loop aT in the operating steam generator is:
- 1) less than the full power aT (if all RCPs are off)
- 6. RCS Heat Removal 6. At least one steam generator has level:
- a. within the normal bandwith[maino a N d h f feedwater available to maintain level E
- b. being restored by
- 7. Containment Isolation 7. a. Containment pressure less than [1.5 psig]
- b. [No containment area radiation monitors alarming]
- c. No process radiation ala rms a,ng
- d. No steam plant activity i.
- 8. Containment Temperature & Pressure 8. a. Containment temperature Control less than [120'F]
- b. Containment pressure lessthan[1.5psig].
- 9. Containment Combustible Gas 9. a. Containment temperature Control less than [120'F]
- b. Containment pressure lessthan[1.5psig].
- STATION BLACKOUT PEC0VERY GUIDELINE i
- fer-tte F-E 0'
- !':::: CROUP l
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed, i
- a. [ Loss of control room lighting) b, Extensive loss of various indications-c.
- d. Tripped breaker indications on the [6<9 and 4.16 kV) buses
- e. Extensive loss of [ component) power available indications
- 1. Any of the Station Blackout Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfied.
- b. all Safety Function status check acceptance criteria are being satisfied,
- c. an appropriate procedure, which has been provided and approved by the [ Plant Technical Support Center or the Plant Operations Review Comittee], can be implemented.
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip Actions 1.
- c. pressure control by one of the following (listed in preferred order):
- 4. Ensure all appropriate breakers on 4.
- Step Perfonned Continuously 4
- *5 .
- a. restore power to at least one Alvtiw a f
- b. (if possible) restore power to at least one non-vital [NkV]
- c. Go to ster 11.
- Step Performed Continuously
- 7. Minimize RCS leakage by ensuring ALL 7.
- e. RCS sample line(s) isolation valve I f, h (s) closed,rYD?EMYiicitems_t.o p
- a. loop AT (Tg - Tc ) less than normal full power AT,
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing, c.RCSsubcoolingatleast[20*F]
- Step Perfonned Continuously SB 10-6 - CC W p .edi:b
- temperature is less than superheated.
- Step Performed Continuously SB 10-7 CyM 1
- Y
- 12. Borate the RCS as necessary to main- 12.
- tain shutdown margin in accordance 1 with Technical Specifications.
- a. automatic or manual operation of then ensure all available 4
- and water into the RCS per b.RCSsubcoolingatleast[20*F] Figure 10-2.
- c. [the RVLMS indicates the occe M 7eM
- Step Perfornled Continuously SB 10-8 - C Eii-i x Rev. 43
- a. automatic or manual operation of a. step the cooldown, the pressurizer heaters and aux.il- b. depressurize the plant iary spray, using auxiliary spray or to restore and maintain
- b. manual operation of charging pressurizer pressure and/or fSI pumps ,
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or continue to cooldown within the limits of Figure 10-1,
- d. E overpressurization due to (SI/ charging l flow,Thienthrottleor secure (SI (refer to j step 15) or charging i flow and manually control letdown to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure within the i
- Step Performed Continuously SB 10-9 TEN '"' P r> " - n ,
- *15. H f)fSI pumps are operating, 15. ContinueRfSIpump Then they may be' throttled or operation.
- c. at least one steam generator is
- 16. --H-presittrizer pressure i3 16. Cotttinue VShppmp of_e]a-1 rea than[200 psia)and '
- Step Performed Continuously
- a. containment ventilation fan coolers, and b control room [HVAC] or [ emergency airconditioning),
- c. applicable building [HVAC] systems.
- Step Performed Continuously SB 10-11 p01
- 15.11).
- 3. After the required shutdown baron concentration is attained in the RCS, s
- 5. -Minimize the number of cycles of pressurizer auxiliary spray whenever the temperature differential between thu spray water and the pressurizer is.
- 6. If cooling down by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, an inverted aT (i.e.. T chigher than T )g may be observed in the idle loop. This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circulation flow in the intact steam generator (Reference 15.11).
- 8. When a-void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are not operating, the RVLMS provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel licuid inventory.
- 9. !
- 10. Sustained operation of DC power equipment M essential tc maintaining the deliberate cooldown jeopardizes the duration of battery availability.
- , EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES page 14 of 20 g,yision - 0
- 12. Hot leg and cold leg RTD temperature indication may be influenced by S!$
- 13. A station blackout will result in the loss of numerous indications and control functions. It is important that the operators be aware of the affects of a station blackout on all indications and controls, i
- 14. Plant personnel should be prepared for the possibility of inadequate lighting in access areas and equipment rooms.
- TYPICAL POST ACCIDENT PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS (2) i 2500 - i i f a 2400 - LOWEST [
- /
- 1. Reactivity Control 1. a. Reactor power decreasing l
- c. Not more han 1 CEA bottom light not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
- 2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- 2. a. Main turbine tripped (AC and DC power) '
- divaiad
- c. At least one t win of electrical DC power is available for:
- 1) DC control power and ii) The operatio g ,P
- 3. RCS Inventory Control 3. a. H RCS subcooling is atleast(20'F) based on[averageCET) temperature Then; i) pressgrizer1ggel 7
- b. H pressurizer level g islessthan((["),Then:
- 1) [averageCET1 temperature is less than super-heated, and -
- 11) (theRVLMSindi-catesthecoMrs 84tgoWe s, I
- 6. RCS Heat Removal 6. At least one steam generator has level: ,
- a. within the nonnal band with
- b. being reNored by 4 W [r f feeJwa r flow E MY7
- 7. Containment isolation 7. a. Containment pressure less than(1.5psig) 1"j.
- b. [No containment area radiatier.
- c. No process radiation alarms a,,!1(
- d. No steam plant activity
- 8. Containment temperature & Pressure 8. a. Containment temperature
- b. Containment pressure less than(1.5psig).
- 9. Containment Combustible Gas 9. a. Containment temperature Control lessthan(120'F) .
- b. Containment pressure less than(1.5psig).
- 10 W j
- ' and
- 2. Plant conditions indicate that an Excess Steam Demand Event has occurred.
- a. Loud noise indicative of a high energy iteam line break, i
- b. Decreasing RCS average temperature caused by the increased RCS heat j removal.
- c. Increase in feedwater flow until main feedwater isolation valves are
- d. Possible increase in containment temperature, pressure, humidity, and sump level.
- 1. The diagnosis of an Excess Steam Demand Event is not confirmed.
- 3. The Excess Steam Demand Event EPG has accomplished its purpose by .
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip 1.
- 2.
- a. verifying Safety Function Optimal Recovery Guideline
- b. referring to the Break ,
- c. {+ampling-both -steam-generators-for activity);
- 3. If pressurizer pressure decreases 3. If pressurizer pressure to or below [ W psia), Then here es to or below 4
- Step Performed Continuously ESDE 7-4 ,
- a. start idle $15 pumps following as necessary:
- b. start idle charging pumps. b. ensure correct SIS valve lineup,
- c. ensure operation of necessary auxiliery systems.
- 5. if,pressurizerpressure 5.
- 6. (Verify RCP operating limits are 6. (TriptheRCP(s)whichdo not satisfy RCP operating satisfied).
- CONTINGENCY ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Determine the affected SG (or most 7.
- a. SG steam pressures,
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures,
- c. SG 1evels.
- 8. Go to Step 9.
- 8. M Excess ' Steam Demand Event stopped due to MSIS, Then go to step 11.
- 9. Isolate the most affected steam 9.
- b. verify closed, or close the b. locally close MSIV MSIV bypass valve, bypass valve,
- c. close, or verify closed the c.[locallycloseADV(s)J.
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main isolation valve, feedwater isolation V*** [;*fy 5MfM cperyn'7 e.flocally close m N4ar.y.
- e. [close theg4u444trf *feedwater feedwater isolation isolationvalve)',
- f. close vents, drains, exhausts f. locally close vents, and bleedoffs, drains, exhausts.,and bl eedof f s . --
- Step Performed Continuously ESDE _7-6 (L-m-a.._03"
- 10. Verify the correct steam generator 10.If,thewrongsteam is isolated by checking the following: generator was isolated,
- a. $G steam pressures, Then unisolate that steam
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures, generator and isolate the !
- c. SG levels, generator per step 9.
- a. turbine bypass system.
- b. atmospheric dump valve (s).
- Step Performed Continuously 4
- a. RCS subcooling at least (20'F]
- b. prep,urizer level is greater than
- c. at least one steam generator is
- Step Perfomed Continuously 7-8 C ' ^ ' m ^4 '
- Step Performed Continuously ESDE 7-9 EM' re . S
- W. , H RCS subcooling greater
- a. pressurizer heaters and (main /hr]Thendothefollowing or auxiliary) spray, as appropriate:
- b. charging and letdown, b. depressurize the RCS 2.C using[mainor
- c. throttling of g S1 pumps. auxiliaryspray) to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 7-1,
- d. E over pressurization is due to F SI/ charging flow Then throttle or secure flow (refer to step 13) and manually control letdown to restore and maintain i
- Step Perfonned Continuously.
- a. containment isolation is actuated a. M containment automatically [-pla&4 pet-444c isclation does not
- b. all available containment emergency not in their accident fan coolers operatirg in the positions, Then emergency mode, manually initiate and containment isolation
- Step Perfomed Continuously.
- a. ensure containment spray system actuation, a,,n,L
- b. place the hydrogen monitors in service and continuously monitor containment hydrogen, f-. e m#r e. A Wkl UwT 8 YSN "
- Step Performed Continuously.
- Iff containment spray system is Continue containment spray operating and containment pressure system operation, i islessthan(7psig],Thencontainment j spray may be terminated. Upon l
- Step Performed Continuously.
- l I
- a. adequacy of RCS and core o,r heat removal using natural circulation, b. !f fat least one RCP is l operating in each loop,
- c. the need for main pressuri:er spray capability, '
- d. the duration of pCWp' interruption
- Step Performed Continuously.
- INSTRUCTIONS C0hTINGENCY ACTIONS b V 2y f
- Determine whether RCP restart .f4 tostep%.
- b. RCP auxiliaries ([CCW]) to maintain
- c. the unisolated steam generator is available for removing' heat from
- e. RCSsubcoolingatleast[20'F]
- f. [other criteria satisfied per RCP operating instructions
- Step Perfonned Continuously.
- a. start all available charging pumps. M pressure less than
- b. start one RCP in each loop,
- c. (ensureproperRCPoperationby monitoringRCPamperageandNPSH),
- d. operate chirging (and EFSI) pumps and letdown to maintai,r), .
- a. loopAT(TH - T g) less than normal full power AT, inventory and pressure.
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures control (refer to steps i
- d. noabnormaldifference(greater than10'F)betweenT RTDs g and average CET temperature.
- Step Phrfonned . Continuously.
- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE EXCESS STEAM DEMAND l EVENT RECOVERY l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- a. plant status, l
- b. auxiliary systems availability, j
- Step performed Continuously.
- b. Prevent boron dilution by pressu- i riter cetturge by the following l (listed in preferred order):
- 11) use(mainorauxiliary] spray
- a. E the condenser is available, ,
- b. E'thecondenserorturbinebypass system NOT available. Then cooldown .
- Step Perfomed Continuously.
- TITLE EXCESS STEAM DEMAND COMBUSTION ENGINEERING EVENT RECOVERY l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 19 of -
- )
- b. depressurize the plant of l '} operation of charging / letdown, using(mainor b.
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in.a stable pressure-temperature 4
- within the limits of Figure 7-1, (ContinuedOnNextPage)
- Step Performed Continuously.
- d. !_f,overpressurization duetoQSl/ charging ,
- Step Performed Continuously.
- d. RCS T g < [NF], indications, Ar---{4that__A14nt-+pec1fie criterta parameter changes,
- Step Performed Continuously (Continued On Next Page)
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
- 39. . 139.-(Co W d)~
- b. M voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to -
- Step Performed Continuously ESDE 7-22 W ^ r- 3
- Step Perfonned Continuously ESDE 7-23 LY- 03 .
- d. Continue attempts to establish SCS entry condition, or exit this guideline and initiate an appropriate procedure, et44 reded
- Step Perfonned Continuously.
- ' EVENT RECOVERY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE i ) GUIDELINES Page - 2s of 3e Revision ** 1 l
- I 1. Lengthy operation of the containment spray system may jeopardize the operati9n of equipment which would be desirable later in the event.
- 2. During all phases of cooldown, monitor RCS' tereperature and pressure to
- 3. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in automatic is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frecuently to
- 5. If the initial cooldown rate exceeds Technical-Specification Limits, there may be a potential for ~
- 6. Solidwateroperationofthepressurizershouldbeavoidedunless(20*F) of subcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 7-1), if the RCS is solid.. closely monitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup or cooldown to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions.
- 7. Minimize the number of cycles or pressuriter auxiliary spray whenever the temperature differential between the sprag water and the pressurizer is gretter than [200*F) in order to minimize the increase in the spray nozzle thermal stress accumulation factor. Every such cycle must be recorded in
- Q3. Operation of .sny equipment in the containment building when containment hydrogen concentratio 4 [4%] should consider the possibility of hydrogen ignition (eference15.3)2Considerationshouldbegiventothefollowing:
- a. The importance to safety of equipment operation
- b. The urgency of equipment operation
- c. The use of alternative equipment located outside containment
- d. The current hydrogen level and the anticipated time to reduce Hg 3 [4%].
- SIDE DEMAND EVENT i BREAK j (ESDE) 1r d 9r ONTAINMEN YES ONTAINMENT NO YE NO PRESSURE PRESSURE INCREASING INCREASING 0 r
- FIGUFE -E
- m
- 1. Reactivity Control 1.a. Reactor power decreasing and
- b. Negative rtup Rate a
- c. Not more than_1 CEA bottom light
- not lit or borated per Tech Specs.
- 2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries 2.a.-Main turbine tripped
- b. Generator output breakers open' kwnF
- c. At least one v talg d
- d. At least one rain of e ectrical dt3rrf4MM u A d he.dedid3 DC power i availabi for:
- p*,r he r e s uj . t e .! .
- 3. RCS Inventory Control 3.a. If pressurizer level is r .ml e
- b. If oressurizer level is less than M Then:
- areoperatingandtheSig pump (s)areinjectingwater '
- SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK Safety Function Acceptance Criteria 4, RCS Pressure Control 4.a. Pressurizer heaters and spray, or charging and letdown, or SIS pumps (unless SIS termination criteria met) are maintaining er
- restoring pressurizer pressure-
- b. All available charging pumps are opbrating and the SIS pump (s) are
- b. The RCS is at least [20*F]
- 6. RCS Heat Removel 6.a. The unisolated steem generator has level:
- b. RCS T,y, is less than [545'F].
- 7. Containment Isolation 7.a. i) Containment pressure less than [f}psig [ #
- 11) CIAS present or mar.ually initiated, f
- SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK Safety function Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Containment Temperature and 8.a. 1) Containment temperature less Pressure Control than[240'F]
- b. The containment cooling system is operating in one of the following configurations:
- atleash00gph
- 9. Containment Combustible 9.a. Containment sprays have g been Gas Control actuated or
- b. Hydrogen c centration less s 3gW ' than [0.511 h,Ow e p<cd **
- AM ##~^ re . i) [all available hydrogen j_ g g ,L
- 11) hydrogen concentration is e
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been perfomed and
- 2. Any of the following conditions may be present:
- a. A reactor trip, and unusual concurrent symptoms, with no immediately apparent diagnosis or cause,
- b. Any condition, or pattern of symptoms, for which abnomal or emergency guidance cannot be identified.
- c. Actions taken in an Optimal Recovery Guideline are not satisfying the acceptance criteria in the Safety Function Status Check.
- 1. The acceptance criteria for all success paths in use are being satisfied.
- 2. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists or has been approved,by +ha [Dian+ NhM"1 %ppeet Cente- or the ohnt Op;r:tions kevicu Cerittee)) for wR.
- 1. Ensure Standard Post Trip Actions 1. 'O' ' b- A ' '"'i" d '
- 2. Ifpressurizerpressuredecreases 2. Continue RCP operation, to less than /1300 psiaf following an SIAS, Then ensure all RCPs are tripped.
- 3. / S m W both steam generators h 3.
- 4. Place the hydrogen monitors in 4 service.
- 5. Confinn the status of each 5.
- Step Performed Continuously FRG 11-3 CE b . 43
- 6 Verify all safety functions are 6. Identify plant resources or being satisfied, or identify success patils, which can be those in jeopardy, by comparing used to fulfill each safety control board parameters to the function that is not being acceptance criteria of the Safety satisfied. Refer to the Function Status Check. Resource Assessment Trees.
- 7 If All Safety Function Status 7. If ary Safety Function Check acceptance criteria are Sta'eus Check acceptance satisfied, Then perfom . criteria-NOT satisfied, appropriate OPERATOR ACTIONS for Dendothefollowingin e
- a. perfom OPERATOR ACTIONS for those success-paths wiinse acceptance criteria are Not satisfied and_
- b. perfom appropriate OPERATOR AC710NS for all success paths in use.
- Step Perfomed Continuously FRG 11-4 Cf.thiS2=tev -03 l
- a. appropriate OPERATOR ACTIONS for all success paths in use have been performed.
- b. All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- Step Perfonned Continuously FRG 11-5 C M Js
- / )
- u /
- COOLING _
- n B,m .,
- u. , cw m cmM -
- f
- see .
- (2) FOR HDT AND COLO LEG INJECTION MODE.THE LPSI PUMPS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERATING.THE HPSI PUMP FLOW IS OlV10E0 EQUALLY BETWEEN THE HOT AND COLO LEGS .
- 1. REACTIVITY CONTROL -------------------------------- Tree A Success Path Currently In Use Acceptance Criteria RC-1: CEA Insertion a. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit and reactor power decreasing E
- b. Reactor power less than
- b. Reactor power less than
- c. Adequate shutdown margin ,,
- 1. REACTIVITY CONTROL (Cont'd) ------------------------- Tree A Success Path Currently In Use Acceptance Criteria At Itat 2 si 4 Sr tus~s cI*hv*'*
- b. Reactor power less than
- c. Adecuate shutdown margin established per Technical Specifications and reactor power constant or decreasing.
- b. Reactor power less than
- 2. MAINTENANCE OF VITAL AUXILIARIES III------ 7 --------- Tree B-1 and B-2.
- o. Vital DC. ' must Vesbe'T AC D 'S satisfied in order to satisfy Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries.
- 2. MAINTENANCE OF VITAL AUXILIARIES ------- Tree B-1.eT:tb B-2 av / d3 .
- 3. RCS INV ENTORY CONTROL -------.---------------------- Tree C Success Path Currently In Use Acceptance Criteria IC-1: CVCS a. Pressuriz level is - % 1* GDo 270.0 2 a:::u}. a n d cce
- 4 aa a_n
- b. TheRCSisatleast[20'F[
- c. [TheRVLMS dicates the 'c' M *'" ^*
- x. ~ 3 covered .
- b. heRVLMS5dicatesthe'e*M '~
- If the RCS is'in a solid condition for pressure control, then the limit of 289*
- Success Path i Currently in Use Acceptance Criterja a ;
- a. Pressurizer pressure is within i Controlled Steaming the Post Accident P.T limits of figure 11 1, Pc. 5 Sstel y De 7,,,,,,,,,4 s Q u p l tM (bt A'ec. A t P.T I,m.43
- -4) 1+n-tAar 2350 ps4a-and roaster,-or decrees 4ag.
- b. Pres su ret <c pen succ. M lua raa< a k door <a luel, f
- 5. RCS AND C0P.E HEAT REMOVAL ........................... Tree E i
- b. l'H . Tc is less than /10*F/ and not increasing a_ n_,d, ,44$?;3 a~ 3,$ap
- c. T,y,islessthan/'AS*Ffandnot .
- d. TheRCSisSleast/20'F) subcooledby-{T gsN. I M and e.-/horeactorvesselvoidingas indicatedbytheRVLMS/. .
- b. Tg-T less than {40'13 and not c
- c. T3y, is less than {SC*i] and not increasing 3D$
- d. The RCS is at least [20*F7 subcooledJbyaverageCET7 ,,
- e. No abnomal difference {wicoter thei.IG"T]'vetween[T RTOs g and CETs/.
- Success Path
- HR-3
- SG Heat Sink with a. At least one SG has level:
- b. [AverageCb7temperatureless than superheated 4
- c. All available charging pumps are operating and the SIS pump are injecting water into the RCS per Figure 11-3 (unless SIS termination criteria met)+e-AAS hat e vnerad). ,,
- d. M lea k o ne. k s% o f (~
- 6. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION .......-----............----- Tree F
- GUIDELINES Page 22 of 13 Revision 03' SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK 1
- 7. CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE ---------------- ---------- Tree G
- b. Containment pressure less than
- b. Contain.nent temperature and pressure constant or decreasing.
- 11) [Twocontainmentsprayheaders 1E500gpm],
- b. Containment temperature and pressurecogantordecreasing.
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l GUIDELINES Page " of -_u Revision ._ 01 4
- 8. CONTAINMENT COMBUSTIBLE --------------------------- Tree H GAS CONTROL i
- b. 1) [All Nailable hydrogen '76'"5 ^^$
- and ii) Hydrogen concentration is M 4 (.-2.4_ 4 94,1.pk $p w f CCGC-2: Hydrogen Purge System a. Hydrogen purge system operating inaccordancewith(plant specific operating instructions).
- 1. Maintain RCS temperature constant 1.
- on
- 2. Insert CEAs into the core by3the 2.
- a. 0 prc33 eli manual C4A trip 0 dck
- w. <rs , . . i un
- 21
- re. _aia%.lf Mf P*4 Lt t,~ s p,. a6viaf,
- d. [0ther ple'rit sp;cific rathods, I ir.3erthere). .
- 1. Reactivity Control is satisfied if:
- a. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light not lit
- b. ReactorpowerINsthan[10' %)andconstantordecreasing,
- 2. E above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate Reactivity Control success path.
- 3. H above criteria satisfied. Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented as precau-
- tions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training prcgram.
- 2. It may not be possible to control other safety functions if reactivity control is in jeopardy. .
- 3. Changes in RCS temperature affecting reactivity must be minimized until a shutdown margin per Technical Specification Limits is achieved in order to prevent core restart.
- 5. Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equalize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a
- 6. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCSpressureandthereforeshouldbeavoidedunless[20*Ffofsubcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, .
- 1. Maintain RCS temperature constant 1.
- the initial transient.
- 2. Comence maximum boration using the 2.
- a. Align all available charging pumps 2, ^'i; 21' :v:11:ble totakeasuctionfromthe/ boric cher>;i g pu p: to take
- c. Manually operate charging and letdown to mainja.ip pressurizer V6 T* 1* tL2 --.e-- - ----- se level m w 6,s ;.
- a. Boron addition rate greater than [-C ; ] /80 y 1 and reactor power decreasing.
- b. Reactor power ins than [10 %)andconstantordecreasing E
- 3. M above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy. !
- 1. Changes in RCS temperature affecting reactivity must be minimized until a shutdown margin per Technical Specification Limits is achieved in order to prevent core restart.
- 2. After a shutdown boron concentration is attained in the RCS, makeup water added to the RCS should be of at least the same boron concentration in l the RCS in order to prevent RCS dilution.
- 3. Main, or auxiliary, pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equalize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration. If pressurizer' spray is not available, RCS boron concentration should be increased. This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum requirements caused later by a possible pressurtzer outsurge.
- 4. All available indications should be used to aid in an evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular ,
- 5. It may not be possible to control other safety functions if reactivity control is in jeopardy. ,
- 6. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCS pressure and therefore should be avoided unless [20'F/ of subcooling cannot be' maintained in the RCS (Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup or cooldown in order to avoid rapid pressure excursions.
- 8. Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past [1 I hour] af ter event initiation unless reouired for reactivity control. ;
- 1. Maintain RCS temperature constant 1. !
- control is established, in order to prevent power increases following the initial transient.
- a. start idle SIS pumps and a ensure electrical power verify SIS flow in accordance to valves and pumps, i
- Step Performed Continuously RC-3
- c. pre,s rizer level greater than
- r. 0 s and not decreasing, and
- d. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow).
- 5. (Cont'd) i and e.[theRVLMS dicates a minimum level at the top of the hot !
- 6. M criteria of step 5 can NOT O be 6.
- Step Performed Continuously RC-3 t-FRG 11-67 S&fretSTdo . A ~
- 1. Reactivity Control is satisfied if:
- a. Boron addition rate is greater than-{40 vem)hlo je,~)
- b. Reactorpower1[lessthan[10~ %]andconstantordecreasing 9L
- c. Adequate shutdown margin established per Technical Specifications and reactor power constant or decreasing.
- 2. M,abovecriteriaNOTsatisfied,ThengotonextappropriateReactivity Control success path. .
- 3. M above criteria satisfied. Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 2. It may not be possible to control other safety functions if reactivity control is in jeopardy.
- 3. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is
- 5. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make is difficult to control 1
- 6. Changes in RCS temperature affecting reactivity must be minimized until a shutdown margin per Technical Specification L1mits is achieved in order to prevent core restart.
- 7. Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equalize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration. If pressurizer spray is not available, RCS boron concentration should be increased. This avoids 4 an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pres-i surizer outsurge. I
- 8. After a shutdown boron concentration is attained in the PCS, makeup water added to the RCS shoald be at least the same boron concentration as the RCS to preveht kCS Jilution.
- 1. Maintain RCS temperature constant 1.
- 2. ire-energizeCEAdrive 2.
- 1. Reactivity Control is satisfied if:
- a. Not more than 1 CEA bottom light is not lit and reactor power is decreasing or
- b. ReactorPowerisles[than[10" %)andconstantordecreasing
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR REACTIVITY CONTROL.
- 3. E above criteria satisfied Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. All available indications should be used te aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular
- 2. It may not be possible to control other safety functions if reactivity control is in jeopardy.
- a. Energize or restore other vital auxiliaries to necessary components on j'l the reactivity control success paths, i
- b. Attempt manual operation of inoperative valvas,
- c. If high RCS pressure prevents S!S injection of boric acid, then the pressure and heat removal sections should be referenced and an attempt made to lower plant pressure to pennit SIS, pump injection of boric acid.
- Unit thauuting
- 1. Veriff that the [44e M 1. Realign the offsite grid to
- 2. If electrical AC power is 2.
- available from the 6
- tutup] not available from the { trtup-] ,
- onefvital [4.16kV) bus 4n- Vital AC Power success path.
- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS PATH MVAC-1:
- 1. Maintenance of Vital AC Power is satisfied if:
- Atleastonevital/4.16KV/4eeisenergized.
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied. Then go to Naintenance of Vital AC Power success path MVAC-2.
- 3. If above criterion satisfied AND Maintenance of Vital 0C Power satisfied, t
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is J apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. Ifonlyenehp:w ital AC bws- has beer, restored, the acceptance criteria for Maintenance of Vital AC Power will be met and the operators should proceed to the next safety function in jeopardy. However,-efforts to restore the seceM-M hnd the non-vital busest should be j continued in order to increase the availability of plant systems and components.
- o. rwn bw , o c i ke5 me 3 b e. app i,a d fn.m offs.h. powe.c.
- b. T.m f uu h em a l $asdc.bne does ne t un side e o Icn3tc bm Spa.ce., d aif b 4 M ^ %'j E a u SGoem d E bOf re h r t e, o f t h e. 3 repici ce ment o f o. f c iled t r n s form e e.
- 2. Ensure3emergency diesel 2. R We- g ,"," g c < ,
- 3. Ensure at least ones vital 3. If diesel generators N_0T
- 1. Maintenance of Vital AC Power is satisfied if:
- 2. E above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate Maintenance of vital AC Power success path MVAC-J.4 gc, Dcond
- 3. E above criterion satisfied AND Maintenance of Vital DC 3 Power See 1
- 4. E acceptance criteria for AM safety functions are being satisfied.
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: MVAC-2 3 i
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 1. Restore electric power to at 1. If this mode of operation p .
- V bas Ico m t h e, Pe r m -n e ni pe a. sa( c.43 4 . i L. W ows- pw& ' w
- 4. i t, x v bus cannoF be eaeegt'd h b not a. vcu lq ble (re.n i h e hu v e. A w n u a d. 3 from +ho. T2ex e Trans b e.e., tg c lo se Mc A w xi u a a y T c. u s c-<.,e s e e ,
- f-3o to M a s n ke n n ut
- 1. Maintenance of Vital AC Power is satisfied if:
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to Maintenance of Vital. AC PowersuccesspathMVAC-[.3
- 3. If above criterion satisfied AND Maintenance of Vital 3DC Power satisfied,
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. If only onehital AC bus has been restored, the acceptance criteria for
- GUIDELINES page to of 13 Revision E
- SAFETY FUNCTION
- Maintenance of Vital AC Power Ac So rte SUCCESS PATH: 4,Second: tar %tg hnt ".C]:
- 1. Verify that AC power is available 1. Oc to C ntinuing A 44 ens-for from Eth Occcad phnt], the. ca.hr"k Mehtemmcc cf Vital AG AC 58*t' c a wS *
- r ' *
- 2. Restore ele @ cp power to at 4r ger e fhe pec,bl< m least oryev ital J4.16 KVJ has by a n A s t e- e t the AAC par' ~ 4nc [nlen+ spect'ic operating S :,.cs . ,
- 4. ib (v feed}. ci ne rgiting e n e N, ~ .a M 2
- Ac 4' L4 ^ 9 A'*^'
- 1. Maintenance of Vital AC Power is satisfied if:
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL AC POWER.
- 3. If above criterion satisfied AND Maintenance of Vital DC Power satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confinnatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. If only one[ ital AC [4.16 KV] bws has been restored, the acceptance I
- 4. T h e. A l h e n J c. A c. 5 - cu is d e s.g r,, a fc swt u t hin twc m i n d 's of Lo64 of Ec + <- Io N s'a fc - U
- FRG 11-103- __ E ~.
- . 2 " C4 l
- 1. Verify that at least one [12; velt]- 1. Fnw re_that,at least 4 4 D.v.s. e v.bl D sv *DCb$3as electrical-96 power
- T_ n g s - k e s .
- P P ' ' b I
- u. cc. a v uh
- W s- N i2o v Ac. cb sks W M ^-
- 1. Maintenance of Vital 96 Power is satisfied if:
- k '* k
- p. v . , , ,; - %ct enes is4 d L n.
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to C4NTINUING ACTIONS FOR-MaI" TEM ^NCE OF "!-TE--DC -POUQr M V C P - 2 g qua,egwccorvirci' oc A'W S S d "I'.d, 3 .- I,.f above criterion satisfied A,ND Maintenance of Vital AC Power satisfied, j
- 4. If acceptance criteria for M safety functions are being satisfied, Then l go to LONG TERM ACTIONS after performing appropriate operator actions for all success paths in use.
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular
- 3. If[only one sitol a a:;...s a4a+ been restored, the acceptance criteria for t
- e. v function i %t n. ins,.w jeop Nard es. However, efforts to restore3the earnna vital hun (and tha non eitel bu5ed should be l continued in order to increase the availability of plant systems and components.
- power is available, the station batteries should supply electric DC power to the vital station DC loads - If a prolonged loss of vital AC occurs, the sustained operation of essential DC power equipment becomes more critical . Therefwe, bettery current ch uld be m
- nitored te u4atze-the-du"tica e' batter-y evaiiaoliity. # f # "'" " " "' 6 /c h v e 61
- FRG 11-116 CEN-152 _Rev M 3
- 1. Verify that,at least one [w.s,e.e.125 vslt-] n 1. rnwra + hat-atg least one Dis.s.c..
- ( GUIDELINES Page 2 of 5 Revision W g e c t'-t 4
- c -
- 1. Maintenance of Vital 90 Power is satisfied if:
- 2. H above criterion N_0T0 satisfied. Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL DC POWER.
- 4. f 1_f acceptince criteria for ALL safety functions are being satisfied, Then 4
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to f ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24). '
- 3. If 3cnly en: "it:1 OC Abe hn been restored, the acceptance criteria for
- 4. SinceKhebatterychargersarepoeredbythevitalACbuses,ifvitalAC power is vailable, the station atteries should supply electric DC power to the vital tation DC loads. If a prolonged loss of vital AC occurs, the sustained op ation of es .ntial DC power equipment becomes more critical. Therefor batter current should be monitored to maximize the duration of battery ava ab lity.
- a. During the first [3 min. of a loss of vital AC, the manual and automatic use of v tal stati DC' loads will be maximized to:
- 1. realign the n-site distribution r electrical AC power; gVC P-2--
- p. v. S. e. 3 c (
- 1. Verifythatatleastone[125voltf 1. Ehure that at leas one D s.nen of DC bn.has electrical DC power
- available from the associated vital electrical power available DC battery chargers, from the _teti^ tery. afsc.c.ubd L ii - -4 DwH< rt e s .
- u. Pc4 L < e.. ,s Lw eeq ~v 3 e a c.h dnFr.b tico cen ke d'i o w O'1 (c.n i k c m ba d f eg Ch w r t *~ .
- b. One_ t u re<t. u d As 9 e.b Jic,
- v. u ihe D v . s . c ., ch s & c. b. hon cuke e TM D i v . u c ., cli d e b h e.'
- 1. Maintenance of Vital DC Power is satisfied if:
- 11) The operation of at k;.;t une-120 volt vital AC instr =er.t channel.104
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to 4-ONTINUING ACTIONS-f0R-1 MA+NTENANCC OF-VtTAt-tet0WER; svDC-L
- 3. If above criterion satisfied AND Maintenance of Vital AC Power s:tisfied, Then 90 to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is
- apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated vben one or more <onfirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. If only one vital DC tnrs has been restored, the acceptance criteria for Maintenance of Vital DC Power will be met and the operators should proceed to the next safety function in jeopardy. However, efforts to
- 4. Since the battery chargers are powered by the vita sC buses, if vital AC power is available, the station batteries should ' supply electric DC power to the vital station DC loads. If a prolonged loss of vital AC occurs, tDIuEa'ilfePokratNn f e$sIEtial'Y)$ power equipment becomes more critical. Therefore, battery current should be monitored to maximize the duration of battery availability, sk .s
- a. During the first {30 y'" ] of a loss of vital AC, the manual and automatic use of vital station DC loads will be maximized to:
- i. realign the on-site distribution for electrical AC power; MVDC-1 FRG 11-116 CEii 15faiier. 03-
- battery availability. Non-essential DC loads should be removed from the DC distribution by opening the loads' supply breakers.
- b. If the loss of vital AC powercc::d [20 -h] the continued use of 4
- 1. provide only a minimum of instrumentation and control equipment to monitor and control the plants parameters.
- c. A c Ne 1:, re s w ee. v ,si A c p o n e , a n ct s.p gl y of V. led D C_ pe w e 4 c,% W k W.c che.c p c.s Shodd be. cm4i,we.J. <_ve n if A Aec.<fbee Ce 14e m of Hvoc-7. ismd.
- 1. Verify that at least one f125-vekt 1. run - th;; at ic ,3t 0, r -
- d. , Ta kt o c.be,n A5 cc (2.t < c 4, b rwin e' m. s. e it . et ci s A butic.cErs h ex 4 nel Lauery liG .
- 1. Maintenance of Vital DC Power is satisfied if:
- 1) DC control power a_!Ld ii) The operation of =t least one 120 volt vital AC instrumerit channel. Ic.n h .
- 2. J_fabovecriterionNOTsatisfied,ThengotoCONTINUINGACTIONSFOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL DC POWER.
- 4. H acceptance criteria for ALL safety functions are being satisfied, Then go to LONG TERM ACTIONS after performing appropriate operator actions for
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. If only one vital DC-btts has been restored, the acceptance criteria for Maintenance of Vital DC Power will be met and the operators should proceed to the next safety function in jeopardy. However, efforts to I
- 4. Since the battery chargers are powered by the vit AC buses, if vital AC -
- a. During the first fSC .....] of a loss of vital AC, the manual and automatic use of vital station DC loads will be maximized to:
- 1. realign the on-site Ulstribution for electrical AC power; MVDC'l.
- b * * *0 ' \3 a.-r4 M
- b. If the loss of vital AC power excccds [20 min.] the continued use of vital station DC loads should be minimized, but not restricted, to:
- 1. provide only a minimum of instrumentation and control equipment to monitor and control the plants parameters.
- SAFETY FUNCTION: RCS Inventory Control SUCCESS PATH: CVCS; IC-1 RESOURCE TREE: Tree C INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Verify charging and letdown are 1. Manually control charging and operating automatically to main- letdown to maintain or restore tain or restore pressurizer level nressurizer level -{46-to-34&M.k- rA%
- 2. Verify adequate suction source (s) 2. Replenish source (s) or switch exists for charging pump opera- charging pump suction as necessary tion. Available sources include k to maintain charging capability, VCT,Yoric keid htorage~fankf spent funi 15 avu to W h nn,1.
- 3. If high pressurizer level condi- 3.
- 4. If S l A s i s in ib l e d, oJ I c> v o il a.bl e, cu t s p e p s 5 % )4 de o.t p b p ~p 4o h 4. I ts un4ll rw le y h.uule.d , d % h 6 u@ W Ic.wsT.
- 1. RC$ Inventory Control is satisfied if:
- a. Pressurizer level is -{-3%N0^3*
- b. The RCS is at least [20*Ff subcooled and
- c. ,hheRVLMS dicatesthe'Co7E08Mf.
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied Then go to RCS Inventory Control success pathIC-2($15).
- 3. H above criteria satisfied Then go to next safety function in jeopardy, 4 M accepttnce criteria for ALL safety functions are being satisfied, Then go to LONG TERM ACTIONSfe ,a_f,t_er perfonning appropriate operator actions for all success paths in use.
- 1. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCS pressure, and therefore should be avoided unless /20*FJ of subcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Ficure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, i closely monitor any makeup or dr .mng and any system heatup or cooldown to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions.
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluating plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24),
- 3. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- due to the effect of the RCP induced pressure head on u,e RYLMS. it.e i
- Void elimination should be started soon enough to ensure heat removal and inventory control are not lost (Reference 15.14).
- SAFETY FUNCTION: RCS Inventory Control SUCCESS PATH: 515; IC-2 RESOURCE TREE: Tree C INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- b. start idle charging pumps lineup,
- c. ensure operation of neces-
- Step Performed Continuously.
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE Rn un cui0ttiNo GUIDELINES Page 6 of 2o Revision E l
- and Heat Removal success paths is use),
- AM of the following are satisfied:
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat 4 from the RCS (ability for feed
- ! j a v e l W rn a c c e , I8 '"* d* '& * * * # available sources.
- *10. Ensure #S1 ow 3 [30 m) 10. H F SI flow <[309.)per ump per pump ddring recire ation, durin recircula on Th turn off one chargi pump a a tim u til HPSI fl w 1(30g ]per
- pump. H m nimum HP I flow still not et with all ch ging, pumps o ,Then rn off one $1 pump a time ntil H ! f1pw 1[3 pm]per mp.
- Step Perfonned Continuously.
- 1. RCS Inventory Control is satisfied if
- a. All available charging pumps are operating and the S!S pump (s) ,
- b. [The RVLMS indicates the N /$ N Y M f'
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR RCS I INVENTORY CONTROL.
- 1. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCSpressure,andthereforeshouldbeavoidedunloss[20'F[ofsubcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 11 1). If the RCS is solid, closely nonitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup or cooldown 1
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluating plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confimatory indications are available (Reference 15.24). Hot and cold leg RTDs may be influenced by cold $15 injection and should be checked against each other,
- 3. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- GUIDELINES Page_.19. of 10 Revision 08 CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR iNVtNTORY CONTROL
- %a N to dischacge.
- 1 l COMBUSTK)N ENGINEERING Tm.E FUNCTIO M
- MC WRY GUI EUNE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE _
- automatically maintaining limits of Figure 11-1 are violated.
- b. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature
- 2. Y* rd) C g6 ing a4 k b n e t. L A , m c. de,j g, ,, g o /c t<Mg cA hmdic.Ily M ewm km )ddoj 4, m , , , gore
- 3. V* % nJe p k sweben 1; u e o. b) A Reebd 5.utc4) or 5W T V'd be hgia p e p g
- e g 4Q,-
- Step Performed Continuously PC-1 FRG 11-145 Cwasi :-73 3 s
- 1. Verify charging an t wn are 1. Manually contrakt ng and operatingoutbItically letdo ,wn t [ maintain or restore p
- 2. Verify adequate Sucti i,o- source (s) 2.'4eplenish source (sPditch exist for c)afhng p p opera- cha(gin p suction as necessary tion. rces include t . ntain charging gapability.
- Step Perfonned Continuously TC-2
- a. attempt to maintain the plant !
- b. !_f,overpressurization due to excessive charging flow. Then throttle or secure charging and manually control letdown to ,
- Step Performed Continuously j
- 1. RCS Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- 2. If above criterion NOTT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate RCS Pressure Control success path.
- 3. Jff above criterion satisfied Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- GUIDELINES page 3 of 40 Revision #
- 1. Continuously monitor RCS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a heat removal rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations. If the heat removal rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, there may I
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or i
- 3. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCS pressure and, therefore, should be avoided unless [20'F] of subcool-ingcannotbemaintainedintheRCS(Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining, and any system heatup or cool-down, to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions..
- 1. RCS Pressure Control is satisfied if: '
- 3. E above criterion satisfie . Then go to next safety function in
- 1. Do not place systems in " manual" unless misope' ration in " automatic" is
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readjngs must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are ada11able (Reference 15.24),
- 3. Continuous 1 f monitor RCS temperafure and pressur,e to avoid exceeding a heat removal rate greater than, Technical Specification Limitations. If the heat temoval rate exceeds /fechnical Specification limits, there may be a potential for pressurize'd thermal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel (Reference 15.8) unless Post Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits are maintained (Figure 11-1)./
- 4. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to enntrol RCS pressure and,[herefore, should be avoided unless [20*F] of subcool-ing cannot be ma tained in the RCS (Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, closely monitor ny makeup or draining, and any system heatup or cool-down, to avoid ny unfavorable rapid pressure excursions.
- an SIAS actuated.
- *2. If pressurizer pressure 2. Continue RCP operation.
- the following: following as necessary:
- a. start S!S pumps and verify a. -ensure electrical power to .
- b. start idle charging pumps. c. ensure operation of necessary auxiliary systems, i
- Step Performed Continuously.
- b. pressurizer. level is greater than[M]andnotdecreasing, j c) at least.one steam generator ,
- *g. E the criteria of step; 4 ec E5 i
- Step performed Continuously.
- a. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-tempera-ture configuration or contin-ue to cooldown within the limits of Figure 11-1.
- b. E overpressurization due to excessive WS! flow, Then throttle or stop SPSI pumps (refertostep4)andmanually control-letdown to-restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Figure 11-1.
- Step Performed Continuously.
- Step Perfonned Continuously.
- 1. RCS Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- 2. Jff,above criterion M Satisfied. Then go to next appropriate RCS Pressure Control success path.
- 3. E above criterion satisfied. Then 90 to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in "autmati." is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in the evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a partic-ular instrument reading. Instrument ieadings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. Continuously monitor RCS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a heat removal rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations. If the heat removal rate exceeds Technical Lpecification Limits, there may be a potential for pressurized thennal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel (Reference 15.8) unless Post Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits are maintained (Figure 11-1).
- 2. Allow pressurizer level to lower 2.
- 3. Perform a controlled cooldown/ 3. M the condenser or turbine bypass depressurization in accordance system E available, Then cooldown with Technical Specifications via the atmospheric dump valve (s),
- Step Perfortned Continuously.
- GUIDELINES Page 16 of .12. Revision #
- g. +f nfor-auxi444ry feedwater in a. stop all RCPs, M'f l accordance with the following: b. isolate SG blowoown, secondary
- Step perfortned corttinuously.
- 5. Ensure the available condensate 5.
- a. [at least one steam generator a.@bothSGwiderangelevels[15[
10*F)betweenT HRTDs ) and[CETs). *2. ivaluate the need and desira- 2. H RCP operation g desired, bility of restarting RCPs. Then go to step 8. Consider the following: '
- a. adequacy of RCS and core heat removal using natural
- b. existing RCS pressure and temperatures,
- c. the need for main pressurizer i spray capability, (Continued On Next Page)
- Step Perfomed Continuously.
- e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures.
- selected RCPs.
- e. RCS subcooling at least 120*Ff.
- f. [other criteria satisfied per RCPoperatinginstructions].
- Step Perfonned Continuously PC-J'9 FRG 11-167 CE M&M3 4
- a. St+rt ei; availabie cnarging 6"5*eo O /"" * " ("r , *d A P ' ** f ' " '
- b. s, tart one RCP in each loop, c.hsureproperRCPoperation by monitoring RCP amperage and -
- d. operate charging (and l#S!)
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat l from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow).
- Step Performed Continuoutli PC-ji'f FRG 11-168 C1'?r:I",;Z Ted
- COMBUSTON ENGINEERING TITLE FUNCTIONAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE RENW MRINE GUIDELINES i Page 25. of .u- Revision a* l
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I
- 9. Allow pressurizer leyel_to.._1_ower 9.
- Step Performed Continuously PC-g4 FRG 11-169 CEM 'd M l
- 10. Perform a controlled cooldown/ 10. H the condenser or turbine bypass depressurization in accordance system M available, Then cooldown with Technical Specifications- via the atmospheric dump valve (s).
- Step Perfomed Continuously, s
- a. at least one steam generator a.hbothSGwiderangelevels haswiderangelevelh15%] E15%] Then initiate cWhrough-ceoL&eg (success path HR-4 ,and aj implement success path PC 'J .
- b. RCS-T teroperatures are stable g or decreasing /.
- b. H RCS Tctemperatures increase ,
- Step Performid Continuously.
- b. depressurize the plant using 4
- Figure 11-1.
- d. If overpressurization due to M/ charging flow Then throttle s or secure flow (refer 4
- and maintain pressurizer
- of Figure 11-1.
- Step Perfomed Continuously.
- a. voiding in the RCS may be in-dicated by any of the following indications, parameter changes, or trends:
- 11) pressurizer level increas-ing significantly more than expected while operating pressurizer spray, iii)/theRVLMSindicatesthat voiding is present in the reactorvessel[,
- b. E voiding inhibits RCS de-pressurization and depressur-ization is desired. Then at-tetnpt to eliminate the voiding by:
- 1) verify letdown is isolated, ang (ContinuedOnNextPage)
- S'ep Performed Continuously.
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 11) stop the depressur-ization, i 10d iii) pressurize and depres-surize the RCS within the limits of Figure 11-1 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray or AfSI and charging pumps.
- Monitor pressurizer level -
- c. M depressurization of the RCS is still not possible, and voiding is suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes, '
- 4 4
- d. If depressurization of the RCS is still not possible. Then
- attempt to eliminate the voiding by
- Step Performed Continuously.
- 1. RCS Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- 2. If above criterion NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate RCS Pressure Control success path.
- 4. If acceptance criteria for ALL safety functions are being sati:fied, Then
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PC-[f i This section contains items which should be considered when imp,lementing EPGs
- and preparing plant specific E0Ps. the items should be implemented as precau-l tions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training program.
- 1. Do not place sy: " .ns in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in the evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a partic-ular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference ?5.24).
- 3. Continuously monitor RCS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a heat removal rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations, if the heat removal rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, there may be a potential for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel (Reference 15.8), unless Post-Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits are maintained (Figure 11-1;.
- 5. Natural circulation flo'w should not be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped.
- 6. Verification of temperature responses to a plant change cannot be accomp-lished until approximatelyh to 15)inutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times during natural circulation (Reference 15.11).
- 7. When RCS heat removal is conducted by natural circulation with an iso-lated steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e., Tc higher than T h) may be observed in the idle loop. This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circulation flow in the operating steam generator loop (Reference 15.11).
- 8. The operator should not add feedwater to a dry steam generator if another steam generator still contains water. Re-establish feedwater only to the steam generator that is not dry. If both steam generators become dry, refill only one steam generator to reinitiate core cooling.
- 9. When a void exists in the reactor vessel, and RCPs are not operating, the RVLMS provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel liquid inventory.
- rely solely on the RVLMS indication when RCPs are operating (Ref. 15.15).
- 10. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS voiding and take steps to eliminate voiding any time voiding causes the heat-removal or inventory control safety functions to begin to be threatened.
- inventory control are not lost (Reference 15.14). PC FRG 11-178 { Emf 2 " A-^3
- in the case other' success paths have.
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 3
- *1. Open steam dumps or 1.-11 valves do not open atmospheric dumps as from the Control Room, required to use steaming locally open the valves.
- inventory to reduce 8
- j. availablu, stop the j operating RCPs.
- two SI pumps injecting,g g ,) pumps injecting into the
- b. Close bleed valves-1 until additional SI pumps
- a. Establish steady state pressure conditions.
- b. Close the Rapid Depressurization.
- c. Stop the operating SI pumps.
- d. Initiate RCS and Core heat 8.d If,the use of the removal by the selected success path, selected success path is'not
- f. Secure cooling.to the IRWST Pressure Control when no longer required. per PC-5.
- I GUIDELINES page 37 of 4o Revision E
- 1. RCS Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- a. L p rc 0 ", L 1 'scr pii350rc i; 1000 tha" 2340 ptft and ennstant or decreasing ,
- b. pressurizer pressure is within the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure 11-1f.II
- 2. If above criteria NE satisfied, Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR RCS
- 3. I above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy, s
- 4. If acceptance criteria for ALL safety functions are being satisfied,- Then t
- GUIDELINES Page 38 of do Revision 87 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PC-f3 d
- 1. Do not place a system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24).
- 3. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control j RCSpressureandthereforeshouldbeavoidedunless/20"F?'ofsubcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid,-
- 5. /Monitorcench+ankparameterssinceanysustainedoperationofthe PORVs m y bur;t the M ak's r"pture # scvh 6. k. % h u s e a b ^
- I P w 5 T~.
- SAFETY FUNCTION: RCS and Core Heat Removal SUCCESS PATH: Forced Circulation, No S!S Operation; HR-1 RESOURCE TREE: Tree E a INSTRUCTIONS C_0,NTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. Perfom a controlled cooldown 3. H the condenser or turbine in accordance with Technical bypass system NE available, Specifications by operation of Then cooldown via the atmospheric
- a. stop the cooldown,
- b. manually control pressurizer spray to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 11-1, (ContinuedOnNextPage)
- Step Perfomed Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-218 'ux-43rN G3
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or continue to cooldown within the limits of Figure 11-1,
- d. M overpressurization due to charging flow, Then throttle or secure flow and manually control letdown to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 11-1.
- 5. H indications of steam 5. If NOT, Then go to step 14 generator tube leakage Then go to step 6.
- 6. Verify RCS hot leg temperature 6. Cooldown the RCS to a hot leg islessthan[525'F]inorder temperatureof'.essthan[525'F),
- 7. Determine which SG has the tube 7.
- a. sample SGs[for activity,
- b. [ monitor main steam piping for activity /,
- c. monitor steam generator levels, cL [nthar-plant Stie~Bfic indicat4 ens,.47tsert 1 eri:].
- 8. When RCS hot lag temperature is 8.
- a. close the MSIV, a. locally close MSIV,
- b. verify closed, or close the b. locally close MSIV bypass MSIV bypass valve, valve,
- c. [ raise the setpoint for the c./MaintaintheaffectedSG ,
- 11) local operation of the associatedADV[
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-220, Cfitd P M 4
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 8. (Cont'd) 8. (Cont'd)
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main feed-isolation valve, waterisolationvalvg
- e. fclose the ad ka he'gq e.[locallyYloYhisolation feedwater isolation valve (s) and steam driven pump valve (s) including the i steamsupplyvalve)',
- f. isolate steam generator f. locally isolate SG blowdown, blowdown, g, close vents, drains, g. locally isolate vents, exhausts, and bleedoffs drains, exhausts, and from the steam system and bleedoffs.
- 9. Verify the correct SG is 9. .I_f the wrong SG was isolated, isolated by checking the Then unisolate that SG and following: enichte thtt SG and isolate
- a. SG samples for activity and the affected SG per step 8.
- b. possible SG level increase.
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-221 09 + 7 ; A 3' l
- 10. Decrease and control RCS 10, pressurebyusing4[O3[g gp A aur414 e y spray,'or operation am of charging and letdown to maintain pressurizer pressure within the following criteria:
- a. lessthan(1000 psia]
- b. approximately equal to isolated SG pressure
- 11. Maintain the isolated steam 11. Restore the isolated steam generator level within the generator level to the indicated indicated rarige by the rangebythefollevig following: a. draining. to the Gedicsciive
- a. f.e.riodicdrainingt.othe e system [ ov du.mr> Nd
- bh
- b. dump steam from the affected the isolated steam generator steam generator to the pressure, condenser. mt--
- p. inning pei pleut speciric orneedorec}.
- Step Performed Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-222 t%51'nh4 l
- 15. Detemine the affected SG 15.
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures, c.
- 16. E excessive steam demand 16. Go to step 17.
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 17. Isolate the most affected steam 17.
- a. close the MSIV, a. locally close MSIV,
- b. verify closed, or close the b. locally close MSIV bypass MSIV bypass valve, valve, c./close,orverifyclosed c / locally close ADV(s)[,
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main feedwater isolation valve, isolation valve,
- e. Jclose the 'annusy feeb,at r e. [ locally close aM11TII-y~. -
- f. close vents, drains, exhausts f. locally close vents, drains, and bleedoffs, exhausts, and bleedoffs.
- 18. Verify the correct SG is 18. If the wrona SG was isolated, Then isolated by checking the unisolate that SG and isolate the following: most affected SG per step 17. ,
- a. SG steam pressures,
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures,
- c. SG levels.
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-224 CE2' 152- % 63
- 19. Stabilize RCS temperature 19.
- a. ,
- b. atmospheric dump valve (s).
- c. attempt to restore [ main ard/or
- Step Perfenned Continuously HR-1 FRG 11-225 @- 23 l
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- b. temperatures HR-4 :-d ' 't'ete
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o<u or<~ns-
- a. " SG e- n i
- r. ant-feet --pumpSr pa r t $p. Mig fe:torcAlevel, en 64 r-i m , ,, G - l e e l n. 6 ,e no al-band, 6 M. A. \ k '40
- flow ret.c U 150 p per-affeet I \
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-1
- GUIDELINES p.g. 11 of 69 R.visio,i w ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS PATH HR-1
- 1. RCS and Core Heat Remcval is satisfied if:
- a. At least one SG (or the unisolated SG) has level:
- c. T,y, <[5458F]andnotincreasing a_n_g,
- d. RCSsubcooling.3/20*Ffby/T gRTDsj
- 2. M above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate RCS and Core Heat Removal success path.
- 3. M above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented as precautions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training program.
- 1. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in the evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a 4
- 3. Continuously monitor RCS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a heat removal rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations. If the heat removal rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, there may be a potential for pressurized thennal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel (Reference 15.8), unless Post Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits are maintained (Figure 11-1).
- a. generator feeding and steaming, loop ai (TH-Tc ) less than and RCS inventory and pressure.
- , .
- Step Performed Continuously FRG HR-2 11-231 C@t' WK C3 ,
- a. electrical power is avail-
- b. RCPauxiliariesi{CC@ t tomaintainJseal injection),bearingand motor cooling are operating, and there are no high temperature alanns on the selected RCPs,
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow),
- d. pressurizer level is
- e. RCS subcooling at least-f20*Fpbasedont{ average CET) temperature (Figure ,
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-2 4
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page 16 of 69 Revisfori 6-INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- a. Start 9H-eve 44able r % e, gc, %, 56 un u u,l.u, e gr3 p m f s , u , ,15] p ~ r~* i 5 charging pam y pf,%,, , . , de in s emo N pressuro lass than 9eet L h- ryint
- l'
- b. start one RCP in each loop,
- c. [ensureproperRCP operation by monitoring RCPamperageandNPSHJ,6fj [
- a. RCS subcooling at least
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-233 C G id i h 5=C3
- _
- b. press ,1,zgr level is greater than and not decreasing, 4
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow),
- d. ftheRVLMSindicatesaminimum level at the top of the hot legnozzlesf.
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-234 J t* +tr Rw_Ql.
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 9. Allow pressurizer level to lower 9.
- 10. Perform a controlled cooldown 10. M the condenser or turbine in accordance with Technical bypass system NE available, Then Specifications by operation of cooldown via the atmospheric dump the turbine bypass system. valve (s).
- b. manually control pressurizer ,
- Step Perfortnea Continuously HR-2 k
- 11. *11. (Cont'd)
- c. attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or continue to cooldown within the. limits of i
- 13. Verify RCS hot leg temperature 13. Cooldown the RCS to a hot leg i is less than [525'F] in order to temperatureoflessthan[525'Fl.
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-236 C M"%+A3 3
- a. sample SGs j for activity,
- b. /monitormainsteampiping 4 foractivity[,
- c. monitor steam generator levels, dM4ther- "la n+ "4 indwtiens.Mmer2 hese},
- 15. When RCS hot leg temperature is 15.
- a. close the MS!V, a. locally close MSIV, b, verify closed, or close the locally close MSIV by-b.
- c. [raisethesetpointforthe c. [ Maintain the affected SG
- associatedADVto[950 psia], pressured 50pshby
- .
- 1) manual operation of the associated ADV ii) local operation of the associated ADV]
- Step perfonned Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-237 -0EN % c E 3 -
- 15. (Cont'd) 15. (Cont'd)
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main feed-i isolation valve, water isolation valve, l e. fciose thi d EAI$IE ., ' ' e. [ locally close A M Tso W '
- g. close vents, drains, exhausts, g. locally isolate vents, drains, and bleedoffs from the steam erhs"sts, and bleedoffs. I system and turbine building sumps, I h; [ ether p hnt spect'fc .Lem -
- 16. Verify the correct SG is isolated 16. E the wrong SG was isolated by checking ,the,fo},lowJng,;g Then unisolate that SG and
- a. SG samples, for activity and isolate the affected SG per -
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-238 TdL32 5:43 i
- d INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 17. Decrease and control RCS 17.
- c. within'the P-T limits of Figure 11-1 (refer to l step 11). .
- a. Periodic draining to the iu . ws .n ms.s y.~.4 wette system)'c' d-*P Q E"
- condenser. ._aad-.
- Step Perfc.med Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-239 C'E :MF
- monitors and any other applicable corrective actions in accordance radiation monitors, with Technical Specifications.
- 21. H indications of excessive 21. If NOT, Then go to step 27.
- 22. Detennine the affected SG 22.
- a. SG steam pressures,
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures,
- c. SG levels.
- 23. E excessive steam demand 23. Go to step 24. -
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-240 IE '.5: ^;. 03
- b. verify closed, or close b. locally close MSIV bypass the MSIV bypass valve, valve, c.[close,orverifyclosed c. [ locally close ADV(s)],
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main feedwater isolation valve, ., g * # isolation valve,
- e. [close the a N N ary feedwater T e. [locallyclose-aeONE isolationvalve/, feedwater isolation valvep f, close vents, drains, exhausts f. locally close vents, drains, and bleedoffs, exhausts, and bleedoffs.
- 25. Verify the correct SG is 25. I,f the wrong SG was isolated,
- a. SG steam pressures, per step 24.
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures,
- c. SG levels.
- 26. Stabilize RCS temperature by 26.
- 26. (Cont'd)
- a. turbine bypass system or
- b. atmospheric dump valve (s).
- d. [attempttoestablishan alternate, low pressure feedwater source to 'at least oneSG/.
- a. a. II_f fboth SG wide range levels
- b. RCS T temperatures c
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 FRG 11-242 C" "' " J3 1
- b. [HRCST temperatures i increase 'F)orgreater,Then go to RCS and Core Heat Removal success path HR-4 and
- i restored, Then.do_.the owing -te prevent-SG-fee *3c, I f f,,a es,tu i
- r
- A
- A '-
- a. h,fsnwater l a vel-4 s bove aQ,
- b. .E SC-ha+arlau ' is below ngml ban d, the-fee u\ i i ng , un/en~do7he" fol4ew :
- 1) stan hedn ant ' 4eedwater
- maiJ tatiied re, five minuw
- Step Performed Continuously HP -2 FRG 11-243 CUi '5: R 03
- EMERGENCY PROCEDURE "E***'""'
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1
- a. voiding in the RCS may be indicated by any of the following indication.,
- 11) pressurizer level increasing signi-ficantly more than expected while operating pressurizer spray, iii)[theRVLMSindicatesthat voidir.g is present in the reactorvessell, iv)[HJTCunheated thermocouple temperature i
- Step Performed Continuously HR-2 4
- b. If, voiding inhibits RCS ,
- Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by
- i) verify letdown is i isolatad, and ii) stop the depressurization,
- Step Performed Continuously HR FRG 11-245 CN:4 ^ r.~14
- c. H depressurization of the RCS is still not possible.
- 1) cool the suspected steam generator (by steaming '
- is still not possible, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- Step Performed Centinuously HR-2 FRG 11-246 CC '.'^ Z . C3
- 1. RCS and Core Heat Removal is satisfied if:
- a. At least one SG (or the unisolated SG) has level:
- 1) within the normal level band with feedwater available to maintain level, or eg (,yj ,, ,,,c,
- g ,
- b. T -T H c
- c. T,,, < 45AFf] and not increasing and
- d. RCS st.bcoolitig 1,f 20*F[ty [averaga CET) temperature, and e.
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied, Thy go to next appropriate RCE and Core Heat Removal success path.
- 3. _If_ above criteria satisfied, h 90 to next safety function in jeopardv.
- 1. Natural circulation flow should not be verified until the RCps have l
- 2. Verification of temperature responses to a plant change cannot be
- 3. Continuously monitor RCS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a 4
- complying with the pressure / temperature limits of Figure 11-1, then
- maintaining of adequate core cooling will be given the higher priority.
- 5. If cooling down by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, I
- 6. All available indications should be used to aid in the evaluatien of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Refer. 15.24).
- 7. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCSpressureandthereforeshouldbeavoidadunless/20'F)'ofsubcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 11-1). If the RCS is solid, closely monitor any makeup or drainage and any system heatup or cooldown to avoid any unfavorable pressure excursions.
- 8. When a void exists in the reactor vessel, and RCPs are not opertting, the 4
- operating,
- 10. If there is a conflict between isolating a SG (e.g., due to indications of steam generator tube leakage or excessive steam demand) and maintaining adequate heat removal, then maintain RCS heat removal via the least affected SG. At least one SG should always be available for heat remova'1, if at all oossible.
- pres >ure 3 (A*p'sig), Then [ sig) and an $1AS has g been j verify an SIAS actuated. initiated automatically. Then manually initiate an SIAS.
- Step Performed Continuously i
- 4. M high RCS pressure is 4 preventing adequate 515 flow.
- a. loop AT (T -T ) less than 57 %
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing,
- c. RCS subcooling at least
- d. no abnormal difference
- Step Performed Continuously HR-3 FRG 11-251 ctbl52-fbesM)3-4
- l 1
- and) two phase natural
- a. all available charging l pumps are operating and 515 pumps are injectino water into the RCS per Figure 11-3, ang
- b. SG steaming and feeding l are properly controlled, and c,.faverage Tftemperature
- 8. Allow pressurizer level,to, lower 8.
- Step Perfortned Continuously HR-3 4
- 4. stop the cooldown,
- b. manually concr01 pressurizer and spray to restore and maintain presturizer pressure within the limits of Figure 11-1,
- c. attempt to maintain the olant
- the limits of Figure 11-1,
- d. If overpressurization due to I #lFa!orchargingflow,Then throttle or secure flow (refertostep30)and manually control letdown to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure withir the limits of Figure 11-1.
- Step Perfomed Continuously HR-3 i
- 12. Verify RCS hot leg temperature 12. Cooldown the OCS to a hot leg islessthan(525'dinorder temperature of less than [525'F]
- 12. Determine which SG has the tube 13.
- a. sample SGs,for activity,
- b. [monitoimainsteampiping foractivityf,
- c. conitor steam generator levels, Mather--plant-s pee 4 ff t-JMket6sT-inser4-herp i
- Step Performed Continuously HR-3 !
- a. close the MSIV, s. locally close HSIV,
- b. verify closed, or close the b. locally close MSIV bypass M51V bypass valve, volve,
- c. Jraisethesetpointforthe c. [maintaintheaffectedSG associatedADVto[950 psia), pressure 1 950 psia by:
- 1) manual operation of the associated ADV ii) local operation of the associatedADV],
- d. close the main feedwater d. locally close main feldwater
- e. [close 44MNryNe water e. 11ocally c15eY[ k$1t1on i isolation valve (s) including valve (s) and steam driven pump the steam driven pump steam steamsupplyvalve,I, supply valve associated with the steam generator being isolated),
- f. isolate steam generator blowdown, f. lect.11y isolate SG blowdown.
- g. Close vents, drains, exhausts, g. locally isolate vents, drains, and bleedoffs from the steam exhausts, and bleedoffs.
- Step performed Continuously HR-3 FRG 11-255 4EE- T M A 3-
- 4. SG samples for activity step 14, i and radiation levels, j b. possible SG 1evel
- increase.
- 16. Decrease and control RCS 16.
- b '("'
- b. approximately equal to isolated SG pressure
- Step Performed Continuously HR-3 i
- 17. Maintain the isolated stearn 17. Restore the isolated steam l generator level within the generator level to the indicated
- indicated range by the range by the following
- L,Lu.o " 5 N following: a. draining to the fr444ac44ve
- a. r
- b. dump steam from the affected pressure, steam generator to the end condenser, c.-[],t!~eend-circuntances pe it, Then i n e t
- 11._ s nubber-i aineing-pe*-phot-specific ~
- other applicable radiation with Technical Specifications, monitors, e
- 20. If indications of excessive 20. If NOT, Then go to step 26.
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-3 I
- 21. Determine the affected SG 21.
- a. SG steam pressures,
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures.
- 22. If excessive steam demand 22. Go to step 23.
- a. close the MS!Y, a. locally close MS!V.
- b. verify closed, or close the b. locally close MSIV bypass MS!V bypass valve, valve, c.[close,orverifyclosedthe c glocally close ADV(s p',
- d. Close the main feedwater d. locally close main feedwater isolation valve,
- e. lose the r W;.e m rr e.
- f. close vents, drains, exhausts f. locally close vents, drains and bleedoffs, exhausts, and bleedoffs.
- v. [vinerpiantspes:Ticit:::
- Step Performed Continuously ,
- a. SG steam pressures, per step 23.
- b. RCS cold leg temperatures,
- c. SG 1evels.
- 25. Stabilire RCS temperature 25. l by controlled steaming of the unisolated SG using the following.(listedinpreferred !
- a. turbine bypass system 9.C b, atmosphericdumpvalve(s).
- SG 1evel) in the normal band using are Icst. Then do the following: ,
- b. 1solate SG blowdown, secondary sampling, and any non-vital steam discharge,
- c. attempttorestore:{susin eM/;;:.Mier/]feedwater, (ContinuedOnNextPage)
- Step Perfonned Continuously l
- d. [attempttoestablishan
- b. gRCST temperatures are path HR.4 and : . ;, t e c
- b. {M RCS T etemperatures increaseh' hor greater, Then 90 to RCS an3 Core Heat Removal success path HR.4 enemp33 00.00-thTr.,0jh-000 % .
- o. ed<-e
- a. RCS 5"' cooling at least f20%basedonTaverage CET) ternperature (Figure 11-1),
- Step Performed Continuously HR.3
- l 1
- c. at least one steam I generator is available for l
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR 3 FRG 11-262 C C L R t.J-
- b. existing RCS pressure and temperatures,
- c. the need for main pres.
- d. the duration of W icol[^g W b inde ruption to RCPs,
- e. RCP seal staging prestures and temperatures.
- a. electrical power is available to the [RCP bus) Cat h. y
- b. RCP auxiliaries M to maistainfsealinjectick,
- bearing, and motor cooling are operating, and there are no high temperature alanns on the selected RCPs,
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS (ability for feed and steam flow).
- Step Performed Continuously HR-3 FRG 11-263 KH-152 4 6
- d. press rizer evel is greater
- e. RCS subcooling at least f f20'F[basedon[ average CF.TJ temperature (Figure 11-1),
- f. (other criteria satisfied
- a. vtact-e44-eva(4ablu,ha rging E^5 '* 'M S 7'% *' t (
- d. operate charging (and # 51) i pumps until ess zer level greater than and M !
- Step Perfomed Continuously HR-3 FRG 11-265 6fith.1"*""=* '
- 99. M the RCS fails to depressurize, 31.
- a. voiding in the RCS m&y be indicated by any of the following indications, parameter changes, or trends i) letdown flow greater than charging flow, 11)pressurizerlevel increasing significantly more than expected while operating pressurizer spray. .
- 99. (Cont'd)
- c. If depressurization of the RCS is still not possible.
- Step Performed Continuously HR-3 FRG 11-267 C Eh 1 " N . M3 -
- 11) monitor pressuriter level for trending RC5 inventory.
- d. If, depressurization of the
- RCS is still not possible,
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-3 i
- 1. RCS and Core Heat Removal is satisfied if:
- a. At least one SG (or the unisolated SG) has level:
- 1) within the nonnal level band with feedwater available to maintain level
- 11) being restored by feedwater flow I '. : : , r.
- b. (Average CETT temperature less than superheatertf.
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied. Then go to next appropriate RCS and Core Heat Removal success path.
- 3. !_ff above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy, 4 M acceptance criteria for AL_L, safety functions are being satisfied,
- 1. Do not place system in " manual unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in ' manual" must be checked frequently to ensure proper operation (Reference 15.34).
- 2. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluation of plant conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (Reference 15.24). Hot and i cold leg RTDs may be influenced by the cold $15 injection and should be l
- 3. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCSpressureandthereforeshouldbeavoidedunlessf0'Ffofsubcooling I
- itquid inventory trending can still be discerned. However, operators are cautioned not to rely solely on the RVLMS indication when RCPs are
- 7,2.70urps recircujation, at least oneySI pump should be operating at all l # '
- ff; if there is a conflict between isolating a SG (e.g., due to indications of steam generator tube leakage or excessive steam demand) and maintaining adequate heat removal, then maintain RCS heat removal via the least affected $3. At least one SG should always be available for heat 4
- This success path should only be used j in the-case other success paths have j failed to establish adequate RCS pressure l control and heat removal. Use of this '
- pressure to maximize
- SI pump flow.
- b. Close ole,ed valves until additional SI pumps can be placed in operation.
- a. Establish steady state pressure ,
- b. Close the Rapid Depressurization bleed valves.
- c. Etna the operating SI pumps,
- d. Initiate RCS and Core heat 8.d 11 the use of the removal by the selected success path, selected success path is not
- e. Close the Rapid Depressurization successful, reenter gate valves. heat removal per HR-4.
- f. Secure cooling to the IRWST when no longer required.
- 1. RCS and Core Heat Removal is satisfied ift )
- b. SIS pumps are operating and supplying water to the RCS per Figure 11-3.
- 2. H the above criteria are not satisfied, Then re-evaluate the
- 1. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual' must be checked frequently to ensureproperoperation(Reference 13.34).
- 2. All available indications should be uted to aid in evalvation of plant
- conditions since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confinnatory indications are available (Reference 15.24). Hot and cold leg RTDs may be influenced by the col'd SIS injection and should be checked against each other.
- 3. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCS pressure and therefore should be avoided unless [20*FIof subcooling cannot be maintaineo in,the RCS. If the RCS is solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup or cooldown to avoid any unfavorable pressure excursions.
- The perator/ ould be c tioned aga nst p emat rely hi iatin an A$.
- T o at[rsho ch .k co ain .t s level nsure uat i s etion the 515 fore switc ng to ec culat on. i r (
- a. pr g izer level following indications,
- [ and constant or parameter changes, or trends:
- b. RCSsubcoolingg20'Ff, charging flow,
- c. pressuri.zer pressure 11) pressurizer level 1[ Mil], ,,, increasing significantly
- d. RCS HT 1 -{400 j,. m re than expected while
- e. RCS activity levels within operating pressurizer
- Step Perfgrmed Continuously HR-5 i
- 3. *3. (Cont'd) iv)hJTCunheated thennoccuple temperature indicates saturated conditions in the reactor i
- b. Iff voiding inhibits-RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:
- 1) verify letdown is isolated, a,,nd ii) stop the deprCssurization, a,.gd, (Continued On Next Page)
- Step Perfomed Continu9usly HR-5 FRG 11-280 CEM 'TJ3M3
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. *3. (Cont'd) iii) pressurize and depressurize the RCS within the limits of Figure 11-1 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray or 9 51 and charging i
- c. If depressurization of the RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible, and voiding is suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes, i Then attempt to eliminate'the voiding by
- Step Perfortne'd Continuously HR-5 FRG 11-281 i8dE- - 93
- INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. *3. (Cont'd)
- d. l_f,depressurization f of the
- RCS to the SCS entry pressure is still not possible Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by
- Step Perfonned Continuously HR-5
- FRG 11-282 CEL ir " M
- 1. RCS and Core Heat Removal is satisfied if:
- 3. If above criterion satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: HR-5:
- 1. Do not place system in " manual unless risoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in "manu11" must be checked frequently to j ensure proper operation (Referm 15.34).
- 3. Solid water operation of the pressurizer may make it difficult to control RCS pressure and therefore should be avoided unless[0*F7 of subcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS, If the RCS is solid, closely monitor 1
- f. The h operate. should ck cont n nt sump vel o e sure eq t p IS efo s tching circu ion.
- 6. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS voiding j and take steps to eliminate voiding any time voiding causes the heat removal or inventory control safety functions to begin to be threatened.
- 1. If the RCS and Core Heat Removal safety function is still in jeopardy, then the operator must pursue the RCS and Core Heat Removal safety function and other jeopardized safety functions simultaneously. If the PSI estmaEG8F pumps are delivering flow to the RCS per Figure 11-3.
- a. restori.9 the vital auxiliaries necessary to feed one or both steam generators
- b. using alternate means (e.g., fire water pumps, non-grade A condensate, etc.) to feed the SGs
- c. alternate means of operating steam dumps or turbine bypass valves or other steam outlets.
- 2. If the $$Sd@#SI pumps are not delivering adequate flow to the RCS, then the operator should evaluate ways of implementing one of the RCS and core heat removal success paths by considering:
- a. restoring necessary vital auxiliaries (control air, electrical, diesel generator, etc.) to regain needed components or subsystems
- b. manual operation of failed remotely operable valves
- c. alternate sources of water for SG or RCS makeup
- d. alternate means of steam discharge from the steam generators.
- e. depressurizing/ cooling the RCS to increase or establish @tI<d,L/SI fl ow.
- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES Page i of 4 nevision .e_
- equal to [ psia), Thy verify N_0T in their accident positions, i containment isolation is actuated Then manually initiate contain-
- method of ensuring adequate con- method of manual containment tainmentisolationinsertedhere]. isolationinserted,here].
- Step Performed Continuously Cl-1 FRG 11-360 G -isih
- 1. Containment isolation is satisfied if:
- a. 1) No steam plant activity or alams
- and
- =
- f
- b. Each containment penetrat hn not required to be open has an isolation valve closed.
- 2. M above criteria NOT satisfied. Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR
- 3. E above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy, i
- success paths in use.
- 2. Local radioactivity levels should be determined before attempting any local manual valve closure. Appropriate precautions should be taken if high radiation levels exist.
- CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION t
- b. The risk to plant personnel and the public of leaving certain containment penetrations unisolated.
- c. The feasibility of isolating the containment penetration (s) by alternate methods.
- SAFETY FUNCTION: Containment Temperature and Pressure Control SUCCESS PATH: Containment Fans (Normal Mode); CTPC-1 RESOURCE TREE: Tree G INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS j
- Step Performed Continuously CTPC-1 FRG 11-368 CC lif.__E=v. 03
- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SilCCESS FATH CTPC-1;
- 1. Containment Temperature and Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- a. Containmenttemperatureislessthan[180*F]
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate Containment Temperature and Pressure Control success path.
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: CTPC-1 This sections contains items which should be considered when implementing EPGs and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented as precautions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training program.
- 1. During some events, the containment fan coolers may be required to operate in the emergency mode even though the containment temperature and pressure are not increasing. [This will occur during events which generate a CIAS on low pressurizer pressure, but do not include an inside containmentbreak.]
- Step Performed Continuously CTPC-2 FRG 11-371 t ta2+52 Rev . -
- 1. Containment Temperature and Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- a. [At least three] containment fan coolers operating in the emergency mode 4
- b. Containment temperature and pressure are constant or
- 2. If above criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to next appropriate Containment Temperature and Pressure Control success path,
- 3. H above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy, 4 E acceptance criteria for M safety functions are being satisfied, Then go to LONG TERM ACTIONS after perfonning appropriate operator actions for all success paths in use, 4
- 1. For those plants which use charcoal filters in the containment fan coolers for iodine removal, operation of the filtered fan units may be desirable in the event of an iodine buildup in containment.
- 2. A CCAS may be manually initiated at containment pressure less than the CCAS setpoint, This would be appropriate if the containment pressure were increasing, or if the fan coolers were inoperable in the normal mode. .
- RESOURCE TREE
- Tree G INSTRUCTIONS CONT:NGENCY ACTIONS s *l.
- a. verify containment spray a. manually actuate containment actuation, spray, u i n. ^ % k i
- a, nLd v'e d Sg3Ag,,
- Step Performed Continuously CTPC-3 FRG 11-374 CGrisE e W
- aligned and reset for automatic operation [or manual restart].
- Step Performed Continuously CTPC-3 FRG 11-375 JN i . 01
- 1. Containment Temperature and Pressure Control is satisfied if:
- a. 1) At least two containment fan coolers operating in the emergency mode and at least one containment spray header delivering at least 1500gpm]
- or
- 11) [Two containment spray headers delivering at least(500 gpm]
- b. Containment temperature and pressure constant or decreasing.
- 2. If abose criteria NOT satisfied, Then go to CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONTROL.
- 3. H above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. For those plants which use the containment spray system (CSS) in conjunction with the iodine removal system (IRS), operation of the CSS may be desirable in the event of an iodine buildup in containment.
- 2. If sump water is highly radioactive, it may not be desirable to circulate it outside the containment.
- CONTINUING ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONTROL J
- functions. Evaluate further actions based on the following:
- a. Rate of change of containment temperature and pressure, and potential for damage to the containment,
- b. The urgency of other jeopardized safety functions.
- 2. [Ensurehydrogenrecombinersare 2.
- availableandalignedforuse{.
- 3. Ensure all available containment 3.
- b. CEDM cooling system, l c. reactor vessel cavity cooling
- system,]
- Step Performed Continuously CCGC-1 FRG 11-387 A C" 1:: " -M
- *4. Verify containment hydrogen y. Operate hydrogen recombiners and iyh, concentrationislessthan[0.5%]. until containment hydrogen con- !
- I l
- Step Perfonned Continuously CCGC-1 {
- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS PATH: CCGC-1
- 1. Containment Combustible Gas Control is satisfied if:
- a. Hydrogen concentration is less than (0.5%) j o_r a x, uka b.1)(Allavailablehydrogenrecombiners[areenergizedf and i 11) Hydrogen concentration is less than [4%].
- 2. E above criteria E satisfied, Then go to Containment Combustible Gas Control success path CCGC-2 (Hydrogen Purge System).
- 3. E above criteria satisfied, Then go to next safety function in jeopardy.
- 1. Operation of any equipment in the containment building when containment
- a. The importance to safety of equipment operation
- b. The urgency of equipment operation
- c. The use of alternative equipment located outside containment
- d. The current hydrogen level and the anticipated time to reduce,H 2 #
- 2. The containment fan coolers should be operating in the emergency mode in l order to satirfy the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control function. The fan coolers will also aid in the Combustible Gas Control function by
- 1) mixing the containment atmosphere, which reduces the possibility of local hydrogcn pockets forming, and, 2) reducing the ,
- 3. [Any cautions provided by the hydrogen recombiner vendor concerning
- 4. Measured containment hydrogen typically represents a value of hydrogen in units of percent by volume of dry air. The measured hydrogen will typically indicate higher than the actual containment hydrogen for a steam / air. mixture inside containment. The indicated value should, therefore, be corrected to account for any steam / air mixture inside containment (Reference 15.16). CCGC-1
- SAFETY FUNCTION: (,ontair. ment Combustible Gas Control SUCCESS PATH: Hydrogen Purge System; CCGC-2 RESOURCE TREE: Tree H INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- b. CEDM cooling system,
- c. reactor vessel cavity cooling 4
- d. ,[otherplant-specificair recirculation systems].
- Step Perfomed Continuously CCGC-2 FRG 11-391 A 2^ "; . . C L
- Step Perfomed Continuously CCGC-2 l
- COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TITLE r0NCTIONAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE " "" GUI ELINE GUIDELINES Page 7 of .JL. Revision
- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR $UCCESS PATH: CCGC-2:
- CONTAINMENT COMBUSTIDLE GAS CONTROL.
- 3. E above criterion satisfied. _Then go to next safety function ir.
- 1. Operation of any equipment in the containment building when containment .
- a. The importance to safety of equipment operation
- b. The urgency nf equipment operation
- c. The use of alternative equipment located outside containment
- d. The current hydrogen level and the anticipated time to reduce Hp<
- 2. The containment fan coolers should be operating in the emergency mode in
- order to satisfy the Containment Temperature and pressure Control function. The fan coolers will also aid in the Combustible Gas Control function by
- 1)mixingthecontainmentatmosphere,whichreducesthe possibility of local hydrogen pockets fortning, and, 2) reducing the containment temperature, which decreases the amount of hydrogen generated by the corrosion of aluminum and zine materials.
- 3. (Any cautions provided by the hydrogen recombiner vendor concerning
- operation of the recombiners with a degraded containment environment shouldbeinsertedhere).
- a. Rate of change of containment hydrogen concentration, and potential for hydrogen burn
- b. The urgency of other jeopardized safety functions
- c. The feasibility of restoring function to a success path by restoring vital auxiliaries necessary to operate systems or components in the success paths.
- b. Success paths in use for fulfilling each safety function-
- c. Adequacy of core cooling
- d. Plant area radiation levels
- e. Rates of radioactivity release to the environment.
- Step Performed Continuously N
- 4. Do NOT discontinue implementing a success path unless another equivalent i path has been verified ready for irnplementation.
- a. Rate of release of radioactivity to the environment, g a high rate of release to the environment exists, Then a cooldown should be initiated. If possible, dump steam to the condenser rather than to j the atmosphere.
- c. Continued availability of vital auxiliaries required for a cooldown.
- 1) electric power supplies
- i i )compressedairsupplies iii)[otherplantspecificauxiliaries] ,
- d. Ability to make required repairs. E a cooldown is necessary to
- make repairs, Then a cooldown should be initiated. If the plant can
- Step Performed Continuously 1 t' A )
- a. Failed equipment, or conditions, which may prevent or inhibit a cooldown (e.g., loss of all pressurizer sprays, inability to dump stesm). H repairs to required equipment are not feasible Then if possible, bring the plant to conditions allowing the repairs.
- b. Avail'.ble condensate inventory. M insufficient inventory is available (determined using Figures 11-4 and 11-5), Then attempt to increase the inventory or obtain additional sources of feedwater.
- c. RCS voiding. H voiding inhibits RCS depressurization to SCS entry pressure, Then an attempt at eliminating the voiding should be made.
- a. verify letdown is isolated,
- b. stop the depressurization,
- c. pressurize and depressurize the RCS within the limits of Figure 11-1 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray (preferred method) or M SI and charging pumps (alternative method). Monitor pressurizer level [and the RVLMS[for trending of RCS inventory.
- Step performed Continuously
- 8. If,f a cooldown is to be performed, Then guidance from [the technical support center] may be required. Standard cooldown methods may require i
- per SCS operating instructions
- b. The RCS is depressurized to at least [400 psia)
- c. The RCS is at least /20'F)'subcool
- d. Pressurizer level is greater than g]andnotdecreasing
- e. RCSactivitylevelwithin[appropriatelimits) f>.---{0ther-p1 ant -spec i f ic criteria , J nserLhere) .--
- Step Performed Continuously FRG '
- CHAPTER 18 DSER OPEN ITEM RESPONSES I
- Author: Human Factors Assessment Branch ;
- (letter LD 92-065, dated May 8,1992) provides specific implementati_on in
- the bases for MMI characteristics selectec.
- RCS panel example throughout the design process, A suitability verification l- analysis evaluated.whether the resultant- MMI -features of. the design process t . acceptably supported operator- task accomplishment. Similar task analysis;and
- for Nuplex 80+ (attached) defines testable- criteria for evaluation of the implementation of the design requirements into the design.
- m -s w M e se +e +'7,e- - wsne e w - m r--t&rr=-r
- The System 80+ task analysis methodology has been revised to address NRC concerns identified in this open item. A revised Section 18.5 of CESSAR DC is attached
- incorporating the modifications. 1his revision will be formally submitted -in Amendment L of CESSAR-DC.
- of unavailable components on safety and non-safety success paths and respond to i resulting unavailability conditions with alarms, i
- 9. Operator task loading evaluations identify high workload-situations for subsequent resolutions C. Data ' on information and control usage by operators that
- supports the arrangement of physical components on .the
- The FTA methodology is based.on the approach of References 1 and
- methodology is presented in Jix major steps
- we -+-Ye- - ~m- ' "
- operating strategies (i.e., excluding complex interactions, error propagation, and sabotage.) The analysis of garnic l casen provides adequate data for the FTA's evaluation cf j operator workload and behavioral requirements. Selected' event sequences are specified in Section 18.5.1.5.1; these
- operator tasks per the applicable procedure guidelines
- (e.g., Reference 5) along a time line. Event sequences identify decision points and basic decisions, but do not pursue variations of these basic decisions into multiple L
- Section 18.5.1.4) . are considered error-likely situations to be documented and resolved.
- provides the baseline for - describing the operating role of the i revised systems in System 80+ and extrapolating their operations for revised procedure guidelines and the FTh. A' list of-these basic purposes of the plant systems and configurations is maintained as part of the System 80+ FTA data base.
- c. Output (Action) - Perform the act or manipulation specified.
- : R e e ,
- C n
- n i #
- 4 available and required time intervals.
- rator Tube Rupture Amend nt I 18.5-8 Dece er 21, 1990
- PARAMETER ACCESS TIME CRITERIA FOR SPECJJJ.9 1 UABDWARE IMPLEMENTATION METHODS d
- movement and visual orientation)43)
- level 1menuacc7gy+ choice j
- l (touch target rt 4 choice
- decision rt) x3
- b. Touch target reaction time (rt) is an estimate of the time necessary to physically move hand to and press. a target. This is estimated by.Fitt's law assuming ' distance' = 2 feet and ' target size' =. 1 inch.
- c. Choice decision reaction time (rt) is an estimate i of the time necessary to cognitively choose a menu
- n=7 and Ic=157.
- Orientation time (1 second) must be added to access time ~ if operator must move between' 2' or l more CRTs.
- I responses.
- 3. Observe for existence of signal,~e.g.
- 3. Confirm actions by parameter value
- 3. Mentally record value for.later use.
- estimated by operations experts. -
- partial listing of parameter uses for pressurizer pressure. The remaining uses for pressurizer pressure and the uses for other i parameters are stored in the task analysis data base.
- remaining task analysis parameters and stored in the task analysis data base.
- CSS Containment Spray System CVCS Chemical and Volume control System EFW Emergency Feedwater System FCS Feedwater and. condensate System FDRAIN Equipment'and Floor Drainage System FHS Fuel Handling. System - ,
- IWSS In-Containment-Water Storage System 2
- 1. Transport hot primary coolant from the reactor vessel to the steam generator and transport cooled primary coolant from the steam generator to the reactor vessel.
- 2. During normal operation and upset conditions, maintain a high integrity boundary for the primary coolant which prevents leaks to the containment atmosphere.
- 3. During normal operation and upset conditions, maintain pressure in the primary coolant system within specified limits for all anticipated reactor coolant transients, without dependence on pressure relief devices. Maintenance of system pressure is accomplished in the pressuricer.
- 4. Provide forced circulation for primary coolant.
- 5. Support natural circulation sufficient to remove decay heat from the reactor.
- 6. Provide overpressure protection.
- 7. In conjunction with the reactor system, assure that there is only one steam / water interface during normal operations, and that this steam / water interface is located in the pressurizer.
- 8. Following severe accidents, provide for high point venting of hydrogen and other non-condensible gases.
- Design minimum RCS flow rate (gpm) 445,600 2 Steam Generator
- Design pressure (psia) 2,500 -2,500 Design temperature (*F) 650 650 l 2,250 i Operating pressure (psia) 2,250 Inlet temperature (*F) 615.8 621 I
- Full- Load Steam Pressure (psia) 1,000- 1,070 4- Full Load Steam Temperature (*F) 545 553-- l1-Zero Load Steam Pressure (psia) 1,100 1,170 6 6
- 1. Total . Steam Flow per gen. (1b/h) 8.56x10 9.59x10 4 Full load steam quality (%) 99.75 99.'75.
- Internal free volume (ft ) 2,400 1,800
- Vessel height (ft) 54 42 ,
- formers or dieset generators.
- ' Evaluate information.- ELEC e
- Decide if isolation is-required. CNTNT-1
- l. Decide if additional cooling'is -
- 1.01 Ensure seactor Cottect N1 information.
- pressure. Evaluate against control Limits. PZR 5, 6 Pressur(ter,. pressure-Pressuriter pressure Time
- d. . - ..;s #. .-. _, . , _.-.-_,_.._,w..... . . - . . . . . _ , . . , _ ,
- PEACTOR TRIP TA$r ElfMENT LISTfWG f
- containment information. . .
- combustible Decide if H2 exists. -CGC 3' containment temperature gases.
- Decide event. -Pressuriser levet
- 8.01 -Control Main Control main feedwater flow to SG. FCS 1 . Main feedwater flow E-Feedwater to Cottect FCS flow information. FCS 1 SGs. -Evaluate against demand for SG SG 3 makeup.
- j. . 9.01 Ensure parameter-info. Levet j condensate reserves Evaluate parameters against RCS 1/SG 3 I RW1 - ( eve t adequate. speelffed timits.
- -Cire, for ops, f
- December:30,jl988-
- ($heet 1 of.5) 3 REACTOR TRIP CottECT INF00 MAT 10N.
- Gross
- f. ~ method).
- $G tevel to normal' band while NOT-
- l. expected).
- December 30, 1988
- RCP Amperes l RCP Bleedoff Flow E RCP Motor Temperature l RCP Operating Status RCP Seal State Pressure (s)
- Reactor. Vessel. Level l.
- -23.02 LotA 1 observe for value ac tose" to hot standby.
- 31.00 scit observe to record RCS pressure below Sif isolation setpoint.
- o.
- depressritation, i
- 34.00 LOCA 1 Observe' for value at or above spe-
- ific pressure daring depressurlastion and cooldown, l
- Amendment E
- j .:
- i. -
- Units of PSIG.are consistent with pressure-instrumentation throughout the plant.
- i. Margin of Subcocting I Rationale fvoe Charseteristics A value is needed to assess the parameter.as-Display .value compared witn. saturation conditions. 'The Intent 1-is to ens;re eubcooled liquid is available to
- 03
- A 0.00 value indlistes that the time cortstraint for that etenent is indeterminable or does not eniat. these are incitx1ed in the cognitive loading calculations. .
- CESSARnubau 1
- ee 2.$0 248(4) 2.5 1.05 0.60 sCP Steed
- ee Steam Ptont Radiation 0.50 248 1.0
- 1.03 I 1.33 Pressurtser Level 2.50 310 0.5 1.03 ee i- 450 0.5 2.50
- 5.00 2.00 i
- Q- -l- December 30,fl988'
- e+ 4 =-~+w-e +we-r=-++-=e-r-r--s=--=--wer- ==r w- = - c e e vW--m-~srwm -a *v -
- reviewing the instrumentation used in existing plants. Operators
- use this instrumentation regularly and control room design
- designers. The primary process and component controls identified
- were essentially the' same as for previous plants with a few exceptions for system design changes. Thus, the . analysis of control requirements was' taken from previous functional task analysis efforts based on References _1 and 2. The control requirements were then verified to be correct for System 80+ and revised where system changes dictated it.
- 1. " Generic Operator Information and controls Requirements Review Based on Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedure Guidelines," Combustion Engineering, Inc., CE-NPSD-299, July 1985.
- 2. "C-E Owners Group Generic Information and Control Characteristics Review," Combustion Engineering, _Inc., '
- 3. " Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Crews,"
- 4. " Human Factors Guide for Nuclear Power Plant Control Room _
- 5. " Combustion Engineering. Emergency Procedure Guidelines,"- 1 Combustion Engineering, Inc., CEN-152, Rev. 3,'1987.
- 6. "Information Processing and Human Interaction,"
- 7. "The Psychology of Human-computer Interection," S. Card, T. Moran, A. Newell, Lawrence Erlbaumt NH, 1983.-
- 8. " Time Response Design Criteria for Safety-related Operator Action," American National Standards Institute, ANS 58.8-1984.
- 1. Switches and CRTs are extensive used in the industry and human factors was not involved in their selection.
- 2. Flat Panel hardware evaluation is described in LD 91-033, RAI 620.2.
- 3. The Nuplex 80+ MM!s were prototyped for each hardware selection and the whole MMI device hardware design evaluated in the suitability analyses which is the docketed. report Nuplex 80+ Verification Analysis Report, NPX80 TE790 01, Section 11, Part C. This suitability analysis verified that MMI design is acceptable, we believe that this is adequate.
- Engineering Data Compendium Human Perception and Performance indicates that search time for a shape is slower than search time for a color however, combining color (used to identify alarms) and shape (used to distinguish priorities ) as used in Nuplex 80+ together should provide a shorter search time than either
- 1 i
- are not required to distinguish between duty cycles, per se; rather, the use of different duty cycles permits operators to unambiguously read multiple superimposed tile states.
- to color, shape and flash.
- 1) The applicant should also provide empirical data or- other means of cemonstration of that operators can sffectively utilize the 27 properties and parameters encoded, the 15 colors, and the 10 shape / symbol : odes under normal, abnormal, and emergency operations and under all modos of plant operation.
- 2) The applicant should send a complete matrix, detailing all the information coding methods used in the control room.
- 3) directs his or her attention with context specific messages and directory information on the CRT, and 4) confirms a cleared alarm by an audible tone and slow flash in dark yellow. When in the alarm context the
- 3) the equipment / component status codes equipment / component navigation aids on the CRTs and process controllers.
- 2) Nuplex 80+ uses the following types of codes:
- l. -
- 1 1
- hn i t i , e
- 1 1 1; y
- s
- i. i. b e !
- tj5- et E
- 1) Human engineering justifications for the control panel profiles, control panel arrangement in the control room, the selection of the control ;
- 2) ?
- a. IPS0
- b. alarm scheme and alarm acknowledgement
- c. readability of alarm text-and tiles from all operator positions in the control room
- d. display hierarchy and navigation scheme used for CRTs
- e. number of colors and shades used on displays l
- f. types and amount of information encoded in the control room as well as the encoding techniques used
- g. audio and tactile feedback for controls, controllers, and other devices
- h. auditable documentation of the design process that support the human performance aspects of the reduction in the quantity of data presented to the operator
- 1. impact of the human performance of the differences between breadth of information in System 80 and System 50+ control rooms i
- j. qu:litative and cuantitative criteria that identify when the operator is receivLng "enough" rather than "too many" or "too few" ,
- 1. effects -(positive and negative) on operator- performance of the changes,- individually _and collectively, between System 80 and System 80+.
- 1) Human engineering justifications for- th'e features identified in item 1-
- Nuplex 80+ Verification Analysis Report, Revision 2, NPX-TE790 01, December, 1989, Part C (Suitability Analysis), Section B.4 (Alarms).
- 2) Re'sults of System 80+ specific studies or analyses that determined the quantitative and qualitative thresholds of " adequate" rather than "not adequate" human performance for the following is provided below:
- a. IPSO The Halden Reactor Project IPS0 reports document the evaluation of the usefulness of a large overview display. The criteria used to evaluate the usefulness of IPS0 in terms of human performance is contained in the following Halden reports:
- b. Alarm scheme and al :m acknowledaement The Nuplex 80+ Verification Analysis Report, Revision 2, NPX TE790 01, December, 1989, Part C (Sultability Analysis), Section B.4 (Alarm Systems) provides the criteria used to verify acceptability of the alarm features from a useability standpoint.- Validation will demonstrate their effectiveness as part of the ensemble.
- c. Readability of alarm text and tiles from all operator positions i.n the control room The following report provides the criteria used to verify the readability of alarm text and tiles from all operator positions in the control room:
- d. Display hierarchy and naviaation scheme used for CRTs The following reports provide the criteria used to verify acceptability of the display hierarchy and navigation scheme features (e.g. menu and navigation, alarm lists and alarm features) used for CRTs:
- e. Number of c_glors and shades used on displays The following reports provide the criteria used to . verify the acceptability of the number _ of colors and shades used on displays:
- f. Types and amount of information encoded in ,be control room as well as the encoding techniaues used The following report provides the criteria used to verify the suitability of the types and amount of information encoded in the
- g. Audible and tactile feedback for controls, controllers, and ottler stevices The Human Factors Engineering Standards, Guidelines and Bases for i
- Verification Analysis Report, Revision 2, NPX-TE790-01, . December, 1989, Part C (Suitability Analysis) provide the criteria used to verify suitability of the tactile feedback characteristics for push buttons, the only control device type requiring tactile feedback in the control room. No audio feedback is used in Huplex 80+,
- System Description for Control Complex information System for Nuplex i 80+, Section 3.2 (Information Processing) describes how inioimation
- is presented to the control room operator in a cleac and concise
- designed for the reduction in the quantity of data presented to the
- o)erator) afforded by both the main control room-and the remote ,
- successful- accomplishment of the operator's functional role and specific tasks under dynamic, real-time conditions. The criteria to evaluate acceptability of the quantity of data presented to operators is provided in the HFE V&V plan.
- information and the same functions for operator use as the System 80 -
- by both the main control . room and the' remote shutdown area will confirm that the operating ensemble supports the successful
- k. Auditable documentation to track the data /information that was lost /cained between System 80 and System 80+ control room desians There are no r'equirements in the Nuplex 80+ design process to track data /information that was lost / gained between System 80 and System 80+ control room designs. Availability verification (similar to the RCS panel availability analysis) will confirm adequate data /information for performance of control room tasks for all control room panels.
- 1. Effects (positive and neaative) on operator performance of the chanoes. individually and collec_ lively, between System 80 and System 80+.