ML20059J911

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Draft Sys 80+ Emergency Operations Guideline, Loss of All Feedwater Recovery
ML20059J911
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 11/05/1993
From:
ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20059J906 List:
References
PROC-931105, NUDOCS 9311150101
Download: ML20059J911 (67)
v • d • e


Text

.-

. ;, y, _3 s >

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE- LOSS OF ALL'FEEDWATER RECOVERY-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -

GUIDELINES-Page ' . of _" Revision ""

t' i

t t

l LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER

-RECOVERY GUIDELINE I

I i

i i.

n LOAF' 9311150101 931105 15 1 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

PDR ADOCK 05200002 I A PDR j;j

a SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL'FEEDWATER REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -

GUIDELINES Page 2' of '7 Revision "^"

l PURPOSE j This guideline provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of a Loss of All Feedwater (LOAF). The actions in this guideline are.  :

necessary to ensure the plant is placed in a stable, safe ' condition. The _ goal ,

of this guideline is to safely establish the plant in a condition which will ..;

allow the implementation of an appropriate existing procedure: shutdown cooling, hot standby, or hot shutdown. Radiological releases to the r environment will be' minimized and adequate core cooling will be maintained by following this guideline. This guideline provides technical information to be.

used by the utilities in developing a plant specific procedure.

.i Entry Conditions  :

1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed E

All of the following conditions exist:

a. Event initiated from MODE 3 or 4 I
b. SIAS has NOT been blocked .
c. LTOP has NOT been initiated j and
2. Plant conditions indicate that a Loss of All Feedwater event has l occurred. Any one, or more, of the following may be present.
a. Decreasing steam generator water level or low level alarm,
b. Main feedwater pump trip alarm. l
c. Low main feedwater pump or startup feedwater> pump flow (possible  !

high flow for a feedwater line break). j

d. Low main feedwuter pump suction pressure. j i +

LOAF 2 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* l l,

SYSTEM 80+" TITLE t0SS OF All. FEEDWATER -I REC 0VERY 7, EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES.

Page 5-of f Revision ""' i i

Exit Conditions .'

l. The diagnosis of a loss'of All feedwater event is not confirmed.

E

2. The feedwater line break is not isolable from the steam generator.- I E ,
3. Any of the loss of All Feedwater Safety function Status Check acceptance {

criteria are not satisfied.

E

4. The Loss of All Feedwater EOG has accomplished its purpose by satisfying- .;

ALL of the following:

a. All of the Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria l are being satisfied.
b. RCS conditions are being controlled'and mair.tained in HOT STANDBY, HOT SHUTDOWN, or COLD SHUTDOWN.
c. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists. or ,

has been approved by the- Plant Technical Support Center or.

the Plant Operations Review Committee.

t Y

i I

l LOAF 3 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" . j l

i

SYSTEM 80 +." TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER -

RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS-GUIDELINES Page.' of . '.7 Revision "" .;

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i

  • 1. Confirm diagnosis of Loss of 1. Rediagnose event and exit'to.

All Feedwater by verifying either the appropriate  ;

Safety Function Status check Optimal Recovery Guideline .  :!

Acceptance criteria are of to the Functional  !'

satisfied. _ Recovery Guideline. 1!

2. Trip all RCPs. 2.  !
3. If a feedwater line break is- 3. If the feedwater lin'e break suspected, then islolate the is NOT isolable from the [

break and continue with the steam generator, Then exit.- ,

actions of this guideline. this guideline and implement- l the Excess Steam Demand  ;

Event Optimal Recovery i Guideline.

  • 4. Attempt to restore main, 4. -

I startup, and/or emergency  ;

feedwater systems to  :

operation. l

steps 6 through 8. step 9.

i k i LOAF 4 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"  :

i i

^

i

'i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL-FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 5 of Revision ""

i

~I INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. If main, startup or 6.

emergency feedwater has NOT l been restored, Then do the following: ,

a. isolate steam generator blowdown, secondary sampling, and any non-vital steam discharge and
b. continue actions to restore '

main, startup or emergency feedwater.

7. Depressurize the steam 7.

generator (s) in order to establish an alternate, low pressure feedwater source to at least one steam generator.

W 8. Verify adequate RCS heat 8. When at least one primary removal via the steam safety valve has opened generators by: following steam generator

a. at least one steam generator dryout, Then implement the has wide range level greater FRG and initiate RCS and than {0%), Core Heat Removal success and path HR-4
b. RCS Tc temperatures are stable or decreasing.

LOAF- 5 ABB CE SYSTEM 80f"

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER s RECOVERY.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page ' of " Revision ""

GUIDELINES INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

  • 9. If feedwater is restored, 9. i Then Modulate feedwater flow -l rate as necessary to restore and maintain SG water level in the normal level band ,

Ensure automatic or' manual  :

10. 10. If condenser vacuum is lost control of the tucbine a4ca^a or the-t g o s ...bine bypass system bypass system is maintaining is not available, Then a

RCS T,,,5 [567'F]. operate atmospheric dump  ;

valves to control _ RCS T,,,, < .

[567'F].

  • 11. Ensure the available 11. 3 ;

emergency feedwater j inventory is adequate per  !

Figures 8-3 and 8-4. j

  • 12. Verify charging and letdown 12. Manually control charging  ;

are automatically and letdown to maintaining or restoring restore / maintain pressurizer. i pressurizer level [2'4to level . [Z4to 78%].

78%]. l 1

5 l

E 4

LOAF 6 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

.=

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER I

RECOVERY-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 7 of '7 Revision '""

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

  • 13. Ensure pressurizer heaters 13. H RCS subcooling greater and spray are maintaining or .than P-T limits or cooldown restoring pressurizer rate greater than_100*F/Hr, pressure within the limits Then do the following as of Figure 8-1. appropriate:
a. stop the cooldown, .;
b. manually control the Reactor ,

Coolant Gas Vent System or h I

auxiliary spray to restore and maintain pressure within l the limits of Figure 8-1,

c. attempt to maintain the .

plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration or continue to I

d. H overpressurization due to. ,

SI/ charging flow, Then-throttle or secure' flow i (refer to step 18) and manually control letdown to .

restore and maintain  ;

pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 8-1.

'[

LOAF 7 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"-

i l

w SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE - LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER.

RECOVERY-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS "

GUIDELINES Page

  • of Revision ""

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS [

~

  • 14. Verify natural circulation 14. Ensure proper control of, 'i flow in at least one loop by steam generator feeding and ALL of the following: steaming-(refer to steps 93
a. loop aT (Ts - T,) less than and 10)'and RCS inventory:

normal full power AT, and pressure controi ' refer-

b. hot and cold leg temper- to steps 12 and 13).  ;

atures constant or de- ,

creasing,  !

c. RCS is subcooled,
d. no abnormal difference

[ greater than 10*F] between Tg RTDs and Core Exit Thermocouples. a

  • 15. Evaluate the need and desir- 15. J.f RCP operation NOT g ability of restarting RCPs. desired, Then go to Step 20. ,

Consider the following: -

a. adequacy of RCS and core heat removal using ,

natural circulation,

b. existing RCS pressure and temperatures, ,
c. the need.for main pres-surizer spray capability,
d. the duration of CCW in-terruption to RCPs, *
e. RCP seal staging pres-  ;

sures and--temperatures.

i LOAF 8 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

' SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE . LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER

~ REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page ' of " Revision "

GUIDELINES _ ,

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS [

  • 16. Determine whether RCP 16. If RCP restart criteria NOT restart criteria are met by satisfied, Then go to step ALL of the following: 36. ~i
a. electrical power is available to the RCPs,
b. RCP auxiliaries (CCW) to maintain seal cooling, bearing and motor cooling are operating, and there are j,,

no high temperature alarms '[

on the selected RCPs. -j

c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS (ability .j for feed and steam flow):,
d. pressurizer level is greater  ;

than [33%) and not .

decreasing, .

e. RCS is subcooled based on representative CET  !

temperature (Figure 8-1).

f. other criteria satisfied per plant specific operating .

t instructions.

I s

i LOAF 9 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

H SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER 4 RECOVERY ,

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 1 GUIDELINES Page '" off Revision "

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

  • 17. H RCP restart desired and 17. Go to step 20.

E restart criteria satisfind, -

Then do the following:  !

a. start one RCP in each loop, >
b. ensure proper RCP operation i by monitoring RCP amperage and NPSH,
c. operate charging pump and SI -

pumps until' pressurizer level greater than [14.3%]

and SIS termination I criteria met (Refer to step 18). (

  • 18. H SI pumps are operating, 18.

Then they may be throttled l or stopped one pump at a time, if All of the

.l following are satisfied:

a. RCS is subcooled based on [

representative CET temperature (Figure 8-1), j

b. pressurizer level is greater than [14.3%] and not decreasing,
c. at least one SG available for RCS heat removal (ability for feed and steam  ;

fl ow) ,  ;

d. the RVLMS indicates a minimum level at the top of the hot leg nozzles LOAF 10 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

SYSTEM 80+ TITLE . LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY:

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS >

Page " of " Rev..ision P" zi GUIDELINES r

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS _;

I

  • 19. H criteria of step 18 19.

cannot be maintained after l SI pumps throttled or  ;

stopped, Then SI pumps must be restarted and full SI flow restored. -

i

20. Evaluate the need for a 20.

plant cooldown based on: l

a. plant status,
b. auxiliary systems availability, .
c. emergency feedwater inventory (refer to Figures 8-3 and 8-4).  :
21. H a plant cooldown is 21.a. Maintain the plant in a '

desired, Then perform steps stabilized condition, -

22 through 27. and -

b. Exit to appropriate procedure as directed by l

'{ Plant Technical Support .;

Centeri. j

  • 22. Borate the RCS to maintain 22.

shutdown margin in j accordance with Technical '!

Specifications. .]

l a

LOAF 11 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" l l

(

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'ALL FEEDWATER_ -!

RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS - -

GUIDELINES Page

'2 of_" Rev..ision ^^" q

'?

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS i

23. Commence an orderly plant 23.

f cooldown, using forced or natural circulation, in accordance with Technical Specifications.

Reduce RCS temperatures by the following:  ;

a. If the condenser is available, Then cooldown  !

using the steam bypass

  • system, E ,
b. Jf the condenser or steam bypass system NOT available, Then cooldown using the atmospheric dump valve (s). -
24. Bypass or lower the 24. l automatic initiation ,

setpoints of MSIS and SIAS as the cooldown and depressurization proceed.  ;

25. When pressurizer pressure 25.

reaches [740 psia], reduce f

SIT pressure to [300 psia].

i l

LOAF- 12 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

1 l

SYSTEM c +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER 1 RECOVERY ~

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of _ Revision ""  ;

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS.

A

26. When pressurizer pressure 26.

reaches [445 psia], Then  ;

isolate, vent or drain the safety injection tanks (SITS).

27. Initiate low temperature 27 ,

overpressurization protection (LTOP) at T, < [259'F] . .

28. When the following SCS entry 28. H the RCS fails to de-conditions are establ,ished: pressurize, then a void v.34
a. pressurizer level > [F/.]

should be suspected. .

and constant or increasing, a. Voiding in the RCS may be 'I

b. RCS is subcooled, indicated by any of'the
c. RCS pressure s [450 psia], following indications, para-
d. RCS Tu s [400*F], meter changes,'or. trends:

i) letdown flow greater than charging flow,

11) pressurizer level in-creasing signifi-cantly more than expected while oper-ating pressurizer  !

spray, iii) the RVLMS indicates -1 that voiding.is i i

present in the  !

reactor vessel, i LOAF 13 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*  !

i

r'a[-

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS'0F ALL'FEEDWATER REC 0VERY- 1i

-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS-  !

GUIDELINES Page "- of f Revision " o; INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

28. (Continued) iv)-HJTC~ unheated  :

thermocouple temperature indicates

-saturated conditions in the: reactor vessel upper head.

b. Jf voiding inhibits.-RCS .

depressurization to SCS~

entry pressure, Then attempt to eliminate the voiding by:

1) verify letdown is isolated, and- .l ii) stop the. j depressurization,.

and- t iii) pressurize and depressurize the RCS within the limits of l Figure 8-1 by-operating pressurizer heaters and. spray or .:

SI and charging pumps. Monitor ,

pressurizer level. and the RVLMS for .;

trending RCS inventory.

i LOAF ~ 14 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER

-REC 0VERY-EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS "

GUIDELINES Page of _ Revision ""

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS a

28. (Continued) c. H 'depressurization of the RCS to the SCS entry. pres- ,

sure is still not possible, and voiding is suspected to exist in the steam generator ,

tubes, Then attempt to ,

eliminate the voiding by.

1) cool the~ suspected ,

steam generator (by  :

steaming and/or blow- .

down, and feeding) to j condense the steam generator tube void, and ii) monitor pressurizer

~ level for trending RCS inventory. -

d. H depressurization of'the i RCS to the SCS entry pres- _j sure is still not possible,  ;

Then attempt to eliminate -

the voiding by -

1) operate-the Reactor

~ Coolant Gas' Vent Sys-tem to clear trapped ,

non-condensible gases, and -

h LOAF 15 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY- t EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page of. " Revision ""

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

28. (Continued) 11) monitor pressurizer- ,

level and/or the RVLMS for trending of. jl' RCS inventory. ]

e. Continue attempts to  ;

establish SCS entry e conditions, or exit this guideline and initiate an '

appropriate procedure as directed by Plant Technical -

Support Center.

The Loss of All Feedwater Recovery Guideline has accomplished its purpose if RCS conditions are being controlled in HOT STANDBY, HOT SHUTDOWN,. or. COLD ,

SHUTDOWN with all of the SFSC acceptance criteria satisfied, and the entry i conditions of an appropriate, approved procedure are satisfied.

END 1

i i

t 1

LOAF 16 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+

1

i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'ALL FEEDWATER  !

RECOVERY j EMERGENCY OPERATIONS i GUIDELINES Page '7 of _" Revision " j SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION EOG-s .

This section contains items which should be considered when implementing EPGs  !

and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be. implemented as _ precau-tions, cautions, notes or in the E0P training program. ,

1. The operator should not add feedwater to a dry steam generator if-another steam generator still contains water. Re-establish feedwater only to the steam generator that is not dry. If both steam generators become dry, refill only one steam generator to reinitiate core cooling. .
2. During all phases of the cooldown, monitor RCS temperature and_ pressure .

to avoid exceeding a cooldown rate greater than Technical Specification Limitations.

3. Do not place system in " manual" unless misoperation in " automatic" is apparent. Systems placed in " manual" must be checked frequently to '

ensure proper operation.

4. All available indications should be used to aid _ in evaluating plant  ;

conditions since the accident may cause-irregularities in,a particular instrument reading. Instrument readings must be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available (e.g., during rapid depressurization the indicated level in the pressurizer may be too high).

5. If the initial cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification Limits, l there may be a potential for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) of the reactor vessel. Post Accident Pressure / Temperature Limits of (Figure 8-1) should be maintained.
6. Solid water operation of the pressurizer should be avoided unless subcooling cannot be maintained in the RCS (Figure 8-1). If the RCS is LOAF 17 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" j

~

SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEE 0 WATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page of." Rev..ision "

solid, closely monitor any makeup or draining and any system heatup or  ;

cooldown to avoid any unfavorable rapid pressure excursions.

7. Minimize the number of cycles of pressurizer auxiliary spray whenever
  • the temperature differential between the spray water and the pressurizer

'I is greater than 200*F in order to minimize the increase in the spray nozzle thermal stress accumulation factor.

8. Natural circulation flow cannot be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped. ,

i

9. During natural circulation, verification of an RCS temperature response to a plant change cannot be accomplished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased-loop cycle times. l

~

10. After the required shutdown boron concentration is attained in the RCS, makeup water added to the RCS during the cooldown should be at least equal to the RCS boron concentration to prevent any dilution of RCS l baron concentration.  !
11. Once the pressurizer cooldown has begun, pressurizer level indication I decalibration will occur. The indication on the normal pressurizer l level indication will begin to deviate from the true pressurizer water i level. The operator should use correction curves to find the true  ;

pressurizer level. A cold calibrated pressurizer level indication is l also available for lower pressurizer temperatures. i

12. When a void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are not operating, the .

HJTC RVLMS provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel liquid  !

inventory. When a void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are i operating, it is noti possible to obtain an accurate reactor vessel liquid level indication due to the effect of the RCP induced pressure head on the HJTC RVLMS. Information concerning reactor vessel liquid ,

LOAF 18 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" 2

SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY  ;

EMERGENCY-OPERATIONS ~ -

1 j

GUIDELINES Page of ." Revision ""

i inventory trending may still be discerned. The operator is cautioned not to rely solely on the HJTC RVLMS indication when RCPs are operating. l i

13. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS voiding '

and take steps to eliminate. voiding any time voiding causes heat removal. i or inventory control' safety functions to begin to be threatened. Void -[

elimination should be started soon enough to ensure heat removal and- i inventory control are not lost.

!- i

14. It is desirable to have all electrical equipment available in order.to i most effectively mitigate and recover from a loss of All Feedwater' l event. Therefore, if any vital AC or DC bus is de-energized, operators  ;

should attempt to restore power to the vital AC or vital DC bus (es). l This action is taken even though the loss of one vital AC or-DC bus will l not prevent the operators from performing all necessary actions in the l Loss of All Feedwater ORG I;

. n I

[

I l

i s

LOAF 19 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

i

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER' REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 2"-

GUIDELINES-Page of . Revision ""

.l i

i i

i i

Figure 8-1 i TYPICAL POST ACCIDENT PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE LIMITS i

(TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) t i

t y

LOAF 20 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

2 i

~

SYSTEM - 80 + " TITLE - LOSS OF. ALL FEEDWATER; RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 2' of f Revision ""

FIGURE 8-2 TYPICAL ACCEPTABLE SIS FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE >

M SIM -

asno -

- N

,' *", T__. _ \_ ,' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _m,_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

im 2 'N N . < .

.r 1890

= _

y sese -

~

J W 1300 - \

h-y is

\

N 5 esoo -

[ ,_ : N

= _. g N.

x 680 ~ ,

_ \

~ f M .-- g M

$N

, , , , i . ,

\ .. ...

o reo _i...i.i.,,,,,i aouo uus asuo rww (r.rk)

(2) dF AM D91 M FV 3 'tsr$ aMB 2

'"* k {ll'h f 3"* ,$" $ % .,T M 'm' i E id7 A"* '

(4) TIEEE CJRVER be NCf A(23tJart FOR lhlrTRUtfENT&MOff N i

LOAF 21 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE . LOSS 0F ALL FEEDWATER  ;

REC 0VERY

.; ~

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES' Page 22 of ." Revision '""  :

f Figure 8-3  :

TYPICAL FEEDWATER CAPACITY VERSUS TIME REMAINING UNTIL SHUTDOWN COOLING REQUIRED I 5

4 10 a , , . c . 1 t 1 .

3.5 1D -

F fl T E

D , ,

W 3 10' - - (

A I

Time after trip when s c hows E

R Feedwater is started

, u .,,5 _ . _

E Q

c ,

I a R 2 10 5 - 16 bours - .

E  !

D.

o .

A L 5 _ ,

t .5 10 _

-i i

5 -

1 10 Basis:

, Secondary Pressure = 1100 psia

[f Feedwater Temperature = 1200F 3 lo * '

/j/ ,

' i f

' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 4 ' ' ' ' '

D' i o 2 4 6 R to 12 14 16 18 2D 22 24 24 28 30 32 j HME0mmr4 ' From start of Feedwater i

l

-1 LOAF 22 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"  ;

i

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE'- LOSS'0F ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY

- EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page 25 of " Revision ""

GUIDELINES 3

1 Figure 8-4 ,

TYPICAL FEEDWATER REQUIRED FOR SENSIBLE HEAT REMOVAL T,a, (REQUIRED) VS T,,,, (INITIAL) f (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)

)

I i

LOAF 23 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"~ I

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE- LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER-REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 2'

of . Revision "

SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ACCEPTANCE CHITERIA

1. Reactivity Control 1. a. Reactor power decreasing and
b. NegativeStartupRate) and
c. Maximum of one CEA NOT fully inserted or-borated per Tech Specs.
2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries 2. a. Safety Load Division I (AC and DC Power) energized 9E Safety Load Division II energized and b.i)[125V] DC and [120V[ AC C Safety Bus A-energized

%j and Uzr V3 Dr. .wJ LiDd E [125V) DC and [120V] AC_

Di,>uv I cia 5 ump Safety Bus C energized-or ii)[125V] DC and [120V] AC Safety Bus B energized and ,

[125V] DC and [120V] AC Safety Bus D energized

%d 42.0 N-5 bZT '/] Q r W D,vw o n 3. bussmtgizth LOAF 24 ABB CE SYSTEM 80f"

.g '

. SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER- .)

RECOVERY ]..

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 25 of _" Revision "

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA' q

3. RCS Inventory Control 3.a. Charging and letdown on SIS are maintaining or restoring pressurizer level [2% to 78%]

and

b. The RCS is subcooled and
c. The HJTC RVLMS indicates the. <

I, >

core is covered. j i;

4. RCS Pressure Control 4. Pressurizer heaters and spray -

are maintain.ng or restoring I

pressurizer pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits of  ;

Figure 8-1.

5. Core Heat Removal 5. Tg RTD and representative Core  !

Exit Thermocouple temperatures ,

less than [626*F].

6. RCS Heat Removal 6. ' a. . RCS T,,, is < [567'F] 1 4 r. 1 d i f" l 7 b. 1 At least one steam b i I/:Jwu 6s W enera [haswide  !

ran 1evel->^[0%),

llGd Qlcai^Ifr sbc- greendo and 3 4, i' RCS T, tem atures are stable or C decreasing. =

l i

l LOAF 25 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"  !

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER-  !

REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 2'

of " Revision ^^"

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA  ;

7. Containment Isolation 7. a. - Containment pressure less than [2.0 psig]'

82 1d

b. No contr.tnment-area y radiation monitors alarming -

and

c. No steam plant activity monitors alarming.  ;

and

d. No nuclear annex alarms. ,

ca L Wo neAc dt,adsig_redab%e 14

8. Containment Temperature and 8. a. Containment temperature less 1 Pressure Control than [110*F]

and

b. Containment. pressure less than [2.0 psig].
9. Containment Combustible Gas 9. a. Containment temperature less Control than [110*F]

_a_nd

b. Containment pressure less than [2.0 psig].

LOAF 26 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

-i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER ,

REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS . z' GUIDELINES Page of _ Revision " ]

BASES .

i The bases section of the Loss of All Feedwater (LOAF) Recovery Guideline  ;

'f describes the LOAF transient in relation to the actions which the operatur  ;

takes during a LOAF. The purpose of the bases section is to provide.the ,

operators with information which will enable them to understand the reasons -

for, and the consequences of, the actions they take during a LOAF. l Characterization of a loss of All Feedwater Event

.i A Loss of All Feedwater results from a loss of main, startup, and emergency  !

feedwater to the steam generators. Some rossible causes for a Loss of All  ;

Feedwater include:  ;

a) Loss of all main feedwater pumps. l b) Malfunction of the feedwater control system which closes the main feed-

  • water control valves. ['

c) Inadvertent isolation, or blockage, of the feedwater flow path. ,

d) Malfunction of the condensate system.

e) Feedwater line break (loss of feedwater resulting from a feedwater 'line '

break which is not isolable from the steam generator is covered under .;

Excess Steam Demand Event).

A Loss of All Feedwater is characterized by specific parameters that may be  ;

indicated in the control room. Some of these indications are:

a) Decreasing steam generator water level. The existence of this condition ~

may be indicated by an a'larm in the control room. l b) Increasing steam generator pressure before a reactor trip, followed by a i decreasing and stabilizf y trend, j c) Increasing pressurizbr level and pressure before a reactor trip, j followed by a decreasing and stabilizing trend.  ;

d) Reactor trip generated on low steam generator water level.

i

~ LOAF 27 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" i

SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE . LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECCVERY

}

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ,

GUIDELINES Page 28 of _" Revision "  ;

1 l

e) Emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS) generated on low steam L j generator water level. _

f) Turbine / generator tripped. .,

g) Low main feedwater' pump flow / suction pressure, resulting in a main .j i

feedwater pump trip alarm. (The main feedwater pump flow may possibly be high if there is a feedwater line break.)

h) Containment pressure may increase if a feedwater line breaks inside ]

containment. In addition, possible increase in containment pressure, j '

temperature, humidity, or containment sump level.

i) A feedwater line break outside containment may be indicated by noise. 'l j) Possible equipment operational irregularities, such a's a loss of feed- ll water control indication, a failure of the feedwater flow control -

valves, or a closure of a main feedwater system isolation valve.

k) Possible steam flow vs. feedwater flow mismatch noted. I Safety functions Affected }

l 1

A Loss of All Feedwater, if not corrected, results in a loss of the steam generator's ability to remove heat from the RCS. Operator actions should be j directed towards conserving the available steam' generator water inventory and . 3 re-establishing feedwater flow to the steam generators so that RCS heat '

removal capability is maintained or restored. All safety functions should be l monitored to assure public safety, or to detect changes in the plant l

conditions which could lead to unsafe conditions. j In addition to RCS heat removal, other safety functions may be affected in the following manner. The loss of All Feedwater flow to the steam generators  !

causes level in the steam generator to decrease. If the level decreases below j the top of the generator tube bundle, heat transfer in the steam generator  :]

c decreases and RCS temperature will begin to increase. RCS temperature also j increases because cooler f'e edwater is no longer being added to the steam j generators, thereby raising overall steam generator temperature. The rate of level decrease and RCS temperature increase is a function of reactor power.

LOAF 28 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"'

i

i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'ALL FEEDWATER [

RECOVERY  !

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  !

GUIDELINES Page 2' of f Revision ""  !

r The rate of decrease is also dependent on the rate of feedwater loss or the  !

size of the feedwater line break. As water level decreases below the reactor  ;

trip setpoint, a reactor trip (reactivity control) will occur, accompanied by j a turbine trip, and rapidly decreasing RCS temperatures'(to the hot zero power ]

setpoint), pressurizer level and pressure. At high reactor powers, the j reactor trip will occur within approximately 15-30 seconds after the loss of l all feedwater. Following the reactor trip, the steam bypass valves will l usually control steam generator pressure at the hot zero power setpoint. If the steam bypass valves are unavailable, steam pressure may be controlled by 3 the ADVs if the operator opens them or by the steam generator main steam  !

safety valves. RCS temperature will be controlled at a value slightly above ~[

that corresponding to steam generator saturation conditions until a substantial portia of the tube bundle in each S/C is uncovered. At this  !

point, RCS temperature will begin to increase. If the steam generators boil l dry, RCS temperature will rise rapidly. When saturation conditions ,

in the RCS reach the setpoints for the pressurizer safeties, RCS inventory will be lost out of the safeties (loss of RCS inventory control). If RCS inventory loss continues at a high pressure, core uncovery may occur with >

corresponding severe consequences. The high pressure in the RCS will_ prevent l

RCS inventory replenishment via the SIS. Thus, operation of the charging pump will be the sole means of injecting water into _the RCS. To avoid this j situation, the operator is given explicit instructions to go to the Functional .i Recovery Guideline to initiate once-through-cooling upon indication that a RCS -I safety valve has lifted following SG dryout.  ;

-Trendina of Key Parameters  ;

Reactor Power (Figure 8-5)

When the level in one or both steam generators falls below the reactor trip l setpoint, the reactor willitrip. At high powers, this will occur in 15-30 l seconds. The main turbine generator will trip concurrently with the reactor l trip. If the operator is able to conclude that a loss of feedwater has l 1

LOAF 29 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

a 1

g -, ,y

l SYSTEM 80+"

TITLE- LOSS OF~ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 3" GUIDELINES Page of " Revision = q i

occurred before the reactor has tripped, the react'or should be tripped immediately (even before steam generator water level drops to the low level '

trip setpoint) to conserve the available steam generator water inventory.

RCS Temperature (Figure 8-6) -i RCS temperature may increase before the trip. After the trip, RCS tempera-tures should decrease to approximately the hot zero power setpoint. If steam generator water level begins to drop below the top of the heat transfer tubes, the RCS heat transfer surface is reduced and RCS temperature increases. -If the steam generators are allowed to boil dry, RCS temperature will increase .j dramatically.

Pressurizer Pressure (Figure 8-7) .

Pressurizer pressure will initially increase prior to a reactor trip due to  :

the RCS heatup and then decrease after the trip. If the SGs are allowed to boil dry, pressurizer pressure will eventually increase in conjunction with RCS temperature and pressurizer level. [

Pressurizer Level (Figurc 8-8)

'l Coincident with RCS temperature rising prior to reactor trip, there will be an increase in pressurizer level. The level will decrease post trip as-heat-is j removed from the RCS. If the SGs are allowed to boil dry,'RCS heat removal is -

no longer being maintained and pressurizer level will increase in conjunction {

with RCS temperature increases.  !

i

[

i I

i LOAF 30 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* l h

l i

I SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER- ]

RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of " Rev..ision "^"

Reactor Vessel level Voiding is not expected to occur during a Loss of All Feedwater. transient  ;

since the RCS heats up and RCS inventory is not expected to be-lost unless the l pressurizer safety relief valves open. If RCS inventory loss continues at.a high rate because of a loss of heat sink, voiding could eventually ~cause core i uncovery because system pressure is above SI snut off head. If feedwater is j restored, voiding should not occur.

Steam Generator Pressure (Figure 8-9)

Initially, the pressure in the steam generators will increase as feedwater  !

flow to the steam generators is lost because the_ heat required to heat the  ;,

cool feedwater now causes SG temperature to increase. Following the reactor ji trip, SG pressure will usually increase to the steam bypass control setpoint. }l If steaming continues with the steam vent path left open, and without l feedwater, steam generator pressure will eventually begin to decrease as the steam generator boils dry. q Steam Generator Level (Figure 8-10)  !

I A loss of feedwater to the steam generator will result in a decreasing steam i generator level. This decrease usually causes a reactor trip. If steaming

~

continues without feedwater, the SG tube bundle will- uncover and, eventually,- -i the steam generators will boil dry. 'l I

LOAF 33 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY i

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 32 of ." Revision ""

i

.q i

i t

[

Figure 8-5 '

REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER-FLOW ,

REACTOR POWER (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)

j i

L t

t t

i i

LOAF 32 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

v SYSTEM 80+" TITLE toss of'ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY' EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of " Revision "

1 i

Figure 8-6  :

REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW- i i

LOOP A RCS NARROW RANGE TEMPERATURES i

b P

(To BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) j

l l.

]

1

' LOAF 33 'ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" j

LSYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY

. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES P a g e of Revision "^"

j i

ti 4

Figure 8-7 REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW ,

PZR NARROW RANGE PRESSURE '

r (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) ,

I i

i

'l h

-l l

. LOAF 34 ABB CE SYSTEN 80+"-  !

f',' I SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL' FEEDWATER --

' RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page " of _" Revision ""  :

GUIDELINES 4

1 Figure 8-8 REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW ,

PZR LEVEL (T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)

LOAF- 35 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+'"

c. . .

s SYSTEM - 80 + " TI'!LE- . LOSS O'F ALL FEEDWATER .;

REC 0VERY' .

-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 3' of _" Revision "" r

'l i

i Figure 8-9 REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW r STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE l ;

r 3

(TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)  ;

-q

-t 2 -

i

{

le

+

l l

h 1

e l

LOAF 36 ABB CE~ SYSTEM 80+"  !

SYSTEM 80+"- TITLE LOSS OF.ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 37 Page of Revision ""

GUIDELINES il V,

-j.

l r

r l

Figure 8-10  :

TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL (T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)

.i i

f s

i 1 .I i

LOAF .37 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

w

SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER l REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Revision "^"

38 GUIDELINES Page of . '.7 j l

Guideline Strateay and Information Flow Figure 8-11 has been included to provide the reader with' a summary description:

of the LOAF Recovery Guideline strategy and information flow. If a LOAF is initiated from MODE 1 or MODE 2, the operator performs the Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses the event prior to entering the LOAF Recovery Guideline. f However, if the event is initiated from MODE 3 or MODE 4, the operator is not -

directed to the Standard Post Trip Actions since they may not apply. Instead, the operator ensures that the LOAF is properly diagnosed and that the specified entry conditions are met prior to entering the LOAF Recovery i Guideline. After tripping all RCPs, guidance-is provided to restore a  !

feedwater supply to at least one steam generator.

If main, startup or emergency feedwater cannot be restored, then unnecessary j steam discharges are isolated and a low pressure feedwater source is l

established if possible. If adequate heat removal via the SGs cannot be ';

maintained, the operator is directed to implement the FRG and to. establish  !

once-through-cooling. If feedwater-is restored to at least one steam' generator, then the operator decides whether a cooldown to SCS entry '

conditions is necessary. Guidance to perform a cooldown is provided in this

. path.  !

A more detailed chart (Figure 8-13) illustrates the LOAF Recovery Guideline l I

strategy and lists the guideline steps.

l !;

i f

LOAF 38 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+'

-- _ _ _ J

s 0  :

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'ALL FEEDWATER ,

RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of_". Revision " ,

I f

5 Figure 8-11.

LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER (FLOW AND STRATEGY CHARTS WILL REFLECT THE DETAILED STEPS IN THE GUIDELINE.)

i-LOAF- 39 ABB CE.' SYSTEM 8D+"

i l

l SYSTEM 80 +"- TITLE . LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER l REC 0VERY' l EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  :

GUIDELINES Page a of # Revision "" i i

Bases for Operator Actions The operator actions for a Loss of All Feedwater are' directed at placing the 'l plant in a safe, stable condition. Actions are taken to ensure that an .j adequate heat sink is maintained and radiation releases.are minimized.  ;

3

  • 1. The diagnosis of a LOAF event is confirmed by verifying that the. Safety-  !

Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.- This

]

action ensures that the proper procedure is being used to mitigate the effects of a LOAF. If another event is diagnosed, then the operator'is -l' directed to implement the appropriate Optimal Recovery. Guideline. . If diagnosis of one event is not possible, then.the operator is directed to - t implement the Functional Recovery Guideline. The Functional Recovery  ;

Guideline is based on safety functions and will ensure that all safety- l functions are addressed regardless of what event (s) is occurring. j i

i

2. A Loss of All Feedwater results in a reduction of the ability of the  ;

a steam generators to remove heat from the RCS. Heat input to the RCS is j minimized by tripping all four RCPs. Natural circulation heat removal .

is adequate to remove the decay heat generated in the core.

3. If a feedwater line break is suspected, then the operator should try to l isolate the feedwater line break from the steam generators by any  !

plant-specific methods possible (e.g., closing main feedwater isolation. I valves, closing main feadwater regulating valves, etc.). A feedwater line break upstream of the check valves at the inlet to the steam _j generator should automatically be isolated from the~ steam generator. If l a main feedwater line break has not. occurred, or the break is.' isolated )

from the steam generator, then the c'mrator is directed to continue'with J the actions of this guideline which address restoration of feedwater and plant control. If the feedwater line break has occurred and cannot be- g isolated from the steam generator, then it will continue to blowdown until the steam generator boils dry.. This results in an uncontrolled LOAF 40 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

)

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page " of_" Rev..ision "

GUIDELINES cooldown of the RCS When the operator. determines that' a feedwater line ,

break is not isolable, the Excess Steam Demand Event Recovery Guideline should be implemented for all further actions. -!

  • 4. The operator should continue the efforts to restore main, startup j and/or emergency feedwater systems operation which were begun in-the SPTAs. These efforts may include restoring electrical power, operating l i

valves, starting pumps, or restoring necessary auxiliary systems for feedwater system operation.  ;

  • 5. If feedwater flow is not restored to at least one steam generator, the operator is directed to perform steps 6 through 8. These steps are_

directed at eliminating non-vital steam discharge, establishing a low i pressure feedwater source, and/or directing the operator to the FRG as a "last resort" heat removal method.

i If feedwater flow is restored to at least one steam generator, the operator is directed to perform steps 9 through 28. These steps are directed at stabilizing the plant and recovering from a Loss of All i Feedwater event.

l The steam generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system, and any 6.

other non-vital secondary steam discharges should be isolated. Until- l feedwater is re-established, the steam generate

  • water inventories must i be conserved. Efforts-to restore main, startup, and/or emergency feedwater systems to operation should be continued. Such attempts may include restoration of vital auxiliaries like instrument air, electrical i power, and/or instrumentation. These actions may also include manual operation of valves or other equipment that is normally operated i remotely. .!

i '\

7. If main, startup and/or emergency feedwater cannot be restored to at  ;

least one steam generator, then all plant specific sources of feedwater j LOAF 41 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" ,

i

r 1

SYSTEM 80 +"

TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY ,

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  :

GUIDELINES Page '2-of _" Revision ""  ;

I which could be made available to replace steam generator boil-off should j be implemented. Examples of alternate low-pressure' sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. When developing l plant procedures, alternate low-pressure sources of feedwater should be ,

identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures.  ;

Guidelines on steam generator depressurization should be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low pressure sources of I feedwater as a backup feedwater supply. Figure 8-12 provides an example j of the type of information that must be developed on a plant specific .!

basis. The figure provides a typical steam generator dump area required f to remove heat from the steam generator for various times after j shutdown. The required heat removal, compared to the available heat

{

removal capacity (e.g., atmospheric dump valves), provides the technical basis for which guidance may be developed on steam generator  ;

depressurization to permit use of alternate-low-pressure sources of feedwater. ,

  • 8. For the Loss of All Feedwater event, as long as at least one steam  !

generator has a wide range level greater than [0%), then adequate RCS ,

heat removal is implicitly being maintained. An additional criterion requires the operator to monitor RCS T, to ensure temperatures are stable or decreasing. This criterion assumes that no operator or plant-initiated actions have caused a momentary, correctable reduction in RCS  !

heat removal (e.g., ADV is closed manually). These criterion are based  !

on ensuring that the steam generator is capable of removing heat from ,

the RCS. i i

, Once the steam generator has dried out or no longer is able to remove .I heat from the RCS, the pressure and temperatures in the RCS will increase until the primary safety valves open. Analyses have shown that  !

r once-through-cooling (FRG HR-4) must be initiated by the operator within  ;

30 minutes following' the opening of the primary safety valve to ensure  !

that the core remains adequately cooled. l I

LOAF 42 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER' RECOVERY ,

EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS Page '5 of _ R= vision ^^"

GUIDELINES i

I

.t Figure 8-12 REQUIRED STEAM DUMP AREA VERSUS STEAM PRESSURE (T0 BE DEVELOPEC DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) t i

LOAF 43 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

'1 SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY EMERGENOY OPERATIONS i GUIDELINES Page " of _" Revision " j

necessary to restore and maintain SG water level in the normal level f band. Modulation of flow should be made using the feedwater regulating

  • control valves for the particular feedwater system in use. f
  • 10. RCS T,,, should be controlled by the steam bypass system at less than l

[567*F]. The goal is to stabilize RCS temperature and remove decay heat. If condenser vacuum is lost, the turbine bypass system is not available, or if the MSIVs have closed, the atmospheric dump valves must be used to control steam generator pressure. This action is performed-to maintain steam generator pressure below the secondary safety valve setpoints, preventing them from opening, and to allow a controlled RCS heat' removal process using the steam generators.

  • 11. The emergency feedwater source is the emergency feedwater tank. If the emergency feedwater_ system is being used, the inventory in the emergency feedwater tank must be verified to be adequate. This can be determined from Figures 8-3 and 8-4. Alternate sources of emergency feedwater must be investigated. These alternate sources must be identified in plant specific procedures. Examples of alternate sources are non-seismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

1

  • 12. The PLCS is verified to be automatically controlling or restoring pressurizer level in the band [2 to 78%]. If not, the available charging pump and letdown are operated manually to ensure pressurizer level is being maintained. This action verifies that the RCS inventory.

control safety function is being satisfied.

  • 13. The operator-must ensure that pressurizer heaters and spray are-controlling or restoring RCS pressure within the limits of Figure 8-1.

If subcooling or cooldown limits of Figure 8-1 are being violated, then the operators should take actions to restore the RCS to within the P-T

-LOAF 44 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS'0F ALL FEEDWATER

-RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS-Page " of '7 Revision "

GUIDELINES limits. Depending on the situation, the operator should perform the following actions as appropriate:

l

a. Stop the cooldown, '
b. Operate [ main or auxiliary] spray _or the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System as necessary to restore pressurizer pressure to within the  ;

P-T limits of Figure 8-3,

~'

c. Attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature configuration. The cooldown may be continued, if desired, within the limits of Figure 8-1,
d. If an overpressure situation exists and is caused by Si and/or - ,

charging flow, then' throttle or stop SI (refer to step'18) or charging pumps and manually control letdown to restore and -

maintain pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure [

8-1. i

  • 14. Once the RCPs are tripped, natural circulation RCS flow should develop-within [5 - 15 minutes). Natural circulation flow will be ensured by maintaining RCS pressure and inventory control and using at least one l steam generator for RCS heat removal.

J When single phase liquid natural circulation flow is established in at  ;

least one loop, the RCS should indicate the following conditions: 3

a. Loop AT (Tu - T,) less than normal full power AI,
b. Hot and cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing,
c. RCS is subcooled based on representative ~CET temperature,  ;

i

d. No abnormal' differences between Tn RTDs and core exit thermocouples.

3 Hot leg RTD temperatbre should be consistent with the core exit i thermocouples. Adequate natural circulation flow will be reflected by -  :

LOAF 45 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" q

SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY ,

EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS  :

Page " of " Rev..ision "

GUIDELINES -

the core exit thermocouples temperatures being 'approximately equal to the hot leg RTD temperatures. An abnormal difference between Tg and the-core exit thermocouples could be any difference greater than [10*F].

Natural circulation is regulated by a combination of factors. Factors ,

which affect natural circulation include decay heat, component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, and voiding. The component elevations on C-E plants are such that a .

satisfactory natural circulation decay heat removal is obtained utilizing density differences between the bottom of the core and the top- f of the steam generator tube sheet. Natural circulation flow is enhanced by the density difference obtained when primary to secondary heat removal through the steam generator U-tubes is utilized.

' i' If the natural circulation criteria of this step are not met, then natural circulation is not effectively transferring heat from the core  :

to the steam generators. If feedwater has been regained or sufficient i inventory is available in at least one SG, then ensure RCS pressure and inventory are being controlled properly. Feedwater, however, must be  !

restored to at least one SG in order to continue the natural circulation heat removal process. Both the RCS and Core Heat Removal Safety functions may be jeopardized if the criteria of this step continue to be l violated. .

I i

  • 15. Plant conditions should be carefully assessed before any RCPs are ]

restarted. The need for forced circulation operation should be balanced against the risk of damage to the RCP seals.

The need for operation of the RCPs should be evaluated based on:

1. the adequacy df the RCS and core heat removal under the existing natural circulation conditions,
2. the existing RCS pressure and temperatures, LOAF 46 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+

l

1 l

SYSTEM 80 +." TITLE. LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER [

RECOVERY [

i EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page '7 of ." Revision "

3. the need for main pressurizer spray capability. ,

If the existing natural circulation is providing satisfactory RCS and' l core heat removal, a transfer to forced circulation operation may not be  ;

necessary. This would be particularly true if the RCS had already been f cooled and depressurized to SCS entry conditions. If the RCS pressure '

and temperatures are closer to hot standby conditions, it may be  !

desirable to restart the RCPs in order to allow a normal forced {

circulation cooldown. Consideration should also be.given to the  ;

necessity of having main pressurizer spray capability if auxiliary spray  :

is not providing the desired depressurization rate.  !

The potential for RCP seal degradation should be evaluated based on: i l

i

1. how long CCW to the RCPs was interrupted,  !
2. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures. j f

The possibility of seal degradation increases if the CCW has been interrupted for longer than [10 minutes). The seal staging pressures {

provide an indication of degraded seal stages. (a low pressure drop l across a stage indicates a problem). Restart of an RCP with one or more  ;

degraded seal stages should be avoided if possible.

+

  • 16. If all RCPs have been stopped, then operation of two RCPs (in opposite loops) should be attempted if feedwater can be restored to at least one 1 SG and RCP restart criteria are met. This will ensure continued forced  !

circulation of coolant through the core and will provide the capability for the normal mode of pressurizer spray. However, only one RCP'in each ;j loop should be operated to minimize heat input to the RCS.  ;

Determine whether RCP restart criteria are met by the following:

a. Electrical power available to the RCPs, LOAF 47 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER ,

-RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page of_" Rev..ision ""

i

b. RCP auxiliaries ([in particular, Component Cooling Water]) to maintain seal cooling, bearing and motor cooling should be operating in order to prevent damage to the pump _and/or motor.

I

[Following automatic or operator initiated containment isolation, reinstatement of one of the following means of RCP seal cooling  !

([CCW), [CVCS seal injection (SI)], [ Dedicated Seal Injection {

System (DSIS)] should be considered to ensure' adequate RCP cooling]. There should be no high temperature alarms on the RCPs f to be operated.

l

c. At least one steam generator has feedwater restored and is available for removing heat from the RCS. A steam generator -

having the ability for feed flow and steam flow is available for ,

removing heat from the RCS.

d. Pressurizer level is greater than [33%) and not decreasing. With  ;

this pressurizer level, the possibility of draining the  ;

pressurizer due to loop shrinkage and/or steam void condensation

  • is minimized and there is a greater likelihood of keeping the ,

pressurizer heaters covered. This will assist in maintaining  ;

positive RCS pressure control. The value of [33%] is based on the assumption that a void exists in the RCS equal to one half the reactor vessel upper head volume. [33%) ensures that the minimum pressurizer level, [2%], will exist following this void collapse. _

The criterion of pressurizer level not- decreasing implies that RCS inventory control has been established.

e. RCS is subcooled based on representative CET temperature (Figure

+

8-1). This condition taken in conjunction with (d) above  !

indicates that inventory and pressure are being controlled.

  • 17. Upon restarting two RCPs in opposite loops, pressurizer level and pres-f sure may decrease due to loop shrinkage and/or void condensation. It is ,

possible that this action will drain the pressurizer. Steam voids, if- i present in the reactor vessel, will condense upon restarting RCPs. The l HJTC RVLMS should be monitored for the trending of reactor vessel liquid  ;

LOAF 48 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+'  !

SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER f REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  ;

GUIDELINES Page " of _" Revision "

level. This trending information may be correlated to pressurizer level  :

decrease. RCP operation with a drained pressurizer may continue provid-ed certain actions are taken and certain criteria are satisfied. i I

The following constitute the actions to be taken and the criteria to be- j satisfied when restarting RCPs:

I

a. Start one RCP in each loop.
b. Ensure proper RCP operation by monitoring RCP amperage and pump NPSH. NPSH is determined by pressurizer pressure and corresponding T, on Figure 8-1. ,
c. Operate all available charging pumps and SI pumps until  ;

pressurizer level is greater than [14.3%] and (SIS termination j criteria of step 18 are met). lt i 'I

  • 18. If the SI pumps are operating, then they must continue to operate until SI termination criteria are met. Termination of SI should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria. >

Throttling of SI flow is also permissible if termination criteria are-  !

met. SI termination criteria are: j

a. RCS is subcooled based on representative temperature (Refer to Figure 8-1). Establishing a subcooled RCS ensures the fluid surrounding the core is subcooled and provides for reestablishing flow should the subcooled condition deteriorate when SIS flow is secured. Voids may exist in some parts of the RCS (e.g., reactor vessel head), but these are permissible as long as core heat i removal is maintained.  !
b. Pressurizer level is greater than [14.3%) and not decreasing. A-I pressurizer level greater than [14.3%) and not decreasing, in conjunction with criterion a. above, is an indication that RCS l

inventory control has been established. I i

~!

LOAF 49 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* j I

~

SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER  !

REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS i GUIDELINES Page 5" of Revision "

-i

c. At least one steam generator is available for removing heat. from e the RCS. A steam generator having the ability-for feedwater flow and steam flow is available for removing heat from the RCS..  ;
d. The HJTC RVLMS indicates a minimum level at the top of the hot leg nozzles. This provides an extra margin of core coverage and, -

taken in conjunction with the above, serves as an additional indication that adequate RCS inventory control has'been i established. .

i If the criteria are met, then the operator may either stop or throttle .

the SI pumps. The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate  ;

flow if the SI pumps are to be used to control pressurizer levol or plant pressure. A general assessment of the SI pump performance can be j made from the control room. The operator should confirm that at least .

' one train and preferably both SI pumps are operating and that system  ;

delivery rate is consistent with RCS pressure. Injection flow rates to each reactor vessel nozzle should be approximately equal. .

I

  • 19 If the criteria of step 18 cannot be maintained after the SI pumps have been stopped, then the SI pumps must be restarted and full SI flow  :

restored. j i

  • 20. At this point in the recovery, the operators should' decide if a plant l cooldown is necessary. If the continued availability of any systems j required for maintenance of HOT STANDBY is in doubt, a cooldown will be .

required before the ability to cooldown is lost. For example, if the' l available emergency feedwater inventory is marginally adequate (as f determined by using Figures 8-3. and 8-4), a cooldown should be commenced -

immediately in order to avoid running out of emergency feedwater before  ;

the shutdown cooldown system can be placed into operation. Similarly, l consideration should be given to the availability of compressed air and l cooling water systems as well as the continued availability of  !

LOAF 50 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*  ;

1

l SYSTEM 80l+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER l RECOVERY  ;

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

( GUIDELINES Page " of '7 Revision " ,

i electrical power. A cooldown may also be required before any necessary repairs can be made.

21. A decision is made whether to maintain the plant in a stable condition-or cooldown to shut down cooling entry conditions. -If the plant is to i be maintained in a stable condition, then this guideline can'be exited,.

and an appropriate, approved procedure implemented. If a plant cooldown j is to be performed, then the remaining steps of this guideline (steps 22 ,

through 28) should be implemented. .

  • 22. The RCS should be borated to Technical Specification concentration .for -

the required shutdown margin prior to starting a controlled cooldown.

Should letdown not be available, it may not be possible to borate'the RCS to a cold shutdown RCS boron concentration prior to commencing the-cooldown. Boration will be limited to the makeup space available in the j pressurizer. If this is the case,'the operator should borate the RCS to ,

the minimum shutdown margin (per Technical Specifications) corresponding-to T,. During the cooldown, RCS shrinkage will. provide more. space in l the pressurizer for additional boration. The. operator should l' continuously or periodically borate to maintain the minimum shutdown margin until the cold shutdown boron concentration is achieved. j

23. An RCS cooldown to shutdown cooling entry conditions is performed, using .

forced or natural circulation, in accordance with Technical i Specifications. One of the following methods should_be utilized: ll

~

a. The preferred method for cooling the RCS is by discharging. steam-using the steam bypass system. This method can only be j implemented if the condenser is available. I
b. If the condenser or steam bypass system is not available, then. an  ;

RCS cooldown should be performed utilizing the atmospheric ' dump l valves. '! -

P LOAF. 51 .ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" l I

SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 52 GUIDELINES Page of " Revision " l l

24. During a controlled cooldown and depressurization the automatic j operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable. The setpoints of MSIS and SIAS must be manually reset (lowered or bypassed) as the l cooldown progresses. This ensures that automatic engineered safeguards l actuation remains available until the RCS has been cooled down and_ j depressurized. t
  • 25. If pressurizer pressure reaches [740 psia], the safety injection tanks ,

(SITS) must be vented, drained, or their discharge valves shut to prevent the nitrogen cover gas from being discharged into the RCS when l

RCS pressure is reduced below the SIT's pressure during a controlled cooldown. The max SIT pressure is [640 psia] and the value of [740 psia] is 100 psi greater than the maximum SIT pressure. -l

  • 26. If the pressurizer pressure reaches [445 psia], the isolation valves on I the SITS may be closed to prevent unnecessary SIT discharge. [445 psia]  !

l is the SIT outlet valve interlock setpoint.  !

=1

  • 27. Low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) is instituted at  !

T, s [259'F] to protect against subjecting the RCS pressure boundary to j a low temperature brittle fracture situation. I

  • 28. The cooldown and depressurization should continue until shutdown cooling i system entry conditions are established.  ;

I i

a. pressurizer level control should be established and verified by a i level greater than [33%] and constant 'or increasing,  !

l

b. RCS is subcooled  !
c. RCS pressure should be at or below the shutdown cooling system  !

I entry pressure of [450 psia],  ;

d. RCS hot leg temperature should be at or below the shutdown cooling -[

system entry temperature of [400*F],  !

LOAF 52 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

}

. SYSTEM 80 +"- TITLE LOSS OF ALL'FEEDWATER RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES ' Page 55 of ." Revision = l When these criteria are established, the LOAF ~0RG should be' exited and_ f SCS operation initiated per [ operating instructions).  ;

s If the RCS cannot be depressurized to SCS entry pressure then a void  ;

should be suspected.  ;

t

a. The operators should continuously monitor for the presence of voids using any of the following indications, parameter changes,  ;

or trends: ). l i) letdown flow greater than charging flow, ,

ii) pressurizer level increasing significantly greater than .f expected while operating pressurizer spray, 1 iii) the HJTC RVLMS indicates that voiding is present in the l reactor vessel, I iv) HJTC unheated thermocouple temperature indicates saturated conditions in the reactor vessel upper head, [

b. If voiding hinders RCS depressurization to SCS entry. pressure,. t then an attempt to eliminate voiding should be made. An attempt to eliminate the voids is performed as follows- -

i) Letdown is isolated or verified to be isolated to minimize further inventory loss. j ii) The depressurization is stopped to prevent further growth of the void, i I

iii) The RCS is pressurized and depressurized (within the. limits of Figure 8-1), to condense the void. Pressurizing'will have the effect of filling the voided portion of the RCS  !

with cooler fluid, which will remove heat from the region.

Repeating the process of pressurizing and depressurizing several times will cool and condense the steam void. With a void in the reactor vessel, the pressurization /depressuri-LOAF 53 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

i SYSTEM 80+" TITLE ' LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER l RECOVERY-f EMERGENCY OPERATIONS-of _" Revision "_

GUIDELINES Page "

i i zation cycle will produce a fill and drain effect in the ,

reactor vessel. This cycle may be accomplished using

- pressurizer heaters and spray (preferred method) or the SIS / charging system (alternative method). The monitoring of pressurizer level and the HJTC RVLMS for trending RCS ,

inventory will assist the operator in assessing the effectiveness of void elimination.  !

c. If indications of unacceptable RCS voiding continue, and voiding -l is suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes, then attempts should be made to cool the steam generator and condense the tube l bundle void. Steam generator cooling'can be accomplished by  ;

steaming and/or blowdown in combination with feeding the steam generator. The steam generator cooling will be effective for condensing steam voids but will not have an effect on  :

non-condensible gases trapped in the tube bundle. Howe'ver, a  !

buildup of non-condensible gases in the tube bundle will not ,

hinder natural circulation, even with a large number of tubes l blocked, as only a small amount of heat transfer area is required for the removal of decay heat. The monitoring of pressurizer .;

level for RCS inventory trending will assist the operator in-  !

assessing the effectiveness of void elimination. I

d. If indications of unacceptable RCS voiding continue, then voiding may be caused by non-condensible gases. Operate the Reactor  !

Coolant Gas Vent System to clear trapped non-condensible gases.

The monitoring of pressurizer level and/or the HJTC. RVLMS for  !

trending of RCS inventory will assist the operators in assessing l the effectiveness of void elimination.

e. The efforts to eliminate voiding should be continued until SCS entry conditions are established or until an appropriate procedure -t has been approved by the plant Technical Support Center. l LOAF 54 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

.l r

o "ei l 1

SYSTEM 80+' TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER  !

REC 0VERY i i

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS - 1 GUIDELINES Page 55 of f Revision " ,

l SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK BASES- i LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER The safety functions and their respective acceptance criteria. listed below are those used to confirm the adequacy of the LOAF Guideline in mitigating the <

event.

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES

1. Reactivity a. Reactor Power For all emergency Control Decreasing events,'the reactor must and be shutdown.
b. Negative Startup Rate and Reactor power
c. Maximum of one CEA decreasing, in-NOT fully inserted or conjunction with borated per Tech. negative startup rate, Specs. is a positive indication that-reactivity control-  !

is established.

The criterion that no more than one CEA be stuck out or the RCS borated observes typical Technical Specification requirements.

LOAF 55 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

]

SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE- LOSS OF ALL-FEEDWATER RECOVERY:  ;

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  !

GUIDELINES Page " of " Revision "" ,

SAFETY FilNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ., BASES ..

2. Maintenance of a. Safety Load Division One vital AC division _is j Vital f.uxil- I energized required to power iaries (AC ano o_r equipment necessary to- ,

DC Power) Safety Load Division maintain control of all ~

I II energized other safety functions.

and b.1)[125V] DC and [120V] One DC division is AC Safety Bus A required as'a minimum to energized provide monitoring and and limited control of the ctf$ , [125V) DC and [120V] -other-safety functions.

{tg L/] DC M E'Z d j AC Safety Bus C  ;

m, 0 ,,,,s w T b w < C' # i ' energized

's:: c "1 E

ii)[125V] DC and [120V]  !

AC Safety Bus B  ;

energized -

and

[125V] DC and [120V]

AC Safety Bus D energized.

J

[zgd]5C U200 y_ O,y.Os H t:v m er""I'M - 7 b

LOAF 56 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER:

REC 0VERY v

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 57 of .'7 Revision ""

SAFETY FUNCTION- ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES

3. RCS Inventory a. Charging and letdown .The value of [78%] was Control are maintaining or chosen as an upper limit- ,

~'

restoring pressurizer for pressurizer level to level to [2% to 78%] ensure an operable steam -

and bubble is present in the- .

b. The RCS is subcooled pressurizer. A value of and [2%] was chosen as the
c. The RVLMS indicates lower limit to ensure ,

the core is covered, some measurable level exists in the pressur-izer. Subcooling co-- >

existing with a pres-surizer: level of [2% to. ,

78%] indicates adequate RCS inventory control. ,

via a saturated bubble in~the pressurizer.

Representative CET Tem-perature is to be used  ;

during natural' circu-lation flow conditions and Tn RTDs are to be -

used-during forced ,

circulation flow conditions.

i 1

i

. j i

1 LOAF 57 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*-

L SYSTEM;80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY' EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

-GUIDELINES Page " of '7 Revision ^^" .

SAFETY FUNCTION' ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES  !

3 RCS Inventory An RVLMS indication that-Control the core is covered, -

(Continued) taken in conjunction '

with subcooling, is ,an additional indication ,

that RCS inventory-control has been established.

4. RCS Pressure Pressurizer heaters and For the LOAF event, Control [ main or auxilliary] spray operation of the are maintaining or restoring pressurizer heaters and ,

pressurizer pressure within sprays sh'ould be the Post Accident P-T limits sufficient to control of Figure 8-1, the RCS pressure within the acceptable region of the Post Accident. t Pressure-Temperature-  ;

limits'of Figure 8-1. 1 i

i f

LOAF 58- ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" i i

i SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER -i RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page: 5* of " Revision "

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA -BASES

5. Core Heat Re- Tn RTDs and representative The basis for the tem-moval Core Exit Thermocouple perature limit during'-

temperature less than the use of Optimal Re-

[626*F] covery Guidelines other than LOCA'is the indi-cation that the event i specific recovery- ,

strategy is not effec- l tive in core heat re- -!

moval. For the optimal. .

recovery guidelines other than LOCA, heat is normally removed from. -

the RCS by the steam generators. The value of the T RTD g and CET- ,

temperatures will'be governed by steam gen-erator conditions (i.e.,  ;

pressure and tempera-ture). In general, T, ss T3 a and.CET tem- f perature will be T, + core ' 4T. Normally_

this core AT is expected to be approximately  ;

[59'F] during single  !

phase natural circu-  !

i lation conditions. For f LOAF 59 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" 7

J T

SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY j EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of Revision ""

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES i

5. Core Heat Re- forced RCS flow con-  ;

moval (Con- ditions Tso a T, Ta es CET temperature. The design tinued) secondary system pres-  ;

sure is [1200] psia. The 3 corresponding saturation temperature.is [567'F].

By adding [59'F] to ac-count for- thermocouple inaccuracy and the AT between T, and CET, the  !

value of [626*F].-is reached.  ;

6. RCS Heat Removal 1 . RC5 T,,, is < [567] " 67'F]-is' based on the and sa ' ration temperature ~{

n b. i) ~At le'as one. corr ponding to th 1 steam pressu relief se point -!

b "]6s F

Av6) l IM gene tor has of the f st set of main

~

f

  1. 4h) Gil#M^9 wi range steam safe v ves. If i 5 c- pardF 4 1 vel > [0%), RCS T,,,is. s than  ;

dryd. ad [567*F], en'a quate l ii RCS T, decay at remova is ,

temperat res beiy maintained vi the are stable r ISSCS or the ADV(s). f decreasing. g pg gg y 3Jij ll q ;mp fwzmkcb Gllukcf

s4e m 9emb d'P' c4 . k- sk pH~w1  !

5xCel y vcJe > vrA^')- I

- LOAF 60 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* 'l c

j SYSTEM 80 +." TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER:

RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

. GUIDELINES Page " . of _" Revision ""

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES .;

1

6. RCS Heat Removal If a steaming path is ]

(Continued) available, then a steam generator. level > [0%)

is sufficient to ensure: .i that the steam generator ,

is. capable _ of RCS heat removal. Stable RCS temperatures are an in-dication that RCS heat  !

' removal is sufficient

  • assuming'that no operator action has-cau:ed a momentary,_ -

correctable reduction in, RCS heat' removal. Once the steam generator has dried out, the operator ['

should' exit'this guide-line and enter the FRG.

RCS and Core Heat Re-  !

moval HR-4 success path.

The operator should con-tinue attempts to re-store feedwater until the primary safety ,

valves open, at which' time the operator should initiate once-through--

e cooling. ,

LOAF 61 .ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"- -

i SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER l RECOVERY- l EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ,

GUIDELINES Page '2 of " Revision "^"

SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES

7. Containment a' . Containment Pressure [2.0 psig] is based on Isolation < [2.0 psig] the containment pre sure '

and alarm. It is not -

b. No containment area expected.for a LOAF radiation' monitors event that containment alarming pressure will increase i and to the alarm setpoint. '
c. No steam plant activity monitors During a LOAF radiation al arming. should not be detected i and _inside containment. The  ;
d. No nuclear annex containment area i al arms. radiation monitors 3rd should not be alarming. I
e. 6 rea3r b'"'l "*l Steam plant activity is '

I J; h edc a s' an indication of a SGTR and is not anticipated-for a LOAF. There-should be nuclear annex .c m d5<

alarms during a' LOAF. ""b'k ?

a i

LOAF 62 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

c ,

. SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER-REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page '5

- of. 62 Revision ""

GUIDELINES SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES

8. Containment a. Containment Containment temperature-Temperature and temperature <[110*F] is not expected to Pressure Control -and increase to [110*F] for .;
b. Containment pressure -a LOAF event. [2.0 ,

<[2.0 psig]. psig: 1s based on the'.

containment pressure

. alarm.. It is not-expected that the pressure will reach this value during a LOAF event.

9. Containment a. Containment Maintaining these ,

Combustible Gas temperature <[110*F] containment conditions Control and provides an indirect p . o n r ired for H2 generation in containment do not  !

exist.  ;

1 i

i LOAF 63 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

9 SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF ALLLFEEDWATER-RECOVERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS  :

GUIDELINES Page " of . " Revision ""

- _e.

-Event Strateay l

This' section contains the detailed LOAF operator actions strategy flow chart,;

Figure 8-13. The flow chart pictorially depicts the ' strategy around which the LOAF guideline is built. It is intended to assist the reader in understanding, the intent of the guideline writer and for use in training. Operators should understand the major objectives of the guideline in order to facilitate their progress toward the guideline goals.

The strategy charts show the LOAF Recovery Guideline strategy in detail and  !

list the guideline steps which correspond to each strategy objective. Some steps in the guideline may be performed at any time during the course of an i event. Those steps which have an asterisk next to'the step number can be  ;

performed at any time during the event, q

t i

i i

I

-LOAF 64 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" )

i

a

s.
  • SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER' REC 0VERY EMERGENCYs OPERATIONS -

GUIDELINES-Page " of ." Revision "

4 k

?

r

. j. , ,

'}

  • Figure 8-13a STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER EVENT ,

(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)

?

i i.

h I i

i LOAF 65 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" ,

SYSTEM 00 +" TITLE ^ LOSS'0F ALL'FEEDWATER RECOVERY-  ;

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES . Page. " ~ of Revision ""

4 L

l 4

3 I

Figure 8-13b STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS 0F ALL FEEDWATER EVENT (T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING).

I 4

LOAF 66' ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"

1

IJ1 a

SYSTEM 80 +"

~

. TITLE - LOSS 0F ALL FEEDWATER.

. REC 0VERY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page " of "' Revision ""

GUIDELINES

+

r

-i Figure 8-13c STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER EVENT (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) i

- LOAF 67' ABB CE SYSTEM 80+*

t f

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20059J911&oldid=3079289"