ML20126F080
| ML20126F080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1992 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126F060 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-921231, NUDOCS 9212300103 | |
| Download: ML20126F080 (74) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. . . -- 1 l DESIGN RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM PLAN FOR THE l SYSTEM 80+ STANDARD DESIGN DECEMBER, 1992 REV. 1 I ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR POWER WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT ABB ASEA DROWN BOVERt nas!3?i8)]g2 [BA
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1 SECTION 17.3 CONTENTS Section Title EARA .i i 17.3 Reliability Assurance Program During Design Phase 17.3-1 17.3.1 Introduction 17.3-1 l 17.3.2 Scope 17.3-1 l 17.3.3 Purpose 17.3-1 j 17.3.4 Objective 17.3-2 17.3.5 ABB-CE organisation for D-RAP 17.3-2
- i l 17.3.6 SSC Identification /Prioritization 17.3-3 17.3-4 17.3.7 Design Considerations
' 17.3-4 17.3.8 Defining Failure Modes f 17.3.9 operations Reliability Assurance Activities 17.3-5 17.3.10 owner / Operator's Reliability Assurance Program 17.3-5 f 17.3.11 D-RAP Implementation 17.3-7 17.3.11.1 CCWS Function 17.3-7 17.3.11.2 Earlier CCWS Design 17.3-7 17.3.11.3 System Redesign 17.3-7 I- 17.3.11.4 Failure Mode Identification 17.3-8 i 17.3.11.5 Identification of Maintenance 17.3-8 Requirement 17.3.12 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 17.3-9 17.3.13 References 17.3-10 1 a 4 e i'
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l t SECTION 17.3 ) i if CONTENTS ).
- i Table 11111 EAge f
l i 17.3-1 Example of Component Importance for an- ALWR . " for Internal Events 17.3-10 l i 2 17.3-2 Example of Risk-Significant Ranking of SSCs' , i for 1 CCWS Train 17.3-11 j 17.3-3 Example of _ CCWS Failure Modes & 0-RAP Activities 17.3-12 " 4 l Fioure Title Pace f + j 17.3-1 Example of System 80+ FOAKE Functional Project { Organization- - 17.3-13 1 i 17.3-2 Design Evaluation for SSCs 17.3-14 4 17.3-3 Process for Determining Dominant Failure Mod i of Risk-Significant SSCs 17.'3-15 i f' 17.3-4 Use.of Failure History to Define Failure Modes 17.3 I '= 17.3-5 Analytical Assessment to Define Failure. Modes .17.3-17 1 l 17.3-6 Inclusion of Maintenance Requirements'in the j_ Definition of Failure Modes 17.3-18 j 17.3-7 Identification of Risk-Significant SSC 0-RAP
- j. Activities 17.3-19 i . -
3 17.3-8 Example of Early CCWS Design 17.3-20 . 17.3-9 Example of Improved CCWS' Design .17.3-21. 17.3-10 Example of Fault Tree for CCWS. Train 1 17.3-22 h a ( ,- i
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l i l'.3 Eeliability Assurance Pr29EAe Durina Desian Phase a ! This section presents the System 80+ Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) a 17.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The System 80+ Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) is a program that will be performed by the designers during detailed design and specific equipment selection phases to assure that the important System 80+ reliability assumptions of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will be considered throughout the design process. The PRA evaluates the plant response to initiating events to assure that plant damage has a very low probability and risk to the public is j very low. Input to the PRA includes details of the plant design and assumptions i about the reliability of the plant risk-significant structures, systems and , components (SSCs). The plant owner / operator will also have an Operations Reliability Assurance Program (0-RAP) that tracks equipment reliability to j demonstrate that the plant is being operated and maintained with an acceptably a low risk. The D-RAP will include the design evaluation of the System 80+. It will identify , relevant aspects of plant operation, maintenance, and performance monitoring of important plant SSCs for owner / operator consideration, safety of the equipment and, limited risk to the public. The policy and implementation procedures will be specified by the owner / operator. Also included in this explanation of the D-RAP is a descriptive example of how the D-RAP will apply to one potentially important plant system, the component Cooling Water System (CCWS). The CCWS example shows how the principles of D-RAP will be applied to other systems identified by the PRA as being significant with respect to risk. 17.3.2 SCOPE The System 80+ D-RAP will include the design evaluation of the System 80+, and it will identify relevant aspecta of plant operation, maintenance and performance monitoring of plant risk-significant SSCs. The PRA for the System 80+ and other industry sources will be used to identify and prioritize those SSCs that are important to prevent or mitigate plant transients or other events that could present a risk to the public, i 17.3.3 PURPOSE The purpose of the D-RAP is to assure that the plant safety as estimated by the PRA is maintained as the detailed design evolves throughout the implementation and procurement phases and that pertinent information is provided in the design documentation to the future owner / operator so that equipment reliability, as it af fects plant safety, can be maintained through operation and maintenance during the entire plant life. 17.3-1
A 17.3.4 OBJECTIVE The objective of the D-RAP is to identify those plant SSCs that are significant , contributors to risk, as shown by the PRA or other sources, and to assure that, during the implementation phase, the plant design continues to utilise risk-
- significant SSCs whose reliability le comensurate with the PRA assumptions. The D-RAP will also identify key assumptions regarding any operation, maintenance and monitoring activities that the owner / operator should consider in developing its J
0-RAP to assure that such SSCS can be expected to operate throughout plant life with a reliability consistent with maintaining utility performance criteria described in the 0-RAP. A major f actor in plant reliability assurance is risk-focused maintenance (Ref.
; 17.3-1). Maintenance resources are focused on those SSCs that enable the System 80+ safety-related systems to fulfill their safety-related functions. Also, Maintenance is focused on SSCs whose f ailure may directly initiate challenges to safety-related systems. All plant modes are considereo, including equipment j directly relied upon in emergency operating procedures (EOPs). Such a focus of
! maintenance will help to maintain an acceptably low level of risk. 17.3.5 ABB-CE ORGANIZATION POR D-RAP l The project organization for the First Of A Kind Engineering (FOAKE) of System j 80+, shown in Figure 17.3-1, is integrated and the responsibility to meet the D-RAP objectives rests with the Project Director. Regular meetings are scheduled to coordinate all the design and D-RAP activities with participation of i Engineering Manager, Reliability Analysis Services, the Project Integration Manager, the Quality Assurance Manager and Regulatory Conformance Manager. During these meetings, design changes and the impact on the overall plant performance are identified, and discussions about the impact of these changes on plant risk are held. Management meetings are also held in which programmatic issues affecting the System 80+ design are discussed. The responsibilities of each organization in the D-RAP plan are as follows: The Project Director is responsible for the programmatic aspects of the plant design as well as the overall direction of the project, certification and licensing issuec. The NSSS, I&C Design Manager is responsible for the design of the nuclear steam supply system. The Regulatory conformance Manager has the
- responsibility of addressing any regulatory concerns and bringing these concerns to the attention of the Project Integration Manager and Reliability Analysis Services.
l ! The NSSS, I&C Design Engineering organization is the core of the RAP program and it is responsible for the design of the System 80+ NSSS. It is in this group where the NSSS design and drawings are developed with inputs from the mechanical, IGC, reactor, and fluid systems subgroups. It is also in this organization where the PRA models are developed as well as the Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The Project Manager for the System 80+ PRA and is responsible for managing and integrating the D-RAP Program and has direct access to the System 80+ Project 17.3-2
Integration Manger and is responsible for keeping him abreast of D-RAP critica.1 items, program needs and status. The PRA and D-RAP Project Manager or his-designee will attend all of the design review and progress meetings. . He has organizational freedom to:
#- identify D-RAP problems;
# initiate, recommend or provide solutions to--. problems through designated organizations;
# . verify implementation of solutions; and
- function as an integral part of the design team and final design process.
The Project Manager for the PRA and D-RAP is in the Reliability Analysis Services Department which performs reliability analyses, RAMI,- risk assessments and PRAs. This group is part of ABB-CE Nuclear Services- and ' reports to the NSSS, ICC= Design Manager, through the Project Manager for the.D-RAP and PRA (Figure 17.3-1). The PRA input to the D-RAP and any of the System 80+ reliability analyses will be performed in this organization and will be integrated into the System 80+ design. The Quality Assurance organization provides quality control by performing regular audits and participating in the scheduled meetings to discuss System 80+ issues.- organization for the 0-RAP is the responsibility of' the CL applicant. It is recommended that the CL applicant also have a group which coordinates _all the reliability activities. This group could be in charge of keeping a living PRA during plant operation, developing a corrective actions programi performing an RCM program, and maintaining a component / system aging database. These functions could be coordinated by one or several groups depending on the organization of-the staff. However, direct and frequent communication _ should be kept between these groups since their functions complement each other. The CL applicant could also consider participation in the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) and using this group to foster feedback to the designers and other owners about the design performance of the SSCs important to risk reduction. 17.3.6 SSC IDENTIFICATION /PRIORITIEATION The PRA prepared for the System 80+ will be the primary source for identifying. risk-significant SSCs that should be - given special consideration during: the detailed design and procurement phases and/or-considered for inclusion in the O- - RAP. The method by which the PRA is used to identify risk-significant SSCs-is described in' Chapter 19. It is also possible that some risk-significant SSCs will be identified f rom - sources - other than the PRA, -such as nuclear plant-operating experience, other industrial experience and relevant component f ailure data bases. 17.3-3 __mm- _ _m
17.3.7 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS The reliability of risk-significant SSCs, which are identified by the PRA, will be evaluated at the detailed design stage by appropriate design reviews and reliability analyses. Current data bases will be used to identify appropriate values for failure rates of equipment-as designed, and these failure rates will be compared with those used in the-PRA. Normally, the failure rates will be similar, but in some cases they may dif fer because of recent design or data base changes. Whenever failure rates of designed risk-significant ' SSCs are significantly greater than those assumed in the PRA,.an evaluation will be performed to determine if the equipment is acceptable or if it must be redesigned to achieve the appropriate reliability. For those risk-significant - SSCs,_ as indicated by - the PRA or other sources, component redesign (including selection of a dif ferent component) will be considered as a way to reduce the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) contribution. --(If the system unavailability or the CDF is acceptably low, less effort will be expended toward redesign). If there are practical ways to redesign a risk-- significant SSC, it will be redesigned and the - change in system fault tree results will be calculated.- Following any redesign, dominant SSC fa'ilure modes will be identified so that protection against such failure modes can be acconplished by appropriate activities during plant life. The design considerations that will go into determining an-acceptable, reliable design and the sSCs that must be considered for 0-RAP activities are. illustrated-in Figure. 17.3-2.
'Jaing the PRA or other design documents, the designer will identify to the plant ,
owner / operator the risk-significant SSCs, their associated failure modes, and reliability assumptions, including any ' pertinent bases -and- uncertainties considered in the PRA. The designer will also provide this information for the plant owner / operator to consider in- developing an operations Reliability Assurance Program (0-RAP). This information can be used by the owner / operator for establishing appropriate reliability targets and the associated maintenance practices for achieving them. 17.3.8 DEFINING FAILURE WODES The determination of dominant f ailure modes of risk-significant SSCs will include historical information, analytical models and existing requirements. Many PWR ~ systems and components have complied a significant ~ historical record, so an-- evaluation of- that record comprises Assessment Path A in Figure 17.3-3. Details of Path A are shown in Figure 17.3-4. For those SSCs for which there is not-an adequate historical basis to identify
~
critical failure modes, an analytical approach is necessary, shown as Assessment Path B in Figure-17.3-3.- The details of Path B are given'in Figure 17.3-5. The ' f ailure modes identified in Paths A and B are - then reviewed, including the existing maintenance activities 'in the industry and the maintenance requirements (Assessment Path'C in Figure 17.3-3). Detailed steps in Path C are outlined in Figure 17.3-6. 17.3-4 j
17.3.9 OPERATIONS RELIABILITY ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES Once the dominant failure modes are determined for risk-significant SSCs, an assessment is required to determine suggested 0-RAP activities that will assure acceptable performance during plant life. Such activities may consist of periodic surveillance inspections or tests, monitoring of SSC performance, and/or periodic preventive maintenance (Reference 17.3-1). An example of a decision tree that would be applicable to these activities is shown in Figure 17.3-7. As indicated, some SSCs may require a combination of activities to assure that their performance is consistent with the PRA. Periodic testing of SSCs may include startup of standby systems, surveillance testing of instrument circuits to assure that they will respond to appropriate signale, and inspection of SSCs (such as tanks and pipes) to show that they are available to perform as designed. Performance monitoring, including condition monitoring, can consist of measurement of magnitude of an important variable (such as vibration or temperature), and testing for abnormal conditions (such as oil degradation or local hot spots). Periodic preventive maintenance is an activity performed at regular l'ntervals to preclude problems that could occur before the next preventative maintenance (PM) interval. This could be regular oil changes, replacement of seals and gaskets, or refurbishment of equipment subject to wear or age-related degradation. Planned maintenance activities will be integrated with the regular operating plans so that they do not disrupt normal operation. Maintenance that will be performed more frequently than refueling outages musu be planned so as to not disrupt operation or be likely to cause reactor scram, engineered safety feature (ESP) actuation, or abnormal transients. Maintenance, planned for performance during refueling outages, must be conducted in such a way that it will have little or no impact on plant safety, on outage length, or on other maintenance I work. 17.3.10 OWNER / OPERATOR'S RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM The 0-RAP that will be prepared and implemented by the System 80+ owner / operator will make use of the information provided by the designer. This information will help the owner / operator determine activities that should be included in the O-RAP. Examples of elements that might be included in an 0-RAP are as follows: Reliability Performance Monitoring -- Measurement of the performance of equipment to determine the.t it is accomplishing its goals and/or that it will continue to operate with low probability of failure. Reliability Methodology -- Methods by which the plant / operator can compare plant data to the SSC data in the PRA. Problem Prioritization -- Identification, for each of the risk-significant SSCs, of the importance of that item as a contributor to its system unavailability and assignment of priorities to problems that are detected with such equipment. 17.3-5
Root cause Analysis -- Determination, for problems that occur regarding reliability of risk-significant SSCs, of the root causes, those causes which, after correction, will not recur to again degrade the reliability of equipment. Corrective Action Determination -- Identification of corrective actions needed to restore equipment to its required functional capability and reliability, based on the results of problem identification and root cause analysis. Corrective Action Implementation -- Carrying out identified corrective action on risk-significant equipment to restore equipment to its intended function in such a way that plant safety is not compromised during work. Corrective Action verification -- Post-corrective action tasks to be followed after maintenance on risk-significant equipment to assure that such equipment will perform its intended functions. Plant Aging -- Some of the risk-significant equipment is expected to undergo age related degradation that will require equipment regslacement or refurbishment. Feedback to Designer -- The plant owner / operator should periodically compare performance of risk-significant equipment to that specified in the PRA and D-RAP, and, at its discretion, may send SSC performance data to plant or equipment designers in those cases that consistently show performance below that specified. The plant owner / operator should consider participation in the CEOG. Programmatic Interf aces -- Reliability assurance interfaces related to the work of the several organizations and personnel groups working on risk-significant SSCs. Maintenance Rule Integration -- The plant owner / operator should consider the integration or interface of the 0-RAP and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 which require the operator to develop a maintenance program for risk significant SSCs or SSCs that could , produce trips or transients. The plant owner / operator's 0-RAP will address the interf aces with construction, startup testing, operations, maintenance, engineering, safety, licensing, quality assurance and procurement of replacement equipment. 17.3-6 l
17.3.11 D-RAP IMPLEMENTATION An example of implementation of the D-RAP is given for the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). This system was selected as an example because it is not a f ront-line safety system but was found in the earlier System 80 PRA to contain risk-significant SSCs. Because of this finding, and through the D-RAP organization described in Section 17.3.5, the design was changed. The design and - analytical results, as presented in this chapter, is presented only as a D-RAP example and does not necessarily correspond to the current System 80+ design. 17.3.11.3 CCWS Function The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is a closed loop system that provides cooling water flow to remove heat released from plant systems, structures, and components. The CCWS functions to cool the safety-related and non-safety-related reactor auxiliary loads. Heat transferred by these components to the CCWS is rejected by the Station Service Water System (SSWS) via the CCWS heat exchangers. 17.3.11.2 Earlier CCWS Desion The System 80+ Design is an evolutionary plant and improvements were included with input from the earlier System 80 PRA. The earlier CCWS design in shown in Figure 17.3-8 and described in more detail in section 5.3.19 of Reference 17.3-2. It consisted of two independent, closed loop, safety trains. Each train contained one pump that was on standby. One of the major insights of the System 80 PRA (Section 8.2 of Mference 17.3-2) was that loss of the CCWS was a dominant cause of front-line systco failure. Failure of thr CCWS pumps to start and run were one of the dominant failure modes. 17.3.11.3 System Pedesion To more easily meet the desired CDF for the ALWR, the CCWS probably required a redesign as recremented in Figure 17.3-2. This redesign was also helped by desion ruview meetings where the Project H eager for the RAP and PRA discussed utth the designers the PRA results, including failure modes and importance of support systems to front line safety systems. An example of an improved CCWS design is given in Figure 17.3-9 and an example of analytical results are presented in Tables 17. 3-1 and 17. 3-2. Details of the actual System 80+ CCWS design and reliability analysis is given in Section 6.3.3 of the System 80+ PRA and do not nece narily correspond to the example presented here. The improved CCWS design contain two trains (only one is shown in Figure 17.3-9). Each train contains two pumps and one pump is kept running at all times. This design eliminated the important failure mode of the CCWS pump failing to start which was observed in the earlier design. Table 17.3-1 gives an example of the components importance for internal events for an ALWR. The Fussell-Vesley Importance is the fraction of the CDF that the component f ailure contributes to. In this example, the components in the CCWS are underlined. The first CCWS 17.3-7
_ _ _ _ . _ . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ .._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .m I J 1 0 in importance based on this measure. The SSCs in component is only ranked 59 > i the improved CCWS meets the criteria that they have a small impact-on risk j_ (bottom of Figure 17.3-2) and can be considered for 0-RAP. 5 i 17.3.11.4 Failure Mode Identification 1 i , j Figure 17.3-3 gives two methods for 0-RAP evaluation, using failure history or j analytical methods.- For this example an analytical method as represented in - l Figure 17.3-5 was used. Figure 17.3-10 gives an example of the upper level f ault i tree to analyze failure modes for Train _1 of an improved ccWS. _ Table 17.3-2 gives an example of the ranking of the risk significant SSCs for Train 1.- There
~ , is also a second train not evaluated in this table. Because this CCWS design is
! an evolutionary design using standard components, a search of the operational j data bases for component f ailure rates'and operations experience is also possible { using Figure 17.3-4, but was not used in this example. ) i Following the flow chart of Figure 17.3-5, the designer would-determine more details about each f ailure mode, including pieceparts most likely to f ail and the ' frequen y of each f ailure modo category or piccepart f ailure. This would result; l in a list of the dominant failure modes to be considered for-the 0-RAP. ASKE l Section XI requirements for inspection and other mandated inspections and tests. j would be identified, as indicated in Figure.17.3-6. , j Examples of the types of failure modes that could impact reliability of these j identified components are shown in Table -17.3-3.-_ The example. is not a ' complete i listing of the important_ f ailure modes, but is intended to indicate the types of failures that would be considered. { i i 17.3.11.5 Identification of Maintenance Reauiremente l ! For each identified f ailure mode, the appropriate maintenance tasks will be } identified to assure that the failure mode will be (1) avoided, (2) rendered j insignificant, _or (3) kept to an acceptably low probability. The type - of maintenance and the maintenance frequencies are both e important - aspects - of assuring that the equipment- f ailure will be consistent with that assumed for the
- PRA. As indicated in Figure 17.3-7, the designer would - consider periodic j- testing, performance testing or periodic preventive maintenance as possible 0-RAP ~
4 activities to keep failure rates acceptable. For the CCWS, one pump in each train is in operation and all the valves are in
- that flow path are open._ An example of the possible maintenance and testing-
- follows and'is summarised in Table 17.3-3. Minor PM on the pumps will- be
- performed based on the recommendations of the vender (8000 hrs of operation for L example) . and a major overhaul'would be performed every 50,000 hrs of operation. j only maintenance'on one pump will be performed at a time during Medes 1 through i 4. The most frequent surveillance req;irement for the CCWS might be to verify i that each CCW manual, power-operated or automatic . valve : in the flow ... path servicing essential equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. This test is performed every 31 days. Additionally, there is a surveillance requirement that every 18 months, it must 7 17.3-8 f-1 1-
. . - - - , . , - . - , ~ . - _ . - - , , - - - - - . ,
- . - . - _ _ . . - ~ ~ - - .. _ -.~ . ~-- - - - -- -._.. - . . - - . . - -
i I l i l j be demonstrated that each CCW automatic valve actuates and each CCW pump starts on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Example of maintenance activities
- j. and frequencies are shown in Table 17.3-3 for each identified f ailure mode. The i D-RAP will include documentation of the basis for each suggested 0-RAP activity.
3
- 17.3.12 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS J
f ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor .
- ASKE American Society of Mechanical Engineers
} CCWS component Cooling Water System l CDF Core Damage Frequency, as calculated by the probabilistic risk assessment. j CEOG Combustion Engineering plant Owners Group. 3 CFR Code of Federal Regulations 1 CL Combined License j D-RAP Design . Reliability ' Assurance ' Program, - Performed by the plant designer to assure that the plant is designed so that it can be l operated and maintained in such a way that the reliability j assumptions of the probabilistic risk assessment apply throughout , ! plant life. E0P Emergency operating Procedure EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ! ESF Engineered Safety Features l FOAKE First of A Kind Engineering i I&C Instruments & Controle-0-RAP Operations Reliability Assurance Program -- Performed by the . plant owner / operator to assure that the plant-is operated.and maintained safely l and in such a way that the owner / Operator 0-RAP performance criteria are
- met.
! owner / Operator The utility, CL applicant, or other organization that owns and operates the System 80+ following construction. PM Preventative Maintenance PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment - : Performed to identify and quantify j- the risk associated with the System 80+ PWR Pressurized Water Reactor ( RAMI . Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Inspectability l-RAP Reliability Assurance Program r RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance {- Risk-Significant Those structures, systems and components which are identified as contributing significantly to the system unavailability. SSC Structures, Systems, and Cocponente SSWS Station Service Water System-I -' 17.3.13 REFERENCES L 17.3-1 Lofgren, E. V., et al. , "A Process: for Risk-Focused Maintenance," SAIC. NUREG/CR-5695, March 1991-
~
-17.3-2 Finnicum, D. J., et al, " Base Line Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the System 80 NSSS Design," ABB-CE, January, 1988.
17.3-9
Table 11.3-3 EXAMPLE OF COMPONENT IMPORTANCF FOR AN ALWR FOR INTERNAL EVENTS FUSSELL* VESLEY COMPONfWT COMPONEhi DESCRIPil0N IMP 0eTANCE AEFWTA2DVINDD FAILURE OF THE DISTRIBU110N VALVES IN EFW SYS SUSTRAIN A2 1.14E 1-AEFP1031NDD FAILURE OF EFU SYSTEM TUR8tNE DRIVEN PUMP EFWP 103 10 START 1.12E 1 AEFP1011NDD FAILURE OF EFU SYSTEM TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP EFWP 101 To START 1.04E 1 NPMXA4 C0 pet 0N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 OUT OF 4 $1 PUMPS 8.22E*2 EDGAINDO DIESEL GENERATOR A DEMAND INDEPENDENT FAULTS 7.91E 2 EDG81NDO DIESEL GENERATOR B DEMAND INDEPENDENT FAULTS 7.71E 2 hPMXA3 COpMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 OR MORE $1 PUMPS 4.87E 2 b FS$0$1AS OPERATOR FAILS TO GENERATE SIAS 3.85E*2 FSSX$IAS C0pe40N CAUSE FAILURE OF SAFETY INJECil0N ACTUATION SIGNAL . 3.85E*2 HPMXA1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 3 OR 4 St PUMPS 3.55E 2 HWXD2 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 0F 2 HOT LEG INJECTION VALVES 3.39E 2 EDDXDG C0pMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS 3.33E*2 HYMXC1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 3 OR 4 DVI N010R VALVES 2.06E 2 HVMAGS1312 HOT LEG INJECTION MOTOR VALVE $1 312 GROUP FAILS 10 OPEN 1.92E 2 HVMACS!313 NOT LEG INJECTION MOTOR VALVE $1313 CROUP FAILS 10 OPEN 1.92E*2 HYMAGS1412 HOT LEG INJECTION MOTOR VALVE $1412 GROUP FAILS TO OPEN . 1.92E 2 HVMAGS1413 HOT LEG INJECTION MOTOR VALVE $1 413 GROUP FAILS TO OPEN 1.92E 2 NVMXC4 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 OUT OF 4 DVI MOTOR VALVES 1.41E 2 HPMJCSIP301 St PUMP $1 P301 CROUP FAILS TO START 1.39E 2 HPMJGSIP401 St PUMP SI P401 GROUP FAILS TO START 1.39E 2 APTX EFP12 COMM00 CAUSE FAILURE OF TURBINE DRIVEU EFW PUMPS EFWP101/103 1.14E 2 DVPBADVS ADVs ON RUPTURED SC 2 FAILS TO RECLOSE 8.07E 3 EttX125C1E COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1 E 125 VDC SUSES 7.75E 3 ESAfil!NDU BATTERY 11 UNAVAILABLE 5.71E 3 CVMAMV123 CCW/CS HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION Mov MV 123 FAILS 10 OPEN 4.90E 3 NVNOS1304 MOTOR VALVE SI 304 NOT OPEN DUE 10 PRE EXISYlNG ERROR 4.80E 3 ESATIINDU BATTERY I UNAVAILABLE 4.16E 3 AEFP1021NDO FAILURE OF EFW SYSTEM MOTOR DRIVEU PUMP EFWP 102 To START 4.12E 3 CVMAMV124 CCV/SCS HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLAil0N MOV MV 124 FAILS TO OPEN 3.91E*3 JVMAGS1127 SCS MOTOR VALVE $1 127 FAILS 10 OPEN 3.91E 3 GVMXA2 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CTM1 ISOLATION VALVES $1 144/51 244 3.39E 3 FSERAPS NO (EFAS) ACTUATION SIGNAL FROM ALTERNATE PROTECTION SYSTEM 3.15E 3 FSEX-EFAS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF EMERGENCT FEEDWATER ACTUATION SIGNAL 3.15E 3 HPMKSIP301 St PUMP SI P301 FAILS TO OPERATE 3.01E+3 HPMKSIP401 $1 PUMP $1 P401 FAILS To OPERATE - 3.01E 3 APMX EFP22 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF MOTOR DRIVEN EFW P(MPS EFWP*102/104 2.92E 3 HVMXC3 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 OR MORE DVI MOTOR ISOLATION VALVES 2.10E-3 APMKEFP102 EFW STSTEM MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP EFWP-102 FAILS TO OPERATE - 2.06E-3 JVMAGS1120 SCS MOTOR VALVE $1 120 FAILS TO OPEN 1.87E 3 JVMACSI121 SCS MOTOR VALVE $1 121 FAILS TO OPEN 1.87E*3 JVMAGS1122 SCS MOTOR VALVE $1 122 FAILS TO OPEN ' 1.87E 3 JVMAGS1129 SCS MOTOR VALVE $1 129 FAILS TO OPEN 1.87E 3 GVMAGS1244 CTNT SPRAY MOTOR VALVE S1 244 FAILS To OPEN 1.51E 3 CVMAMV223 CCW/CS HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLAfl0N MOV MV 223 FAILS To OPEN 1.51E 3 AVCAEF214 NON SAFETY CONDENSATE SOUR;E CHECK VtLVE EF 214 FAILS TO OPEN 1.50E-3 AVNAEF215 NON-SAFETY SOURCE ISO. MANUAL VALVE EF 215 CANNOT BE OPENED 1.50E 3
- WVM051204 MOTOR VALVE $1 204 NOT OPEN DUC 10 PRE EXISTING ERROR 1.39E 3 GVMAGS1144 CTMT SPRAY MOTOR V81VE $1 144 FAILS TC OPEN 1.36E 3 GHRVCSHX1 CTMT SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER 1 UNAVAILASLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE .1.24E 3 CPMX-CCVJD ' COMMON CAUSE FAltuRE OF ALL FOUR (4) CCW PUMPS (T0 START 1 1.1 M-3 CPMX ESWSP44 -- COMMON CAUSE F AILURE OF ALL FOUR (6) ESWS PUMPS (TO START) 1.16E 3 CVNOV234 235 CCV MANUAL VALVES V 234/235 FOR $1 PUMP 2 N.O. QUE TO M.E. 1.14E 3 CVNov236-237 CCU MANUAL VALVES V 236/237 FOR $1 PUMP 4 U.0. DUE TO M.E. 1.14E-3 FSXX HITEMP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CS HIGN TEMPERATURE ACTUAfl0N SIGNAL 1.0BE 3 FSSXCSAS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUAil0N SIGWAL - 1.00E 3 HVMOS1104 MOTOR VALVE $1 104 NOT OPEN DUE TO PRE EXISTING ERROR 1.01E 3 17.3-10
3, t
- ^
Table 17.3-2 $ EXAMPLE OF RISK-SIGNIFICANT RANKING OF SSCs FOR THE CCWS TRAIN 1 i
. RANK / COMPONENT NAME DESCRIPTION ! 1) CVNDCC-1316 MANUAL VALVE CC-1316 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN j' 2) CPBKCCWP1A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN
, CPBVCCWPIB CWP IB UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE j 3) CPBJCCWP1B CCW PUMP IB FAILS TO START l CPBKCCWP1A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN
~
- 4) CHFLCC-1305 VALVE CC-1305 NOT OPENED DUE TO PRE-EXISTING j MAINT. ERROR l CPBKCCWP1A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN l
- 5) CHWEHX1A CCW/SN HEAT EXCHGR. 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING CVMACC-107 MOV CC-107 FAILS TO OPEN
- 6) CHWEHX1A CCW/SW HEAT EXCHGR 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING CVMACC-109 MOV CC-109 FAILS TO'OPEN j 7) CHWEHX1A CCW/SW HEAT EXCHNGR 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING j- CVMASW-123' MOV SW-123 FAILS'TO_OPEN
{ 8) CHWEHX1A CCW/SW HEAT EXCHNGR 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING CVMASW-121 MOV SW-121 FAILS TO OPEN l 9) CHFFSTBHX1B OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN CCW HX IB ISO. VALVES l CHWEHX1A CCW/Sh HEAT EXCHNGR 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING
- 10) CBDBCCWP1B 4.16 Kv CIRCUIT. BREAKER 18 FAILS TO CLOSE i CPBKCCWP1A CORPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILE TO RUN l 11) CPBVCCWPIB CCWP 1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE l CVCDCC-1302 CHECK VALVE CC-1302 FAILS TO-REMAIN OPEN l' 12) CBDQCCWPIA 4.16 Kv CIRCUIT BREAKER'1A TRIPS SUPRIOUSLY i- CPBVCCWP1B CCWP'1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE-l 13) CPBKCCWP1A COMPONENT COOLING WATER' PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN i CVCACC-1303 CHECK VALVE CC-1303 FAILS TO OPEN
- 14) CPBJCCWP1B CCW PUMP IB FAILS TO START l CVCDCC-1302 CHECK VALVE CC-1302 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
- . 15) CBDQCCWP1A 4.16 Kv CIRCUIT BREAKER 1A TRIPS SUPRIOUSLY l CPBJCCWPIB CCW PUMP IB FAILS TO START
- 16) CPBKCCWP1A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN l COMMON CAUSE DEMAND FAILURE OF CCWPs IB, 2B CPBXDCCWP1B-2B
- 17) CPBKCCWPIA COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1A FAILS TO RUN 1 CPBKCCWPIB COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP IB FAILS TO RUN l 18) CHFLCC-1305 VALVE CC-1305 NOT OPENED DUE TO PRE-EXISTING l MAINT. ERROR l CVCDCC-1302 CHECK VALVE CC-1302. FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
- - _ 19) CHWEHX1A CCW/SW HEAT EXCHNGR 1A FAILS WHILE OPERATING CHWVHX1B CCW HX 1B UNAVAILABLE DUE~TO. MAINTENANCE-
+
- 20) CVMACC-107 MOV CC-107 FAILS TO OPEN j- -CVMDCC-108 MOV CC-108 FAILS.TO REMAIN OPEN i
- The ranking is the order of decreasing probability for.the combinations of-
, . equipment failures. 1 17.3-11. l-t
j } i Table 17.3-3 EIAMPLE OF CCWS TAILURE MODES & 0-RAP ACTIVITIES PICCFr.nEaDED MAINTENANCE COMPONENT FAILUPI MODE /CAUSE MAINTENANCE INTERVALS BASTS C.3ts pump fails to start, . cal functional test pump 18 months experience with other pumps fails to run, mechanical functional test 18 months experience with other pseps 4 minor PM 8000 op. hrs pump vrador . major PM 50000 op. hrs pump vendor leaking seals, gaskets visual inspection J1 days AsME code T
'ccws MOV fails to open functional test 31 days experience with Move inspect viv interior 5 yrs corrosion experience t manual viv fails to remain open i
left closed, op. error functional test after operating experience l l maintenance l' I ! heat fails, leakage walkdown 31 days operating experience , exchanger < fouling monitor AP, Ar 7 day trending operating experience k t I i P a 17.3-12 L r
. i
_m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._
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i rigure 17.3-2 Design F. valuation for SSCs 1
"W[g@frtN S
I 4 rM% RECALCULATION 4 829FcB'&l4 CHANGE 4-l I
^
thk f> > "klkhy$f!hk"' > NO 2 NO 7
)f DOES SCC A! LURE HAVE YES YES
^^ T SYS1 bt AVAl y F F NO 2 NO 7
)f SSCs FOR O-RAP 17.3-14
_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - ~ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ .-_.__._ i 1 i i Figure 17.3-3 a ) j Process for Determining Dralnant Failure Modes ] of Risk-significant sses i' 1 i . ! I l 1 i 1 F e RISK SIGNIFICANT SSCs FORO-RAP l ] ) _ _ , < i i e i' 1F l ASSESSMENT PATH A 1 YES i DOES FAILURE HISTORY - IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE i MODES AT PIECEPART LIVEL7 , A I NO 4 a 9P ' 1P , ASSESSMENT PATH C i i ASSFESMFNT PATH B . f INg kOkd kT P ^ USING ANALYTICAL ME" HODS R l Y . i 1r 9F i 10 7A RE D 0 ~ EUR ET
- 1. DEFEND AGAINST r
i i 1: 4 1 -. 1 17.3-15 9 7 yr -m' 7- g r e- w v e "y - r - e o'* sw+* r> m rv w,-t- -yc'*1,=--i=--wee- --,- w,c ww w ee-w -='t-w-e vw -m -< -,w---- *v - - ev <e-e*+ -e ta.*--r---7-- - /
.. . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ = . . =__. . . . _ _ _ _ .m . . _ . _ .__-
Figure 17.3-4 Use of Failure History to Define Failure Modes lNFORMAT10N NrrnED AStrRSMENT PATH A I e ES S FAI S RY I i TIONS AND MAINTdd CE
- 1 A ALYSIS 1P
* 'Y- EM WA OWNS DETERMINE THE ANALYSIS BOUNDARY (INDIVIDUAL 20MPONENT)'
N SIMILAR A PUCATIONS, COMPONENT ETC.) TYPE ir . FROM FAILURE HISTORY N N SW IP M e" ark LEVEL 1P A O A R 9P FREO EN O HC ORY (OR PIECEPART FAILURE) 1F DEFINE THE DOMINANT FAILURE "esNS?Ja% YOW ^ 17.3-16 - - - . - - - . - - , - . . . . . . - . - . . _ -- -- ~.-. . - - - - - - - - .
rigure 17.3-5 Analytical Assessment to Defino Failure Modes LNFORMATION NrrDED AS$[SSidQ1LPAlli.ll
> OUAllTATIVE ANALYTICAL ENGINEERING OIAGRAMS OF ASSESSMENT CHillCg!ggfgT UNDER V
PERFORM A FAULT TREE OR FMEA ANALYSIS ON COMPONENTS TO PIECEPART LEVEL V IDENTIFY:
- SINGLE PIECEPART FAILURES THAT Fall THE COMPONENTS FUNCTION (AND THAT ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR).
e LATENT PIECEPART FAILURES NOT DETECTED THROUGH ORDINARY DEMAND TESTING. e PIECEPART FAILURES THAT HAVE COMMON CAUSE POTENTIAL, INCLUDING DY AGING OR WEAR, AND e PIECEPART FAILURES THAT COULD CASCADE TO MORE SERIOUS FAILURES. V Fkl[bNkb N $ N M ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS 17.3-17
- _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . - - _ _ _ . .-_m __ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _
i ) 1 i , rigure 17.3-6 6
- Inclusion of Haintenance Requiremente in the l Definition of Failure Modes 1
I l WFORMATION NEEDED Aa1EiaM NTPATH c . i IDENTIFY M.ANNED j ASME SECTION XI REQUIREMENTg > MAWitNANCE FROGRAM AND MOUIREMENTS j VENDOR MCOMMENDATIONS i EQ MOU1MMENTS i ' TECHNICAL SMCinCATION ' FOR TESTING & CAubRATION OTHER MOULATORY-MANDATID - 1I REQUIREMENTS ], usi Au.MAWTtNANCE 3 MOUIREMENTS AND t MCOMMENDAT10Ns PROM ALL SOURCES
^
i i F } PARTm0N UST WTO THOSE MANTENANCE i REQUIREMENTS AND MCOMMENDATIONS ACTUALLY PLANNED AND THOSE THAT ARE NOT l ( 9F 1r
! MAWTENANCE A Y NED NO NED l
9P 'F RECORD RATIONALE RECORD RAT 10NAlf i FOR PERFORMING FOR NOT PERFORMING ! THE MAINENANCE THE MAINENANCE ir ir 10ENT1FY FAILURE IDENTTTY FALURE MODES MODES AFFECTED NOT PROTICTYD BY AND FREQUENCY OF MAINTINANCE 3 MAINTENANCE (IF ANY) - , I l.- ir DEFINE THE DOMINANT FAILURE MODES 17.3-18 J
- - - y ,c, ,y,.. ., y-, , - --- - , , . . . , , , - --. v-- , -.y-. y . - ,
J ! 4 1 4 i i t i Figure 17.3-7 l Identification of Risk-Significant SSC 0-RAP
- Activities !
1 I } ! DOMINANT FAILURE MODES . OF RISK SIGNIFICANT SSCS V 4 !} ! YES I I Tbl SPECiggulRED I NO ! r f 4 i V PEkF A CbhTihG7 > g gE NO
- i 4
i V k h E YES SPECIFY PERIODIC ! NO l 4 U ! DOCUMENT FOR OWNER / OPERATOR 1 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES AND BASES, PLUS . UNCERTAINTIES, FOR THE RISK SIGNIFICANT SSCS. i l j, 17.3-19 .f
~
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i Figure 17.3-10 4 Example of Fault Trea for CCWS Train 1 + [ i i ra n set ,. .eu ,t. M ICItwT CCW FLOP rae CCoS gig, s EFL2*s :S m I ParLust TO Cettvem asaMumL watvt CC-CCar FLDW roe Off. t 1313 FatL3 TO ea rtisW FC Ortt*te 8!F a f L . TO talOLaft #Emmate ertae CCM FLCs8 2* t#1W 9 m/9 Loac9) D*/3 LDaCT 190Lattop I F uNG ls 15 E I 16.%CC- LJls 1 o [ , c_ps. g z j k I FarttJat 70 CELitte CCm Flee F80* Div 1 Stag setLatto FLaE3 I Fattaset 70 230Laft 1 Fa!LU*C CP CDs, la 9 restpettigwt m y
- Sart?T CDDLins asso te 70 pacwtSt LOaOS I oc h e- ese sa 9M' est,Citerf Ptew ame op la asse 33 To I F;J+.cB% I s a iaLJ N 1;iU4 1 L P;_P4 ~H I l e ._F-;; _ I g r 1 I I E I Fa!Lunt or CCw* Sa Isr3UFFICIttfi Ptaf FAILunt to 13cLart Faltynt 70 130Laft I
On 19 TD svaov3DE EmeralSYDG laOm foss-t99tattat 3rp see s 90sety surFICitoff rLee to ts 3sTty estacEsa t paraMa Mt 1a CI tg IMN M1I I POwb01!Ut 3 I PGC 49 a I I $Od
- di I 17.3 ,
Plant Systeins 11 ranch prA tut titti twg ee 03.04.2*1 COL IftN The COL eppitsamt must provide a spesific description of the sa.e and the elevation for $lts all safety *teleted attustures, estetter essesses. epigment. ead erstems. ee 03.11 J . b 1 COL aflN The stoff will evolvete the dete11s of e ette*ensific envitonmental quellfleetion spts I't ot t aa.
/06.2.3*1 CCt ITDt The COL estlitant shovid patere total leak sete teste on the annulus ventilation system sitt IAY$) in essesdance with Argendia J to 10 Cf1L $0.
96.4-1 COL IffN The COL opplicant for e multi unit site must apply for no evoluetion of the unit's spLti temopliante alth the repliaments of CDC S.
, 06.4 2 COL If!N The COL opplicant must demonettete that conttel tocas operatete are adepotely protected EPLB eseinst the effects of teste substances.
06.4*3 COL IftN The COL applisant will oeed te verify that the control toca habitability systee is EPLt constatent with ne !! sensing beels deementation.
# # 06.S*1 COL IftN The COL applicant must verify the opetehility of no conteirveent sprey system by ustrig sitt proeperational tests.
!09.1.11 COL ITDt The COL applicant must apply for evolustion of mult1* unit's ab!11ty to s<mply with CDC $. $118
/09.1.2+1 COL 17tN The applicant for e multi
- unit site sust apply for the evolustion of the unit's compliante $lth with the to pitonente of Otc $.
#8 09.1.3-01 COL ITDi The COL sppilaant must apply for the evolustion of a multi-unit's compliance with the SitB sopitemente of CIC $.
!09.1.4*1 COL IftN The COL applicant must opply for no evolustion of multl* unit's complianse with tbe Sitt repiremente of GDC 5.
09.2.0l*1 COL IftN The COL sppittant osast take approptiste measures to prevent organte fouling and inessenit $PLD buildup in the station servlee water systes (85WS). 09.2.02 1 COL ITDt the m appliennt must apply for the evaluation of a emiti unit's toegallante with the $rLB to pitements of OtC 3.
/09.2.04 1 COL !!!N The COL opplicant n eeds to provide potable and sanitary weter system designs for staff SPL8 teview.
/09.2 > 0 F1 COL IftN The COL applicant will provide an analysis to show that the function of no ultimate boat Silb-sink is s et impered by lee formation.
/09.2.0 F 2 COL ITD1 The specifle ultimate best sink design is site dependent, spLa 09.2.09.1*1 COL If!N The COL opplicant must opply for the review of a multi unit's compliance with otC $. SPLB 09.3.1'1 COL !!Di The COL opplicant must apply for the eyeluettern of the multi
- unit's compliance with the $119 teptiements of CDC $.
! V 09.$.1*1 COL ITIN The COL applicant must provide e desetiption of estetyagrade provisions for the SPLli
,j fite* protection systmes.
v ol . $ .1. S *1 COL If!N The staff w!!! perfore e dete!!ed review of the administrative controls during the COL ' SPLB review.
/09.$.4.1*1 COL ITIN The ItUREG/CR*0660 guidance on diesel opetetor training will be performed by the site $PLS specifle applicant, j /09.5.4.1*2 COL If!N All diesel generator eutiliary support systems' test and calibration tropencies will be $lt8 evaluated on a site specific beels.
dt.S.4.2*1 COL 17tM The specific diesel generator fuel storage and transfer system desian criterie will be SPLB l provided by the COL opplicant.
- 09.3.5-1 COL 17tN Spectf!e diesel generster cooling water system information w!!! be provided by the COL Sitt opplicant.
4 4 9.5.S 2 COL IftN The COL applicant must address the prevention of sum and vernish deposita due to estended .8PLB diesel generator Adling. V 09.5.6*1 COL ITD1 The COL opplicant must psovide a preventive maintenance progros for the diesel generators' $PLD starting air instrumentation. 09.$,6*2 COL If!N Specific diesel generator starting ett system interface se ptrements will be provided by . S'LB l the COL opplicant.
/09.S.7*1 COL ITIN The COL epplicant sust provide specifte design criterie for the diesel generator tube oil SPLB system, i j t.f 5.F 1 COL ITD1 The diesel generator alt flow cepecity will be specified by the COL oppittant. $PLB V09.5.9*1 COL 17tN The edepecy of the diesel generator bu!! ding sump pump systen design in regards to the $ plt masimum leekoge et assimum credible pipo rupture is a plant specific interf ace issue.
/10.2*1 COL If!N The selection of the tutbane valve operation times that meet the turbine valves closing SPL8 time criterle is e COL oction item.
V10. F 1 COL ITD1 . The COL oppiteant must provide e program to protect egoinst the potential occurence of . Sitt steem heamer. 10.3*2 COL ITDt The COL opplicant has to opply for the evaluation of the multl* unit's ability to comply SPLB with CDC ).
/ 10.4.4*1 -COL ITDt . The COL eppilcent will need to provido pressure drops between the steam generatos noggles SPLS and oech system volve in order for the staff to eyeluote the turbine bypese system.
10.4 b 3 COL If!N The COL applicant must opply for the evolustion of a multl* unit's compliance with the SPLB requirements of CDC S. do. 6. b 2 COL IftN The staff will review the edepecy of the provistahs for eveldence of water hanner in the $116 condensate and feedwatet systems on a site-specific besto during the COL review, i 10.4.9*1 COL If!N . The COL applicant aust apply foe the evolustion of a multlaunit*e compilence with the $PLB tequirements of CDC $. [10.4.9-2 COL ITD1 Water hemmer in the emergency feedwater piping la e COL ites since the detailed design is $PLB
- dependent on vender supplied information.
(10.4.9*3 COL IftN The staff will evoluete the steem binditJs of the emergency feedwater pumps on a $itB site
- specific bests during the COL review.
l
3Mn TYrf fiftf t Kan [11.l*1 COL 1TDI The M opplicant mast ensuto not its applisetton confers.s with 10 CFR $0, Appndte !. $PLB AN11 N13.1 and Roe 1.21 and 4.1$.
/11.4+1 COL ITDt site specific solid weste maneseeent syst em eptating procedures are to to devolered by $ ttli the M opplicant, dt.$1 COL ITIN The COL erp11:ent must demonstrate confessance with to crR So Appendis !. ANS! W13.1, RG grL3 1.21 and R3 4.1$.
/41$*2 COL ITIN rhe COL opplicant must provide procedutos in escordance with Position C of RG e.16. snt 1$.3.10*1 COL If!N The patametets that show that f allute of the bette estd storage tark to the limiting tank trL8 f allute and show e miniense equivalent dilution f actor of 1.436f 8 must be Trevided.
do.!*02 COL ITIN The steff will review site spesitie espects of the resolution of 0!*$1 es part of the $ng soview of the COL opplication.
/20.2'03 COL ITDI The staff w!!! evoluste the teeolution of lesse $7 during its review of the CUL $PLs application.
20.2*0$ COL IffH The staff will evaluate the steen bindins of the 17V pumps on e ette*epetitle beste during $nt e COL toview. 20,2 06 COL 171N Genette Issue 106 bas not been tuelved by the staff. The staff espects the COL erpileant $ plt to addrue the reseletion of thie issue. M 0.2 07 COL If!N The site *opecifle design auet esempty with to Crn $0.34(f) for soebustible ses sentrol. $PL3 20.2*06 COL IfDI Cemette Issue ISO has not been t u olved by the staff. The staff orpects the COL opplicant SPIB to address the resoluttom of this iseve. e e 03.11.3.2.2*1 CDNF If1N The app 1&sent must templete the proposed changes to CES$AR Sections 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.3.2 $f1.8 e e 0$.2.5 1 CONF ITDt The staff will sonfits that the senteinment atmosphere monitor is designed to setsele $ plt Cet*4ery I and is included in Table 11.$*3 as previously proposed by the applicant. 06.2.3*1 CONT IfDt The oppiteent should provide ne design 11 mite for annulus pressure and tempeteture in the SPL3 CESSAR. e e 04.4 1 CONT ITD1 The steff w!11 confire t.het the locations of Go eentrol tome vente are laeluded in e SPLb revielen to the general attantement drowings (CESSAR Tigures 1.2*3 and 1.2*8). e e 06.4 2 CDNT ITDt The staff will confits thet a future revision to the general attengement drowinge SPLD incorpotetes the losetten of ne unit vent. ee 04.4*3 CDNF ! tdt The steff v111 confits that toeponne to Rale 04$0*3 and 0410.116 see incorpoteted into SPLB the CtssAA. e e 99.1.1*01 CONT 17D4 The staff will confits that the identification of the restlities pelif ted se eetomie $PLB Categery I see incorporated 1ste CESSAR Soetten 9.1.1.3.3. e e 09.1.1*02 CONT IftM The applicant's toeponse te RAI 0410.103(1) should be incorpoteted into CEstAR Section $PLS 9.1.1.3.1.1. e e 09.1.1 03 CONT IftN Additional internetten on fuel teck design features and on the seismie elessi!!eetion of EPLS new fuel inepection aree egulpment should be incesporeted into CESSAR Settien 9.1.1.2. 9 e 09.1.1 04 CONT ITD1 The criticality desiso beste described in CESSAR 9.1.1.1.A is not derived from RO 1.13. SPLt l CESSAR 9.1.1.1.8 aust be revised to state which parts of RG 1.13 are met. l e e 09.1.1*05 CONT ITDI The design bests for the eterase of 121 new fuel essemblies must be incorpoteted into SPL5 CESSAR 9.1.1.1.D. e8 09.1.1*06 CONT ITD1 The applicant's sometiteent to semply with AMS $7.1 and ANS $7.3 aust be incorpoteted into SPLI CESSAR 9.1.1.1,-
* *09.1.1*07 CONT IflN The teatrictions limiting the liftins especity of the overhood crane must be stated in $PLB l CESSAR 9.1.1.3.1.
l ,e e 49.1.1*06 CONT IT7N The features to preclude the fell of besvy objects onto the new fuel techs aust be SPLS incorrotetod into CESSAR 9.1.1.3.1.1. } e e 09.1.1*09 CDNT ITDt The applicent must statify in CESSAR Section 9.1.1.1 what fraction of the total core is SPLB
- . teptosented by the 121 new fuel essemblies.
l e e09,1,1 10 CONT ITDi The oppilcant must statify t.he design seguiremente for the new fuel tecks for este SPLB 1 I ohutdown earthpake sonditions and dropped fuel essembly conditions. 8 e 09.1.2 01 - CONT ITDI The design foetutes showing compliance with AMS $7.2 should be incorpoteted into CESSAR SPLS i 9,1.2.3.
- e ' 09.1.2* 02 CONT ITDt The list of facilities should be incorporated inte CESSAR 8ection 9.1.2.2.3. SPLB
. e e09.1.2*03 CONT ITDt The justification that etcessive force cannot be applied to opent fuel rocks and fuel pool SPL9 should appeet in CESSAR Section 9.1.2. j e # 09.1.2*04 CONT ITIN Portions of etS$AR 8ection 9.1.2.3.3.3 ete misstns. This error should be corrected. SPLS e e 09.1.2*0$ CONF ITDI The applicant must insert estettel into CESSAR Section 9.1.3.2.2 concerning the - $PLS - teatrictions of fuel storese in Region !!. e+ 09.1,2*06 CONT ITDt Compliance w!Lh SRP 9.1.2. Item !!!.2.e should be incorpoteted into CESSAR 8ections 9.1.2 - $PLB
' and 9.1.4 e e 09.1.2 07 CONT ITD1 Discussion togstding fallute of non*sefety teleted systems and structures on spent fuel $PL5 l tache should appeat in CESSAR Section 9.1.2.
i e e09.1.2'06 CONT IftN The oppittant's response to RAI Q410.64 must be incorpoteted into the CESSAR, . $PLB e e 99.1.2'09 CONT ITD1 The appittant must esplein what fraction of a full cote is reptosented by Region 11 and. SPLt
-the total spent fuel storage copecity.
- e e09.1.2*10 CONT ITD1 The applicent must incorpotete its response to RAI Q410.66 into the CESSAR. SPL5 e e 09.1.P01- CONT ITD1 The second peregraph to the applicant's response to RAI Q410.$5(d)(a) should be added to 8FLB i
CESSAR Section 9.1.3.3.3. } t/ Y e e 09.1.3*02 CONT ITDi The third petograph to the applicant's response to RAI Q410,67 should be added to Ci$SAR SPLS Section 9.1.3.3.1. ! /ee09.1.3-03 CONT ITD4 The opplicant's response to RAI Q410.59 must be insetted into CES$AR Section 9.1.3.1I$. SPLB
- e s09.1.3 04 CONT ITD1 The opplicant's response to RAI Q410,61'should be included in CESSAR Section 9.1.3. . SfLS
, . d e 0 9.1. 3
- 0 5 CONT ITDI The appiscont's response to RAI Q281.34 must be included in CESSAR Sections 91.3.3.3 and . $PLS --
9.1.3.2.2.5. !
- i
) ' e e 09.1. 3
- 06_ ' CONT ITDi The appilcant's response to RAI Q410.$5(d)(51 should be incorpoteted into CISSAR Section- SPLB l
'~
9.1,3. !
- . A e 09.1.3*07 CONr_1TD1 The discussion of NPS design foetutes provided in response to RAI Q410.06b should be -
STLD ' given in CESSAR Section 9,1,3.1. 1 I-b _ - - - .- -.-_.;...-. .wa ~ - =--..-.-u. w, - , -- , ..a,- . --
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - _ - - - - - - - - - _ ~ _ - - - _ -
L E*t!D TYrr t ritt trm t e 8 09.3 3*00 CONT 1 TIN The appittant's response to M10410.66 contains an estertable tevision to CESSAR Section grLD 9.1.3.3.1. i e e 0 9.1. 3
- 0 9 CONT ITEH The CEssAR does i.et identify the teleted Figute 9.1 3. grLa !
e e09.1.3*10 CONF ITIN N erg.11 ant has not yet incotjeteted its respcess to RAI 0610,68 into the C135AR. srtt 09.1.4*1 CONT ITIN N en11: ant sust insosposete its sessense to RA! 0410.107 into cittAR section 9.1.4 srte e e 09,1.4 2 CONT ITIN The applicant $hould insetpotete its response to RA) 0410.104 into CESSAn Sostion 9.1,4 SFLt [ e 6 09.1.4*3 CONT ITfM N response to RA! 0410.109 should be sette Lod to tefor to positions C 3 and C.$ of RO grL3 ; 1.13. e e 0 9.1. 4
- 6 CONT ITIN The oppiteant should vetify not 2*essembly fuel cattle ,,esten for the fuel trentfet trL3 '
eeteelse includes critice11ty considerations. 1 e e09.1.4 3 CONT ! TIM N tosponse te RAI 0410.66 should to incorpoteted into CtstAR 8ection 9.1.4.3. srts ; e e 09.1,4 *6 CONT ITIN The response to M10410.69 should be incorporated into CESSAR Section 9.1.6.2.1.2. stLe e # 09.1.4*7 CONT ITIN The response to M10410.71 should be interrotetod into CESSAR Sostion 9.1.4.4 srLB e eOL 1.4*8 CONT ITIN The sosponse to M10410.73 should be interpoteted into CT.SSAR Section 9.1.4. ,.1. grL3 e e 09.2.06 1 CONT ITDI The staff will constain that a flow diesten of N condensete stetese systne is it eluded in $rLS e future revision to the CEt1AR.
* *09.3.1 1 CONT ITIN N staff will confins that RA! 0410.114 tosponse will be incorporated into e revision to trL3 i the CESSAR. )
** 09.3.3*1 CONT 17tM The applicant cassnitted to theerpotete internation on the teactet building euop pumps and SPLS theek volves in CESSAR Section 9.3.3. .
e e 09.3.3 2 CONT ITIN P&1De in CESSAR Section 9.3.3 wi!! be revised to indicate the component safety SI'LB classifteetion and to indicate shoek valve designetten.
# d 09.3.3*3 CONr ITIN CE11AR Figure 11.21 will be tevised to estee with the tent in CESSAR Section 9.3.3. $rLB e e 09.4.2 1 CONF ITIN The oppiteent has comeitted to incorpotete changes in DESSAR Section 9.4.2 and Tables $rLa s.3.1** and 0.3.1 3 in response to RAI 0410.117 i
#
- 09.4.4*1 CONT ITIN The opplicant hos emmaltted to interporate its response to M10410.118 into the CESSAR. $rti
#
- 09.4.S*1 CONT ITIN The applietnt esemnitted to incorpotete its sosponse to RAI 0410.119 into the CEstAR. BrLB e e 99.4.6*1 CONT ITIN The appiteent committed to interpotete its response to RA! 0410.120 into the CEs5AR. $PL3 e 09.4.0=1 CONT ITDf The opp 11 ent hoe commaitted te provide interfese separements for the stetton service $rLB water pump ettutture vent 41stiam system.
e e 09.4.9*1 CONT ITEH N appiteent has eenmaltted to 4*eetpotete its response to M1 Q410.122 into CESSAR SPL3 Section 9.4.9. e# 09.$.4.1 1 CONT ITIN The app 18 ent sammaitted to revise Ct&5AR Section 9.$.4.3 to provide assutante t. hat the trLB fuel oil tempoteture would remale above n o 41094 point.' e
- 10.2 1 CONT ITIN The app 11eent will revice N CBSSAR to include N ortreetion eteen non return check trLB velves and tutbine volves eloeing esitette.
e e 10.2*2 CONT ITIN N applicant will revise the CESSAR to include the etitorie t.het t.be speed severnor for 8FLB normel speed lood*eentrol fully closes the control and intercept velve et 105 poteent. e s 10.3*1 CONT ITIN The appiteent enast incorpotete ate response to RAI Q410.2 Anto the CESSAR. SPL3 e e 10.4.$*1 CONT ITIN N opplicant has temsnitted to provide additional inforsetton in CES$AR Section 10.4.$. $rLS e e 10.4.F*1 CONF ITIN The applicant has scaneitted to este fully inestporate statements addressing water heemmet $PLB in CESSAR Sections 10.4.7.2.$*F. 10.4.9*1 CONT ITIN Incorpotetton of the most recent PRA analysis in the chapter 10 emergency feedwater systee trL9 teliability analysis is e confiteetory ites. 10.4.9*2 CONT ITIN The oppiteent seassitted to prepare e distribution system design conce:1ning wetet hearnet in SPLB the emersoney foodwater piping. 11.1*1 CONF ! TIN N applicant should change the appitcable CESSAR sections to show is30 spd (not 143 spd) SrLB for the ehte bleed rate. 11.2*1 CONT ITIN N opplicant anast incorpotete changes proposed in e January 24, 1992 letter into the SPL8 CESSAR. , 11.3*1 CONT ITIN N etaff will confism that t.he revisions proposed in the opplicant's Janvery 24, 1992 $rLB 1ettet are incorrotetod into N CESSAR.
/ e 9 11.3*2 CONF ITIN The opplicant must state the filttetton system temponents for the todweste building $PLB etheust.
11.4*1 CDNF ITIM The staff will confirm that N opplicant incorpotetes the information included in its SPLB January 24, 1992 letter into the CESSAR. e
- 11.5*1 CONT ITIN The staff w!11 confits that t.he appiteant's response to RAI 0410.139e is included in e $rLB tevision to the CESSAR.
p p 20.2 01 CONF ! TIN N statf will confire that the applicant revises CESSAR 8ection 9.$.10 to include the $PLB requirements of SRP 8ection 9.S.1 for hydrogen lines located in safety *teleted etees, e e 09.2.04 1 INTERTACE The potable and sanitary watet erstems shall be designed with no interconnections with $rLB systees tontaining radioactive materials. e
- 09.2.04*2 INT!1 FACE Protection by the use of air gaps shell be provided where necessary in the potable and SPLB l etnitary erstems.
9
- 09.2.0s 1 INfERTACE N turbine building cooling watet systee 16 to be located in a building that does not SFL9 l contain any safety *teleted components.
e e 09.2.10 1 INTERFACE The turbine building servlee water system is to be located in a butiding that does not SPLB contain any eefety related compnnents. e e 10.4.S*1 INTERFACE N applicant has sumerised interf ace requisements for the condenset circulating water SPLB system. e# 03.04.1'1 OPEN ITDi The app 11sant needs to specify where seismic Category I structures requiring flood $fLB . protection will be identified, e
- 03.04.1*2 OPEN ITIN N solemic Category 1 diesel fuel ett statege structures are not identified es requitit.g~ $FLD flood protection in accordance with RG 1.29.
e a 03.05.1.3*1 OPEN 1 TIN N applicant should revise the CESSAR to be consistent with the# staff's turbine SPLB saintenance and inspection prestem. L M 03.11.3.2,1*1 OPEN ITD1 CESSAR Section 3.11.2 ettermete test profile is not in toepliance with 10 CFR 50.49 and is $PLB therefore..unoceeptable. 1/ .11.3.2.1 2 OPEN ITIN , N opplicant's use of IEEE 323*19s3 is not acceptable to the staff. SPLB
, _ - - _ _ . ,-_ -- , _m ~ . _ _ . - .~. - . . _ _ _ _ _ - , - _ ~ . . . _
few tyrt t ytt im 4 V # ct iL s.t.1 3 OrtN Ifm The opp 11: ant should .adiese ne stof t's soi.ceans seletive to enviroveental guellfleetion sta , of electrante ecu enents. , V v a.11.3.2.1 c 4 Orp IftM ne stof f does not estee thot teriant soport Curtr2 SPA kev. 3 anould be estended to srts Instude other equipent suntions.
/iA L 2.P 1 Os p Ifm ne opplicant states not ne o.asteum alto.atte tetel identified leanese will be given in sitti 1
the is. ha 1.as esotes that t.eth identified and unidentified tea 6*g* should be given ee 06.2 1.1.2 1 Cru 17tN The crylitant's reliance on e possible future d anse in 10 Crt 100 for sentelement ens pressuse o.arsta is unectertable, e# 06.2.1.1.2 2 OPEN ITIN The applisant must show that the enternst diffesential psessuse on no primary cont 1,s.er.t trLt due to no inedvertent actustion of contatteent sprer gsovides an ecceptable e.at:1n. 96.2.1.2-1 Or!.N If!N It is tot slees that the opplicant has identified s11 of the high energy line beesks. that $tt$ Lib may not erply t*. that swy seuse subscurettaent pressutisetton. . # # 06.2.1.3-1 OttM ITIN The staff believes that the metal water energy st.ov1d be instuded et one of the energy $rt$ 1 sourses that effect the sentesteemt pressuto efter e LOCA.
/e006.2.b3 000 IftM The app 14 ant sust justify testirig IItrA filtere in eteosdance with MIL *STD-202 vite the la stLS 1.82 tesammended test.
, p 06.2.3 2 OrtM ITIN It le not 81eet that the flitet (tete will include minious instrumentation seguisements $PLS listed th ERP f able 6.3.1*1.
e a 06.2.3 3 OrtN IftH ne tedlant host transfee to the secoo'ery sentelement has not been included in the trL3 erplicant's annulus building pressure anetysis. The opplicant should justify this. 06.2.3 4 OPEN ITIN The opplicant should oddress the issue of litissary conteitsent leakete bypassits the $PLS secondary sentattoont es it is speelfied in SAP 6.2.3 and 87F CSS 6 3. lj 06.2.4 1 OrtN IftM The opplicant abould clearly state which standseds and teconnendations specified in $kt SFLt l 6.2.4 mill be met. 96.2.4*2 Ort.N ITIN The ops,licant suust provide edditionet information on the contatteent isolation velves $tLB listed in CtstAR Table 6.2.4*1.
; 06.2.4*3 OfD ITIN The applicant does not indicate that line$ Sohnetting the Contoirment etm00lihere and Oe $FLB envitesment beve sediation sonitors that could isolete no lines on high radiation.
06.2.4 4 OPEN ITIN The contalement isolation valves ese designed te withstand a marienes radietten dose that SPLb is not physitelly teosonable (i.e., 6.08 7 rede). e e 06.2.4 $ Oru ITIN The applicant hee not responded to EA! Q430.37(d) togarding an analyste of de SFLB tediologleal sesults of a DBA with c.he entainment purge system initially open. , 06.2.6*1 CrtN ITIN The contalement lottation volves on piping sonnected to the stone generatet eetendary side 8FLB aust be leak tested with operating fluid. . 06.2.6 2 OrtN ITIM The opplicant should leak test the shutdown ecoling systen and the safety injection twp 8PLS system tentaitment isolation valves in escordance with 10 CTR $0 Appendte J. 06.2.6*3 0FD ITIN The lack of e leak sete test for the setendary containment to not acceptable. SPLB e e 06.4-1 0 FEN IftM The applicant does not conform to the guidance of ERF 6.6 teleted to the control toce $FL5 boundary pressurisetton systems. 4 9 e 06.5 1 OPEN 17tM The oppittant must provide edditionel information to allow the staff to verify that the SPLB contatraent sprey systne will cover 90 persent of the contettsent volume, e e 06.5 2 Orp ITIN The calculated contetrment spray system pump minionas NFSB could not be ecopated to srLB tequired MPCB since no specific pump has been selected.(1TAACI e
- 06.4 1 OPEN ITIN The hydrodynaale loads to the IRWST and ERS have not been addressed in the CESSAR. $PLB
[09.1.1 1 Cr u ITIN The opplicant should provide stiticality informatten for the review of CESSAR Section $rLB 9.1.1.
/09.1.1 2 OPEN ITlh ERF 9.1.1 taquites StiLicelity infettation to show the fuel teck s =14.h k*eff less than $Fbb 0.95 et design entlehment fuel, p49.1.1 3 Ol'EN ITIN The oppl sant should discuss which accidents require ICT 6 and the ose of the tuo IV EFLB toeputer codes and t.be respective accuracies of these codes, 449.1.1 4 OrtN 17tN The applicant should erplain how e 10 inch space between the top of the active fvel and E PLB .
the top of the teck precludes a drogred essmably stiLicolity, e49.1.1*S OPEN ITEM The applicant should confits that flooding with unborated room-tempeteture watet is e EPLB conservative assursption for an optimum modetetten condition, e a 09.1.1-6 0FD ITIN The opplicant should discuss provisions in t,he design for drainage of the veult to prevent EPL9 the occumulation of a fluid onderstor, j e s09.1.1-7 OPEN ITtN An analysis should be pe foteed to ensure thet f allute of non seismic Category 1 systems $rLb cannel, cause unacceptable k*ef f.
! 09.1.1-8 OPEN ITIN The oppiteent must show how the distances between the concrete and the fuel errey provide SFLB
, the most conservative assumptions for the criticality aneylets. , ea 09.1.1 9 OPEN ITEM The applicant must orpleta how cross
- placement of new and spent fuel storage socks will be SPLS psevented.
! e8 09.1.2-1 OPEN ITIM The appiteant must incorporate its response to FAI 0410.104e into CtsSAR section t.1.2. SPL8 The response should be orpanded to show conformance to R01.13 Position C.3.
/ 09.1.2-2 OrtN ITEN The opplicant should discuss which onelyses requite the use of D07 4 and tuo IV cceputer Sitt codes.
!O9.1.23 0 FEN IIIM The applicent should submit nwnetical values for k of f for all normal design and accident SFLB a
analyses performed for the sp6nt fuel storage.
/ 9.1.2 0 4 0FLN ITIN The opplicant should provide the results of esiticality analyses which assume a boron $1%B concentratten of 0 ppa lot the dropped load conditions discussed in the CESSAR.
V 09.1.2*5 OTCN II!M The applicant must provide information which doecnstrates how the spent fuel storege pool SPLD will be protected from o spent fuel storage task drop.
/09.1.26 OftN ITIN The applicant must esplein how pool leakage w!!! be detected and discuss design features $PLS to prevent water inventory loss beyond annimwn saf e shielding and cooling limits.
V09.1,2-7 OtLN 17!N The applicant must orplein how fuel rocks will be anchored and prevented from tiprim8 in SIL8 the pool. V09.1.2*8 00tN ITIN The arplicant must esplein how placement of a fuel assembly in a wrong location is SPLB prevented.
_.m _ __ __ . _ _ - - -_ _ _ _.. _ , _ - _ _ _ - _ i 2 PWt rN TYn f1 Tit , l tp axH l l j g o.i + 0i OnN nm no errue-t e .esponse to m 0.i.... ,e.e, ding heat gone.etion teio sol uisu.no se m. ! sensidsted inteellete. Aloe the et,p14 tent should show how t.RP t.1.3 is set. I I V V09.1. b ei OTEN If!N The opplitant's tosponse to RA! Q410,3He) is considered inadequate, CoS$AR $ettien t 1.3 $ng should provide the heat senevet estos topired to sieet the design 486et taitelle. Oe.l.3*06 O MN If!N ne alplicant eeust ptovide loformat ten showing the ef f ect of t onbeteted eish out to the g.c.el $ttp on esittselity. L / V09.1.3 05 onN !!!N The ettlicent must provide infosmetion tesording no ef fect of epi mut l wetting on systee $rts opetability. 6# 4 ! 90 1.3*06 OnN If!N no opplicant met provide edditions! intets,etion on the system contetsment asetetsvn $nt valves. VV 09.1.3*07 0 FEN 1TfN The applicant must ideettfy all outcoatie system functions. $rt B j g//09.1. b0 s Ot!N If!N The oppilsent aboule provide en entlysis of the effect of opent fuel pool sustion grLa sonnection tosetton on the pumps when the poet is et its mantotes level. { V6 k l.3*09 onN IflN no applicent should identify the bof eted adeup water soutse fet the pool as well as no $nt i non sefety*teleted soutes of nonbotsted oster used to sobeup for evopotetten lesses. ! , , e a . b 10 Ortu if N no .prtisant m.s op.sifr n. ooi.e. .etegory ad estetr stes. of ne purifi ou n sne i lettien of ne system. e d 09.1.4*1 OPLN IflN The opplicent should eseemit to estletying the IMR tequirements tontained in $6ttleh $ of StLB 1 Witt0 0612. l 1 e e 09.2.03-1 OttN !!!N The dual teetation valves between the essentiel and con *etsentiel portions of the Stit i ? toeponent seeling watet system should be added to CESSAR 8ection 9 2.2.2.248. 09.2.08*1 O nN IttM The turbine building toeling estet systee deterirtion in Ct.11Ak $eetion 9.2.4.2 does not trLB i 4 estee tetelly with Figute 9.2.6*1. l l t/09.2.09.1*1 0 FIN ITIN The essential ehill water systee design does bot appest to considet potection water henner $rLB
,j concerts.
l V 0 9.2. 09.1* 2 CPEN IflH The applicent should tiestly state which portione of the essentiel chilled wetet systee 8FL3 see safety teleted, l V 09.2.09.1 3 CFtm ITIN The flow diegten in CESSAR Figure 9.2.t*1 is het suffielect to show bow backflow through BrLB the soeused moraal chilled wetet erstes pump elti be ptevented. ! 09.2.lb1 OtLN IftN The opp 114ent should provide more infotoetion tegerding tutbine butiding service motet SPLB erstes parameters. l
- 809.3.1 1 0 FIN ITDi Any portion of the esorteesed ett erstem designated 8eisels Category !! abould be sleetly SPLB
- identitled by the opplicant.
# e 09.3.1 2 OttN ITIN The PE!V ett reservoit should be shown on the mein stees supply orten diegtens or the $FLB
' inattsenent ett diestems. e e 09.3.1*3 O M N ITIN The oprilsent must provide e revloed e*py of CtstAR Tigure 9.3.11 to indicate SPLB i eefety*teleted portiene of the sporteesed ett erstem. e e 09.3.1*4 OPEN ITIN The applicant poet parvide revised figures for the breathibg ett end station ett systems $PLD to inslude the portlene of t.he systems that include the sentatseent penetrations.
# # 09.4.1*1 O MN If!N The opplisent met sleetly state that the ESF stede filter train will instude the minimum $PLB instrumentetton re eltamente listed in ERP fable g.S.1 1.
e, # 09.4.1*2 CPEN If!N The optlisent has not provided information on the carbon adsorbet offittency for SFLt radiolodice removel.
# a 09.4.2*1 OrEN ITIN The applicent's single bypees deeper (et the (41ttetten erste.e does met meet the single SPLB f ailure critorie mesessary for preventing inadvettent telesee of todienstivity, e # 09.4.2 2 OTEN ITDi The applisent must justify having the fuel be!! ding ventilation systen leseted inside a SPLS
, non*seisale building. l e # 09.4.3-1 OMN ITDi b todweste bu11dits vent 11stion systes must confere with R01.140 in order to comply trL9 with ODC 40
# e 09.6.3*2 OFEN ITDi The todweste buildthe ventilation systes esseponente design poteseters and flow disgree ete $PLB teptred for staff toview, ee 09.4.6*1 OPEN If!N The diesel building ventilation systee components design poteseters and flow diestem, and $tLB piping and insttweentation disgree are e.eeded for staff review, e e 09.6.4*2 0 FIN IffN The applicent must aposity the elevations above ground level of the lateko vents for the SPLD diesel building ventitetton erstem.
09.4.b1 OMN ITD1 CES$AR Table 3.2*1 teeds to identify the system, system camponents and their lotettons $PL8 regarding safety sleselfleetion, seleele setegory and petity escutence designettons.
/ 09.4 $*2 CTEN IftN The staff sovites more information regarding the intdo ett vent of the subsphate $FLS building ventilation erstem, 09.4.b1 OPEN It!N The staff teettes more information tesording the turbine building ventilation system. 5fLB
! V09.6.9 1 0 FEN 1701 The staff repites more information to review the nucteer annes ventitetton systere's EFLB intake vent.
/09.$.1.1'1 OMN ITD1 The opplicant must identify any deviettone from the National Fate Protection Assetistion $rlin codes and standerde and descrito eiessures th en to ensure e pivalent protection.
09.5 1.2.1*1 OMN 11Dt The staff does not essept the concept of radiant host shields and 4.1 m (to it! SFLB sepetetton, toch such deviation inside conteinment must be fully justified. 09.5.1.2.1 2 OrtN'1 TIN The appligent asuet cleetly state hew the todundant shutdown tseins ese separet 6 in the- $fth Systen goe design. l 09.5.1.2.2 1 OTEN If!N The porticent has presented insufficient poterial togerding possive fire protection $tl$ features.
- j. 09.5,1,2.2-1 OrtN ITD1 The applisent should provide more information regarding the HVAC system that is to be used SPLB
- l for sawste removal.
0e.L 4.3.1 1 OPEN ITD1 The orp14*ent must verify the stoff's assumptions tesording the design and installation of $rLD fire detection repobility. 09.S.I.3.2 1 OfLN IfiN The applicent does not odotustely discuss the lite *ptet ection wat'er* supply system in the . $FLS fire hacetde emelysis. 09,5.1.3.3 1 OPEN 17D1 Details concerning tressure reductog orifices, estoriet hydtents and hose houses, and $rtt electrical supervleton of control and section=18 ting valves need to be discussed.
- , _ , - - - ,, . - . - .s-,,.. , - - .- , , _ ,_ _ _ _ _ . , - , ,
,= .. + _ ~ - _ _ . _ - - . _ _ _ - . - .
M TRr flytt og pe 0 9. 6.1. L 3 2 OttN Ifta The opplicant must show that redundant saf e shutdown equisa.ent se edequetely protected snie fire and the water used to fight the fire. snt 0t 5.1.4.1 1 Of f N Ifm ne staf f-repites mor e inforsatinu to tevsew the meessency ta-le etians and 11thtsi,4 systes. srte 09.s.1.4.2 1 OrfN Ifla The rit Nonetds Assessment does not discuss emergency t reathing alt. CRb Ot.s.t.4.3 1 OILN lim The staf f topitos acto information to teview the cual-s and dteins discussed in the 3:3e $ltt eenetde Ateessment, e e 09,5.1.4.f+1 OrtN lita he staff cannot detemit.e whether et tiot adequate protection has been provided for sete $313 shutdown egulisent.
/ 0s.5.1.6-1 OttN 11Di Several file stees designated Category 2 by the ettligant have tie autonistle fire $ plt suppres sion g revided.
/09.5.1.6*2 CitN If!N Some Category 2 f ate areas state that outmette fine suppression to to be determined. EFLt 09.5.1.6 3 O MN IflN The opp 11 ant must stovide justif tsation for using an engineering antireis vice laboratory $111' testing for p ellfylt4 ottw tutel members, doors, dampets, and penettstlon aests.
09.$.1.6 4 O M N IflN Some Category 2 fire stese state that an engineetit.g analysis will be provided to vettfy <s outamatic f ate suppreselon le not needed. 09.S.1.6*$ OttN IflN The opplicent asust confits that tio penettettone e: Ast in the 3*hout tetod betriere $rLe sopreting safe shutdown equigeant, e e 10.3-1 Orp ITD1 Cts 1AR 8ection 10 should be modified to referense the main stema valve house MUYlf) and EPLB elearly identify the equipment in the PCYlls, e e10.3 2 OrtR ITDi The orplicant smet clearly identify the need to have the COL *ltlicant s'tovide e steam trL) hammer dynamics prostem. 10.4.1*1 OPEN Ifm The applisant has tiot provided e systema drawings and essaponent design parametets table th $PL3 Cts 1AR Section 10.4.1. 10.4.2*1 0FU IfD1 CESSAR 8ection 10.4.2 does met g>tevide suffleient dotatte to conclude the staff *e review BPLb of the meio condenser eveewation systoa. 10.4.2*2 OMN ITDi The vacuum 3.unip discharge sieth and the monitoring cepabilities associsted wit.h the path SFLt are not identitled. 10.4.2*3 0FLN If1H The applisent_ bos not demanettsted sonformance to kGo and standards as meted in D3ER SFL3 8ection 10.4.2. 10.4,3 1 OPEN IftN Cts 5AR 8ection 10.6,3 does not contain suffielent detalls to couetude the staff's review SrLB of the turbine gland sealing bystee. 10.4.3 2 CPEN ITD1 The orplicant has bot demonettsted conformance to Roe and standards se noted in liter $F1.3 Section 10.4.3. /se10.4.4*1 OrtN ITDi The CRP etates that t.he turbine bypese system preoperational and etsetup teste should EFLB conform with the recomunendatione of RO 1.64. ed 10.4.$ 1 OMN ITD1 The staff cannot conclude that the etteulating water erstesa design seeets GDC 4 8PLB tequirements with toppect 44 t.he ef fects of discharging water resulting itsee a system falluto. 10.4.5 2 0 FEN ITD1 The normal inlet and outlet tempetetute and the flow esteetly of the sliculating watet SI'LB pumps is moeded for the stoff's review, e e 10.4.7 1 OPEN 17D1 The condensete and feedustet systee piping and instrument diagrama should clearly indieste EI'LB where eless changes secut, fe 10.4.7 2 CPLN ITD1 Complianee with CDC 46 is an open item pending evellability of the infermetion togarding $119 functional testing of the condensate and feedwater systems. e e 10.4.9 2 OMN ITDi The 48 hout endurance test recoiseended in ifUREG-0611 was tot discussed in Cf.$$AR Chaptet SFLB 10. 11.1*1 OPEN IID1 C185AR Section 11,1 tequires more information to enable the steff to evaluate the SPLB radioactive weste system. 11.1*2 OPEN ITDt ERP sections 11.2 and 11.3 etate that the todweste system thould have t.he serability to SPLB process westes based on 1 percent failed fuel. 11.2-1 OMN !!!M The 11guld waste management system must consider opetetet ottor. Also, the LFs for the Sit 6 shis bleed stream used for concentration determination may not be conservative. 11.2 2 OMN IffN The applicant must tovise CESSAA Soettan 11.2 Lakles and demonstrate that normal teleases f.FLB to unrestricted areas will be within 10 CPR 20, Arpendis 8 acceptable concentrations, e e11.2*3 OPEN 17D1 All espects ei RO 1.143 aust be addressed by the applicant.
- e 11.2*4 $Pl2 Of EN ITD1 The dispoettien of the discharge flow for the shim blood and clean wette streams must be $ltB made clear.
#e 11.3*1 OPEN ITD1 The applicant anst explain its basis for the 1 esta flow t ote of settier gas through the SPLB deley bed.
p e11.3 2 OPEN ITDt the appilcant must show how thatcoal deley beds comply with RG 1.143 Fesitions C.2.1.3, SPLt C . S .1.1, C . S . I . 2 and C. S .1. 3, and how the 0% me e t s R0 1.14 3 Po s i t i on C 6 . V 11.3*3 OIEN ITDi The oppittant must provide additionel information to show that the GRi$ design meets GDC $PLS 3. 11.3-4 OTEN ITD1 The four values identified by the staff in D512 Section 11,3 erust be cettetted. El'LB 11.3*5 O M N 11IN The soutco tore used in the ebarcoal delay bed systes design should cottospond to 1 percent failed fuel, . Sftll e# 11.4*1 O M N IfrN The errite*nt should Provide information to show that the se14d weste sanagement system EftB eumplies with M 1.143, 11.4*2 OPCN ITD1 The orplicant shou 11 provide an emplanetton of how the values in CESSAR f able 11.4'2 were 5fLB determined. Also the applicant should show the tutte content of the weste. 11.S*1 OPEN IffM CfSSAR Section 11.$ should be revised to Anelude all gaseous and liquid process strearns or $PLD offluent telease points that will be monitored and sampled. 11.l 2 0FLN IflN Genetic monitor locations should be presented in tabular form for gaseous and liquid SPLB process and effluent monitors.
- 20.2 2$ OFEN jfD1 The applicant should conduct tests et analyses to show that contatteent purge or vent STLB velves would shut without dettading conteinment intogtity during a LOCA.
20.2 26 OPEN ITD1 The opplicant should conduct analyses to show that contatteent valve operability is $lta estured against ascending differential pressure and dynaste loading resulting f rom e LOCA.
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SPLB Confirmat ory item 9.1.3 2: The applicant will include its response to RAI Q410,67 providing an failure modes and effects analysis (fMEA) on the spent fuel pool cooling system (SfPCS) in a future Amendment to the CESSAR (as Table 9.1-3). The applicant should incorporate paragraph 3 of its response into CESSAR Section 9.1.3.3.1 to show the effect of this analysis. Resnonse to Confirmatory item 9.1.3 2: Per response to RAI Q410.67, a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was developed for the spent fuel pool cooling system. ThisFMEA(asshowninthe attachment) will be included in the next Amendment to CESSAR DC as Table 9.1 3. Per response to Confirmatory item 9.1.3 0, the rewording of CESSAR DC Section 9.1.3.3.1 from RAI Q410.68 response will be added to the next Amendment to CESSAR DC. The revised section contains the following sentence: ' Suitable redundancy is provided to ensure that this function can be achieved assuming a single failure of a component coincident with the isss of either onsite or offsite power." This provides the same information as stated in paragraph 3 of response to RAI Q410.67. l l t
g.. . ._ . __.___-- _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ ___ _ . _ - . _ . _ _ _ I i Table 9.1-3 (Sheet 9 of 17) _ i a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fue! Pool Coofino System r Effects . Method Inherent I 1 No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System of Detection - Co spensating Provision Remarks t ! I 1 Spent Fuel Pool a. Plugged Corrosion or Reduced flow High pooltemp alarm Failed heat exchanger Complete plugyng Cooiing Heat tubes boron in one (T-420)in control can be isolated by of alltubesis l Exchangers buildup, system. room at 180 *F. valve PC-212t211. unlikely.
. Heat Exchanger 1 foreign Gradual Local temp indication Redundant heat Reduced tiow would ;
! Heat Eschanger 2 objects in increase in (T-404/406 and excharger is available ce detected long I PCPS. temp in pool T-405/407). t!' rough cross before comp!ete [ j Local flow L4c.aiicn connecDon (valves pluggmg occurs. l [ (F-400/401). PC-201 and PC-293). Redundant train is PIN ! ! l
- b. Corrosion or Reduced Hich pool temp alarm Heat exchanger can be insufficient boron buildup heat removat (T-420)in control isolated by valve heat transfer on tubes. in one room at 180 *F. PC-212/211.
I system. Local temp indication Redundant heat
- Gradual (T-405/407). exc.: npisavaitable increase in through cross &
temp in pool. connecDon (valves l' l PC-201 and PC-293). Redundant trainis ! , provided. l~ ' ! c. CCWS Casing crack, Reduced High pool temp alarm Failed heat exCwgsi ! ] leakage welding heat removal - (T-420)in control can be isolated by i ; failure, in one room at 180 *F. valve PC-2121211. { f manufacturing - system. Local tempindcation Redundant heat ) defect. Gradual (T-405/407). exCwswiis available ! increasein through cross [ i tempin pool connecDon(valves i' PC-201 and PC-293).- Redundant trainis t l -{_ 4 OEM j
! r i !
t P
%--aw ..w- - w .a. ye., m. ni u;s4. .:e,-
i Table 9S3 (Sheet 2 of 17) . . - l~ Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Poof Coorino System Effects Method inherent No. ' Name/ number Failure Mode 'Cause on System of Detecten Cen pens & ting Provision Remarks j d. Cross Tube Contamination High water level Failed heat exchanger Water levelin fuel leakage corrosion, of comconern alarmin CCWS surge can be isolated by pool can be vibration cooling traler tanks. valve PC-212/211. retumed to normai } . wear, system. Fuel poollow level : Redundant heat with manual makeup
- j. manufacturing increase in alarm (L--420) in - exCisc@- is available flow with borated
, defect. pool temp. control room. through cross water from the CVCS. Decreasein High pool temp alarm connection (vafves
- pool water (T-420)in control PC-201 and PC-293). l sevel. room at 180 *F. Redundant trainis l
!. Localtempindication provided. (T-405/407). Local flow indication (F-400/405). 2 Spent Fuel Pool -
- a. Fails to Electrical Fuel pool Motor status in Redundant train is Single train is Cooling Pumps start malfunction, temp wi!! control room. provided for cominued sufficient to Pump 1 mechanical gradua!!y High pool temp alarm !!ow for heat removal remain fuel pool j Pump 2 failure or increase. (T-420)in control Stand-by pump is ter:p at 180 'F for binding, loss room at 180 'F. started manuaRy. abnormalleads and of power. Low discharge 140 'F for normal pressure alarm loads.
{ J (P-403/404) in control room. Localpressure I indication i^ (P-4011402). l* Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-4051407). 4 4 5
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Table 9S3 (Sheet 6 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Coolino System t Effects Method No. Name/ number Failure Mode Inherent . Cause on System of Detection Compensating Provision Remarks
, b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check. If both valves fail Valves are normally failure or coofing pumps open, the heat open.
binding impossible if exC.d@ei inlet both valves
- va!ves (PC-211/212) can in one train be used toisolate i fail open. pumps. \
5 Pressure a. Fails closed Human error. Loss oflocal Periodic check. Low /high pressure alarm indicator Vafve Vafves are normaffy , mechanical pressure PC-204 (P-403/404)in control open. ' failure indication room. PC-205 } (P-401/402). ! t j b. Faits open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check. Pump suction valves Valves are ncrma'ly failure or pressure (PC-202/203) and pump open. '
- binding indcitor discharge valves j
impossible. , (PC-208/209) can be used to isolate
' pressure indicator.
t 6 Pressure Switch a. Fails closed Human error. Loss of Periodic check. Localpressure Vafves are normatty vaive mechanical ~ low /high i Low discharge indication (P-401/402). open. j' PC-200 faiture discharge pressure alarm ' PC-210 pressure (P-403/404)in alarm control room. I' (P-403/404) in controt
, room. J I
t i b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check. Pump discharge valves Valves are normaUy failure or pressure ! (PC-208/209) and heat open. t binding switch exchangerinlet valves i impossible. (PC-211/212) can be i
' ' used toisolate ,
I pressure switch. ; ! i 1
I Table 9.1-3 (Sheet 7 of 171 4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooiino System I Elfects - . I4ethod -
. inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System ~ of Detection - Compensating Provision Remarks 7 Heat Exchanger a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of one High pool temp alarm Redundant heat Singfe train is
. Inlet Valves mechanical heat (T-420)in control exchangeris available sufficient to a
PC-211 failure exchanger. room at 180 *F. through cross remain fuel poo! PC-212 Gradual temp High discharge connection (valves temp at 180 *F for i, increasein pressure alarm PC-201 and PC-293). abnormalloads and pool (P-403/404)in Redundant train is 140 *F for normal control room. provided. loads. Localpressure Valves are normaffy indication open. 4 (P-4G1/402). Local fiw indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-405/407).
'b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Penodic check. Pump 656=rgs valves Valves are normany failure or heat (PC-208/209) can be open.
binding exchanger used te isolate the impossible. heat exchanger. j 8 Heat Exchanger a. Fails c osed Human error. Loss of flow High pool temp alarm Redundant heat Singte train is Outlet valves mechanical in one train. i (T-420)in control exchanger is available sufficient to j PC-213 failure Gradual room at 180 *F. through cross remain fuel pool j PC-214 increase in High discharge mection(valves temp at 180 *F for j temp in poo!. pressure alarm PC-231 and PC-293). abnormal toacs and
- (P-403/404)in Redundant train is 140 *F for normat
, control room. provided. Ioads.
Local pressure Valves are normany indica! ion open. (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). , l' Local temp indication (T-405/407).
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Tabte 9M-3 (Sheet 9 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Soent Fuel Pool Coofino System Effects Metriod innsient of Detection Compensat:ng Provtson Remarks No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System Localflow in6 cation Valves are normary 11 Flow Indicator a. Faits closed Human error. Loss oflocal Periodic chec!c (F-400/401) possible by open. Outlet Valves mechanical flow indicator using the other PC-300 failure redundant train. PC-302 (F-400/401). Redundant heat exchanger and flow andcator available through cross connecGon (vafves PC-201 and PC-293). None. Valves are norma!!y
- b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check.
open. < failure or local flow binding indicator (F-400/401) impossibfe. High pool temp alarm Redundant train is Singte train is I2 Foot Cochng inlet covered Foreign Loss of one provided for continued sufficie it to Piping objectsin coofing (T-420) at 180 'F. Low discharge heat removal remain fuel pool Suction Line spent fuel train. pressure alarm temp at 180 'F for Intet pool Gradual abnormalloads and increase in (P-403/404) in control room. 140 *F for normal tempin pool Local flow indication loads. (F-400 or F-40t). Localpressure indication (P-401/402). Localtempindication (T-404/406 and T-405/407).
Table 9.1-3 (Sheet 10 of 171 Failure Mode and Ef'ms Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Coofino System Effects .. Method Inherent , No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System .of Detection ~ Compensating Provision Remarks ! 13 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow High pool temp alarm Redundant train is Piping in one train. (T-420)in control provided for continued Pump Suction Loss of room at 180 *F. heat removal Line coolant. Fuel poollow level if pool drains to level Pool drained alarm (L-420)in of pump suction intet, to level of control room. sufficient water suction line Low discharge remains to allow time infet. pressure alarm in tc fine up make up to Temp in pool control room preclude reaching the rises. (P-403/404). minimum shielding depth. Local pressure indication (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-405/407).
+
.m.. ._ _ . . . _ _ . _ . . - . . _ . . _ _ . ~ . .- . . _ . .. m... .-
Table 9.9-3 (Sheet 11 of 171 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Poof Coolino System
' Effects: Method Inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System of Detection - Compensating Provision Remarks 14 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow High pool temp alarm Broken pipe is isolated Single train is Piping in one train. (T-420)in control with valves PC-202/203 sufficient to Pump Discharge Loss of room at 180 'F. and PC-214/213. remain fuel pool Line coolant. Fuel poollow level Redundant trainis temp at 180 'F for Gradual alarm (L-420)in provided for continued abnormailoads and increse in control room. heat removal. 140 'F for normal temp in pool. Local flow indication if pool drains to level loads.
(F-400/401). of pump suction infet, Water levelin fuel Local tempindication sufficient water pool can be (T-405/407). remains to allow time returned to normal Eventually low to line up make up to with manual make up discharge alarm preclude reaching the ilow with borated (P-403/404) in minimum shielding depth. water from the CVCS. control room. Eventually local pressure indication (P-401/402). Eventually local temp indication (T-404/406). 1 i i 1
i Tr ble 9.1-3 (Sheet 12 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Coofino System Elfects . Method . Inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System of Detection Compensating Provision Remarks 15 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow High pool temp alarm Broken pipe isisolated Single train is Piping in one train. (T-420)in control with valves PC-208/209 sufficient to Cross Loss of room at 180 *F. and PC-212/211. remain fuel pool Connection Line coolant. Fuel poollow level Redundant train is temp at 180 *F for Gradual alarm (L-420)in provided for continued abnormalloads and increase in control room. heat removal. 140 *F for normal temp in pool. Local flow indication if pool drains to level loads. (F-400/401). of pump suction inlet. Water levelin fuel Local temp indication sufficient water pool can be (T-405/407). remains to allow time. retumed to normd to line up make up to with manual make up preclude reaching the flow with borated minimum shielding depth. water from the CVCS. 16 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow High pool temp alarm Broken pipe is iso!ated Single train is Piping in one train. (T-420)in control with valves PC-212/211 sufficient to Return Line Loss of , room at 180 *F. or PC-214/213. remain fuel pool coolant. Fuel pool low level Redundant train is temp at 180 *F for Gradual alarm (L-420)in provided for continued abnormalloads and increase in control room. heat removal. 140 *F for normal temp in pool. Eventually local flow if pool draine to level ioads. indication of pump suction inlet. Water levelin fuel (F-400/F401). sufficient water pool can be remains to allow time retumed to normal to line up make up to with manual make up preclude reaching the flow with borated minimum shielding depth. water from the CVCS. l
. ._ . . . . - - . . . _ . .-- - - - . - -- . - . . . ~ . _ . . _ _ . . - . . . - - . -= . Table 9.1-3 fSheet 13 of 17) Faifure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Soent Fuel Pool Coolino System Effects Method - Irtherent No. Nameinumber Failure Mode Cause - on System ' of Detection Compensating Provision Remarks 17 Pool Cooling Plugged nozzels Corrosion Reduced flow High pool temp alarm Redundant train is Complete plugging Piping buildup, in one train. (T-420)in control provided for continued of allnozzlesis Discharge Line boron Gradual room at 180 'F. heat removal. unlikely. Sparger buildup, increase in Local tempindication Reduced flow would foreign temp in pool. (T-404/406). be detected long objects in Local flow indication before complete PCPS. (F-400/401). plugging occurs. 18 Pump Discharge a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident low Low discharge pressure Pressure pressure mechanical impact on discharge pressure alarm (P-403/404). Indicator indication malfunction. system alarm (P-403/404) Redundant train is P-401 Setpoint operation. with low pressure provided. P-402 drift. gauge Indication from P-401/402. Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident high High discharge pressure pressure mechanical impact on . discharge pressure alarm (P-403/404).
indication malfunction, system alarm (P-403/404) Redundant train is Setpoint operation. with high pressure provided. drift. gauge indication from P-401/402. Periodic test.
. . - . , ,.. -. . - - - . . . _ . . - . . - . . . - - . . .. . _ . .- , _ . - -- - . . . - = . . . - . . .. ~- Table 9.1-3 (Shee? 14 of 17) Faiture Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Coolina System Effects Method Inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System :'of Detection - - Compensating Provision Remarks 19 Pump Discharge a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincidentlocal Local pessure No direct impact on Pressure Switch pressure alarm. mechanical impact on - low pressure gauge indication (P-401/402). system even if the P-403 malfunction. system indication Redundant train is operator closes one P-404 Setpoint operation. (P-401/402) with low provided. train and sw;tches drift. pressure alarm from to the redundant P-403/404. train. Periodic test. Single train is sufficient to remain fuel pool temp at 180 'F for abnormalloads and 140 'F for normat loads. D. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident local Local pressure No direct tmpact on pressure alarm mechanical impact on high pressure gauge indication (P-401/402). system even if the malfunction. system indication Redundant train is operator closes one Setpoint - operation. (P-401/402) with high provided. , train and switches drift. pressure alarm from io the redundant P-403/404. train. Periodic test. Single train is sufficient to , remain fuel pool-temp at 180 'F for abnormal loads and 140 'F for normat loads.
. . . _ _ _ m . _ . _.
_. _ .._.____.m _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ . _ _ . . . - - . . - _ ,. - . - - . _ Table 9.9-3 fSheet 15 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cootino System Effects- Method ~ Inherent ! I No. Name/ number Faiture Mode Cause on System of Detection - Compensating Provision Remarks l 20 Heat Exchanger a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident local Redundant train is inlet temp indication mechanical impact on low temp indication provided. Temperature malfunction. system (T-405/407) or low Indicator Setpoint operation. pool temp atarm T-404 drift. (T-420) with low temp T-406 gauge indication (T-404/406). Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincidentlocal Redundant train is A high heat temp indication mechanical impact on high temp indication provided. exchanger intet malfunction. system (7-405/407) or high temp makes Setpoint operation. pooltemp alarm increased cocting drift. (T-420) with high necessary. A false temp gauge indication high temp (T-404/406). ; indication results Periodic test. 'in lower temp than necessary in pool.
21 Heat Exchanger a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident low Spent fuel pool temp Outlet temp indication mechanical impact on pool temp alarm alarm (T-420). Temperature malfunction. system (T-420) with low temp Redundant train is indicatcr Setpoint operation. gauge indication provided. T-405 drift. (T-405/407). T-407 Periodic test.
- b. False high - Electrical or No direct No coincident high Spent fuel pool temp A high heat temp indication mechanical impact on pool temp alarm alarm (T-420). exchanger outlet malfunction. system (T-420) with high Redundant train is - temp makes ,
Setpoint operation. temp gauge indication provided. increased cooling drift. (T-405/407). necessary. A false Periodic test. . high temp Mdication resu!!s in lower terr:p than necessary its pool. 1
Table 9.1-3 (Shset 16 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analys:s of the Spent Fuel Pool Coofina System Effects Method . Inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause . on System of Detection Compensating Provision Remarks 22 Heat Exchanger a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident high Redundant train is Outlet Flow . flow indication mechanical impact on pool temp alarm provided. Indicator malfunction. system (T-420) with low flow F-400 Setpoint operation. gauge indication F-401 drif1. (F-400/401). Periodic test,
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident low Redundant train is flow indication mechanical impact on pool temp alarm provided.
malfunction. system (T-420) with high Setpoint - operation. flow gauge indication i drift. (F-400/410). Periodic test l 23 Spent Fuel Pool a. False low Electrical or No direct ' No coincident local Local temp indication Temperature temp alarm mechanical irnpact on icw temp gauge (T-404/406) when pump indicator malfunction. system indication is running. T-420 Setpoint operation. (T-404/406) with low drift. temp alarm (T-420) when pump is running. Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincidentlocal Local temp indication - Low pooltempis ~ '
temp alarm mechanical impact on high temp gauge (T-404/406) when pump desired. malfunction. system indication . is running. Setpoint operation. (T-404/406) with high drif1. temp alarm (T-420) when pump is running. Periodic test. 1
.. - . . .. ~ . . - - ~ _ - - . . _- - . -. - - . - . . . . - .- -- . . . . _
Tabte 9.1-3 (Sheet 17 of 17) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the SDent Fuel Pool Coofino System Effects Method Inherent No. Name/ number Failure Mode Cause on System of Detection Compensating Provision Remarks 24 Spent Fuel Pool a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident high None. No risk of i Level Switch IcVe! alarm mechanical impact on temp alarm (T-420)in overfi!!ing of pool L-420 malfunction. system control room orlocal since make up is Serpoint operation. Iow flow indication manua!!y provided. drif1. (F-400/401) with low tevel alarm (L-420). Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident None. No risk of level alarm mechanical impact on indication ofloss of uncovering the malfunction. system water from CCWS and spent fuel since Setpoint operation. CVCS with high levet the suction !!ce drift. alarm (L-420). inlet is situated i Periodic test. near the normal water level a
SPLB Open item 5.2.5-1 The applicant states that the maximum allowable total identified leakage will be given in the TS. RG 1.45 states that both identified and unidentified leakage should be given. ABB-CE Response Section 16.7.12 and 16.7.14 of the CESSAR-DC, chapter 16 - Technical Specifications, provide the information required by Position C.9 of RG 1.45. Section 16.7.12 specifies limits of I gpm of unidentified leakage and 10 gpm of identified leakage. Section 16.7.14 specifies operability requirements for the RCS leakage detection instrumentation. Therefore, CESSAR-DC Section 5.2.5.3 will be revised in a future amendment as follows: 5.2.5.3 Leakage Requirements 4 The maximum allowable identified and uni 6entified leakage and the instrument availability to detect leakage is stated in the Technical Specifications, Chapter 16. R I i
SPLB l Qpen Item 3.11.3.2.1-1 ! l In CESSAR Section 3.11.2, the applicant is using an alternate test ! profile which allows for the substitution of testing twice at the specified service conditions as a substitute for testing once at a profile that includes margins. This approach is nonconservative; not consistent with IEEE 323-1974, NUREG-0588, or RG 1.89; and does not meet the intent of nor is it in compliance with 10 CFR 50.49. Therefore, this is an open item. To date the NRC staff has not endorsed IEEE 323-1983. l Bosnonse: CESSAR Section 3.11.2 will be revised to reflect testing once at aand 323-1974 profile that includes margins to be consistent with IEEE to meet the intent of and to comply with 10 CFR 50.49. i 4 4 4 4 k l
l SPLB l l 1 i Open Item 3,11.3.2 1-2 323-1983; consequently, To date the NRC staff has not endorsed IEEE are not references to Therefore, this standard in its entirety, or in part,in CESSAR Section 323-19833.11.2.1 acceptable. the is referenced in regard to the definition of a mild environment, staff considers this an cpon item (Open Item 3.11.3.2.1-2). An - acceptable definition for a mild environment can be found in 10 CFR j 50.49, paragraph (c). i Resnonse:
- CESSAR-DC Section 3.11.2.1 will be revised and to use to remove the definition reference to IEEE of the mild environment in 10 CFR 50.49, Std. 323-1983, i
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SPtG Open Item 3.11.3.2.1-3 With the expected significant increase in the quantity and variety of electronic components in newer generation plants, the staff hac increasing concerns about the efforts being made and The the ability of applicant these components to be environmentally qualified. should address the staff concerns relative to their position on the environmental qualification of electronic components. ResDonse:_ For harsh environment, it is anticipated that equipment which has i previously been qualified in accordance with theJune requirements 1984, IEEE ofStd. IEEE Std. 323, 1974, Regulatory Guide 1.89 Rev. 01, August 1977 will be 344, 1975 and Regulatory Guide 1.100 Rev. C1, utilized. Harsh environments are defined as environments that will experience significant changes in environmental parameteys due to a postulated DBE (e.g., inside containment, radiation 2 10 Rads TID). It is expected that no new harsh environment equipment will be required for SYS80+ beyond that which has previously been qualified If necessary, for the parameter envelope of the SYS80 design. previously qualified harsh environment equipment will be re-qualified by previous methods to plant-specific parameter envelope forsituati qualification envelope. For seismic qualification, however, this if necessary, to meet the requirements equipment will be re-qualified,and Regulatory Guide 1.100 Rev. 02,June 1988. of IEE Std. 344 1987 i i I
SPLB i Open Item 3.11.3.2.1-4 The staff does not agree that topical report CENPD-255-A Rev. 3 should be extended to include other equipment suppliers.
Response
ABB-CE will change CESSAR-DC, Section 3.11.2 to read: Qualification of electrical equipment of System 80+ will comply with 10CFR50.49 as described below: (1) environmental qualification of electrical equipment located in harsh environments within Combustion Engineering's scope of supply will be in accordance with the methodologies outlined in CENPD-255-A, Rev. 3 (Reference 1); 4 (2) environmental qualification of electrical equipment located in mild environments within Combustion Engineering's scope of supply will be in accordance with the methodologies outlined in NPX80-IC-QG790-00 ; (3) environmental qualification of electrical equipment outside of Combustion Engineering's scope of supply will be in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 and Regulatory Guide'1.89, Rev. 1. Environmental qualification of r.echanical equipment will comply with GDC 1 and 4 and Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 (Criteria III,
" Design Control," and XVII, " Quality Assurance Records") and will include the following:
(1) identification of safety-related mechanical equipment located in harsh environments, including required operating times; (2) identification of non-metallic subcomponents of this equipment; (3) identification of the environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified; (4) identification of non-metallic material- capabilities; and (5) evaluation of environmental effects." Note".* NPX80-IC-QG790-00 has been transmitted to the staff by , letter LD-92-115 dated November 24, 1992. l 1 l 1 4
0 pen item 9.1.3-1: SPLB The applicants response to RAI Q410.56 regarding heat generation rate calculations is incomplete. The applicant should show how the spent fuel cooling system meets the assumed conditions given in SRP 9.1.3 issue !!! H.iii and 111 H.iv. The applicant should incorporate the missing material into CESSAR Section 9.1.3. Response to Open item 9.1.3-1: In accordance with SRP Section 9.1.3 Issue til H.iii, for abnormal conditions the spent fuel pool cooling system should have the capacity to remove the decay heat from one full core at equilibrium conditions after 150 hours decay and one refueling load at equilibrium conditions after 36 days decay without spent fuel pool bulk water boiling. Cooling system single failure need not be considered concurrent with this condition. Since the System 80+ spent fuel pool is designed for a storage capacity greater than 1-1/3 cores, SRP Section 9.1.3 Issue 111 H.iv is also applicable. This section states that one additional refueling batch at equilibrium conditions, af ter 400 days decay, should be included in the-spent fuel pool cooling requirements. Based on the above requirements, a total decay heat load was calculated using the decay energy vs. time after shutdown curve provided in Attachment (1). This curve was previously submitted in response to NRC RAI Q410.56. The 6 resultant spent fuel pool decay heat load for this condition is 52.65 x 10 Btu /Hr. System 80+ CESSAR DC Section 9.1.3.1.4, " System Capacity Basis", states that the System 80+ pool cooling system is designed to remove decay heat from a full core offload heat load (which is the abnormal heat load). This is equal to the normal spent fuel pool heat load, plus the addition of decay heat from a full core offload 120 hours af ter shutdown. The normal heat load is the decay heat wh!ch occurs when an accumulation of spent fuel equal to 10 full power years is in the spent fuel pool with the newest spent fuel batch having just been placed in the pool during refueling at 120 hours after shutdown. The resultant decay heat load calculated for this condition, using the 6 Attachment (1) curve, is 65.27 x 10 Blu/ilr.
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5 l Section 9.1.3.1.4 also states that for the above abnormal spent fuel- loading l l condition concurrent with normal plant operation (which is both cooling trains' ] cperating, (no sirgle failure)) the spent. fuel pool maximum bulk water j temperature is 140'F. , 4. \ Based on the above information, the System 80t design meets the. criteria in ! SRP 9.1.3 since the_ System 80+ cooling system'is designed to remove a spent
- fuel pool heat load of 65.27 x 106Btu /Hr. which'is greater than the 52.65 x-106 Btu /Hr required by SRP 9.1.3. ~ Also the System 80+ design must keep the f
j spent fuel pool bulk water temperature 5140'F, where in SRP 9.1.3- the pool must not bulk boil. Per respon e to Open item 9.1.3 2, the heat loads for normal and abnormal l l conditions stated in CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.1.4 have been added to this i j section. i 1 i 4 i 4 [. h i i s J
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it Open ! tem 9.1.3-2: O The applicant's response to RAI Q410.55(a) is inadequate. Although detailed j final design information may not be available, the applicant should include in l CESSAR Section 9.1.3, as a minimum, the heat removal rates required to meet
- the design-bases criteria for normal and abnormal conditions and the design heat removal rates for these conditions.
Response to Onen 11em 9.1.3-2: The following spent fuel pool decay heat loads were determined for normal and , abnormal conditions in accordance with CESSAR DC Section 9.1.3.1.4, System Capacity Bases: 6 Normal Conditions - 18.60 x 10 Blu/hr 6 Abnormal Conditions - 65.27 x 10 Btu /hr
- The above decay heat loads will be included in the second half of the_ first i paragraph in CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.1.4 in the next amendment as follows
- "The normal heat load is the decay heat which occurs when an accumulation of l spent fuel equal to 10 full power years is in the spent fuel pool, with the
- newest spent fuel batch having just been placed in the pool during refueling i at 120 hours after shutdown. The resultant heat load for this condition is 18.60 x 106 Btu /hr, The full core offload heat load is equal to the normal
~
! heat load plus the addition of the decay heat from' a full . core offload 120 i hours after shutdown. The resultant heat load for this condition is 65.27 x 106 Btu /hr. The heat load from any other combination of spent fuel within the ' 6 pool will result in heat loads lower than 65.27 x 10 Blu/hr." Each spent fuel pool heat exchanger will be sized to remove a minimum of 32.63 x 106 Blu/hr with a tube inlet temperature of 140*F. This is the worse cas-scenario where both PCPS cooling trains must maintain the spent fuel pool water temperature at s 140*F during abnormal heat load conditions. 1
J t 5 i SPLB NRC Open Item 9.1.3 5 The applicant scust provide information regarding the effect of equipment wetting i on system operability. Rennonse to NRC Onen Item 9.1.3 5 The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) contains both safety grade and non safety grade equipment. The portion of the system providing pool cooling is designed to Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I criteria, while the portion of the
- system which provides pool purification is des 1 6ned as non nuclear safety and non seismic.
The pool cooling and pool purification portions of the PCPS are located in the nuclear annex and the reactor building subsphere. The nuclear annex and reactor building subsphere are designed as Seismic Category I structures and are designed to maintain a dry environment during all floods by incorporating the following design features: A. No exterior access openings will be lower than 1 foot above plant grade elevation. B. The finished yard grade adjacent to the safety related. structures will be maintained at least 1 foot below ground floor: elevation. C. Waterstops are used in all horizontal and vertical construction joints in all exterior walls up to the flood elevation. D. Water seals are provided for all penetrations in exterior walls up to l flood level elevation. l E. Waterproofing of walls subject to flooding is provided. In addition, for the safety related pool cooling portion of the PCPS,- redundant l equipment is separated and compartmentalized so that a single flooding event does not affect the redundant heat removal loop. The .cactor building subsphere, at the elevation where the pool cooling equipment i. located, is physically separated such that a potential flood in one division is prevented from flooding the other division. i The arrangement of the redundant safety related pool cooling trains protects
- against a loss of pool cooling due to spray resulting from a nearby pipe break.
The compartmentalization and separation of the cooling trains by division in the reactor building subsphere ensures that. spray affecting one division does not af fect the redundant heat removal loop. l i l i
~_,..-- ~-._.
Aesp01 W loM0 A W " 9.l.3- f (Cm khc & ) PCPS equipment is qualified for environmental conditions which are expected for that particular components
- location. The pool cooling equipment is designed to function during a LOCA or MSLB. These environmental conditions are specified in CESSAR DC Table 3.11A 1 (Environmental Category D). Pool cooling equipment is designed to function in temperatures ranging from 55 to 104 F, with relative humidity ranging from 20 to 90s, with a limit of 8 hours operation outside the normal humidity range.
The pool purification equipment is non-safety related and design conditions are reflected in CESSAR DC Table 3.11A 1 (Environmental Category C). The pool purification equipment is designed for normal nuclear annex environmental conditions with temperatures ranging from 55 to 104 F and relative humidity between 20 and 90s. The environmental conditions stated above represent the minimum conditions to which PCPS equipment is designed. Additional, more restrictive environmental requirements may apply to some equipment.
SPL8 Open item 9.1.3_6: The applicant must provide additional information on the system containment isolation valves. This should include isolation time, valve type, inspection and testing requirements and power supplies. Response to Open item 9.1.3-6: Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) containment isolation valves PC-257, PC 258, PC-291 and PC-292 are part of the purification portion _of the system and are located in-the refueling pool inlet and discharge piping on the inside and-outside of the containment. All four valves are Safety Class 2,_ manually operated gate valves and are_ normally closed during power operations. The valves are opened in the refueling mode when the pool requires filling and purification. Since the valves are' manually operated, there are no isolation time or power supply requirements. CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.4, " Tests and Inspection", states' that for PCPS components, periodic visual inspection and preventitive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice. The Seismic Category I portions will be inspected in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section XI. The layout of the components of the_ PCPS is such that periodic testing and inservice inspection of this system are possible. The valves are-listed in Table 3.2-2 of CESSAR 0C Section 3.2, Classification of Structures, Components and Systems. In this Table, the valves location / description, safety class, seismic category and quality class are provided. 1 In response to this Open item, the following section describing containment - isolation for the PCPS will be added to _CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.3: 1 l 9.1. 3 . 3 . 4 System lsolation 9.1;3.-3.4.1- Containment Isolation [ b There are two penetrations through the containment structure to accommodate PCPS piping. One penetration allows' flow. from- the' purification loop into the refueling pool. The other penetration allows; flow from the refueling; pool. l l-back into the purification loop. , The penetration for the purification loop to the refueling pool consists of: a Safety Class 2 manually operated gate valve (PC-291) outside containment and a, Safety Class 2 manually operated gate-valve-(PC-292) inside containment. The= l penetration for the refueling pool to the purification loop consists of a L Safety Class 2 manually operated. gate valve (PC-257) _inside containment and a l- ' Safety Class _2 manually operated gate valve (PC-258) outside contalment. The- containment isolation valves-are normally closed during power operations, ! The valves are opened in the refueling mode when the refueling pool requires filling and-purification, i L
. . - .- - - - - . - . - .. - . - - _ - - . . . - - . . . - - _ _ ~ . - . - .
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. .S PL 8 Open item 9.1.3-7:
The applicant must identify all automatic system functions. Primary l- functions, such as isolation on low flow in the system or in one train, and
- high temperature, should be identified, i.
Response to Open item 9.1.3-1: l ! The PCPS provides one automatic function (whichLis located in the purification
)ortion of the system). Both ion exchangers are automatically bypassed on a ligh temperature signal to valves PC-400 and PC 401. This provides overtemperature protection for the refueling pool ion exchanger resin, in the i
event that the temperature of the spent fuel cooling water exceeds the temperature at which the ion removal capability of the resin is adversely 4 affected. This is described in Amendment J of CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.2.2.5, Pool Demineralizers. All other valves in the PCPS are manually operated. Both the pool purification pumps and the pool cooling pumps are controlled
- manually.
e
- Per ABB-CE response to Confirmatory Item 9.1.3 2, a detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was developed for the safety-related spent fuel pool-cooling system. This FMEA will be included in the next Amendment to CESSAR DC as Table 9.1-3.- This table. analyzes potential failure modes that exist within
! the system, down to faulty instrumentation. When necessary, the table-provides on an individual basis what valves need to be isolated in order to i compensate certain failure modes. This includes low flow and high temperature
- situations.
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l I l 1 SPLS NRC Open item 9.1.3 8 The applicant should provide an analysis of the effect of spent fuel pool suction connection location on the pumps when the pool is at its minimum level. Response to NRC Open item 9.1.3-8 The PCPS suction piping is located highar than 14 feet above the stored fuel. All other piping in the s)ent fuel pool or refueling pool is either located above, or has a siphon breaker Tole located above the pool cooling suction piping. The net positive suction head available (NPSHA) has been calculated for the spent i fuel pool cooling pumps and the pool purification pumps. The calculations were based gn the minimum pool level as stated above and the maximum pool temperature of 180 f. The maximum pool temperature is based on a single active failure in the cooling train with a full core offload with 10 years of irradiated fuel in the pool, as specified in CESSAR-DC Section 9.1.3.1.4. NPSHA for the pool cooling pumps was calculated to be 26 feet and NPSHA for the pool purification pumps was calculated to be 42 feet based on the above conditions. 1
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? V i 1-J t-1 SPLB [ NP.C Open Item 9.1.3-9 The applicant should identify in CESSAR Sections 9.1.3.1.4 and 9.1.3.2.1 the
- borated makeup water source for the pool, as_well as-the non. safety related source I of nonborated water used to make up for evaporation losses from the pool during1 j normal operation, discussed in Section 9.1.3.2.1. Also, the applicant should-j_ identify the building housing the system, referred to in Section 9.1.3.2.1.~
f Response to NRC Open Item 9.1.3 9-1 -
- The borated makeup water source for the spent fuel pool is the boric acid storage l tank located in'the-CVCS. Borated water from the1 boric acid storage tank is
! delivered to the pool via a connection to the boric-acid makeup pumps. The flow j path from the boric acid storage tank to the spent fuel-pool is shown in CESSAR-DC Figure 9.3.4 1, Sheet 2 of 4 (Area a.6), and CESSAR.DC- Figure 9.1-3 (Area' G 2) . } l The Demineralized Water Makeup System supplies normal, non. safety grade, j nonborated water to the spent fuel pool'to provide makeup for evaporation losses e during normal operation. - CESSAR.DC Section 9.2.3 provides information on the. Demineralized Water Makeup System and its' interfaces.with other plant systems. l l The pool cooling portion of the PCPS is located in'the reactor building subsphere, e The two cooling trains are physically separated.- The nuclear annex houses the [ purification portion of the PCPS, with the exception of the piping and valves required within containment which enable the PCPS to purify the refueling pool.
- Both the nuclear annex and the reactor building subsphere are Seismic Category I l structures and provide protection from the-effects of natural-phenomena
- and i missiles. Refer to general arrangement drawings in CESSAR-DC Section 1.2 for the j location of the spent fuel pool-and individual =PCPS components.
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Reactor Systems Branch JJW ER TYrf TITLI PRARH e 8 04.2,1 1 COL ITIN The COL applicant must perform the on-line fuel fatture monitoring and post-treadiation SEXB surveillance to detect anomalies, e a 06.3.7-1 COL ITDi The COL spplicant will periodically test the safety injection system in accordance with SRXS I31 seguiremente of ASME Section XI. e e 04.2.b1 CONP ITDi The applicant should provide the fuel design acceptonce esiterte es ITAAC to be certified SRXB for System 80e fuel design.
/ /04.4.6.3 1 CONP ITIN The staff will em!!re that an ITAAC is developed to include testing and calibration of SRXB the inadequate core cooling (ICC) system.
e e 06.3.8-1 CONP ITD1 The applicant enast ccanit to e preoperational testing program and an ITAAC program for - ggxg safety injection, ee C6.7.1 1 CONY ITDI 7t e staff will confirm that acceptable TS are sutanitted for the EDS (including the RCGVS SRXB and RDS) et all operating adodes. e # 0(.7.k-1 CONP ITIN The applicant must provide en evaluation confirming that 1720 RPe (250 pota) criterion SRXB precludes e direct containment heating challenge, e d 04.3.2 1 OPEN ITIM The staff requires that the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) be non postrive et all SRXB operating conditions. e e 04.3.2*2 CPEN ITD1 The applicant must provide justafacetion to shoe that the calculated neutron fluence LRXB complies with 10 CPR 50.61. e e 04.4.4-1 OPEN ITTM The applicant should provide e description of the software design for the digital core SRXB protection calculater and CfA calculator. 05.e.3.1-1 OPEN ITIN The applicant must provide the analysis demonstrating that the plant as designed is SRXB capable of achieving cold shutdown per BTP RSS 5-1. t / ( A 5.4.3.1-2 CPEN ITIN The applicant is required to include e boron mixing test in the ITAAC program to SRXB demonstrate e satisfactory baron mizing under natural circulation. e a 05.4.3.2*1 OPEN ITIN The appilcant should state that the valve position indicators for 4 isolation valves SRXB inside containment and 2 Ime outalde containment will be provided in the control room. 05.4.3.2-2 OPEN ITEM The applicant le requested to evaluate design end procedure improvements for overpressure SRKB protection of the shutdown caoling system. 05.4.3.2 3 OPEN ITIN The applicant must provide technical justifications for the deviations from BTP RSB 5*1. SRXB e e 05.4.3.2-4 OPEN ITIN The staff to reviewing the applicant's report that addresses the staff's concerne on SRXB intersystem LOCA issues. The staff will include its evaluation in the FSER. 05.4.3.4+1 OPEN ITIN The applicent le requested to address the durability of the SCS pump for long term SRXB operation, e e 05.4.3.5-1 OPEN ITDi L.e applicant submitted en interim report on May 15, 1992, addressing shutdown and SRXB low-power risk. The statt has not completed its review of this report. a e 05.4.3.5 2 OPEN ITDi The staff will review the responses to RAls Q440.140 through Q440.151 in the TSTR. SEXB e
- 06.3.1-1 OPEN ITEM The applicent is requested to redesign the RPSI pumps so that they offer a wider operating SRXB range that would provide increased injection flow at icwer RCS pressures, e e 06.3.2 1 OPEN ITD1 The applicant must provide justification and addrene the intersystem LOCA concerne as ERXB stated in SECT 90-016 and RAI Q440.45.
/ 06.3.3-1 CPEN ITIN The applicent should provide the design criterte for the SI minimum recirc. flow and SRXB provide pump operating date or test results demonstrating operability at low recire, flow.
06.7.1-1 OPEN ITDI The applicant must submit emergency procedure guidelines on the RCGVS for staff review. SRXB e e 06.7.1-2 OPEN ITEM The applicant should specify the required flow cepecity of RCCVS and provide an ITAAC, SRXB e e 06.7.2-1 OPEN ITIN The applicant must justify that the 10 minute deley in tripping the RCPs is conservative SRXB when determining the else of the RDS valves. 06.7.2-2 OPEN ITIN The applicant should specify the required flow cepecity of RDS and provide an ITAAC.
/ /06.7.2-3 OPEN ITDt The applicant must provide en evaluation showing high evettability of RDS when being SRXB SRXB utilised for severe accident saltigetton.
06.7.2-4 CPEN ITDi The applicant must submit emergency procedure guidelines on the RDS for staff review. SRXB e e 15.1-1 OPEN ITD1 The oppittant should provide e discussion of the doppler reactivity feedback functions. SRXB MTCs and control rod worthe for the transiente and occidents analysed in the CESSAR
/ 15.1-2 OPEN ITD1 The statistical convolution method hee not been approved by the staff. Fuel failure must SRXB be assumed for all rods not meeting the 95/95 DNBR limit.
$ / 15.1-3 OPEN IfD1 The applicant must provide e complete list of designs that deviate from the EPRI IfRD SRXB requirements and provide justification addressing the adequacy of the deviettona.
/s e 15.1*4 OPEN ITD1 The 3 second 140P deley time may result in a f ailure to tranter ECCS loads. Also the real SRXB time grid conditions may change over time and not always meet the time delay.
/ 15.1-5 OPEN ITDt The applicant must provide e discussion of each of the transient and accident analyses and SRXB justify that they meet GDC 17
/ 15.2.2-1 QPEN ITDt The staff concludes that the applicant's loss of condenser vacuum analysis is not SRXB acceptable, e e 15.3.1-1 OPEN ITD1 The applicant must provide e discussion of the SLB analysts calculational method that
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SRXB determines the peaking factor of 150 and justify the conservatism of this value. V e
- 15.3.1* 2 OPEN ITD1 The applicant must reenelyne the SLB and post LOCA long term cooling events taking credit SEXB of only eefety grade systems.
e e 15.3.2-1 OPEN ITEN If 3 second LOOP deley is not accepted by the staff, the applicent will be required to SRXB 15.3.5-1 reenelyse the feedwater line break event assuming a LOOP inunediately ef ter turbine trip. OPEN ITD1 The applicant must justify that the velves in the letdown. Instrumentation and sample SRXB lines are quellfied to be isolated upon demand durins letdown line break conditions, e e 15.3.6-1 OPEN ITD1 The applicant must perform a sensitivity study and demonstrate that lar p break LOCAs with SRXB the merimum SI flow is the limiting case for System 80+. *
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- 15.3.8-1 OPEN ITD1 The applicant should evaluate the potentist benefit of mitigetton features for potentist SRXB containment bypass due to e steem generator tube rupture event.
N M ER TYPE TITLE tug;g 15.3.8 2 OPEN 171}$ The applicant must provide 4 technical basis for steep generei.or overfilling prevention SRx) during a pteam generatcr tube rupture. OF 20.1-05 OPEN ITD1 !seue A-26 w!11 be addressed in the FCER. SRX3 20.2-07 OPEN ITD1 The applicant should provide adequate test date to demonstrate the K58 seal integrity or EMB provide e diverse seal injection system. O e 20.2 12 OPEN ITD1 Tr.e applicant must revise the 73 for LTOP by reducing the uilowable outage time for a En3 single thannel from 7 days to 24 hours in H1 DES 3 and 6 au stated in GL 90-06. e 9 20.2-13 OPEN ITD1 The staff will evaluate the oppilcant's shutdown risk evaluation report against the ggx3 guldence provided in the staff's draft report when the appiteent's report is received, e e 20.2-14 OPEN ITD1 The applicant must address interfacing system LOCA requiremente es discussed in SECT SRXJ 90-16. p e 20.3-1 OPEN ITD1 10 Cllt 30.34(f) (TMI) requirements II.K.3(2) and !!!.D.1.1 will be addressed in the T$ER. SRXB 4 A D d d l l l l a
Sf' x 8 Conf item 4een: 4 4 4.J - l The staff will confirm that an ITAAC is developed to include testing and calibration of the inadaquate core cooling (ICC) system. Resoonse ITAAC for testing and cahbration of the inadequate core cooling (ICC) system will be submitted to NRC separately under the System 80+ ITAAC submittal schedule. 4
s SRXB Qoen item 5.4.3.1-2 j The applicant is required to include a boron mixing test in the ITAAC program to demonstrate a satisfactory mixing under natural circulation. ABB CE Response
- A boron mixing test under natural circulation conditions will be performed during the startup test program as described in CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.4.23. This test is performed after fuel load, during power ascension testing, and therefore would not be part of the ITAAC program, which would be completed prior to fuel load.
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1 Open Item Number 6.3.3-1: The applicant should provide the design criteria for the SI minimum recirculation flow and provide pump operating data or test results demonstrating operability at low recirculation flow. ABB-CE's Responset The design minimum flow rate of 85 to 105 gpm for the SIS pumps was set based on critoria for pump and system protection, include the following considerations for operation at reduced flow:
- 1) limiting the fluid temperature rise across the pump due to reduced efficiency
- 2) radial thrust limitations
- 3) system pressure limitations due to the higher head
- 4) optimizing performance
- 5) review of existing equipment and systems The criteria presented above have been evaluated based on extended operation at miniflow for a minimum of 36 hours. This time is consistent with the performance requirements of the System 80 High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps and far exceeds the expected time at minimum flow operation for the spectrum of System 80+ LOCA events. The analyses presented in chapter 6 of CESSAR-DC show that RCS pressure is reduced below the corresponding pump head much sooner than 36 hours, allowing an increase in flow above minimum flow for all design bases events.
The SIS pumps have been tested at miniflow in several ABB-CE designed plants. The report from this test shows that the pumps have been operated successfully with miniflow rates as low as 35 gpm. The pump vendors at that time endorsed a related maximum life for the pump seals of 720 hours of continuous or 60 hours of intermittent use. In addition, a survey was conducted to determine the frequency and duration of the safguard pumps operation at miniflow in existing plants. The result of this survey revealed no seal problems for operating time of up to 45 hours at miniflow operation. However, since these tests and reports, the pump vendors have revised their position on the minimum recommended pump flow. They have recommended significantly higher values, but have agreed that the SIS pumps will operate satisfactorily with a minimum flow of 85 to 105 gpm. Based on the above criteria including past performance of the HPSI pumps, the same miniflow rate has been specified for System 30+ with the operational requirement of a minimum of 36 hours. The operation of the pumps at minimum flow will be verified and is included in the draft submittal as item number 16 of ABB-CE's ITAAC.
sRXB Open item 6.7.2-3: The applicant must provide an evaluation showing high availability of RDS when being utilized for severe accident mitigation. Response to Open item 6.7.2-3: The issue of RDS availability for severe accident mitigation will be addressed in the Level 2 PRA report which will be issued in January.
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