ML20059B040
| ML20059B040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1993 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059B027 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1432 NUDOCS 9310280012 | |
| Download: ML20059B040 (600) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:o _- - , l System 80+ vs. STS Differences T.S. # 1.1 System 80+ has the following additional definitions: Kn-1 Mid-Loop Reduced RCS Inventory 1 9310280012 931011 EO ' PDR ADOCK 05200002 P A PDR bj
CESSAR nai"icnica 1,6.1.2 1.0 USE AND APPLICATIONS ( 16.1.2.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS NOTE The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and% Bases. Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a techmeal shification
%T -wheeh-prescribes Required Actions to be taken undu designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.
AXI AL 0!!A". E INOSWAASI) shall be the power AXIAL SHAPE INDEX [AU generated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core divided by the sum of these powery gcecetted Ja j %e jaa t- M1 oyer kalses er +Ls. c we . i **' ' """*# ASI = lower + upper AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (ThAZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T) shall be the power asymmetry between azimuthally symmetric fuel assemblies. CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment,
, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds '
a 4'%idt the necessary e and accuracy to known values of the parameter the channel monitors. The ; CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire 7,by, J channel, including the'sensorg alarm,and/pc trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL
- FUNCTIONAL TESTJrtreHANNWOIL u ' ' _
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m -me summe, as mmrateo. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1 1 Amendment 1 16.1-1 December 21,1990
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4 CESSAR EnMICATI@N l Dermitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Term Definition CllANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative l assessmentjof channel behavior dunng operatioQ Qbservation/This determination shallIEEide, where possible comparison of the channel indication andthr
~
status other indicatiocs and(or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated .<- Ad al signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm 9a#erjtrip functioD[iaterloc r, cf; y/49 og (c.j.; pr<ssare sM, thes -
7 yd 5Mck o.:bcis\ b. Bistable channegthe injection of a simulated oc 4 JI signalinto the %to verify OPERABILITY,
/
meluding alarm and3qf trip functions; or-At Me iu &. x,jsa- u% as gegg c. Digital computer channels - the er::iing of,4be io fe_si digital computer hardware usinaggnostic s programs ahne i(edlibn~6f simulated process data into the channel to verify OPEttABILITY, including alarm and$nt trip functions. a n.a;ningieg . m m,-,7 c = = = r:.~ 4 .--.1,. he CIIANNEL TL'NCi!ONAb-TEST-may-be perfe ;;d by ny xd;; ef wwimi, ou:s!:pping, or :e: ! ch-m J ueps sudi aiu dic ca1.c sh-m.cl i; fur:"cr!!y :ad. be, pek~ae~c The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST N ~ w'" 1 b adj=:r:,:, = r~7, M de :!==, in:x!;ck, and/or i , * *f
!dp x:ps.a:s sah 0;; i; x:pcia:: = - i^.in ic- se< .es d
~. Se 'or ~lal; l Ch a -w/ _eq=:2n =;dess: =4 ====Ild bord.'ost, L eat;ke t%es /s verlyJp '
.pg [g g, (continued)
SYSTEM S0+ 1.1-2 Amendment I 16.1-2 December 21,1990
. CESSAR !anncum Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Definition Term AINMENT INTEGRITY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist wh :
- a. All penetrations required to be e sed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. Capable of bein losed by an OPERABLE tamment automatic isolation val , or
- 2. Closed manual valves, blind flanges, or d tivated automatic valves secured in eir closed positions, except when pened under administrative control as provided in LCO 3.6.3;
- b. equipment hatches are closed and scaled;
- c. Each nnel lock is OPERABLE pursuant to LCO 3.6.
- d. The contammen eakage rates are within the limits of LCO 3.6. and
- e. The sealing mechanism ayiated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.
l
' (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-3 Amendment Q 16.1-3 June 30,1993
- - ~ - -~ -- --------.-------------- - - - - -
CESSAR!al%mo Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Infinition IEm CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or
/ CORE ALTERATION manipulation of any fuel, sources, hr reactivity control.cq.*Ms, e r-de,-" components [ excluding CEAs withdrawn intoppper guide '*--
__f structu@within the reactor vessel with the vesset neaa dect.h) vvyL.1l } removed and fuelin the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe e-91w position. ne COLR is the unit specific document that provides CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) core operating limits for the current reload cycle. Rese cycle specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.9.1.6. Plant opention within these core operating limits is addressed in individual Specifications. _ {
-BtVisiON ~~ m - c -. - - . u wuv- , . o.p AC yu.m. . Dim.w m Jw iughea ievei of sepcM
.od maymdm c DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/ gram) M alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotropic mixture of I-131 I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. He thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, ' Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and g ~ ' g ^,
TeTs Reactor Sites *Cf r h hs* ri bk. M f h y m q Gih Ic3,deJ.L,tNc, W1*73 E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the E - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than (ISMutes, mahng up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-4 Amendment K 16.1-4 October 30,1992
1 CESSAR nn%uiw 1 1 9 Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) 1e,n:1 Definition ES ;: ENGINEERED SAFETY TheENGINEERED 5arci s' FEATURE RESPONSE FEATURF3RESPONSE TIME TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitoral parameter exceeds its Yactuation setpoint at the gf p/ camd sensor until the ESP equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays,where applicable. The response time may be measured 4 b any,$/fdES: of sequential, overlapping, or total st ps mmh that the entire response time is measured. mea *S of ESRMATEL uru fiCAL i'OsuiON a caicuintea set of r- t _ g u. - - 4/v. - -- ' 1.: if...m. n .ii m w r--. C Q i.0)
-fEEP)
-IDENTIFICO LEAKAGE 0 LEAKAGE-iDENiiiiEL.-
Ky., Km is the K effective calculated by considering the actual CEA configuration and assuming that the fully or partially inserted full-strength CEA of the highest mserted worth is fully withdraw 11. LEAKAGE-! DEN!T"!EO- 4DEP"FIEO- LEAKAGE shall be: c1. T. hat he.t LEAKME y, t . =---g. - , m i nv. .mLEAKAGE, T & 6d ;j. r, such as$ ump seahor valve M ",.*"b gekingWake, that A captured and conducted to c,LaLay
% a Sump or collecting tank,pc (wpt 8CP Ake el,4 d:.a u
leAkN) (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-5 Amendment Q 16.1-5 June 30,1993 t . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CESSAR nainum. i s Defmitions 1.1 Term Definition MARAGE LEAKAGE-!OE!!TII'IED- y. 2. Lenkage into the containment atmosphere from (continued) sources that aie both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation LauftV of Joab te detection systemsfor not to be PRE 6&URE COUismRi LEAKAGE, or fnuare 3..,.cle q m v.3 . Reactor Coolant Syste through a steam C5 genera theAcondaryfystemg,
-t-EAKAGEfRE55URE RRESSL"tE BOUNDiuu 1.nAKAGc snau oc learage, pntivnpov . 77: -- ;- --e~ e n t ;e, 2 c ,:, , ,,_
isnlable fault in a Rwtnr N'- ' Sph = wy d-2 _ b sy, pig,; ==", :: "-~~' " A h tAsJc.ft.TicJ 4)
.-EEAY: AGE-Univen inito v.,. ., . .. ..~ LEAKAGE;sh H-be sIl leakage which is not IOCB""FIED LEAKAGE. l Q & ideslfifst)
MID-LOOP Plur -PWR condition with fuel in the reactor vessel and reactor [, coolant level below the top of the hot legs at their junction with the reactor vessel. MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, m o qe, antf reactor coolant temperature,yified in Table 1.1-1p sa'M -foel . c..,4 rod-r wasJ ks. A cinac beh %A.4 { q,Jg us se ( ,
- v. . . . .~ 2E- Me OFFSIE3 DOSE CALCL"_^'".ON ?L'J"JAL-CALCUL/. EON !L*J!UAL (ODCf.') 4=?' ;;;' ' 'le Mi^d^'^gy P"d p-~'- -
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- . la ic ::.1:&t!~- ^! nfM** ^^~ ~~?tir; !som
_.. Aise ua gu. rd !!q"id e a's.=,
- b. In 1: *"!-*H cf g- me liquia emuent ia m;u.ms J-m/: iip cpoint, .='
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-6 Amendrnent Q 16.1-6 June 30,1993
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CESSAR nn%mou l
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Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Term Definition
-eFFSITE-DOSE-~
a L- 1: Ocetr cf in iv.. -- ei Rmiiviugical CALCUL'.T,0N I4ANUAL P ^9 ?.:;; S .r .- l
,fi
! -(wa _ d)- A system, subsystem, division,%smponent or device
/ OPERABLE - OPERABILITY shall be OPERABLE,= be OPEP ^."LITb when it 4gb is capable of performing its specifieMetion(s)3 and when all necessary attendant instrjytation, controls, ae~t . r-e.u ge-g electrical poger seums, cooling os seal water, lubrication,pr other auxiliary equipment that are required r for the system, subsystem, divisionicomponent or device 4 b. <
cg;,g .F to perform its%ction(s) are also capable of performing 1 their related support function (s). PilYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to l l { measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the ra.ctor core and related SE?'$fn.;-J Sd are: l 1 l ' qg 7tese Tests L LL T<+rE'fya a. Described in Chapter 14, of'CESSAR-DC'
- b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or hdea h yl+f*rf
- c. Otherwise approved by thetommission.
-Piu.55URE BOU6DimY h LEAKAGE-FRESSURE BOUND /a5 i
LE *.KAGB-. i (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ 1.1 7 Amendment I I 16.1-7 December 21,1990 1
CESSAR nainunou
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l Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) he A*Ac1cd PROC-ESS CO?TTROL PROCESS muis .nv . nvunnm trurj - ~m
-PROGRAM :he ca._: fe. , ---.ittrg, analyses, tests, and-d""r ";.nge;.f
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A4D O PR1550&E. p ~m .. --- - (ossen on ' d" - M i;~--= i O g of L J ei - I e ~LJ 7 FMMATOG. M w a .5
>cr'r) nii! te ue .L.L ' in n .2 way as = __ __e _
cc ,,L.m. ..u.10 CFR T a 20,61, mod 71, 5mm regulet m , L m.. ..m J .,m. a, d e^J.cz
- qs.,; ; ;c=H ; it d:--! cf n'M i Jb .a.
wasW-RATED THERMAL POWER RATi,i) TriETddAL Puvv EMRTP)tshall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of (RTp} [3914]MWt. l , itP 5 REACTOR PROTECTION The REACTOR Pom.-..va e a aiuM RESPONSE , SYSTEh RESPONSE TIME TIME shall be that time interval from whenh gP S monitored parameter exceeds its' trip setpoint at the channel sensor until electrical power h !rM_fd to the c,&./ efar, (RPS Asen blic> (CEA%tive mechnnisor Is MerofTcci. TM re sp4c 1.h a r sesweed was af my redes o f seputskI,, cuer , ,,
-REACTOR SIIIELD= aE ' CTOR S._ P " BL9LDIMC INTE-ORffY 64/ s. ,
-BUEDING INTEGRITY -and cust when: W e ,,,f/u f, f &c 4 m.
Each door in each access orv.aing is closed is be,in[used for except when nbreal transit entrytheat.d access exit, th opening /at least one door - be closed; and
- b. He Annulus V ion System is OPERABLE; and
- c. ne.4aling mechanism associa ith each etration (e.g., welds, bellows, or - s)is OPERABLE.
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-8 Amendment N 16.1-8 April 1,1993
_ _ _ _ _ _. _ . . . _..._. _. _._ . . .- . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _. _ . _ . . _ . . ~ . . . 9 Ic . i -F (cea S 7 , k f 4 PTLL a. L i k ,> p g l Kf 44-p>b % A pww a spLw FL, , AM fety J wELv ,a.tw, f A w,J i vwb- vaaf w pal . % p~ + J I
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l CESSARnnh a l i F Definitions 1.1 , 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Term Definition Plar REDUCED RCS INVENTORY FWR condition with fuel in the reactor vessel and reactor K coolant level lower than three feet below the reactor vessel flange.
-REPORTAP,LE EVENT '. "EPORTA"LE EVE!TT ,L:l k ou, of ie.;.
z~A:':- gx;f.cd la 10 CFR 50.73. , 5DM SHUTDOWN MARGIN (sow . SHLTDO" }" ADSW shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is suberitical or ! would be suberitical from its present condition assuming: x "a ?-;.g; g.;.. Mg i g ;;;;agt CE.'Comkv\ nnet~.L\-~^ M g qf All full shTEAs)(shutdown and lK regulating) are fully inserted except for the single CEA of highest reactivity worth which is D hyMassumed ed $94) to be fully withdrawn.14rwW whk wi r' LE ifc,A Qt A5 ,
-GITFrBOUNDdY Tk ';lTE BOUNDARY . :l L 1 ; S:: bry- A k;-k ik,t A1 m,;,k - nwn~t o m i--- g , ;;7 ;;;;;;; u ; , j
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ST u G e r D TE w ?W 5 ~- -* .I^^ N'."5.m .^..".;k".;.u" "x"..f "'x" Y: _r"r". E TIIERM AL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant. TRAIN- A --' d Ja'y-re! tM cc.c.;,or.ca:: i:t p de m - r- 9 y L ;.vu. T...as 6.fu.uuus Imiundam funuivos are- K i T4 2YSie*lf@4fic;". 7 =d L'.id.; .i;;lly 'rTr'"" !O '-h l e h.u. umswIf tu Inhurc IDUCPCnucut gma su.a. LOC O,-
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UNiDENTtFtED i EaGCE SEE LEA!E^.CE UF!OENEFIFD. SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-9 Amendment K 16.1-9 October 30,1992
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CESSAR 8alinema 1 Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) Term Definition h1. o m---- nn nen v.i. ,v.r,-c. .m,. o. ..r.--r n m. m.11Nnnnnen,,,,..u-n
- m---m-..,4s - mnn. unavini,- ru nnunu
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- 1.;,2ddLv..mm.Jp.ux,::&d!:;Slt.
{ SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-10 Amendment I 16.1-10 December 21,1990
CESSAR Enhuou f Definitions 1.1 1.1 DEFINITIONS (continued) l TABLE 1.1-1 MODES l 1 MODE REACTIVITY % RATED " / COOLANT lK i CONDITION, ( TilERMAL POff!R TEMPERATURE'F l i s ' 1 2 0.99 2 350 2 2 0.99 <5 2 350 3 < 0.99 NA 2 350 4 < 0.99 NA 350 > T , > 210 5 <0. NA s 210 6* / s 0.95 NA N s 135 ,
- Fue he reactor vessel with one or more of the vessel head closure s less than l Iy tensioned.
K
- Excluding Decay lleat.
Su su+ A scid . SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-11 %J Amendment K 16.1-11 October 30,1992
, Q;)m+ , ~[$l$/ul.l-I c lC l~ A Definitions i 1.1 l
Table 1.1-1 (page 1 of 1) MODES i s )
% RATED AVERAGE REACTOR REACTIVITY THE COOLANT l MODE TITLE CONDITION POWERa(i TEMPERATURE {
(k,,,) (*F) i l 1 Power Operation e 0.99 >5 NA l i 1 2 Startup a 0.99 s5 NA 3 Hot Standby < 0.99 NA a [350] 4 HotShutdown(b) < 0.99 NA [350] > T,,, > [200] ! 5 Cold Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA s [200] 6 RefuelingIC) NA NA NA l l I (a) Excluding decay heat. (b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. (c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned. 4 EOG STs_ 1.1 Re; 0, 0^/28/92-
s CESSAR Maincum 16.1.2.2 1.2 LOGICAL CONNECTORS
;.C dhi NN d bfE' M *C V 1.ogical Connectors i.2 m s c9P+ -
I 1.2 LOGICAL CONNECTORS [ .
-- e mw se e u ~ c v e m e. w w .3 a t to M ;
__(ps) PURPOSE Logical connectors are used inTechnical.$pecificationgto discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditigns,. Required Actions # Surveillance; ne only logical connectors sAliibli appear in M&! rp"H92:s e 6N_Q and. QE. The physical arrangement of these conrectors constitute logical onventions
]c.9hh, with specific meaning. gia.
n i-'rt cf 'E =tka s to ju=^ mecific examntes of Inp-at ac_muts.; r.ad. carW the-in' ended a.wa.,2 -
~ 3useas (s,, +0ub4 su d (A-B p .
EXAMPLES Example 1 demonstrates th,at for Condition A. both Required Actions t be d shows that completd. In this case, th\ logical connector AND is left justified [d, both Required Action A.1 a d Required Action A.2 must be satisfie equal weight.
/
Examtsle 1: CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. f A.1 / Restore ...
^N 57 '
4-L 4 b /
/
A.2 Be in ...
/
Example 2 is a more complex use of logical onnectors. In this example, Required Action A.1, to restore, or Required Action A) , to align, or Required Action A.3.1, to verify, are alternate choices. If A.3. is chosen, an additional requirement, indicated by'the nested (indented) 1 ical connector AND, is imposed. uireinent is met by choosing A. 2.1 or A.3.2.2. This additional req / The nested positi6n of the logical connector QE indi ates that A.3.2.1 and A.3.2.2
\
are alternate an'd equal choices, one (but not both) of which has to be performed. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-12 Amendment I 16.1-12 December 21,1990
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CESSAR Ensi"ication i Logical Connectors 1.2 . 1.2 LOGICAL CONNECTORS EXAMPLES In addition topos the \ ition of the logical connectors e alphanumeric system is (continued) also used to provide'the proper interpretation of R uired Actions. In Example 2, the letter A identifies'that all of these Required ions apply to Condition A. - De - first number after the letter A (in this case 1 or or 3) indicates a group of equal n like manner, A.3.1 and A.3.2 are (continued) alternate act}9ns for Condition A. two Required Actions in ys same group link by a logical connector. Required Actions in the sa group are indi sted by the same first digit and sequential seccnd digits. U. g this logic, equired Actions A.3.2.1 and A.3.2.2 are in the same subgroup use they ha e the same first and second digits, and sequential third digits. Hat ese two uired Actions have the same first digit as in A.3.1 above indicates the, two uired Actions are also part of the A.3 - j group. 4 I Examrile 2: l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION i i A. A.1 . Restore ... j [ .2 Align .. .
- 0 L L
.X t
A.3. Verify ... AND A.3.2 I pduce ...
\
/ "
/
/ A.3.2.2 Redu\ ct . .
/ \
- / I 1.1-13 l SYSTEM 80+ 1 l i Amendment I 16.1-13 December 21,1990 l l 1
o _ _ k
- CESSAR88L m.
a i f r s 16.1.2.3 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES j j.O CA G M M O U d Completion Times 1.3 y C*/3 ' 1.3 f0MPT FTION TNFL. . %4 cid4 , Wh;; ; L uuimi; Coud.nvu fu. Cmonvu (LCC) i: : ' -' TrMd j PURPOSE ) Sp ;;.".;.nvu. .J uni, Nuud A nvu. hkL m ; L seu.ek;vd mJuu oymind am;a. /m w.d;;--=.ndL g f iv vuiam meamng os compicuva Tie .. uw-y [07 ;oa pI'. L;0 Y."h 10 .,,.gu.awmsu6a v[ wc TN9Picai SptNi[ivai.voo. - f l 44Wk. '
'The purpose of tbs section is to E3s the ' ' - - Completion Times,_ set
' ., WWWkrir mnnre m, iae c.onvedon cexd b provide
% \A d o wt t, QC fh (x5 6 . .
e--- C.e 4 w9 t CNT4GN T)e Completion Time is the a com .su-JO unt of time o allgwed $s[jett discoverld t ::U
" ag'equired Action.
TfWE-~ M is referenced to the time _
) ' ' "
Required Actions must be completed prior to Skad-J pgmh 1toO e.; ..J .ud;s ;1 __ ,- (A-/. the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An Actions Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions :- b;;!::f a6 until the Condition no longer exists,.If ip,more than one Condition at a / .Qwith, ( ( gy.M { o, * " .4 6 go a smgie I CO (rnultiple Co g, the Reqmred Actions for each Condition must (a time 3
,c. ,1N 1
e ik be performed within the a Completion Time,assoetetcd mi 1.i Coud.nvu. 4+ r g u ._ When in multiple Conditions, separate Completion Times are tracked for each I ,w g , f gg %.:4^" Condition, 3T p;; :!y y....;; C =p!-%r T- n;r;;L;dfor'h ~ ~ M. # %* ,s g S*epl' 9 T C::me:: =h;; a ;; ;.a =;= ^- ^-- S ec McM(A-2.}. I RJ h w-
$.W' TL; fe!!c-me, u.mpia siiustrate me use vi Cvmpk;.es Tia ;; 2:1 J;ffs. ; :;p of en uit;~.e u C- ' c- u-
" Sn GLf.ey_E? T ( [ [
(continued) ~ -- . 5^g*- SaxG.2cuw D Lto s s p . c muu% nguiremods C.e e asuri % t I cm alicm o4 % ue d. "Ib. hC'T ICMS me.dMe d w f D M-i Lco sbk Coatbs && 49(u,d y desn h de 9 s wt Lto c3 x Sa,d 4e he, ik dith 4t vtjuivfme.d$ o& mek. htti(Hd M fod sMel GM A are. hun d A c A ( y .2mit o g \e A m a , l l i r i SYSTEM B0+ 1.1 14 Arnendment I 16.1-14 Decernber 21,1990
N&$ u Nel'N
' ' G.3., m9,4 eg J u e + u% 6,b) M <eglm eam-% AC h e C.J L g unWs3 e4,ma. spdfnd ,
p b t1e A uwrf U l's a MobE or sy dffed Cod / Men doled ad N 7
%g h cMh d A Lco. _._.
e.- t tod t Y N ee n e nkt ab , s dJ s e} ue h nin s , su bsyslfm.S, Coqcnewh, c c turdts 01tpr4W 6 k dl ; " '~ ((}- NuopesLUt or nO- yin h* b# . 1
% (odc hh, uwltss :>pecMic" N } Sb *d * *--
'F" M g k A m to A 4 Jo -em A cShad E'b'% - -
g 4 % W h s bea t i o n. idbd eA IA ** C*^dr1% However, when a subseouent train, subsystem, component, or ' variable expressed in the Condition is discovered to be __. 2 N inoperable or not within limits, the Completion Time (s) may (py3) be extended. To apply this Completion Time extension, two __ criteria must first be met. The subsequent inoperability:
- a. t exist concurrent with the first inoperability; _
- b. Must remain inoperable or not within limits after the -
first inoperability is resolved. The total Completion Time allowed for completing a Required Action to address the subsequent inoperability shall be limited to the more restrictive of either:
- a. The stated Completion Time, as measured from the initial entry into the Condition, plus an additional 24 hours; or
- b. The stated Completion Time as measured from discovery of the subsequent inoperability.
The above Completion Time extensions do not apply to those Specifications that have exceptions that allow completely separate re-entry into the Condition subsystem, component, or variable expr(essed in thefor each train, Condition) and separate tracking of Completion Times based on this re-entry. These exceptions are stated in individual Specifications. The above Completion Time extension does not apply to a Completion Time with a modified ' time zero." This modified
' time zero' may be expressed as a repetitive time (i.e.,
~/ 'once per 8 hours," where the Completion Time is referenced from a previous completion of the Required Action versus the time of Condition entry) or as a time modified by the phrase
'from discovery . . ." Exam Time]ple1.3-3illustratesoneuseof h g ompletion Time
CESSAR na??ication i i MSk"
- d *
- Ces Mmou1 ba Q Co A ;'"-
g,,a kd dd;W a$ +escoplGS 4 y p.s 6+
/
f l
/ Completion Times 1.3 i
1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued)
%' EXAMPLE 1.3.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Actiong B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated ,
AND- l Completion Times not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Condition B has two Required Actions,$ach Required Action has its own separate Completion Time. Ear' Completion Time is referenced to the time that Condition B is entered. w'p p The RequiredIctions of Condition B are to be in MODE 3 in d hours AN_p_ in l MODE 5 i36 hours. A total of da bours is allowed W MODE 3 and a
~~
_ f,e n. total of 36 hours (not 42 hours) is allowed te.mdb MODE $ from the time that , Condition B Y entered. If MODE 3 is reached in three hours, the time allowed to : reach MODE 5 is the next 33 hours because the total time allowed to reach MODE 5 is 36 hours. i If Condition B is entered while in MODE 3, the time allowed to reach MODE 5 is the next 36 hours. (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ 1.1 15 l 1 Amendment I 16.1-15 December 21,1990
CESSAR Ennr"ication r t I Completion Times i 1.3 ) 1 1 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued) EXAMPLE 1.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION i TIME l l A.1 Restore pump to 7 days A. One pump inoperable. OPERABLE status. B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 houa C M Completion Time AN_Q I not rnet. B.2 E e in MODE 5. 36 houn 1 When a pump is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. If the pump is not , restored to OPERABLE status within seven days, Condition B is entered and the l Completion Time clocks for Required Acticus B.1 and B.2 start. if the inoperable pump is restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated, i g
'g p as,f i e,eJo\e. Me n+ OEt u4 h #N j When a second pump ke .a.-.wg;g; Cct dit er ^. =!:t :;-' 'y 'r ' i (3,gi e.,. Ab*' 3N UmqwCemeicuvo Tin = er ::'*":'- '^- --4 7" r *"A m '--- c5 1 y ; c % set # x / t% t: ~ -=4 numn wa= det- ' ; ,..LL.-Hemunes LCO 3.0.3 issa #'
" I pa, entered, since the ACTIONS do not include a Condition for tilroinoperable pumps,'
' "I If ea; ef i; sei~. M; p;.np: :: :=:::d i O"E" " 0LC a- ud ie camp +;~ T = f:: i;r;;. ' ';; ber 7" 7 h= ::: =p!::i 'h; LCO =
1 1 0 ' i :le - .; -- y $7 '- :- : . m u
.gvg- He 4.
. . .. . . . _, b*ui b,
gg dupsal Completion Time,for ..- contmues rom the time t'^' !! ' '.c l_ Y---
..r.
p ---
...,__.y A b M t h $ Lurd [4 8
-La be 4mdred Ab '
- l f6Mhile in LCO 3.0.3'/one of the inopge bgumps is restored to OPEpLE l N
, _... . has expired. ei j status and the Completion Time for 1 := - 5 ' 4 --
h LCO 3.0.3 may be exited and operation continued in C_..!~S.. O, h- . M' Ce4Guu m: :d Twu .i; E ._ i: C:- P l 95'#r p %*JAM n.usvu vvuay Time nor Ennena, - A llllG C A p4& Eu a va mv aw...a'...ubh .CC[:
~e 2.,
["
- f (continued) )
I l SYSTEM B0+ 1.1-16 Amendment I 16.1-16 December 21,1990 i
! MAhkTp k Ib - 'b l 1 1Y i l l While in LCO 3.0.3, if one of the inoperable pumps is restored to OPERABLE status and the Completion Time for Condition A i as expired, LCO 3.0.3 may be exited and The operation continued in accordance with Condition B. Completion Time for Condit'on B is tracked from the time the [C C;ndition A Completion Time expired. [,g On restoring one of the pumps to OPERABLE status, the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues This from the time the first pump was declared inoperable. , Completion Time may be extended if the pump restored A 24 hourto i OPERABLE status was the first inoperable pump. l extension to the stated 7 days is allowed, previded this i does not result in the second pump being inoperable for j
> 7 days.
l e h a k P w-es ,- - r-- n+r,r-< - m" e t,'
CESSAR naincum . e o Completion Times q 1.3 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued) EXAMPLE 1.3.3_ ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME u.w.n x A.1 Restore dv- a.sa; ewe e X 7 days A. One coat.nu.;st Sprey division S, c y .'.Yto , y c,hsb 3 inoperable. OPERABLE status. p 2;,,.% a mpf g t.L j v wo 1 B. v.so - One Cer"-U B.1 Restore4c Co aLS, mumut / s ! Coeheg division Couhng train to ^ *:L9 inoperable. OPERABLE status. l r .x duwd rs l One Cc%at.an; C.1 Restore Centummein )(, 72 hours i C.
, gdhion and S Spey train to g -
1 oue a u m.m... m OPERABLE Status. ; i 5ne R. ddw X Cacr.;d. ;!:n 93 f d r.ic.4 i n p m d f. . it." M* RestoreE CcM*u l A re 6 C.2 t umuiy- % kcur3 t 7 , C m_ h c.c m,w) Ceehng train to OPERABLE status. y.M 1 r.c.pe<alt .
' rw c' 2 ]'M ~# Wh r. S P' ~ >:s a.ugdIrom a smgic moperacie oms on to oncjg divst =d c;; Crius ddilson tnoperable, Loadawu A and Cuudaimu o are i,7 eyF. Me .i e . :.e trme 'ne Completion Time for Condition A and Condition
. , B are tracked separately for each division startinE romf the time each division was
"." g ' a , ~ . . declared inoperable.e A separate Completion Time in esutlished for Condition C od.
45 W"t - tracked from the time the second division was declard inoperablej (.re %.e 1r% ,p,( i 4L A Au.;ua:'iCod.%c-C + 4 .- 4. l If Required Action C.2 is completed within the s stied C . npletion Time, Conditions B and C are exited. If the Completio 'io e fa Required Action A.! bas not expired, operation may continue in4Condi.
- Re remaining Completion Time in condition A is measur 4 from the time the affected train was declared inoperable.Q.+. belted ed.g
- A 't. M/e A (continued) i
,/
. +
u(wdau widi '
- .~ . T/pict .%M--
,;t ;r r'
- /
W[p SYSTEM 80+ 1.1 17 Amendment I 16.1-17 December 21,1990
Cc% wi L tLp i G J - r1 A ~$ U A M h a d s w X h v o te's cwd ca bmid'c d c2tasql, m
.wupudh, Wu 8 ud CmalLA 3 ou. ce
+1 W-J The Completion Times of Conditions A and B are modified by a logical connector, with a separate 10 day Completion Time measured from the time it was discovered the LCO was not met. In this example, without the separate Completion Time,
/ it would be possible to alternate between Conditions A, B, h;-(p I and C in such a manner that operation could continue
( indefinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO. ( The separate Completion Time modified by the phrase "from i discovery of failure to meet the LC0" is designed to prevent ! indefinite continued operation while not meeting the LCO. l This Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal
' time zero" for beginning the Completion Time " clock." In this instance, the Completion Time ' time zero" is specified as comencing at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time the associated Condition was entered.
l l 1 I
_ l CESSAR 8anncum
'r Completion Times l 1.3 1.3 COMPLETlON TIMES (continued) ,
EXAMPLE 1.3.4, 1 ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more valves A.1 Restore valv@to 4 hours inoperable.dwe4e- OPERABLE status.
- . !ag B. Required Action B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated Completion Time MQ not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 4. 412[ hours
' tion A may be entered separately for each inoperable valve and C tion Times are .- on a component basis. When a valve is de moperable,
_ > Condition A is enter declared inoperable, Condition
'ts Completion Time sta sMbsequent valves are te each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for eae v.
If the Completion associated with valve (s) in Condition Condition B is enter the valve (s) which caused entry into Condition B are restore o
- O BLE status. Condition B is exited.
A single Completion Time is used for any number of valves inoperable at the same time. The Completion Time associated with Condition A is based on the initial entry into l Condition A and is not tracked on a per valve basis. 1 Declaring subsequent valves inoperable, while Condition A is l still in effcet, does not trigger the tracking of separate ' Completion Times. Once one of the valves has been restored to OPERABLE status, , the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues !
\ from the time the first valve was declared inoperable. The l Completion Time may be extended if the valve restored to l OPERABLE status was the first inoperable valve. The Condition A Completion Time may be extended for up to 4 hours provided this does not result in any subsequent i valve being inoperable for > 4 hours. j.
SYS'. If the Completion Time of 4 hours (including any extensions) expires while one or more valves are still inoperable. -- Condition B is entered. rassessauassctSL a 16.1-18 December 21,1990 l
CESSARunibmu s____ _ _ . sew = _ _ _ _ - . . fqn,deCoMLACMg h dLud E t' ed
\M e < shk WM . - ~ ~ n l
Completion Times 1.3 i 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued) EXAMPLE 1.3.5 ACTIONS s, , CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more valves A.1 Restore valvesto Ne inoperablegue-to OPERABLE status. Cec +Laee T; eMa.. . s '.E p. 4e vu = wuwaaOn bere-- 4 hours B. Required Action B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated
. Completion Time b.@.
q Jr- g \', riot r3C'. , a ,9 , .42 th .e M O D E .1 $2fhours
! [ -
WA abanDte 4. AC7
" 9'"N in 1:INS toMtT!;.:
C:xpk& b a;dwe4AeA _ ".'d 2:f!E: Mhow 4 'M - /( %rMg 'v or each M' ' ' ' . Complekis tracked.+ Condition A k be entered separate
> moperable valve 3 - er, a single Completion Time is r any number of
./ ,
valves inoperable at the same .. The Completion Ti sociated with g 7p o Cond' A and is not tracked on a j" Condition A is based on the initial en component basis. Subsequent valves decla table, while Condition A is still
+. Q ~> in effect for the first valve, do not es - rate com - 'on Times to be tracked.
-l- O r
o
@ jf. , If the Completion Time while ur bours (as measured from initial ent one or more valves are stillinoperable, Conditi is Condition A) e f enter (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ 1.1 19 Amendment I 16.1-19 December 21,1990
~ l l (j_ f f A t 6 hc. /L I-l7 l l l l
\
The Note above the ACTIONS table is a method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked. If this method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked was applicable only to Condition A, the Note may appear in the Condition column. , i The Note allows Condition A to be entered separately for - valve inoperable each basis. When valve, and Completion Times tracked on a per a valve is declared inoperable, - Condition A is entered and its Completion Time starts. If hg subsequent valves are declared inoperable, Condition A is entered for each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each valve. If the Completion Time associated with a valve in i I Condition A expires, Condition 8 is entered for that valve. If the Completion Times associated with subsequent valves in , Condition A expire, Condition 8 is entered separately for , I tracked for each valve.each valve and separate Completion Times start an - If a valve that caused entry into Condition B is restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is exited for that valve. -- Since the Note in this example allows multiple Condition entry and tracking of separate Completion Times, Completion Time extensions do not apply. _ . _ 1 l l i 1 1 I
CESSAR Sini"icarian 4 f ( 1 I Completion Times 4 1.3 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued) I (. i EXAMPLE 1.31 ACTIONS 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMP T1 - h A. One Control A.1 Restore the inoperable 4 rs
. Element Assembly CEAC to OPERABLE Calculator (CEAC) status.
A' inoperable. O_g 4 A.2 V each Ais Once every 4 ; i ' thin 7 inches I hours ' other CEAs in its i
/ group. s ;
l ; B. Required ions B.1 Be in MODE 3. 10 rs wg and -iated l t
$ mpletion Times 8I not met.
M ' i k' Entry into Condition A offers a choice between Required Action A.1 or A.2. ] y Required Action A[~ has a ' hec k' type Completion Time,which qualifies for K . (q " the 25 % extension,1W SR 3.0.2dIf required Action A.1}is followedgand the l , 4 'q Required Action is not met within the Completion Time (including 25% extensio$
- y'- ;a,; itu n; m. , m,s ; . - -'- -
- Condition B is entemd. If required V K s action A.fis followed and the completion time of A hours is not met, condition B q gw is entered.
g i W r L If after entry into Condition B, Required Action A.1 or A.2 is met, Condition B is {A exited and operation may then continue in Condition A. 4 SPECIAL In some cases "Immediately* is used as a Completion Time. In this case the b COMPLETION Required Action shall be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. lK
- F TIMES 4
SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-21 Amendment K I 16.1-21 October 30,1992
~ .. __ ._. _
WLY k fmu 16.I-2.\ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
' A. One channel A.1 Perfom Once per inoperable. SR 3.x.x.x. 8 hours E
~~
A.2 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours k-9 POWER to s 50% RTP. t B. Required 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Action and q associated ~ -- Completion Time not met.
CESSAR nai?icarian ! f l Completion Times 1.3 l 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES (continued) 7 ; EXAMPLE 1.3.1 _ l 110NS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I A. One rh A.1 P;.f..ra. ;.kfdWP de :: u._;; cffde h#
* "'e r t
~3
)
l off.:a ci.cua PeraMe. eJegs k)4.
\so\kq%ed .
Once per 8 hours
- 4. , e aW r-g A.2 Restore off.6
._ .tab _39.. ;;72 tshours k OPERABLE status.
B. Required Actions. B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated N l Completion Timey A_N_p_ not met. l B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. He 1 hour Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and g 'Once per 8 hours thereafter" l 2= " = -e* A i,M,,J begins c.^... s^um M . l upw'. p-2L4 ~.ue. 'af Rqau a syys wwwpicuva T$ue F P?q'_' A M ^" A I""* " IM 'b-- aus vuss psa M C ff _ _ .-mw' i_' gg if after fondition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either th - initial eiis hour, or any subsequent a yht houd ' ' ^ ,. E' 3 terv , %4e. p/td: Condition B is entered. He completion Time cloqk for Condition A does not stop pak after Condition B is entered, but continues MA the time Conditi A "d d '.~ "i was initially entered. Ifafter Condition B is entered,0(equired Action A.1 is ed nsim O Condition B is exited and oper ion may continue in, Condition A. provided the bg 54. '. Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired. 7atu, Jam e . A. S w e_ % s ewi Crachl*m 'N.+ 4 h .> . <-d
)\chois 8el $ws a mbt'{rf1
- 4tvne ee<D't U.yflc.r- (continued)
Se, mehm\ 1. Mr, woh $vom kvn4 of Codth 4 s n4rh de dowawC? b a % \4{.tm Itowe. edewsih den O yph S STEM 80+ 1.1-20
\tb f '?>
Amendment I
'q a0 16.1-20 December 21,1990
a . - f kWTh <- ll . l-P _ 4 IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the COMPLETION T1HE Required Action should be pursued without delay and in a ' controlled manner.
.-- e .* * *
- 6eAppe D.r
* * = = " e mehr. d-F eev a8mMMmew 4 hwNwp 4
*eeT6 -6 @
ge&w
=
->m
+= qi.4,.
y ..-, - - - . - , 9-e-g,p y, w r . - - . - - -
.,w, - - - -- ,, - g,,wr g- .,
CESSAR nutricarios 16.1.2.4 1.4 FREQUENCY
).O ()5 E A.: D A PP L &TQ
- y 1.4 1.4 FREOUENCY N" pESCRIPTM pURpOsp; Each Surveillance Requirement has a specified Frequency in which the Surveillance must be met 5N5 U.!!b.g the associated LCO. An understanding of the correct k'fMn of 4hprFrequency is necessary for ..
compliance with the dd.L. m.o vf Om AlmLi wifttuntms %
- Sr , * * * ,
b ANM W I Ag p, l -n. : , m. : A ; c ~,u c - .% p.ypy u= =j i . ,7g;; er g; 3;gg;p g; , E::q; ^:7 b at. f t NT 6 2. -9
-QUENCY In Examples provided in Table 1.4-1 and discussed below, the Applicabili of the LCO is given as MODES 1,2,3 and 4 (except Example SR 1.4.
Example 1.4.1 Example SR 1.4.1 contains the type of SR most often encoudred throughout hich the associated the technical specifications. It specifies Surveillance Requirements must be performed at 1 one t an .interval Completiondunof [ime l Surveillance Requirement initiates the sub ent interval. Each pe ce must be completed within the times the frequency allowance to meet requirements of SR 3.0.2. e measurement of this interval continues at times, even when th urveillance Requirement is not required j (by SR 3.0.1). ases where t 1.25 x Frequency interval is exceeded while not in a MODE or o sp ed condition for which the performance of the , Surveillance Requiremen equired, the Surveillance Requirement must be performed prior to e into MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would resu an invalid h E change. j Sometim pecial conditions dictate when urveillance is to be met. These conditpi s may apply to the Surveillance, to the equency, or to both. Exaniples SR 1.4.2, SR 1,4.3, and SR 1.4.4 discuss ese special cor.ditions. Example SR 1.4 Example SR 1.4.2 requires that this Surveillance in perform only at or above 20% RTP. The phrase *Only required ..." means this Surveill may be performed in any MODE or other specified condition where unit sta would allow successful completion, but is not required to be performed unles(s greater than or equal to 20% RTP.
\
c (continued) ( Nue s t % papose J W. . s. ch o Ldh A ( 4er ose ud pyis ea%
- yeac]"T **'" # '
C SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-22 Amendment 1 16.1-22 December 21,1990
4 4 S . I - 2.2.
$f -. -{ i A6uT d'I l The "specified Frequency" is referred to throughout this section and each of the Specifications of Section 3.0, .
- Surveillance Requirement (SR) Applicability. The "specified Frequency" consists of the requirements of the frequency column of each SR, as well as certain Notes in the
. Surveillance column that modify performance requirements. Situations where a Surveillance could be required (i.e., its Frequency could expire), but where it is not possible or not desired that it be performed until sometime after the associated LCO is within its Applicability, represent potential SR 3.0.4 conflicts. To avoid these conflicts, the 4 SR (i.e., the Surveillance or the Frequency) is stated such
~
that it is only " required" when it can be and should be . performed. With an SR satisfied SR 3.0.4 imposes no restriction. I l l / l 6
(3.d u l a k i ok & . 1 2 2. Assi- 6 z-EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the various ways that frequencies are specified. In these exam Applicability of the LCO (LCO not shown) is MODES ples, 1, 2,the and 3. EXAMPLE 1.4-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered
. in the Technical Specifications TS)~. The Frequency-specifies an interval (12 hours)(during which the associated Surveillance must be performed at least one time.
Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent interval . Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours, an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the stated , Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is inoperable, a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LC0). If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a M00E or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and the performance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer to Example 1.4-3), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable. If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR . is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4.
..,_-m.,,y.... . _ , , ...n.,w.,, -., -
yw,,,, -
g_ _. - _.- . ___ _. __._ . _ . _ _ - .. CESSAR. nni"ication 1 I \ b' k &TiA-cbe$ chn w T 0~5 , 1 I 9 i 4 l 1 j Frequency , 1.4 ;
.4 FREOUENCY (continued) l 1 \ (e SR 1.4.2 The interval measurement for theallfrequency of thi Exam (contmNed) times, as described in Example 1.4.1. However, if this Surveillance di not meet SR 3.0.2 while operation continued at less than 20% RTP, it uld not N constitute a failure to meet the LCO. The Surveilla 20% RTP, even though the LCO per its Applicability, may Ired below required to be et. Prior to reaching 20% RTP, if the Surveillance wer not performed within {
th 'nterval as allowed by SR 3.0.2, it must still be pe ormed prior to reaching , 20 % TP. If it is not performed prior to exceedin 0% RTP, the provisions , of SR 3. 3 would apply. Example SR 1.4.3 Example SR 4.3 allows the option of sel ing one of two Frequencies in which to satisfac rily perform the Surv ' lance. The first Frequency (12 hours) is like that in Exan .le SR 1.4.1. second option is an example of a Frequency where the easuremen f the 12 hour interval does not continue at all times. The measure ent ms only if the PDIL Alarm is inoperable. '
/_
If the PDll Alarm is OP LE, at a time when the first Frequency cannot be l met, as required by S .0.2, e second Frequency can be elected and will not be considered a fail e to perfor a Surveillance Requirement within the : specified Frequen Upon restorin the PDIL alarm,12 hours (plus 25 % per
- SR 3.0.2)is al wed, within which the urveillance must be complete. If not performed w' in this interval, it would th become a failure to perform a Surveill e Requirement within the specili Frequency, and only then would j MOD hanges be restricted per SR 3.0.4. On performed the SR is met, and both requencies are reinitialized. Selection of eit r Frequency would again be al wed.
Example SR 1.4. Example SR 1.4.4 is a Surveillance with a one time perfo ce Frequency followed by an Example SR 1.4.1 type Frequency. The logic connector "AFLQ" will require both Frequencies be met. If no other gui e is given, the
- prior to* means 'within the specified Frequency prior to", and on) ' requires the Surveillance be performed once during this period. Should the co itional event not be performed prior to the frequency elapsing, it must be perfo ed again, but not until it is planned to perform the conditional event, i.e.,
regulating CEA withdrawal. i l SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-23 i Amendment I 16,1-23 December 21,1990 l
Lt 6-% EXAMPLE 1,4-2 _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Yerify flow is within limits. Once within 12 hours after a 25% RTP i l M l 24 hours thereafter Example 1.4-2 has two Frequencies. The first is a one time i performance Frequency, and the second is of the type shown ' in Example 1.4-1. The logical connector "M" indicates that both Frequency requirements must be met. Each time reactor power is increased from a power level < 25% RTP to l t 25% RTP, the Surveillance must be performed within { 12 hours. l The use of 'once' indicates a single performance will satisfy the specified Frequency (assuming no other Frequencies are connected by "M"). This type of Frequency . does not qualify for the 25% extension allowed by SR 3.0.2. ! 'Thereafter" indicates future performances must be I established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the 'once' performance in this example). If reactor power decreases to < 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals start upon reactor power reaching 25% RTP. o I
CESSAR nutricuiu r . Frequency 1.4 1.4 FREOUENCY (contiraed) b
- TABLE 1.4-1 .
h ed h"f EXAMPLES . l SR 1.4.1 a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL 31 days I Per e lK TEST SR 1.4.2 NOTE Only required w THERMAL POWER l
> 20% RTP.
/
Verify linear heat rate wklimits.[ 7 days SR 1.4.3 Verify regulating CEA group ion. 12 hours j urs if PDIL alarm circuit is ' ino ble SR 1.4.4 Verify eae .hutdovm CEA withdrawn 2 Prior to w drawal of any regulating (145 in es]. CEA group d g an approach to I criticality AND 12 hours Amendment K 16.1-24 October 30,1992
O dia.c1 4 k <_. N.I 'LM 4 cha 6 -y i l EXAMPLE 1.4-3 _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ,
.................-N0TE------------------
Not required to be performed until 12 hours after a 25% RTP. Perform channel adjustment. 7 days The interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is
< 25% RTP between performances.
As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is co nstrued to be part of the 'specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after , power reaches t 25% RTP to perform _the Surveillance. The surveillance is still considered to be performed within the
'specified Frequency.' Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day (plus 25% per SR 3.0.2) '
interval, but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES,
~
even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power a 25% RTP. Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency; MODE changes then would be restricted in accordance with SR 3.0.4 and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply. I I o I
~ -.
=. . .. ._ .. . ..
CESSAREHLua , i e 16.1.2.5 1.5 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ( p legal Considerations l.5 1.5 LEG AL CONSIDERATIONS i INTRODUCTION ne Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that technical specifications be a part of operating licenses. As such, they are enforceable under federal statute as l well as Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). When an applicant receives a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate a commercial nuclear power plant, the technical specifications are included as Appendix A to the license. Consequently, whenever a change is made to a plant's technical specifications, an amendment to the operating license is required. L nere are, however, certain sections and additionalitems included with these Technical Specifications that are for information or convenience and are not legally a part of the Technical Specifications or Operating License.' ' Itis section identifies the legal parts (i.e., the items that require a license amendment to change) of these Technical Specifications, and those additional parts that do not ; require a license amendment. LEGAL PARTS 10 CFR 50.36 delineates those items which are to be included in technical specifications. These items to be included are:
- Safety Limits,
- Limiting Safety System Settings,
- Limiting Conditions for Operation.
- Surveillance Requirements.
- Design Features, and
- Administrative Controls.
In addition, the Use and Applications Division, comprised of Definitions, ; Logical Connectors, Completion Times, Frequency, and Legal Considerations, is also a legal part of the technical specifications. Since the technical specifications are issued as Appendix A to the Operating License, any change to the legal parts of the technical specifications constitutes a - license amendment. As such, the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90,50.91, and 50.92 apply. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-25
'l.
Amendment I 16.1-25 December 21,1990
CESSAR Enitricarian i 1 Legal Considerations 1.5 1.5 LEOAL CONSIDERATIONS (continued) l 1 i FRONT MATTER Front Matter is all the material in the front of the technical specifications used to ' identify and locate specific information. It includes:
- Preface j
- o. Title Page
- Table of Contents e List of Tables e List of Figures
- List of effective pages None of this material is required by 10 CFR 50.36, and the Front Matter does not include any requirements on the safe operation of the plant. Therefore, the front matter is not a legal part of the technical specifications or operating license.
Cross-references are included in the body of the technical specifications to assist l CROSS-REFERENCES the user in determining applicable requirements for a common system or , component. This section is not required by 10 CFR 50.36, and is included in the technical specifications to assist the user. As such, they are not a legal part , of the technical specifications or operating license. . BASES 10 CFR 50.36 includes the following statement, 'A summary statement of the bases or reasons for such specifications, other than those covering administrative controls, shall be included in the application, but shall not become part of the-technical specifications." Therefore, the bases are not a legal part of the technical specifications nor the operating license. Changes to the bases shall be controlled in accordance with the requirements in Specification 5.8.4.f of the Administrative Controls. SYSTEM 80+ 1.1-26 Amendment I 16.1-26 December 21,1990
CESSAR E!a%mou ; 1 f I 6.2 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS I Safety Limits 2.0 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (5bs 2.1 SATETY UMiTs SLs de a bv e b au M e-2.t,i %cw cea W 2.1.1.1 In MODES I and 2, the . doms $4o(MBO shall be maintained dh.24] . I N ! 2.1.3 21n MODES I and 2, the peak linear beat rate shall be maintained s@l.0)kw/ft.
- 21. a, etendor Cda Mpiv~ucs)PmmeSL (4.ng)W%M for Let .a d gnad )
'~
In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the E- C c c...,(RCSKPressure shall be maintained (2750] psia. sL 2.2 hr e ! ' L siiT-VIOLATIONS st 2.i. s1. a.i.t.2 is vicidQ reAe compka= t 2.2.1 IfB'H+R^,t.iorfinear he:: .e - ms ^.1;; Lum , be it; .';O05 3 - ?: me M. 2nd be ih M ob E. 3, tom is I kW. SL :? 1 2. b viob4ed*l!H 2.2.2 If RCS P-- r :-P a- S :y
-i - +.: !!=!! v:4:-
2.2.2.1 In MODES 1 or 2, he != h! ODE 3 ';h RCS preau;; le:'in MODF- 3 Wr. (t[ (C dgidn't ancft . 2.2.2.2 In MODES 3,4, or 5, :::'er RCS p-m'<e ! id. .. :he hd; w.;h 5: '
.m.mm. res4cn e. Com p na me. tois ,. s a c, 1
2.2.3 Within one hour, notify the NRC Operations Center,in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. 2.2.4 Within 24 hours, notify thehat [C:n Suf
- ,. 'i.+.sciatd.
- Nua. Phm: T and Vice President - ,
vde ch=T rse, 5 fee'l ' d Nucleap and the {E f;:y P; . g,,,f,a Oc ":ta (SRC)).@$/sc.fic,ta
- rJ./, YW4eJ 8' . ']
2.2.5 Within 30 days of the violation, a Licensee Event Report shall be prepared ist aceordsem mah 10 CFR 50.73. TL.1Elt omty ggg) ptsu.a d- ++ 2.2.6 Operation of the unit shall not comunence until auth ri ed by the NRC.
/
be vo/ud bC S b .M c b ko % M.C., h , s u {> a,.h. pud n ewn spes;6.1 L c.c. a , a s w .. , s ,, s u ,. Saee;kudJ n d V.*ce hed. led - Ak,Jeet.Ofr#4us}, SYSTEM 80+ 2-1 Amendment I 16.2-1 December 21,1990
CESSAR Ennficam,. l 16.3 3.0 APPLICABILITY 16.3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (LCOs) LCO Applicability , 3.0 3EAPPLKWlHtMY-3 0 LIMITINO CONDITIONS FOR OPER ATION (LCOs) AP01h A 6it i IY LC D.s LCO 3.0.1 LhriF:;;'1;fi,e; fu. Gm hva shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCOs 3.0.2 and 3.0.7. l LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.6. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified ' l Completion Time (s), completion of the Required Action (s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. l LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associzted ACTIONS are not met or an associated I ACTION is not provided, the unit s'aall be placed in a MODE or other specified I condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within I hour to place the unit, as applicable, in:
- a. MODE 3 within 7 hours; ;
- b. [ MODE 4 within 13 'uours]; and .
- c. MODE 5 within 37 hours.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required. LCO 3.0.3 is applicable in MODES 1,2, 3, and 4. LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. ' Ibis Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.0-1 Amendment O 16.3-1 May 1,1993 '
CESSAR nancuia I t LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (continued) LCO 3.0.4 Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. (continued) These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other rpecified condition in the Applicability only for a limited period of time. LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perfonn testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. f This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.8, " Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported ; system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shallbe entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2. LCO 3.0.7 Special test exception (STE) LCOs [in each applicable LCO section] allow specified Technical Specifications (TS) LCO 3.0.7 requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with STE LCOs is optional. When an STE LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the STE LCO shall be met. When an STE LCO is not desired to be met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with the other applicable Specifications. SYSTEM 80+ 3.0-2 Amendment O 16.3-2 May 1,1993 _ _ _ _ _ - . . . ~ _
CESSARnn% - Muq b ~+4 ~ Suvsedirmtt , ,
' wa a w h e6 es%,p., m as.no r,ck Sesdtla.is o
% p t h, maw t %
S Lc4 b( 16.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRES 1ENTS P" k -+ > G.d c NmE"'"d"5) o m e.f. 4 y' SR Applicability 3.0 30 suMc\uMCC R cau wmmT(S2) 69icA6107f t- 9 ^ s p r' ' e" 'TY
.WRVFtt%3DwP-!GOWRF*4ENTfrsssHr SEs 2 -- the MODES or other specified I SR 3.0.1 h : v... : shall be met d conditions in the Applicability for. !H' M"'g Q%. ^!:n, unless
)
otherwise stated in the S A-. 9:,i=x;.nt.+ Failure to meet a Surveillance,
, "_, m m: within the specified Frequency shall be failure tim ~eEihe LM "* /
eyw te>p14<1
- C=@"R ' C,s. avo SurveillancePa y n- - : do not have to be performed on inoperable equipmentor- vomoM o oats 2e geeih J i r m sb ,
SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency of each Sm.se;l!==N:v 1 at is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance, or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met, cddA For Frequencies specified as *once g*, the WE5 interval extension does not apply. CegeUmTf% per oat- N If a Re ,+=' * :na requiresiwrformance of ; Scic;!!=:: ".%...c...m", 2: Ccmp!:' r E~ .cy..m r.. d:e is..'v.umum of *once per .. *, the h25 lt;rcl extension applies to tlg . , ,v T. m.g.J. gy
*1"* %
Exceptions to this aw... at are stated in the individual Specifications. 5p uCev tra-SR 3.0.3 en a Limiting Co dition for Operati is not met due to failure to rm a Survei within the ified interv of SR 3.0.2, the require . to declare the equipment ino e ma be delay [or up to 24 hours, fr e time it is identified rmit the completion of the hi g that the Surveillance Surveillance. If the Surveill ot n performed, to ot perf within the 24 hour allowance, the yt , Completion Time of the Re i ed n 'ns immediately upon expiration of the N 24 hour allowance. Wh eillance is per o within the 24 hour allowance S and the Surv e quirement 's not met, the Comple ime of the Required Act' egins iminediately upon fa re of the Surveillance. M / of a s n-Lc) . Entry into a MODE or other specified condition of the Applicability"shall not bepma -%' M, SR 3.0.4 unless the Surveillanec)" nit - : i: E ' . _,;!!n.l'. LCO have been mett This @'" gI provisio shall not prevent passage through or to MODES or other specified Q:g*# conditio s in compliance with Required Actions.
/ (continued)
LCDs SYSTEM 80+ 3.0-3 Amendment 1 16.3-3 December 21,1990
-- _ e 4
f se 3 o.3 7c 4 is discoaned h+ a Sursvilame. uns na+ prb-*J wi Ata ik spdC42 Engu.emg, 4en compliante. s cA Me. ngateme A b Aetbc We Lco so4 %d m3 he. dehged , krorn de. hywt_. o f di$toVe<} } up b A4 boutf 5 of gb ne. \ivwt h of N t 6ptcibied Fr9eng, thbee 13 hss . ~ks d d eg p w oJ Ju ps,neWJ 4o a h p < 6 - e_. ah sauer t(ana. pertOd A e_. LCO mwbb kvwm odiLMg - he. dec3sted . Mob o d, anA. Ae ag caw li _ C.d r C%) ms4- %e_ evde<d. A cmeA %.s & Re. Rega; a. tb b s b g s
%diday 9 espi<dem e % ad q grtod, tAes 4k %<mhme_ (3 p<bd' wcAm A dehg potd ani A e_. L<oecilame._ 6 nd ~ d, &
Lto immdrsW g k Aederd ~Nd, ed 4 he. upp)itdle. (ondf LM hhb k enbd, ibt Cmpi L %> d Ae_.:% uheJ Ac% beb L-4cs4 d b V" Sh0"'b$ **d N 1"*'ll'"' i 1
CESSAR naincArion SR Applicability 3.0 1 10 APPLICABILITY l SU EILLANCE REOUlREMENTS (continued) ! SP?S. \ Eq:b.- ;c i- monomoum mc une in wo mamau.:
';H.2 :; / . l o
l (con c rr:_,$ SR 3.0.5 [h LTI-UNIT SITES - Surveillance Requirements shall pply to each unit indiv~ ually unless otherwise stated.] Surveillance Requirements fo inservice inspection and testing of ME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall apply as follo
- a. Inservice inspection f components, and inse ice testing of pumps and valves, shall be in accordance with tion XI of the A E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda (the ode), except ere relief has been requested pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). 3
\#
y'a b. Test frequencies specified in th ode shall be applicable as follows: , 9- Frecuency
.@ Code Terminolocy ,
~
\" b 3,5 \ 7 days
\ Weekly
\ Monthly 31 days Quarterly r every 3 months 92 days Semia ally, or every 6 months 184 days [
Eve months 276 days - Y y, or annually 366 days I
- c. The pr isions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the abov Code required Frequencies.
, e
- d. P ormance of Code inservice inspection and testing s 11 be in addition to the
.pecified Surveillance Requirements. A single performance a test may be used to >
satisfy both Code and Surveillance Requirements where appro . ' ate. Nothing in the Code shall supersede the requirements of these techm I specifications. f i i SYSTEM 80+ 3.0-4 Amendment I 16.3-4 December 21,1990 l
't System 80+ vs. S.T.S. Differences T.S.# l 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temp, and Flow DNB Limits l Applicability: Mode 1 and 2 Safety Analysis done for all times the Rx is critical.
This would include Mode 2. 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temp (P/T) Limits Action A.2 NOTE This NOTE applies to System 80+ only due to the Region of Unallowed Operation on the P/T curves. Operation in this region does not violate any P/T limits and therefore, no derermination of RCS is required. 3.4.5 RCS Loops - Mode 3 S.R. 3.4.5.2 System 80+ designates the usage of W.R. SG-indication. Wide range gives an accurate reading of heat- sink inventory within the SG. 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 S.R. 3.4.6.2 WR SG level is used to meet the SR. 3.4.7 RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled l S.R. 3.4.7.2 WR SG level is used to meet the SR. 3.4.8 RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loop Not Filled LCO 3.4.8 NOTE - System 80+ design allows the use of a Containment spray Pump as a replacement (backup) to the Shutdown Cooling Pumps. 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 - System 80+ has a requirement for minimum Pzr water level. This will keep the heaters covered and therefore, they will remain available to maintain ' RCS pressure. 3.4.10 Per Safety Valves Action B.3 was added to place System 80+ RCS in LTOP mode of operation. This ensures over pressure protection is available.
, . __ 4 -e , , . . . -
1 1
't 3.4.11 LTOP System - System 80+ design is described in SAR ,
l Section 5.0. 3.4.13 RCS Pressure Isolation Valves (PIV) Leakage System 80+ does not have auto-closure of SCS suction valves from RCS, therefore, STS's Action C. is not utilized. Also SR 3.4.14.2 and 3 is not used. 3.4.14 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation System 80+ requires more instrumentation to be OPERABLE than the STS. 3.4.15 RCS Specific Activity Action A.1 - System 80+ does not employ the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 curves used in STS. Instead System 80+ limits D.E. I-131 to 5 60 n Ci/gm during all critical . operations. 3.4.16 RCS Loops - Test Exception System 80+ has a different LCO due to the testing required to be performed. System 80+ has two additional Tech Specs not in STS 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System 3.4.18 Rapid Depressurization Function , System 80+ does not have a Tech Spec on Pzr PORV's as found in the f STS. l l l l
)
I
p eu t l CESSARnahou i
'f6.7 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTE51 16.7.1 3.4.1 RCS PRESSURE, TES1PERATURE, AND FLOW DNB LIh11TS ,
RCSpPressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits ) l
'3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Tepa.tsrc h . OsJedc 1; 3.4.1 RCS Pressure. Temperature. and FlowbNB) Limits l
LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold leg temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below: , It 7 7- $ 3 A5'
- a. Pressurizer pressure 2 [t98fr psia) and s [3996-psial, l
- b. RCS cold leg temperature (T,):
i 2 {543*F] and s [565'F] for < of RTP. or 2 [553*F] and s 1563*F] for 2 of RTP, and
- c. RCS total flow rate 2 [95 %] and s [116%) of 445,600 gpm.
APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurigrgressure or A.1 Restore parameter to within 2 hours RCS flowanot within limits. limitJ . j B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. RCS cold leg temperature C.1 Restore cold leg temperature 2 hours not within linuts, to within limitf. - D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion 3 Time of Condition C not met.
. . . .. . .. A) C T E. ..... .... . . .
w_ Sec s s s e: se r fressul'ee ~: Y A s< .s '. st sph <lar:)'. L. Tr4 EML fo a c g. c. g la ucm M s'4 Air)
- y. e u.a su , e r-O . TW CA.tn4L. IQ SYSTEM 80+ - - -- - - - - -
PO 4/2., Ap- .k- - eMe 3.4-1 b
- -~
J Amendment I 16.7-1 December 21,1990.
3 CESSARannncum ! 1 , i i l l 1 RCS, Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ,
ry >,-. .w x, n- asc '
- SR 3.4.1.1 Venfy pressure 2 B905] psia and s [W psia. 12 hours 4
- 1
, SR 3.4.1.2 Verify RCS cold leAtemperature n [543*F] and 12 hours s [565'F] for < t90% of RTP or n [553*F] and s [563'F] for 2[9d% of RTP.
m&p'.seE ye;-menc,. se e NeOTE mo,,,
-.L'y appb in Mode Ix vid
_q<I acts esa;os . J SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow rate 2 [95%] and s [116%] of 12 hours 445,600 gpm. Aioi'qlL9h,hk_N $ fe,f45' L 3 ~O hwrs nhe e :;,,1;; , . :S~md'iQ L UP, y / SR 3.4.1.4 D:=en &RCS total flow rate 2 [95%] and s [116%] [18 months] of 445,600 gpm,2 2b :: u.,~. ; .; rd p ~m. fWr.}) b y (ac:5.wa nce bd wc_ hr i SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-2 1 Amendment K 16.7-2 October 30,1992 ; l
CESSAR Minficma 1 16.7.2 3.4.2 RCS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality ! 1 3.4.2 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality LCO 3.4.2 Each RCS loop average temperature (T,,) shall be 2 [543]'F. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with T., in one or more RCS loops < [550]'F, MODE 2 with T., in one or more RCS loops < [550]*F and K.,21.0. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. T., in one or more RCS -A. : R=tr T,, ' - lik IR. 15 rirr-loops not within limit. M _ i A.7 Be in MODE 3. 30 minutes [ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1 Verify RCS T., in each loop 2 [543]'F. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving criticality. bHD 30 minutes she,enAer. i
-. SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-3 l Amendment K 16.7-3 October 30,1992 l
CESSAR EHFincarien ) , . l 16.7.3 3.4.3 RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (Pff) LIMITS i i RCS P/T Limits : 3.4.3 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (Pm Limits ( ' LCO 3.4.3 L- -' uf RCS pressure, RCS temperature and RCS heatup and cooldown .r rates shall L maintained within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.3-1 A R 3.4.Y16. p i APPLICABILITY: At all times. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE -
.AprRequired Actiony'uneN4M
' A 2-compled ver this (
Condition is entered. A. Requirements of dLCO A.1 Restore parameter (s) to 30 minutes not met, L WDe 3,2. , within limits. 3,ev- 4. M NOTE Not applicable to " Region of Unallowed Operation" in Figures 3.4.3-1 A and 3.4.3-1B. i A.2 Determine RCS is acceptable 72 hours for continued operation. B. Required Actior/and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours ! associated Completion Timer not met. M t B.2 Be in MODE 5 with RCS 36 hours pressure < [500] psig. {e bU SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-4 Amendment O 16.7-4 May 1,1993
9 b fsx w d h fy NO-Y
- c. . . . . . J a ... . .. .: c.4 AutAt & -h> JL a l^
gg 4J.k c.1- va&w (ndap) 6
.w.a k pLhd uk RL . !
uw G M o.- W Jg.
..-- A c s -.. .....-
t tynngw 13c @ M~ n -g ut A k av i t w J dr u K .', f y a w aan k~ 9 3.q.3-in u .9 - s. v.3 - i a . O' 2- Nua~ AC.S L &b l
&R , .
cxd. aq xtuaY l apa . mae y h 1 I l i 1 l l i l l l l 1 . I 1 l 1 , J
l 1 CESSAR ME"icarieu l l i ! 'r t I g ,g RCS Pfr Limits ; mA . 3.4.3 - j g g < s e i ll8 "' t I
. rO"y g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (
SURVEILLANCE FREQUkNCY SR 3.4.3.1 Verify C-^ M RCS pressur ektemperature ----N OTE
- Pj and de heatup and cooldown rates with , limits.5p/c4Cil -
Only required during l g in p[gw<e 3.4 3-1A q RCS beatup and 3.4.S cooldown operations I andj inservice leak : RC$ ~43 hydrostatic l testing. , I 1 30 minutes > K ! i 1 l l l l l
.i
( SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-5 l Amendment K 16.7-5 October 30,1992 l
CESSAR Ennncmo. RCS PTT Limits 3.4.3 i 68 1 i 6 I 6 4 6 4 [6 [ [ f INSERVICE ,' INSPECTION & 2400 - HYDROSTATIC 8 TEST , i e i
' 543 F 1905 psia g ,
LOWEST SERVICE ! Minimum I TEMPERATURE N i Pressurizer
. Pressure N aa ,e= -
e I e 483 F,1305 psia Region 1200 - 8
/ nallowed U $ ' / operation j 5 ,
e\ / , d ISOTHERMAL - --*- CRITICAL y f p
%100 *FMR N
, Ns 80 'FMR
'--8 40 'FMR
' ~
\ 40 'FMR ,'
80 *FMR e 100 *FMR I 1
+- MIN. BOLTUP TEMP. l
' h ' ' ' i /
0 t ' ' 200 250 300 350 400 450 $00 550 0 50 100 150 ACTUAL FLUID TEMPERATURE,'F i
)
RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS , (HEAT-UP) K l l FIGURE 3.4.3-1 A SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-6 Amendment K 16.7-6 October 30,1992
CESSAR 8lninemeu
*f RCS Pfr Limits 3.4.3 i e i i i - i i i i i i SSEnvCc , ,
INSPECTION & g HYDROSTATC g TEST e ; e f f i no - e 8 543 F.1905 psia LOWEST l Minimum SERVCE 8 g TEMPERA TURE-* I it i .m - Pressurizer Pressure \
$ 8 g a l 483 F.1305 psia
[ g ISOTHERMAL % , /Rege of /
.f % Unalbwed /
y l\ CORE CRfTCAL y' Operation j I I
'M -
\ 40 TMR 80 *FMR 8
8 3 8 100 VMR
~ MIN BOLTUPTEMP. g g f f f f f f f f f o so im m a m a no 4m 4so a no ACTUAL FLUID TEMPERATURE. *F RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS (COOLDOWN) K j FIGURE 3.4.3-1B l
SYSTEM 80+ 3.4 7 Amendment K 16.7-7 October 30,1992
-- - m
CESSAR naincmo i l i 16.7.4 3.4.4 RCS LOOP - MODES 1 AND 2 RCS loops - MODES I and 2 3.4.4 l 3.4 REALTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.4 RCS leoo - MODES I and 2 P LCO 3.4.4 Two RCS loops shall be OPERABLE and in operation. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ":q:: d auu.6 vf A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours RCS [. opera!a,uviis don. f Re. quit t me*45 of LcC> nd me4. I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE [6 FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify each RCS loop in operation. 12 hours S R 3.' t.2 ^
' NL L:n i .... ;cc :.t; . ;::;2y b .;;e.J .;. !.. = x.io.m 4. !!c
- ^ 'h: ?!er:r C: =:r- Tde c ;;:6.;; I'rc;m.: 5: ... Cenca::: T.k *
" .. . . . .. .;; , ea, . .J.
K i i SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-8 Amendment K 16.7-8 October 30,1992
CESSAR 88Wncims 1 1
*r 16.7.5 3.4.5 RCS LOOPS - MODE 3 ,
J l RCS Loops - MODE 3 3.4.5 ,
, l l
i 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 1 l 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 LCO 3 A$ (Two]RCS loops shall be OPERABLE and one RCS loop shall be in operation. NOTE - All RCPs may be de-energized for 9 I hour per 8-hour periodjprovided; l
- 1
- a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron l concentration) and l
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10'F below saturation temperature.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 3. i i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required RCS loop A.1 Restore required RCS loop to 72 hours inoperable. OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 4. (12] hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not I i met. C. No RCS loop in C.1 Suspend all operations / Immediately p ctLRA6LE. involving a reduction 19 R CS l boron concentration. NO (KS LCOPI^ AND cperaMo n . C.2 Initiate action to restore one immediately RCS loop tojperation. t cPEa AGAE 64mh o ncl q0Aa SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-9 ( Amendment I 16.7-9 December 21,1990
CESSAR llnincuiu
*f I
RCS Loops - MODE 3 3.4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify required RCS loop M. ep+ f adfe A - 12 hours SR 3.4.5.2 Verify secondary-side water level M$eam generatort 12 b'ours 2 [25]% wide range indications. SR 3.4.5.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days available to :: hc : ::: "CP p:: "CS h;p. OR etjuired pump Aa4- b no 4- )
'M opc(odici\ . I 1
I ( ' l l l l I l 1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-10 Amendment K 16.7-10 _ October 30,1992
- i CESSAR Ennncim. 1 l
16.7.6 3.4.6 RCS LOOPS - MODE 4 RCS loops - MODE 4 3.4.6 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.6 RCS Loot 3s - MODE 4 o r-LCO 3.4.6 Two 7psloops71..A= C :E; Sy:'n (SCS)- divisions consisting of any combination of RCS loops an isions shall be OPERABLE and at least one looprdivision shall be in operation. tw s. ors .sa G,/.;,1 NOTES g
- 1. Al@ cps)and SCS pumps may be de-energized for up4e 1 hour per 8-hcar ru h u.,6 d g, g[ Period,provided:
- a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration) and
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10'F below saturation temperature.
K2 No RCP shall be started with any RCS cold leg temperatures :s [259'F] r during_cnoJdown_orf 00*F] during hegtyp (the heatup rate : s limited to r (40'F/hr or less]) unless: Mcondary* water temperature $;each steam i generator.is < (100*F] above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
! /uN k A* o iguas*/g e t= tdt! /W . '.r L 5] To j' ae b.5 APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
- u, s.
One'RCS foop m a s rar A.1 Initiate action to reten a Immediately inoperable second Rf,E loop /$GS division to OPERABLE stat $s. AND Two SCS divisions inoperable. (contmued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-11 Amendment O 16.7-11 _ JhtAJWE -.
CESSAR EnelCATION
'f RCS Loops - MODE 4 3.4.6 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME p r. , ,,, m ., B. One SCS division W rtestore a second RCS 4h-i-inoperable. -!cep!SCS dhisica L-OPEP).BLE v.r.s,- AND tR--
-u, .:ud S
Two RCS loops -B t - 75 hours inoperable.. G.I Be in MODE 5. 4 C.Y[tCS loops or SCS C.1 Suspend all operations immediately . divisiong in,cF.2000-- involving reduction in RCS )
< = v'< '"4 'e . boron concentration.
OL hED A)0 d C S /= ar o /* C.2 Initiate action to restore one Immediately , Sc5 h & yf,,f,'d. -RCS-1 pgdivision to
<t . o ;s, .,a c r =h = = 0 fMM L G. '
1 STAM ndd operntOda l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY a
/ SR 3.4.6.J 2, Verify secondary-side water level k required steam 12 hours generator (s)ph [25}% wide range indication]
VV is ia rpenet..J
\ SR 3.4.6.K l Verify aTHEM one RCS loop or SCS division wre mg. 12 hours SR 3.4.6.3 Venfy correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days available to the required pumanot is operation.
4 At .'s SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-12 Amendment K 16.7-12 October 30,1992 l
h e. CESSAREnMc-f 16.7.7 3.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND CIRCULATION - MODE 5, LOOPS FILLED RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled 3.4.7
.l 3.4 REACI'OR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ecs 3.4.7 Resetee %!-Loops - MODE 5. Loons Filled LCO 3.4.7 One Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) division shall be OPERABLE and in operation, and either:
- a. One additional SCS division shall be OPERABLE; or
- b. The secondary side water level of each Steam. Generator (SG) shall be :t
[25% wide range indication] ; { its din.'..i ;.1g*
- 1. TL,.,SCS pumpt may be de-energized for 1 bour per 8-hour period provided:
- a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least)0*F below saturation temperature.
1. D. No RCP shall be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures J (259'F1 during cooldown or [290*F] during heatup (the hestup rate is limited to (40*F/hr or lessMfcondary water temperature of each I SG is < [100*F] above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures. T ^-s . ten ue;eu. .u sa u m '.s < C.*3 % ; e ' b
'r. All SCS trains m.7ay be removed from operation during planned heatup to
- 9. MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is in operation.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops filled. scs . _ p 2, Da a uG W 5a-+ a k u.yu.d4 lv y p .2 k ws '
-ae OfC<d 6 LE-
+ar9 m u a n - n - -
na i p.fi . SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-13 Amendment O MW-M 6
CESSAR 8aecmou RCS Loops - MODE 5, Ioops Filled 3.4.7 ACTIONS e *d ' COMPLETION TIME CONDITION. j REQUIRED ACTION A. %8ne*SCS division A.1 Initiate action to NMSCS Immediately
^ " " " ^ " ' "
division to OPERABLE status.
;a p ra ite AND Aay SG a.'il %
tm in d; .W secondary side water A.2 Initiate action to restore SO Immediately level i; =y SC. o J secondary side water levelsto u;ftla 1:~lf. within limits. B. [hCS division B.1 Suspend all operations Immediately OPEIL", ELE.- .i.y< elk involving reduction in RCS boron concentration. M AND No SCS division in operation. B.2 Initiate action to restore one Immediately SCS division to OPERABLE status and operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1 Verify required Steam Oenerator secondary side water 12 hours SR 3.4.7l2. level is 2 [251% wide range indication.A] (continued) r - Y h*W N h $ b N5'?" WP 5 Y SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-14 Amendment K 16.7-14 October 30,19M
CESSAR Ennnema l
}
)
I i i RCS Loops - MODE 5. Loops Filled 3.4.7 -
)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.7.gf Verify one SCS division gr" ;. ;3 .. -per & .). 12 hours l l I SR 3.4.7.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7'--- available to the required SCS pump wheek is not in Oply A mpg 1 operation. -fl4t I w > w a x. 7 days l l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-15 Amendment K 16.7-15 October 30,1992
CESSAR Ennnemen i 16.7.8 3.4.8 RCS LOOPS AND CIRCULATION - MODE 5, LOOPS NOT FILLED t RCS Loops - MODE 5. Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.8 RCS Loons - MODE 5. Loons Not Filled ; LCO 3.4.8 Two Shutdown Cooling (SCS) divisions shall be OPERABLE, and at least one division shall be in operation. r---+ NOTES 4 72, One SCS division may be inoperable for ajide 2 hours for surveillance testingg j g provided the other SCS division is OPERABLE and in operation. ] { 4 a. l
$.1. Th e ep:- " ; SCS pumpsmay be de-energized for tejitr15 minutes Wt di'S; SCS purp:1 wMrai.a 4 Ae w we. d.'en6.a to Mc;he pro 61=1*. .- y
- 3. A Containment Spray Pump can be manually realigned to meet the requirement l I
of an SCS pump. i l i APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled. 9i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SCS division A.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately I inoperable. division to OPERABLE status. l k . 4ce l B'. % SCS division B.1 Suspend all operationsg Immediately OPERADLI'.- involving reduction d RCS U oper<h/c . boron concentration. O_H l AND ( No SCS division in l operation. B.2 Initiate action to restore one Immediately SCS division to OPERABLE j c status and operation.
&pLc ure o T M h p r tore. 6-
,,4 C .a.A vto p bet,a e .,ctc.a ty,edue-
"c f* " Ad *
- S "d5'- " " ddCtk' 'k A 2 C T- ba ** -
9 b. b oferd545-c,m a%%a , sas C,, No A fA'ds e oferein'tAS N FY~k *f rc el*e.e. Y lSC$ Jir$s.t Nos se W
/u &d.
SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-16 Amendment Q 16.7-16 June 30,1993
. - i d CESSAREHL m. ! I 1 9 I i RCS Loops - MODE 5 Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ) SURVEILLANCE , . FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8.1 Verify h one SCS division q0.1.I g. W+T.O . 12 hours lE , J SR 3.4.8.2 Verify correct breaker abgnment and indicated power 7 days ' available to the required SCS pump that is not in lg operation. l K j f", l
?
i A 1 L SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-17 Amendment K 16.7-17 October 30,1992
CESSAR 884%ma 16.7.9 3.4.9 PRESSURIZER Pressurizer 3.4.9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Pressurizer water level 2 [26%) and s [60%];and
- b. Mtzsr[wo group,4 's of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group b+ ' [200 kW][and powered from c" :: pens u.d Cl_ a~
tR emergency power 3isgf]. A APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
> NOTE #
Pressurizer w evel limit does not apply durin
- a. a thermal power ramp ' - >cf 5%) RTP per minute, or
- b. At- . power step in excess of [10%) RTP s ~
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer water level A.1 Be in MODE 3 with reactor 6 hours not within limit. trip breakers open. AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. [12 hours] B. One required group of B.1 Restore required pressurizer 72 hours pressurizer heaters heaters to OPERABLE status, inoperable. 1 l C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B AND l not met. C.2 Be in MODE 4. [12 hours] 1 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-18 Amendment I 16.7-18 December 21,1990 l
CESSAR naincuia 1 1 Pressurizer 3.4.9 f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify pressurizer water level 2 [26%] and s [60%]. 12 hours SR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required group offeaters 2 [200] 92 days l kW. f's+++ e i
- e
~
ISR 3.4.9.3 Verify required pressurizer beaters are capable of being (18] months ;
;_ powered from an emergency power supply. -
l l I SYSTEM 80+ 3.4 19 Amendment K , 16.7-19 October 30,1992 l
6 CESSAR naincimu ,
-e ,
4 16.7.10 3.4.10 PRESSUR1ZER SAFErY VALVES 1 Pressurizer Safety Valves l 3.4.10 l ] 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves , LCO 3.4.10 (Foudpressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings 2 [2475 psia] and s [2525 psia). l
- 4. ch se Hs.ys m Rmf,,;udyoyg 4s 6. Au Lco 1:.:4.s LasD LCO $ n A " Sp 3 n M are not' ;;!':dh fer u.:.j i;::' MODES 3 and 4 for the l -
l purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions. This I exception is allowed for [g hours following entry into MODE 3, provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup. l 1 bl1) APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3, MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature > [259'F] during cooldown or - ( [290*F] during heatup (the heatup rate limited to [40*F/hr or less]). ( A N ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pressurizer eode A.1 Restore valve to OPERABLE 15 minutes safety valve status. l inoperable. l l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND
~
CL
- B.2 Be in MODE 4 with all RCS [12 hours]
coldleg temperatures s b] o e .wo< c [259'F]. Mwuch+e b i)g a3 'me ,uak . E B.3 Be in MODE 4 on Shutdown [12 hours] Cooling with the requirements , of LCO 3.4.11 met. i SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-20 l J l Amendment O 16.7-20 May 1,1993 ;
- . , . .. .l
O he C E S S A R Elinne m x f I Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , SURVEILLANCE f FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 N'" $1 each pressunzer safety valve # OPERABLE in In accordance with accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Follow: j the Inservice Testins
% & 4,l'l+ .urt a y h il it a;ttlJ L / % . Program.
t r ( ( ~. SYSTEM S0+ 3.4-21 Amendment K 16.7-21 October 30,1992
CESSARnnLmu 16.7.11 3.4.11 LOW TEMPERATURE OVEIU'RESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) S SYSTEM LTOP 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 lew Temperature Ovemressun Protection (LTOP) System LCO 3.4.11 LTOP System shall be OPERABLE as follows: a r-
- a. Two SCS Relief Valves with lift settings s (530] psig;=:' : ~^^ '-d bha 4:ee v.~ nt
- b. He RCS depressurized with the pressurizer manway open or an abmete RCS vent pae of j ; x =a==1. 2 Q.s] vm a c4 o . ,
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4, with any RCS cold leg temperature less than or equal to: [259'F] during cooldown or [290'F] during heatup (The heatup rate is limited to [40*F/hr or less]) MODE 5, is MODE 6, with the reactor vessel head #on ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i << A. One'mm% SUS A.1 feliefRestorelb..azCS falve Kelieffalve 91= =s-~to q d,q g inoperable. .J A De 4.
. OPERABLE status.
(contmued) l B. b.t s' csn e._ sc s. 1 CA <<Io;uA scs e1a:ui 34 m s.u relief <,uc aepok . l:ef .>[d k dfMA.tU-
~ uu r. E v s . jp, I'
J
** 'nr.n a mz --m
.;- q SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-22 Amendment O 16.7-22 May 1,1993 m
CESSAR E!!#icmou . [7 , ( i LTOP ' 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued) ; CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. F. Required Action /and Qf.1 Depressurize RCS and 8 hours associated Completion establish an RCS vent peek Timeinot met. . area of 2 D.S sgvac s'a cLis . D %
'MYCS gelief Valves b.1 laitiate action to establish Immediately inoperable. an alternate RCS vent path- ;
;; cf [ h .f' 2. D .s]
s g s4.cc <-c^eA SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.1 NOTE Only required when complying with Required ActionsB-b-s c..i ~ .1 p.
, sue chl.<> lt sp l.
Verify sexpmed RCS vent = _ f.:.f.
. ;. 2] y,! ] =d ished?
12 hours l [ S ". 0.4. ". 2 %dfy S i: "ua ..hu a ye f-- ': :qu!=3 SCS 12Luun.- i P-%r 7.:s. SR 3.4.11.3 Perform a SETPOINT CALIBRATION for each required [18 months) , SCS felief y'alve. l l k S,1 3. 4. H. 2. - - - - e gc _ . . - . _ . . n-'y n d /si-I it. Cal 7 ay.kJ Au
~ Ta t ONwsa.cy .
u. m v k .~ .s tu
*Jf.4;* ms-3 4 f
Cfeu. w i SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-23 , Amendment O 16.7-23 May I,1993
C E S S A R !a nncim ,.
*f j i
16.7.12 3.4.12 RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE , RCS Operationalleakage ! 3.4.12 3.4 c.EACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 RCS Orierational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.12 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:i- i !!2-Mg:
- a. No/ressuregoundary LEAKAGE, f g63) l I gpm pnidentified LEAKAGE; L b.
- c. 10 gpm/dentified LEAKAGE- h LEAKAGE through all steam generators and
- d. I gpm total primary-to-secon
- e. [720] gallons pr day primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE through any once pw....d S tr) . ;
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME , A. RCS LEAKAGE not A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within 4 hours
'I within limits for limitf.
reasons other than fressurefoundary LEAKAGE. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AliD not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours OE l Pressure youndary LEAKAGE exists. I SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-24 Amendment I . 16.7-24 December 21,1990
CESS'4R Ennncum
't RCS Operational Leakage 3.4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY hi,u k.dd bbenjNOTE '4
- ~ W N rtwi1*A b b*-
co n _ ~. _ _ _ u , u _ r_ _ aA wnnh# e.e#csJ kNa 4% $&&&J ~4 wu u ssug
-.... sa.a sv & w
- t. - 4 < \ p u c" . ___... .v.s t ism a t f,bJ,3 5 4 ge 3;t,1w34 V45 ftes . >
o ? ns Ms - Eg% L s%"&m%im , SR 3.4.12.1 Perform a RCS water inventory balance. 72 hours
- .1 : k. :-. s , W~n~ .
- .;e,i y<. .<
l5 <-:c ~i",, . e. c . , .
. , , . , .w .x sa n. '.-~.1- C.- - a:~
; J -s ~,m c-.-fm K g.,3 nr . r~ ' m l # # t',
7 v r ., . . ; 4 s .,_ m. : , e
- l. ,, ev e > ll , y c. <.
s,,ne r sr, t 4 _ _ - ~ _ . . . - -
?
l 1 l 1 I 1 i t' SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-25 i Amendment K , 16.7-25 October 30,1992 I
t CESSAR Ennncmo. 3 j i 16.7.13 3.4.13 RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE RCS PlV f akage 3.4.13 +
- 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Pressure isolation Valve (PIV) Leakace jdC lk3s.
LCO 3.4.13 Leakage from each RCS PIV shall be !:rix' :: 0.5 ,em F. au - i :a nr v.tue
+ rp te 2 -a-r: cf [5 ,emi = au RC.5 p mum k (2230 m4 s 227^] ym.. i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Y enkage from one or A.L hstore RCS PIV leakage to )thours more RCS PIVs not 2. 2. within limit. '11. within limit.
~9F.
NOTE Each valve used to satisfy Required Action A.2.1 or A.2.2 must have been demonstra:ed to meet S 3.4.13.1 and be m the E :::!=: pressure boundary,{ c % y( r#(88vv e en . m. Isolate the high pressure A.% 1 4 hours portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of one closed manual, deactivated automatic or check valve. AND I" """"
.. ..-- . .. 4 0 T t.s _ . _ _ _. . . _ , _-
i.bamc QJ:.a c.it e L attmad Er e.sc L 41. J (4th . 2 Lsr 9pi:c..Wc C.d. Im -uA by J AC" b" "
-ae . a .,e ca we y a :m e<>Me PU.
SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-26 Amendment I 16.7-26 December 21,1990
e-i 1 CESSAR 8lni"lCAT13N l 's i RCS PIV I rakage 3.4.13 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACflON COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.)l isolate the high pressure 72 hours portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of a second closed manual, ductivated automatic, or, check valve. B. m Required Actions and B.1 Be in MOl;E 3. 6 hours associated Completion Timesjnot met. AND [. GM.W;a A B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 1 1 1 l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-27 Amendment I 16.7-27 December 21,1990
CESSAR n!!ific41cu RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.13.1 dtn gin-MM-- --- I ^ MWE* *M
- OT%-v '
h S" 2.0 !: ::: vpEr ~ rt:; --' MODES 3 and 4 4ke 1 4 + " I T 'S '"S fe 6: pu:pe:: :":::f ; S: ;:lic, dc.a byaq enA. l u 63 u nJ&TeT I t Verify leakage from each RCS PlV M tot.5 gpm [18 months) .
/ per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum of [5
/
gpm], at a RCS pressure 2: [2230,Jand s;[2270] psia. AND [ O p.A Prior a entenng MODE p<(ovmtd on Me. the pD,2 haswhenever Os y y,iui,,cl h k I Sc5 been in MODE 5 for 7 days RtS P1Vs lecA,J A & -!EE %A or more, if leakage uken in Ot. s b 4do m coo h ,a a lt. e4 testing has not been I performed m the [-
#9' '
previous 9 months RC5 'P1Vs ocAv.a4rj dur4 4e. 3 O Qev Somage_ o& 4% 5moen\ owf._, are. Within 24 hours Ac4 repir.1 lo b.bedel mo<e. %an following valve once. iC a. re p.1:4tve. -\,.sk hop actuation due to ca.no4 be be\ded, automatic or manual action or flow through the valve. l* SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-28 Amendment K 16.7-28 October 30,1992
1 CESSAR E!ai"lCATION t
'e 16.7.14 3.4.14 RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUh1ENTATION RCS Leakage Detection Instmmentation 3.4.14 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.14 RCS Leakare Detection Instrumentation l
( LCO 3.4.14 The following RCS leakage detection instruna.ntation shall be OP'3RABLE: ; C..,% :u -. .d. '
- a. ^- :;u- c ci:y sump monitor, and l K
^~ '! Ap c!=; +=i 'cs;' ...;J., _.d I b.. GeerIntainment atmosphere radioactivity monitor (gaseous or particulate)* M6
- c. Cuts:a..A u kr v~d n u ds. has ~ .,s M w .
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4. ACTIONS , tr.hc.a(ML, es CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME c.a% ann. A 6stp A. Required nec 2i A.I Perform SR 3.4.'t9.1. Un~ce per 24 hours
\
( sump monitor w 12 iw!A, u b.. ;ma AND 1; 4e ' ~d'% inoperable, y,j f. ,. g 7 0R
~'-"'
A.2 Restore inerved4rerx; c..r." )3. days m -E to OPERABLE status. B. Required containment B.I.1 W.r .oa./nalyze grab Once per 24 hours ; l atmosphere samples of the contamment j radioactivity monitor atmosphere. inoperable. i O_R ' B.I.2 Perform SR 3.4.12.1. Once per 24 hours A4b 3e B.2 Restore containment [X. days] k atmosphere radioactivity monitor to OPERABLE status. l{ o.'ted w ta;a m 8 - - Morg . . - . . . . . (continued) G c Eu wkde d# l' M E6 A
. . . " . - -W. .l' . -
tn n h, s e [ ~.wo f ud te , ( SYSTEM 80+ 3.4 29 Amendment K 16.7-29 October 30,1992
CESSAR 8!?ai"icaries I RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.14 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours D. All required monitors D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately inoperable. ( l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-30 Amendment I 16.7-30 December 21,1990
CESSAR naama RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.14.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the required {12] hon s l containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors / SR 3.4.14.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the 31 days required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors. SR 3.4.14.1 - Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required [18)onths 4 containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors.
- SR 3.4.14. A Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the .. [18] months 3 containment sump monitor.
SR 3.4.14.5 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of theJuddup [18honths
;c! := d 5 . J . a b c 4h.t c .lu '
g. coa.4c.sutc, tus m .-tw . 4 i I i i I SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-31 I l Amendment K 16.7-31 October 30,1992
I ) l CESSAR ninricuiow l 16.7.15 3.4.15 RCS SPECII~IC ACTIVITY RCS Specific Activity 3.4.15 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.15 RCS Specific Activity hle ; LCO 3.4.15 The specifi clivity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to:
> b. y hoss specific activity s 100/$ pCilgm.md
> q . 5. 4 DOSE EQUIVALENT l 131 specific activity s 1.0 pCilgmj awd APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2 and 8 MobE3 ud RC5 cuefebt desp9rt (Tag DN.
- ACTIONS i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
([- hf. Gross specific activity 6 X.1 b~ N...m r %uw!LE n-3. N. If; R 4 hours of the reactor coolant EQUIVALENT i-131. not within limit. ANQ J l A.2 Be in M oMNb E3 wiR%)-)6
< sco*F Ebours _
4.A DOSE E.1 DISHY DOSE EQUIV- Once per 4 hours
) EQUIVALENT l-131 4 ALENT l-131 s 60 Cilgm.
e< > 1.0 pCilgm. l
,l ANQ 4-E.2 Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 48 hours 1-131 to within limit.
1 C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 4.= Jihours
~
s associated Completion MobE 3 W A - g i Timer of Condition B 4 600
- F. %
! not met. 9.E i DOSE EQUIVALENT l-131
> 60 pCi/gm.
SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-32 l Amendment I 16.7-32 December 21,1990 l
I i CESSAR En'sncui:,. 1
.f I
i RCS Specific Activity 3.4.15 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY O < < %n :. reactor coolant gross specific activity s J21.e... i SR 3.4.15.1 D::e::: 100/8 Cilgm. 7 dM S R 3.4.15.2 DNMn reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131
~
14 days specific activity s 1.0 Ci/gm. AND Between 2 and 6 hours after THERMAL POWER i change 215% # RTP within a 1, hour period. SR 3.4.15.3 NOTEf NOTE
- 1. C". 3.0 A i: ::: ,y: 1 E Oaty q : . J -i.
( ua ,, u.a w w e -.~eJ t "M Moe:: :.--- jl'.3t A;fanple after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of MODE 1 operation have elapsed since the - reactor was last suberitical for 2 48 hours. Determine $4 dra % a 3 s wplt. 4tken i 184 days hf\o bG l ache a minim % g
;2 G FPD epd Ac dcq5 t4 k\cbE, l cape,4.Lf en h9 a e. d a p+cl M m s 4t rt a de As hs wbtrilfed Ef 1 % 6< s ,
SM - -- -- Daly ago,xa d 4 be ferfe~ d la A/QbE/, SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-33 Amendment K 16.7-33 October 30,1992
CESSAR nainc-- 16.7.16 3.4.16 RCS IDOPS - TEST EXCEI' TION RCS loops - Test Exception 3.4.16 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 RCS Loops - Test Exception LCO 3.4.16 He requirements of LCOs 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.4 and noted requirements of Table ; 3.3.1-1 may be suspended during startup PHYSICS TESTS provided:
- a. THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5 % of RTP, and
- b. He reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set s; [5]% of RTP.
- c. Both RCS loops and at least one reactor coolant pump in each loop are in operation.
- d. He RCS pressure temperature relationship is maintained within the acceptable region of operation required by Figure 3.4.3-1 A except that the core critical l line shown in the figure does not apply.
i APPLICABILITY: MODE 2 during startup and PHYSICS TESTS. , 1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1 l A. THERMAL POWER A.1 Open reactor trip breakers. Immediately p not within limit af C p required number W M 3 RCS loops and RCP not in operation. (continued) 4 SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-34 Amendment Q 16.7-34 June 30,1993
CESSAR !!ninemo,. RCS Loops - Test Exception 3.4.16 ; I ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Inunediately ! B. RCS pressure and B.1 Open reactor trip breakers temperature outside limits specified in M B.2 Restore RCS pressure, _ 30 minutes temperature within limits of Figure 3.4.3-1A . M B.3 Perform Engineering Prior to achieving next evaluation to ensure structural reactor criticality integrity of the RCS. i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify THERMAL POWER s: 5% of RTP. I bour SR 3.4.16.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 12 hours prior to logarithmic power level and linear power level neutron initiating startup or flux monitoring channel. PHYSICS TESTS SR 3.4.16.3 Verify that both RCS loops and one RCP in each loop is 1 bour l in operation. SR 3.4.16.4 Verify RCS pressure / temperature relationship within limits I hour specified in Figure 3.4.31 A. l SR 3.4.16.5 Verify RCS average temperature is 2 [300*F]. I bour - SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-35 Amendment Q 16.7-35 June 30,1993 l
-- - - ~ _ - , - -. - , ,- _1
^ CESSAR nL m,. l l t J 16.7.17 3.4.17 REACTOR COOLANT GAS VENT SYSTEM 4 Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System a 3.4.17 a ! 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System i j {%. N fe.m LCO 3.4.17 Seth] reactor coolant system gas vent paths shall be OPERABLE rd 'ai e - ^ ef the following locations: J
- a. Reactor vessel head, and
- b. Pressurizer steam space.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTIONS , _ CONDITION, REQUIRED AC. T ION COMPLETION TIME v a e. u A. gent patk .mta^P ki - A.1 Restore required vent path to 72 hours ( from the reactor, head OPERABLE status. n
- 1:- ; vene{
4yerdle . 3 A.2. I Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
-6ER A d 2.1
. A.X Be in MODE 5. 36 hours bis 4, ( 6ter = * % ,
B. wVent path Eq u s B.1 Restore required vent path to 72 hours from the pressurizer OPERABLE status. steam space sent-hne. i~ yen b{c. g B.2. l Be in Mode 3. 6 hours 4t!D A*/ D Bf'
- 2. Be in Mode 5. 36 hours l l
(contmued) l 1 i SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-36 . Amendment K ! 16.7-36 October 30,1992
CESSAR !! hun I Reactor Coolant Ors Vent System 3.4.17 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. "Twa
- - ciis required C.1 Restore at least one of the 6 hours
~+~ c i . -' :y:' = required vent paths to vent paths bm OPERABLE status.
OPEP>.0LE.
</.% c tow 4 I..a QE i.a of t a+ kl v. . ,
C.2 a Be in Mode 3. 6 hours BED L1 36 hours C.3 Be in Mode 5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.17.1 Verify all manual isolation valves in each vent path are 18 months locked in the open position. SR 3.4.17.2 Cycle each vent through at least one complete cycle from 18 months the control room. SR 3.4.17.3 Verify all manual isolation valves to pressure instruments 18 months in each vent path are in the open position.
-- SR 3.d P' V:-ify Sc>> irsegh ic ;;s:e. c 1 ui ya .c ; 7 2 : la .m,uis-6.: ; met:mg_
SR 3.4.17.7 Verify correct breaker alignment and position indication 7 days 4 power available. l I I SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-37 Amendment O I 16.7-37 May 1,1993
j i j CESSAR n!!inema j l l
's I
i 16.7.18 3.4.18 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION FUNCTION Rapid Depressurization Function l 3.4.18 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) I I 3.4.18 Rapid Depressurization Function LCO 3.4.18_." ::a:[ne of the two vent paths providing the Rapid Depressurization Functionof the S:Oy Dqu~.. Luo Cy.:'r shall be c; d!: =d bS pi; d.;.!! k :!: ed d A: "::= d x: .;-. .;pec. OffAABLE. . APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,2,3 and 4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Twoc:sm;.;.!= A.1 Restore N one of the two 72 hours sp. bk ca aa.g tai vent paths to OPERABLE vent paths so-be status. ,_ inoperable. ( A.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours 6.MD A.3 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours a vent / B1 Restore valve to closed hours th found o sition
/
/ .oa B e in Md'Db 6 hours I
AND 4 Sc3
/ Be in MODE 5. 6 hours (contusued) ;
SYSTEM 80+ 3.4-38 Amendment O 16.7-38 May 1,1993 ,
k ] CESSARnahm. ,
't 4
i i ) Rapid Depressurization Function l 3.4.18 i
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.18.1 Verify all manual isolation valves to pressure instmments [18 months]
in each vent path are in the open position. i SR 3.4.18.2 Cycle the valves in each vent path at least one complete [18 months] cycle from the control room. SR 3.4.18.3 Verify correct valve position indication in the control -hiny {p.] L.u3 room.E d' .ava. SR 3.4.18.4 Verify correct breaker alignment and position indication 7 days g .= ' " : - power available. ( l 1 1 I D
.l SYSTEM 80+ 3.4 39 i
Amendment O 16.7-39 May 1,1993
l l l
't System 80+ vs. STS Differences l T.S.4 3.5.1 Safety Injection Tanks (SITS)
Ap'plicability - Operability must be maintained anytime pressure can exceed 900 psia (includes MODES 3 and 4). S.R. 3.5.1.6 Surveillance is required to insure operability of the SITS (e.g., active failure of vent valve could make a SIT inoperable.). 3.5.2 SIS - Operating Applicability - Safety analyses for System 80+ assumes SIS available in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Condition A - System 80+ SIS design allows one train to be inoperable for 72 hours. Does not take credit for flow from other trains as in STS. Action B.2 - Due to applicability action requires entry l to MODE 4 if LCO not met. l S.R. 3.5.2.1 - System 80+ does not use key locks on tha ; control panels. , System 80+ does not have HPSI and LPSI and throttle valves are not utilized to throttle flow. 3.5.3 SIS - Shutdown Due to differences in Safety Injection System design, the System 80+ Tech Spec is different from STS. This is ' attributable to the extended applicability and train separation. 3.5.4 IRWST Due to SIS design for LOCA protection during shutdown, , the IRWST Applicability is different. IRWST has l temperature limits to insure containment integrity is 1 maintained following Containment Spray inadvertent I actuation. 1 I 1 j
CESSAR nainema Ewam EJcy (c a (co' A tr TysTru (pr-h 16.8 3.5 SA;r: ? !NJEC:ON SLi c.ivi (5isi ( 16.8.1 3.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS (SITS) Safety Injection Tanks , MELGEhC, y (D R; Ch. A e Sy iT4dELC 5 3.5 E? FT !NJEC".';O:4 SYSTE:4 (sis)- 3.5.1 S_sfety Iniection Tanks (SITS) LCO 3.5.1 Four SITS shall be OPERABLE. t APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2 MODES 3 and 4 with pressurizer pressure 2 [900] psia. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SIT inoperable due A.1 Restore boron concentration 72 hours to boron concentration to within limits. < not within limits. ( B. One SIT inoperable for B,1 Restore SIT to OPEP.ADLE 1 hour , status. j reasons other than Condition A. C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion . Times of Condition A AN_Q , or B not met. C.2 Reduce pressurizer pressure 12 hours i to < [900) psia. D. M1 -- SITS D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable. 1 i l SYSTEM 80+ 3.5 1 Amendment I 16.8-1 December 21,1990 l i
i 1 l "5'" ) CESS AR CC:TiflCATICN 1 l l l i i Safety Injection Tanks 3.5.I 1 SURVEILLANCE RE"flREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILI.ANCE Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully open. 12 hours SR 3.5.1.1 i 12 hours SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each SIT is 2 [1625 cubic feet (25% narrow range) and s 1902 cubic feet, (75 % narrow range)]. Verify nitrogen cover-pressure a each SIT is 2 [575] 12 houn SR 3.5.1.3 f ' psig and s [627] psig. SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each SIT is 2 [5 $[,31 days i ppm and s [4400] ppm. AND
+
Once within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of 2 [1%) of tank volume 3 u ;3 af A xAx
" " ' "
- f a v4 't ~~ h.*
SR 3.5.1.5 [\FM nagi . n, / %&A _ w. Ta a s r. _/W" ^ YQ^[5 JC f;aQ 31 days Verify powe removed from each SIT isolation valve operatorp . a ~ ;#m ..elter ez m ,u :3 ? ] :;3 #.a. SR 3.5.1.6 $OTE Ony/equirehwhen-RGS-pressure is 2 [900) psia. pwa.w
.s 31 days .
Verify power
- removed from each SIT vent valve operator.
f l
. . . d - T .. -
<M h ;g ta os 9 343. nd W gtTc ct, A SIT 3.5-2 SYSTEM 80+
Arnendmmt Q 16.8-2 June .40,1993 I w__ . . . - . . -
C E S S A R aniincy.. 't 16.8.2 3.5.2 SIS DIVISIONS - OPERATING SIS - Operating l 3.5.2 SySTde(Ecc5) 64CAGr"W G f C M C CA4 e 3.5 SAFETY I'"FNON W4 TEM &t919)
$d]tf; [ ' 4 :. 5 ym -- l 3.5.2 419 - Operatinz Four trains of SIS shall be OPI RABLE. l LCO 3.5.2 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2 and 3 ACTIONS
+
REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A.1 Restore train to' OPERABLE 72 hours l A. SIS train [ inoperable. status. B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not ANR met. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours I 3.5-3 SYSTEM 80+ Amendment K ! October 30,1992 16.8-3
CESSAR Ennncum l l
'f l
l S!S - Operating 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE
..A Verify the following valves are in the listed position) 12 hours) l 1 R 3.5.2.1 9..sse *= m we sfa cs,- r sm) .
Valve Nutuber Position Function [ Shut] [ Hot 12g] Injection [St 604] [ Shut] [ Hot Leg] Injection -
% [SI 609]
31 days SR 3.5.2.2 verify each SIS manual, power cperated, or automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, scaled or J otherwise secured in position is in its correct position. DWhe SIS pipingkil of water. 31 days] SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.4 Verify each.Sa N[NN In accordance with d?N)T7p'"y injection pump
'st e differential k of[ ]
pressure the Inservice
-, _ _ ='Testing psid. , o., <u:e s J..a +. sa y y
yea oths D:r-Etre each SIS train automatic valve in the flow [18 SR 3.5.2.$ L path actuates tokcorrect position on [an] actual or simulated :i, ajm.cn actuation signalDd. SR 3.5.2.$ Ob$Nr2 each Safety Injection pump starts [18hnths 9= 7 automatically on an actual or simulated d:- , actuation signal. l t Verify, by visual inspection, that each-Sluram-suction (18}nonths f SR 3.5.2.)f inles.and the IRWST Holdup Volume Tank is not restricted by debris and starthe #- W trash j seks and screens show no evidence of structural i i distress or abnormal corrosion. L as A ue, u A S.S.'t . 5 /u 1 7 m S i s 7.,y d. a.;f, a 44,.2 A T u,n h ~csti r* [ ]p 4.r 2 s l . . , a. ) u '
,a - w ,+ [ ] v.y . My 3.5-4 SYSTEM 80+
Amendment Q 16.8-4 June 30,1993
I I l 1 l CESSAR naincano.
't l 16.8.3 3.5.3 SIS DIVISIONS - SIIUTDOWN SIS - Shutdown h 3.5.3 EMERGf Af Y C l.L C >:) .+< 5ys e%(Eoc.5) 3.5 GATETY RUE 50N evST98 (SG)-
3.5.3 SIS - Shutdown h.,, s d SiO g LCO 3.5.3 Two S fc:y Ld dc (SO :.i:fdi one pwap.in each divisionjhall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 4,apd 5 , 2 MODE 6 when RCS level < [120' - 0*] ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME so> Sis n Required SCtrain met A.1 Restore ::qu.m" - . : 5: :. 6 I bour lK A. U,g v6/e. O" ERA"LE. to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and -ft-t- Y:-ify "IS 'ng r:5 44kmr K associated A < 2:0*" : :!d: n n Completion Time not I ; - .,. met. f
/ '
g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
),, ., ,,'- . , ~ w so.-
SR 3.5.3.1 -*rf== the followmg s .-- - - - ' =" 76== : In accordance with rcg.x3 t S OPED "LE, - applicable SRs ; i (SR 3.5.2.1] C~SM- l
- ,R 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.6
[SR 3.5.2.3] SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.4 Q s.t z./] 1 k > i- g l i'l
^Ic e'.h dC 5iou
*f:C G 3.G.4 o me .; , ak. g ,
, ,..] ,
h 0d j
- ) L a. r e- c.c s wa .m u w s '1 3.1. 2.
( L__. _ . _ - - . - - - { L I [itd - d').9
/ 3 SYSTEM 80+
/
/ ' -
M.55 e__ t
- Amendment K I 16.8-5 October 30,1992 ;
- 6. 2. 6 6 A,Cs sf yduc. . Z4 ba es j
- h. 4 13 7
- F l
I i i ! l CESSAR Enn"icmou , i 't 16.8.4 3.5.4 IN-CONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK ORWST) In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 3.5.4 EMEAGE4Cy (a A. E C o o L- 4 (r- 51 5 N ( F ccf) 3.5 u,TET/ .. J iO:4s> '"1m; 3.5.4 In-containment Refueline Water Storace Tank (IRWST) LCO 3.5.4 he IRWST shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, ansL5, A.i j MODE 6 with RCS level < [120 ft - 0 in] , ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
-4 #
tr. iRW5T 6.id (1 Restore IRWST kr'--_4 mm I hour i g, . .._.._..m__-. ma -- _ . _ 2.e _ i : __ : . - g
'c.i^ ' lumt. O/dAA6Lf._ Jk ios.
K IRWST boron ).1 Restore IRWST to 8 hours
- A. concentration not A. OPERABLE status.
within limits. 93 . IRWST borated water temperature not within limits. 1 C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not AN.,Q met. g C.2 Be in MODE 5 ossaecesaR 36 hours lK r~ A.j b
$ 6. I .t .J 5 T- ,-. ye n t/c Ie r rcusa >C- C .1, 64 R.cs tc._guda. 4fkws l Na A. ,
t,, g g3gop l L.I b (.y As Os ca. M5 .c-al b SI 4..,s. 5 E ht ' - ."] . SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-6 i-Amendment K 16.8-6 October 30,1992 1
i CESSAR Einibnon ! 1 l In<antainment Refueling Water Storage Tank 3.5.4 ) l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.4.1 Venfy IRWST borated water temperature is within 24 hours gange specified in Figure 3.5.4-1 SR 3.5.4.2 Venfy useable IRWST borated water volume is 7 days h f 2[505.000] gallons and s (535.000] gallons. SR 3.5.4.3 Venfy that the IRWST 11oldup Volume Tank is 7 days [ Empty j. SR 3.5.4.4 Venfy IRWST boron concentratica is 2 [4000] ppm 7 days and s [4400] ppm. K SYSTEM 804 3.5-7 Amendment K 16.8 7 October 30,1992
CESSAR nainemo In<ontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank 3.5.4 120 , , , , , , , ' MAXIMUM ALLOWED IRWST TEMPERATURE 110 -- - __________________ 100 - OPERATION ALLOWED g go _ - o N C E w - s ro _ 3 70 - E OPERATION
?.'OT _
60 - ALLOWED so - I I I I I I I 40 110 120 130 140 60 70 80 85 90 100 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE ( ALLOWED 1RWST TEMPERATURE VS. CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE-FIGURE 3.5.4-1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-8 l l Amendment K i 16.8-8 October 30,1992
. . _ - . . _ - . _ _ . . . . _ . . . ~ , . - _ . _ . - - _ - - . _ , _ - . . _ _ . . - - _ - , - - _ . . _ . , . . , . . - _ . . , - .
1 CESSAR nenneum,. l l l i tai 16.8.5 l l 3.5.5 ,DfSODIUM PHOSPIIATE (DSP)
.e o T I)i' sodium Phosphate (PSP) l 3.5.5 FMS LGE.JCy ( =&C Cou.k G System (Ltc h l 3.5 - . . u,, m .v., 5Ya i t.w 915; Tr. T 3.5.5 Disodium Phosphate (DSP) l
-gp 14 0 I
LCO 3.5.5 ne DSP baskets shall contain 2 [4 } cubic feet of active RSP. l APPLICABILITY- MODES 1,2, and 3. l ACTIONS = REQUIRED ALTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION ' A. [SP not within A.1 RestorekSP to within limits. 72 hours l timits. B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not AND met. B.2 Be in Mode 4. [12] hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE % FDEQUENCY SR 3.5.5.1 ; . Verify the kSP baskets contain 2 [* ] ft' of granular [18hnths
'# hviium phosphate, dW e m ,,gc c e ,
l SR 3.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the kSP baskets provides [lkmonths adequate pH adjustment of IRWST water. f i l SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-9 i I Amendment Q ! 16.S-9 June 30,1993 j 1
f System 80+ vs. STS Differences o T.S.# , 3.6.1 Containment S.R. 3.6.1.2 - System 80+ containment does not use tendons. 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves S.R.3.6.3.8 in STS - Not 'tsed by System 80+ due to design features differences. 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature System 60+ has minimum air tempera.ure. The 60*F was used for initial conditions for performance capability on SIS. (SAR 6.2.1.5) 3.6.6 Containment Spray STS has containment spray and containment cooling in one T.S. System 80+ only has containment spray and does not , have a safety ralated containment cooling system. Actions and SR's are significantly different due to these design features. 3.6.7 H 2 Analyzers System 80+ has been asked by NRC to include this T.S. System 80+ does not have the following: (1) Spray Additive System; (2) a safety related H 2 Recombiner System; (3) a H 2 Mixing System; (4) Iodine Cleanup Systems; and (5) Vacuura Relief. 3.6.8 Shield Building STS SR 3.6.11.1 - not used by System 80+ T.S. Annulus transient analyses assumes the annulus to be at atmospheric pressure. S.R. 3. 6.13. 4 - STS - System 80+ - Annulus Vent. Does not have bypass damper.
r System 80+ vs. STS Differences T.S.# 3.5.1 Safety Injection Tanks (SITS) Ap'plicability - Operability must be maintained anytime pressure can exceed 900 psia (includes MODES 3 and 4). S.R. 3.5.1.6 Surveillance is required to insure operability of the SITS (e.g., active failure of vent valve could make a SIT inoperable.). 3 ! 3.5.2 SIS - Operating j Applicability - Safety analyses for System _80+ , assumes SIS available in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
- Condition A - System 80+ SIS design allows one train to be inoperable for 72 hours. Does not take credit for flow from other trains as in.STS.
Action B.2 - Due to applicability action requires entry to MODE 4 if LCO not met. S.R. 3.5.2.1 - System 80+ does not use key locks on the control panels. System 80+ does not have HPSI and LPSI and throttle valves are not utilized to thr:ttle flow. 3.5.3 SIS - Shutdown Due to differences in Safety Injection System design, l the System 80+ Tech Spec is different from STS. This is attributable to the extended applicability and train separation. l 3.5.4 IRWST l I Due to SIS design for LOCA protection during shutdown, the IRWST Applicability is different. IRWST has temperature limits to insure containment integrity is maintained following Containment Spray inadvertent actuation.
CESSARnahm. EAc % F,,3Cy (cdf COOL A k T y ST C4 h C' 16.8 3.5 s n u r !N;r c :c:-: a ,e.rm iais, ( 16.8.1 3.5.1 SAlYrY INJECTION TANKS (SITS) Safety injection Tanks EMELGEAc. Y (D R;: C .:a L.. k $Y aITkE'5-1 3.5 E? t'P' 0 JEGO:4 5YSTE:,i iS;;) 3.5.1 Safety Iniection Tanks (SITS) l l LCO 3.5.1 Four SITS shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2, MODES 3 and 4 with pressurizer pressure 2: [900] psia. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACrlON COMPLETION TIME A. One SIT inoperable due A.1 ~ Restore boron concentration 72 hours to boron concentration to within limits. not within limits. ( B. One SIT inoperable for B.1 Restore SIT to OPERABLE 1 hour reasons other than status. Condition A. C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion l Times of Condition A ANJ1 ! or B not met. ! C.2 Reduce pressurizer pressure 12 hours ! to < [900] psia. D. EEA N 'm SITS D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable. I SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-1 l Amendment I l 16.8-1 December 21,1990
. - . _ _ , __ _ _ . . . _ . . . ~ _._..._m
1 CESSARnahum i Safety Injection Tanks ; 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE 12 hours SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully open. 12 hours i ' SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each SIT is 2 (1625 cubic feet (25% narrow range) and s 1902 cubic feet, (75% nzrrow range)]. 12 hours SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover-pressure in each SIT is 2 [575] psig and s (627] psig. wOd 3 31 days SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each S"is 2 (2000] ppm and s [4400] ppm. AND Once within 6 hours after each solution I volume increase of 2 (1%]of tank volume 3 Tu ;3 a gt A
\ ""N' N N
! SR 3 515 yym, *, w sitnr. Q Y C /~'rX M> f W Yl _ _ _ a 31 days Verify powedremoved from each SIT isolation, valve operatorts. . <~ ,
< .se;1er e s v. - < u : ? Li::a k. . .
,,gm-a SR 3.5.1.6 NOTE Oog/cquirehwhen -RGS. pressure is 2 (900] psia.
gIT j 3.5-2 SYSTEM 80+ Amendment Q 16.8-2 June 30,1993
h CESSARnium. l t i 16.8.2 3.5.2 SIS DIVISIONS - OPERATING t t SIS . Operating l , 3.5.2 I ES AG MC, f ( m C ox.% 57s7Eu (Ecc s,) 3.5 SAFHY IM'EN.OM %'&TEMfM519) I
.04454;. S W' y - ;
3.5.2 -Me - Coerstine l LCO 3.5.2 Four trains of SIS shall be OPERABLE. l. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2 and 3 , ACTIONS , REQUIRED AC110N COMPLETION TIME ! CONDITION A.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 72 hours l A. [NSIS train inoperable. status. B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours B. Required Action and , associated Completion Time not AND rnet. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours 1 i 4 l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-3 Amendment K
'I6.8-3 Octolwr 30,1992 -
_ , , , - . . . _ -._u,_.:-...__._
CESSAREnLuo I i l i f I SIS - Operating 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS : FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE
.x.
SR 3.5.2.1 Verify the following valves are in the listed position) 12 hours) l l e.sv n % w eefac.e e m et. r Valve Number Position Function l [ Shut] [ Hot Leg] Injection l [SI604] [ Shut] [ Hot Leg] lajection
% [SI 609]
t Verify each SIS manual, power operated, or automatic 31 days i SR 3.5.2.2 valve in the flo,v path that is not locled, sealed or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position. 31 day]s SR 3.5.2.3 D IN4 SIS pipingkil of water. each.Sa ty injection pump io c*c.pH
- P^) In accordance with SR 3.5.2.4 Verify,MT7gJ" FC= e s differentia! pressure of[the ] Inservice '
_ _ s- Testing psid. os c. . r :J.- u.s p v er. w (18pnths SR 3.5.2.$ D : x=' each SIS train automatic valve in the flow L path actuates toMcorrect position on [an) actual or { simulated :- 'u ym.;n actuation signalDd. SR 3.5.2.jk ChE$r* cach Safety injection pump stasts (18haths ; 4= I 7 automatically on an actual or simulated =':; , actuation signal. 7 l SR 3.5.2 7 Verify, by visual inspection, that each-Sl!hram-suction [18hoths f inie4-and the IRWST Holdup Volume Tank is not f restricted by debris and thatthe-W EH trash j racks and screens show no evidence of structural i distress or abnormal corrosion. A " "'
! , S A Esa.s lu.q m 3.s t'M d'#c'P ' b" o [ ]p cr - e . . ., c p -it 2-.s.,mc.'Lt.g k 3as
)
,. re n a >r [ ] es.y .
i
.a ,.
SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-4 Amendment Q 16.8-4 June 30,1993
4 CESSARnnLm. ! 16.8.3 3.5.3 SIS DIVISIONS - SIWTDOWN SIS - Shutdows h E WJGFZ y Cedr_ C n 4s sysiu(Etc-5) J 3.5 6AFETY ;!"ECT40N SYSTE"M l 3.5.3 SIS - Shutdowm l t%.e s d S8E LCO 3.5.3 Two Of;;y :.da;. - (S!) ; bfit one pump.in each divisionjhall be
. g OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4,apd 5. . ~l MODE 6 when RCS level < [120* - 0*] ALTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ss> u.m sis n a A. Required SCtrain not A.1 Restore e'y " 'r ; S! :..- I hour lK jf,go/de, OPERABL-E. to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and -B-t- Vrify RCS ': pr :r: -24 in, . - R associated +2:0" ; ;ccd c.,c.: Completion Time not u - ,. met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I j SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j 72--i= the following s;F,E, - .. m: foratt2qmp. .ent- In accordance with
! SR 3.5.3.1 rcq::::J r S OP"9_E. applicable SRs
[SR3.5.2.Il ;^JT'~"5-l ! SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.6 [SR 3.5.2.3] SR 3.5.2.7 ' l SR 3.5.2.4 [_ e s.t 4. / )
% '*\
- lc r'. (C 3 ,a n \ N = > r* g MG 3.0.4 o uo; bbk, g {,3 , ,,.] ,
\ "
0R
)
b le ,Th e' Id C S Mei 3 + M'O
- -- (' B . i . 2.
3 o c Otv- 3 ].m 'l SYSTEM 80+ / 3.5-5 l - - ~ = ~M= . i Amendment K 16.8-5 October 30,1992 S . 2- tek LCS %gudo.1 2.s k w s b, 411F*F
i CESSAR naincuiou , 16.8.4 3.5.4 IN-CONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (IRWST) In<ontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank EM EA4EA C '1 Ma c o a t.h tr- 51 5 7 A- ( Ec45) 3.5 E/ JET'l ..,C T!O!J ' ' ' ' & (:!U 3.5.4 In-containment Refueline Water Storace Tank (IRWST) LCO 3.5.4 ne IRWST shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, mid.Sf M d MODE 6 with RCS level < [120 ft - 0 in] ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
-4 3
*. iRW5T 6.id Restore IRWST hr'" at:- I bour fl
'- 6 ; c_- b=-> =E...; = 1 Mi- !Mt. -ten uiG ;m ;. OMAA6t.1 ffdos V IRWST boron 11 Restore IRWST to R hours l- . concentration not 4. OPERABLE status.
within limits. ; 9E IRWST borated water temperature not within limits. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours l l ! associated Completion Time not AND met. i C.2 Be in MODE 5 osancesaR 36 hours lK 40
-6. T.tJ57 < - op e Lle.
Ie r re 49 e Ale C . 2, L A,,c,_ iLC.s %gda. 4f kw3 bA4 ^* , k, 4 g3gD p AJ b j 4,,,,. s C.3 Ac. A. r ACS . ~ .A b h 5'[ I Qtu' - :-] . l SYSTEM 80+ 3.54
\
Amendment K 16.8-6 October 30,1992 l
l CESSAR Enn"icarisu In<ontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank 3.5.4 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l FREQUENCY l SURVEILLANCE Venfy IRWST borated water temperature is within 24 hours SR 3 5.4.1 gange specified in Figure 3.5.4-1 SR 3.5.4.2 Verify useable IRWST borated water volume is 7 days h 2 [505,000] gallons and s [535,0001 gallons. SR 3.5.4.3 Verify that the IRWST Holdup Volume Tank is 7 days IEmpty]. SR 3.5.4.4 Venfy IRWST boron concentration is 2 [40001 ppm 7 days l and 6 [4400] ppm. K i l l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-7 Amendment K 16.8-7 October 30,1992
1 CESSAR Eatincuion .
't In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank !
3.5.4 + 120 , , , , , , g MAXIMUM ALLOWED IRWST TEMPERATURE
------------------ t 110 ---
100 - OPERATION ALLOWED g go _ _
?
CE e 80 - _ 2 N g, 70 - E OPERAT ON so - NOT _ i ALLOWED 50 - ! 40 60 70 80 85 90 100 110 120 130 140 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE 5 ALLOWED 1RWST TEMPERATURE VS. CONTAINMENT ATMOSPilERE TEMPERATURE FIGURE 3.5.4-1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-8 Amendment K 16.8-8 October 30,1992
i C E S S A R 8E nncan a ; Tal l l 16.8.5 3.5.5 ,DfSODIUM PHOSPIIATE (DSP) ! 3e6 T
)(wxlium Phosphate QDSP) l l' 3.5.5
{ FM.LK.GEJCf ( CKE Cm.b G SYS7gm f/sc. . 3.5 a ~ n . u,~ ~s w., 5iasc m wi51 4
- Ten T 3.5.5 Disodium Pbombate GSP) l i
TSP f T ) LCO 3.5.5 The D8P baskets shall contain 2 [ ] cubic feet of active RSP. l ; 1 i
! f APPLICABILITY MODES 1,2, and 3. l ij ACTIONS ;
i REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION
- T !. A.1 RestoreDSP to within limits. 72 hours l i A. MSP not within limits. ,
B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours , B. Required Action and '
- associated Completion Time not AF_]2 met.
B.2 Be in Mode 4. [12] hours , i i y SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE % FREQUENCY l - a
~
SR 3.5.5.1 _ Verify the ibSP baskets contain 2 [ ] ft' of granular [18hoths
~
l I i
Wium phosphate, dW q,.# ,,dr Atc .
SR 3.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the kSP baskets provides [18] months adequate pH adjustment of IRWST water. .; J 1 1 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.5-9 Amendment Q 16.8-9 June 30,1993. _ - _ , -. ,, - . . . . . - . -- - - , ~
'r System 80+ vs. STS Differences i
T.S.# r 3.6.1 Containment i
~
S.R. 3.6.1.2 - System 80+ containment does not use tendons. ' f 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves S.R.3.6.3.8 in STS - Not used by System 80+ due to design ' features differences. 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature System 80+ has minimum air temperature. The 60*F us used for initial conditions for performance capability on SIS. (SAR 6.2.1.5) 3.6.6 Containment Spray STS has containment spray and containment cooling in one . T.S. System 80+ only has. containment spray and does not have a safety related containment cooling system. Actions and SR's are significantly different due to these design features. 3.6.7 H 2 Analyzers System 80+ has been asked by NRC to include this T.S. System 80+ does not have the following: (1) Spray Additive System; (2) a safety related H 2 Recombiner System; (3) a H 2 Mixing System; (4) Iodine Cleanup Systems; and (5) Vacuum Relief. 3.6.8 shield Building STS SR 3.6.11.1 - not used by System 80+ T.S. Annulus ) transient analyses assumes the annulus to be at i atmospheric pressure. S.R. 3. 6.13. 4 - STS - System 80+ - Annulus Vent. Does not have bypass damper. l l
i CESSAR nai"icciou l 16;9 3.6 CONTAINhlENT SYSTEMS 16.9.1 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT Containment 3.6.1 i l 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 Containment i LCO 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES X, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Contamment A.1 Restore [ontainment to Ihour inoperable. OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and associated B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 Perfram requi.N visual examinations and lord,.f rate testing NOTE ; exe:pt for Conta ament P:Nf :1jeckdoctlxd!- t Sh J.0.2 is not tes'.ing, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jj as applicable. ! modified by approved exemptions. L ,. . . . - - . . . . -. 4 c. ,. em,L.,. In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J [ L ,v a m . 4-<.T ..i ac i,-(t gce 47 *1 as modified by
% _.m. .Wd v .- uta % r g o .. .e , P , ,pp,9 p, 9 ,
)
I l I I SYSTEM S0 + 3.6-1 l Amendment I 16.9-1 December 21,1990
P CESSAR En#ICATION h-l P.- ( 16.9.2 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT-PL*'*W**+ LOCKS A in Containment "u.e. -! Locks 3.6.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS h*a 3.6.2 Containment Pe ' Locks AIa LCO 3.6.2 {Twhontainment " ..~. .d Locks shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. I NOTES-
- 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs of the affected personnel lock components.
Spec;4h. ,,lla led b* e*c4 nIn. /*cA-
- 2. L.:,,22 xG:pr adl4 : extry--
?W -- e. ,e -me! :f : edE d 1:2.' d=! :f :: :-
,,,, _ t t - tm
- _ z_ ..u.
,,m.
- 3. E. uke p yI ;c.ekic ( ,oJh.CS *ad 5) 'd he 7:m W 4co u.e,
'lo.,,ts. ast', ala,i L<L 7c n df> <b 1cd"'d h L *'*" '"'* ~ N#W "
ACTIONS ,.s g,_,, f,m g,p,;_ , CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME b v A. Q:: d;;r c.v. We A.1 Verify kOPERABLE door I hour 4T/46'i .ie/ne or more is closed in e3$11'affected .- N0~J - B$otainment F O -1 lock % .
"$$..QLocks, itL cac v.o 1* l a~ +' AND gl1 jou. .iw
, 4,, . /c . 4.y u .,7; a ,,, ,, g737vgtg ,_7 t;=3_
.eum s-l QE' l A .2. 4
, , . 2. 2. P Lock n OPERABLE door 24 hours closed in M affected p$/'~::!locM.
ArJb & f -A.2.2.2 Verify hPERABLE door is Once per 31 days i A :3 locked closed.in M l affected p:hiOId lockg),
... . 4;e........- (continued)
Ilic to. da.es aa f ,4 ra e lat. b.! l SYSTEM 80+ At4 4 t mg M4 6,. 4 .'/:ed k J ( ) ch.ti ey ndm,s de,4tiac ,ess. l i l Amendment I ' 16.9-2 December 21,1990
_ - - ~ j
}
t
~ *~* .,
e b * - 1 l' h W uhu b.l , k . I. , % h.5 pu uT
.cos w - % uu f 4L g< krl , cwM M MAG lo cJz- au i 5H -
- z. ag J uf~pu-ofsy7yu s ry az L nLM f T&J 5 5 g i & [ y M a A fw un .;cpk ].
'MWT .
462bbd&n w- -- m
CESSAR natricmo
'f i
Alr Contair. ment " .~. .d Imks 3.6.2
.. 4o a s . . . ..
ACTIONS (continued) COMPl ETION TIME CONDITION \ REQUIRED ACTION B. Kontainment am ~.1 B Verify an OPERABLE door is I hour
- oc, .. . . . . E U E :! ks wA closed in ~eEli-affected ie ,e < % % interlock mechanism nManal lock %.
j inoperable.h v..a c,_,. :--at AND -
,M_..~..t.t__t__.
W EL#3 b. 54 4 54 EAJ E 5 47b
'-i- : q ;.db 2r.;s.
K B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door 24 hours closed in h affected F NSdlockh. f l NO 72 - - * **
. A.- louc da *4 .a h t *. AND r.a: 5.sa m.. u < y *e -
> a rc ri s. . 8 *~ d *1 B.3 Verify tbs. OPERABLE door is Once per 31 days od ist-afa.ii. w s. locked closed in haffected M lock d6 C. One or more ~9 C.) .,. .. MOZ ,
T 44fc /7 u oom ocors m na pcu,vuun fontamment iva ia.c hiicu mc w i bi,- PAT [neelihks r inoperable for Cuir-m sali oc deciarea-reasons other than ici-;.au- m ecc . ' . - - .i Condition A or B. - LCO 4.1- - l i C.). 2- Verify E cab door is Irc.2 ,'indy i n >.,<- closed in kaffected .;.- i+ ~ ..d lock.CQ. AND Aia Judd b CJ 3 Restorerpt OPERABLE status. 24 hours
- c. i .)..M n/w f, uQu
,,,,,tj (continued)
MTC # -
A y ucc f.u.i, ,
SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-3 1 Amend.T.ut K 16.9-3 October 30,1992 ; 1 I I l
It ame.c 1 % by A.f- 5 l
. ....... ar,a s .. _ ..
l I. 2.1 8. 2- i uf 8. 3 ca w l
/b[sdu[ L{nw i !
u7 y(LLlL ] l-7'l .t.o e ; A. .- -
.ahet ac 4 c@ Q LL7 C a Jued . a c..u .~.r 2
2J,7 A u dI a a,n.u16. ~ 4./ w . v r-d q ~ LL&J n&ld'. WW/WNW we ..
i I CESSAR Mi"icmon d 4 A i.e Containment Fa Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued) , CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Actiong D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated Completion Timeg' AND not met. D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE F QUIREMENTS SURVElLLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 NOTE 1,
/. An inoperable 4 e pr..
r4 lock----NOTE-door does not invalidate SR 3.0.2 is not P the previous successful performance of an overall applicable p%J-lock leakage test. ~
~
,2 ?($< /Irtzds./)
le4L . Perform required p=m.--! lock leek rate testing in In accordance with 10 accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J as modified CFR 50 Appendix J,.y adlhed 1 Map,. roved by approved exemption @. . " 1 ! '! t.+.-- . r. n . e ,
, j s- . exemptions t- - -._.;- ,
The acceptance criteria for p M4 lock testing are: ,L P. 0 7.. .m r , . . . . m 2 . - I
- a. Overall pN_-! lockTia'te is s [0.05 La]
~~ ' '
'; -J wb:n tested at %. 2l. /.
- u. I
- b. For each door, leak rate is s [.0li when tested at 2 [9.0] psig.
SR 3.6.2.2 D E.'dE2 S: only one door inb p::NOdlock .-N GTE can be opened at a time. Ord, , q,..;;j i' -v. psluwsu -.a..:. p.c .u,.; ' Si 67 : [-- f3aTi - - . - . - )yy Jy M y Apas 9 /c fu /o e a, j sys./ P A r:: :.:.j % Wn ' ~ r; . ,, ?4 i /., e sT. Cria.. ...m a l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-4 j Amendment K 16.9-4 October 30,1992
Amcse es 4 dec /6. 9-7
/ 'f
- b M
- b Mo %
, su9 a s . a. u a a a a n a,x v DCM sb &f psQ ^J, n mqad
+(yvozid %,Z s. g ~ - lE-l n tw Aa - . n 9 c cnt m my
+ &w3,: t w1
- Im1
/Y e.!W 9
r CESSAR n="ication -
't
( 16.9.3 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Containment isolation Valves 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. i NOTEf - ru g '-q r y 5: r;:--e : r3:-- !y _.i.-
- xLS- *- p-:7(:: -eg gW}
ad # c' ";; . :.; . i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. 9,! NOTE A.1 NOTC I
*)dL applicableguto ,eew. - % :.yy:. .Li. 6 :1.cx >
pd /4 3 . , a p, J ...vus wm penetration; r ; 7., r ; Stk daa gontainment isolation valves , rJy :: :2!::::: cd/ . 4- ; ;tg -,,.m . A e mer. y:w ( , , _ _. c. . . . i . . ,, m 8 f A.s pnf4 s e s.ye, f t.'.s -- v 3 uvun _
.w:.; v ..: : =
pe eeene,egontainment isolation valvet inoperable OPEid5LE m mL [except for purge valve err _ .;3 p; , 77- .mtice, leakage 4+mre)r AM 5Cs Il AbB-b i.if.<j *gra.s l e4* *je 4** d'
- WA * ., gnn ,
_ i, , 7 n; . . .
; 1. ;, . .g,_g ,7 OP5"J."LE r'ac ~
i l (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-5 Amendment I 16.9-5 December 21,1990
l 1 ACff>7c, f b f lN* f
- S
'f NO /W 4.h b $ h; [ # a h 0- M g., j ,,C , pA*(A L yb] ~.y .aMdMuMAG
-n .s,- .x<si wt<h .
2- dy T<- Gudi aTry JLucf l/d pc f<fA
-< b ,.4fL .
3 'E J u f,1L rJe. G>JLs ~a Q, f Cf 94 L (c) J ayJ:sGufir M-v6
- 9. Lt- ag M.4 GErw a lgJ ddng gLco 3 c. . i , Wa7 ,' ~L 14.- 4
- na9 m w~w aJ - r-A q <ae udu L .
ca.c y / n l
CESSAR nai"ication Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Isolatebaffected 4 hours A. (contmued) penetration'by use of at j'## /# 7T least one closed and
)
deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve 4veide _C::'i :.::t with flow through the valve secured.
... do;6-- ..
AND
.la l 4 < <, n.4 bl: d lis.,1e5 A.2 y g
. ^
,..:.2.2 Verify each affected Once per 31 days for o,/ /,, / 4,,c a
.'a n 7 i 6.s. ,r. J uc4 s ~7 e outside us.. , /-
penetration is isolated. 6c v <,'[A J h fontainment M -:a. 's te d. % .
* Sta pg
^ < e .5 AND Prior to entering i l
MOPE 4 from MODE 5 a' not m~e A= f ar $.<> J . >.'tAL ' A M*I*N : p;r 92 days 1
"' # ' *~ #",
for 4es inside footainment B. NOTE B.i nestore tne vaiven) w M '~ -q Only applicable to b6*. OPEL' OLE ar ;. r O Mf*'N ~ penetration /with enly-ene [ontainment isolation valve 5.
.gg---
=d : &::A :p.a wa %
N* ' Bgl isolate eneh affected 44 Ec ;:) - j Lf, penetration *by use of at p u c /, 4 f. .., r, '. f, One or moredcontainment least one closed and g (*
- Lje isolation valvesinoperabl4
- f. ,. rye fe; pg4 deactivated automatic valve, closed manual i l
~ valve, or blind flange.
m , ,4,g /,% u/
/
gmhbi o s:ne:.;s<suye. ***r ~. G !*~,t). g (contmued) l SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-6 Amendment I 16.9-6 December 21,1990
CESSARnuibuo 'f Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 i ACTIONS (contmued) REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f- JO@! TION Cpj * &% - r .. *m-"WU
..c,. _ . , mm n
c _ ,... _u,...-
- o. . , . ., -.v e n ,.ym u g Ca ae ,<c,pcfedaa p :.,;..;~ u . .u .. a ra , 94/kb o e fA c.: %- =! " ;; m.:- m :,c .. -
E .j E pne or morepontainment
, Purge valves not within h pt.;ge valve leakage limits.
M tX %. 24 hours pj,, ) e=RW !solate_each affected pg, { penetratiorfby uee of at A least one@losed and deactivated automatic { 'K
# j ' ' " '
valvei closed manual (- valve 7 or blind flange,]. bS.D r- ".hE. LP: ^ r.; " " 3.6. ',.7 - 4
) -e-2t Ouee g;M tys M. Required Actions and )p.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours l E associated Completion F. ;
Timey not met. ANS
'O.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours E . ~1- ~ ~ ' #U CE ~ ~ ~ ' ~~
V s s. a > <ssd of.dd J *9. s
.- 4.', a reJls Li wof my ec w.}lcd oy >>c a l +. s.'. ruf.+ &
. ... *(49
.~k l C , q y ,. J/ d g k* 5.,/d;.
Ye 4 'y % bi
~ ~ s.'u ; s t.a'de u,. w.as N re%C1.v.a %s p ;hy As0 6s . a i s t e.J ,
b.*or A enfer y Atobs f -f
~
h a t> Mcbl C .1 aoorpe}'u~ed As I k p.as;,,s qz )y f.+n,41 a . s,h> L die ca.n4l.laur SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-7 [ ,5 Pe c1.r- 5A 3.w. 3.6 he A m w rar . m ,~ + w ,- Da. p, { J J.M g hsa.d b c.~pl'y a,tk Amendment I 2 ,,t< / A y, / ./, 716.9-7 December 21,1990
.h.. 4 --.4 2 A..h..Wm- 4- a e s _Lw. 42. - - _ - 44 e 3.Ma,,- ,Jw*.h*,.ss a .c,-.a.-.-.a-.me.aa.m..g- - - - - - - - -
h k 0
- f/(,(((bt dw l t
*f C.f N s$s_ Ih] yr, ,
dM
% 16# W. /
2d'd %f r l sa ja pc. a.a i, - g .c L.r .- , 4 mr esa a sucau > 2.J.t+ iA ut & w f a w' us e , acud i c61<J y>f. _ _ _ , wuf .iddu, WM 1% - 1 L - -a pm . f j& -.it n Adb maw vs -. pas.. - c.t . ... kn .....
\ldw ~ Q WS j i
QL JL ~ . g k dyJ/ 6 - i b sasaw A. me.as f wik
- f ta~r-(d.W hy *y\
" a ld j
kud* ty LddJ Dl [On 4 kw s Qp .Q ut- u2L 4 2 -
\
w u s. l
CESS A R Eini"icariou 8
- e. e. p,7 a. val r .- p ef<<t.sa n a ps1L Containtnent Isolation Valves u4!/c. ,. (., /.Y. u J .t. W.'. tco. 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVElLLANCE ,gj \ FREQUENCY bR3.6.3.1 Verify each [24] inch / purge valve is/ closed 4 raupT-[,r31 days ]
SR 3.6.3.2 !L 1 -4M -- vLSEGMA + c : : e -J-M Jhe [63nchJ purgejalves Mopen for pressure control. ALARA apd air guality considerations for personnel entry, gi2 foribrveillanc@that require the valves to be open.
.,,.=m=a~..==--==---- --
Verify each [6]inchKpurge valve is closedge, cept )31 days SR 3.6.3.3 NOTE
- 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be venfied by use of administrative cem46.
mas .
- 2. V.: , c.a , 1 c c.d h.a c- ::ccc'r =&-
- a : +,c,h +. g. '
-3. No. .qm.-M :s !~ mi vu ..:.m L.ch a.c c., =-
=& ,am;n;temem,. rnn rnte e es.1 Verify pMgontapment isolation manual valvegand 31 days blind, flanged Md. located outside[cntainment and/ required to be closed during accident conditions
$ closed, ea.fT s .' es. T~ - *. dt Is*t*\'A * *I.e s %st as :se~ a s< < u .a.,bst;o a c 1ro t's .
SR 3.6.3.4 - - - , . OTE,---, .
- l. Valves -f ',~ m,_EpW' . LT'd!O....,UW. ' ~ " "
- - - - - '**f"''
hy ne c/ adrmnistrative h m ts . y e,- g.t_ _ . __ .;g;;; g;g ;7; ;g,
-= & zeH ":-.:; , -- c:;.
eacA Verify i4 fonta Prior to entenng blind flangey nil " "gment ocated l isolation manual valves insidegontainment MODEand 4 from and required to be closed dunng accident conditions MODE 5 bdnot f t.d. .cc) s .W.k de closed, acep t he .: re- .-f ;> >4 tr = cf:= '" : z; M r# vl. s s
.43 r u / w < m .-,.. ., h /.<e per 92 days
< /r .
(continued) SYSTEM SO+ 3.6-8 Amendment I 16.9-8 December 21,1990
.e -
CESSAR 88!%mou
- f Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.5 DVerd~.y:e the isolation time of each power-operated Yn accordance with and each automatiefontainment isolation valve is laservice W ast! Testing Program, within limits. Lor 92 days ; SR 3.6.3.51 -0 Irb uch . automatic [ontainment isolation[18 months] valve actuates to$ isolation position on tan) actual or simulated actuation signal %. SR 3.6.3.) C - N OTE----- Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria ' of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix 4,as modifi,ed by approved except,ionsh .
; . . _ _ ____:_:__ _ - - - .,- .__w r uf_y_ _ _ ,
, : y. . _
Perform 29" ' r; $IN rate testing for 184 days containment purge valves with resilient seals @.
~ AND
! > 2 .
_ e ,
^"^ T~" Within 92 days after
-pening the valve t - -- -- ~ m 5 g 3, g, 3. y' . _ As c T E dw b2 O k wUcd' sp#
w.,a_ uLa g .x . . u. u - sca ri" w JL i.' LM C. 4/ch k u - 4
\)
s4.A. bly j'- \ L; l1 J .m%v f 4- A_ jp .sii"? W Ugo (: gu-- p
- 3 ; 7"h / 'd - s SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-9 Amendment I 16.9-9 December 21,1990
CESSAR naincmon 16.9.4 3.6.4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE Containment Pressure 3.6.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4 Containment Pressure LCO 3.6.4 Contatnment pressure shall be (s +0.4 psig and 2 0.4 psig]. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment pressure not A.1 Restoref'ontainment 1 bour withm limits. prr.ssure within limits. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. M B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Venfy Containment pressure isif ^ ' pd; ed 2 - 12 hours SR 3.6.4.1 0ipi} .i. t A; s dio/fs. l l SYSTEM 80 + 3.6 10 l Amendment I 16.9-10 December 21,1990 ! 1
. CESSAR 83Mcuiu , i e i 3.6.5 CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE ! 16.9.5 Containment Air Temperature 3.6.5 i 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.5 Containment Air Temriersture - k LCO 3.6.5 Containment average air temperature shall be [260*F" and s110*F]. 9 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2. 3, and 4. l ( Applicable in MODES I and 2 only.) ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME - CONDITION A.1 Restore y'ontmament 8 hours - A. Contamrn nt average air temperature not within average er temperature limits. within limit. B.1 De in MODE 3. 6 hours i B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. M B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTE -- Minimum temperature requirements valid only in MODES 1 and 2. Verifyfontunment average air temperature thM8f- 24 hottrs l SR 3.6.5.1 r.e.d :110'Pk b 4.i(;a i;.;t. SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-11 Amendinent Q 16.9-11 June 30,1993
i C E S S A R n ainc m . T r I 16.9.6 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS Contamment Spray System > 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6 Containment Sorav System l f LCO 3.6.6 Two Contamment Spray divisions shall be OPERABLE, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4. l l ACIlONS 4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Containment Spray A.1 Restore Contamment 72 hours division inoperable. Spray division to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not md. E B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours C. Two Contamment Spray C.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately divisions inoperable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each %ntainment/ pray manual, power 31 days operatffd automatic valve in the flowpath that is not locked, sealed,or otherwise secured in positiongis in its correct position. 4 Pav r.he eachMatainment/ pray pump head- In accordance with l SR 3.6.6 73 t
- t. ,m ,. % . u;- z y - - - . . the Inservice j (ci;usf$ r[ ] r'5' d iM' 'd* I
- -,- --G Testmg pre u s ec. s ., . , A . .N ~ f l. Program A S t. 5 . t. . '. 2. VerW & cea74,'ame. T spey ,Q**~'.I is ;
'l l . q ,,
7 *
-ball sf u des' t.> TQ [ }gud-
; is,i .., t L . . w. ~c - r s, m '& ,, .l.c. ' #,
LSYSTEM 80+ 3.6-12 1 i f Amendment K 16.9 12 October 30,1992 '
.-a. s .- - -w >>r.. ~, -aw - - . . . - . ..a na s ,, - - ~
- CESSAR niincanon 1 1
't l l
Containment Spray System ' 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l Metr SR 3.6.6.X4 Dr--"ye eachfontainment)fpray 4ystem automatic [18 months] valve in the flowpath actuates to jn i torrect position on } Yan); actual or simulated actuation signaly SR 3.6.6 p.f NN be eachfontainmentfpray pump starts [18 months] automatically onja$ actual or simulated acnution ' signal)C. SR 3.6.6.,YL -I :; each spray cozzle is unobstructed. {At first refueling. AND] 10 years i s l l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-13 Amendment I 16.9-13 December 21,1990 1 (
CESSAR nutricuion 16.9.7 3.6.7 IWDROGEN ANALYZERS Hydrogen Analyurs 3.6.7 3.6 CONTAIMIENT SYSTEMS 3.6.7 Hvdroren AnalYur5 LCO 3.6.7 Tv.o liydrogen Analyuts shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2. ACTIONS CONDl'llON REQUIRED / CTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Hydrogen Analyzer A.1 NOTE inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. Restore Hydrogen 30 days Analyur to OPERABLE status. B. Two Hydrogen Analyzers B.1 Restore one Hydrogen 7 days moperable. Analyur to OPERABLE status. l C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours I associated Completion Times not met. I l SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.6.7.1 SR 3.6.7.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months i SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-14 Amendment I 16.9-14 December 21,1990
4 i CESSARunkmw
'f 16.9.8 3.6.8 REACTOR SIIIELD BUILDLNG Reactor Shield Building 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4
3.6.8 -ftseeeer Shield Building LCO 3.6.8 JGinegar Shield Building shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY MODES 1,2,3 and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. "JE3neegr Shield [uilding A.1 Restore remeter shielding 24 hours inoperable. building to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time ( I not met. @ I B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours ! l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.8.1 Verify thse each door in each access opening is closed 31 days except when the agcess opening is being used for normali[siiIsA' entry and exit (thenj at least one door l shall be closed] l SR 3.6.8.2 Verify Reseterfhieldguilding structural integrity by During shutdown for performing a visual inspection of the exposed interior SR 3.6.1.1 Type A and exterior surfaces of the #nemrfhield fuilding, tests S A 3 4.f 3 Yu M Nb"" UpL } %{p w :n ~ pa p~ s ( f{ } cfw pol, , m . fv% G" g[hc . H] d N" f"*f" ~ w x e ~~~y u & , nW G [J] m A f '*' SYSTEM 80+ ## s. 3.6-15 Amendment O 16.9-15 May 1,1993
P w E'C LGGMutC A CERTIFICATION D DESIGN
*r 16.9.9 3.6.9 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Annulus Ventilation System 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.9 Annulus Ventilation System LCO 3.6.9 Two Annulus Ventilation System divisions shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIO!. TIME A. One Annulus Ventilation A.1 Restore division to 7 days Systetn division inoperable. OPERABLE status. Two ,'aa. ' '/u.id.nud li.1 S:t : cc- db>:d: Lw 24 m .. .,
-B.
--Sp;= dh .. ,a umm.Lk O!'"!L^."LE e 2.
6 M. Required Actions Af 44d $ K.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours C==1 & =.'. .d D ua;.c.a 4ss.dfdc.:"" rg .ced Completion AND Time, a .7 -e f .
$$.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ====
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.9.1 Operate each Annulus Ventilation System division for 31 days {2. flC4 continuous hours with heaters operating]
...4,. v. n. ut .
SR 3.6.9.2 Perform required' filter testinga l.a .. 9, .re. A W .c.v..J by Reg. L mordaa<e s Je kt.~ta . 7:4<e %lu3 fe.ys (prv) . -C dc :.52.} - a:s if 79. l i De=grlJ' 4 each Annulus Ventilation System division [18]monthsy i SR 3.6.9.3 = ' O' M on an actual or simulated actuati_on signal. ww s e a t . t< t . . e 'y* l' " t to f SR 3.6.9.4 Verify each' division prek- : ; r;; :h; y as ~ '. u.p - [18] months). 34 4 h t[ ]cb. 2 ' n'~ ; ";:
^2- Il man .d: 574% p e ) Tnr 64 f( 5 3,n 33.9,5 m : r). L - a
,e amw rs;4 in 611 kw. [1 ~ =thet SYSTEM 80+ 3.6-16 e
Arnendn.ent Q l June 30,1993 16.9-16
f System 80+ vs. STS Differences T.S.E 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) Action B - System 80+ accident analysis assumes a minimum of 3 MSSVs/SG. (STS has only 2.) Table 3.7.1 Lif t Settings - System 80+ SAR Section 10 requires a set pressure tolerance of
+1%.
3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves System 80+ design includes bypass valves. 3.7.3 MFIVs System 80+ does not have MFIV bypass valves. 3.7.4 Emergancy Feedwater System 80+ has no Auxiliary Feedwater System. This T.S. is significantly different than STS because of this nesign feature. 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank System 80+ has two tanks, one per division. 3.7.8 Station Service Water System SR 3.7.8.2 Not in System 80+, there are no automatic valves to position in the System 80+ SSWS. 3.7.14 Subsphere Building Ventilation Added active B.3 for Mode 5& 6 operation to support SIS. 3.7.15 Full Building Ventilation System l Only required OPERABLE for fuel handling accidents. Condition B of STS is not applicable. 3.7.16 Diesel Building Ventilation System System 80+ credits this system to ensure D/G operability. l l l l
e CESSAR 8!niflCATION
' 16.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 16.10.1 3.7.1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES l MSSVs
-3.7.1 l
3.7 PLANT ST STEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) i l LCO 3.7.1 nie M.m Sium S 6iy V.imAMSSVs/shall be OPERABLE as specified in l' Tables 3.7.1-1 and 3.7.1-2. APPLICABILITY: MODES'1. 2. and 3.
'. .ma..._. . . _ .---.
.s o << ate C..i .>.. ,
e,,,r<, is att.a. d i.e e s w s/. ACTIONS - - -- - CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME wc .,e mo A. L=: 'h..,o :qe_s required -A . ; V;.;f, .i k.x [3] hmvs 4 h;= MSSVs Ol'ERAOLE. ;= -rTied ' ;;-
.' a _y a - a ie. -gen;c.:cr arc CP EP>.B LE . -
-At@
-,%-24 --4-imurs-Rw4ere MSSV : - l OPERAELE ==
M A 2.2.1 - 4 hours A.. Reduce power to s the applicable RAT-EB 7. CP
-THERM AL iGWER )
listed in Table 3.7.1-1. AND I3-A.2.;t*C &bours Reduce thelya,riable d)-#$verpower Trip setpoint 7 [
~
c :, q' j
- h,0 J j in accordance with Table 3.7.1-1.
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-1 Amendment I 16.10-1 December 21,1990
C E S S A R E!8nneuio MSSVs 3.7.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Actionrand B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Times'not met. AND , oA. l ,
~- B.2 Be in MODE 4. [12] hours l
l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 NOTE SR 2.0.0 . ; se; .;-iHd!: fr :::rj hic =d ep rtica j : u nnr 2 cm, ,k. ~..r- . -. m r .w -. . ..:t e - - - Q-1<Lud-4 K nehh ili5((s].Yi ). l ler.h# e*4 n,u.al W I' " , Ln n.;e., 0.c MSSVp lift setpointafm accordance with the In accordance with JInservice '- 7"^r =d Testing Programy F.u.a irN g, the,Unservice - j f.'l4 Afligs M4// 6e w'.VI.',J .i / 7. . .m"en =d Testing !
, Program}'
t ( Um u ,,:, o d% . 1 u s .J.rm s t k. L- ' I " " L"] i wk- MS is ' r GPGd ML 2 i f SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-2 Amendment I I 16.10-2 December 21,1990 -
CESSAR n Encm2. : 9 MSSVs 3.7.1 a i TABLE 3.7.1-1 (ju,c ' A 1) l (VARIABLE OVERPOWER TRIP SETPOINT VERSUS OPERABLE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE S MINIMUM NUMBER MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE OF MSSVs PER [VARIABI.E OVERPOWER ( STEAM GENERATOR MAXIMUM TRIPjSETPOINT l REOUTRED OPERABLE POWERl% RTP) [fCEILINGl % RTP) ; {~ 9 l [95.04] [104.84] f 8 l [84.48] [94.28] l 7 k [73.92] [83.72] 6 [63.36] [73.16] l k 5 } [52.80] [62.60]
\ 4 l [42.24] [52.04]
L3 J _ [31.68i [4i.48i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-3 Amendmmt Q 16.10-3 June 30,1993
1 CESSAR E54?ncm:. , I l l MSSVs 3.7.1 nu TABLE 3.7.1-2 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE LIFT SETTINGS 1 1
'l A' *' #- 0J"'M L . LIFT SETTING, I VALVE NUMBER SG #1 SG #2 (953 A i[1%) l l l
[1] [1] [M e2Zu l ! [2] [2] [W f Ln [3] [3] [M l [4] [4] [Nid] f as v l [5] [5] [H60] i l i [1] [1] [ii[A] [2] [2] [$$5] [3] [3] [Miw [4] [4] [H60] [5] [5] [$I5d] SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-4 Amendment Q 16.10-4 June 30,1993
CESSAR Ea#lCATION i 16.10.2 3.7.2 51AIN STEA51 ISOLATION VALVES : MSIVs i 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) LCO 3.7.2 [Four[ Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and associated htStPyypass [alves shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, , MODES 2 and 3 -ie MS!V: sp,... wyt ace *y C Vs yk '
~ , , . cyns s,sise s Ace as se a wa L" - u1O< 1ch ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MSIV or Met!Y A.1 Restore MSlV or 3!!SN bypass [8] hours bypass valve valve to OPERABLE status.
inoperable., e d' K } . N u,waLs m- -- --- B. Required Action and ActionsJ3.1 and B.2 perfo if i associated Completion MSIV isYnoperable. ction B.3 Time of Condition A. perform bypass valve not met. mop B.: Cle= i..cp;rati; I4SIV. thourt -
-ANu B.2 ; Be in MODE 2. 6 hours K
-flLt-([ . !p t , .. eq -U 2 CIO: i ;F G ebic IASIV L u ass
-valve--
- 2 hem 6 Required Action and Il Be in MODE 3. 6 hours ;
2 associated Completion ' Time of Condition K. AliD not met. O h.2 Be in MODE 4. [12] hours SYSTEM 80 + 3.7 5 Amendment K
- 16.10-5 October 30,1992 L _ _ _ _ .. . , _ - _ _ - . - _ . , _ - . _ _ - - . - . - - - - - -i
L y J _ f .f, l]a. + zw: Ib .10 -S* O f C.-- do n - --- c./ (/ne a st/ av Lyp.so }g Las sn . o n a d.n u c s ,.. vs /ve. 4/64 5. c c4 4m / A40 oc bj f us n/Jc. C . 2. Vu.Y A{4i/ x b yf s<j Dace (c e m/a. c/ued. 7J t. Che oc ~~ a r t v's a by(As M(JCL afcts
- a A(caz 1 sc 3.
k
CESSAR naincum MSIVs 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 NOTE '
.sR 2 n e : nne applic ht, (nr .- 3. :-*' M g:x: ion h MODE 3 ii. MSIV visu Iv. ,sifei;. .:: cf iis su_m.:it em.. a7 < ,:. v be pdr-d - 4:E' r f 2. .
d'rll. ~ esc. 5.A sh ewk De=:n-:. :; MSIV and MSIF bypass valve elasme In accordance with aume is s [5] seconds on an actual or simulated the [ Inservice actuation signal. L.. ., - .- ' Testing Program, or [18 months)) 1 f i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-6 Amendment I 16.10-6 December 21,1990 ;
CESSAR nn%mou f i 16.10.3 3.7.3 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES MFIVs 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Ir.olation Valves (MFIVs) , ELo ] LCO 3.7.3 Mdr FxJun 'ac!:ticr. Ve!~jMFIVs)shall be OPERABLE. MODES 1. 2, andGcc 3 ' ' d'$rm.saa MF./ .. h.cd *.aa {.e- n (5}e APPLICABILITY: -- ,-__._: _ .- _u [ .nN b. 5 ;,.e,. a ma -. w u - +-) . C. Aare - - - ACTIONS [ d" d ^ C""~*'t?'T l"' * "' * " " ~' * ' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
,. -.<a A. Onet MFIV,h A.: Ilcavm mum.bie vaive to 72 kaun_
mara % peths OPERABLE mus. inoperable. O3
, ,i Agi Close or isolate inoperable 84./. 7it hours
@ Ar,id<..(/ ^ % ., n!ve e a L ;- M 0 9 3 2; B.
_Twofir!Vs W .'eds B.1 %::ca ;; a;; s..; MFIV pcr 8 hours byp m n' red p- ,e ti : Reu pa:h :s OPERACLE
% flow path inoperable. _ state 1- .4 t- -in M *
- n en: r- - .;.; Sc=
g r nA. W O__B-
!ce.%
B.2 -Glese inoperable MFIV os ) S hours - c:h . -.3c 230!;;; a ;h effs ; J w % :sth. % a w .u vTc a . l 33 - C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion - Times not met. ! AF.R t _C.2 Be in MODE 4. [12] hours ,, SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-7 Amendment I 16.10-7 December 21,1990
.-- -s.w - w _ _ _ u - -- 6 kach~e7 v P9 JL. le -1
, A .J a I AL Nr. 0 s4.yce, Alc, gny '
, , c/c.,g 6 ace (,,. 1 J, .
7
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CESSAR innneuiu MFIVs j 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 VnE SR 3.0.1 x.d SR ? 0 4 := ;;; epp::; L' for u.:.j mio a sg. ;! : in MODE 3 wii. MFIV. vi~o. fe. ,~. fu...-.c c of ni: wn..m ..<-. i
/celf3 D: retrete the closure time of each MFIV is In accordance with the sL]secondsf.a ~4 5 S laat - ; - a.4t< d (Inservice ".---- - ^ - --4 A_m t .r. . '.a J . Testing Program, or [18 months))
K i l l [ SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-8 Amendment K 16.10-8 October 30,1992
N CESSAR naineme. f 16.10.4 3.7.4 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER EFW System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Emercency Feedwater EFW) System Two "-- ;---- - >r4EFWy T .., ' ; ---,a , _ __ . - n shall be LCO 3.7.4 OPERABLE. bo nao NOTE Only one motor-driven pump of steam generator in operation is required in MODE 4. 3ab APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, m. is velred gwn TMob2 f when 3 4 cam ywe<tbe Ce Lu4<emeuJ]. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTIOy! x COMPLETION TIME
\ CONDITION ,
A One E pu 1 re pump to 72'ho B. ReMActions for h Be'in mod . 6 houn Co/qtio'n A. not met ithin requY
\M AND,/ /
/ \
/ Completion %
Time.. / Be in M \ / E 5. N ghours
/ , 4.2 5a cud'14 d SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-9 Amendment I 16.10-9 December 21,1990
O 4 / V <., I L, . l o ^ R , (dVaAnT Qu b b C (C D (cub O lc td QGOC\lt1&s> 14CTich) erQ c57 0 7/MF Ao snu EFi Pung moptsade. A.1 9 tab <t EM pus 9 6 7 hs . OPuA6tE shk. b,w p + < ssIt,' . C?s#A6LE sfa b . ns eta diJu6, Paw, -b ceseAote stah Aod [E f c,',$ [>[6 , l C. A Cog \Akt 3+g 4 gy4 k f4cLk A. l O D umlJ44 Ccyk 6 . a u c> hl I CA s' >w t 'N <N . k- j A 3 e c c .a me t. /
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J P E C E A D CElitN W E= w G M ER CERTIFICATISM d 1 i l 1 3 J
,I . f EFW System
,. 3, .a c : n .-
i .
, , : e. m- 3.7.4 i
i
, . o f - g,.
Jr te~ f " '- f; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ( SURVEILLANCE I FREQUENCY t SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each EFW manual, power operated, and 31 days l automatic valve in the flow path %st is not locked, , l
- sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its 1 I correct position.
SR 3.7.4.2 NOTE i t ca ,,,, 'a.ed to sa pa<1,< ,..t ne rh. r.,,s.:. e Jr. 'n n i f. 4 w .r d .I 4 J 7 4*n * , aHee re u ;4 fL., .
...-.if..,-.,.
s.v. mas avimyyu-_-_= . , . _ , - JDo,Q psJ; ia > _' .c; . ".+ ia MCD" 3, "v y.;-- oi =i=g * *" f' M . , j u -. .. ,
. - .- , . y ,,..
1 h1] days on a yec;f7 & Edied Demonstrese LoJ.b EFW pumpy '- ' , M ' ' at - STAGGERED TEST ' . I the flow test point is 2 the required developed BASIS. 1 head. ' i me m .uw , 18,anonths ; SR 3.7.4.3 N===n=== each' automatic valve actuates to its
' correct position on an actual or simulated actuation
! signal. [t . SR 3.7.4.4 -
,..-a ,' s - r..O. N .T. E . o 1,.- r e _ -1.,et. e ;
w r <c s ira,1 h .J n, wr.,Dd w ; de,. . a a:- 3R 3.v. I d .g" 3.0) --- d 4 ;'!E' ' - f.,
,, __ ^ ,
) [r . jpc.s ,a fu clo 1
i j
- inw rd "; m9- i- MODE .t. ymm uf 7 " ' " '"
- j j + n=: S *' 4 :- i+;;; Em ;-
- 18' months
, .c '
/ c r .-111 '
N==** each EFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
-r SR 3.7.4.5 L,.e,, m y e < .- . . . , ~ - < u.a ^.he required EFW flow
^^
~
Priorpaths to entering MODE freen-ele i7 cg. 94i j .ad~ AEmergency Feedwater Storage Tank to tlie Steam 2 whenever unit has bean Generator.. .a;;i c;; ;f S FN t -- f. '!;u; in MODE 5 or 6 for > mr 1 - , K. nni. .-. s- e n 2171 -i. - ,rc-5%, 30 days. l l i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-10 Amendment Q 16.10-10 June 30,1993_-
CESSAR nainema 16.10.5 3.7.5 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK EFWST 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Emercenev Feedwater Storace Tank (EFWST) Two LCO 3.7.5 1Ciith Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank (EFWSTs) levels shall be 2: [350,000] maEEfe gallons.cach, f: - txtehesuiciivrrnot appiivabWuuus vuoiuown p.md .c. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3. K
^/G'p.
MODE 4@ hen S%m ha:cyr;rr+e c.;!n~r i: Frfu.u is v cW Ly 1tta V
%;, e be.d- vt m N ad *)
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One asasse EFWSTd A% K E.~ /ST ;o a asar: i :, . 2!e.Ie ae1 O T'"" '. _ :. . .. . scv w M % % fE- , M ! l A.1.1 Verify OPERABILITY of 4 hours f l other EFWST tank. Mo
% T" A L' '
AND see mw AX.2 Restore EFWST te I"
- I DdM$
h OPER*Bt.& stems.~ A'b \f n k, B. Required Action not B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours sc: wid.iu .sqaired Co...r:a.vu Tiu.e. AND e 7 a d A> > c u wd [) /J Of 1 Q1 B.2 Be in MODE 4W.d..t- Mours n o a se , a > .ca- p an ne for wr re , < s
- SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-11 Amendment K 16.10-11 October 30,1992
-e* rmy -F - -d 1 t W **'r --
- - M- ->-v37-
hw
- l CESSAR En#ication f
1 l EFWST 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l J SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify EFWSTs level 2: [350,000] gallons. 12 hours Vc.-ify ^ - """/ST muuuus c i330,000i s iivua. =il h - '..- .. Sk s...s. req 6fted by AwsGG , n.s.1 K i i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-12 Amendment K 16.10-12 October 30,1992
CESSAR E!nincuisu ( 16.10.6 3.7.6 SECONDARY SPECIFIC ACTIVITY Secondary Specific Activity 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Secondary Snecific Activity LCO 3.7.6 The/pecific[ctivity of the/econdary hiant shall be s [0.10] pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT l-131 APPLICABILITY: MODF/1,2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Specific /ctivity not A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours within limits. AILD A.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours I l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ! SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 N#' =222 >.he specific activity of the [31] days g "!!,M-5econdary EQ"!"'.LTJTTfoolant is ,4
! !3 ' e M d {0. 0] ,.f/ m M .
SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-13 Amendment K 16.10-13 October 30,1992 l
CESSAR EE58?N CEbTIFICATION l r 1 1 16.10.7 3.7.7 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CCW ! 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l l 3.7.7 Component Cooline Water (CCW) System l LCO 3.7.7 Two Cuy. a.: Cccli;; "'eserACCWJ divisions shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.X l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CCW division Restore CCW division to 72 hours inoperable OPERABLE status. YO l AS Dactnre any innnernhl, 4.hogggg. Safety-Re:M .,.- -
! e4he-OPERABLE CC#
e e n OPEPA %E , au. - B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time If Condition A. not AND ( met.
; B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours l i
(continued) l. WMc 5 ud 0, oc +dility rquume ef S Ce'* S;:e= r.;; dc_. -a by i; systeme-it ;;H~as. ,
\~- tJ : r e . . . . . . . .
.+,,e ':, a.f. s. e i i ' Catv y p . .
_' ine:aH rr.us :( a a ...e/ p o u, a 1 weoy..nowr'he
;;la a meet < = 0,f i / Wcy b ZE.
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SYSTEM 80+ 3.7 14 Amendment Q i 16.10 14 June 30,199:;
CESSARnn%meu CCW 3.7.7 DCQONS (continued) hDQON x REQUIRED ACTION /
/
COMPLETION TIME M wtT N divisat Cl Os MODN ~ lh nu w rn d - A l
/
C.2 le;';='h f ina en F~h - J2-hours-
> I
. , m n ,- h .t w l
$^c a . ,k} --2 -f l CCW wm,~eeH h AND C. ...v a;
._, .. J . Q '
at in .-. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY y
.> Verify each CCW manual, power-operated or a4 SR 3.7.7.1 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing 5,4 e h edd e d -eanentsal equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in-it Q !
correct position. SR 3.7.7.2 NCL each CCg automatic valve in the [18) months flow path actuates to e correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal, ve<< w r. , SR 3.7.7.3 Denwnewise each CCW pump starts U 8.Jmonths automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
.... Q37 r . . . . . .
.h/ef ba E GM /W b'IN'd'N T :.c p i<~ti set w t l'. ~' L "
go sfi Nye rdIG < SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-15 i l Amendment K 16.10-15 October 30,1992
1 CESSAR !!aincmo f i l
; 16.10.8 3.7.8 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i
1 SSWS I 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Station Service Water System l 6 dh ! 5 j i a j LCO 3.7.8 Two Su:br. Scia "lawr4yeem.tSSWR( divisions shall be OPERABLE.
~
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.X
$ f5 :,: . hem} c'Ai,I- !
4 ACTIONS CONDITION f REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SSWS division A.1, Restore SSWS division to 72 hours j inoperable. OPERABLE status. i 7CS Re. 2 :: g - , L:. N
-Saics p ;- = p _ m
.:tku-urz: .:.DL 3^"l:
di :x. L 0"EMLE B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion l Time if Condition A is M not met. 3 z -. & A Abd v I' 3 4 w ,o 5 E; IE R&aFMODE S. (continued)
*4n-Moden ano e, me um.buny-4.quirenvma-ef-the-SSW5 are ducium.d by i: .;y=.T.,; ;:
SW SYSTEM 80+ 3.7 16 Amendment Q 16.10-16 June 30,1993
m e l pggs - _ . . . _ . - l 1 A-I
- l. e;&u ,/te., sit. C=,vi,,u; u a.s Paya,M neJde e uce 2 s.t " x w ees - cy c at.,s," w ea,,,
l drc>d gewerder vnzd e owp,4 ble b q 35 d.S . Rs 64e gh'czbi t Comb'au q 4 %gaf M dufAwa
!.cc 3 9.e, " Rcs Lcops -biele 4" b AnLja~ ceGt3 maAt ixp< a.u e. %SsC5.
- - + + - - - - . -
=
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T" VL M QU 6Wd'" M h,%A,y ~ ,.p p w% jg
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l CESSAR !!nincm. 1 i i SSWS 3.7.8 : i 3 ] ACTIONS (continued) 1 N CONDITION REQUIRED ACITON ' COMPLET10N i j C. Tw WS divisions C.I Be in MODE 4. 12 h l
- inoperable.
A.J.Q ., 1 4 ' C.2 itiate ag ' to place unit 13 hours j in ' 5 with an i equate co ment of l SSWS components. .l1 1 AND C.3 Continue action as , required in C.2. Until unit is in h 2 l 5 l 1 ( I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
--a SR 3.7.8.1 Verify each SSWS manual, power-operated, pc ea. 31 days
,. automatic valve in the flow path servicing 56*1~ '%N&rel equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in44eTLc correct position.
'/
SR 3.7.8.2 E._c c i b.. ... each SSWS pump starts [18 months) automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
---.s) ore..-.. .
Ts si du.) d 1iaS fu ; 6 i ,dik (
~
r . mp,m m .Lc af , now ;5a3 l i.,nged L: . s - _ - . _ _ . . . . , . ,- SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-17 Amendment K 16.10-17 October 30,1992 _ , , . . . _ - _ _ _ . - . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ - _ - ~ - _
CESSAR CESIGN CERTIFICATISM 16.10.9 3.7.9 ULTIMATE IIEAT SINK Ultimate IIcat Sink 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink LCO 3.7.9 The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.* l ACTIONS h -- =, A . CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A n" k t> a nad A. Rc)fr..edasF.!;: v mt Sai ;yK,1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours immm mhu A ur A te d %flt1. ' gy9 7~.l, , i f L .t s./ 4 o r-6
'j[- 'A.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours X
UHS .ufererik ((a- re v.as slQe %a C sd. +.s s A]. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
~ _
- SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level of the Ultimate Heat Sink is 24 hours G 2~ W ' '" '. C 3 n . [p e, .> s .a L se l]. -
[ SR 3.7.9.2 Verify average water temperature of the Ultimate 24 hours L Heat Sink is s [95'F]. _
"~ ~
s f 2 3 'l 3 C f vde e44 cm /.y to - s b 3l j ,
' ~
h- t. h t ] m a u te s.
^ lu Muhs 5 mui u it epe=5"!:y .c#. ...c.cs d ic U :S = d :c;.. r.J by ic 9,. ... S.
-*P W SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-18 Amendment Q 16.10-18 June 30,1993
6% LS b /3n 16 !*-'f 1 l C 's A 3 C~h L,L LvJ s a . .. c: s en.a ,. l l t < I
' l il- [neer ,~~ ec >h n'y AA Pesk><ravha y 2dq3 i
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bs wi Al om ccohg bc btsA l
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0 M uts sJaJas ._. ) 6 i l
CESSAR nai"lCATION 16.10.10 3.7.10 FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL l i Fuel Storage Pool Water level 3.7.10 ; 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Fuel Storace Pool Water Level
)
E LCO 3.7.10 The Fuel Storage Pool water level shall be 2 23 feet over the top of(irradiatd I fuel assemblies seated inJthe storage racks. APPLICABILITY: b y.
"' n3 'mo o t m4
- 4 o f- i < e d fa f *E md fuel assemblies = in the Fuel Storage Pool.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Fuel Storage Pool water NOTE level not within limitK LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. d
, af fo '
A.] Suspend movement of Immediately assemblies in fuel storage pool. W A71 !-M2! :/, v . ~. ~. ; - 2.. ..mme ;y t ;; p:-,; - a , e a
~?tttB A.2.2 gem-( muug, U, 5.jl . g:
pooi water acs ci w wiuan p=. .. .. . ;; c;; 3s Itm e -- neemL i i i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-19 Amendment K 16.10-19 October 30,1992
C E S S A R En n"ic m u l 4 l Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is 7 days 2 23 feet above the top of(irradiated fuel lK assemblies seated in}the storage racks.
K i i i l 1 1 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-20 I Amendment K 16.10-20 October 30,1992
CESSAR 88#icariou 16.10.11 3.7.11 ATMOSPIIERIC DUMP VALVES
- Atmospheric Dump Valves 3.7.I1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ,
3.7.11 Atmoenheric Dumn Valves ( AD\/S i li.ic. LCO 3.7.11 [Two)A+-cWe "" r V:k:{ADVf C - "- __ _r4ar shall be' _ OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. [Acccct den den 3e n9<M N D*Q l G,r hs.d r e vno *U . ACTIONS CONDITION , REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Oneh,,DV linerep hed NOTE inoperable. jlCO 3.0.4 is not applicable./ 1 A.1 Restore ADV line to 7 days _, , OPERABLE status. m.. - . p i r 4.,1 ) B. Lw" c.:me-ADV
. a. B.1 Restore :: 'x. t [i:=(Nf-) 24 hours i lin6 inoperable. ADV lined to OPERABLE I status. !
C. Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion - , Times of Co..J.:.r.; A AND er-B not met. C.2 Be in MODE 4A ibei" [12] hours al.r u 4
- s , m 1 3c o stae (.e ks st i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- " * '
f l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY we.,3 com SR 3.7.11.1 ,- one complete cycle of the ADV. [18 months] SR 3.7.11.2 one complete cycle of theMN [18 months] Jalve. % s SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-21 Amendment K 16.10-21 October 30,1992
CESSAR 8Hiincuion 16.10.12 3.7.12 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Control Complex Ventilation System lK 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Control Complex Ventilation System g LCO 3.7.12 Two Control Complex Ventilation System (CCVS) divisions shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3,4, and during movement lg ofirradiated fuel. \ g ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One CCVS division A.1 Restore CCVS divisions to 7 days lK l inoperable. OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A. ANQ not met in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours W K gqgr > - +m W-LEs
;,A'.A (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ 3.7 22 Amendment K - 16.10-22 October 30,1992
. . . ~ _ . . ~. . . _ . _ . . - -
CESSAR nuirication f Control Complex Ventilation System lK 3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.! NOTE. 'r' ~~~~ - - O c T 2 - - - - - C. Required Action and b* i% t ibd fi P*b associated Completion Te d ;= p. __ m, ,,,4 Time of Condition A. g 4 ~:d T ; ; j. _ ,, ;u med t 14 adv =k 't*E r not met [in MODE 5, 6, te!: ;c y. ,;m,v , ,,,We 4 ko jas * *cd *- or] during movement of : epru., 9 aue. irradiated fuel. Place OPERABLE CCVS division in emergency Immediately radiation protection mode. OB W
.LCO 3.0.3 .. m .
C 2.1 Suspend CORE i ALTERATIONS. Immediately
,AND _ _ -
- .. grV JE ,%b 5 C _ .1 % E 5 euCvua.
Immedtetely - 22fik 2. C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuelan+~4IN. Immediately (contmued) SYSTEh! 80+ 3.7-23 Amendment K 16.10-23 October 30,1992
CESSAR Ennncum Control Complex Ventilation System lK 3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
& Two CCVS divisions } D.1 Suspend CORE 1mmediately lg f, inoperable [in MODE 5 - ALTERATIONS. ,
6, or] during movement l of irradiated fuel 7 AND J wexb\tas . IMF Ss.9 cad , . . . _ 2:y Fri=:ir
&dd.i.GuL
- w :z T'. y i a d w.u.7\ Ea p.X Suspend movement of Immediately c', s ,)
irradiated fuelm-bIm.
~
'I' ' ^ " '
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE 9 FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 Ce="k- each CUvS division for 2h0 31 days lK continuous hours with the heaters operating. , s R. 3 7.it.g Pe < 6 % vyi'ed WS P1br det $, 6 g % J ,,y 1 L
,_, w f sw ow: rde.vut w stk{bbid% H, ibe ne% kc. [vt_7p .
g N p m (y c Tp)] , . g ,2 3 3.a.3 A 5,441 ed cces Rh e%h> g %A . or5tm.lkhd h b en a ,s 3 sig. CCVb dkg$[m G g
#2. *) .') . R . i
- fyi w,a pn.
Co p, ns,-,w . bG-u-44 c ga hlW @ 5 TrbC7 M O
% [ } Ed*) oditved { art $de ve M g ng 3 7 39,514 ,
e vwt <3e w
/hinb % c W t o f 4 t_
t vw evy rwade e4 u p f Mw. G} =;\ t eI[ me v 3cf m)w. wL h ba A mi . o SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-24 l Amendment K 16.10-24 October 30,1992
O he ( M
~
v ' l d, '% \ 1 w
- WO b(Yb b b 4,0 .k W f b(C h*C+3 mmp [d inc7e< aie_ -i bebE I, i
L , 3 , e c +. i I I l l l j 4 1 I l l l t l l l 1 9 Y-* -- ,
CESSARiininema f 16.10.13 3.7.13 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM l Control Room Ventilation System l 3.7.13-3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Control Room Ventilation System (CN b LCO 3.7.13 Two cua.J 6: %:tilation-System 4CRVS4 divisions shall be OPERABLE. A; Ji nms, Mo bed l, 2,3, <4 { $, bd g'1ktcl 444I 3 APPLICABILITY: hving muu+me ef. iv r sell asse man . I ACTIONS i I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One CRVS division A.1 Restore CRVS division to 30 days l l A. inoperable. OPERABLE status. l l 6 hours ! B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. associated Completion Time of Condition A. AND not met in MODES 1, 2, 3. or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours E ! l wn &; ;.m T. .u.. ~_ umr. . .. m l5:~3 = 4 (continued) l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-25 Amendment K 16.10-25 October 30,1992
CESSARnancmo r Control Room Ventilation System 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE CRVS Immediately associated Completion division in operation. . Time of Condition A. not met [in MODES 5 QB 6)or during movement i of irradiated fuelarde I.2.1 C Suspend CORE ALTERNATIONS Immediately
;W p E=, __O .. . . . _ . ity l
he2 I . C.21 Suspend movement of immediately ;
'($ndAdbe "i irradiated fuelM 'P$- I l
I l R. F. Two CRVS divisions 3.1 Suspend CORE immediately, inoperable in MODES ; ALTERNATIONS. 5,6, or during rnovement of irradiated AND J fuel. -
<C I--Ny
.++mm -
W . 2.
,D.1 Suspend movement of , immediately irradiated fuel.cosed * -
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Verify eac ivision oNN2E has the [18 months] capability removing a the hest N load. b *" " " * '
/
SYSTEM 80+ 0 3.7-26 Amendment Q 16.10-26 June 30,1993
[Lb k1 h # u I L . Jo - 24 i 4 i 4
~ ,
i CC IO l'I' c'N EEC d 1R Gb d(7Ic'd torn pti:7/ce T/n C sm p _ g.te cas =~ b.i Esh c Lcc 2.e.3 1% ;
- qeabk is mot
( 73 3,0< f . 4 J 4 j - t i S i i l l
.,..._._._._.__,_,,,,._,I
j CESSAR 8lainema r i i Control Room Ventilation System 3.7.13 i i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR-3.' !?.2 :'s.Tv.m muu ' C.""! F!:r ::f;;. [LAKR; - SR 1 ~1 " ' D:a~ ....i mu CRV5 divinuu miu+ -- l ' "'aa'h ag act""' c: J. M ! miusuvu ass ek SR-? 7 " ' D=a....;; aa; C"VS J.ua.ea c a =M in : !!! r^-9 ^- - l ye,.;.. p.mure or a tu.lDJ taches water
~- 5TAGucium IE5T isn5i5j g="ga :!M.c; ;c ic Jjeue; [e.a] J ca.; i;
[,,2c,;;u._;.em] mude vi vr.. dun at a iiow rate ^r < [2, e ; g _, , I t l SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-27 Amendment Q 16.10-27 June 30,1993
CESSAR EMMncma i I
~
( 16.10.14 3.7.14 SUBSPIIERE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM , f r Subsphere Building Ventilation System 3.7. I4 , t 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Subsrhere Buildine Ventilation System , k LCO 3.7.14 Two Subsphere Building Ventilation System divisions shall be OPERABLE. or RC $ ' ' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 antf MODE 6 with h level ,
< [120 ft - 0 in). l i
ACI1ONS . ; CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ! A. One Subsphere Building A.1 Restore inoperable division 7 days i Ventilation System to OPERABLE status. I I division inoperable. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. NiiD B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours M q 3.3 aeam acs T+n~b T*63 4IBC*F ad snwk-RCS Lead ?- (12.4'-Ob. SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-28 ( x
~ Amendment K 16.10-28 October 30,1992
^
~
,r - ---- n
; CESSAR Enri"ication
'I f Subsphere Building Ventilation System 3.7.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Sk , ., , SURVEILLANCE oi FREQUENCY
.c<.r7 m ef w n .s l Q] vt SR 3.7.14.1 MGrerste each Subsphere Building Ventilation 31 days A"dag , d~'e " %
-4 { System division in filtered mode for 2 10 3' ry~ - M -^' '-n 1D continuous hours with the heaters operating. y *- '
's k ,.
(" SR 3.7.14.2 Perform required Subsphere Building 'L *.TEP 2 'p}, ([ 4 Ventilation System filter testing, w se sjne, Yh SR 3.7.14.3 D A' each Subsphere Building Ventilation System division actuates on an [18 months] l 3 , 7
.c / actual or simulated actuation signal.
Y SR 3.7.14.4 DNI)$2'; one Subsphere Building [18 months] on a l Ventilation System division can maintain a STAGGERED TEST BASIS negative pressure 2 [%4) inches water gauge l relative to atmospheric pressure during the post-accidentj mode of operation at a flow rate i of s; [396Mlrefm].
!?, to o i K l
i I l l l l 4 SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-29
.c .
Amendment K 16.10-29 October 30,1992 e.-- >w- p + - , . , - - . . , . m, em,, , -y-,.., , ,.,em.-,
CESSAR inik - 16.10.15 3.7.15 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION EXIIAUST SYSTEM Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust System 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.15 Fuel Buildine Ventilation Exhaust System (f EJr.s) LCO 3.7.15 Two fuc' Eui! ding " *i' .m. Eima SA..AFBVES) divisions shall be OPERABLE # ^ "t.cd Lds. APPLICABILITY: Dunng movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F 6 t l ?> A. One Fuc' Eu!L'.Fsit.5
... A.1 Restore i r;ncalc division 7 days "r "' m Sh:mt to OPERABLE status.
W division inoperable. B. Required Actions and B.1 Place OPERABLE FBVES Immediately associated Completion division in operation. Times of Conditions A. not met during O_R movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building. B.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel Immediately building. C. Two FBVES divisions C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during irradiated fuel in the fuel movement of irradiated building. fuel in the fuel building. i SYSTEM 80 + 3.7-30 Amendment I 16.10-30 December 21,1990
r,. J, CESSAR anVl?icarieu s i M , ( $
.e*
w 1
] Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust System V 3.7.15
'5 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '
A; E A S11R VFII LANCE FREQUENCY d SR 3.7.15.1 apwu each FBVES . Yss in the filtered 31 DAYS l mode for[2 10 continuous hours with the l 3s heaters operating. 7 ,7 LM aw"ut. w sTk SR 3.7.15.2 Pgfo,rm,rguiref @@,f(the,rutestirghy, 7,,t,y [isEEER] _nef V c re] , , TR 3.7.15.3 NI*N1:
- cach FBVES h [18 months [
actuates on ad actual or simulated actuation
. signal.
ye,c4 r-SR 3.7.15.4 S.. -- i::e one FBVES Seusememston can, ia.w.a onths on a [1 maintain a negative pressure 2 [0.1] inches STAGGERED TEST BASIS] l water gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure, during the [ post-accident] mode of operation at a flow rate 4 s; [25,000] cfm. l SR 3.7.15.5 p-Nevi-te$ each FBACS filter bypass damperq r[18 j months] l i closes and filter damper opens. j % K i i l i SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-31 Amendment K 16.10-31 October 30,1992
I CESSAR nnincarios 1 , 16.10.16 3.7.16 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Diesel Building Ventilation System i 3.7.16 l l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l 3.7.16 Diesel Buildine Ventilation System LCO 3.7.16 A Eseh Diesel Building Ventilation System shall be cjw. tk. OPC/U4/3LE. APPLICABILITY: -M OD FS ! , 2. 3. -;. 5 ^. -..d G ^ U b u As.soddel Die 3d Gesce, der g is KW 0/CAA6LE. ACTIONS rcY:(c) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Diesel Generator A.1 Restore livision to [72 hours] Building Ventilation 0,~mb.. status. System /noperable. OPE /A6 LC:. A.2 Declare affected Diesel Generator inoperable. B. Required Actions of b.1 Be in MODE 3,N 6 hours Condition A not met p::'; =:-!y '.. ?/. ODES i K within Required -w-2-- Completion Time. AND 36 hours B.2 Be in MODE 5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify Diesel Generator Buildingget..perature [12 hours] ! is maintained between [40*F] and [100*F] with I giesel generator not operating and [40*F] and [120*F] withyiesel generator operating. Y 4~ I SR 3.7.16.2 Dr&ih "4 :. . .:da.v.. supply fam, exhaust [l8 months] l fans ud , ca:;d 5:a.' n;; ;; 'ci a perform their function ( l
- " Lc. :.: =t ! DL _! Cc m: . . .y..a iu Lu vr.J,' . K SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-32 Amendment K 16.10-32 October 30,1992 ;
CESSAR Eininemou 16-10.17 3.7.17 ESSENTIAL CillLLED WATER SYSTEM Essential Chilled Water System 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Essential Chilled Water System (Eth LCO 3.7.17 (Two]E=--6:! CH' J 'ii.w Spwm4ECW54 divisions shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: ^'^""-- A"
^%DLS-K McDES 1,2.,3; na1 4.
ACIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME su A. One ECWI division A.1 Restored division to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status. 7' '- B. Required Action and F = ' ^ O "/ :, 2, 3 -,d 4 associated Completion Time n*Hnes, o f B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours C,al;4;w A ut et iw McDE I,1,3 y 4. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours w For M O - 5 and 6 i B.3 Co ue etion as Unk CWS ision(s) l equired in A. are res to BLE tus .'- SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-33 Amendment K 16.10-33 October 30,1992 ww w--- ew w
CESSAR nai"ication l l Essential Chilled Water System 3.7.17 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify each ECW8 manual, power operated 31 days and automatic valve in the flowpath that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position. Is in e correct position. f ee:J- 5 3 em SR 3.7.17.2 "NJwr(3 :h actuation ofTCW8
--- _ cproper s [18 months) coy.e4 on an actual or simulated high EC"/S --.a .
. - ~. a. . . : :;e :. a ac.Au dten G**vcIl. !
K I ( 1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.7 34 ( Amendment K 16.10-34 October 30,1992
CESSAREinhua e l 16.10.18 3.7.18 NUCLEAR ANNEX VENTILATION SYSTEM l ff Nuclear Annex Venti tion System h 3.7. I 8 v 3.7 PLANT YSTEMS /A 3.7.18 Nuclear nnex Ventilation System LCO 3.7.18 All ntial Mechanical Equipment Room Cooling d Ventilation Units in the Nucl r Annex shall be OPERABLE. r APPLICABILITY: h DES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Ow ^* T/'" y 4 ; /c / ~ '%" l g ACTIONS CONDITION \ RhUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Essential A. Restore inoperable unit to 7 days-( Mechanical Equipment OPERABLE status. Room Cooling and Ventilation unit inoperable, j B. Required Action and B.1 B in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completi Time not met. AND B.2 Be in M DE 5. 36 hours SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-35 Amendment O 16.10-35 May 1,1993-
CESSAR neincanew l . l 1 \ Nuclear Annex Ventilation System 3.7.I8 l SURN II. LANCE REQUIREMENTS .
\% SURVEILLANCE _ [ FREQUENCY
, --~-e . . ..adh Essential Mechanical Equipment31 days during periods when l
SR 3.7.18.1 R m Cooling and Ventilation unit fo(2 the system has not been operated. minu .] l SR 3.7.18.2 Demonstra one Nudear Anne Iilding [18 months] Essential Mec ' cal Equip ent Room Cooling l and Ventilation 't actuates on an actual or simulated actuation nal. ] i l l Cl SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-36 Amendment K l
- 16.10-36 October 30,1992
CESSAR En#lCATION i 16.10.19 3.7.19 FUEL STORAGE POOL llORON CONCENTRATION Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration ! 3.7.19 ' 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i 3.7.19 Fuel Storace Pool Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.19 The fuel storage pool borcn concentration shall behithin the limit specified in the COLR] APPLICABILITY: When fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage pool and a fuel storage pool verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME , A. Fuel storage pool boron NOTE K concentration not within LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable limit. - A.1 Suspend movement of fuel Immediately ; assemblies in the fuel storage pool. AND A.2.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately fuel storage pool boron concentration to within limit. 9E # .a 0 6 oddsgghA i A.2.2 Verifye [ Region 2] fuel Immediately storage pool verification i has been performed since l the last movement of fuel l assemblies in the fuel aweMt*5 Nk (ved storage pool..isman6er { _. __......~{.--
- ppg- \
SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-37 Amendment K 16.10-37 October 30,1992
CESSAR naincmo s l (' ) i Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.19 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS e SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.19.1 Verify the fuel storage pool boron 7 days concentration is within limit. t ( K SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-38 ( Amendment K 16.10-38 October 30,1992
CESSAR n!Micariou l 16.10.20 3.7.20 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.20 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS f 3.7.20 Spent Fuel Assembly Storace ' LCO 3.7.20 'Ihe combination of initial enrichment and M] burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in [ Region 2] shall be within the acceptable [burnup domain K of Figure 3.7.20-1. C or A ano<b*% win Sp m A R 4 3-l I , l APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in [ Region 2] of the fuel storage ; pool. l ACTIONS I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the NOTE LCO not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable A.1 Initiate action to move the immediately noncomplying fuel from [ Region 2]. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.20.1 Verify by administrative means the initial Prior to storing the fuel I enrichment and (Gddhtfairidt] burnup of the assembly in [ Region 2] fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure 3.7.20-1. o r S etlLtA 'l4 b 1. p l l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.7-39 l Amendment K 16.10-39 October 30,1992
CESSAREinhia ( Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.20 40 . . 1 1
. . . . . 4
...c, . . .
35 .
.__;___ .__o... ...i_...
_.s.._. .
.... . . i ACCEPTABLE l 3 l l l l l s 30 ,
; K ;
c5 . B
. ...; __.t... __.u...
....r e ....,...
..s..__ .. ...
- a. ,
D 25 .' .' ,' .' , z ., ; ;
. / . .
e '
' 1 g ___ ___ ___;. . . _ _j. _ ___ . '. - __j.__ ___'__. . _ _ 'y . . . ______.
w . ; . . . . . o 20 .' x ; . . . . . . 1 .
.__,. __ .__t...
o m o .
>. 15
- m ., . .
2
...,'... ...;___ . . u' , . . .__, . __. __,___ . . . , . _ . . . _ _ , . ... ... ___
m . . l l l l . l m .
< 10 ,
l l . NOT ACCEPTABLE . .
...p... ... ... . . _ . . . . . _ _ _; _ . .._..__...,......;..... . . .;_ . . . :
. . . . l
. . . . 1 5 . '. '. '. '.
...q.. .......
' ' ' ' )
0 l 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 l l U-235 ENRICHMENT (V/0) DISCHARGE BURNUP VS. INITIAL ENRICHMENT FOR REGION 11 RACKS FIGURE 3.7.20-1 3.7-40 i SYSTEM 80+ Amendment K 16.10-40 October 30,1992 l
, bn8x n, n. sis kllg-w T.s.*
- 3. 7. c LCD 3.S'.l.s L LLb4 L. deTE &
CAA F, .2 zh-~ sc + e 9 o,= y new n au A&id L Mf .g n ogifL hw wD nt af/A L D/cr. dndC G aA22
~A(
or g h.
- 3. s . 3. r. uv Jy .r~ roi .by ~- At.gd
- u 4; sufnu Le j ir .qs..
DWe 5. <.H D AldA a f J/ Q .% A u d ,6vf qqa s4: r. c . g s on. .
.I . 7. 4 PC- bu - Qp-, Ap
-bo fs ' )G Syd~e $w M dsA v 6 4
$f' hLp a-pnw y ny a sua u
% ts. ~. " p-f -n sc srs.y 6f4 k 4 buj-J'
-w.
- 3. Y. 'l L.w/w'~ - hg fd 5
A Jyr~ w ,L AxJudw A pau 4c A s Lyso C5. ~ agp~(^ L 6 7w &Luy. .~s.
'1 1
't . . * . L b I b ,W%
j ss < , b y L - r qk beW J a .u. eL he < 4 3 5.m . A brc .c a - D y b v." Y l Nk. & MJ0
% L Speu .
CESSAR nai"ication 3 16.11 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ( , .16.11.1 3.8.1 AC SOURCES - OPERATING 1 , AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 l l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS I i 3.8.1 AC Sources - Orieratine l I LCO 3.8.1 The following AC Electrical Power Sources shall be OPERABLE. a. soslifiel Two a 1,s..L : circuits between the offsite transmission network and 2 -'" onsite Class IE AC/stribution/} stem;and . T.Ae
- b. Two diesel generators (Dc s) M ag o[.s.,p/yy eye, Me'v/5r[od a[ N.< ca.sl1t. C/A ss Id Ac *].'s%%t.'a Qreu .
I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2,3 AND 4 I ACTIONS i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPL!! TION TIME A. One Mrequired] A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.q for e., I hour offsite circuits := %Jequiredy . _ . . inoperable. d4Slb A" OPEAA %E C'
- Once per hours AND thereafter Dec.htc.
A.2 Ea,_ J required featurq) 24 hours from , g,;fe gwer So
; ix ..i r - f2::: = ;;. d.c discovery of ! gcin.di g *
(,4 j c,, 4mn with no offsite power CrEn;&LE; A.ud \s UL fs::=
' ?"
- sa- fJ corm 6 .a; K
.aogle w ks.a d t.)
' " *J0f eo k ) % cf '
redundant feature (6) AND f8gd'M d A.3 Restore [ required)offsite 72 hours k circuit to OPERABLE status. ut, (contmued) le da3s 41. d;st.aseg o$ Redald4.it' rego.'s.ed 4,Ng .h, meit Lco (c4toa<(Q ls la */cuble. . SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-1 Amendment K 16.11-1 October 30,1992
CESSAR nutricarien f 4 AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 i ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE Required Action B.3.1 or B.3.2 shall be completed if this Condition is entered. i B. One[r,equired)N B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for f-kc 1 hour K p '^- g (required]offsite circuie) inoperable, f epf,g433,g, AND Once per 8 hours ANm thereafter
\m SeguAed (cd* Esu.c M .y..M iwiu.m 4 hours from discovery ;
sagprM h3 % s'asfeu%. u s..;a wik ke of!-~,~ A =(** w Caad k,e.s ~b CPEPJ.BLE d a! puu..;w concurrent with s'aofe44Wy M , a .I, u 6 Ic. Jk,a if 5 =: OPE"AELE. !- ^ of eclashaf I telaM r'c Aaed 4Td*N g,. 'r ,mm
, d ': dig,,g mi g, 4) 15 akfcreble. AND .
Dc: _2d B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE diesel 1E) hours
;-- !^- is not inoperable due to common cause failure.
9.E 6.3 4 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for (24) B .M OPERABLEd:m: em. ;w. p() hours D cr AND B.4
- g. 4, J) h Restore _-: , c tk la 72 hours aa n:= to OPERABLE A4D status.
b h Iro(~ continued)d swu en u.% 6 A ~ & Lc.o . SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-2 Amendment K 16.11-2 October 30,1992
C E S S A R Ennfic m w ~ ~f AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1
. k3 o T e . . . - .
6 "
+/ ($b e ' 4'[ef)
\
ACTIONS (continued) _ 7 COMPLETION TIME y CONDITION , k REQUIRED ACTION Onehequired)offsitek.1 Restore requikffsite) circuits 12 hours K. to OPERABLE status D. circuit inoperable. M _QE bG p Restore (require)d dieset-M 12 hours One[ require)d diesel.k.2
;::&- inoperable. ;;;;-.ner to OPERABLE status.
'Q . Two{ required R.1 Restore one[ require]d M 2 hours E. ,_ ..au, E. ;- "-- to OPERABLE inoperable. status.
C.. us u4ao
\N Exc_.. ." required,featuros) 12 hours from C. $ Two[ required)ffsite E,1 discovery of;!::gg.,,,
circuits inoperabic. 2: O. "E" A"LEr ,a .euw 6/e d:s g 4JAed 48 ev/vadast rc A82 L: .e concurrent .in Lef.dl4'4 7 m & ~w . . .s ci ~ u . &; _. . .+..u; ,, su ,, ,,w b6v4(s) c.. _ R.2 Restore one[ require)d offsite 24 hours circuit to OPERABLE status. . Required Actions F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours F. and associated Completion Times of M Conditions Aj8,c,, p F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours l oc -emstr E not met. G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately G. Three or more [ required; AC Power Sources inoperable.
~TG G J 'a . p> Me,e L u , . , - ,
, .- ...u ,
du / * /> C ,s . l- sa :& J A .' be. .e de se c. . -t<; - l
- s. si gvi t.o .g 'b .' g.b .a SYSTEM 80+
55% 1 - j' l
- - - - l. . . . . . . .
1 Amendment Q f 16.11-3 June 30,1993 ;
My 4 ditcJ .,_4 .6 16. Il- 3 l
/1)m ;
-, 1 1
----... M u T* [5 . .-. - --.. -. ,
h$W L' & h0 W kJ k am g ua s.t.9 N M x hs ~ -
+~q / A cx a u 2. a . # g de AC p ww 4 ~ Aa-a .
I l
, CESSAR DESIGN CERTIFICATICN
't AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker ali ent and indicated power 7 days availability for each uired]offsite circuits.
SR 3.8.1.2 NOTEC
- 1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.1 satisfies this surveillance. ~7 D (e .
- 2. All am: puwaux starts may be preceded by m coyas ,
prelube j,.J.._ .; .u-- ------ t ' by :i; yceloJ u4 [ //e v./ 4 7 A
"r-*m:: - am.,p pee;sd ye;oe la /a .e.l .yu .
F O. .l: 41..L A :~. J;_4. _w..w. start m
- 3. y u .,. ,o w b.,g pr~+rr _ i .; idling and gradual
,* '1" "d*" ~
acceleration 4may be used as recommended byI the manufacturer. When 4he[are not used, N m Jlhed dA d Pr**e b "* 5 the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in SR 3.8.1.5 must be met. q s ( D: Yer
- h.= dish Mr
-. each Sur! ;r:rtr starts from standby As specified by condition and achieves the following steady state Table 3.8.1-1 voltage = ' f .y. uy.-
- 2. Wh:g; 2 [3744] volts and s [4576] volts, and
--h,- [requency 2 [58.8) Hz and s [61.2] Hz.
(continued) i l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-4 ( , Amendment I 16.11-4 . December 21,1990
T CESSAR nai"lCATION 4. 4 E SE d.d %., pecce).d 4ad ; ( 8% e dM<.1 fMW d.OJT sketdo.w o c sones skd ge ek emate. .( 14 L Y. 4 . 'Z ..y=rHh j
! of SA 4.9. #5 .
i AC Sources - Operating l 3.8.I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.3 b4 NOTEG
- 1. C., s : r..m.eu loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
\ Adb. sr kAOer' YAa3e g Momentary transients outside the load weg*fesu 2.
( do not invalidate this test.
- 3. This surveillance shall be conducted on only
's - No one dH d . .. c;;;;- at a time.
Pk Vu$ D - - :yr;:. each diesel generator is synchronized, a.lJAs specified by loaded, and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 2 Table 3.8.1-1 [5957] kW and s [6255] kW, lK SR 3.8.1.4 m '/;.-;fy p ~~ m ... . v. . J o u ouni. m . m.. 2.[1S0] - ay; -
'~
(Sec 4,ruded N II d4YS SR 3.8.1.4 7 NOTE Y All diesel generator starts may be preceded by IS4 dogj-an engine prelube period.
- 2. " - " -
ng:':E ;-;;;: . .R wuus.u m . ( m ,p: 'c- ;,u sJ ' yv SR 3.0.2. U yc. '- - sn,ei, Yuky: Dc.. ; each J;m:N ;m starts from standby e u.. j py dq g condition and achieves :Fc ' " 'ag ;--::or x' fe--; m in s[20hconds v
- p. goltage 2 [3744) volts and s [4576] volts,
""P
)( /requency 2h8.hiz and sE62.234z.
(continued) L Yecih t 4 d 14y th {ud e ,ac w atej MQ *
.4 fod o'. ( .
c atA.d s 1 {220] 3 LL o SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-5 Amendment K 16.11-5 October 30,1992
..._m. _.- _. _ _. m..__ _ . _ .
, Aggan af f- lge /4.//-E -
~
3 e he k* 5 L&$ (* OJ IfmebC dcGJmo f A k C h udte b- e4ck d4v t,au [4a A eay. . j moodeJ b{. , Sk 3. Y. i . 4 tri 1 NC of cak k/ F i 5Y$ce - d4 of e r,te s t, geb%tt y] barfer j u t u S . - s %3 e t. m ,) 6 1 4hc My duL Aa1 o).%cu.sdid
+~ q . ,
i I l i
1 } CESSAR Ennncuio I, 4 4 4 i j AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) j SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 3-- __._ ___ SR 3.8.1.h
-NOTE 1 1. ' Ibis surveillance shall not be performed in 4 MODES 1 or 2.
j 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events 4 which satisfy this r""- SA, i J 4 I
-k%[
sources ri:;d
" - - - ' ~
rea u. g~.c automatic % manual] transfer of f.=&4y- _,7 y} from the)(normafcircuit to each M e7Q fte, [18 months] l <dh.cacit.[equired)1. offsite ;.circuit r' 'r'" -- t ..+..;;dj ;JS::e s ~ ..;a G.
/ / }
1 a%( SR 3.8.1.1 0 .Vc@y_ each JL ' p;Cr
. , . . ~ . ;r~: grejects a load of 2 [18 months]
9 kW,we aoJJ d ,,, y 6. [c q]
- a. Following load rejection, the frequency is s (
[63]liz, if. WithirQ].econds following load rejection, the C. frequency is 2 58.811z and s 61.2 HzM
- g. Within{J] seconds following load rejection, the b, voltage is 2 [3744] volts and s (4576] voltsj nJd SR 3.8.1.K -NOTES ,
do 1. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES le2,,3, -; v. 5. --- j~ - J n veAry ya pcc orwbyd~P 4rch A[0 93 _u-;! ;-m.2 - does n t trip andj voltage (18 months] is maintained s FG001 volts during and following a load rejection of 2 [5957] kW and s [6255] kW. K
]
l (continued) ! Q ('L, ee l 4 q ac. 44 M pv l uafasJc1 i c.Je d s Lt .hthf 4.h 7 St .
)
SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-6 Amendment K 16.11-6 October 30,1992
~ .
4 mica mr 4 /4< /6. // - (, d doves __ _ ___
- 1. ~Ila saue;lhace. shit not be gef~ J l ia Adobe I .< z. j
- 2. . Ced:+ ny be hkea &< uay lsaae d l
+L + u+;sly B;s sr . l
.acAs - - - _ - !
l
CESSAR Ein%uen i i
! *t I
i l 1 AC Sources - Operating l 3.8.1
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVElLLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.8.1/
II 1. All dH h--*^NOTE-S starts may be preceded by . Aa ca3.a e prelube ::::dar r tr -- =&d by ic
..., re-D N' b <1 l
- 2. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1, 2, 3, +emHr. e < 4, cc.Jif m43 be -fa s 4 r w k sd e k eseds Nb
- 3. Ary.owJ c.1;b..;; aa J w a/
ti ~= fcund ce! cf i !::ua .' i...; ii:-
,g2 g 7
4;, g ,
= : !!u a v"! u ff.a fe. . a a y ., r r y '( M stkod. se eete on#m. simulated loss of offsite power [18 months]
signal:
- a. De-energization of emergency buses,'
- b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and-.
D(r
- c. der! ;--ae automatically starts from standby condition and:
- 1. Energizes permanently-connected loads in s[20lseconds, _
- 2. fnergizes auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer,
- 3. )daintains steady state voltage 2
[3744] volts and s [4576] volts,
- 4. Maintains stead state frequency 2
[58.8]Hz and s 61.2]Hz, and
- 5. gupplies permanently-connected and auto-connected loads for 2 [5]
minutes. (continued) i i SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-7 i Amendment I 16.11-7 December 21,1990
t i CESSAR En#icarios i 1 1
- j , ,
i l ( 1 ! AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 1 1 d SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.14 NOTE-S '
- 12. 1. All dk;d m'~ starts may be preceded by a. a '"5 ' d '-
~ - ' ' '
prelube - '- ,- - .~.- --,"
-,-r,-,.=. f sr.s b ,
- 2. This surveillance shall not be perfonned in MODES Ir2, 2, 4 m J 0. se 7. .
C, el*k n d< lae4 heurflvN eocAs it, < }
- 3. ^ppn m a uuv. uva w m v , ,c..ce a[l,/, g, J4 ,
, ; m., m . em. , ,, a n. . . me . i;;;.n , j ,,, ,,,, ;;,,, <
e !_y- t, . :'t =fc : f-
;;;;; ,, 7;._ .
t- :tenebl-v (i f wa M] EM+L'a orla simulated)(Engineered Safety [25 =c :] :: :
eatures'(ESF)1 actuation signal
';!. day;d Im.. vi- STACCERED TEST sifi.ic ;x =: BASIS %
SR 2.S. ' !! - K ([ch dL94 d g;;...m:r auto-starts from standby ( condition and:
. e17 2 'x p:- < "^!!:;; i [2744] ,e::; ud e+ c; 1 g c.s [4570] .01:.f8 r 20 x:7 s o re,r w;v-e i s.d Jm..a; :;s:, p I b. 2. ^ d.;c . m f.w.c..;y b 58.8 H: =d j
f C 6!.2 H:i _,_,_- f 20 rent efte:-
. ._ ~
- c. 6f ades h, y S ,.)
)(.d. Permanently-connected loads remam energized from the offsite power system; and
)(.e, Emergency loads are energized [or auto-connected through the load sequencer) to the offsite power system.
I Ta & {to } .sec,.se h *S\ w k W 1 % 4 A (**"'""*b) 2, ! J.u. 3 % T$,svX.cJcs 6%$5 ' hht] / d t i i U%lV-
- J /
g, u ( @'] gecah d4 e $ d d*C Add
& ci.,) -tests, m. Cues 4're gv e a t UU) U [
SYSTEM 80+ 3 E'8 AJ4 i(u.2} dB
- Amendment I 16.11-8 December 21,1990
CESSAR nai"lCATION AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY s ez-SR 3.8.1.M Before the last load step, simulate loss of offsite power / (htinued) and demonstrate: -
/
- a. De-energization of emergency buses,
- b. buses, Load DG shedding from emergency /
- c. -Dic:! ;;; m'cr from ready toload condition:
Energizes ently-connected perman/ loads, 2. erg.izfs auto-connected emergency to - through the load sequencer,
. rte. $
- 3. ex =\teady state voltage
(' 2 [3744) valts and s [4576] volts, 4. AdtAsddh\ Schies = steady state frequency 2
@8.8]Hz and s[61.2 Iz, and
' 5. Supplies permanently-connected and i
/
/ auto connected loads for 2 [5r minutes. .
l S R 8.1.lf g--NOTE 6 ----
/ !
i- A;; 2.. _'. , _ -_ _ - str..;; umy im WJ% c xl ,m l
--pr< dub 7 -^'_t' = ~,. w uu,nu u MyNaw
-----..r..... I re-~*
'I i . This surv s all not be performed in MOD r2, /,' r 5. .,- 2..
-y. $., , . [-(PR..v.h.. .. ...- .!'.'f.h*'d' A y ;,'.f g ., y ,
1:~~ (~ r.d su: af-;vk. ~ J .. .,,f' su.~ei!!r e "" :ufCec for .s; s; p .i
- N (contmued) l n
SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-9 (s. ; Amendment I 16.11-9 December 21,1990
CESSAR ninncamu !
'f
( l AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (conti . 2ed) : SURVEILLANpE , ,. d,j c. , FREQUENCY / h(con.8.1.ds g N ^N
- on$ simulated [ kumudai Safety Engineered
/
tinued) Features (ESF)] actuati,on, signa 6/ d>&ts eu .jipGucyb p% d% w#- TE5 a5
^--
im
- a. 2[3744) ts and SI' 9 /chieves volta !.,
s [4576] vol s [20 nds after auto-start and durmg test,. g
- b. 9 chieves frepency 2(58.8]Hz and s@l.3 H3 s 'clseconds after auto-start and during test,
- c. ratesfor [5] minutes:
Permanently-connected loads remain energized from the offsite power sy m; and
- e. Emergency loads are energized [o auto-connected through the load sequencer he offsite power system.
. N b* T* SR 3.8.1.ld -g NOTEG j pa3t.1,if j 19 1. All d!:':! ;; er:*^- starts may be preceded by % u .'4 ' ~ ,
prelubey=i~ ~ ra-- 2:2 by S
* )
l
- - + - :=:: a p er,e J.
i
- 2. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1. 2, 3, A.or-4 */ 4 -
3 ^AM Inn ' - #' " Y4' b '#!/ W s M . N.'::: Er.d.;ef-:ek.mm1
==!!!=x -.!: ~fCcm f.. .c;s; y..ranc.
(contmued) l i SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-10 . Amendment 1 16.11-10 December 21,1990 i
CESSAREHLua
*f AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 1
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVElLLANCE n; ufa/ g FREQUENCY o Ver cr SR 3.8.1 hp . C;.-.aa ..y :: on 2 simulated loss of offsite power
. . [18 months] ,
(continued) signal in conjunction with g simulated [ESF] actuation signal: u dvd er-
- a. De-energization of emergency buses,-
- b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and-
^56
- c. Diesel cenaauu automatically starts from standby condition and:
- 1. gnergizes grmanently-connected loads in s[20] seconds,
- 2. nergizes auto-connected emergency
[ loads load sequencer,
- 3. chieves steady state voltage 2
/[3744] volts and s [4576] volts,
- 4. f(chieves steady state frequency 2[58.8]Hz and (61.2]Hz, and
- 5. fupplies permanently-connected and auto-connected emergency loads for 2 [5] minutes. ,
SR 3.8.1./ NOTES--
- 1. This surveillance shall not be performed in 4 :: k e e 1 -
2- MODES
.G.e.s J :+ r.Ir2,
~ 2,6L t4hN be "42l"
estsis .1%t prefy rsh .52. V es n eroh*--" each di =!pfy mm's automatic tripf are- [18 months] g m bypassed on a flimulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated JESF{ actuation signal] except: (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-11 Amendment I 16.11-11 December 21,1990 l t b - .- , - , , - - - - .,
CESSAR EMWicario. 1 AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.. 13 a. Engine Overspeed ; c,,,<.d-, (continued) b. Generator Differential "
- c. Low Low Lube Oil Pressure ; o4
- d. Generator Voltage-Controlled Overcurrent.
SR 3.8.1. 14 NOTE-5
, 1. Momentary transients outside the load sange u d p.w. ,. b.t., eages ,
do not invalidate this test.
- 2. This surveillance shall not be perfortned in MODES 1,2, ' a ~4. =c 2.
m' 3- -
\_
hm.verd p r., > m.. .y~ each dica . :;r [18 months] hours: epfd. gperatesa, for 2 24g g,,_,
.=-e , ,
4-
- a. : j:foaded 2 [6553] kW and s [6881] kW4ee-- lK t F.e G Q k..<s 9 c , ., ,a pet. % e, a lJ 'ay ha m d $$r fest
- b. paded 2 [5957] kW and s (6255] kW. h Juda; :h: nr!&;; 22 Men of h; :cc:7 SR 3.8.1. l i' NOTEG
- 1. 'This surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the diesel generator after the diesel generator has operited 2 [2]
hours at 2 [5957] kW and s [6255] kW., lg DG-
- 2. All ^~ 1 y~~m starts may be preceded by As edy<4e, prelube,p=1.;; :.: ::::: = i d by ;h; j
.=. fu ; ... ' VitId
- o
$ % Momentary transients outside % load range do not invalidate this test.
l (continued) y 3. Cead2 my b c Mea 6 sa,344ed \ 4gg gge.sh ilab .Q bIr N0 3A-SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-12 Amendment K 16.11-12 October 30,1992
CESSAR Ennncum
\
AC Sources - Operating ' 3.8.1 l l SURVEILI.ANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE g ,, FREQUENCY
, venly ow SR 3.8.1.' , t$I L':--mm each d! :! ;; ~. :sc starts and achieves, [18 months]
(continued) k fc"; ':;"^'"; -d ':q ;ny in s{20bondsXj h gottage 2: [3744] volts and d [4576] volts, and W. frequency (58.8)1z and sh1.2]Hz. SR 3.8.1. I'< NOTE-S
- 1. This surveillance shall not be performed in '
.L MODES 1, 2, 3,fAAcal Gr.s.4Lt..co.su..Jbs +edr.e 'f. S N/b'*d stears L4 r+tisfY 14's s4.
%eM I':
n
-r. y...tc each J;cd gcac. ::: " ^'a 'e: [18 months]
- a. Synchronizeswith offsite power source while l loaded with emergency loads upon an str! c:
simulated restoration of offsite power l
- b. Transfec: loads to offsite sourcey,' and
- c. Retunsto ready to load operation.
SR 3.8.1. 17
- NOTEC 7
- 1. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 or 6. r L .Gc.A.dtd ht q Ct..$1 M J ibC Ud/kided ca 64- s44f'E this u..
}
gred. uTs
,~~.. . ~. . _ with m. A
, Wegcc.cr .r operating in test
.m. .
[18 months] mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated LESFYactuation signal overrides the test mode by:
- a. Returning Air be- to ready to load operatio(and
- p. Automatically energizing the emergency loads with offsite power.] j (contmued) {
SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-13 Amendment I 16.11-13 December 21,1990 j
I l, l CESSAR nai;'icarieu
*9 I
I AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 l l i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY : NOTE - 7 SR 3.8.1. If {1. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4. Credh m be kata At aqlAdde) 6.redfS $h App""'ed 0 !y!i.;;;vu ,$.aka Of K aca.
- 2. -
!! a faud :: cf "'rr:e du:!:; ;U;
., f[ g*, g ,
a.. 16. ;l1 ~ff.a fe..;e;y..,~ ~. i~ segueJc.ed Q. De-' _te-the interval between eachhoad block is [i8 months within i [10% of design interval] for each emergency [AJJskafdodJ) load sequencer. SR 3.8.1.'. 20 - N NOTE w gg ,'s, /g, , g, All d!; se.. ..a starts may be preceded by probbe 7r~ ,r,,.. .e r ,-g 1 Ly :,a _: f:g..= - l D-~'=' 6*h d!:. :! ;=r:!:n ~'e : - foi u h,, . ele and f;;y - e , m s i2Gi mm.d; 10 years
'/v. , when started simultaneously from standby condition; e4ck D& nelluth ,a d Do3 Seds/
- p. foltage 2 [3744] volts and s [4756] voltsj andy K /requency 2(58.8]Hz and s(61.2]Hz.
I K . SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-14 Amendment K 16.11 14 October 30,1992
_ . - - __ _em-J j CESSAR nai"ication I I l l l !( i i 1 AC Sources - Operating 3.8.I
- TABLE 3.8.1 1
< DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE ' 1 NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LASTE. VALID TESTS"> FREQUENCY , s1 At least once per 31 days T ' 14
)2 At least once per % days #
g (L; ..e; b;; 'h:.:. 21 hx 4 I NOTEI' (1) Criteria for determining number of failures and valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, where the number of tests and failures is determined on a per diesel generator basis. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid t:sts conducted after the OL issuance date shall be included for the computation of the *last )6 valid tests".
/
Joe
-(7) H.!; ;is; f.muw49 sitali oc maimainea untu seven consecutive tailule-Iree dcus.usds hr: % p 6 =:,.', m.d dio nuudici vi induius ni d2c inst lv valid dema2. is nas L o
~ h:r'L r: ~_ L
> 3 M hat m- p 1dys ;
14 M La my3L9.c e i i l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-15 l AmendInent I f 16.11-15 Decernher 21,1990 l l _- - _ _- - - -. . - . - a
CESSAR naincuiu AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1
\ )
TABLE 3.8.1-2 ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY ACTIONS NO. OF FAILURES NO. OF FAILURES IN IN LAST 20 VALID LAST 100 VALID ACTION TESTS TESTS 3 Within 14 days prepare and maintain a report for NRC audit describing the diesel generator reliability improvement program implemented at the site. 11 Declare the diesel generator "noperable. Perform a requalification t program for the affected diesel y genemtor. r l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-16 Amendment I 16.11-16 December 21,1990
~'
-- I CESSAR insncma 16.11.2 3.8.2 AC SOURCES - SilUTDOWN
\
AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELELTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 'Ibe following AC Electrical Power Sources shall be OPERABLE: goal;Att
- a. One%:ircuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution 4stemg r
. 4 a;um, 3 ce o;ted b, u;e s. s /j ,
- D:st/.f st:.a gS de LdJwl&
g
- b. l & .sc 6m.'o o /-
One diesel generator (br,) 9(,1c .4 off y.'s)T
-ku cas,'/e C/4.s it Ac. Q.'sTr.Lt .%I y n st6 ked by L 'O 1.E.1 ,
APPLICABILITY: hkODES 5 and 6, during movedient ofirradiated fuel assemblies. l NOTE Refer to LCO 3.10.6 (Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - AC Power Availability) for applicability of AC power sources during reduced inventory operations. ACTIONS ( CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME W A. One er-more required A( Suspend CORE Immediately 41/ O- ACPum. Scu :::
- .-u_
2.. I ALTERATIONS. 4'2'"*b A.2.2.- Suspend handling of irradiated Immediately y.,p en ile , fuelp As:<dl.e s. AMP _ A./ 8nitiate actions to[ suspend Immediately 2..?. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, CCPDRus). AND
'24Ltc +<hJ -b >
A.4 . fuspend operations involving Immediately 2M positive reactivity additions. AND AS Initiate action to restore Immediately
.2.5 requiredd_.C P :.:: Se= : to OPERABI.E_ status. T
, &
- OttsMe. f c 'er circa,y SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-17 l
( s. l Amendment Q 16.11-17 June 30,1993
$ 7 tat n w h 4 byr IL .ll -f'l 7y/
4 l
....... Jore -.- - . . .
un a<. alf;a.J Ju:s a s c.'svi'd u . c.solt J Coal:6 A , u4u-qgicdic. C a A as +1 %A A LT'os ' be. Ac %S,b Asa s p ; _ , t_ co ' 3.v.,e , A.i 'D<. Acc. dfcct<J <<ylu 1 feda(s)i T~<.3:de l q u;ik e. obt<. Fu #4a4/J/c loopeedic. A : b . w !.i.(!m ( n_ .a:- n _ i s u,
., j- ,t un J n w. -
;- a. :,,,, J5 --
i l' 1 i\ a s - a - ,, n . , . r 6.:, :c .: OR.
_.A_ ,4 e sem e e em, a & 4 a ,sn- . _ , _ ,.,a 4. .i,A__ s- ,2p _ a a .;A..-_a, 4 ; f f
. ALI fd L): C N E'I *5A ISC- A*wt.b'.bab 4.pe4/c . ALTuAT o A s, 1
a.m s.,,. a -. - a + 4 w..n4a 1 aul:A a coa . wss e. JW u. . . r h
, M. b O Mn$ .
up aA croA.V c . uY.'s .J Isl4:de 6 s.y _t'.c h Ah.($ sos M d s p d.'.a s,
*MalJ'43 palJ LJc.
eulJ +7 dia.ke i MD SS T ,.. % d <. A. aa % -. J.sk 4 re care a 0.sc L
- w. +. Deswu neov .
1 7 ..
CESSAR 8!!#ic- l
.f AC Sources - Shutdows 3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE R5QUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE :r., m .r..... w'4k SR 3.8.2.1 F6. iui m. - g e- A. yw;5d by-spplicable SRs y SR 3.S : 1, SR 3.0.k2, 5R 3.8.i.4,-2 . _ . .. .$6R 4
3 4.1." , J S R 3.^.i.1 $ , . .d ;e. . i. i , h - 1r n i L_
- r.. ,-w w o e.c s < o ..cm 3 -~ _ j j
- - - - - j ( .11-~ rs ,h o -
vr nuo us ' w \ r; L i_ 4_. me . y ew
- m m.
; - - - - d a 7 r.
% w SAs We di dN i
< ppva a 3.1.i. s a s.su.s n ~ ,L L u 3.s.1.!L i 3.r. i . t t , s A 3. r. t .a w~g
[54.3.t.t.lG a w sc 3.r.l. q l 't J -/o b< Of?AAdG)
/ f, fc p un
- - m aca 3.e.t '
ac
/
L '> 4 s af q w 9 --- 3 f.<.11 d
.r aw - ua., f p' 4 %ef S4 3L 3.i . i. Za ff
\
3.8-18 SYSTEM 80+ Amendment K 16.11-18 October 30,1992
DESIGN CESSAR CERTIFICATI@N
*t
( 16.11.3 3.8.3 DIESEL FUEL,WNILLUBRICATING OIL, A4h sTaa.T m Mp Diesel Fuepend Lube Oil, % .h u r.k 3 8 Ja A;4. 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS M A- ' 3.8.3 Diesel Fuc4end Lubricatine Oil c d STAtT.b3 1 & ,;l , 4a 4 d 4A M ap o '*8-LCO 3.8.3 The diesel fuel oi[ubsystem shall bent.s *."LE odj!~y . L ;;a'.N.a
- .ag c" li.
- -- M
- " j A"5:: C --, r or each required diesel generator.
DG APPLICABILITY: When associated &;! ....ci ;c; is required to be OPERABLE. ht g ACTIONS NN CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
#< M( A. T J 1,. ; > [450j A.1 P - c ' ^- fm1tre!in e ey;;.ad 4-heur.
^ w gal .e gin: x= -.'~ d]^ - L.^e E- 48 /o%S
.r[M:v.m .ua'ascae (9vuj
- e. .uvs~ -1000] gd L a.
J.y [cr : ginc .ncun'ed] (,itou_ ,I M
+ -ta axh.a.J L.:1s o* .
to . .a B. Toc :ca.sf . spabrhty- B.1 Restore f;;! 'm-9..,,al.,7 1 hour b iaui J.ca: ci .1"::y :: 0"E"m'"LE 4& 4eoc
& gns.eLicfoimm.
. .a - N.T a.n..s I ~. 4 s.
C. F" ' '-ve! ' '5,"] C.1 R=:~e fue! leveiia e' = ge -24 Lu .. b 'rh tc 2155,000] gallena. 7d
- !!; : ad : l55,000]in M ;a;c v. u.v.s so. gc Liu wel o;( f,nw 93 rank
- yd.Igu;{+:c.,(4te5 g jo y /j,
~
apm p Restore wL. ;=e..agoil up 'r1.b l D. Lubumims uii imcatury D.1 f r 24 Le .s-
'M w.uhient. E -'~v.t. _
aNU.,#~!h. Jo J ys kv.1.s erwt. ni<t E. N;w fud p;cpe.d = sf SR- E.1 Prifv fu:! premds2E 44J.y
- 313.5 no: v.;;L:.. limits. Nh/V^2N"*- 4 dM -4mts. f. E [22s] rsiq . '
a F rud iv ; p.uicuime r: "c::=fud:e: paii :c -3(Hieys cc-+- < .::.on ovi mddh ce >=::::!-- te liin
! Lolo in GUw Gi .uv.w- M s6mge.4anks. I 1
l (continued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-19 Amendment Q 16.11-19 June 30,1993
kyM7 h hgc- 4 /L ll-li
-- ---- . .. kD'TE - - - . -
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l:
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- f
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l l G. Ou. c/ wiu D(rs UN $4rk k oh he Y p~nJJ~ 2 to y j.t .
- o. Du a - bs, w d of p pf'w at-u K % :fs sj % h.uf fd dd 7d~
~Boyn .
E. Lw wa 'l% w24 iful as aa&w a,,A fwdo 4[225] (c.) 3E2s]ps}. l l
1 l ' P v EEl"C e7 GCtMAE1 D CERTIFICATISH DESIGN i , 3 i I
\
l
! 1 1
i Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil ' 3.8.3 J ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G.1 Declare associated de: set #6 Immediately
- 6. Required Action # and F associated Completion ;-We inoperable.
Times not met.
~
DR . Diesel fuel oil,loh $1, .e sf=1' - 9 $. subsystem i-^p95 mf --
// .h for reasons other than Conditions A, B, C, D, jit; or K.E .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ( SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-S" 3.0.3.1 V;dfy ed fud &y [=d =;is: a r.:cd] 'ri 31 dr.ya conti= t [60^] gd!c= cf S:!.
Verify each fuel storage tank containa 2: t.u ,-j 31 days SR 3.8.3.X l gallons of fuel. Erf,3*a] Verify lubricating oil inventory is 2 (500] gallons. 31 days SR 3.8.3.Y 2 SR 3.8.3.43 Veriff 0 ; d.e Osh pcist, g.r..;i, d-nii, aud "/.dla 31 hy: pdct ,
)
m:ek: i:-yr . t= e:ed : :: ;33;;b; ;r y,;;; jy .epor.or, nr new rne_1. N ;I :o a:or:g t a N :.cecrde.nc ndia :.pp'Jc.Llc ASTM e; od.ida. - S" 3.0.0.5 Oc.r.on:;:rre *" &e a, raaad" af aa* fua' ^'h~ 'h=n Within 11 day'
- 0.as m SR 3.3.3.4, arc widda appiiwb6 ASTM '^!!c >/ing "h. p. fo. n i.a : f.
mena s.o
. . -,. ,a
-Osmuu.imm Gm dio mud panicuive in umod foc! b WJ, days SR 3.8.3X i eiSI: "-a wh; ;_ - tJ m .J uw id. ppik a h 31
-A&TM .i.ud Js. l N Ytre CAck N '4ut ST4df f C EI/f /*
[/t s 514C, [5 3 ZZ.f] f 5a . SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-20 Amendment Q 16.11-20 June 30,1993
.I 4
9 e { O
- h_h
- Y w
'I j
*
- g CLOf (M C O sa fa ;4 - 44 a a:n w b:...) ;
l ueak w +L , 4 wlfQ Li KI %+.a3 '
- o r ,. A D<i<A f& 0 $
GJA 7~y . r lut:( P<yw. t A B t J 4 F i i 6 5 l l
P E'C C A D DESIGN V EG e7M us CERTIFICAT13N i
*t i
4 Diesel Fuel sad Lube Oil 3.8.3 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-S" 3.3.3.7 G rE 'r = d ....w.s .w. !.;c, wn .- f. m sci.- i3;]J.y.
n ,i a.y r. a - g:-- c.. .Hj - t , [31] days SR 3.8.35'i,d e storage tank. Check for and remove accumulated wate 4". 3. S. 3.^ - Dr-^~' :.:: i; f ;. in .ymm upersterte 4^2} ay:
-[=L.. ;. : , j :.-..f . f c f. A nu..e :-- 'r t:
'h A y e- ' D_ A = '= re- :i 6 M}e SR 3.8.3.% b For the fuel rhy--' ael sp%. ,
10 years
- a. Drain each fuel 3; ..e ; 1. ed *
- b. Remove the sediment *4^= 'ha 'a~a= + 4
/
and
- c. Clean the storaga tank.
( ii i 1 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-21 l. Amendment K 16.11-21 October 30,1992 i I
CESSAR naincmu 16.11.4 3.8.4 DC SOURCES - OPERATING DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Or>eratinc
'""Tk M ekt& dyshm LCO 3.8.4 &D:y R:! O DC Pr =: La.~ fui Division 1 and Division 2\ hall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One DC A.1 Crc = :. nr!:!r;; hm 2 hours k;;a mur.J,k. d .. .vud L.nerits as
/#.w .r.,hvL uM 2pp:;pri ;e ie .v.cc n ,, n . ., . n.
;JE : d
-leede.-(n. <rt< 444)
AND A.2 uan DC-pc== :. cur;; G4 hours gegtorg?$W/44k.L
= =F dstas.7A' 1Je4 ps Two DC.Foww. Restore one DC p sw;q.~p=:
o u. 2 hours B. B.1
,,, JNidwd8YnIperable. sj9;fw-to OPE,RABLE status.
r Ity; sue * (h ~6T m uA .) C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify the battery terminal voltage 2 (129] volts on 7 days float charge. l I (contmued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-22 Amendment Q 16.11-22 June 30,1993
i fyfg lN* Y ' , .. & s\ ) .- h,l 0.u.- Y / 0m wka,u YH
- w 37p A t q~ -fL. J ~
s ecs ze
-a
~-
(n4L s c6 4 Ln L 8 mi.J7 g it
- fo e .
-m Aab s . 2. can +L L a.& tn wfa 64-2 2 u w yf utu t J9w 4& Q-6 ga ac - - A aD M A nd a L d j (E fu ls.
a tu. -
=
v- u w r w- - p,:,n -(~ . Q l"--(4_Cz C ;_" --J l 1 i
CESSAR EnWication
*f
( DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVElLLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at terminals and connectors. 92 days 98 r~- Verify the connection resistancek^r'e--M =l & ieys
=- -+m !: c [150E 6] ?:r!
-=- _---- . + _ _ ,,....,4 SR 3.8.4.3 y %fy the cells, cell plates and battery racks show no ps monthsh visual indication of physical damage or abnormal g]
detenoration. , , (%'r ws n sioic N M od44 Carew"' o SR 3.8.4.4 yerify,the celktoncell and terminal connections are ,M monthsy I clean'j tight, f.cc mr .. ;th ;.7 m and coated with [62] anti-corrosion material. SR 3.8.4.5 Verify connection resistance fmf 1. :14mm!; . J D(monthsy e... c.; sum.ce;.vc .> ; [150E x! ahm=1 D1.] SR 3.8.4.6 NOTES ,
- 1. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1,2, 3 or 4. !
1 1 I
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events ;
j which satisfy this ~~"- 1. S A, i i VeeX Pama*y'a each battery charger will supply 2 [400] 7 [18 months] { amperes at 2 [125] volts for 2 [8] hours. ; I l (C "*E""*d) j h3 i h f - # cla s) S e .dceccl/ cc w J/Q 3, 4 k I hf i ch~a] he .Me-e d vwvM'o.A, l v_._. - -- la iee f.'e e c..Jd eSad.5, AJY t [t!.c A s} f.s s 94 a.a r., +u : .t omst..u]. SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-23 Amendment I 16.11-23 December 21,1990
4 CESSAR Eininuuou
'r i
4 DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.7 NOTE
- 1. SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.4.7 once per 60 months.
- 2. This surveillance shall not be performed in MODES 1,2, 3 or 4.
- 3. Credit may be taken for unplanned events which satisfy this wm!!!rm..SE.
Ytri(y De m.m battery capacity is adequate to supply, and [18 months) maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle) when subjected to a battery service test SR 3.8.4.8 NOTE
- 1. This surveillance sha!! not be performed in MODES 1, 2,3 or 4.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events which satisfy this er ?!!rn. s 2.,
Ycri$y V*
-Om.w.-:rm battery capacity is 2 [34%] of the 60 months manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. A4 D_ j l
NOTE I Only applicable when battery shows degradation or has reached [85 %] of the expected life. 1 [!S rr.e."hd {, Q 'I i 2. w evu g I SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-24 Amendment K 16.11-24 October 30,1992 1
C E S S A R in nnc e ,. g s 3.8.5 DC SOURCES - SIIUTDOWN 16.11.5 DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown OG LCO 3.8.5 DC. dr.dvd Mur J n U N- dA&448La
&E*y mu,-a ne pnwer unece. _ ge ep;-d;; : as: ; m ,b b.
b syfA fle l f 2;x. ud/ ' " is O."E" AOLEr l .dstf, &axd5 S_: ._.. c.p &/ 4 76 *=ja J LU $ /? /o,
~ p:gr<:Lti.st sp a s - sursaa. " fmb) ry>$
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. l l NOTE l Refer to LCO 3.10.6 (Reduced RCS Inventory Operation - AC Power Availability) for applicability of AC power sources during reduced inventory operations. ACTIONS t CONDITION , , c)}EQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME n., - ,,,,n , n v l w A. L ;==-1 Din =dl A.1- Suspend CORE Immediately E-C "=:- 31,=e 2. . l ALTERATIONS.
. _ . s=
AND Qw w w<u I "g p c. ummedb A.2 Z Suspend handling of irradiated immediately
$frw'.Spu- fuely Asca.m 6 lies AND a , ,. a . A+ Immediately
[ Initiate action to)' suspend , A.2.3 operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND Le%fe Ad.'ea t. A.4, guspend operations involving Immediately 2.'f positive reactivity additions. AND A.Y- Initiate action to restore Immediately A8 required DC "c:g9I?5 d## pyn,f.JDF ;} to OPERABLE status. SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-25 Amendment Q 16.11-25 June 30,1993 l l 4
i ALWWf A.o. , lb . l{ a){ A. I Dulae. pp i
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CESSAR nainemeu DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 he-fe..a 3R 3.5.4.1 Juvush S" 3.0.4.S. - Aew.dius iv L 4 c weLcc - F. r- DC so or'<e s agvlt-<d'h.be* dN44KE, SR 3.5.4.1 Guvush Appl **ab/c S A
.rt,_ f,// v/c SA s oc -~ :
/- U "' 3 0 0 E
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sg 3. r. .{. t 54 3. V.u. y R 2 t.4.1 Tot. 3. t.1.L st 3. r. V. >' n s.r.y.r. sz 3. r. 4. s a a . V. 4. L-
-......kp75 ....--
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SL .5Tr.y. (/ f,<. 3.F.if.7/ t u.{ !
\
l s t 3. r. 't. V. ' 1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.8 26 Amendment K 16.11 26 October 30,1992
~ -
CESSAR nn"icario. 16.11.6 3.8.6 BA'ITERY CELL PARAMETERS , 1 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.6 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters f,- %. ?,b4,s , / J 44.',..a 2 - httvies LCO 3.8.6 -DC ,"ceci Suuredattery cell parametersishall be within imw '
- 3. )'. b'l.
% c,s ,,7 A n J: 3 & ,<. g n ble APPLICABILITY: When associated DC " eu.- Smu.m are required to be OPERABLE.
'44<f.'d -(p*.' Qw
\
- 3CTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more celu A.1 Verify the pilot cell:9] I hour
-- ~ - - batteries electrolyte level and float ct iiin H=b af voltage meet Table 3.8.6-1
-Tabic 3.5.6-i. Category C =1!==F': values.
(sith . a<. a mere _
' bou, tellpw- M uth" e>f "*b A.2 Verify battery cell parameters 24 hours
/,,,/,, meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category C attaanode values.
M i A.3 Restore battery cell parameters 31 days I to Category A and B limits of Table 3.8.61. (continued) y .. .
. . . g o, ,s . . . . . . . . . -- .
\ l a umJ l' bs *h y. Seya e 7e G ad:la.J asti? ,ls
- n .'."4 -
l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8 27 [ ' Amendment I l- 16.11-27 December 21,1990 - l l
~' - . - - . ,. , .
" - ~ ~
. I 1 6 CESSAREn!ine- l
*e ;
a 1 Battery Cell Parameters l ' 3.8.6 i ACTIONS (centinued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Actions and B.1 Declare associated DC "ua;r immediately c~~~ associated Completion - inwi-.th. b* yfer7 4 Timennot met. $,f,r4 f/c, af Gw+; a 6 -
@ J l v ,e ~,< 6*Ne ks s W- I ,
fverage electrolyte ' temperature of the r<rees<4/ke-paea cells !- -- $'] , i-MS! . ;oum v.' Tsic I 3.".0-; 4 [6.] *F. , E on .e a.,,,e khki a:sL ooc . ~<e Any battery cell ' parameter >not within [ Category C .!!v- L:; , 3 values. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY f SR 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 7 days Category A limits. SR 3.8.6.2 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 92 days Category B limits. AND C*/u fithin 24 hours after - a battery discharge of C $ [110] volts. AND (contmued) SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-28 Amendment I 16.11-28 December 21,1990
M t"
\
CESSAR Ennncmou
, 4 4
1 l Battery Cell Parameters I 3.8.6 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY + SR 3.8.6.2 (continued) See [ithin 24 hours after a battery overcharge l
>)( [150 volts]
SR 3.8.6.3 Verify the average electrolyte temperature of:t; p!!: 92 days cells is > [60]'F. forreseJTdis i K h ( l l i I l l l l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-29 ( Amendment K 16.11-29 October 30,1992 f
,- - .. - , , _ _ - _ y -,,.,,s . ,,.w,, ,- , , . -
CESSARnab a ! f
. i
. Battery Cell Parameters ;
i 3.8.6 1 TABLE 3.8.61 BATTERY ELECTROLYTE REOUIREMENTS CATEGORY A: CATEGORY Bt CATEGORY C: J Limits for each Limits for each Allowable value for Parameter designated pilot cell connected cell each connected cell Electrolyte > Minimum level > Minimum level Above top of plates, Le. vel indication mark, and indication mark, and 5 and not overflowing s 1/4" above maximum 1/4" above maximum level indication markJ) level indication marN2 Float Voltage 2 [2.13] volts M 2 [2.13] volts k > [2.07] volts Specific 2 [1.200]d 2 [1.195]# Not more than Gravity *'I [0.020] below the , sverage ef-en-connected cells [
.AND-. ANQ Ap"? cf :.!! saatc4 Average of all a!!: 2 (1.205]"" connected cells t 2 [1.195]* i NOTES .---
- a. T F h e cer M 72May t: =:pd for av&erage electrolyte :; c.i:-catur; elese l fa Yey e 4s.uc lLe. .rfre/Ad mer. <e-. dsta y ej. dN. shny.s fM.'ded .'f *s ast esteh psal.o r,
- b. Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level. I.eul c.ercSe,a l5 a d <rg4 u J, b w rseg uLsa bs k .g ch uf <y h < D]my s.1h=ag ~ -fL-et cA9 e.
- c. amperes 4on float charge. Tk:5 b wcgMIc Or, oa4ybattery ds.%y scharging a,arl~-~ .'current fL is < [2]7] d";s j*il.u.'9 iec4~me- 4**e.ey A Y ~' -^::rstic: ;; nc: xqu;ad wh;n beH;ry che.su s cuuous a a [2] arcgas wher.-
em finnt rhnrrra i l
\
SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-30 4 Amendment I 16.11-30 December 21,1990
~_ ._
Inverters-Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating b;,;4.a I b;4n.a 2. LCO 3.8.7 The required Trai , A and Trair, 0 inverters shall be OPERABLE. l
...__........___....St.h'N[N0TE-...-.------...-..--......I
[0ne/11re] inverterPQAmay be disconnected from [its/Ahexr] associated DC bus for 5 24 hours to perfom an equalizing charge on [itsitherr] associated fMuiHisiT battery, provided:
- a. The associated AC vital bus (es) [ists**} energized from
[its,M] [ Class IE] constant voltage source transfomer[s]; and
- b. All other. AC vital buses for both trains are energized from their associated OPERABLE inverters.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 1., 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One [ required] A.1 Power AC vital bus 2 hours i inverterf noperable. from its [ Class IE] u.O _ acWga constant voltage j source transformer. . AND , A.2 Restore inverter to 24 hours OPERABLE status. ; B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours i 1 CEOG STS 3.8 35 Rev. O, 09/28/92
l i Inverters-Operating 3.8.7 r SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage,- 7 days [ frequency,] and alignment to required AC vital buses. 3 l t i i i f i t CEOG STS 3.8-36 Rev. O, 09/28/92 i
Inverters--Shutdown 3.8.8 t
~ 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters--Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 Inverter (s) shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) i required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution -Systems--Shutdown."
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, ! During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more [ required] A.1 Declare affected Immediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) 4 uib m d;AJ.. inoperable. OB A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND t A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies. AND . Initiate action to l A.2.3 Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. . AND j (continued) l 1 l l CEOG STS 3.8-37 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l i
l Inverters --Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions. AND A.2.5 Initiate action to Immediately restore required ir.verters to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, 7 days [ frequency,] and alignments to required AC vital buses. CE0G STS 3.8-38 Rev. O, 09/28/92 I
CESSAR En#lCAUM j l 1 l i 16.11. 3.8 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING Distribution Systems - Operating l 3.8 7T ] i f 3# ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l 3.8. Distribution Systems - Operatine Acycg 4(,M L,JedrJJ 9 54sv.te. LCO 3.8.% Division I and Division fower pistribution Syvene shall be OPERABLE. l
' NOTE-- -' l
[Two a ers may be disconnected from their associated DC b or s 24 l hours to perfo equalizing charge on associated batte anks, providmg
- a. Associated AC vita are en from their [ Class IE] constant voltage source transfo , l l
- b. AC v' uses for the other battery banks ar ized from their )
sociated inverters connected to their DC buses. J l l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. j ACTIONS I 1 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ! A.1 Restore M =;u::_ik,isil cJc _m_ P";er -2 hc;;., - 7 hears A.}' OPEPeBLE mua. Adebtl
/
O so sy5 h ta cru.4m.A aD m shy , H, kas es fro-. d.E*nq ef fa.%re. P nw)- L ca, A.2 E.m .. . ." r quiaa r,* m {;; hv ,;
- J;...i ; iv i m i.. a
~~d t= h.q,;inb AC h.22.. GFERALLEr k .
AND Cat AC, dectr.a\ pu l'.w3sperg,(c tam.3, wqrt- .AJ- D a~^= =iu:=d AC hr:= J hvo.,
.a OPEPeDLE at ;as.
(continued) l ( SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-31 Amendment I 16.11-31 December 21,1990
- - - - - - - . m n - - - , , , y- .,
4 mm n--s , ,
CESSAR 8ini"lCATION
*r Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.)t' 4 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITIQN , REQUll'ED ACTION ,
. COMPLETION TIME B. One AC vital bus B.1 #M AC wi'al bus 2 hours inoperable. e!!: .= ;C:n ' Ej :!=g MD e 4 0/dAA6t.E )(, b rs [ rem dlJCavu 3$bu5* g$ f.o.%re to naef Lco
-ANO-
-0.2 Rosv.m AC ..a1 hu; :o 2' hcure-p O!'ERACLE 66..
J>' . Required Actionsd R.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours D. associated Completion D. Time # M Cvudevu. AND Mnot met. p K.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8. 1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to the 7 days _c [ required]AC;and DC Pr - D P -S ut!cn F,"' - 4 ) 4 pn 3.5.1-;L. -Verify cuma,AC vital bus Nge. ;y of SS. '^^'4 _7 &p] -
-+It- de d<bl po.4 r J.or.bd.w ssbs9(14 a . j DC E
--> C . N. <- R C.t Ratvael Mc4 2 kors clc ctr k A k {2 0W C (* po.h (* d!Mr b/Y6 04
~
d;stN b +.e4 q Tc- 4 Sda'idca h
. )Lhws [res I5cVu{
44ofc/abfC . CfsAA8LL {tdvs. d .[il>ce h no LCo l SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-32 Arnendrnent K 16.11-32 October 30,1992
l CESSAREnihm,
, lo lo
(- 16.11.$ 3.8 7 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SliUTDOWN Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.Vio 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS , 3.8. Distribution Systems - Shutdown gg ,,3f M - 80 nece b ' 04ll bc O/dA46LE LCO 3.8.y 'IbeOm.ngq;gh.ld*la 2fowerpistribution.pbgdssy1... ;.0 :d. _ q~ e :2:_: r ..tv. 1 :: 6 crzRnBLE.
- 4. s.ypet egoy wt aga;< eel 4 be b4M&e .
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, during movement ofirradiated fuel asemblies. l NOTE Refer to LCO 3.10.6 (Reduced RCS Inve 2 tory Operations - AC Power Availability) for applicability of AC power sources during reduced inventory operations. ACTIONS f.) b d CONDITION
/
[ 2.l REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. _R:;i:2 [O: . .e..] A.y Suspend CORE Immediately [ m-bar ALTERATIONS. On .r/ ~or~ f'sc.( N, N, weeaaf w 4C u/./ k A.2 2. Suspend ' d"5 ofirradiated immediately g,y fueV A sua.4lles . fat <Lfm am LEIA A.3 Ilnitiate action tdf suspend immediately 2 3 operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND L'd;4h c.ias b A.t operations involving Immediately 2M positive reactivity additions. AND A.) Initiate action to restore Immediately
.Li required {O . . 0..] ^; 44, D( ,
0"CasLE mi . ng Ac uXJ w JedM SYSTEM 80+ D-33
+
[ w wusst.e Ards. _ A10 h Ne-cad' Amendment Q 16.11-33 June 30,1993
f b dd b ( 4. I b .* U ~ 31 l g e uko) AeJG- - 1 i i i
. Ae 04f Y ^ 2 Y be aak y +Asyd k -(n) A o pk ;
a ur a yx. ; i
CESSAR inHncam,. ( Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.)Vt o SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE , FREQUENCY SR 3.8./1 g".fv=r..;E.1;._2C"2.0.7.2j. 7 days l0 Vu l e vex.$ $ A wA M vd y b 'f Aq bc., c, a Ac uXJ W dufd y &frAL Jfw.
)
( ! SYSTEM 80+ 3.8-34 ( Amendment K 16.11-34 October 30,1992
~ ~ ~
], ._ - System 80+ Refueling Section 3.9 Exceptions 3.9.5 Shutdown Cooling System Required actions A.3 and B.3 added to System 80+ due to alternate cooling means available (ie., Containment Spray pumps can provide SCS. ; cooling). j l l l , 1 l
CESSAR nainema 16.12 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1 3,9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION i Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1 The%ron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System [the refueling canal and K , the refueling cavity] shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR. APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Boron Concentration A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately not within limit. ALTERATIONS bHD i A.2 Suspend positive reactivity Immediately additions. AND A.3 Initiate actior6to restore Immediately lK boron concentration to within limit. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration within limit as specified in the 72 hours g COLR. K
? SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-1 1
Amendment K 16.12-1 October 30,1992
CESSAR nai"lCATION 16.12.2 3.9.2 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation [A3 . LCO 3.9.2 Two source range monitors 11 be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 l 1 i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One r%.uJ suece A.1 Suspend CORE immediately rr.s;c as.m:sr- 5RM ALTERATIONS inoperable. M A.2 Suspend positive reactivity Immediately additions.
-ANE A Initistc .;:!ce 'e ~c'~ _ Niny,-
Arce ir.s;c r .crJ:ar4a
. OPERABLE ems. ,
1 3- Two requiretwin~te B.1 Initiate action to restore one 15%utes ! 4ht range-rnonitors 9?v1 soun/ Eke men!br to ( m~ $ :.@ig '
)
inoperable. OPERABLE status. AND B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1 fBoren WdEin 4 hours C......- d M Once per 12 hours thereafter. SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-2 Amendment I 16.12-2 December 21,1990
7 i CESSAREnnncu. Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.2 SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS , SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.9.2.1 Perform 4 CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours , A SR 3.9.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FtfMCOMMML M. 94bspa(j g] rnon 4A 3 i CGLi3fCOM K
- _ _ _ _ _ _ N c T5 - --
de b deiehrs a< c o c-I w d d f rom CJid @ ; C AL h3A WTic4.
~~~ - -
-- -----_ ,-~~
( l i l SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-3 (. .. Amendment K 16.12-3 October 30,1992 i
CESSAR 8lnincamu 9 f 16.12.3 3.9.3 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 . 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment $Hedg penetrations shall be in the following status:
- a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by - ? M [four] bolts;
- b. One door in each airlock closed Sad
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is either:
g man at{ of adsvvihktt 15DIdio^ dJe.,3.
- 1. Closed by ami.i;uu v ivc, 'vima Lp, n c.ur%+:, emer, er_
o d* a r h equ @
- er b\ mi Ch vv,e. , o r ey t' 3
- 2. E i uir.gd.. '.OPEP". ELE L A i- .2,, Cvem ..: Pwge-Fuhaust Rycie.m1!EP ^ "';sNd N8 capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System.
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS During movement of irradiated fuel4within containment. I u s ments ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately containment ALTERATIONS penetrations not in Alfe required status. blLQ . A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated containment. fuel {within W 'O' O SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-4 Amendment K 16.12-4 October 30,1992
CESSAR E!aincamn : i l r \ Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment beridag penetration is in 22 h a c; - Me 4 required status. '7ciq S SR 3.9.3.2 "W- e Tj- each. required containment purge and exhaust [18 months] valve actuates toYisolation position on,{at% actual or simulated actuation signalJs{. K ( l l i SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-5 Amendment K 16.12-5 October 30,1992
CESSAR naincum f K 16.12.4 3.9.4 SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SCS) AND COOLANT CIRCULATION -IllGil WATER LEVEL SCS - Iligh Water Level 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooline System (SCS) and Coolant Circulation - Hich Water level K Ow_ %d LCO 3.9.4 % SCS divisions shall be OPERABLE - ' "' '~^ J;6;en sh. : i~ in lg operation.
--NOTE - - - - ,
The required SCS division loop may be removed from operation for s one hour per lK Ifg hour period. provided:
- a. No operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the RUS boron concentration. t- bd < [e]
_ G ak p YA' APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level 2: 23 feet aboveTop of the reactor vessel flange. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SCS loop A.! Suspend operations involving Immediately lg requirements not met. a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration. AND Iji 3 . ir cul6d f A.2 Suspend epm!!~: 'invoMag Immediately
= N.aa n.sa:- &ay
< _ _ . - ~
.C:,r.woil e s w A*:
AND Initiate actions to satisfy SCS Immediately K A.3 loop requirements. NfJb .
- n 0: r b b t- - > bM)~
SYSTEM 80+ $.9-6 Amendment K 16.12-6 October 30,1992
/1tfA k,u / L. iz -6 f
th + Oc5e. ~6\\ conNiampk A* )1gu1.5 penelvah' ens pGOiding .__ _ . . l La aws 6 _ containm#wbe4% p e<e k _ le oAde abspk4,4
+=wnap.-p-x
-+mm ha wen I
? i
.,y -.------ r r n,
DE$ltN CESSAR CERTIFICATION f SCS - High Water Level 3.9.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l SURVEILLANCE e i b opv<dion FREQUENCY Verify one SCS divisioni; ; and circulating reactor 12 hours l SR 3.9.4.1 coolant, av .x ?6 v a.'tt e9 2[aceo] 3fm . , I i i l i I l ( t i 3,9 7 ( , SYSTEM 80+ Amendment K 16.12-7 October 30,1992
CESSARnab u,. f 16.12.5 3.9.5 SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SCS) AND COOLANT CIRCULATION - LOW WATER LEVEL SCS - low Water Level 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Shutdown Cooline System (SCS) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water level LCO 3.9.5 Two SCS division shall be OPERABLE, and one SCS division shall be in operation. APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level < 23 feet above the top of We reactor vessel flange. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One SCS division A.I.1 Initiate actionx to restore alle immediately A. inoperable.wittttbe- inoperable loop to ru ; ? Jt: OPERABLE statua. OP* rat =8-DE f A.EP Initiate actions to establish Immediately
Z 2 23 feet of water above the
$p $ reactor vessel flange.
AND 3 A.1 Establish alternate decay beat 7 days removal capabilities. B. No SCS division m B.1 Suspend operations involving Immediately q _ . .. - cr
. a reduction in reactor coolant OPERABLE, M boron concentration.
~ :. n a a n .
AND B.2.( Initiate action ( to restore one Immediately SCS division to OPERABLE status andgperation.
-* O AN3 (contmuod)
SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-8 Amendment Q 16.12-8 June 30,1993
j CESSAR EnWicarieu e l l l i B i SCS - Low Water Level ' 3.9.5 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) 5.2.2 in.:. :; . nvu> w estaolish : _ . J. ; , lK
.__2 21-feehtc1 .imvc iim ,
.-~...~....p.
- g. !
B.3 Initiate action to implement immediately lK l attemate decay heat removal. l l i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE / re a <<d FREQUENCY ' v.: x- cw .~ e, ne i Verify one SCS divisiortoperiting =d :yu o .ca:::i:ing ex;:c: j SR 3.9.5.1 12 hours lK u EC-6 <dd ,,,*s m ocn 5ios, lx i 1 SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-9 Amendment K 16.12-9 October 30,1992 _ _ , . - _ . . . _ . _ . . _ . . , . _ . , , . ~ . - - - . _
CESSAR !!aincim. l 16.12.6 3.9.6 REFUELING WATER LEVEL Refueling Water Level 3.9.6 4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Refueline Water Level (em:\ \ % LCO 3.9.6 T(ater level shall be maintained 2 23 feet syve the top of der re b of nw3c ,.Cce
,,a t At.T red W 4 mt =+u g r , .e sce
. p =Gs kLt3 wA u.dec.u.im APPLICABILITY: During movement of, fuel assemh+ lids within containment; id. ... dind f=!
w!.u- . :~~.at. N treadee 44d ACTIONS CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
- x. w . 3 FWater level,not Al A.
within limit. [ 2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment. Immediately
/
N A. 3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify refueling water level 2 23 feet above top of the 24 hours ( reactor vessel flange.
'x
[g g,d CCRE AGON \ kp..,, dd' K t
\
\ 'rJA D a.,, JrA aam k \_ a m ,c,4 <J 63M
Ucher \tN Y Wi 1 %4s . i k SYSTEM 80+ 3.9-10 Amendment K 16.12-10 . October 30,1992
CESSAR !anneuin 14.13 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 16.13.1 3.10.1 REACTOR TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKERS Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers 3.10.1 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 3.10.1 Reactor Trio Circuit Breakers ( RTC3) , l LCO 3.10.1 The RTCB's shall be open . l l I APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY L<( ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I Open RTCB's Immediately ] RTCB's Elosed E k nisi
- w.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.1.1 Verify RTCB's GRE3L cpe n . [12 hours] 1 1 I ( SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-1 Amendment K 16.13-1 October 30,1992
CESSAR Ennncuiu 16.13.2 3.10.2 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS -INSTRUMENTATION 1 Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Instrumentation 3.10.2 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS I l 3.10.2 Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Instrumentation l O k t? tit 3k C . LCO 3.10.2 The following reactor coolant system instrumentation shall be +.l'.
- a. Two independent means of monitoring RCS level indications; one narrow range (N and one wide rangeptrument] Andy C*O
- b. Two independent means of monitoring RCS temperaturej pdf l
- c. Two independent indications available to monitorjCS') performance in the loop on service for decay heat removal. gg 4 APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY v.A AND MODE 6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY l mts l ACTIONS 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A.1 Initiate action to restore [Immediately]
A. All WR RCS[evel instmmentation instrument to OPERABLE inoperable status. -AmA 01L4
'O I -* A. Monitor RCS femp [Every 30 minutes) dD --* 5. Monit'otSCSferformance [Every 30 minutes]
- 4. : 3, -9 'd. MonitoDR RCS/evel [Every 10 minutes] l 1
l i l SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-2 Amendment Q 16.13-2 June 30,1993 1
CESSAR 8!aincari:n Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Instrumentation 3.10.2 ACTIONS (Continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I B.1 Initiate action to restore [Immediately] B. All NR RCSJ.evel instrumentation instrument to OPERABLE inoperable status. And;. i dS.D. 3.2.1 --e A. Monitor RCS 7emp [Every 30 minutes) 22A -95. MonitMsCSferformance [Every 30 minutes] [Every 10 minutes] 323 -% MonitoMfevel M 1 B.I Initiate action to restore RCS [Immediately] l 3 level to > [EL-1170*] C. One of the required RCS C.1 Initiate action to restore [Immediately] l [emperature/ndication instrument indication to inoperable OPERABLE status. AS { M
" 'g
-Ah Monitor RCS Mvel (Every 30 minutes]
- 2a - N R'. Monito7%CS . Performance [Every 30 minutes]
C40 M. MonitorDERABLE [Every 30 minutes] femperatureJnstrument [Immediately] l D. Two of the required RCS D.1 Initiate /ction to restore one
. Temperature Indication instrument to OPERABLE inoperable status. And;.
n .c 7 A. Monitor RCS level [Every 10 minutes]
-a. A j $'. MonitESCS performance [Every 10 minutes]
M D.llnitiate action to restore RCS [Immediately] l 3 level to >[EL-117'0*]
! SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-3 Amendment Q 16.13-3 June 30,1993
4 CESSAR !!ainem. Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Instrumentation j 3.10.2 ! E.1 Initiate action to restore [Immediately] , E. SCS gerformance '
/ndications inoperable instmnent to OPERABLE status.
I 1 AND E.2.!X. Monitor RCS ; Temp [Every 10 minutes] l [Every 10 minutes] c2 2.5. Moni?ErMCS/evel AND l : E.3 Initiate action to place other [2 hours] division of SCS in service. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of RCS).evelt.(One [6 hours) . WR ( and pne NR). SR 3.10.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of RCS 7'mperature e [6 houn] SR 3.10.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of SCS performance in the [6 hours] loap removing decay heat. SR 3.10.2.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the applicable [60 days] RCS level, temperature and SCS performance. l l 1 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-4 Amendment Q 1F 13-4 June 30,1993
. i CESSAR EnWicarien 16.13.3 3.10.3 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - VENT PATilS ,
l t Reduced RCS Inventory Operations Vent Paths ' 3.10.3 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS , l 3.10.3 Reduced RCS inventory Operations - Vent Paths . K 1 LCO 3.10.3 A RCS [ent fath of 27tessurizer yanway D =!j is established and maintained. I l 1 APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY t AND j i MODE 6 REDUCSD RCS INVENTORY W4TM.s , coacu nonu m- . ; ptAcc=. 'O 4th ecuts s.6W xc44 * , l pt.we.
- t ACTIONS
( C VDlTION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS fentfath h4eeed. A.! Initiate action to restore, Vent [Immediatelyl fin me . fath. AND A.2 Complete restoration of vent [6 hours) path. ! AND A.3 Monitor RCS temperature. level [ Hourly] and SCS performance. i B. Required Action and B.1 Restore RCS/evel to [6 hours) l completion time not > [EL - 117'0*) met.
- One or more head bolts tensioned.
SYSTEM S0+ 3.10-5 Amendment K 16.13-5 October 30,1992 l l
~
1 l CESSAR nnincuia l 4 I l Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Vent Path: 3.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.10.3.1 Verify /ressurizer /anway is removed and unobstructed [12 hours] or an equivalent vent path is established. I I I K ll I l i SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-6 Amendment K 16.13-6 October 30,1992 l
CESSARiniLuiu f 16.13.4 3.10.4 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - HEAT REMOVAL ; Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Heat Remova! ; 3.10.4 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATTONS 3.10.4 Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Heat Removal LCO 3.10.4 l
- a. Two Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) divisions shall be OPERABLE, and at least one division shall be in operationj x.E
- b. Containment Spray pump shall be OPERABLE in the operating division.
APPLICABILITY: MODE SyREDUCED RCS INVENTORY wik AND MODE 63REDUCED RCS INVENTORY ( pisk ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I A. One SCS division "C Restc= div. ._ u [riz4 inoperable. OPERAia.E mi . : i l
)
.M= i A. 1 Insure one SCS division is operating.
h5m:~\es] l
.QR
( A.I.2 Initiate action to place one SCS division in operation. B. Required Action and B.1 Raise RCS level to [6 hours} associated Completion > [EL-117'0*]. l Time not met. SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-7 1 i Amendment Q. l 16.13-7 June 30,1993 l
, . . . . - - - m... , - - , -
4 C E S S A R n utric m on i 2 4 i j Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Heat Renovat J 3.10.4 1 4
) i ACTIONS (Continued) i REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION s C.1 Suspend all operations involving [Immediately) l C. No SCS division in '
cptation. reduction in RCS boron
- l concentration.
s
- . AND C.2 Initiate action to restore one SCS [Immediately]
division to OPERABLE status and place in operation. AND C.3 Initiate action to raise RCS level [Immediately] to >[EL-il7'0*] D.1 Initiate action to place the . [6 hours] t , D. Containment Spray e, Pump in operating alternate division in operation if division inoperable , the,5ntainmentfpray pump in that division is OPERABLE. j D.2 Monitor SCS performance. [Every 30 minutes] i bHQ D.3 Restore inoperable Containment [48 hours] Spray fump. E. Required Action and E.1 Raise RCS Level >[EL-117'0*] [6 hours] i Completion time of Item D.3 not met. AND E.2 Initiate action to align alternate [5 hours] decay heat removal system. SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-8 Amendment Q 16.13-8 June 30,1993
+ .,m.,,,--_,.y. _ .-9.2, . 3.p.y,-y , -p% 9-, ,
CESSAR Einincuieu f l Reduced RCS Inventory Operations IIcat Removal 3.10.4 . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.4.1 Verify at least one SCS division operating [12 hours] SR 3.10.4.2 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power [24 hours] available to the SCS pump that is not in operation and the OPERABLE Containment Spray pump. I K 4 l SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-9 I l l Amendment K ) 16.13-9 October 30,1992 l
I, i CESSAR ninneuiu l a i
- F 16.13.5 3.10.5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 3
Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Containment Integrity 3.10.5 l 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 3.10.5 Reduced RCS Inventory Orierations Containment intecrity
.j LCO 3.10.5 De containment building penetrations shall be in the following status: K j
- a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by [a minimum of four bolts ] l
- b. One door in each airlock closed,
/
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is either:
- 1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, water, or equivalent, or j 2. Exhausting through OPERABLE Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System IlEPA filters and charcoal absorbers, and is capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation System.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 54REDUCED RCS INVENTORY ; JL : AND MODE 6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY ; di ACTIONS
~i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
One or more [6 hours] j A. A.1 Restore gontainment penetration containment to required status. penetrations not in the required status. B. Required Action and B.1 Restore RCS level to [6 hours] Completion Time not >[EL - IIT0*]. met. SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-10 Amendrnent K l 16.13-10 October 30,1992
CESSAR naineme,. l l l r I l I Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Containtnent Integrity ; 3.10.5 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j i FREQUENCY ; SURVEILLANCE i SR 3.10.5.1 Verify each required containment building penetration is in [12 hours] its required status. SR 3.10.5.2 Verify the furveillance r#cquirements of).9.3.2 are met. [18 months) St. l 1 l l [ l l l l l 1 i l ( SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-11 Amendment K l'6.13-11 October 30,1992
CESSAR EEninCAMN 16.15.2 3.10.6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - AC POWER AVAILAlllLITY Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - AC Power Availability 3.10.6 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 3.10.6 Reduced RCS Inventerv Operations - AC Power Availability LCO 3.10.6 The following AC Electrical Power Sources shall be OPERABLE.
- a. Two independent sources of AC power to each division supplying the Class IE Distribution System, AND
- b. A Diesel Generator in each division.* l APPLICABILITY: MODE S gREDUCED RCS INVENTORY wdL AND MODE 64REDUCED RCS INVENTORY w.K ACTIONS .
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One source of A,Cr A.1 Perform S.R. 3.8.1.1. [1 hour] then every 12 [ower to either division hours inoperable. AND A.2 Restore division to OPERABLE [30 hours] status . B. One Source of A6C. B.1 Restore either division to two [12 hours] Jower to each division OPERABLE sources. yOPEP_A DY _{p joyaghtw.
- The combustion turbine can replace one Diesel Generator provided the combustion turbine has been demonstrated to be operational within the past seven (7) days. l 1
(Continued) I SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-12 l Amendment Q 16.13-12 June 30,1993 d
~ ~
CESSAR E!ai"lCATION G ' Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - AC Power Availability 3.10.6 ACTIONS (Continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required fliesel C.1 Perform S.R. 3.8.1.1 [1 hour] then every 12 generator inoperable, hours AND C.2 Restore required diesel generator [12 hours] to OPERABLE status D. Required Action A, B D.1 Raise RCS level > [EL-117'0*] [6 hours] , or C not met within required Completion Time. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY D SR 3.10.6.1 Verify diesel generator operability per 3. 8.1.2, 3. 8.1.4, 3.8.1.5, 3.8.1.9 and 3.8.1.18. As specified by applicable SR's l K
< 1 l
l t SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-13 Amendment K 16.13-13 October 30,1992
l CESSAREnama l i l 16.13.2 3.10.7 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - DC DISTRIBUTION l i Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - DC Distribution ! 3.10.7 l 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS j 3.10.7 Reduced RCS Inventory Oxrstions - DC Distribution System l LCO 3.10.7 The following DC Electrical Power Sources shall be OPERABLE
- a. One Division of the DC Distribution System coinciding with the OPERABLE l Diesel Oeneratorj Amt M1 ]
h, Power is available to the opposite division 125 vde & 120 VAC Distribution Centers. l wc. . IA gJ ) , -? l l APPLICABILITY: MODE 54REDUCED RCS INVENTORY ! Witk l AND l MODE 6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OS g ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required DC/ower A.1 Restore to OPERABLE Status [4 hours] pivision inoperable. B. Opposite division B.1 Reston to OPERABLE status [12 hours] distribution fenters inoperable. , (Continued) j SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-14 Amendment K 16.13-14 October 30,1992
CESSAR nai"icarisu Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - DC Distribution 3.10.7 ACTIONS (Continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action A or C.1 Raise RCS level to [6 hours] B not met within > [EL - 11T0*] required Completion Time. SUkVEILLANCF REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.7.1 Perform S.R. 3.8.4.1 through 3.8.4.8 on the OPERABLE Per 3.8.4.1 through division of the DC Distribution System 3.8.4.8,dequency { K J l SYSTEM 80+ 3.10-15 Amendment K 16.13 15 October 30,1992
1 i CESSARn!L me e f 16A.7 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16 A.7.1 B 3.4.1 RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOWhNB LIMITS RCS Pressure Temperature and How DNB Limits B 3.4.1 B 3.4 ) REACTOR B 3.4.1 RCS Prenure. COOLANT Temperature SYSTEM and ( tFlow /q' Limits 4 tJodele , DNBR 4 1~- /- BASES BACKGROUND bases address [ requirements for maintaining Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure.4eep temperature, and 4eep flow rate within limits assumed in the safety analy(ce i : :k %/_..a :ai fr Se Dg-"r= '.;; N 'er*- Pe!!L ; SS (D"0") ni!! E rd i- e: =2: ef ;..umoa. s2feb ne eeer' dent' analyses (Fefc.0 3 of normal operating conditions and Anticipated i Operational Occurrences (AOOs) assume initial conditions within the normal l steady state envelope. He limits placed on DNB relatgyeters a*sPM* 1 that these parameters will not be less conservative than wee assumed in the analyses and thereby provide assurance that the minimum NBR 'll meet % required crite for each of the transients analyzed. p- r re. Nucl(O The LCO4for.the minimum and maximum RCS pressurfas measured at the )
- pressurizer are consistent with operation within the nominal operating i envelope and are bounded by those used as the initial pressures in the i analyses.
\u%
1 He LC0 for 4 minimum and maximum RCS cold leg temperatureSare consistent with operation at the indicated power level and are bounded by ] those used as the initial temperatures in the analyses.
%h The LCO for minimum and maximum RCS flogar{e bounded by tho yg cc
] i as the imtial flow rates in the analyses. The RCS flow rate is not expected to vary during plant operation with all pumps running. APPLICABLE Tb 3. r. present the ini ' conditions for NB SAFETY ANALYSES limited t sients analyzed ' the plant safety alyst: (Ref.1). e safety an. :!ye., h::.: shown that sients initiated fr the limits of L 3.4.1 will 4 the DNBR 9e 's. These transien clude loss of t flow even and dropped or s control rod even A key assumpt' a for the ana sis aCc M />f these events ' that the core powe/ distribution is wi n the limits o CO gg 3.1.7, regula
- g rod insertion lirnits, LCO 3.2.3, a 'muthal powe ilt, and l LCO 3.2.5[ axial shape index./
}
I
- -._ (continued) i' SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4 1 Amendment O 16A.7-1 May 1,1993
{
CESSARnnincm
- l RCS Pressure Temperature and Flow DNB Limits B 3.4.1 fp a ce taib ltd$Cf2f /\
4 APPLICABLE LCO 3.4.1, pressure, temperature, and flow DNB limits, satisfies the SAFETY ANALYSES requirements of Selection Criterion 2 of the NRC Interim Policy Sutement (continued) (Ref. 2), because they limit the variation of RCS pressure, temperature and flow, which are initial condition inputs to the plant safety analysis, s y speu 'e t : PCs LCOg lNs LCO 14:-l limits on the monitored process variablegpressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, and RCS total flow rate to ensure that the core operates within the limits assumed for the plant safety analys[ Operating within these limits will result in meetingy DNBR criterig in the event of a DNB limited transient. M ch
\ tLCFT 6 :-
APPLICABILITY In MODE I and 2, the limits on RCS pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, I and RCS flow rate must be maintained in order to assure that DNBR criteria gg g I will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of coolant flow or other DNBR limiting transient. In all other MODES, DNBR is not a concern because the i g epT O, wer level is low, providing other applicable LSQt are rpet ACTIONS 6.1 Pressurizer pressure is a controllaw and measurable parameter. With this parameter not within the LCO limits action must be taken to mtore the z parameter. The two-hour hmpletion ence that shows the parameter restored incan be,Aime this time is based period. RCS flow on plant o rate is not a controllable parameter and is not expected to vary during steady state operation. If the flow rate is not within the LCO limit, then power must be reduced, as required in ACTION B.1, to restore DNB margin and eliminate the potential for violation of the accident analysis bounds. The two-houdompletionf me for restoration of the parameter provides sufficient time
~
toQetiiEnifif the'viot'ation ofhli~nWudue to instrutnentToM
- /s h5k flM 4voyeh5
% OQ vorws-[\ cwkiWow, awldo ree\ dos deore. ktvmihe M -{M Caus yea g e w h W iN , W (2 cup cc .
\e b b ie, hy,g cm { lad r alingequeu (continued) 1 l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-2 __
Amendment I 16A.7-2 December 21,1990
IN$ERT A: 9WA,% The requirements of LCO 3.4.1 represent the initial conditions for DNB limited transients analyzed in the safety analyses (Ref.1). The safety analyses have shown that transients initiated from the limits of this LCO will meet the DNBR criterion of 2 [1.3]. This is the acceptance limit for the RCS DNB parameters. Changes to the facility that could impact these parameters must be assessed for their impact on the DNBR criterion. The transients analyzed for include loss of coolant flow events and dropped or stuck control element assembly (CEA) events. A key assumption for the analysis of these events is that the core power distribution is within the limits of [LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insenion Limits"; LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.2.3, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T,)"; and LCO 3.2.5, " AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) (Digital)]; [LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating Rod Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.2.4, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T,)"; and LCO 3.2.5,
" AXIAL. SHAPE INDEX (Analog)"]. The safety analyses are performed over the following range of initial values: RCS pressure [1785-2400] psig, core inlet temperature [500-580] F, and reactor vessel inlet coolant flow rate [95-116] %.
The RCS DNB limits satisfy Criterion 2 of NRC Policy Statement.
'ab 4
l l l
I INSERT B: ( fay 144.7 The LCO numerical values for pressure, temperature, and flow rate are given for the measurement location but have not been adjusted for instrument error. Plant specific limits of instrument error are established by the plant staff to meet the operational requirements of this LCO. INSERT C: t l@.]-q.). In MODES I and 2, the limits on RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, and RCS flow rate must be maintained during steady state operation in order to ensure that DNBR criteria will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of forced coolant flow or otrer DNB limited transient. In all other MODES, the power level is low enough so that DNBR is not a concern. A Note has been added to indicate the limit on pressurizer pressure may be exceeded during short term operational transients such as a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of 5% RTP per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase of > 10% RTP. These conditions represent short term perturbations where actions to control pressure variations might be counterproductive. Also, since they represent transients initiated from power levels < 100% RTP, an increased DNBR margin exists to offset the temporary pressure variations. Another set of limits on DNB related parameters is provided in Safety Limit (SL) 2.1.1,
" Reactor Core Safety Limits." Those limits are less restrictive than the limits of this LCO, but violation of SLS merits a stricter, more severe Required Action. Should a violation of this LCO occur, the operator should check whether or not an SL may have been exceeded.
l l j
CESSAR nai"lCATION f
. r RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow NB imits 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS Rd heu3 N* '
(continued) f f If Required Actio A.1 is not met within the associated fompletionfime, the plant must beih.d in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. Hrs-w To acWeve M hoc by p! ! ;; i N st is at least MODE 3 in six hours. He six hours g%g tu ply l israte a reasonable time that permits the plant power to be reduced at an orderly in conjunction with even control of steam generator heat removat In rMed h Wqg g ', g $.
~F MODE 3, the reduced power conditionQthe potential for violation of the accident analysis bounds. climiruhG 1 :-p 'E D: 'El ; i f.c pA
_f g.3[f}C RCS cold leg temperature is a controllable and measurable parameter. -Widt W
~7 g C' l action must be taken to restore the
' 3 his parametegiot within the LCO limits,fime is based on p arameter. The two-hour fompletion g
LJ g $ h"$ 3 xperience that shows that the parameter can be restored in this time period. ( 5QiaE4 d* Jl o;.3 i D3 .T p.l a f fg;j ? .9,"2O "~kp.d Ti% 1 7 yJf Required Action C.1 is not met within the associated om letion lime, he w k g is p e in a ew e the does n appy. is is o b F-' ~ Mpac g the anti toDE 3 ithin si hours. The six!hour ccmp etion time is a reasonable time that pernuts power re uction at an orderly rate in conjunction with even control of steam generator heat removal, SURVElLLANCE SR3.4,11 Giace Pe m'reJ Ackcw A,1 AlI'ws 4 Gmpleb T1= ' REQUIREMENTS o} 2 bs to as rc A he 12-hour furveillanchYe{sbnzer pressure is su the pressure can be restored to a normal operation, steady-state condition following load changes and other expected transient operations. The 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analysis assumptions. (continued) (
~
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-3 Amendment I 16A.7-3 December 21,1990
CESSAR EnWICATION , [
\
i l RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow DNB' Limits 3.4.1 BASES SMce P'p ed kb A 1 AN A b lebTiW ' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.2 0{ '2, M 5 b d o<v P4me!cr5 bl o(vt. cof JefM REQUIREMENTS I "* b i p (continued) e 12-hour furveillancep YS cold leg temperature is sufficient to ensure that the RCS coolant temperature can be restored to a normal operation, steady-state condition following load changes and other expected transient operations. The 12-hour interval has been shown by operating. ractice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and[erify operation' thin safety i analysis assumptions. g SR 3.4.1.3 bT.2q h The 12-hour furveillance a ef-RCS total flow rate is performed using the installed flow instrumentation. ".b c.cd!wcc ,s.i.b ."CS S > "::. .
+. : b=.c.i c4 0.c c.c!y~ The 12-hour interval has been sho n by operating experience to be sufficient to assessjegradation and verify
.j.gwit,hin safety analysis assumptions. 4,. p.B d SS is modified by a ote which only requires performance of This =N..;..:c this SR in MODE 1. The $ote is necessary to allow measurement of RCS ,
flow at normal operating conditions at gpower w S- til P&s rann'ig . SR 3.4.1.4 Measurement of RCS total flow rate by performance of a p n calorimetric heat balance r um a method nce every[18] months os the installed RCS flow instrumentation to be calibrated and verifies that the actual RCS flow is within the bounds of the analyses. The inten' cf Sc = e i!kr.cc frequency ofh83 months h-tr reflect)the importance of $erifying flow after a refueling outage where the core has ; been altered,which may have caused an alteration of flow resistance. SP~ %t- : The sw.c3!== is modified by a ore which states +het-SR 34c4 is net- l
- .r-!' d ': The riote is necessary to allow measurement of the flow rate at '
normal operating conditions at power in MODE 1 4 e f Qcatinued
'Tho $vseillaect CW,vc] k h MDCE 7 W M NI av A wiO vud gie\chverJs ae em0h{.de,Md il r(e<@WA bdM t l 90 % FTP. 1 SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-4 Amendment I 16A.7-4 December 21,1990
l C E S S A R an nnca m , l l 1 J RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow NB Limits l 3.4.1 BASES REFERENCES 1. CESSAR-DC Chapter 15, Accident Analysis. , i
- 2. 52 FR 3788, NRC Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification ;
Improvements f Nuclear Power Reactors, February 6,1987. ;,
-i 1 4 ij l
.t i
-i
-[}k 1
, l f ( 1 i ( SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-5 Amendment I 16A.7-5 December 21,1990 l 4
.m CESSAR naincuiu l 4
k' 716A.7.2 B 3.4.2 RCS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY. I'T
'[-
RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality B 3.4.2 CE. B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) d B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality Y i ASES n,
. ?. u : I Establishing the value for the minimum temperature for reactor criticality is .
J; hBACKGROUND based upon considerations for: 1) operation within the existing instrumen- I tation ranges and accuracies,-and-2) operation within the bounds of the 3 ]h _4 jd\ 2 y_ existing accident analysesf The reactor protection system receives inputs
.1 1 Y O.fy41#T v
[ from the narrow range hot leg temperature detectors which have a range of [520*F to 620*F], and the integrated control system controls average
] 35hTO' EY temperature (T,,,) using inputs of the same range. Nominal temperature T, I '5 E
- 1- for making the reactor critical is [543*F]. Theoretically there is no specific minimum temperature design constraint for making the reactor critica!. i 3
-~
$ _f b '[ There do not appear to be any fundamental material or equipment limitations d7 Q which would prevent adoption of a lower minimum. However, selection of
'C 3 y e d ro p} G}r- % instrument ranges and analysis inputs was done in anticipation of [543*F]
I-j being the minimum temperature at which criticality would occur. Safety and t 4 operating analyses for lower temperatures have not been made. Plants have l 8 not been licensed for low temperature criticality and licensing regulations 2
- 7 permitting criticality below the normal power operating range have not been i f developed for commercial power reactors.
S. I g a.lt kw pswe r
? APPLICABLE Rere are no avcident analyses which dictate the minimum temperature for 5 SAFETY ANALYSES criticality,
[543'F].bb'd %,(), but)(pafety analyses assume (initial temperature y" . . 3 _ satisses the re airementsM Selectio/CriterionThis~spesifica of the N) ' [ (Sjalemen[gef. p , LCO[ ne purpose of e LCO is to prevent criticality outside the normal operating regime [543*j561*F]. While it is theoretically possible to operate the l reactor at critical conditions at lower temperatures, specific design features have been included and analyses have been performed on the basis that it is neither necessary nor desirable to do so. Consequently, this LCO prevents operation in an unanalyzed regime. l (continued) ; I SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-6 Amendment Q i 16A.7-6 June 30,1993
l CESSAR Ennnema i e j s d 1 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality B 3.4.2 BASES LC The LCO is only applicable below [550*F] and provides a reasonable (continued) distance to the limit of [543*F]. This allows adequate time to trend its i approach and take corrective actions prior to exceeding the limit. APPLICABILITY The reactor has been designed and analyzed to be critical in MODES I and
; 2 only, and in accordance with this specification, criticality is not permitted in any other MODE. Herefore, this LCO is applicable in MODE 1 and MODE 2 when K , a 1.0. Coupled with the applicabilitpdefinition for criticality is a temperature limit. Monitoring is required atend below a T, of[550*F]. The no-load temperature of[557*F]is maintained by the steam dump control system.
ACTIONS .> A,.1 4 L 4 Is
, .g g y With T,gbelow(543*F, estoration is repired within 5 minutes ne I 7 {q 5 Mmp' tion ume F restricts e period fo peration o ide the 4gE anal limi The Co letion Ti is reasona e for the o . rator t;o y&-5 4 n$ (ac mylish t specified etions.f To achien ftus Os 2 '3 i e g tw plad wst be-k $ f.} f Ob U'"0NO AA., a au = L. :.; .w...a cm,:a.ci=, the Lj"3,7 c2- v s sih.-Ryiq$r' plant must be pin a MODE in which the LCO does not apply, h.es
. M A;: hy yLigfh: p!--' ! MODE 3ftD0 minutes. The allowed time reflects the ur;;:Ey of ==in'2ing the plant within the analyzed range. ~ akhh loped..n %e aclok tvd rw}& l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS T,,,, is required to be verified 2 [543'F] within 15 minutes prior to achieving l criticality and every 30 minutes thereafter when the MODE requirements apply. The 15-minute time period allows the operator to adjust temperatures or delay criticality so the LCO will not be violated. The 30-minute time is frequent enough to prevent inadvertent violation of the i LCO. l l (continued) [ SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4 7 Amendment Q 16A.7-7 June 30,1993 l 1
~ . .
CESSAR Enfincuin. f RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality B 3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE While surveillance is required whenever the reactor is critical and ! REQUIREMENTS temperature is at or below [550*F],in practice the furveillanceis most (continued) appropriate during the period when the reactor is brought critical. Because the operator would likely verify average RCS temperature more often than required by this surveillance, it is less restrictive than nornal operating practice. V ,~ V '- _ REFERENCES 1. 52 FR 788, NRC Interi Policy Statementpn Technical Specification Improvements for Nuci . Power Reactors, February 6,1987. [
/
i C CGGAL.-DC Chaplc< lS , Acc.odenF M ly$I$. e f l (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-8 Amendrnent I 16A.7-8 Decernber 21,1990 l
CESSARnnL m,. , l f 16A.7.3 B 3.4.3 RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (ET) LIMITS l RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits I B 3.4.3 I B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) l B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits 1 BASES BACKGROUNDM3 h Pressure and Temperature (P/T) limit curves for heatup, cooldown, and l g Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic testing (ISLH), and data for the maximum
, gg allowable rate of change of reactor coolant temperature are in the Pressure l t.
t Q and Temperature Limits Report (IrTLR). Both sets of curves also provide criticality limits and regions of unallowed operation. i 3 1u E 3u&'The limit curves define an acceptable region for nonnal operation. The
' N-
- usua use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup and cooldown Y maneuvering where loop temperature and pressure indications are monitored
,I and compared to the curves to determine that operation is within the j , @y .E, allowable region.
is similarly monitored He limit by predicting for thechange the teroperature allowable rate-of-change over a fixed time o ( y ;i period and comparing it to the limit.
,w : .s '
yS * $.3 h The purpose of this LCO is to establish operating limits that provide a wide
% margin to non-ductile (brittle) failure of major piping and pressure vessel
.So F 4 components of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). Of the W major components within the RCPB, the reactor vessel, is most subject to J $.
J brittle failure and therefore is the component for which the technical specifi-cation limits are most pertinent. f g
,_g ~
y The origin of the P/T limits is found in Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 (Ref.1). p Appendix G requires that limits be established based on specific fracture l
, h toughness requirements for RCPB materials such ' . an adequate margin to
.Jfie6Sjt 10 CFR 50
{f brittle Ap ndix Gfailure mandates will thebe useprovided opt S"E " durin@!, Appdix G (Ref. 2). , 5 % hwas %< Q cl IMchwuil W oven (AsMC) Call , $eh4# W The concern addressed by 10 CFR 50 AppenMx G is that undetected flaws could exist in the RCPB components which, if subjected to unusual pressure and/or thermal stresses, could result in non-ductile failure. Certain RCS P/T combinations can create stress concentrations at flaw locations. If the stress concentrations are of sufficient magnitude, flaw growth can result in failure before the ultimate strength of the materialis attained. Flaw growth is (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-9 Amendment Q 16A.7-9 June 30,1993
CESSARnnhnw f RCS Pressure and Temperature (Pff) Limits B 3.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND resisted by the material toughness and toughness can cause flaw growth to be (continued) arrested. Toughness is a property that varies with temperature and is lower at room temperature than operating temperature. Furthermore, the material toughness is affected by neutron fluence which causes the steel ductility to decrease. The effect of fluence is cumulative and ductility steadily decreases with exposure time. Only the vessel beltline region is in a high fluence area. Toughness is also dependent on the chemistry of the base metal, weld metal, and beat affected zone metal and their impurities. One indicator used to indicate the temperature effect on ductility is the Nil. Ductility Temperature, NDT (formerly called the Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature, NDTT). The NDT for the steel alloy used in vessel fabrication has been established by testing. He NDT is a temperature below which non-ductile (brittle) fracture failure may occur. Ductile failure may occur above the NDT. The exact temperature value cannot be determined very precisely. Consequently a reference temperature (RTym) has been established by experimental means. The neutron embrittlement effect on the material toughness is reflected by increasing the RTym as exposure to neutron fluence increases. In effect, the temperature at widch brittle failure can occur increases. Regulatory Guide 1.99 (Ref. 3) provides guidance for evaluating the effect of neutron fluence. To assist in evaluating the amount of RTym shift to be applied, surveillance specimens, made up of samples of reactor vessel material, are periodically withdrawn and analyzep st ccorhe 4 As AsTMEIf5[F . 5) M 4% H the RTym increa(ses or 10 with vesselcf f-50 (Fe(. Oto. fluence and t exposure toughness decreases, the PTT limit curves are correspondingly adjusted, thus giving limits that provide pressure boundary protection over the design life of the vessel. The effect of the RTym shift is to cause the pressure limit to decrease at a given temperature. This specification provides two types of limits:
- Reactor coolant P/r curves that define allowable operating regions.
- Limits on the allowable rate-of-change of temperature of the reactor coolant which provide limits on the thermal gradients through the walls of the .essel and thus limits tensile stresses in the vessel wall.
l l 1 l (continued) I f SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-10 l Amendment I ! 16A.7-10 December 21,1990 {
INSERT D: (fg l4A el' 9) All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by stanup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design . assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation. l l l l l l l
4 CESSAREnMnc- . 1 ) . i . j ! RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits B 3.4.3 I BASES BACKGROUND In use, the P/T curves are primarily for prevention of non-ductile fa05, i (continued) whereas the rate-of-change of temperature limits assist in prevention of both ductile and non-ductile failure. ; j j 4 De three curves"(h'atup, e cooldown, and ISLH) are composite curves l established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses for those j , i l ' portions of the reactor vessel and head that are most restrictive. At any
- v. specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate-of-change, one location within the geometry of the reactor vessel or head will dic:ste the most i
restrictive limit. Across the entire pressure and temperature span of the limit curves, different locations are most restrictive and thus the curves are composites of the most' restrictive regions. ', 9 ;
.c, m . 2 . ,, m. e v# , ,
~'
ne heatup curves represent a different set of restrictive elements than the l . {3 cooldown curves because the thernal gradients through the vessel wall are reversed. De thermal gradient reversal tends to alter the location of the tensile stress from outer to inner walls. The ISLH curve values use different j
- l. calculation safety factors (per ASME Appendix G) from the heatup and Q cooldown curves.
ne ISLH curves also extend to the higher pressure (3125 psia) to bound the l 1 test range. The curves have been developed for heatup, ISLH testing, and h cooldown in conjunction with stress analyses to allow a large number of M operating cycles and also provide a conservative margin to non-duc' tile [ failure. The heatup and cooldown curves also contains a limit defining the l minimum glicalityh'al.] that 0 3.4.2 ifies a ynore restriejive muumum te ture fo entical' y than the. h,auts whKh are R 50, Ap ndix G . ~ based on 10 o a his specification requires a post-event evaluation if the lim'.s are violated. The evaluation may take different forms depending on the severity of the violation and can include: comparisons to existing pre-analyzed transients already contained in the stress analysis, new stress analysis, component inspection, or other. One method that may be used is the guidance given by ASME XI Appendix E (Ref. 4). Appendix E is simplified and permits a quick review, but it is limited in application (only the vessel beltline). Although the P/T limits have been created primarily for monitoring the vessel and head, a severe violation may indicate a need to also review the condition of other RCS components. (continued) S'YSTEM 80+ B 3.4-11 Amendment Q 16A.7-11 June 30,1993
CESSAR innncma r f RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits : B 3.4.3 , BASES f i T are not derived from4-(esignresented J 4 APPLICABLE Th limits basisin the$ccidenth(PcA SAFETY ANALYSES CES AR-DC except as notedebelow, but are prescribed as guidance used l during nonnal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate-of-change conditions which might cause undetected flaws to propagate, resulting in non-ductile failure of the RCPBf %d% cowfi % . Steam line break and other increased heat removal events require a SIAS on low pressurizer pressure to ensure subcriticality via boration for events postulated to be initiated at relatively high RCS temperatures. He pressurizer temperature will not drop sufficiently to cause a SIAS for these events if the combination of pressurizer pressure and temperature is not maintained above the limit specified by the region of unallowed operation in Figures 3.4.3-I A and B. Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) methodology, following the guidance given by 10 CFR 50 Appendix G ASME Ill Appendix G, and Regulatory Guide 1.99, is used to determine the stresses and material toughness at locations within the RCPB. Although any region within the / 4 pressure boundary is subject to nonductile failure, the regions that provide )
' the most restrictive limits are the vessel closure head, the outlet nozzles, and the vessel beltline. With increasing neutron fluence, the vessel beltline :
becomes the most restrictive region. A number of analytical steps comprise the overall analyses that establish the limits. The following summarizes the basic elements:
- 1. Define the temperature profile for heatun and cooldown. He i
reactor coolant temperature rate-of-change is defined so that normal plant operation can readily proceed without constraint. Cooldown and ISLH rates-of-change have been similarly defined. Rese rates-of-change become LCO limits as well as the basis for heat transfer calculations. , i
- 2. Perform heat transfer cateulations to determine the thermal gradient through the walls. The analyses account for variance of flow rate :
' and consequent changes in the rate of heat transfer between the ! reactor coolant and the walls during different stages of heatup and cooldown when the number of operating reactor coolant pumps change. (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.412 l Amendment O 16A.7-12 May 1,1993 l
INSERT E: Pay 14 A q- M The criticality limit includes the Reference I requirement that the limit be 2 40 F above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve and not less than the minimum permissible temperature for the ISHL testing. However, the criticality limit is not operationally limiting; a more restrictive limit exists in LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality." i i I I f I i i i
)
l 2
CESSARENncuiu ! r I RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/r) Limits I B 3.4.3 l BASES APPLICABLE 3. Establish the material touchness as a function of RT,. ASME , SAFETY ANALYSES Section III, Appendix G provides the basis for RTwar and l (continued) Regulatory Guide 1.99 provides the basis for adjusting RTunt as a , function of neutron fluence and materials constituents and impurities. l I The actual shift in RTuur of the beltline region material will be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. Since the neutron spectra at the at the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are essentially identical, the measured transition shift for a sample can be applied to the adjacent section of the teactor vessel. De limit curves must be recalculated when the RTwar determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calculated RTuur for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.
- 4. Perform a LEFM analysis to establish the cressure and temnerature limits. Stress analyses are performed and the criteria for setting the limits is that the combined temperature and pressure stresses cannot exceed the material toughness for the specific temperature under
[ examination. Analytical stress concentration at each location under examination is driven by postulating specific flaw sizes. Stress intensity factors for pressure and temperature are calculated and are compared to a reference stress intensity factor. Safety factors are applied to the pressure stress intensity factor.
- 5. Measurement Adiustment - The curves are adjusted for differences in elevation between the instrumentation tap location and the location of interest (beltline, etc.) and are adjusted for the system pressure losses for the number of reactor coolant pumps that are operated at different stages of heatup or cooldown.
l
- 6. He limiting curves for criticality are developed based on the methods prescribed in 10CFR50 Appendix G. This method limits the minimum temperature to 40*F above the governing P/r curve and not less than the minimum permissible temperature for the ILHT curve.
Instrument errors are estimated and the curves include adjustments ; to pressure and temperature. In Re 'ification Selecti6n Criteri 2 of the NR Interim Por y Stateme (Ref. 5) an e LCO should retained in Tec 'g tions. N k5 P/T' lmb sa% OetMw 7_ Of fu t#L folicq EMQ, ' (continued) (s SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-13 Amendment Q 16 A.7-13 June 30,1993
CESSARnnhia
]
f . j 1 1 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits B 3.4.3 1 l BASES
- MS -
- LC The two elements of4he LCO are:
f .O[p**d- 3 The limit curves for a) bestup, b) cooldown, and c) ISLH, and h k M, r n4 d - 1. . i 8 : I
- _Q p%55 2. Limits on the rate-of-change of temperature.
Y - b bh fne rate-of-change of temperature limits control the thermal gradient throug o gg g M .s gg
+
the walls and is used as input for calculating the heatup, cooldown and ISLH j limit curves Rus, the LCO for the rate-of-change of temperature restricts j Lt Ejv stresses caused by thermal gradients and also ensures the validity of the P/T
'4 g- y4 .g !
K$%g 2; C limit curves. p NW VVO Violation of the limits places the reactor vessel outside of the bounds of the V ; 3g4 stress analysts and can increase stresses mf c'~
^
a ._. ., _ ga g k try '
*s 5,I components. De consequences to the reactor vessel and other RCS 3a .
components depends on several factors including the severity of the departure d v g' j,Q[l in j from the allowable operating pressure tempcrature regime or the severity of r
~' ' o '-
j the rate of change of temperature. He consequences also depend on the
/ / length of time that the limits were violated (longer violations allow the ,
temperature gradient in the thick walls of the vessel to become more pronounced), and the consequences also depend on the existenef, si and > an orientatiofof flaws in the vessel material. Although vessel failure is expected outcome of a violation, the possibility for failure exists. APPLICABILITY ne NRC staff believes the concern r non-ductile (brittle) failure exists at ' all times. The RCS Pfr limits pecification provides a definition of , i
$ acceptable operation for prevention o non-ductile failure that is in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix G (Ref.1). Although the PTT li ts were
{ developed to provide guidance for operation during' heatup cooldown ! { (MODES 3, 4, and 5) esl ISLH testing, their (pplicability is to-be at all l 7 times in keeping with the concern for non-ductile failure. At all times is 4 defined to be any condition with fuel in tne reactor vessel.1h lim'il5 do ^ch 0(v'H A* W 9"'*** Teck&a1 C9ei f da%<si ,
' o However, during MODES 1 and 2, other LC-Os provide limits for operation
( that can be more restrictive Aan 4 the Pfr limits. Rege other LCOs in,clude l LCO 3.4 32,"RCS drinimu3n (e rature for criticality, and LCO 3.4.1, ECS l fressure't temperature k andfDN imits?SL 2.1, safety limits for pressure and i FitW fkaht & theich berhQ , (continued) - SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-14 , Amendment I 16A.7-14 December 21,1990
CESSARnn%mo f RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits B 3.4.3 BASES i APPLICABILITY temperature and maximum pressure also provide operational restrictions. In ' (continued) MODE 6, with the reactor vessel head detensioned or removed, the capability for violating the Pfr curves does not exist, however the potential for ' violating the temperature rate-of-change limit remains. ( i Furthermore, in MODES 1 and 2, operation is above the temperature range l of concern for non-ductile failure. As such, stress analyses have been developed in accordance with normal maneuvering profiles such as power ascension. ! l r + __ __ l v 3 Ws M' C6 - ^ ~d- - ' d De a,ctions "r ' by Er :,bt15{dW r
- e. t O (g -
e the premise that al. ! violation of the limits occuned during normalplant maneuvering. Severe' I h +g 9gfgyg 4 violations caused by abnormal transients, which may be cecompanied by 3g
-.d 4 ts o g u equipment failures, may also require additional actions based on emergency operating procedures.' s l
( k 8 A.1 and A.2 g
. 3 %g f , oukde,it T~ mud be ccyredd'd 4,0 fkaf- .'
;T 3 -Qt E *Y f y-Withfperation w. iil- 1,. limi'h^'i LOO, . *"r&r *_ i: !y:
)2
.t +
4{1]g u M g8 9 -frd E -_ n the RCPB -" 5: pH' h.= a condition that has been verified by stress analysis. required action is in the proper direction'to t.5 g '2 reduce RCPB stress. /> rebrv'd -/o
)) $vk,$
e y h
,1 > .5 3 1
- g. The bmpletion kime of 30 minutes reflects the urgency of restoring the parameter (s) to within the analyzed range. Most violations will not be severe yNQ 5% and the activity can be accomplished in this time in a controlled manner.
However, if the activity cannot be accomplished, then the subsequent r 5 54 _f s.k Required Actions B.1 and B.2 require further pressure and temperature { 4 {a h(f.E[ . 5 Je reduction. y g .f'sP3 $ 1:$ In addition to restoration, an evaluation to determine if RCS operation may FG ~ 0 -4. M proceed is required. He note to Action A.2 eliminates the requirement for this evaluation when the operation extends to the " Region of Unallowed Operation" since the RCS P/r limits have not been exceeded. The purpose l of the evaluation is to determine if RC1'8 integrity remains acceptable and must be accomplished prior to continuing operation. A variety of methods may be used for the evaluation including a comparison to pre-analyzed transients accounted for in the stress analysis, new analyses, or inspection of (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-15 Amendrnent O 16A.7-15 May 1,1993
I CESSAR Ennneuiw l I r l RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/I') Limits B 3.4.3 BASES 4 Ccd4 $ c cfiaw @ pe{,4)
.hCTIONS @c components. 4A5MF Appendi'x g(may be used to support the e
. t Y(continued) however,its use is restncted to evaluation of the vessel beltiine. If the I-4 evaluation cannot be accomplished in 72 hours, or if the results of the I 9 b' I evaluation are indeterminate or unfavorable, then the next appropriate action is to proceed to further reduce pressure and temperature as given in Required y2.. M'i
- 3 Actions B.1 and B.2.
e E D S- 4 4 i' p . $3.[ The 72-hour Lompletion time is a reasonable time to accomplish the necessary 3X activities. For a mild violation, the evaluation should be possible within this J[o.j.JS14M Vj time. As part of the evaluation it may be desirable to determine what an appropriate rate of cooldown might be or if a soak period is desirable. More 4 2 d.d severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses and/or j 4*{% j i mspections which are appropriately carried out while the RCS is in a reduced l 4G,f+3y pressure and temperature condition as specified by Required Actions B.1 and B.2. A [svordele edu}k nd be compleled & merw%
, 4 ,5-s.Em %. -
40 ofe %e. .
$ ,d e NoteWyapplies thConditions A d B requires jthat a red (
g actions m,6st be completed whenever ei er or both conditions are cred. t g- o s og The pufpose of the not/is to give ad ' ional emphasid the need restore opersfion to the allo 6able conditi and to perfofm' an val no of the h effod of any excarsion outside o the allowable lifnits. Restoration alone is Y msufficient because hMyred stresses may have occurred and may I have affected the RCPB integrity. . i g fA.I FedR Actici-tU B.1 and B.2 . -c d
* $@u.O to Iftts Required Action ie r' ~g'"Wa the associated Completion Timgthe ok W p
$11 1 J.L.i plant must be placed in a lower operating MODE. Reducing the MODE is 4 g ~ considered a prudent action because: a) the RCS remained in an unaccep-LjiN f I tabl{ region for an extended period of increased stress, or b) a sufficiently iTd t 5 A y4},1 severe event caused entry into an unacceptable region. Either possibility indicates a need for more careful examination of the event, which is best M f-. l
- 3 accomplished while the RCS is in a low pressure and temperature state. With d/h vI O 'g the plant at reduced pressure conditions, the possibility of propagation of undetected flaws is reduced.
- 5 . ; "N ij r"5MJ
_ The six-hour time for achieving MODE 3 is a reasonable time to reach rf1 j 2, MODE 3 from full power without challenging plant systems. k (continued) . SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-16 Amendment I , 16A.7-16 December 21,1990 l
CESSARHnL m,. i i l t I l e i l 4 l t l' . RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits j
- B 3.4.3 l 2
i I BASES ACTIONS The 36-hour completion timc hr achieving MODE 5 is reasonable based on j (continued) operating experience to reach the required MODE from full power without challenging plant systems. %e time permits an orderly cooldown and a i soak period, if needed, or a slower average rate of cooldown (~5*F/hr). A j soak period may be desirable if the temperature rate of change limit has been j violated. l lin @ T~ P- = I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1 . I REQUIREMENTS . . MN 6VCfd b t" Verification that operation is withigimits is requ%when RCS temperature and pressure conditions are undergomg planned changes. The time period of i 30 minutes is based on industry-accepted practice. Since temperature rateef-change limits are specified in hourly increments, a half hour time period
< permits assessment and correction for minor deviations si ' a reasonable time. Surveillance for heatup#asecooldown,"nd a ISIh5 *2iscontinued I when definitions given in the plant procedures for defming the end of these conditions are satisfied. Q He surveillance is ified by a pote which tates that the rveillance is pnlyrequi duringgeatup, cooldown, and testing. There are no
! hrveillan equirements during critical operation because LCO 3.4.2,%CS
, htinimum i mperature forkriticality','contains a more restrictive -
t REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements.*
- 2. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill, Appendix G, ' Protection Against
{ i Non-Ductile Failure." 3
- 3. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, " Radiation Embrittlement i of Reactor Vessel Materials," May,1988. !
- 4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix E, " Evaluation of j Unanticipated Operating Events."
i (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-17 )
; \ ' Arnendment Q j 16A.7-17 June 30,1993 l l
CESSAR !!ainc m. RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits B 3.4.3 N' OI i BASES N REFERENCES 5. 52 FR 88, NRC Interim olicy Statement on Tec ' cal , (continued) Speci rcation Im[rovements for Nuclea Power to., . Feb ry 6 -
- 6. , Murley (USNRC) to J. K[ Gasper (p Letter, Owners ' Group) smitting "NR Staff Review of Nuclear Steam i
Sy(Iply Syste Vendor Own Group's lication p'f the Commission' Interim Polic Statement iteria to ftandajrd Technical S ifications," da May 9,198 . k VloCFf 50 , Af'f!v & A . l l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-18 Amendment O 16A.7-18 May 1,1993
. INSERT F: (yag "
C.1 and C.2 The actions of this LCO, anytime other than in MODE 1, 2, 3 ' or 4, consider the premise that a violation of the Itaits i occurred during nomal plant maneuvering. Severe violations i caused by abnormal transients, at times accompanied by ! equipment failures, may also require additional actions from : emergency operating procedures. Operation outside the P/T , limits must be corrected so that the RCPS is returned to a ( condition that has been verified by stress analyses. The Completion Time of "fumediately" reflects the urgency of I restoring the parameters to within the analyzed range. Most ; violations will not be severe, and the activity can be i accomplished in.a short period of time in a controlled manner. . Besides restoring operation to within limits,'an evaluation" ~ is required to determine if RCS operation can continue. _The " ~ evaluation must verify that the RCPS ' integrity remains acceptable and must be completed before continuing operation. Several methods may.be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients in the stress analyses, new analyses, or inspection of. the components. ASME Csde, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. . may be used to support the evaluation. However, its use is restricted to evaluation of the vessel beltline. The Completion Time of prior to entering MODE 4 forces the evaluation prior to enterinq a MODE where temperature and pressure can be significant' y increased. The evaluation for a mild violation is possible within several days, but more severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses or inspections. Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 to be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluatica of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity. l
-- .- -.y.-_ro.yn y$ w e
t CESSAR innhut:,t f 16A.7.4 B 3.4.4 RCS LOOPS - MODES 1 AND 2 RCS Imops - MODES I and 2 B 3.4.4 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.4 RCS loons - MODES 1 and 2 , BASES _.
.ACKGROUND B ne Reactor Coo /t System (RCS) uses o reactor coolant p s (RCPs) per steam gen tor loop and two s generator loops. e pump now rate has sized to provide core bott removal with app priate margin to departure rom nucleate boilingJdNB) during power operation and f antici ed transients originatin 4 rom power operati . His specifi requ' two RCS loops wi th RCPs in each p. He intent the ification is to aquire heat removal.with orced flow du ' power [
ration. Specifying tw , oops provides the ' mum n (two ; team encrators) for t removal. APPLICABLE Safety analyses contain various assumptions for the esign ases hident(064) ( SAFETY ANALYSES initial conditions including: RCS pressure, RCS temperature, reactor power level, core parameters, and safety system setpoints. The important aspect for this LCO is the reactor coolant forced flow rate which is represented by the number of RCS loops in service. , l Cf I
\
have been performed to establish the I Both transient and steady state analy ' effect of flow on DNB. He transien ccident analysis for the plant has been performed assu j gfour RCPs are m operation. The majority of the plant safety analys kbased on initial conditions at high core power or zero ; o< cusf dod power. The accident analyses which involve RCP miso daJL ro i dMwq events ,Q, Steady state DNB analysis has been performed for the(four) pump ccmbination. F,o(fou)r u operation, the steady state DNB analysis, which enerates theADNBR) limit assumes a maximum power level of [118%) l RATED THERMAL PO R (RTP). This is the design overpower condition for four pump operationg ftscart 64 kemfrrkwv4- WA kUm h (I t.,
% YLa-
#ph b nated WW3 do The [1] v4(4 as fk accAl acal sis y se o,",, f of N "d'" #'
bt) { vip >Os html cmml sisy arsum A %M i f55
- I" b "
(' ah sw evvors . 5mperahuc pk}Tk Nor- Omip da%s o. locus of prm** mod'*~~( Q SYSTEM 80+ 0% sM-tw& b Nresvlt
- I M h.4.A hmin h 9*W CNSP-J' lib 04 correla Amendment Q 16A.7-19 June 30,1993
CESSARnuania f RCS Loops - MODES I and 2 VLS foof$ - MOCCS \ OMA 2 cafis( 0 refwt' B 3.4.4 BASES N 3- Wb-APPLICABLE Il the associatedACS flow as repres/ated by the SAFETY ANALYSE number'of pumps in o lation satisfies the requirements of Se!,ection Criterion l ow is an initial (continued) 2 ofthe Interim Po cy Statemret (Re I1), because the condition for trans' at and steady sta analyses. LCOr ne purpose of this LCO is to require adequate forced flow for core heat ' removal. Flow is represented by having both RCS loops with both RCP: in each loop in operation for removal of heat by the two steam generatoryleepe-To meet safety analysis acceptance criteria for DNB, four pumps are required at rated power. f Operation in these MODES . implies that i tant components are cps providing forced OPERABLE, and an OPgRABLE loop consists o flow for heat transpop.And Ticam generatop' w ch ad OPERABLE in accordance with the { team jenerator (ube i[urveillance hrogram. Steam - generator, and hence RCS loop, OPERABILITY with regard to SO water 7* level is ensured by the Reactor Protection System (RPS)in MODES [
- 2. A reactor trip places the plant in MODE 3 if any SG level is s; J l WR as sensed b RPS. The minimum water level to declare the OPERABLE i ]u? l 4
Operation in r MOD is co ered b LCOs 3.4. (MODE 3)y3.4.6 (h E4) .7 and 3 .8 (MODE 5 , and 3.9.4 dDE6-elin r core heat APPLICABILITY Th removal wi acceptable mar to DNB must be maintained with[the , criteria of the ety analysis. To/nsure the safety ysis accep assu tions remain valid e specification onlypermits operation ' MODES MODES 3, , 1 d 2 with both RC oops and all four 3 cps in operation. '
, 5, and 6, DNB LCO is not appli,cible.
not limiting wh[e 2 me reactor is shutdown, hen
\
N r-e- VN& WEW h (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-29 Amendment Q 16A.7-20 June 30,1993
)
INSERT G: (fd4g NA.] -I i BACKGROUND The primary function of the RCS is removal of the heat generated in the fuel due to the fission process and transfer of this heat, via the steam generators (SGs), to
. the secondary plant.
The secondary functions of the RCS include:
- a. Moderating the neutron energy level to the thermal state, to increase the probability of fission;
- b. Improving the neutron economy by acting as a reflector;
- c. Carrying the soluble neutron poison, boric acid;
- d. Providing a second barrier against fission product release to the environment; and .
l
- e. Removing the heat generated in the fuel due to fission l product decay following a unit shutdown. l l
The RCS configuration for heat transport uses two RCS loops. i Each RCS loop contains a SG and two reactor coolant pumps I (RCP:). An RCP is located in each of the two SG cold legs. The pump flow rate has been sized to provide core heat removal with appropriate margin to departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) during power operation and for anticipated transients originating from power operation. This Specification requires two RCS loops with both RCPs in operation in each loop. The intent of the Specification is to require core heat removal with forced flow during power operation. Specifying two RCS loops provides the minimum necessary paths (two SGs) for heat removal.
R4 SERT H: (f#p (GA } APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, the reactor is critical and thus has the~ ; potential to produce maximus THERMAL POWER. Thus, to ensure , that the assumptions of the accident analyses remain valid, ; all RCS loops are required to be OPERABLE and in operation ' in these MODES to prevent DN8 and core damage. The decay heat production rate is much lower than the full power heat rate. As such, the forced circulation flow and heat sink requirements are reduced for lower, noncritical MODES as indicated by the LCOs for MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6. Operation in other MODES is covered by: LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3"; d S LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4*
- LCO 3.4.7, 'RCS Loops-MODE 5 L ps Filled";
LCO 3.4.8, 'RCS Loops-MODE , ops Not filled";
- LCO 3.9.4, " Shutdown Coolin and. Coolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.5, " Shutdown CoolinggSOC)-and Coolant Circulation-Lowf Water Level' (MODE 6).
95 O gsb
CESSAR na%ma f RCS Loops - MODES I and 2 B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS &l + If the required number of loops is not in operation, the Required Action is to reduce power and bring the plant to MODE 3. ne action lowers power level end thus reduces the core heat removal needs and minimizes the possibility of violating DNB limits. It should be noted that the reactor will trip and place the plant in MODE 3 as soon as the feactor yrotection fystem senses less than four RCPs operating. He six hours allowed is a reasonable time based on operating experience to reach MODE 3 from full power 'without challenging systems. # Ga$ck't SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 - REQUIREMENTS g His _;p .L.a requires verification of the required number of loops in ( operation and reactor coolant circulation every 12 hours to ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analysis assumptions. The verification may be ! performed by checking RCPs in operation and RCS flow and temperature indications. l
- y- -
SR 3.4.4.2 ' j G His SR provid the means necessaryg o determine steam gene $ tor OPERABILITY in an operational MODE: He requirement to demonstrate steam gene'rstor tube integrity in accordance with the Steam Menerator Inspectida Program emphasizes $e importance of steam gen'erator tube
.' integrity. Even though this surveillance can not be performed at normal operating conditions, its inepdion in this specification presides a method of
' determining steam generator OPERABILITY during normal operating
,rxy~ ,
REFERENCES 1. - 52 FR 3/88, NRC Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification improvotnents for /uclear Power Reactors, February'6,1987. / nM AA A Cf5WDC $ech [ ] I SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-21 Amendment I 16A.7-21 December 21,1990
CESSAREnnncum e
. l' t
16A.7.5 B 3.4.5 RCS LOOPS - MODE 3 RCS Loops - MODE 3 B 3.4.5 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.5 RCS leons - MODE 3 BASES BACKGROUND The primary function of the reactor coolant :yr L,,,s in MODE 3 is removal of decay heat and transfer of this heat, via the steam generators, to the secondary plant fluid. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is j }. :{]
+-
to act as a carrier for soluble neutron poison, boric acid.
~&'eP
) i in MODE 3, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs),are used to provide forced
* } UD circulation heat removal during heatup and cooldown. The MODE 3 decay h3 9 'i heat removal requirements are low enough that a single RCS loop with one RCP running is sufficient to remove core decay heat. However,hwo]RCS eN 3 -
j 7 6 sl . loops are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy single failure criteria. Only one RCP need be OPERABLE to declare the associated RCS loop y-}g*,jN OPERABLE. I
.2 :. 5 > - .d 5
$ ,t *
' Reactor coolant natural circulation is not normally used, however, the natural M g$S ?
circulation flow rate is sufficient for core cooling. However, natural o circulation does not provide a rapid response in the RCS to changes in
<I g ~ -- W y conditions. Boron reduction in natural circulation is prohibited because mixing to obtain a homogeneous concentration in all portions of the RCS cannot beps'sured.
t'M APPLICABLE On d startup o A RCP events saffty analyses SAFETY ANALYSES are perfo ed with initia conditions in DE 3. Opera dn of one RCP was cr ited on the a ysis of the in vertent deboration,t event. Fort i an RCP, not more than two RCP[were assumed be inady/rtent startup in, operation. (if o RCPs wt e' running, they wers assumed to be'in the Failure to provide heat removal may result in challenges to a fission product barrier. He RCS loops are part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to prevent or mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure ch,or presents a challenge 12, the integrity of a fissiognroduct barrier.[As suc t is CO isfies the r quireme,rfts of)
^
Criterivn 3 of tiieginterim olicy Statem t (Ref.1). j FCS looft fA0pt 3cahh dpilevidw 3 C[ M (continued)
I (Jf' c [blecy Makewbak. SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-22 Amendment I - 16A.7-22 December 21,1990
CESSARnn%ma : , f RCS Loops - MODE 3 B 3.4.5 BASES - 3 CO The purpose of this LCO is to requir two)CS loops to be mailable for heat removal,thus providing redundancy. e LCO requires the two] loops to be
*)- % OPERABLE with the intent of requiring both steam generato'rs to be capable ff (2 [25 %]WR water level) of transferring heat from Ge reactor coolant at a '
CT controlled rate. Forced reactor coolant flow is the required way to transport I 6 od heat, although natural circulation flow provides adequate removal. A 7 3 minimum of one running RCP meets the LCO requirement for one loop in d $_. operation. ps n 4 4$ Eo The LCO note permits a limited period of operation without RCPs. 3Inis 4 means that natural circulation has been established. When in natural g . circulation, boron reduction is prohibited because an even concentration I g ] .,5 [ distribution throughout the Rg cannot beMGhred. Core outlet temperature is to be maintained at least 10 F below the saturation temperature so that no
~ l
<#g N~~~
vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.
, q sd kw stdw scs SCC In MODES , 4, 5, it is someti t.ecessary to stop all RCPs or kw shutdown c ling from one
) pump forced ircu'ation (e.g., change operation C ;..m to the other, pe orm surveillance or startup testing,
,k - perform the transition to and fromA .y.w- cooling, or to avoid operation H below the RCP minimum NPSH limit). ne time period is acceptable because natural circulation is adequate for heat removal, or the reactor
, coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled and boron stratification 3 affecting reactivity control is not expected.
e
$% Operation in this MODE implies that components are OPERABLE, and an
- d. OPERABLE and a st ge cratorloop whi h isconsists OPERABLE inof a RCPwithproviding accordance the team forced fl kenerator ube urveillanc rogram and has the npnimum water I i for SG OPERABII . M PC i.s ONG if IT i5 A W e-Mng ,
,PC1^'tYtA deAis6le b PmUs. [rxced Ded i{ V29utv APPLICABILITY the heat load is lower than at power and one RCP is ad. unte In transport MODE 3, dwo loops are required for redundancy for heat r for , .
Operatio in other MODES is covere by LCO 3.4.4 (MO ES 1 and 2), f0DE 4),3.4.7 and 3.4. 10DE 5), and 3.9.4 3.9.5 (MODE 3.4.6[ 6 - Re fueling). (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-23 Amendment I 16A.7-23 December 21,1990
I
- CESSAR 8lnincuia i f
i i RCS Loops - MODE 3 l B 3.4.5 , BASES l A ONS M ! {pgej kg,pf , IS l If one required RCS loop is inoperable, redundancy fog heat removalmay_ i -i.vc ka lost. (egd tth The huired ketion is restoration of thegRCS loop to OPERABLE status within a (ompletion Ilme of 72 hours. This time allowance is based on engineering judgment considering that a single loop has a heat transfer capability much greater than needed to remove the decay heat produced in the j reactor core. g p (2 W , If restorat' n is not possible within 72 hours, the unit pust be placed in
$ MODE 4A In MODE 4 the plant may be placed on the l,hutdown fooling l @ System. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is -
l y cr:~5 : .p:in :: .d ;he .q .. d MCOE from the existing plant condition without challenging plant systems. f pe. w(N , t a reqwwed coer e t M ! C.1 and C.2 dejucdold e AL-
$ FC5
- f "'55" r' S h b g If nogloop is in operation, except as provided in Note 1 in the LCO section, 4 all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be C immediately suspended. ' Itis is necessary because boron dilution requires i forced circulation for proper homogenization. Action to restore one RCS oop toloperation shall be immediately initiated and continued until one RCS e
loop is^ restored tofoperation. Tht inimfe CcuplehGmes rk Mt imrabe e, el maidinle ns dV reth rr fe<hca.uFtalye=4 i i i i ; SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS gp. This surveiHanee requires verification of the required RCS loop in operation ; i and reactor coolant circulation every 12 hours to ensure forced flow is ; ! providing heat removal. Verification includes flow rate-and temperature, i l wA dMt 1 monitoring. The 12-hour interval has been shown by op/ rating practice to l be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analysis assumptions. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-24 Amendment I 16A.7-24 December 21,1990
INSERT I: (fgl(aA.lA3) APPLICABILITY In MODE 3, the heat load is lower than at power; therefore, one RCS loop in operation is adequate for transport and heat removal. A second RCS loop is required to be OPERA 8LE but not in operation for redundant heat removal capability. Operation in other MODES is covered by: LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2"; LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4"; sb LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-M00E-5, Loo filled" SCS LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5 oops illed"; LCO 3.9.4, " Shutdown Coolin and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling. and Coolant Circulation-Lod Water evel" (MODE 6).
/ -
scs A s%3
CESSARnih m. ^ r { l RCS Loops - MODE 3 , B 3.4.5 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.2 , . REQUIREMENTS g i (continued) His er ::" - : requires verification of water level in each steam generator 2 [25]9EWR every 12 hours. An adequate SG water level is required in l order to have a heat sink for removal of the core decay heat from the reactor ] coolant. He 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be , sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within the , safety analysis assumptions, gk# '
\op-h sk Y SR 3.4.5.3 'yM 6@
A , 1 I Verification that the uired number of reactor coolant pumps are OPERABLE ensures thagadditional reactor coolant loop [can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay. heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power availability to the required RCPs. The Frequency of seven days ( is an accepted industry practice and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience. REFERENCES 1. 2 FR 3,7k8, ' Interim Policy-Statement on Technical Specificati ' Udted States n ear Impro/ements Regulato Commissio for Nuclear
. February 6,1987. Power Reactors *,/
\
% (Jan .
I SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-25 Amendrnent O 16A.7-25 May 1,1993
CESSAR 88Hnc m. f 16 A.7.6 B 3.4.6 RCS LOOPS - MODE 4 l RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 , I B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) J B 3.4.6 RCS Loons - MODE 4 BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 4, the primary function of the P ytacktsr
-'-CwL: 7 '") cool &
- 4eopris the removal of decay heat and transfer of this heat to the steam generator (s) or Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) heat exchangers. He secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier f neutron poison, boric acid, i
In MODE 4, either reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) or SCS divisions can be l , used for coolant circulation. He intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RCP or one SCS division for decay heat removal and transport. The flow provided by one RCP or SCS division is adequate for heat removal. The other intent of this LCO is to require that two paths be . i available to provide redundancy for heat removal. I This LCO permits limited periods without forced circulation. When RCPs are stopped, the steam generator heat removal provides a natural circulation . flow rate that is sufficient for decay heat removal. When the SCS pumps are stopped, no alternate heat removal path exists, l unless the RCS and steam generators have been placed in service in forced or natural circulation. The response of the RCS without the SCS depends on l the core decay heat load and the length of time that the SCS pumps are ; l stopped. As decay heat diminishes, the effects on RCS temperature and l pressure diminish. Without cooling by SCS, higher heat loads will cause the l reactor coolant temperature and pressure to increase at a rate proportional to the decay heat load. Because pressure can increase, the applicable system pressure limits (pressure and temperature limits or low temperature overpressurization limit) must be observed and forced SCS flow or heat l removal via the steam generators must be reestablished prior to reaching the pressure limit. i (continued) l l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-26 i Amendment O 16A.7-26 May 1,1993
CESSARnn%mo r RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES BACKGROUND Entry into a condition with no SCS divisions in operation should only be (continued) considered for limited circumstances which include: 1) a heat removal path (s) via the RCS and steam generator (s) is in operation, or 2) pressure and temperature increases are casily maintained within the allowable pressure and subcooling limits. APPLICABLE ne only safety analyses performed with initial conditions in MODE 4 are SAFETY YSES the inadvertent deboration and inadvertent startup of RCP events. No forced j 3, coolant circulation was credited for the inadvertent deboration event. For the 4 eg g inadvertent startup of an RCP, not more than two RCPs were assumed to be y g* in operation. (If two RCPs were running, they were assumed to be in the 9 -e same loop.) p 1 5 c?. d _$. -
' g # j, ,6 Failure to provide heat removal may result in challenges to a fission product f,2 ggy barrier. The RCS loops or SCS divisions are a part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to prevent or mitigate a design basis accident OT % or transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the (c3M I .h * . -fA S. t integrity of a fission roduct barrier /As pch, the).CO sat' es the requirpments of C rion Tof 3bre NRC inter)fn PolicyAtate (Ref.1).
- LCOs ne purpose of this CO ' to require the avai ability of a minimum of two RCS loops /SCS divis' s for beat removal thus providing redumfancy. He LCO allows the loops / divisions that are required to V6PERABLE to be comprised any combination of RCS loops or SC ivisions.
The L note permits a limited period of operation without RCPs and SDC
- s. This means that natural circulation 4Ias been established using the m generators. With the RCS in natdal circulation, boron reductionyI
/puprohibited because an even concenpafion distribution throughout the,RCS cannot be assured. Core outlet terriperature is to be maintained at least 10 F below saturation temperature that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation ow obstruction.
M b Mpp y (continued) (
' ~
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-27 Amendment Q 16A.7-27 June 30,1993
CESSAR naincuiu r RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES n ruf Nf J wm LCOs
' Ysecond LCO Note requires that the following condition be satisfied before an RCP may be staited with any RCS cold leg temperature s [259'F] /
(continued) l during cooldown op[I90*F] during heatup (the heatup rate fli limited to ' [40'F/hr or less) n'nless secondary water temperature in each'SG must be < [100'F] above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures / f'r ,/ ,/ Satisfying this condition will preclude violating-the RCS P/T limits when th 6 RCP is started. (see LCO 3.4.11) ,/ /
,f f[)Ne #f ,'
/ In MODES 3, 4, and 5, it is sometimes necessary to stop all RCP or)CS Y pump forced circulation (i.e. change operation from one SCS division to the other, perform surveillance'or startup testing, perfonn the transiti'n o to and j from SCS, or to avoid operation below the RCP minimum NPSH limit). The l time period is acceptable because natural circulation is' adequate for heat removal or the reactor coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled, and boron stratification affecting reactivity control is not expected.
Operation in this MODE implies that corr nts are OPERABLE. and an OPERABLE RCS loop consists of an'RCP providing forced flow for' heat , transport and a steam generator which is OPERABLE in accordance with the steam generator tube surveillance program and has the minimum water level for SG OPERABILITY. Similarly, for the SCS division, the SCS pump (s) are capable of providing forced flow for heat exchange. UN_A e
- /
APPLICABILITY In MODE 4, this LCO applies because it is possible to remove core decay heat with either the RCS loops and steam generators or the SCS. m Operation covered by LCOs 3.4.4 (MODES 1 and 2), 3.4.5 (M9DE 3), 3.4.7 and 3.4). '(MODE 5), 3.9.4 and'3.9.5 (MODE rations).
- Ref,u(ling),and 3.10.4 (Repdced RCS Inventory Uf 4 Fgkte wh- 1N%fT t'-
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-28 Amendment Q 16A.7-28 June 30,1993 l
l INSERT J: (fdp M O The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RCS loops or SCS divisions be OPERABLE in MODE 4 and one of these loops or divisions be in operation. The LCO allows the two loops that are required to be OPERABLE to consist of any combination of RCS loops and SCS divisions. Any one loop or division in operation provides enough flow to remove the decay heat from the core with forced circulation. An additional loop or division is required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy for heat removal. Note 1 permits all RCPs and SCS pumps to be de-energized $ 1 hour per 8 hour period. This means that natural circulation has been established using the steam generators. The Note prohibits boron dilution when forced flow is stopped because an even concentration distribution cannot be ensured. Core outlet temperature is to be maintained at least 10 F below saturation temperature so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural , circulation flow obstruction. The response of the RCS without the RCPs or SCS pumps l depends on the core decay heat load and the length of time that the pumps are stopped. As l decay heat diminishes, the effects on RCS temperature and pressure diminish. Without j cooling by forced flow, higher heat loads will cause the reactor coolant temperatureand i pressure to increase at a rate proportional to the decay heat load. Because pressure can increase, the applicable system pressure limits (pressure and temperature (P/T) limits or low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) limits) must be observed and forced SCS flow or heat removal via the steam generators must be re-established prior to reaching the pressure I limit. The circumstances for stopping both RCPs or SCS pumps are to be limited to situations where:
- a. Pressure and temperature increases can be maintained well within the allowable pressure (P/T limits and LTOP) and 10 F subcooling limits; or
- b. An alternate heat removal path through the steam generators is in operation.
Note 2 requires that either of the following conditions be satisfied before an RCP may be started with any RCS cold leg temperature s [259 F] during cooldown or [290 F] during heatup (the heatup rate is limited to [40 F/hr or less]):
- a. Pressurizer water level is < [60%); or
- b. Secondary side water temperature in each steam generator is < [100 F] above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
Satisfying either of the above conditions will preclude a large pressure surge in the RCS when the RCP is started.
l I l
. INSERT J (Continued):
In MODES 3,4, and 5, it is sometimes necessary to stop all RCP or SCS pump forced circulation (i.e. change operation from one SCS division to the other, perform surveillance or startup testing, perform the transition to and from SCS, or to avoid operation below the RCP minimum NPSH limit). The time period is acceptable because natural circulation is adequate for heat removal or the reactor coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled, and boron j stratification affecting reactivity control is not expected. , An OPERABLE RCS loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and a steam generator that is OPERABLE in accordance with the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program and has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2. Similarly, for the SCS, an OPERABLE SCS division is composed of the OPERABLE SCS pump (s) capable of providing forced flow to the SCS heat exchanger (s). RCPs and SCS pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. INSERT K: hdpl(/A'l42) Operation in other MODES is covered b 7 >,'J c)w LCO 3.4.4, 'RCS Loops-MODES 1 an 2'; .,, $C6 LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3"; y LCO 3.4.7, 'RCS Loops-MODE 5 Loops filled"; LCO 3.4.8, 'RCS Loops-MODE 5 Loops'Not filled"; LCO3.9.4,"ShutdownCooling)(SOCTandCoolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and MtandCoolant LCO3.9.5,"ShutdownCoolingfwate Circulation-Low vel" (MODE 6). 4 \ cCS ~ dem
CESSAR nairicuia l f RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 i l l BASES I ACTIONS AJ. .. g SCG divi'AoW - - i dnd '" OPO
- Ail #W If only one required RCS loop 3is OPERABLF g redundancy for heat removal is lost. The fequired $ction is to initiate activities to restore a second loop /divisionto OPERABLE status and the action must be taken immediately. j i Even thou h one loop / division is OPERABLE and in operation, the i hmpletion{ Time emphasizes the importance of maintaining the availabilityj two paths for heat removal.
B.1(atuYb2 1 1 WPf66" l If only one required SCS division is epwable, redundancy for heat removal l 1 is lost. & :q:..J .;;m., .. i . ; . ; : _ :sf :::p!S. :: *
-O"E"XLZ .;.. .Jun uu. Le . . h ; ;ir;;;t ;;; 2:.;b; h-OPEP2PLP 1.3 k ;,p;=Sr. de mg.L^. ;._ . .pt_. ; 2.. . ,c. _ _
ef :-+ : ; i: ....:.L.: ;3 J ; , l.. f , .._; . .._ . .: . lf . _ - 2
'~7/E :.:; ; ;.;;; i; ._~.J ;u OTL:UJ:LC .. . :. .l.1 ; i:::,
Ie plant must be placed in MODE 5 within the next 24 hours. Placing the ( plant in MODE S is a conservative action with regard to decay heat removal. With only one SCS division OPERABLE, redundancy for decay beat removal l 1 i is lost and, in the event of a loss of the remaining SCS division,it would be key betsee to initiate that loss from MODE 5 ($; 210*F) rather than MODE 4 (210 - 350*F). The completion time of ours is reasonable based on 1 operating experience to reach MODE 5 from MODE 4, with only one SCS without challenging plant systems. division operating,Y'n t m ordedg M M C.1 and C.2 oR hpsorS ~ divisions are operation, th action requ' l i imm te suspensio of any operati for boron r tion and ires I acti to immedia y start restorati of one operat' g loop /divisi . The a, non for resto 6 ion does not ap to the conditio _goopi operation Qen the exe ption Notein the' CO is in fore - ne immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for decay heat removal. He action to restore must be continued until one loop / division is restored to operation. hlote. wh TAfio2T~ l-(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-29 Amendment O 16A.7-29 May 1,1993
CESSAR !!a%ma f RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6/ 7.- ycor/n seb., i 1 REQUIREMENTS nis suns.$;;.m.o requires verification ojwater le el in the required ste generator (s) 2 25% WR every 12 hours. An adequate SG water level is l required in onier to have a heat sink for removal of the core decay heat from the reactor coolant. He 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analyr# assumptions. C SR 3.4.6,[ l he SA , This . ..J11.m.s requires veri cation of the required loop / division in ' operation every 12 hours to ure forced flow is providing heat removal. Verification of RCS or SCS peration includes flow rate,%4% w/ - monitoring. He 12-hour int has been shown by operating practice to ()dah5 be sufficient to regularly assess &;;n&Mn =3 ;:My ^,- -*:^ "- M7
=:3.; = . "-
k Pcs (q sW. L ad.uk, cskhot term ivttien4% ap/gfayc$ ( SR 3.4.6.3 tJtt! Mcwma.t[y M 'M e 19 sfa. fur . FCS IW or Cc5 chvisiox Verification t t the required number of pumps are OPERABLE ensures that an additional - can be placed in operation, if needed to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required ' pumps. The Frequency of seven days is sect-d : d"" y - xd= and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience. r .r u REFERENCES 1. -[52 FR 3788, "Interini7olicy Statement on Technical S ification Improvenients for Nuclear Pow'er Reactors,' USNRC,2/ >/87. 2. Gener/ic Letter 88-17, " Loss /of Dt:ay moval,* Heat Re/ JSNRC, 1 17/88. pg- [ CESSAR-DC. Section 9.8 'ShuAown Risk Assessme . l
/ '
TN d(P5gle<d, I(45crugMe, In %ewf c' - Ok gtdwin.hhajUe (tah; 4va.g idle, SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-30 Amendment Q 16A.7-30 June 30,1993
l l
\
INSERT L: (fFf IhA 'l' i i If no RCS loops or SCS divisions are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions ' I permitted by Note 1 in the LCO section, all operations involving reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action to restore one RCS loop or SCS division to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated. Boron dilution requires forced circulation for proper mixing, and the margin to criticality must not be reduced in this type of operation. , i I i l l l l 1 l l l I l l l
,w
CESSARUn%ma y(k s j k ,N a p# j' 16 A.7.7 B 3.4.7 CS LOOPS - MODE 5 (LOOPS FILLED) CS Loops - MODE 5 (Lcaps Filled) B 3.4.7 B 3.4 REACTOR C LANT SYSTE i (RCS) !
/
B 3.4.7 RCS Lo/ns - MODE 5 (Loons Filled)
/
BASES BACKGROUND- ' In MODE 5 with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loops filled, the primary
/ function of the RCS loops is the removal of decay heat and transfer t 's
,' heat to the steam generator (s) or shutdown cooling (SCS) heat ex ge s. l While the principle means for decay heat removal is via SC the st seuerstors ne specified as a t)ack ;; means for redundancy. ven through the steara generators cannot produce steam in this MOD they are capable .
,/ of being a heat sink due to their large contained volum f secondary water.
As long as the steam generator water is at a low temperature than the I reactor' coolant, heat transfer will occur. The rat of heat transfer is directly
\ propbrtional to the temperature difference. e secondary function of the
\ reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for sol le neutron poison, boric acid. I f In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, th CS divisions are the principle means 4
; for heat removal. The number of visions in operation can vary to suit e
,! operational needs. The intent this LCO is to provide forced flow ffom at
! least one SCS division or
{ S loop for decay beat removal and transport. j The flow provided by o RCP or SCS division is adequate for decay heat j removat The other tent of this LCO is to require that'two paths be
\ available to provid edundancy for heat removal. ,
\ /
'q The LCO pro des for redundant paths of decay peat removal capability. l The first h car be an RCS loop or a SCVdivision which must be OPERA E and in operation. The second path'can be another OPERAB l RCS p or SCS division, or maintaining,ais adequate water level in each f steam generator.
/
This LCO permits limited periodsythout forced circulation. When the SCS l .
\ pumps are stopped, no alternate eat removal path exists unless the RCS and N steam generators have been p ced in service in forced or natural circulation. i
'The responsemf e RCS ithout the SCS depends on the core decay hea load and the length f time that the SCS divisions are stopped. As decay h t diminishes the eff s on RCS temperature and pressure diminish. W out cooling by SCS, high heat loads will cause the reactor coolant tem rature l
(continued) i SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-31 Amendment O ; 16A.7-31 May 1,1993 !
CESSAR 8lninc=w t RCS3230ps--MODE 3 (LooprF led) B 3. , BASES BACKGR ' 'D load. Because pressurej increase, applicable system pressure li 'ts ' (continued (pressure and temperature limits or low temperature overpressurization linu must be observed add forced SCS flow must be lished prior to reaching the presso're limit. Entry into a condition wi no SCS divisions in
}
operation should'only be considered for limited circ tances which include:
- 1) beat remov'al path (s) via the RCS and steam erator(s) is in operation, or 2) press'ure and temperature increases are ily maintained within the \
allowable pressure and subcooling limits. h
/
/ f ,
APP ICABLE ,The only safety analyses performed ith initial conditions in MODE 5 are SAFE ANALYSES / the inadvertent deboration and in vertert startup of an RCP events. No j/ forced coolant circulation was credited in the inadvertent boration event. For l the inadvertent startup of an RtP, not more than two RCPs were assumed to be in operation. (if two ' cps were running, they were assumed to be ' the same loop.) Failure to provide heat removal may challenge the integrity o, a fission [ SCS or RCS loops are a part of a primary product which functionsbarrier. r ac T[ tuates to prevent or mitigste is accident ora design bas transient that ther assumes the failure of, or presents a[allenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier. As such, th LCO satisfies the requirem ts of Criterion 3 of the NRC Interim Poli Statement (Ref.1). LCOs Th purpose of this LCO is to require the ava lity of a minimum of two ths for heat removal thus providing redundancy. The LCO allows the two paths that are required to be OPERABLE /o be comprised of combinations of SCS divisions and/or the RCS loops afid associated steam generators. The LCO Note 1 permits all S umps and RCPs to be stopped. The circumstances for stopping both SCS divisions are to be limited to: 1)) , situation where pressure and temperature increases can be maintained welY within the allowable pressure (PT and LTOP) and [10*F] subcooling li ,
- 2) an alternate h m val path (s) through the steam generatorf is in opera . O Note p hibits boron dilutio SCS fo flowis l stopped because an even conce tion distJ2h on canno assured.
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-32 Amendment O 16 A.7-32 May 1,1993
CESSARnah m
, 4 RCS Loops - MODE 5 (Loops Filled) ,
f B 3.4.7 BAS S [ LC s l / Core outlet temperature is to beanaintained at least [10.F] below sa tion (c ntinued) temperature so that no vapor, bubble would form and possibly cause a circulation flow obstructipts. In this MODE, the steam generators can be used as a backup for SCS heat removal. To ensure their availability, the RCS loop flow path is'to be maintained with subcooled liquid to ens availability. /
/
In MODES J',' 4, and 5, it is sometimes necescary to stop all RCP or SCS ; forced cimulation (i.e., change operation from one SCS division to the other, perfornr' surveillance or startup testing, perform the transition to anfd ttim the l SCS/r to avoid operation below the RCP minimum NPSH limisf. The time penod is acceptable because natural cimulation is accepta r the reactor coolar.t temperature can be maintained subcooled, and boron l stratification affecting reactivity control is not expected [
/
The second LCO Note requires that the followisg condition be satisfied before an RCP may be started with any RCS cold leg temperature :s [259'F] during cooldown or [290*FJ during heatup'(the heatup rate is limited to [40'F/hr or less])
/'
- a. secondary water temperature in each SG must be < [100.F] above each of the RCS cold leg' temperatures.
Satisfying this condition vill reclude violating RCS P/T limits (see 3.4.11). when the RCP,ifIstarted. The third LCO % permits an orderly transition from MOD 5 to MODE l 4 during a p ed heatup by permitting removal of SC8' divisions from i operation w en at least one RCP is in operation. ! Operation in this MODE implies that componentynre OPERABLE, an OPERABLE RCS loop consists of a steam generator that can perf m as a , eat sink (i.e., has an adequate water level), and is OPE LE in ordance with the steam generator tubw' surveillance program. cps are ERABLE if th , capable of being powered and are a to provide flo 'f requir The S is OPERABL hen ca e of providing forced flow for heat exchange. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-33 Amendment O 16A.7-33 May 1,1993
CESSAR inMncino , l
/ V I CS Loops - h10DE 5 (Loops Filled)
BASES . I _\ APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with I filled, this LCO applies because if is possible to > l remove decay heat th the SCS but the steam generators ma r be used as an l alternate heat sin .
/ I
/ Operation in'other MODES is covered by LCOs 3.4.4 (MOD 1 and ,
i
/ 3.4.5 (MODE 3), 3.4.6 (MODE 4), 3.4.8 (MODE 5 - ps Partially l Filled Ind 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 (MODE 6 - Refueling). i i
ACTIONS
/
A.1 and A.2
/
I I If only one required. means of decay Jibat removal is OPERABLE, redundancy for heat removal is lost. e Required Action is to initiate j activities to restore a second loop /di sion to OPERABLE status and the . I action must be taken immediatel An aiternative to restoring a second l l i loop / division would be to initi, actions to restore the water level in the required steam generators and the action must be taken immediately. Either l Required Action A.1 or A 32'will restore redundant decay heat removal p / Even though one looyfdivision is OPERABLE and in operati , the completion time emp)insizes the importance of maintaining the avaf bility of two paths for hea t'emoval.
' I B.1 and B 2
./ i If both required loops / divisions are inoperable or not m operation, the action )
requires immediate suspension of any operation f/or boron reduction and I requires action to immediately start restorftsou of one OPERABLE , loop / division. 'Ibe action for restoration d 's not apply to the condition for loops in operation when the exemptio ote in the LCO is in force. Th i ediate completion time reflects t importance of maintaining opera ' n for y heat removal. The acti to restore must be continued un ~ one loop / ision is restor , (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-34 Arnendment O 16A.7-34 May 1,1993
CESSARMnLuiu
, ..- x 8 /
/ RCS Imops - ODE 5 (Lcq ' Fil'-d)
.' / b 3.4.7
/
i BASNS
/
SU VEILLANCE RE ' EMENTS SR 3.4.7.1
/'
/
To ensure that the steam generators are available as a backup to the SCS, l f steam generator watef level is verified every 12 hours when the LCO requirement is beiig met by use of the steam generators. If bot SCS [ divisions are OPERABLE, the surveillance is not needed. The 1.
-hour l
[ interval has be$n shown by operating practice to be sufficient tpogu ly
/ assess degra'dation and verify operation within safety anQ sis,4sumptions.
f l ,' SR 3 A7.2 j
/ /
'Ihis surveillance requires verification of the required number of ,
joops/ division in operation every 12 hours to ensiire forced flow is providing ' heat removal. Venfication of operation includes flow rate and temperature monitoring. The 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradafion and verify operation within safet
/ analysis assumptions. /
l /
/ SR 3.4.7.3 / l l /
/ This surveillance requires / the required number of pumps are verification that OPERABLE ensures'that additional pumps can be placed in operation, if
/ needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. '
t Verification is4 ferformed by verifying proper breaker alignment and powe available todhe required pumps. The Frequency of seven days is accept industr practice and has been shown to be' acceptable by operatin ex ence.
/
/
REFERENCES 1. 52 FR 3788, " Interim Policy' Statement on Technical Specifi ation Improvements for Nuclear' Power Reactors," USNRC,2/6/ . 2.
/
Generic 12tter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal," SNRC, 10/17/88.
- 3. AR-DC, Section 19.8, ssment".
l x - SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-35 Amendment O 16A.7-35 May 1,1993
j RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled l B 3.4.7 ! 4+ 4 REACTOR C00EANT-5YSTEu (ort) 1 B-3.4.7 RC5 -Lvups-i400E-5, Lugs filled. :l l i BASES 566 i InMODE5withtheRCSlop/ s filled, the primary function of BACKGROUND : i the this reactor coolant heat to the steamisgenerators to remove(SGsdecay) heat and transferor b shutdo
$C$.-450C) heat exchangers. While the principal means for decay ;
heat removal is via the 50e.Sptes, the SGs are specified as ! a backup means for redundancy. Even though the SGs cannot ! produce steam in tnis MODE, they are capable of being a heat l sink due to their large contained volume of secondary side I water. As long as the SG secondary side water is at a lower ( temperature than the reactor coolart, heat transfer will occur. The rate of heat transfer is directly proportional , to the temperature difference. ihe secondary function of i the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for soluble ! neutron poison, boric acid. .., l CCS divisets In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, the 500 trein; are the , principal means for decay heat removal. The number of l pcjg -traks in operation can vary to suit the operational needs. - < The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at ) SCS V least onir400 train for decay heat removal and transport. c6 # The flow provided by one S96-tM4e is adequate for decay heat removal. The other 11 tent of this LCO is tc require -l l that a second path be avai ble to provide redundancy for decay heat removal. Ses <L &. ecg g,gg The LCO provides for redundant paths of y heat removal capability. The-first path can be an S"C traia that must be OPERABLE and in operation. 'The second path can be another OPERABLE SDC train, or through the SGs, each having an adequate w'ater level.
% ScS ck MGvu APPLICABLE In MODE 5, RCS circulation is considered in the SAFETY ANALYSES detemination of the time available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event. The p .tM hs provide f this circulation. ICS chiOcwt RCS loops-MODE 5 (loops filled) have been identified in the NRC Policy Statement as important contributors to risk reduction.
j (continued) . r y RTR S 3.4-3n Re, 0, 6 192 - <
'l a
i 0 RCS Loops-MODE 5. Loops Filled
, B 3.4.7 BASES (continued) g j
[ Sc5 cuvwton LCO The purpose of this LCO is ):o require at least one of the ~ Sctekvidens SDC tr ira be OPERABLE and/in operation with an additional ' ccc cg(sien SDC train OPERABLE or secondary side water level of each SG U shall be e [25]%. One.-SOC train provides sufficient forced to circulation to perfom coolant under these the safety functions of the rThe second conditions. . .. i s SOC tr:. g nomally maintained OPERABLE as a backup to the operating scs cWs-SOC train to provide redundant paths for decay heat removal. However, if the standby.pc tr:in is not OPERABLE, a Sc5 cBv isib -- sufficient aiternate method to provide redundant paths.for decay heat removal is two SGs with their secondary side water levels e [25%). Should the operating SDC trai-' fail, the SGs could be used to remove the decay heat. /, scs Jiyi5dw Sc5 Note 1 pemits all SOG- pumps to be de-energized s 1- hour per 8 hour period. The circumstances for stopping both-SOG Sc5 trains are to be limited to situations where pressure and temperature increases can be maintained well within the allowable pressure (pressure and tem , temperature overpressure protection)perature and 10*F subcooling and low limits, or an alternate heat removal path through the SG(s) ; is in operation.
- rSc5 This LCO'is modified by a Note that prohibits boron dilution when 40G forced flow is stopped because an even concentration distribution cannot be ensured. Core outlet temperature is to be maintained at least 10'F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble would fom and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.
In this MODE, the SG(s) can be used as the backuo for SOE- SCS heat removal. To ensure their availability, th'. RCS loop , flow path is to be maintained with subcooled 'iquid. j In MODE 5, it is sometimes necessary to st9p all RCP or-50G Sc5 gcs , forced circulation. This i; pemitted te change operation from one E tr:in to the other. perfom surveillance or E is e
~
startup testing, perfom the transit len to and from the & SCS or to avoid operation below the RCP minimum net positive suction head limit. The time period is acceptable because natural circulation is acceptable for decay heat removal,
- the reactor coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled, and boren stratification affecting reactivity control is not expected.
Sc ': c% t'icw
- Note 2 allows one 59" tr=in to be inoperable for a period of up to 2 hours provided that the other 40G-kain is OPERABLE.
C c e% d sk. l (continued)
.- c40s+TS- ::.w3t- --Reg 09/2s/92- l
RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops filled B 3.4.7 BASES dQ & ow LCO and in operation. This pemits peri c surveillence tests (continued) to be perfomed on the inoperable 'fr during the only time when such testing is safe and possible. Note 3 requires that either of the following two conditions be satisfied before an RCP may be started with any RCS cold > leg temperature s [285]'F:
- a. Pressurizer water level must be < [60]%; or
- b. Secondary side water temperature in each SG must be
< [100]'F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
Satisfying either of the above conditions will preclude a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when the RCP is started. Note 4 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 during a planned heatup by pemitting removal of 4DC-SCS divisierns4 rains-from operation when at least one RCP is in operation. This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCP is pemitted to be in operation and replaces the heat . .. removal function provided by the SDC train:;. 94 5 chvtSi m 5 scs divisib Sc5 An OPERABLE !@c L oin is composed of an OPERABLE 500 pump and an OPERABLE Rheat exchanger. Scs 6 ?SOE pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. An OPERABLE SG can perform as a heat sink when it has an adequate water level and is OPERABLE in accordance with the SG Tube Surveillance Program. APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, this LCO requires forced circulation to remove decay heat from the core 1d to provide proper boron mixing. One SDC-traQ pro. ides .. . sufficient circulation for these purposes. L_ ses divisim Operation in other MODES is covered by: l LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2"; ' l LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3"; LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4"; LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5 Loops Not Filled"; l (continued) cre m -8 3.4 3e - -aeu_4a9/::/r - !
l l RCS Loops-MODE 5. Loops Filled l
' B 3.4.7 BASES 4
$5 M scs APPLICABILITY LCO 3.9.4, " Shutdown Cooling 4(SDe7 and Coolant (continued) Circulation-High Water Level" (HODE 6); and LCO 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling (SDC-) and Coolant Circulation-Low Wate Level" (MODE 6).
S cdem 9S ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 scs dw. ,is e If the required SDC trai- is inoperable and any SGs have secondary side water levels < [25%), redundancy for heat removal is lost. Action must be initiated imediately to Sc5 chbcw' restore a seconc%DC traic to OPERABLEEither status or to restore the water level in the required SGs. Required Action A.1 or Required Action A.2 will restore redundant decay heat removal paths. The imediate Completion Times reflect the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for decay heat removal. B.1 and 8.2 Scs S M m If no SDC-train is in operation, except as pennitted in Note 1, all operations involving the reduction of RCS boron - concentration must be suspended. Action to restore one GDC-CCS dw.tsicy-tnin to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated. Boron dilution requires forced circulation for proper mixing and the margin to criticality must not be reduced in this type of operation. The imediate Completi:n Times reflect the importance of maintaining operation for decay heat removal. i SURVEILLANCE SR , > 7.1 1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one SBC- Sc5 c h td6K 4 nin is in operation. Verification includes flow rate, ! temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure
- l that forced flow is providing decay heat removal. The l 12 hour Frequency has been shown by operating practice to be !
sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify 1 operation is within safety analyses assumptions. In ! addition, control room indication and alanns will normally indicate loop status. (continued) F ' -C-TS 2.4- F 4ev. O rJ9/23492-
RCS Loops--MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 f 1 BASES l 4 l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.1 (continued) l REQUIREMENTS scs l The 4BG flow is established to ensure that core outlet temperature is maintained sufficiently below saturation to i allow time for swapover to the standby SOC---tra4n should the operating 4rair be lost. scs cWidow - cS'vsim~. SR 3.4.7.2 - g ScS divisicyv i Verifying the SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring ,their secondary : side water 'evels are n [25%) ensures that / redundant heat removal paths are available if the second $00 tr;ir, is ' inoperable. ~The Surveillance is required to be performed the LCO requirement is being met by use of the SGs. If
, oth ..C tr: ins are OPERABLE this SR is not needed. The
)C4 f\vdAL 12 hour Frequency has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analyses assumptions. -
SR 3.4.7.3 g gdSib Verification that the second 'n' '- '- is OPERABLE nsures that redundant paths for decay heat removal are av ilable. The requirement also ensures that the additional can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is ;
~
performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power . available to the required pumps.- The Surveillance is 3 required to_ be cerformed when the LCO requirement is being 53g [##meTTy one
- of level.
water twoh>. Theins, frequency e.g., both of 7 days SGs have < [25]% is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operatir.g experience. REFERENCES None. . i t 1 1 i
)
-C:00-3ts -; ;.4 ~v.1 . v, v1/ES/32- l I
t i
- ~ _ - _ ~ . _ - - _ .- - . . _ _ . . _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ - _ _ , _ ,
CESSAR Ennnemew f 16 A.7.8 B 3.4.8 RCS LOOPS - MODE 5 (LOOPS NOT FILLED) RCS Loops MODE 5 (Loops Not Filled) B 3.4.8 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.8 RCS Imns - MODE 5 (Loons Not Filled) , t t BASES ;
$ BACKGROUND In MODE 5 with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loops not filled, the
( _ primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay beat and , j$ transfer of this heat to the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) heat exchangers. C e The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrie
@ neutron poison, boric acid.
R : 27-~ In MODE 5 with loops not filled, only the SCS can be used for coolant l circulation. The number of divisions in operation can vary to suit the 9 g "i l operational needs. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one SCS division for decay heat removal and transport. ne other intent of this LCO is to require that two paths be available to prov
))f redundancy for heat removal. I nis LCO permits limited periods without forced circulation. When the SCS l 3 c, divisions are not in operation, no alternate heat removal path exists, ne l y,, response of the RCS without the SCS depends on the decay heat load and the I length of time that the SCS pumps are stopped. As decay heat diminishes, g$$
e -t 3 4_ the effects on RCS temperature diminish. Without cooling by SCS, higher ! l p q c ._ heat loads will cause the reactor coolant temperature to increase at a rate l proportional to the decay heat load. Because pressure can increase, s applicable system pressure limits (pressure and temperature limits or low temperature overpressurization limits) must be observed and forced SCS system flow must be reestablished prior to reaching the pressure limit. Entry into a condition with no SCS division in operation stops heat removal and should only be considered for limited circumstances such as when switching from one SCS division to the other. With the pumps stopped, pressure and temperature may increase and pumps must be restored prior to exceeding pressure and . coling limits. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4 36 Amendment O 16A.7-36 May 1.1993
CESSAR !!nincamw f RCS Loops - MODE 5 (Loops Filled) B 3.4.7
\BAliES /
SUR ILLANCE SR 3.4.7f b REQUIRhMENTS To ensure that the steam generators are available as a b mp to the SCS, steam generator water level is verified every 12 ho rs,when th requirement is being met by use of the steam geytors. n [ If both SCS divisions are OPERABLE, the surveillance is not needed. The 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice t7 h sufficient to regularly l assess degradation and verify operation within fety analysis assumptions. R 3.4.7,I l This surveillance requires verificat' n of the required number of loops / 'visionin operation every 12 urs to ensure forced flow is providing heat rem "al. Verification of ope tion includes flow rate and temperature monitoring. The 12-hour interv has been shown by operating practice to be sufficieni regularly assess egradation and verify operation within safety I analysis assumptions. SR 3.4.7.3 l This surveillance r es verification that the required number of pumps are OPERABLE ensur s th additional pumps can be placed in operation, if needed, to main in deca heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is rformed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to e required pumg The Frequency or seven days is acynted e r. , industry petice and has beegshow to. be acceptable by expenenre.
/ \
- /
, , - yym ,
REFERENCES 1 52 Fly 3788, " Interim Policy,Sthtement on Technical Specification Impfovements for Nuclear Power ctors,' USNRC,2/6/87.
/ ! /
/ 2. ,Meneric Letter 88-17,j' Loss of DecaysHeat Removal,' USNRC,j
/ 10/17/88.
CESSAR-DC, Section / 19.8, ' Shutdown R 3 g .~ _ _ "N._ 1 f I N
-f ' i ,. .
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SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-35 Amendment O ' 16A.7-35 May 1,1993 -
CESSAREin bia 1 i 9 ) 4 i l ) RCS loops - MODE 5 (Loops Not Filled) B 3.4.8 4 BASES $ APPLICABLE The only safety analyses performed with initial conditions in MODE 5 with i SAFETY ANALYSES loops not filled are the inadvertent deboration and inadvertent startup of an 4 RCP events. For this analysis one SCS division was credited as operating. The flow provided by one SCS division is adequate for heat removr.1 and for 3
- boron mixing.
Failure to provide heat removal may result in challenges to a fission product i barrier. He SCS is part of the primary success path which functions or ] actuates to prevent or mitigate a design basis accident of transient that either j assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission 4 product barrier. As such, this LCO satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC N;.h Policy Statement (Ref-t) i i LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require 1: r"?""y of a minimum of two i o _ - S_CS division?fer 5::: r; c.c.4 h ,,.-#7 r "ahev- A An OPERABLE
} ,T division is one that has the capability of transferring heat from the reactor l
3 / E coolant at a controlled rate. Heat removal cannot occur via the SCS unless forced flow is used. A minimum of one runmng SCS pump meets the LCO T6J f r dd j n$g uirement uccaMetefor k one wg mdivision s,4te in operation (it, lure cru fenm -/,m 4.telibd F j fo LC o e I sliops an exceptio ITiHee testin g '; ,.,_ %e LCO Nopf 2 permits th CS pumps to stopped fo to 15 min s.
- 5 It is seldomfecessary to op both pumps owever, it y be nec to i fgg3] 3 9
stop bothfumps for a ort period whe switching other./The circums, ces for stopp' both SCS mps are to m one divis' a to the ! limited to g g9 g a shon period of t and when pjessure and mperature in cases can
- % a' mafhtained with the allowabl/ pressure OP or PT) d subcoo g i /
l j ' LCO Note 3 permits the alignment of a Containment Spray Pump if an SCS pump is not available or becomes inoperable. These pumps are designed to be interchangeable for operational flexibility. APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and ) coolant circulation by the SCS. Operation in other MODES is covered by LCOs 3.4.4 (MODES I and 2), s 3.4.5 (MODE 3),3.4.6 (MODE 4),3.4.7 (MODE 5 - Loops Filled),3.9.4 4 and 3.9.5 (MODE 6 - Refueling) and 3.10.4 (MODES 5 & 6 - Reduced RCS 1 Inventory - Heat Removal). 3 1 (continued) I k B 3.4-37 4 SYSTEM 80+ I Amendment Q 16A.7-37 June 30,1993
1 CESSAR ninr"icarie. i l f i RCS leops MODE 5 (Loope Not Filled) B 3.4.8 BASES - ACTIONS AJ , If only one required SCS division is OPERABLE, redundancy for heat l removal is lost. He Iction is to initiate activities to restore a second division to OPERABLE status and the action must be taken immediately. Even though one loop is OPERABLE and in operation, the completion time emphasizes the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal. B.1 and B.2 If both required SCS divisions are inoperable or the required division is not l in operation, the action requires immediate suspension of any operation for boron reduction and requires action p immediately start restoration of one i division to OPERABLE status. The action for restoration does not apply to the condition of divisions r20t in operation when the exemption NOTE in the LCO is in force. The immediate completion time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for decay heat removal. He $ction to restore must be continued until one division is restored. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 g p#f sh REQUIREMENTS g f This surveiHance requires verification of the required div sion in operation every 12 hours to ensure forced flow is providing heat re val. Verification fref* "j ]f SCS operation is performed by flow rate and temperature, monitoring. The l 12-hour Stervel-has been shown Iy ope / sting practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analyses e - Jtssumptions. [m. < , - , ~, / , w .- , . ; n m -- -- ,
'J- I d / O m L / ~~' Q .Q, !
,( ,L SR 3.4.8.2 nya
$,vhicus / g M ed 1
i f ('# t g"j"# lgg Verification that the required number of emps are, OPE
"" d edd!!!=! mmpsi can be placed in operation, if'needed, to maintain decay o< " heat removal and reactor coolant circulationt' Verification is performed by
/ :
avt [g ,ayad6k dd:lis(I ud ' verifyin8 proxr breaker ab.gnment andfwer avad. ble a pumps. Rektequency of seven days is myted !~'-t y p=t!:: and has to the required .
, & ##I ~ -
been shown to be acceptable eratin f ,t w by op/g experience. y
~x-c,fots, ed nr \ e s ea tcva n s v~ M of C(CN/ odwMdvase cMyoh OVOIAO ff __A _s"% _
.n"- ~ . ~ . _
(continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-38 Amendment O 16A.7-38 May 1,1993
l l INSERT M: (f#g-WAO'31) l Note 1 permits the SCS pumps to be de-energized for s 15 minutes when switching from one division to another. The circumstances for stopping both SCS pumps are to be limited to situations when the outage time is short [and the core outlet temperature is maintained > 10 F below saturation temperature]. The Note prohibits boron dilution or draining operations when SCS forced flow is stopped. l Note 2 allows one SCS divir. ion to be inoperable for a period of 2 hours provided that the I other train is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable division during the only time when these tests are safe and possible. 1 An OPERABLE SCS division is composed of an OPERABLE SCS pump capable of 1 providing forced flow to an OPERABLE SCS heat exchanger, along with the appropriate flow I and temperature instrumentation for control, protection, and indication. SCS pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. l l
\
l l
CESSARinnnem. e RCS Loops - MODE 5 (Loops Not Filled) B 3.4.8 BASES .-
~
REFERENCES [ 1. 52fR 3788, ' Interim Pplicj Statement on T provements for N lear Power Reacto
' cal Specif 4 tion USNRC,2/6 7. .,,
f 2. Generic Letter -17 " Loss of D Heat Removal USNRC, l 10/17/88. ! i
- 3. .CESSAR C, Section 19.8, *Sh down Risk Asse ment *.
l
,-- - n. !
l I i l l 1 l < l l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4 39 Amendment O 16A.7-39 May 1,1993
CESSARin h . e f 16 A.7.9 R 3.4.9 PRESSURIZER , Pressurizer B 3.4.9 e B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B ?.4.9 Pressurizer BASES u BACKGROUND He maximum water level limit has been established to ensure that a liquid-to-vapor interface exists to permit Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure control, using the sprays and heaters, during normal operation and proper
+
pressure response for anticipated design basis transients. He water level limit serves two purposes: , ( a, Pressure control during normal operation maintains subcooled reactor coolant 3 g( , in the loops and thus, in the preferred state for heat transport and
- b. By restricting the level to a maximum, expected transient reactor coolant volume increases (pressurizer insurge) will not cause excessive level changes which could result in degraded ability for pressure control. ?
The maximum level limit permits pressure control equipment to function as designed. The limit preserves the steam space during normal operation, thus, , 1 both sprays and heaters can operate to maintain the design operating pressure. The level limit also prevents filling the pressurizer (water solid) for anticipated design basis transients, thus assuring that pressure relief devices p#1'# lp O safety valves) can control pressure by steam relief rather than water i relief. If the level limits were exceeded prior to a transient that creates a large pressurizer insurge volume leading to water relief, the maximum RCS pressure might exceed the Jesign safety limit of 2750 psia or damage may occur to the pressurizerpde safety valves. The requirement to have two groups of pressurizer heatersAsures that RCS pressure can be mantained. The pressurizer heaters maintain RCS pressure to maintain the reactor coolant subcooled. Inability to control RCS pressure during natural circulation flow could result in a loss of single phase flow and a decreased capability to remove core decay heat. (continued) - SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-40 Amendment I 16A 7-40 December 21,1990.
1 i INSERT N: (fayL 14'Al-40) I i l The pressurizer provides a point in the RCS where liquid and vapor are maintained in ! I equilibrium under saturated conditions for pressure control purposes to prevent bulk boiling in the remainder of the RCS. Key functions include maintaining required primary system pressure during steady state operation and limiting the pressure changes caused by reactor coolant thermal expansion and contraction during normal load trainsients. ! The pressure control components assressed by this LCO include the pressurizer water level, the required heaters and their backup heater controls, and emergency power supplies. Pressurizer safety valves are addressed by LCO 3.4.10, " Pressurizer Safety Valves." l l l l 1 i I l i l . _ _ _ . _ , _ , _ -.. - . . , _ . , , . . . _
E i CESSARnnL m,. b r i I Pressurizer i B 3.4.9 BASES ; APPLICABLE In MODES 1,2, and 3, the LCO requirement for a steam bubble is reflected j 4 SAFETY ANALYSES implicitly in the accident analyses. No safety analyses are performed in lower MODES with the exception of the inadvertent deboration and l inadvertent startup of an RCP events. All analyses performed from a critical - reactor condition assume the existence of a steam bubble and saturated conditions in the pressurizer. In making this assumption, the analyses neglect j the small fraction of non-condensible gases normally present. He steam i l bubble limits the volume of non-condensible gases. i 1 Safety analyses presented in the CESSAR-DC do not take crwiit for pressurizer heater operation, however, an implicit initial condition assumption 1 of the safety analyses is that the pressurizer is operating in the range of[2175 , to 2325 psia). The maximum level limit is of prime interest for the Feedwater line break event with loss of offsite power (FLBLOP). Conservative safety analyses assumptions for this event indicate that it produces the largest increase in l pressurizer level. Thus, this event has been selected to establish the pressurizer water levellimit. Assuming proper response action by emergency systems, the level limit prevents water relief through the pressurizer safety l valves. Since prevention of water relief is a goal for abnormal transient operation rather than a safety limit, the value for pressurizer level is nominal and is not adjusted for instrument error. l The requirement for emergency power supplies is based on NUREG-0737 (Ref.J).I De intent is to allow maintaining the reactor coolant in a subcooled condition with natural circulation at hot, high pressure conditions for an undefined, but extended, time period after a loss of offsite power. While loss of offsite power is an initial condition or coincident event assumed in many accident analyses, maintaining hot, h@ pressure conditions over an extended time period is not evaluated as part of CESSAR DC accident analyses. l The maximum pressurizer water level limit satisfies the requirements of
-Sanvu- Criterion 2 of the NRC latene Policy Statement 4%f:-t) because it prevents exceeding the initial reactor coolant mass which is an input assumption of the safety analysis. The maximum water level also permits the pressurizer code safety valves to relieve steam for anticipated pressure increase transients, preserving their function for mitigation. Thus, S9'"
Criterion 3 is also indirectly applicable. (continued) s SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-41 Amendment Q 16A.7-41 June 30,1993
CESSARnn% m f Pressurizer
,4 {AO Jg b 0; () Vrp h CA B 3.4.9 BASES -
y j APPLICABLE Although the beaters are not specifically used in accident analysis, the need SAFETY ANALYSES to maintain subcooling in the long term during loss of offsite power, as indicated b the NRC in NUREG-0737__(Ref.I,2f, is the reason for proveding (continued) .- inchdexanLGG; The eaters o not 't any ofpeliction Cptena 5G'd4RC g nten Policy SifItement (R .1). However, in Reference 3, e NRC ma' ined that/b e pressuri r met Selec} ion Criterio94 of the N Interi O(includingpressurize heaters Py icy Statement (Ref.1) pad that the retained in Technical Specificatiorts%
/,
LCO[ TL ymyvx viem LCG 6 ;e wsa gcamriar OPERADILITY im y.wurc
" e%r-ne==! pe ra. ar .buu mad for amicipated design oasis mue. .s
_5 a 1 - p-viemly hrM ne intent of the LCO is to ensure that a steam bubble
~
tijU exists in the pressurizer to minimize the consequences of potential 37 " overpressure transients. " lie presence of a steam bubble is consistent with 3 . analytical assumptions, g 3{ O q
- f ^ It> Gddu
- a Wow ne minimum beater capacity required is sufficient to maintain the RCS near I py gL p@_ normal operating pressure when accounfi ng for heat losses through the y , 2l pressurizer insulation. By maintaining /the pressure near the operating
[, _ g .i _ conditions, a wide (margingsubcoolingcan be obtained in the loops. He f y,C , t exact design value of (200 kW) is derived from the use of [4] beaters rated at [50 kW) each. Det eed moun to maintain pressure is dependent on
'g_i -
MJ 3 thedosses. Tests indicate at pressurized beat losses do not usually impose dy;[ { a nMr [200 kW]Ldatbi6t} hrAt i %2. : , - The need for RCS pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can ! ; "3.Q ! - ;; y g cause the greatest effect on reactor coolant system temperature resulting in j-i - L c- If the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus. ' i ~ k jpplicability has been designated for MODES 1,2, and 3.4i In MODES 1,2
-W O< : tt9 - -\
j and 3, the need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters and t eir hMm 9I 7_ T, O ( I emergency power supplies is most pertinent. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES gives the greatest demand for pC5hD / i maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODES 4,5, or 6, it is not necessary to control s [ C pressure (by beaters) to ensure loop subcooling for beat transfer when the decay beat removal system is inservice and therefore the LCO is not applicable. gggg 4 )
'Y W VWL\f l(JSC W Q -
(continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-42 Amendment I l 16A.7-42 December 21,1990
INSERT 0: (facp (GA l' 4%) The purpose is to prevent solid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump stanup. The LCO does not apply to MODE 5 (Loops Filled) because LCO 3.4.12. " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," applies. The LCO does not apply to MODES 5 and 6 with partial loop operation. l l i 1 I l I i
., .. i
CESSAR ninnemu : i 1 a e Pressurizer i B 3.4.9 l BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 e 7Ll1 With pressurizer water level outside the ust be limit, taken action to restore / the plant to operation within the bounds of the safet analysf This is done , by placing the plant in MODE 3 with the reactor t 'p breakers open within six hours, and placing the plant in MODE 4 withing " 's hours. This takes the plant out of the applicable MODES and restores the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analysy35
>1 A av-Occitsl9 W%MM W$
Six hours is a r nable time based on operating experience to reach MODE 3 from full powe g without challenging plant systems A r;: _:x;. Further i pressure and temperature reduction to MODE 4 with RCS temperature
< [350*F] places the plant into a MODE where the LCO is not applicable. l 1 I
He 12-hour time to reach the non-applicable MODE is reasonable based on operating experience [r M ewlu.h'ew, El
' M WAwrecicy w pa;c ,p r$ d%trizwpp'.f :;.1: heatersthieqxade If the-emergea;y - . .1.,g =: c.a .y.t!;
2: x: _ . rgrati is required hd,diw of Q200 k'."] c; 0.; y._9 .ir;; hu:n:in 72 hours. The hab4ert a72 hours is E';Tku/ demand ' caused by loss of offsite power !!' m' ~~ in this period. Pressure control may be maintained during tds time using normal station-powered heaters. (w(g k %g;gl C.1 and C.2 If the power cupplies and/or ' heaterss cannot restored, powededuction ; to MOD and then to M E 4 places the ant in a cond' on where th l LCO is ot applicable. e time periods a reasonable b on opera ' g expe 'ence; MODE 3 be achieved six hours an . (ODE 4 c be ac eved in 12 hout rom full power /thout challeng' g plant sys ms, i l pep b wr}t LJ'OT > (continued) f SYSTEM 80+ B 3.443 Amendment Q 16A.7-43 June 30,1993
CESSARnah m
% s brEtlferc< 4 C uves N du k C b N d 8If if 4
- b8j b kn aw he waker lese f is tahdmL klt%r % powkaj u per
[(f;,,Qfop,odda,ct ai0 e o r<-(xtee @v a dum bu @/ ' i
)
\ i s
Pressurizer
\g B 3.4.9
\ '
BASES
\
SR 3.4.9.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '\ - 7L -u!: :: rn;; . = p r:= -iur .i. . . .. - - . ... _ . . _ . . . .
- "-" "a s; j.cricS: i=::. He surveillance is performed by l observing indicated level. The 12-hour inte: val has been shown by operating l practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analysis assumptions. /rham s 4<< 4/fo a a la ble- py ;
tely dikchew % AnorrWd level (L40Abbt . SR 3.4.9.2 l nebrveillance is satisfied when the power supplies are demonstrated to be capable of producing the minimum power and the associated pressurizer heaters are verified to be at their design rating. (This may be done by testing the power supply output and by perfor g an electrical check on heater element continuity and resistance.), The requen$y of 92 day is-- ' cn
- . s . . . . .. - - - - ' - - u - cussk<eL,:knuct & 4he k5 'EcAevad' TGdli'GTWEW t.n3 quHmj Opte<<e b k aneg%k.
SR 3.4.9.3 , 7 This surveillance demonstrates that the heaters can be manually transferred to and energized by emergency power supplies. The kequency of [18] months is based on a typical fuel cycle and industry accepted practice. His
,is consistent with similar verifications of emergency power. J l -f' x
[n /1.52 FR 3788, NRC Interim Policy Statement on TechnicaySpecific-REFERENCES u e r Power geactors, Februyy 6, l98,7-
/ _
,f
/ NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
November,1980. i
- . ., s - _ _ Cg LetterTr'om T. E. Murley (USNRC) to J. K. Gasper (C-E Owners'
[3. Group) transmitting *NRC Staff Review of Nuclear Steam Supply s} System Vendor Owners Group's Application of the. Commission'y ( Interim Policy' Statement Criteria to Standard Technical w-
] Specifications dated May 9,1988, p ,
w __._._
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$ s QL.15vcbogferade. Ik hfales; ad ferraM/
IE l L P"* "' 'l f'** ' '" Pf ' " ' - , i l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-44 Amendment O 16A.7-44 May 1,1993
INSERT P: (fdef l4A .1 - 43) C.1 and Cl l If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable and cannot be restored within the j allowed Completion Time of Required Action B.1, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within [12] hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly j manner and without challenging safety systems. Similarly, the Completion Time of [12] i hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 4 from full power in an l orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. 1 1
\
l l l l l l l l l i I I
i l CESSAREnnnc- ' l f 'i 16A.7.10 B 3.4.10 PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES Prenurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.10 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves BASES BACKGROUND ne purpose of the four spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide Reactor Coolant System (RCS) overpressure protection. Operating j conjunctipn with the r tor protection system, four valves are used tussure ! that the $afety fimi 2750 psia is not exceeded for analyzed transients during operation in ODES I and 2. Four safety valves are used for MODE 3 and portions of MODE 4. For the remainder of MODE 4 and for MODE Q 5, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and LCO l 3.4.11. Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (LTOP) System. l , For these conditions, ASME requirements are satisfied with one safety valve. l Sel{ ac4ualed i 2 Re3 pressurizer safety valves are designed in accordance with the l ( 7 requirements set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section l III. (Ref.1). 7he required lift pressure is 2500 psia i 1%. He safety ; valves discharge steam from the pressurizer to the Incontainment Refueling l Water Storage T ed in the containment. l APPLICABLE All accident analyses in CESSAR-DC which require safety valve actuation SAFETY ANALYSES assume operation of all pressurizer safety valves to limit increasing reactor coolant pressure. The overpressure protection analysis is also based on operation of all safety valves and assumes that the valves open at the high range of the setting (2500 psia system design pressure plus 1%). These valves must accommodate pressurizer insurges which could occur during various heatup events such as rod withdrawal, ejected rod, loss of main feedwater, loss ofload or main feedwater line break accident, ne loss of load event with delayed reactor trip este,.Jaes the minimum safety valve capacity. The single failure of a safety valve to open is neither assumed in ; the accident analysis nor required to be addressed by the ASME code. Compliance with this specification is required to assure that the accident analysis and design basis calculations remain valid. The pressurizer safety valves are components that are part of the primary success path and which function or actuate to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either - (
\- (continued) j i
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-45 Amendment O 16A.7-45 May 1,1993 -
CESSAR !!aincarisa f i Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.10 BASES APPLICABLE assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission SAFETY ANALYSES product barrier. As such, the pressurizer safety valves satisfy the require-ments of.SaleetrotrCriterion 3 of the NRC)stettfiiPolicy Statement,,(Badety" (continued) LCO Thekour) pressurizer safety valves are set to open at the RCS design pressure (2500 psia) and within the ASME specified tolerance to avoid exceeding the maximum RCS design pressure Safety Limit, to maintain accident analysis assumptions, and to comply with ASME Code requirements. The upper and lower pressure tolerance limits are based on the i i % tolerance requirements (Ref.1) for lifting pressures above 1000 psig. He limit protected by this ' specification is the reactor coolant pressure boundary Safety Limit of 110% of design pressure. Inoperability of one or more valves could result in exceeding the Safety Limit were a transient to occur. The consequences of exceeding the ASME pressure limit could include damage to one or more RCS components, increased leakage, or additional stress analysis being required prior to resumption of reactor operation. , e) ne note suspending LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 permits testing and g examination of the safety valves at high pressure and temperature near their m normal operating range but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold Y setting. He cold setting gives good assurance that the valves are as close as possible to the operating setting. The note permits a pragmatie approach to ensure that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one }- valve will be removed from service at a time for testing. The 72-hour g : exemption is based on 18-hours outage time for each of the four valves. The l 18-hour period is derived from operating experience that hot testing ca
9 performed in this time frame. 8 c
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and portions of MODE' 4 above the LTOP temperature, OPERABILITY of[ou3 valves is required because the combined j capacity is required design value during to keep certain accidents. reactor MODE 3 and portions coolant of MODE 4 are pressure bel conservatively included although the listed accidents may not require all 3 safet valves for protectiog. The LCO is not applicable in MODE 4 holow p f[25 F[for cooldown and]29Q'Fffor heatup (the heat up rate is limited to j [40*F/hr or less]) and MODE 5 because LTOP is provided. Overpressure protection is not required in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head detensioned. MfM % d-(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-46 , i Amendment O 16A.7-46 May 1,1993
INSERT Q: (Patp (f/ A 1 - lt$) The upper and lower pressure limits are based on the -
- 1%-tolerance requirement (Ref.1) for lifting pressures j above 1000 psig. The lift setting is for the ambient i conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.
The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that - ( j the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of desion pressure. The consequences of. exceeding the ASME pressure limit l i (Ref.1) could include damage to RCS components, increased leakage, or a requirement to perform additional stress analyses prior to resumption of reactor operation. l 1 1 I l I
INSERT R: d'[ NA 'l-The Note allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits. This permits testing and examination of the safety valves at high pressure and temperatum near their normal operating range, but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting. The cold setting gives assurance that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one valve at a time will be removed from service for testing. The [72] hour exception is based on 18 hour outage time for each of the four valves. The 18 hour period is derived from operating experience that hot testing can be performed within this timeframe. f
CESSAR n!Fincum Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.10 BASES ACTIONS &L sj\h With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place 3 in 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity l of the RCS pressure boundary. . B.l . B.2. and B.3 cr;[ ((wolor reoro fim687'V
< ggc9 g<c wwpe ble- ] l If the Required Action cannot be met within the required Cppletion Time','
the plant must be placed inja MODE in which the requipment does not apply. This is done byalacia tize plant in at least MODE 33in six hours and 4y in MODE 4,below [259 F 2Jhours, or by placing the plant in shutdown cooling with the LTOP re f valves in service in[12 ours. The six hours \. allowed to reach MODE 3 is a reasonable o time based )n ope f to reach MODE 3 from full power without challenging plant systems. q-Similarly, theh2] hours allowed is a reasonable time based on operating 4 experience to reach MODE 4 without challenging plant systems.gelow [253 F}Yoverpressure protection is provided by LTOP. The change from l MODES 1,2, or 3 to MODE 4 reduces the RCS energy (core power and pressure), lowers the potential for large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by[four} pressurizer safety valves. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Surveillance Requirements are specified in the Inservice Testing Program. Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref.1) provides the activities and the Frequency necessary to satisfy the Surveillance Requirements. No additional requirements are specified. A REFERENCES 1. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111, ' Nuclear Vessels,* Section XI
- Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components *.
'2. 75bR'37 Policy Technical' p/ Specification sprovements for, Nuclear Power. Reactors, Feb
__ / -
/ n ,
7 h pec M ur 9thh val # ft.j pod b 1[h}% (g CFCWW[,I htwed/, tw vATvd a v e r esd 40 i { ] *p gg g,, -th
% eatw e t;at 6 % dvig.
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-47 Amendrnent O 16A.7-47 May 1,1993
CESSARnn%mo f f 16A.7.11 B 3.4.11 LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) SYSTEM LTOP System B 3.4.11 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 4 chrhf94 f<0ff \ B 3.4.11 Low Temnerature Overvresmre Protection (LTOP) System g
/
[ sY N oi } BASES 9 ( ~? M erpressure Protection (LTOP)4
\ 13BACKOROUND 'Ibe purpose of the Low Temperature
[ ]}T [ " j ]4 4M\ System LCO is to limit reactor coolant pres re at low temperatures to levels 3 which will not compromise Reactor Coo ant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) i l
\ :.G.,N 3e( integrity (Ref.1). The reactor vessey is the limiting component for$
demonstrating that protection is t3rovided.hhe reactor vessel material is less 6
/
- 5 $ 5 $ 31 $ '}
l $D 4$3 [Q 5 tough at temperatures than at normal operating temperatu reactor vessel neutron FMA accumulates, the vessel materia As mes
]
i' ~_13 3 less resistant to(sEIt low temperatures (Ref. 2). 4;rc:.= 2x crefore b
/ k'}
gl $ J}dM6' -g5 maintained 3low andinereased only as temperature {IncreAM l > ge, ps,.q A Wk+qukues
?S iif W & 3 Overpressure protection given by the LCO is provided by placing the SCS
(' 4 p? , 3f 3. h ;
.j cgn relief valves in service or depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
*' 4 3 A.f. *. 5 ~ through an open vent. He open RCS vent or the SCS relief valves are the
( } 9 M overpressure protection devices which provide backup to the operator in terminating increasing pressure events.
,g me +d m3 b s Me 1 t/T lwtif APPLICABLE $de'g yses hat- E n gric. .rj in rap:=: e F"C .cy.amaa demonstrate rofected against =.,..c.;
.is&
SAFETY ANALYSES at the during reactor shutdown. vesselp:Lis..adequgJy Transients .. capable of overpressurizing the l ' Reactor Coolant System have been identified and evaluated. Postulated transients include inadvertant safety injection actuation; energizing the pressurizer beaters; failing the makeup control valve open; temporary loss of decay heat removal; reactor coolant thermal expansion caused by reactor coolant pump (RCP) start causing heat transfer from hot steam generators; and, addition of nitrogen to the pressurizer. i (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-48 Amendment O 16A.7-48 May I,1993 1
CESSAR n'ainc== r
+
LTOP System B 3.4.11 ' BASES-APPLICABLE The LTOP system was designed to protect the RCS from overpressurization ! SAFETY ANALYSES resulting from any of the following conditions: ; (continued)
- 1. The starting of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature .
of the steam generator s; [100*F] above the RCS cold leg temperature.
- 2. The simultaneous starting of all four SI pumps and its injection into the RCS.
During the two design bases events, no operator action is assumed to take place until ten minutes have passed. SUd% Sab
!= ReH ', 'hc NRC ;;xd&d i;.; i; LTOP f=:== =yieI .da;L Criterion 2 of the NRC latene Policy Statement (Rd. 4) _J J..; e LCG
" * + 2 b . ., . . . v . . . . . . . ,
t , i LCO[ The LCO requires that the SCS Relief Valves be OPERABLE with a setpoint l ) , at the overpressure limit, with the block valve open to ensure a clear flow j l path, or the RCS be depressurized via an open vent. l l l i I l APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 with the temperature of any RCS cold l l leg < [ ], in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on. l The LCO is not applicable for operating conditions above the [ ] temperature because the pressurizer safety valves are able to provide l overpressure protection. With the vessel head off, there is no need for overpressure protection. The applicability is modified by a note which states that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. This Note is necessary to allow entry into I the applicable MODE 3 without meeting the requirements of the LCO. It would not be prudent to place the plant in a condition to meet this LCO until l the plant was cooled down and RCS pressure was reduced. I (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-49 Amendment O 16A.7-49 May 1,1933
CESSARna hin,. f LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS M With one SCS relief' valve inoperable, overpressure relieving capability is reduced and restoration of the SCS relief valve in seven days is required. He other SCS Relief Valve remains OPERABLE or the RCS must be depressurized through an open vent. Either of these paths provide adequate overpressure protection. However, redundancy has been lost. The seven-day completion time in MODE 4, and 24 hour completion time in MODES 5 and 6 (per NRC GL 904), reflects the need to restore redundancy and also takes into consideration theJother overpressure protection paths available in this condition. ( u l If the Required Actions cannot be met within the associated completion times, the plant must be placed in a condition where an overpressure event cannot occur. His is done by depressurizing the RCS through the open alternate #. vent. The Completion Time 'of eight hours is reasonable based on the amount of time required to place the plant in this condition and the probability of an accident requiring the LTOP System during this relatively short period of time. , L in the unlikely event that both SCS relief valves are inoperable action must l be taken to establish an alternate path. The completion time of "immediately" reflects the need to restore vent path capability since inadvertent or uncontrolled operation of an Si or charging pumps could cause overpressurization. i i i (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-50 Amendment O 16A.7-50 . May 1,1933 J
CESSAR naincim-l r 1 LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.1 REQUIREMENTS ne RCS vent must be verified open for relief protection. For vent valves that are not locked open, the required Frequency is every 12 hours. For vent valves that are locked open, the required frequency is eve.y 31 days. Dese frequencies have been shown by operating practices to be sufficient to ! regularly assess degradation and verify operation within the safetv analysis , assumptions. This surveillance is modified by a Note which requires performance of this SR only when complying with Required Action C.I. His vent path is only used when in Required Action C.1, and therefore, need be performed only when in Required Action C.I. SR 3.4.11.2 ] Verification that the block valve is open ensures an open flow path to each . required SCS Relief Valve. Surveillance is required at 12-hour intervals. I. he 12-hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and wrify operation within safety analysis assumptions. l l SR 3.4.11.3 l Surveillance Requirement 3.4.11.3 is the performance of a SETPOINT l CALIBRATION every 18 months. The SETPOINT CALIBR' ION for the LTOP setpoint ensures that the SCS Relief Valves will be wtuated at the appropriate RCS pressure by verifying the accuracy of the valve lift pressure. The calibration can only be performed during a shutdown. He Frequency of 18 months is based on a typial refueling cycle and industry-secepted practice. ( ( SYSTEM 80+ E 3.4-51 Amendment O 16A.7-51 May 1,1933
i CESSAR E! air"lCAMN l l l l LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G,
- Fracture Toughness Requirements."
- 2. Generic I2tter 88-11, 'NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant Operation.*
- 3. Letfet~n T. E. Murley (USNRC) to J. K. Gasper'lC-E Owners'
; Group) transmitting "NRC' Staff Review of Nuclear Steam Supply
/ System Vendor Owners Group's Application of the Commispon's Interim Policy Statement Criteria ffi Standard T hnical
[ i / /S pecifications," dared May 9,1988.
- 4. / 52 FR 3788,/NRC Interim P licy Statement Technical Specification ' Improvements for Nuc, Po 'er Reactors, Febmary 6,1987. /
%- ~ _
3 6 tMA+- bc SecVen D s~ ,
- 4. Gaa.m LeWv c)O-CG .
SYSTEM 80+ B > c 52 n Amendment I 16A.7-52 December 21,1990
CESSARnah m ! f i i 16A.7.12 B 3.4.12 RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE i l RCS Operational Leakage B 3.4.12 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.12 RCS Ot'erational LEAKAGE > BASES BACKGROUND ILimits on leakage ~ f
.f'W~ h
' the.' Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB))re required to limit stem operation in the presence of excessive leakag' Leakage should limited to amounts which do not compromise safety.
nese leakage limits ensure appropriale action can be taken bcfore the , integrity of'the RCPB is impaired. ni CO specifies the types d amounts of leakage whi6h are acceptable L d 'og continued plant ope,ca ion. This LCO is requir,ed'io limit degradation CL f the RCPB. The safofy significance of leaks fpr m the RCPB can vary . d A widely depending on j tse source of the leak as wdll as the leakage rate and duration. Herefoje, the detection and monitorin,g of reactor coolant leakag f M into the containment area is necessary. SepIrating the ident.fied sourcesof 4 leakage .9erp/ unidentified sources is nEcessary to provide promp(and ! i
'g quantitative'information to the operalds to permit them to takejn{ mediate ,
v correctiy[ action should a leak occur that is detrimental to the, safety of th i d publiv l
/
5y
/
4 A limited amount of leakage is expected from auxiliary systems within the ' ) containment. If leakage occurs from these paths, it should be detected, e located, and isolated from the containment atmosphere if possible, so as n
\ 'k to mask any potentially serious RCPB leak / His LCO protects the RCP
\
against continuing degradation and helps assure that serious leaks 6r less o Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) will not develop. The consequences of violating is LCO include the possibility of further degradation of the RCPB whi v w__ - APPLICABLE Primaty-SecondyaLEAKAGE is a factor in the dose releases tesulting from SAFETY ANALYSES accidents or t sients involving secondary steam releasejd'the atmosphere such as a m line break. The permits contaminatron of the seconda i fluid ^ he stam generatory e assumption of ogI(l) gpm Prima -to-Se_cefidary LEAKAGE waiused .s an initial condition for all no OCA e ts in Chapter 15 of Reference 1. /
~
v M[NdeE- vJ b Itd$ts-T T ( (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-53 Amendment I 16A.7-53 December 21,1990
1
- CESSAR nshis,. l l
r i RCS Operational Leakege
* % 'n N ES-T T i APPLICABLE vu/ Primary-to-Secondary LEA s- --~
E is a process ' variable that is an initi SAFETY ANALYSES ' condition a design basis ident or transien alyses that either assumes the fail e of, or presents challenge to, integrity of a fy'sion product (continued) b . As such, it sa ' fies the require ts of Criterion 2 of the NRC in rim Policy State t (Ref. 2). C
/
LCO[ a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE is allowed because it would be indicative of material deterioration. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE : is defined as leakage through a non-isolable fault in an RCS ; component body, pipe, or vessel wall (excluding RCP shaft seals, packing, and steam generator tube leakage). Leakage of this type , is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, , resulting in higher leakage. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
- b. Unidentified LE AK AGE .
H e ppWIM On m)of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable mint um detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump / holdup volume tank monitoring equipment can l detect within a reasonable time period. Unidentified LEAKAGE is . defined as reactor coolant leakage which is not identified. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the leakage is from the pressure boundary. LEAgA6C j
- c. Identified LEAK AGE Identified LEAKAGE is defined as leakage into closed systems ;
connected to the RCS that is captured and recovered. Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because leakage is from known sources which do not interfere with detection of l unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the l g makeup system. l i i (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-54 Amendment O 16A.7-54 May 1,1993
( . .
- I 1
INSERT S: li defvA~l-6h i i BACKGROUND Components that contain or transport the coolant to or from the reactor core make up the RCS. Component' joints are made 1 by welding, bolting, rolling, or pressure loading, and j ' valves isolate connecting systems from the RCS. ! l During plant life..the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant LEAKAGE, through 1 either nonnal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. The purpose of the RCS Operational LEAXAGE LCO is to limit i system operation in the presence of LEAKAGE from these 1
' sources to amounts that do not compromise safety. This LCO ;
specifies the types and amounts of LEAKAGE. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30 (Ref.1), requires means for
- detecting and, to the extt% practical, identifying the source of reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 1
(Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage
- detection systems.
The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE varies widely ) depending on its source, rate, and duration. Therefore, detecting and monitoring reactor coolant LEAKAGE into the containment area is necessary. Quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE is i i necessary to provide quantitative infomation to the i operators, allowing them to take corrective action should a l ) leak occur detrimental to the safety of the facility and the public. 1 i ~ A limited amount of leakage inside containment is expected i i from auxiliary systems that cannot be made 100% leaktight. l 1 Leakage from these systems should be deter'.ad, located, and I' isolated from the containment atmosphere, !f possible, to
- not interfere with RCS LEAKAGE detection. l
! This LCO deals with protection of the reactor coolant ; pressure boundary (RCPB) from degradation and the core from i inadequate cooling, in addition to preventing the accident < analysis radiation release assumptions from being exceeded. . ~
The consecuences of violating this LCO include the i possibility of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). i
.mo
1 INSERT T: (fd4g (% .1 - 94) . l l APPLICABLE Except for primary to secondary LEAKAGE, the safety analyses l SAFETY ANALYSES do not address operational LEAKAGE. However, other l operational LEAKAGE is related to the safety analyses for l LOCA; the amount of leakage can affect the probability of ] such an event. The safety analysis for an event resulting j in steam discharge to the atmosphere assumes a 1 gpa primary ' to secondary LEAKAGE as the initial condition. Primary to secondary LEAKAGE is a factor in the dose releases outside containment resulting from a steam line break (SLB) accident. To a lesser extent, other accidents or transients involve secondary steam release to the ; atmosphere, such as a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). i The leakage contaminates the secondary fluid. The FSAR (Ref. 3) analysis for SGTR assumes the contaminated l secondary fluid is only briefly released via safety valves and the majority is steamed to the condenser. The 1 gpa primary to secondary LEAKAGE is relatively inconsequential. . l The SLB is more limiting for site radiation releases. The i safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes 1 gpm primary to secondary LEAKAGE in one generator as an initial i condition. The dose consequences resulting from the SLB accident are well within the limits defined in 10 CFR 50 or the staff approved licensing basis (i.e., a small fraction of these limits). j RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. , l a- w- ---s1 s + w-m --e e
I CESSARanLmu
, i RCS Operational Leakage B 3.4.12 BASES LCOs identified LEAKAGE includes leakage to the containment from (continued) sources that are specifically known and located, but does not include
#g cr : ' '", or controlled RCP seal leakoff (which is a normal function and'is not considered leakage). Violation of this EOP LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or , ;
system. .
^
Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE
.twqh AN b i
- d. g cd Y / SL5 Total Primary-to-Secondary LEAEAGE of one (11gpm to all generators produces acceptable o ite doses in th ' accident ana1ysis.
Violation of this LCO could e ose Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE 8-Mpffsite be included in the to allowable limit for Identified LEAKAGE. . dda
- e. Primary ndary LEAKAGE ' '
/ Throuch One Steam Generator \ /t Th(720hallons per day (gpd) limit on one steam generator is based on allocating the total one (1) gpm allowed Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE equally between the two steam generators.
\
PPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB leakage is greatest when the RCS is pressurized. In MODES 5 and 6. LEAKAGE limits are not provided because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower resulting in lower stresses and a reduced potential for leakege LEfr f. E , Other related LCOs include LCO 3.4.13, RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage, which specifies leakage limits for certain valves that isolate the high pressure RCS from other low pressure systems and Surveillance 3.4.13.1 measures leakage through each PIV individually. Since there are two PIVs in series in each PIV line, leakage measured through one PIV may not result in any RCS LEAKAGE if the other is leak tight. If both series valves leak resulting in a loss of mass from the RCS, the loss is to be included in the (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-55 Amendment I 16A.7-55 December 21,1990
CESSAR!aL .
/
\ <
RCS Operational leakage e B 3.4.12
< ',,ldOVe M [CO C.
BASES - s y APPLICABILITY g allowable Identified LEAKAGE. LCO 3.4.14, RCS leakage Detection Instrumentation, specifies the requirements for the monitoring equipment used (continued) to detect leakage into the containment. ~ b.d ACTIONS l'ynu5h With Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, or Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits, the leakage sk be , M @%in Q s Mucedpithin four hours. ' Ibis completion time allows four hours to verify leakage rates and either identify Unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce leakage If/ V-Atf6- _ . a duin; u.fix. to within limits, before thega a ym= This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB. L yeaefor Mvtl U Ckul lCW>v. c B.1 and B.2 proh If any Pressure Bodadary LEAKAGE exists or ifIdentified, Unidentified, or ; Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE cannot be reduced to within limits within four hours, thedrirmust be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce (pg p - the seventy of the Wbkage.and its potential consequences. The reactor must be placed in MODE 3 within six hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. This g action reduces the Bl,ege an,d also reduces the factors which tend to degrade the pressure boundary. The 9ompletion}ime of six hours is reasonable based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power w;Sout challenging plant systems. Similarly, the completion time of 36 hourc to reach MODE 5 is reasonable based on operating experience to reach the required MODE witbout challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower and further deterioration is ess likely. tAud SURVEILLANCE SR 3 A 12.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that RCS LEAKAGE is within the LCO limitsesures that the integnty of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure Boundary leakage would at first appear as Unidentified Leakage and can only be positively identified by inspection. Unidentified LEAKAGE and Identified Leakage are demonstrated to be within limits by performance of a RCS water inventory balance. Primary-to-Secondary LEAKAGE is also measured by performance of an (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4 56 Amendment I 16A.7-56 14 : ember 21,1990
i CESSARnnemu } } ' . 1 i i l RCS Operational i abge
- B 3,4.12 iM i
n d"'hv NrtvM ; i 4> BASES / y ! rdURVEILLANCE RCS water inventory balance in conj tion with effluent ponitoring within the secondary Feedwater and Steam Systems. The RCS water inventory i eb [(continued) REQUIREMENTS 5 * ~ balance must be performed with the unit at steady sta and near operating M Z:;R
; 1 pressure. Therefore
-3A4m:= gild..Tu, miv5 )"-a -a'as-
"; . RG MODES m6. , ?E'- ~ ', e5 =q:.:
[ 4 'T lj An early waming of Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE or Unidentified . l l ' ~j i g.f w)jIfI LEAKAGE is provided by the automatic systems which monitor the con ' nent atmosphere radioacti 14 k'? 3 " } ^ (/
- % ixh n . sus % at a<e.*
<tl pnfran(n <c or, tk containment LCO 3 4.14 sump.
8 4 5 *"EEU*$0-1 W Q ,+3 n. . ,
- l *-
i iN 3 equency permits a reasona e mterval for trending of e ile 4 i hd f s;; to 7 L
]2.hM recognizing the relative importance of early leak detection in the prevention of accidents.3Steady state operation is required to perform a propgr inventory ,
.r p p alance; calculations during maneuvering are not useful and the surveillance i
( is not required unless steady state is established. For purposes of Wkage LE&% j g *ct d g 3
; S 1.7 '
determination by inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS i .- y' pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank level, constant makeup and letdown and reactor coolant pump seal injection and } i [ Q['"j s ccGj return flows. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE would be detected more quickly j by the leakage detection systems referenced in LCO 3.4.14. RCS Leakage 4
/
/ Tt4SWT" L) --%-
Detection Instrumentation. l
! / y REFERENCE 3g CESSAR-DC Chapter 15, " Accident Analysis." \ r A i
2. 52 FR 3788, *In rim Policy Statyment on vr.hmcal Specifipsfion } I Improvements or Nuclear Powe/ Reactors" j Rigulatog ommission, Feb1piry_6J87,b, ~. ~ / United Stal I- l0 CFl2- 50 , Appsehy A , GDc 30 l [ ,7 pgehm Ewk I.4s, M9 1973-h hjob t M v'Ikt IV #9 (CMt e)cLb br,d M $.l2. U> 1 e te L d }D be y(av m .L ck ve ~)aa dde o m i 1 l l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-57 , Amendment I 16A.7-57 December 21,1990
CESSARnnhia f 16 A.7.13 B 3.4.13 RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VAINE (PlV) LEAKAGE 4 RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.13 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.13 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PlV) Leakace J $ l WM~i~ , BASES BACKGROUND This specification applies b the four series check valves (two per line) that ! isolate the high pressure Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from low pressure portions of the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) outside the containment. l Two valves in series are required to provide redundancy of isolation, and the concept of the LCO is to provide two barriers. A high pressure rated, motor operated gate valve is upstream of the two check valves. The selection of
. valves is based on information presented in Reference I which requires M testing of two in series check salves used for isolation of high pressure to low ,
pressure systems when leakage of one valve could go undetected for a Jz substantiallength of time.
.S , --- mex- - --
'g_PlV 1 ge limitfi'y to 1::h:gc rr.% for individual ve'.. Thc :- . i 3 e of 10 gpa giv e LCO 3.4.13 ao appliet, b .only
_2 iin*'.:H Mh:;- 4 w en a loss of CS mass thn>ug he two series ves is inf~' by as d nventory b ce (Ref. SR 3.4 ,.1). Since the are two PIV m series in each PlV) e, leakage measured through one# may not result in any RCS LEAA' AGE if the other is 16k tight. PtV , Although thhspecification providespimitl'ir. :he fw. of g allowable leakage rate #'the important purpose of the specification is to prevent overpressure failure of the low pressure portions of the SCS caused by high RCS pressure. l , The leakage limits are symptoms that the boundary (check valves) between the RCS and the SCS is degraded or becoming degraded. Failure of the f check valves could lead to overpressure of the SCS piping or components. J I Failure consequences could be a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) outside of containment, with the possibility of being unable to recirculate from the containment after the initial Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank ! (IRWST) injection. i LTIS 9FC- I The basis for this LCO is thejReactor Safety Study',' WASH-1400 (Ref.27,4 which identified potential intersystem LOC as a significant contributor to h r 'L dcm rM \ t -plantek A subsequent study (Ref.)f eval (uated various PIV co to determine the probability of intersystem LOCAj This study determined that periodic leak testing of PlVs can reduce the probability of a LOCA. IJ%#T )(, ._.- -p-(continued) , i 1 SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-58 Amendment O 16A.7 58 May 1,1993
INkERT U: { fuf ll' ' 'l- 51) SR 3.4.12.2 This SR provides the means necessary to determine SG OPERABILITY in an operational MODE. The requirement to demonstrate SG tube integrity in accordance with the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program emphasizes the importance of SG tube integrity, even though this Surveillance cannnot be performed at normal operating conditions. l l l
I
. INSERT V: (Page 16A.7-58) l l
10 CFR 50.2,10 CFR 50.55a(c), and GDC 55 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Refs. 1, 2, and 3), define RCS PIVs as any two normally closed valves in series within the RC5 pressure boundary that separate the high pressure RCS from an attached low pressure system. During their lives, these - valves can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant i leakage through either norinal operational wear or mechanical I deterioration. The RCS PIV LCO allows RCS high pressure ' operation when leakage through these valves exists in amounts that do not compromise safety.
)
J I INSERT W: (Page 16A.7-58) i 12 The PlV 1 akage limit applies to aach individual valve. l Leakage t rough both PIVs in series in a line must be-included (as part of the identified LEAKAGE, governed by LCO 3.4.)f, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE." This is true during operation only when the loss of RCS mass through two valves in series is determined by a water inventory balance (SR 3.4 5 1). A known component of the identified LEAKAGE before oppration begins is the least of the two individual leakage rptes determined for leaking series PIVs during the required turveillance testing; leakage measured through one P!V in a line is not RCS operational LEAKAGE if the other is . leaktight. I N(1 I l l
)
i INSERT X: (Page 16A.7-58) PIVs are provided to isolate the RCS from the following typically connected systems:
- a. Shutdown Cooling System (SCS);
- b. Safety Injection System; and c.. Chemical and Volume Control System.
The PP sc !!ad c CESSAR-DC Secas:. ("cf5). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a PIV, which could lead to overpressurization of a low pressure system and the loss of the integrity of a fission product barrier.
, CESSAREnnne-r
.w RCS PlV Leakage B 3.4.13 4
BASES APPLICABLE Pressure isolation valve leakage is not considered in any design basis accident SAFETY ANALYSCS analysea. This specification provides for monitoring the condition of the reactor coolant pressure boundary to detect degradation which could lead to accidents. Therefore, Sdeshen Criterion 2 of the NRC .lasemer Policy Statement @edr4) is satisfied. LCOs - ne allowable leaDgEforvalves.ss4msed-eadOT gpm] per inch of (nominal) [, valve diametertp to a maximum of five gpm. Since all valves are [10-inch] diametep6fninal, the limit is [five gpm]r Violation of this LC,O'Icould result (ut(gdabg,( inco mued degradation of a prepsure isolation valve, maycause failure of , undary between the higp pressure RCS and low pfessure systems, and
~ result in loss of reactor coolant outside containment [
~_ -.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this LCO applies because the potential for PlV l leakage is greatest when the RCS is pressurized. In MODES 5 and 6, leakage limits are not provided because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower resulting in a reduced potential for leakage and a lower potential for LOCA outside the containment.
~.
ACTIONS Ex- -- -s With le/y-, age in excess of theAllowable limits, fourdiours are provi 4 to l N X AT~ 2. red leakage. The pericf[1 permits operatio o continue und stable nditions while leakajeds assessed and co. ive actions are ng taken. i l These include actions to verify leakag ne four-hour tim'e allows these actions (E be taken and restricts the time of l l operation wjth's single isolation valve. m
/ '
/
s ac6 141 bN h N (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-59 Amendment I i 16A.7-59 December 21,1990
CESSAREnnnce f RCS PlV Leakage 9 hp Co tyr 'l h({, p g g B 3.4.13 BASES k m ACTIONS A.2.1 and A.2.2 _kj' ' (continued) / If restoration is'not possible, the flow path must be isolated by at least one valve (two are prefer:ed). /
/ .
Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are modified by a note to specify that the j valvec used for isolation must meet the same leakage requirements as the /
,PIVs, must be in a high pressure section of piping, and must be rated for th pressure. De initial, isolation (A.2.1) with one valve must be performed within four hours.pis four-hour period is based on similar rationale to that of A.I. This action is inherently accomplished if only one of the two original valves is leakidg because the other PIV/provides the required isolation.
Required Action A.2.2 specifies that the double isolation barrier of two valves byIrestored by closing some other valve qualified for isolation or restoring the leaking PlV. The 72-hour time is ~ based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the outage time allowed for a single divisiorv
'W Safety In.jection. - ,es / '
B.1 and B.2 W o p,cbwej h Ac Ay r s yv fhWs if leakage cannot be reduced er hegsgem isolated Ahee the plant must be placed in a mode in which tM quammt-does not apply. His is done by placing the plant in MODE 3 within six hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. This $ction may reduce the leakage and also reduces the potential for a LOCA outside the containment. He allowed completion times are reasonable to achieve the required MODES from full power without challenging plant systems. l SURVElLLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 REQUIREMENTS 7 sf qf s.
' Performance of leakage t.esting on each RCS P ' lVTss', required to verify thah b / leakage is below the specified limits and to detecf leaking valves. The pD f leakage limit of [0.5jpm] per inch of nominal Ive diameter [5 gpm)fotal for each of thesepalves) is to be applied to valve. Leakage arterr==
rj
\ requires a stable plant pressure conditior)/ Testing is performe/every 18 g
\ months which is a typical refueling cyp 6. This Surveillance equiren.ent j i was specified by the NRC in Reference I and is in accordan with ASMI:
l XI (Item 3) (Ref. 5). / e - - (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-60 Amendment I 16A.7-60 December 21,1990
INSERT Y: (Page 16A.7-59) , LCD I i l RCS PIV leakage is identified LEAKAGE into closed systems connected to the RCS. Isolation valve leakage is usually on the order of drops per minute. Leakage that increases significantly suggests that something is operationally wrong and corrective action must be . taken. The LCO PlV leakage limit is [0.5] gpm per nominal inch of valve size, with a maximum limit of 5 gpm. The previous criterion of I gpm for all valve sizes imposed an unjustified I penalty on the larger valves without providing information on potential valve degradation and resulted in higher personnel radiation exposures. A study concluded a leakage limit based on j valve size was superior to a single allowable value. Reference 7 permits leakage testing at a lower pressure differential that between the specified maximum RCS pressure and the normal pressure of the connected system during RCS operation (the maximum pressure differential) in those types of valves in which the higher service pressure will tend to diminish the overall leakage channel opening. In such cases, the observed rate may be adjusted to the maximum pressure differential by assuming leakage is directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one had power. INSERT Z: (Page 16A.7-59) The Actions are modified by two Notes. Note 1 is added to provide clarification that each flow path allows separate entry into a Condition. This is allowed based on the functional independence of the flow path. Note 2 requires an evaluation of affected systems if a PIV is inoperable. The leakage may have affected system operability or isolation of a leaking flow path with an alternate valve may have degraded the ability of the interconnected system to perform its safety function.
. IMSERT AA: (Page 16A.7-59) l 1
A.1 and A.2 The flow path must be isolated by two valves. Required ' Actions A.1 and A.2 are modified by a Note stating that the valves used for isolation must meet the same leakage requirements as the PIVs and must be in the RCP8 [or the highpressureportionofthesystem). 1 Required Action A.1 requires that the isolation with one valve must be performed within 4 hours. Four hours provides time to reduce leakage in excess of the allowable limit and 1 to isolate if leakage cannot te reduced. The 4 hours allows l the actions and restricts the operation with leaking isolation valves. l Required Action A.2 specifies that the double isolation barrier of two valves be restored by closing some other valve qualified for isolation or restoring one leaking PIV. The 72 hour Completion Time after exceeding the limit considers the time required to complete the action and the low probability of a second valve failing during this time i period. or The 72 hour Completion Time after exceeding the limit allows for the restoration of the leaking PIV to OPERABLE status. This timeframe considers the time required to complete this Action and the low probability of a second valve failing ; during this period. (Reviewer Note: Two options are ; provided for Required Action A.2. The second option
.(72 hour restoration) is appropriate if isolation of a second valve would place the unit in an unanalyzed condition.)
i i l
.IblSERT AB: (Page 16A.7-60)
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.14.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of leakage testing on each RCS PlV or isolation valve used to satisfy Required Action A.1 or A.2 is required to verify that leakage is below the specified limit and to identify each leaking valve. The leakage limit of 0.5 gpa per inch of nominal valve diameter up to 5 gpm maximum applies to each valve. Leakage testing requires a stable pressure condition. For the two PIVs in series, the leakage requirement applies to each valve individually and not to the combined leakage across both valves. If the PIVs are not individually leakage tested, one valve may have failed completely and not be detected if the other valve in series meets the leakage requirement. In this situation, the protection provided by redundant valves would be lost. Testing is to be performed every 9 months, but may be extended up to a maximum of (18J months, a typical refueling cycle, if the plant does not-go into MODE 5 for at least 7 days. The [18 month Frequency is required in 10 CFR 50.55a(g)](Ref. 8), as contained in the Inservice Testing Program, is within the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,. Section XI (Ref. 9), and is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. In addition, testing must be performed once after the valve ) has been opened by flow or exercised to ensure tight i reseating. P!Vs disturbed in the performance of this l Surveillance should also be tested unless documentation i shows that an infinite testing loop cannot practically be l avoided. Testing must be performed within 24 hours after I the valve has been reseated. Within 24 hours is a reasonable and practical time limit for performing this test after opening or reseating a valve. The leakage limit is to be met at the RCS pressure associated with MODES 1 and 2. This permits leakage testing at high differential pressures with stable conditions not possible in the MODES with lower pressures. Gdub t^td
IN' SERT AB (Continued): (PapllaA.'7-GO) SR 3.4.14.1 (continued) J Entry into M00E3 3 and 4 is allowed to establish the necessary differential pressures and stable conditions to allow for perfomance of this Surveillance. The Note that allows this provision is complimentary to the frequency of prior to entry into MODE 2 whenever the unit has been in MODE 5 for 7 days or more, if leakage testing has not been perfomed in the previous 9 months. In addition, this Surveillance is not required to be perfonned on the,50C'9CG System when the 5 3 ..._ is aligned to the RCS in the shutdown cooling / mode of operation. P!Vs contained in the e 7cg 500 shutdown cooling flow path must be leakage rate tested after X is sepured and stable unit conditions and the necessfry differential pressures are established. bCS Sc5
l l CESSAR !!ninCATl3N l j i J i i RCS PlV Leakage b(A @\ ( B 3.4.13 BASES i phADt be perforuteis
~
SURVEILLANCE , REQUIREMENTS 'llow or uercised ensure tight reseating. Testing must be performed athin I (continued) 24 hours afte e valves have been rescated. The 24 hours is on engineerin judgment that the test is p 'tical in this time peri SRp .4 is exempted for entry into' MODES 3 and 4 to 't leak testing apiigh differential pressures with stable conditions not sible in the lower {OD , REFERENCES 1. NRC rder for Modi ation of License'Conceming Jr(nary t System Pres e Isolation Valves-(all plants) datg4/20/81. I. des Technical valuation Repor(
- Primary ant System ressure Isolatio Valves," prepadd by the F in Research
[ Center. /
. I I
k, y USNRC, " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessm'ent of Accident Risks l in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants". Appendix V, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014), Oct.1975.
- 5. .y uSNRC, ne Probability orIntersystem LOCA: Impact Due to Leak Testing and Operational Changes *, NUREG-0677, May 1980.
4, 52 FR 88, NR nterim olicy Sta ment of Technica Speci ation I rovemen for Nu ear Power R[ ors, F. ry 6,198 .
' 5. ash E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,' Section XI,'SubsecJion
, ' Inservice'T'esting of Valves 1INuclear Power Plan [t .
- _A ~
1 Io cro cp.t . ! 2 10 cf t- CP.55 0- (c) . 3 je crug Ap(sa A, sag V , ebc 56 - G. De \eled. . I. M4, bon wA Pawre hsul C,A , $cekk31, IWV a423 (e). S.lOccc-po56a(g) I 9. /cHe filer e ,t $ % a, yegc( c,dt, sech i 2 1 I Tind - SA 22 , SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-61 Amendment I 16A.7-61 December 21,1990
CESSAR8H h m t 16 A.7.14 B 3.4.14 RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.14 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.14 RCS Leakace Detection Instrumentation BASES
^
j ~ -- ,- _/ NRO'Gecers! Design Crita;a uire that means be provided for detecting BACKGROUND and, to the extent practic identifying the location of the source of reacto coolant leal: age. last System A limited ampt of leakage is expected from the Reacto (RCS) and rom auxiliary systems within the containm- Some leakage will occur f m valve packing, pump seals, vessel /clo e head seals, and safety andj ief valves. If leakage occurs via these j paths, it is detected, collected d g tpine extent practical, and isolated from he containment atmosphere so as should it occur. Rese leakages are
,/not to mask any potentially serious I .k 3 Identified LEAKAGE and may be.pped to tanks or sumps so flow rate can 3 A -
be established and monitored d' ring plant operation. f7 ,/ w ( d) { Uncollected leakage t the containment atmosphere from other' sources increases the humi of the containment. The moisture copd6ased from the $ MT Qs i, atmosphere by coolers together with any associated,ltquid leakage to the i t containment ' Unidentified LEAKAGE and is co.lltited in tanks or sumps ,
, 3 ]s 3 and is m stored during plant operation. Ajrdll amount of Unidentified /
J 4 LEA GE may be impractical to eliminate, but it should be reduced to a sy a / s flow rate, to permit the LEAKAQE detection systems to positively and J 3 D / rdidly detect a small increase in.,f1'ow rate. Thus a small Unidentified '
.g ik i LEAKAGE rate that is of conc,er[will not be masked by a larger acceptable j Identified LEAKAGE rate. ,<
u 1 Jm-
/
E Leakage detection systems should detect significant reactor cooldt pressure d boundary (RCPB) degradation as soon after occurrenceIs practical to minimize the potential for a gross pressure boundary failure. Some cracks might develop and penetrate the RCPB wall, exhibit very slow growth, and afford ample time for a safe and orderly plant shutdown. The leakage detection monitors used provide diversity and operate on two different principles: hold.p volu:ne inr.k (HVT) level insirument/
+ontainment sump and atmospheric activity monitoring. The atmospheric j
,~ , . _ -
p (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-62 Amendment O 16A.7-62 May 1,1993
CESSARnah . F RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.14 BASES < N f
/ \
BACKGRdUND activity monitoring instrumentation detects gaseo culate (contin ' ) radioactivity. Industry practice
- a shown that water flow rate chanh of from [0.5 to 1.0gp,m]'can pu., be detected in containment sumps by monitoring changes in HV"L.~rr = water level, in flow rate, or operating freq(nd air cooler crodensate LEAKAGE, ueticy of pumps ntified
. %s are instrur sensitivity provides an accepa.ble performance for dotSting increases b Unidentified LEAKAGE. /
/ /
eactor coolant activity released to the corttainment can be detected by radiation monitoring instrumentation. Instra1 ment sensitivities of [10' micro Ci/cc] radioactivity for air particulate m[nitoring and of[104 micro Ci/cc] radioactivity for gaseous monitorin sr'e practical for these leakage detection systems. I w In addition to the instrum
' tion cited by the LCO, other leakage,destion means may be used. Hutmdity changes or pressure and temp #erattare changes may provide indicati[ns of leakage.
/ / /
AFPL} CABLE
/ / /
The safetypgnificance of leaks from the RCPB,can vary widely depend ^ SAFETY ANALYSES on the source of the leak as well as the leakage rate and duration. Therefore,
/ the detection and monitoring of reactor coolant leakage into the containment
/ area is necessary. Separating the ilentified sources of leakage from t
' unidentified sources is necessary, to provide prompt and quantitative N information to the operators to_ permit them to take immediate corrective f N action should a leak occur that is detrimental to the safety of the public.
/ ,
RCS leakage detection in'strumentation satisfies Sel.es,en Crit,erion 1 of the NRC Interim Policy, Statement (P.:f.1). As such, these variables are retained s in the RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO./ of protection against RCPB ! LCO3 , One metho ge leaka/ failure is the ability of
\ instrumentation to rapidly detect extremely senall leaks. This LCO requires that instrumentation of two diverse princirles s be OPERABLE to provide a
-high degree of confidence that extremel small leaks are detected in time to ,
ailow actions to place the plant in adafe condition when leakage indicates ! possible RCPB degradation.
/
(s N-/ '
/
sQntinued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-63 Amendment O 16A.7-63 May 1,1993
CESSAR Maincmu l l i
' 4 i
1 RCS. Leakage Detection Instrumentation t B 3.4.14 BASES / 'r. M N f LCOs ,
/
ne LCO is satisfied wlyeti monitors of diverse measurement means are
\
(continued) available, nus the TNT /conta:arut sump monitor in combination with I either a particulate a gaseous , activity monitor provides an acceptable k ,
, minimum.
/ - # :
/ /
'.n MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, leakage detection syst are required to be
[ APPLICABILITY rational LEAKAGE. OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.12. RCS , [ Therefore, the LCO is not applicable in MOD /S 5 and 6.
/
ACITONS ,/ A.1 and A.2 .
/ -
[ With the Oh:sicment sump' monitor l inoperable, no form of grab sample l could provide the equivalent.i6 formation. However, the atmospheric activity s monitors provide indicatio'ns of changes in leakage. Rectoration is req [ t ' to regain the fur.ction of ibe sump mcnitor. ' As an alternate to the ir ./ sump l 3 monitors and in , conjunction with atmospheric monitors periodic
) performed at surveillance, SR 3.4.12.1, for RCS inventory balance is to ,
an increased fr'equency of 24 hours to provide periodije 'nformation that is [ : adequate to detect leakage. The-31-day completion (time for restoration
/ .
recogniu6 that mukiple forms of leakage detection are available. . . j I B.1[1. B.I.2 and B.2 ith both types of containment atni 9 here radioactivity monito i instrumentation (gaseous and particulaie activity monitor) inoperable, iter : inventory balance in accordance with SR 3.4,12.1 must be perfo . or g ab
'%. samples shall be taken and
' Provided the inventory balance,an'alyzed to provide perio is performed or samples are obtained a sd analyzed every 24 hours, th4' plant may continue operati for up to li dap.
' He 24-hour interval provi' des periodic information th is adequate to deter :
leakage. The 31-day cp5pletion time for restoratio ecognizes that multiph l forms ofIcak detectMn are available. /
/
\
~. ,. - .
'N t
\ s-j (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.444 Amendment O 16A.7-64 May 1,1993
l C{ddMRC C A D DESIGN CERTIFICATl!N i ! F l RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
,- 7 B 3.4.14 l
PASES \ [ / s l l ACTIONS d.1 and C.2 ( (continued) If the Required Action ot be met within the required Completion Ti e, l the plant must be pl in a MODE in which the LCO does not appl [ l l is done by placio the plant in at least MODE 3 within six)ours and in ' MODE 5 withi(36 hours. .The allowed completion times ar(reasonable to achieve the ' uired MODES from full power withoutiha!!enging plant' systems. '
' l l
With all required monitors inoperable, no tomatic means of monitoring I leakage are available and immediate plant hutdown in accordance with LCO l 3.0.3 is required. l l l (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-65 i Amendment I 16A.7-65 December 21,1990 i
CESSAR nuirlCAT13N l I. l l RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentatior.
.- B 3.4.14 l y --
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.14.1 REQUIREMENTS , Surveillance Requirement 3.4.14.1 is the performance of a CHANNEL
\
j CHECK of the containment atmosphere (gaseous and particulate) activith ( N monitor. The CHANNEL CHECK gives reasonable confidence that the Kj channel is operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours has been shownj by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess de radation and/ venfy operation within safety analysis assumptions. l l f I SR 3.4.14 2 l Surveillance Requirement 3.4.14.2 is a pe ce of a CHANNEL l f FUNCTIONAL TEST for the containmp atmosphere (gaseous and I i, particulate) activity monitor. This test ensures that the monitor can perform j
\ its function in the desired manner. 'IlprCHANNEL FUNCrlONAL TEST verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the instrume '
The Frequency of 31 days is baselon industry-accepted practice. l I
/ / \
j SR 3.4.14.3. SR3.4.14.4 ND SR 3.4.14.5
,/ Surveillance Requirements 3.4.14.3 and 3.4.14.4 are the performance of
, CHANNEL CAllBRATIONS of the containment atmosphere activity monitor f
/ HVT Level Switch'and containment sump monitor every 18 months. The
[ CHANNEL C4dBRATION verifies the accuracy of the instrument s The calibratio'n includes the calibration of instruments located inside containment.' 'Ihe frequency of 18 months is based on a typi:al refueling cycle antindustry-accepted practice.
/ /
/
s /
/
REFERENCES 1. 52 FR 3788, NRC Interim Policy j Statement on Technical! j Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, February 6,1987. j
/
/
l \ \ ~ l l l l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-66 l Amendment O 16A.7-66 May 1,1993
y-~ -. . E
,'%ss RCS Leakage Detection Instrumen(ation 3.4.15 ,
f BASES ... _ .. . .. ... .. f.. . . AAAAAAAAAAAAA S Leakage Detection Instrumentation ' B 3.4.15 B 3.4 REACTOR OLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
- i. B 3.4.15 CS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
- ASES tiittiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii1111111111111111111111111111111 fiiffiii iii BACKGROUND GDC 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 1) requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.
{ Leakage detection systems must have the capability. to detect significant reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) degradation as soon atter ( occurrence as practical to minimize the potential for propagation to a gross failure. Thus, an
/ early indication or warning signal is necessary to pemmit proper evaluation of all unidentified LEAKAGE.
I,wi AvgcLM A. % 1 Industry practice has shown that water flow changes of 0.5 to 1.0 gpm can readily be detected in contained volumes by monitoring changes in water level, in flow rate, or in the operating frequency of a pump. The containment sumpj used to collect unidentified LEAKAGE, C><d and the containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitor gareK instrumented to alarm for increases of 0.5 to 1.0 gpm in the normal flow rates. This sensitivity is acceptable for detecting increases in unidentified LEAKAGE. CEOG'STS B 3.4-81 P&R 09/20/93 (continued) MMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMAMAAAAAAAA L AAAAAAAAAAAAA
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RGG--beakage vete ~ ction instrurtrencutivu:=- 1 l W5 i BASES l AAAhtuAAA/M AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAla,MAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAwAAA l AtMAAAAAA.uAA l pressure fluctuate slightly during plant ! operation, but a rise above the normally ind.icated range of values may indicate RCS LEAKAGE into the ' containment. The relevance of temperature and pressure measurements are affected by containment free volume and, for temperature, detector I location. Alarm signals from these instruments can be valuable in recognizing rapid and sizable leakage to the containment. Temperature and pressure monitors are not required by this LCO. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA APPLICABLE The need to evaluate the severity ot an alarm or i an SAFETY ANALYSES indication is important to 'he operators, and the ability to compare and verify with indications from other systems is necessary. The system response times and sensitivities are described in th p (Ref. 3). Multiple instrument locations CCS M ' M G e utilized, if needed, to ensure the transport delay time of the LEAKAGE from its source to an instrument location yields an acceptable overall response time. f The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE varies widely depending on its source, rate, and duration. Therefore, detecting and monitoring RCS LEAKAGE into the containment area are necessary. Quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE provides quantitative information to the operators, allowing them to take corrective action should leakage occur detrimental to the safety of the facility and the public. APPLICABLE RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 f SAFETY ANALYSES of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued) - b
-GEGG STS - - - -
A 1 4-Al P&R 09/20/03 AwawawaAmmauAnuuuAm.uAuumuuaunuuuuuA k.mah AAAAAAAAAAAAA
,HCS-Lesasv u DeLection Iaedrumanenei e
BASES AAldAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAMAAAAAA AAAM4AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMAAAAAAAAAAMAAAAAAAAMA AAAAAAAAAAAAA LCO One method of protecting against large RCS LEAKAGE derives from the ability of instruments to rapidly detect extremely small leaks. This LCO requires instruments of diverse iaonitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe condition when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB degradation. LA mat B m I %,. The LCO is satisfied when^ monitors of diverse measurement means are available. Thus,-the c. L.%4b.'.~ containment sump monitor 61n cc:6f"' tic' 'cith a pareicn'nen nr ;rccouc radioactivity monitors j %and
-a. containment as cooler condensate fl .. rata A l monitorK, provides en acceptable minimum. -
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA APPLICABILITY Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RCS leakage detection ! c instrumentation is required to be JPERABLE. In MODE 5 or 6, the temperature is s 200 F and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation is much smaller. Therefore, the requirements of this LCO are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA r ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 i i l CEOG-GTS D 3.4 04 - PfeR 09"0/43 (continuedP AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA
IP f r Y % Lv ri ~ J2 di Qyy %, ny, . ddl u dA~ d 62 n ;s two kv&&( W .Aucf 1 a J up . A a n alLos<du s z<,-u an
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8
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bo ~%~ (W gw b
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RCS-beskuye Dei.ec tion .tns c rwuentet-ic b 3. .
-1mb" AAAAAWJdAAAhMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAWMAMWAMAAhNM AAAAAAAAAAAAA If the containment sump monitor inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information.
i However, the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor will provide indications of changes in ! leakage. Together with the atmosphere monitor, ; the periodic surveillance for RCS water inventory ' balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) at an increased frequency of 24 hours to provide information that is adequate to detect leakage. Restoration of the sump monitor to OPERABLE status is required to regain the function in a Completion Time of 30 days after the monitor's failure. This 1 time is acceptable considering the frequency and adequacy of the RCS water inventory balance required by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 and Required Action A.2 are modified by a Note that indicates the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when the containment sump monitor channel is inoperable. This allowance is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor for RCS LEAKAGE. seC B.1.1 B.1 23 B.2.-l. A With both gaseous and particulate containment atmosphere radioactivity monitoring instrumentation channels inoperable, alternative action is required. Either grab samples of the i containment atmosphere must be taken and analyzed or water inventory balances, in accordance with SR 3.4.13*.1, must be performed to provide alternate periodic information. With a sample obtained and analyzed or an inventory balance i performed every 24 hours, the reactor may be l i u vu brs B 3.4-85 '- pep - n o / 9 n29-3 I (con 12.nusd;) ; nAAAAAXRMAAAAAAAAJ4AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA , hMAA l l
.-, . = , _ - __ __ _ _. . _. , . _ . .
nrn reakage De* action Instrumentat h B 3.4.15 r BASES AAA/Juu.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!vVdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA6 AAAAAAAAAAAAA operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of at least one of the radioactivity monitors. 9.lternat:ccly, continued opcratior ir ' l i madW the n r coc1cr cor.dencatc fla.. ca:.e .~unvring cycrom ir OPEP'_PLE, proc 1dcd grab c2 7 - - 1
-taker c"e r/ ?! hourc.
The 24 hour interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect leakage. The 30 day Completion Time recognices at least one other form of leakage detection is available. J Required Actions B.l.1, B.1.2,"B.2 x1, end 2.2.5 are modified by a Note thac indicates that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when the gaseous and particulate containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor channel is inoperable. This allowance ACTIONS " .1_' n ?
' mnd 9 ' ' f r-tired) l is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor for RCS LEAKAGE.
I I t CEGG ard B 3.4-86 P&R 09/Z M L (su. m eTI AAAAAtVAAAAAAAAA/JAAAAAAAAAidAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIN AAAAAAAAAAAAA
l 1 RCS Leakage Detection ' Instrumental.wu g%g, . BASES x .AAAAA i Ah N i l i
\ !
i 1 l N
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Y1 and C.2 - 3 If the quired containment air cooler r . ensate -J flow rate itor is inoperable, al . native ! action is agal equired. Eith 'R 3. 4.15.1 must ' be performed or wa e inve balances, in accordance with SR 3.4. 1, must be performed to l provide alternate e odic formation. Provided a CHANNEL CHECK a performed e 8 hours or an inventory b- ance is performed ev .24 hours, . reactor geration may continue while iting ' res ation of the containment air coole ndensate flow rate monitor to OPERABLE st s. 406r- 5 2 a a .3.4-87 P& . 7 /93 (continue AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAALMAAAAAAAAAA , AAAAAAAAAAAAA
~f_
RCS Leakaga '4tec t ivu Ilm tiismefe 4 n
. .15 {
r BASES AAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA : I T 24 hour interval provides periodic informati that adequate to detect RCS LEAKAGE. D.1 and D.2 l If the required co ainment atmosp e radioactivity monito and the co ainment air cooler condensate. flow te m Itor are l inoperable, the only mean detecting leakage is the containment sump mon' o This Condition'does not provide the requir dive e means of leakage detection. The Re red Action 's to restore either of the in erable monitors OPERABLE [ status within days to regain the 1 ended I leakage de etion diversity. Complet' The 30 da A Times ensure that the plant will ot be opera d in a reduced configuration for a len hy ti period. C C Y.1 and Y.2 Of If any Required Action of Condition A 4 Bx [C], er [D] cannot be met within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a-MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least , MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are ; reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full 5 L i CEOG S B 3.4-88 P&R 3 , ' ' ~- (continued) ' l AAAAAAAAAAAAAAidAAAAAM1AAAAMAAAAAAAAAAidAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAMAAAA 1 l l i
-RCeakage Detection InstruMEntat-ien- I B. 7 .25
, )
BASES
.AAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA t
C_ C ' ACTIONS V.1 and k.2 (continued) , power conditions in an orderly manner and without ; challenging plant systems. i D i kL1
- l If all required monitors are inoperable, no l automatic means of monitoring leakage are l available and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.
AAAAAAfu AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA N SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.%.1 : REQUIREMENTS ty , SR 3.4.h5.1 requires the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors. _The check gives reasonable confidence the channel is operating properly. The Frequency of [12] hours is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for , detecting off normal conditions. i 19 SR 3 . 4 . Ni . 2 - l 'f SR 3.4.TS.2 requires the performance of a CHANNEL i FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors. The test ensures that the monitor can perform its function in the desired manner. The test verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the ! instrument string. The Frequency of 31 days ! considers instrument reliability and operating ! experience'has shown it proper for detecting degradation. ! 1 SR 3.4. .3. SR 3.4. .4. (SR 3.4. .5V ! c
-5 5 3.4-83 ocn 0D/20/93-~
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA t AAAAAAAAAAAAA (continued)
T r =r
- T 4 rr r * - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - -
-_ . . _ - . - . .. .- . - - . ._ .-- - - . = . . . .
N gage Detection 144sLaumentati-
- s. R BASES ;
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMAAAluVAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA These SRs require the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each of-the RCS leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration : verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Frequency of [18] months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability. Operating experience has shown this Frequency is acceptable. l l l l l i CEOG Sia B 3.4-90 va h AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/JJJA AAAAAAAAAAAAA (continued)
- - - m
l RN Leakage-Det ect ion J.nn e rument ation ' BE X BASES (continued) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section IV, GDC 30.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, U.S. Nuclear ,
Regulatory Commission. '
- 3. F"'.n ,- Section [ ]. ,
111111111111111111'i111111111111111111t11111111111111111111111111 1i11111111111 GC%AG -D C-I
)
C B 3.4-91 , [ P&R 09/20/93 l l
CESSAR !!Bricarion f 16A.7.15 B 3.4.15 RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.15 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.15 RCS Specific Activity BASES BACKGROUND The Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1) specifies the maximum dose to the whole body and thyroid an individual at the site boundary can receive for two hours during an accident. The limits on specific activity ensure that the dose is held to a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limits during analyzed traasients and accidents. The Design Basis events that have the greatest sensitivity to RCS specific activity are the steam line break, letdown line break, feedwater line break and steam generator tube rupture. The purpose of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) specific activity LCO is to limit the concentration of radionuclides in the reactor coolant and the resultant events. pAttoffsite dose d consequ 4 I A f to @6ntco (Q,Q The LCO contains specific actfity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and gross specific activiti4a. The allowable levels are intended to limit the two-hour dose at the SITE BOUNDARY to beehia aac4Me ..bs. The limitiEg valss fe,r 9:d5 si.ns in the LCO replMeit standardized 4tmrts based uponsparametric evaluatio(by L NRC of off ite radioactivity f dose consequences for typical site locations. Thegv'aWt Edshowed that the potential offsite dose levels for a SGTR accident were an appropriately + small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guideline dose limits, assuming a broad range of site applicable atmospheric dispersion factors in a parametric evaluation. These standard limits on specific activity were also used in establishing standardization in shielding and unit personnel radiation protection practices. S - APPLICABLE The LCO limitatterion the specific activity of the reactor coolant ensuresyhat t SAFETY ANALYSES the resulting two-hour dose at the SITEJS ARY.will not exceed SRF
# #j dose guidelines (Ref.1) followmg $$aNA AklDGhaptc !! cf
*, M8I' b4"-
l'4 FIM> COSAR DC: In the safety analyses, the specific activity of the reactor coolant is assumed to be at the LCO limit and an existing reactor coolant-steam generator tube leakage rate of one (1) gpm is assumed. In addition for some events a pre-existing (PIS) and event generated iodine spike is assumed, l> (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-67 Amendment I 16A.7-67 December 21,1990
L CESSARnah m,t J i l 1 l
)
i RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.15 I l l l BASES 1 l' APPLICABLE For accidents with a PIS, the RCS anivity was assumed to be at the limit l SAFETY ANALYSES given in Action B.1 (60 pCilgm). Operation with iodine specific activity , levels greater than the LCO limit is permissible, provided that the activity j (continued) levels do not exceed 60 pCi/gm and do not exist for more than 48 hours. l When specific activity exceeds the LCO limits due to iodine spiking but is ! limited to 60 pCi/gm, plant operation is considered acceptable based upon the { ' low probability of an accident occurring during the established 48-hour time ' limit, together with the fact that iodine spiking is considered in the safety analysis. The reactor coolant specific activity is a process variable that is an initial l l condition of a design basis accident that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier. As such, j it satisfies the requirements of Criterion 2 of the NRC 4*4. man Policy l Statement W.dselk). 9 gross g frran3 l LCOs The specific iodine activity is imited to 1.0 microcurie pr gram DOSE 1 EQUIVALENT I-131 and the4 etat specific activity in the#eeetercoolant is limited to the number of microcuries per gram equal to 100 divided by $ l . (average disintegration energy of the sum of the average beta and gamma ( paM { ,cM*~ensures the two-hour dose _to an individual at the site boundary during design energies of the coolant nuclides). The limit on DOSE EQUIVALENT l 121 : k gM m
' basis accidents will be limited to SRP ;. cepea siteria. The limit on (fY#g Ac'" tMtB ensures the two-hour whole body dose to an individual at the site qv#" m c.b. [ boundary during griidra. OL design basis accidents will a0> be E9 f '> b *Om6(.l l [ra c't[8k- C[ ILC RIl8L"' " (O ole W
gc4 d ' _J Violation of the LCq may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could lead to adNdT88klM': %;; - tri 4 0 m *M-t%- ht L M e sed c } ax CGTA , 30 CIF 8CO M6 f a ds t o .x Tv.L S&Tf- O c edin h asm ly St l k. ) YNI
. f(a ?hmv c e le fhda t e icsc. le ve IC M M N ~
d u ( lst l~le- liwilt. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-68 Amendment I I 16A.7-68 December 21,1990 L-
CESSAREn Liu 4 e RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.15 BASES A PLSamay oje.awre 25ca'f , APPLICABILITY 3,3 operation within the LCO limits for DOSE Am, In MODES EQUIVALENT 1,an2, and,d totga spgsjfic activity are necessa I-131 (\\ pou 3 y % 905 p tential consequences of accufco,b to within the acceptable SITE
/ ,
BOUNDARY dose values. For operation f in MODES 4, 5, and 6, the I M vut d.y,tny6 ,r' probability of a steam, feedwater or letEcwn line break is small due to the
\ 25cd' y ar^d I w primary and secondary pressures and the release of radioactivity in the l event of a SGTR is prevented since the saturation pressure of the reactor
(' coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety valves. In all applicable MODES, with the LCO limits exceeded, an isotopic analysis for iodine concentration is appropriate to monitor the activity level while actions are being taken to reduce the specific activity level. ACTIONS C,A 1 andOAJ tmh p With the gross activity in excess of the allowed .*;mit, an analysis iuo be f C \, performed v'ithin four hours to determine DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. The [ [ n- 1 Completion Time of four hours is reasonable based on the typical time to
\ xt 1 obtain, transport, and analyze a sample. If the gw.; ad. ny a uut Wuul
;,, +w p-rina eh, r,6+ r..j a pl ; u, ;,1cDE 4 Ws uu g, ;,, J, g "O'
c\ .this r'u rmitude pr ' O.c caded.U de!egd Jm m A ;;iTE
-. BOUNDARY codd c;cd ccqd!: u!r The change to MODI' 4 j4 ' *peration lowers the saturation pressure for the reactor coolant below the
'j 3 y( setpoints of the main steam safety valves. This action prevents venting of the l J steam BenFator to the environment in the event of a SGTR. nekompletion Mm {j lime of trid#e hours is reasonable based on operating experience to reach MODE #from full power without challenging plant systems. 1 Qf 3 belc w 5 00
- F :
S .$ ' B ' rd R2 A ,l cu d /\, I a ,
,. No With the DOSE EQUlVALENT l-131 greater than the LCO limit of 1.0 l3 pCi/gm, frequent samples at intervals not to exceed four hours are to be -
C3
'C-taken to demonstrate that the limit 60 pCi/gm is not exceeded. He Completion Time of four hours is reasonable based on the typical time to ;
'_ obtain, transport, and analyze a sample. Sampling is to continue to provide j a trend. If the limit violation resulted from nominaliodine spiking, then the j DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 should be restored to nominal within 48 hours.
['\. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-69 j Amendment I 16A.7-69 December 21,1990
CESSARinhua i i e s
'I l
3 M[ 97 6"fr 'd/~'R S15pecific Activity a! 'B 3.4.15 4 ( ' Soo*F tut h to t w as . BASES l
} r
[ g 6. @t ACTIONS 41 T.{Co4. op A A to nof # wf cv')isrel AcS l-
/
j datL d > (continued) f the DOSE EQUIVALENTl-131 exceeds the 60 Cilgm limit oris > 1.0 , pCi/gm for a continuous time interval of 48 hours, an abnormal co is . ; indicated and the reactor must be placed in MODE '
^ ' ' ' ' '
-- The ,
Completion Time of ours is based on engineering judgtnent and is considered a reasonable time to get to MODE / from full power without ! challeging plant systems. .3 ladcW Cco*p* SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 . REQUIREMENTS j. 7 %f, ,
.__ The ;urveillance is performed at least once per ~12-beirrs to momtor the
.x gamma isotopic analysis of the reactor coolant. It basically is a quantitative measurement of radionuclides with half lives >N minutes, excluding
] [.d_i :l radiciodines. This measurement considers the sum of the degassed gamma >
$y'O activit and the total of the identified gaseous activities in the sample taken,
, ih(TF This urveillance provides an indication of any increase inMMafic -i ,
% ._? o - activity of the ter: tor coolant. Monitoring of the results of thisTurveillance
Of
. .t .C 3 allows for proper remedial actions to be takenprior to reaching the LCO limits under normal operating conditions. His purveillance is applicable in l
i L~
/
MODES 1, 2, and#, ne frequency of 72 ho. Er been dr: ~ t;r j
# a,. 1 1.m.;h , ~. :. ; .:p = - NM M N .!
thnh464ihaoddagrossbthl7N gwe riWy b ttN. .; SR 3.4.15.2 fp 4 gM h b !" " b M'"' h b *' " ' #- il J. uvi,,q ,wma 1 p,,hThis surv7 ' lance is perfortned to ensure iodine levels remain within limits g jfN7followingg wer changep The 14-day Frequency is adequate to trend i
'& changes in the activity level considering that gross activity is monitored every 72 424ous- The Frequency between two and six hours following a power .
5 % RTP within a one.bour period is established because iodine - , changeg,1,det spikes w.su this time Samples( at got other time $would y provideer inaccurate results.
% w p ..
(continued) SYSTEM 80+- B 3.4-70 Amendment Q 16A.7-70 June 30,1993
CESSAR 8!ai"lCATl3N i f i l I i RCS Specific Activity ] B 3.4.15 [
'5 i
BASES
.g <
d SR 3.415.3 g,\ d d f u~) A radio,r' . chemical analysis for E determination is required to be performed i every[(six months)with the plant operating in MODE 1 with equilibrium conditions. These requirements for $ determination directly relate to thb LCO and are required to verify SE@ operation within the specifiedfECO limiti The radiochemicd analysis for E is a measurement of the average energies per disintegratien ofisotopes with halflives $ minutes, excluding iodines. The Frequency of six months is based on th act thy E does not change rapidly during (peration. Thh Frequency hE8 E e-be
<=;"dk L L %vguius upedenee. ruagrims t dem.}cha~d" 'T. I V-
,. , ,e -~s f ,
7 SR 3.0.4 does not apply s3 that umMing can be performed,in MODE 1.' , y Hesample st be taken after a mininprm of two Effectivefull Power Days
/ and 20 da of power operation t. ave lapsed since the reactor was last subcritical for 2 48 hours. ThiyEnsures that the activity is at equili.brium
/,f ~ so the nalysis for E is representative and is not skewed by a crud burst or
. , -~/
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100, " Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population
/ Zone, and Population Center Distance," USNRC,1973.
~
( $5 8 Specification,1(yCS n W'l nprovements for (clear Power. Reactors, ' . RC, ' Februa K 1987. Z - C F%is - D C , $6cb h5 I, .3 .
% S "fJ ha (. bccw alc id o Id Ck C' 085
- h'd f
4* h ' #s s 6 t' M u t(c d 3 \ dJo * > [he < $(
\, *0 Ex {.e <{cnes J- vah%
A Cy t 1 cwe< du::. (Lvb 'J C d o;> c[ M CDL
,,r d s t < < e. & <<oc!w pai '1 ' '
I c(a i u s. hecb e D'"cv'n WI hi N !**sh lwe e\a
.g s 74. 9.gc5 m todjogb '
e volegg .I e al f e s & 2< p. <, CC N WNG D ' (c< E 'l '* O
- b f' q S&.,rp L n C w d. Y & c1 C'I ' V 'O O V ' '** * \ M" k -
SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-71 Amendment I 16A.7-71 December 21,1990
CESSAR Eni%mo c (h 16A.7.16 B 3.4.16 RCS LOOPS - TEST EXCEI'TIONS RCS Loops - Test Exceptions B 3.4.16 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS) B 3.4.16 RCS Loops - Test Exceptions k D tNF N r\/ n .. BASES C- \ - - N / BACKGROUND // This special test exception pe/rmits reactor criticality at' reduced RC
/ temperatures and under reddced flow conditions during PHYSICS TESTS l / while at low THERM ALPOWER levels. /
/ /
APPLICABLE nere are no trans t or accident analyses which specify the alloweh ' SAFETY ANALYSES boundaries of thi's LCO. However, operatirIg experience has dernonstrated this exceptionfo be safe under the present' applicability. ,/
'W. r .-
1 3\LCO The LCO is provided to allow for the performance of PHYSICS ' ' * "S in 0 MODE 2/ Without the LCO, plant operations would be held bound to the (
, 3 %) i p
normal operating LCOs for reactor coolant loops and circulation (MODES 3 " $ .5' 1 i 1 and 2), a minimum temperature for criticalities, and minimum pressure, Y c--j \ temperature air flow limits. Hence, the appropriate physics tests could not 4 '- { , be performed. 3{2g e 4 g gpg AD
- j g V- j e _
In MODE 2 wherene associated PHYSICS TESTS must be performed. - CNy >
, ]Y--t [ operation is s11 owed under no reduced' conditions provided th'e reactor trip
- E Z ' , i setpoints4f the OPERABLE power level channels are set at s; [5%) RTP.
Mipf.; 37 ; This,e$sures if some problem'Iaused the plant to enter MODE I and stait [ incr' easing plant power. [ Reactor Protection Sys' tem would automatijc ily er became too high, and thereby prevent vio)ation of f 3 3 'l J ? T S $5h "' () s'but it down before fuel design limits e LCO also requires ,that both RCS loops.and at least one RCP in ; loop be in operation to provide forced coolant circulation. N- K - s it also requir'es that the pressure / temperature relationship be maimained. v e. .- _ -- _~ APPLICABILITY nis LCO ensures that the plant will not be operated in MODE 1 without forced circulation. It only allows testing under these conditions while in _ MODE 2.gTherefore, no safety or fuel design limits will be violated as a result of the associated tests. [ %sar lp,b h4 I%,cddabbin N hd kJdcdcal Dahul 'rh } haw A 1> rucleAv [w l rt*HWAI M l' JcCo[n M es. ! (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-72 Amendment I ! 16A.7-72 December 21,1990 I
INSERT AC: (Page 16A.7-72) BACKGROUND .This special test exception to LCO 3.4.4, 'RCS Loops-H0 DES 1 and 2,' and LCO 3.3.1, "RPS Instrumentation," permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions during PHYSICS TESTS (natural circulation demonstration, station blackout, and loss of offsite power) while at low THERMAL POWER levels. Section XI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8 (Ref.1), requires that a test program be established to ensure that structures, systems, and components will perfom satisfactorily in service. All functions necessary to ensure that the specified design conditions are not exceeded during nomal operation and anticipated operational occurrences must be tested. This testing is an integral part of the design, construction, and operation of the power plant as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 1 (Ref. 2). The' key objectives of a test program are to provide assurance that the facility has been adequately designed to validate the analytical models used in the design and analysis, to verify the assumptions used to predict plant response, to provide assurance that installation of equipment at the facility has been accomplished in accordance with the design, and to verify that the operating and emergency procedures are adequate. Testing is performed prior to initial criticality, during startup, and following low power operations. The tests will include verifying the ability to establish and maintain natural circulation following a plant trip between 10% and 20% RTP, perfortning natural circulation cooldown on emergency power, and during the cooldown, showing that adequate boren mixing occurs and that pressure can be controlled using auxiliary spray and pressurizer heaters powered from the emergency power sources. APPLICABLE RCS loops-test exceptions do not satisfy any Criterion in SAFETY ANALYSES the NRC J)olicy Statement, but are included as they support other LCOs that meet a Criterion for inclusion. l
i INSERT AD: (Page 16A.7-72) 4 In MODE 2, where core power level is considerably lower and
.the associated PHYSICS TESTS must be performed, operation is allowed under no flow conditions provided THERMAL POWER is
< 5% RTP and the reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set 5 20% RTP. These limits ensure no Safety Limits or fuel design limits will be violated.
The exemption is allowed even though there are no bounding safety analyses. These tests are allowed since they are performed under close supervision during the test program and provide valuable information on the plant's capability to cool down without offsite power available to the reactor coolant pumps. P 5 I
CESSAR EnWicarisu r RCS loops - Test Exceptions B 3.4.16 BASES ACTIONS M If THERMAL POWER increases to > 5% RTP, the reactor must be tripped immediately. This ensures the plant is not placed in an unanalyzed condition, andfrevents exceeding the specified acceptable fuel design limits. [ h.l. B.2 and Bh
-/ /
If the CS temperature and/or pr sure is outside the P/T ts, the reactor' m .t be tripped immediately. e pressure and temper re must be respIed
'th the P/T limits. An en 'neering evaluation m e performed t tnsure s etural integrity of t CS prior to achievinp riticality.
%~
SURVEILLANCE '
/ 3.4.161N - s s REQUIREMENTS /
( / THERM AL POWER must be verified to be within limits once per hour. The
' hourly Frequency has been shown by operating practice tA be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation withinde LCO limits.
/ \
) SR 3.4.16.2 Within 12 hours of initiating PliYSICS TESTS, a CliANNEL j FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on each logarithmic power levelt c ! and,lineir power level neutron flux monitoring channel. 'Ihe interval is z N adequate to ensure that the appropriate equipmen L monitoring and protection of the plant during these tests. ,/ j e i A ,' I
+
N SR 3.4.16.3 l 5N f
\
C hQ Both RCS loops and at least one RCP in each loop must be verified to be in} s operation. The hourly frequency has been shown by operating practice to be i
.)
sufficient. !
/ 1 1
/ SR 3.4.16.4 (
l / h
\ The RCS temperature and pressure must be verified to be with the P/T limits. / j
~ The hourly frequency has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient.
-. _g s,.._ .
l ( (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-73 Amendment I 16A.7-73 December 21,1990 l 1
C E S S A R M8Mncu m,. f 3 RCS Loops - Test Exceptions B 3.4.16 BASES e
' ~
SURVEILLANCE j SR 3.4.16.5 ,- N REQUIREMENTS / / 'N (continued) The RCS tempefature must be verified to.' 2 [300*F]. Th ourlyg- , frequency haibeen shown by operating pra'etice to be sufficient.f
/ .e
')
/ i l h REFERENCES 1./ None.
/
( /
~
~ -
1 2 1 l l l
= l l
1 l I i l l 1 I SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-774 Amendment I 16A.7-74 December 21,1990
INSERT AE: (Page 16A.7-73) I lh SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.M1' l l REQUIREMENTS THERMAL POWER must be verified to be within limits once per hour to ensure that the fuel design criteria are not violated during the perfomance of the PHYSICS TESTS. The hourly Frequency has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and verify operation is within the LCO limits. , Plant operations are conducted slowly during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS, and monitoring the power level once per hour is sufficient to ensure that the power level does not i exceed the limit. Ib SR 3.4 Ef.2 Within 12 hours of initiating startup or PHYSICS TESTS, a ' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be perfomed on each logarithmic power level and linear power level neutron flux monitoring channel to verify OPERABILITY and adjust setpoints to proper values. This will ensure that the Reactor Protection System is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during startup or the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS. The interval is adequate to ensure that the appropriate equipment is OPERABLE prior t to the tests to aid the monitoring and protection of the plant during these tests. I REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XI.
- 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, 1988.
l 4
CESSAR En#lCATION 16A.7.17 B 3.4.17 REACTOR COOLANT GAS VENT SYSTEM Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System B 3.4.17 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS) B 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System BASES BACKGROUND The function of the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS)is to provide a safety-grade means of venting non-condensible gases and steam from the pressurizer and the reactor vessel upper head. The RCGVS is designed to be used during all design bases events for RCS pressure control purposes when main spray and auxiliary spray systems are unavailable. The operability of at last one RCGVS path from the pressurizer and at least one ! RCGVS path from the reactor vessel head to the RDT or the IWRST ensures { that this function can be performed. The RCGVS is a manually operated safety-grade system. It removes non-condensible gases or steam from the pressurizer and the reactor vessel through vent lines to the RDT/IRWST . Each vent line has :wo pairs of parsliel isolatioa valves which are closed during normal operation. During shutdown or transient conditions, if the operator determines that non-condensible gases have collected in the pressurizer or in the reactor vessel upper head, the operator follows the operating procedures to vent the gases by manually opening the RCGVS valves from the main control room. The RCGVS will have the capability to be manually actuated, monitored, and controlled from the control room as required by GDC 19. The two isolation valves in each parallel path are normally powered off of the 125VDC buses. Emergency power is provided to the valve by batteries. A FMEA (Table 6.7-3) demonstrates that the RCGVS will maintain a vent path after a single failure of any single valve or its power source. This demonstration satisfies the requirements of GDC 17 and GDC 34. APPLICABLE The RCGVS provides a safety grade method of RCS depressurization that is SAFETY ANALYSES credited during natural circulation and during steam generator tube mpture events. The operator uses the SI system, the pressurizer backup heaters, and the RCGVS to control RCS inventory and subcooling. The pressurizer vent ime is 1-1/2 inch nominal diameter to meet the EPRI URD requirement to vent one-half the RCS volume in one hour. The reactor (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-75 Amendment O 16A.7-75 May 1,1993
t CESSARanLua .
;I L ,
f e Reactor Coolant Gas Vent Systeci , B 3.4.17 BASES q APPLICABLE vessel vent line is a three-quarter inch line which expands to one inch through SAFETY ANALYSIS the valving. His provides adequate venting to remove steam and non-(continued) condensible gases from the reactor vessel head. CWfhfA2 CftTAt%C-LCO! The LCO requ es the RCGVS to be q rt!; for all design basis events. , ne RCGVS is when a vent p6th can be established from the pressurizerp% ct cchctd from theWad reactor vesselfo the RDT or IRWST. i In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two vent paths are required to be ci-. @... DWP t2 ' APPLICABILITY , ne RCGVS ic primarily used for natural circulation and for tube rupture events, however, it must be available for all design basis events. ; AII l A.2 7 e ACTIONS A. I. Af and k3' , ast. W I , With inoperable components, such that hci =!=yv wd..._!:; in ic v$nt path: v TavgterclWnk y the reactor vessel upper head to the RDT or the IRWST-a'r% operable, e C 4re :: cf i j g =h;; :g.: must be returned to ny-blgtatus within / 72 hours. 'If s @ = ._CVS =!= :..m m dm vent path from the i reactor vessel to the RDT/IRWST cannot be made epr51:within 72 hours, l then the plant must be in MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours, and then in i MODE 5 within an additional 36 hours. u eftfree-Based on the frequency of accidents for which this system is credited to help mitigate,72 hours is a reasonable and conservative time limit. This value reflects an adequate time allotted for return of redundant safety grade systems to operable status. h.7. I b M e 7-B. I . At.pd3-5 co
. 0W componems, such that bei +y ed-Cwl vt
;1 p l With inoperable 'a6 in 'h vent path from M ye wed. M =the pressurizerkto the RDT/lRWgT,M status within 72 hours.
!= t-ss must be returned to cr f d j;; "t canno CCVS ci '-9 r i: vent path from the pressurizegto the RDT be made operable within 72 hours, then the plant must be in MO
\tt Nf g .- 3 within an additional 6 hours, and then in MODE 5 within an additional 36 ;
hours. I (continued) i SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-76 l Amendmmt Q ' l 16A.7-76 June 30,1993
CESSAR naincum l r l l l Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System B 3.4.17 l BASES ACTIONS C.?,\ C.1. Ca. and C.3 C.7.s Q gg g gg.-
,Q (continued) Yg With components inoperable, such that-nere of S RCCVSy wa i: = 1
-eperste, at least one of the RCGVS vent paths must be returned to operable i status within 6 houn. If at least one RCGVS vent path cannot be made operable within 6 hours, then the plant must be in MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours, and then in MODE 5 within an additional 36 hours.
SURVEll. LANCE SR 3.4.1.17.1 REQUIREMENTS ; There is one manual valve in the RCGVS; it is in the vent path from the reactor vessel upper head. It is necessary to verify that this valve is locked open to ensure that a vent path can be established from the reactor vessel , upper head to the RDT. The 18 month frequency is based on accessibility I during the refueling cycle. SR 3.4.17.2 Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle verifies the RCGVS valves will function when necessary. The frequency of 18 months is based on a typical refueling cycle, and is an industry accepted practice. SR 3.4.17.3 Verifying that the pressure instrument root valves are open ensures that line pressure between can be monitored. The 18 month frequency is based on accessibility during the refueling cycle. SR 3.4.17.4 Verifying flow through the vent paths when cycling the valves (SR 3.4.17.2) ensures the RCGVS vent paths are operable. The frequency of 18 months is based on the frequency of valve cycling tests, and the refueling cycle frequency. N. _ (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-77 Amendment O 16A.7-77 May I,1993
= .
CESSAR nEncuiou Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System B 3.4.17 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.17.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification of correct breaker alignment and valve position indications ensures that valves can be operated when required, and valve position can be monitored. The frequency of seven days has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience. NtG12&tJLCS OM-l SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-78 Amendment O 16A.7-78 May 1,1993
CESSAR inWicavi3x r 16A 7.18 B 3,4.18 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION FUNCTION Rapid Depressurization Fun: tion B 3.4.18 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM B 3.4.18 Rapid Depresmrization Function BASES BACKGROUND The Rapid Depressurization Function (RDF) of the Safety Depressurization System (SDS) is designed as a manually operated system that removes steam or water from thc pressurieer through two isolation valves in each of two parallel der:essurization lines to the Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank. The RDF is designed to mitigate the consequences of a beyond-desigu4 asis event such as a total loss of normal and emergency feedwater (TLOFV). The RDF valves are closed during normal operation. These valves are motor operated and fail in the 'as is* position. The emergency power DC busses supply electrical power to the motor operators. Table 6.7-3 (FMEA) demonstrates that an RDF bleed path can be established in the event of a single failure of the valves or an electrical fault. The RDF will have the ( capability to be manually actuated, monitored, and controlled from the control room, as required by GDC 19. The RDF also performs an important function in mitigating a severe accident. During a core melt, the system would allow the RCS to be depressurized and reduce the possibility of a challenge to the containment, such as from direct containment heating. APPLICABLE 7he event for determining the size of the RDF bleed valves is a TLOFW j SAFETY ANALYSES event. The analysis wa. performed using a realistic version of the CEFLASH-4AS code with assumed best estimate decay beat values. Use of the realistic version of the CEFLASH-4AS code is acceptable because the ; RDF is designed to mitigate accidents beyond the design basis. Letdown, l charging, and pressuriur spray were not credited. In the accident scenario; l it is assumed that the initial RCS power and secondary steam are generated l at the rated output. The primary and secondary valves open at lift pressures , I 1 l (
\
(continued) ) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-79 l Amendment O 16A.7-79 May 1,1993 l l
CESSAR nai*icariau ' l r l 1 Rapid Depressurizatwn Function B 3.4.18 l BASES l APPLICABLE of 2500 psia and 1200 psia, respectively, and the RCS pumps trip 10 minutes SAFETY ANALYSES after the event is initiated. i (continued) ! Two cases were analyzed: (1) a TLOFW event with one RDF bleed path open, two SI pumps operable, and immediate operator action to open the RDF bleed path after the primary safety valves (PSVs) open, and (2) a TLOFW event with both RDF bleed paths operable, four SI pumps operable, and an operator delay to open the RDF paths after the PSVs open. The analysis shows that case 2 is the w rst case, which requires larger RDF bleed valves, each sized to meet the acceptance criteria. cy' O kfAfAE PdMW The LCO requires the RDF to be op(erable Botn' vent paths shall be c LCor ' for all design basis events. The RDF is opwaW when a vent path can be established form the pressurizer ta the IRWST. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2,3, and 4, at least one vent path is required to be operable, and both vent paths closed. The RDF is for use in beyond-design-bases events such as a TLOFW, and for mitigating severe accidents such as a core melt. M W ACTIONS A.I . A.2. and A.3 p ci th Y f_g t sbAs With inoperable components, such that both vent paths are ac4 4:::b!:, et least, onegvent path must be returned to opesaMe status within 72 hours, if at least one RDF vent path cannot be made operable within 72 hours, then the plant must be in MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours, and then in MODE 5 within an additional 36 hours. The 72 hour completion time is based on the extremely low probability of the beyond-design-basis event (TLOFW) that the RDF is designed for and reflects an adequate time allotted for return of redundant safety grade systems to operable status.
, ~_ ,
f B.I. B.2. and B.3 'w ' f _._ ~ .- i
/
, . N 1
/ ANSI 51.1 r6 quires two closed valves to maintain the pressure boundsry. If I
/ one valveis found open, at any time except when the RDF is being used for )
/ its desi'gn f.metions, the valve must be closed within 12 hours. Otherwise, the plant must be MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours, and be in MODE '
N 5 Mthin an additional 36 hours. - _-
&s _ _ -
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-80 Amendment Q 16A.740 June 30,1993
1 l CESSAR n="l CATION l l 1
' \
i ! l l l 1 Rapid Depressurization Function B 3.4.18 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.18.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that the pressure instrument root valves are open ensures that line pressure between the globe and gate valves can be monitored. De 18 month frequency is based on accessibility during the refueling cycle. SR 3.4.18.2 Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle verifies the RDF valves will function when necessary The frequency of 18 months is based on a typical refueling cycle, and is an industry accepted practice. SR 3.4.18 3 Periodic verification of the correct valve position indication in the control room for all RDF valves ensures that the valves are properly aligned, and [ that the porition indicators are functioning properly. A frequency of.souem Jgk is accepted by indus'.ry practice, and has been shown to be acceptable b'L] h6WS by operating experience. SR 3.4.18.4 Venfication of correct breaker alignment and power availability to the valve indicators ensures that valves can be operated when required, and valve positic,a can be monitored. He frequency of seven days is accepted industry practice, an d has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
,~e- ,,
D/ ),, SYSTEM 80+ B 3.4-81 Amendment O 16A.7-81 May 1,1993
i CESSARE h ia l Et% E ErlOf &ti CoeuNG GWTEr4 (Ecc.5) tg16A.8 B 3.5 SAFE"." INJECTION SYSTE." (SIS) B 3.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS (SITS )
~d. , .16 A.8.1 C s<
3.;p v' B Safety Injection Tanks 3 yd 8 B 3.5.1 pd d1 EMetaAc:f cac c=uce smuA (Eced c p B3.5 - m.. . ,, . .,.,,, v isTEM (';1S) _,i I of
.s
_F3
- 3e*- B 3.5.1 Safety Iniection Tanks MITs)
I
- a. - y4 IT h'
1
'4 W.3 li c.
s BASES
- c. f k.h BACKGROUND The functions of the four Safety Injection Tanks (SITS) are to supply water
}t al o tot:::re: het %r de e - during the blowdown phase of a less of
%e. reakr vedel Coolant Accident (LOCA), and to provide a-wates inventory to4aad-4a refillin;; 2: :cre ;.sd w .v./ e u Ju-ow-i Jac.ag i ix w .y y l : ,
tF* '"- 'ik SIT. y_... mu.yuumi, ou.vo ou vr..iui v wuiivi aG&iG39 ^.rc 4 r^ air;d foi O s.u iv yv.[vaan ilzsu iuuviivn. in!EN pr-- -~8 gravity - rM:' :: Ed.;.;ge O.; ;_;.'.: w, ;e_-g i, L
" --" " olant - S, Au. (RCS) if RC5 pressure' defeasea eclow m :
$$O irl%LT A Each SIT discharges its water volume directly to the reactor vessel downcomer via a direct vessel injection nozzle, also utilized by the Safety 'l Injection System. Each SIT is isolated from the RCS by a motor operated isolation valve and two check valves in series, ne motor operated isolation valves are normally open,with power removed from the valve motor to prevent inadvertent closure prior to, or during an acciden Additionally, .
Oc i'Me, m l - they are interlocked with the pressurizer pressure'*'j. " channels to ' Vobes ensure the valves will automatically open as RCS pressure is increased above - SIT pressurey,and to prevent inadvertent closure prior to an accident. He ! j valves also receive a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) to open. These features ensure the valves meet the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 (Ref. ,
- 1) for " operating bypasses
- and that the SITS will be available for injection without reliance on operator action. ;
gas a d M er ne SIT g ateevolumes, gas pressure, and outlet pipe size are selected to allow three of the four SITS to partially recover the core before significant clad melting or zirconium-water reaction can occur following a LOCA.- The need to ensure that three SITS are adequate for this function is consistent with LOCA analysis assumption that the entire contents of one SIT will be lost via the break during the blowdown phase of a LOCA. ; z (continued) { SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-1 l Amendment I l 16A.8-1 December 21,1990 l
CESSAR Enncmou . S q re d e b de. accephry_c liMS. bSd New koti AOer L] s O o M, Safety Injection Tanks p B 3.5.1
)vgyf 3 BASES
- m. ~- -m- w g u BACKGROUND
~
f This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance critena established j r hp5 (continued) i by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) for Ernergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS),will O60' [
\ _
be met following a LOCA: [,'y :f 3 5a x
$ Maximum fuel element cladding temperature of s 2200*F; l
')' b dM3 ~M )( Maximum cladding oxidation of s 0.17 times the total cladding fl
, ; ~1 !
thickness before oxidation; , a{ t or4 PACC C.' d ;d
- y Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium-water reaction of ILATO f c g5 \
s 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be gererated if all j' ) y i of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, l py8- \ excluding the claddiug surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; anci 9 d \ d. l 4j; i j( The core is maintained in a coolable geometry. 4 1
~5 8 'e 2 0 t g ,
g 'I e 5 Since the SITS discharge during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, they do not u4 y (contnbute to the long term requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.
% 0O vu #~m Anken oe M A APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The SITS are usted-for in both the large and small break LOCA analysis at full powegg.lln performing the LOCA calculations, conservative f
assumptions are made concerning the availability of safety injection flow.rIn o the early stages of a LOCA with a loss of offprte power, the SITS provide hj ~ the sole source of makeup water to the RCS.* This is because tise safety G . r- injection pumps cannot deliver flow until the : m;;;.;y diesel generators (tri l J T,j M[ start, come to rated speed, and go through their timed loadmg sequence. In yb.
.: pP
-gj cold leg breaks, the entire contents of one SIT @ assumed to be lost through l
y y d $ j 'p ' the break during blowdown, even through the SITS discharge their contents directly to vessel downcomer via the direct vessel injection ne2.zle
.. O c -
M $L The limiting large break LOCA is ayoublef'nded[uillotine,9'old l'eg g break
-; ,,; $ }[p at the discharge of the reactor coolant pump. During this event,the SITS l
&,j discharge to the RCS as soon as RCS pressure decreases below SIT pressure.
h p, [po f ~,; As a conservative estimate in the calculation of the reflood portion of the j g M4 Jia v l (contmued) SYSTEM 80+ B15-2 Amendment I 16A.8-2 December 21,1990
' ~]3sevr A: (ab -b pqe. ILAS-1 ') .
)
The blowdown phase of a large break LOCA is the initial period of the transient during which the RCS departs from equilibrium conditions, and heat from fission product decay, hot internals, and the vessel continues to be transferred to the reactor coolant. The blowdown phase of the transient ends when the RCS pressure falls to a value approaching that of the containment atmosphere. The refill phase of a LOCA follows immediately where reactor coolant inventory has vacated the core through steam-flashing and ejection out through the break. The core is-essentially in adiabatic heatup. The balance of the. SITS' inventory is then available to help fill voids in the lower plenum and. reactor. vessel downcomer to establish s recovent level at the bottom of the core and ongoing reflood of-the core with the addition of safety injection (SI) water, and yank are. The SITS are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The SITS are passive components, since no operator or control action is recuired for them- to perform their function. Internal tank pressure"v> sufficient to discharge the contents to the RCS, if RCS pressure decreases below the SIT pressure.. , I i t l 1 [ S
)
+
CESSARnahou n ' a , y yes % % yc&A'3 N'wA N%N ' "' "'*%
=a,
% r0 j$N[1 Ll
~
Safety injection Tanks B 3.5.1 3*- IJ3 -y BASES 3 , y *P 1 APPLICABLE accident, no credit is taken for safety injection pump flow until the SITS ure- I l SAFETY ANALYSES empty. This results in a minimum effective delay of over [60] seconds,
. s# s (continued) during which the SITS must provide the core cooling function. The actual y delay time does not exceed ,40] seconds. No operator action is assumed pff during the blowdown stage of a large break LOCA.
sv y .ijty The worst case small break LOCA assumes a time delay of h40] secondsl
-r before pumped flow reaches the corea /he SITS and an SI pump both play
, g --' { a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break sizeglecreasef,the "T+ g,J g -{e J role of the SITS decreases until they are not required and the SI pumps l become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.
Since the SITS are passive components, 7 failures are not l applicable to their operation. The SIT isolation valves, however, ary not L 'a u a is \ single failure pr f; therefore, whenever the valves are open, power i,hak4+ ' removed from their operatorsf LThese precautions ensure that the SITS are N F available during an accident (Refs. 4J. With power supplied to the valves g a single active failure could result in a valve closure, which would render one W SIT unavailable for injection. If a second SIT is lost through a DVI break, d
'Y -
only two SITS would reach the core. Since the only active failure which f could affect the SITS would be the closure of a motor-operated outlet valve, the requirement to remove power from these eliminates this failure mode. The minimum volume requirement for thi. SITS ensures that three SITS can P provide adequate inventory to reflood the core and downcomer following a 'd. LOCA. The downcomer then remains flooded until the Safety injection Pumps start to deliver flow. 36 The maximum volume limit is based upon maintaining an adequate gas b volume to ensure proper injection and the ability of the SITS to fully 96 m ged e lirndq / discharge, dJ te !'it the maximum amount of boron inventory in the SITS. l
) A minimum of [ ] narrow range level, corresponding to [1600] cubic feet (
gi and a maximum of [ ] narrow range level cor egnding to [1927] cubic feet of borated water,are used in the safety ar3(Tym as the volume in the SITS. To allow for instrument accuracy, [ ] narrow range (corresponding narrow range (corresponding to [1902] cubic to [1625] cubic feet)and [ Iy]N based upon the cubic feet feet) are specified. The aTa pre.ed$a ' the91[ figures are provided for operator use"M the level indication l provided in the control room is in %, not cubic feet. per cebes
- t_ ;n (continued) l 1
SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 3
)
Amendment 1 l 16A.8 3 December 21,1990
CESSAR En!iPICATION Safety injection Tanks B 3.5.1 BASES i ndrgen cover APPLICABLE The minimumhressure requirement ensures that the contained gas volume l SAFETY ANALYSES will generate discharge flow rates during injection which are consistent with (continued) those assumed in the safety EE$Ls ihaye cover M The maximumhressure limit ensureskxcessive amounts of gas will not be I injected into the RCS after the SITS have emptied. A minimumypysre of [570] psig and a maximum pressure of [632] psig are , g used in the analym To allow for instrument accuracy,*1575] psig nummum and [627] psig maximum are specified. g maximum allowable boron concentration eS T b upon boron precipation limits in the core following a LOCA. Establishing a matimum limit for boron is necessary since the time at which boron precipation would occur in the core following a LOCA is a function of break location, break size, the amount of baron injected into the core and the point of ECCS injection. Post-LOCA emergency procedures directing the operator to M le) anJ Wt nele.lestablish simultaneous L:!dd 'c;; injection are based upon the worst case minimum boron precipation time. Maintaining the maximum S!T boron concentration within the upper limit ensures the SITS do not invalidate this calculation. An excessive boron concentration in any of the borated water sources used for injection during a LOCA could result in boron precipation earlier than predicted. of N (f" I The minimum boron requirementshe based onJreginningp'f)dfe reactivity values and are selected to ensure the reactor will remain suberitical during the reflood stage of a large break LOCA. During a large break LOCA all fontrolflement f(ssemblies (CEAs) are assumed not to insert into the core l and the initial reactor shutdown is accomplished by void formation during blowdown. Sufficient boron concentration must be maintained in the SITS to prevent a return to criticality during reflood. Although this requirement is similar to the basis for the minimum boron concentration of the In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST)3the minimum SlT l concentration is lower than the IRWST since the SITS need not account for dilution by the RCS. riitt The SITS satisfy the-epicuarm of- Criterion 3 of the%4erm Policy Statement -as dcd.bcd in Ref-cc S. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-4 Amendment I 16A.8 ' December 21,1990
= - . . CESSAR Ennneme,.
f i t k Safety Injection Tanks B 3.5.1.
- i 77 BASES !
_Q; - h pc 3 LCO The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure the SITS are available to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA.- qh [FoudSITs are required OPERABLE to ensure 100% of the contents of[threel of the SITS will reach the core during a LOCA.fThis is consistent with the
.I l i 4_ }
75p rr 44 I assumption that the contents of one tank spill through the break for a DVI 0 i line break. IfJese-than three tanks are biected during the blowdown phase i
-.: 8 g A j .{,y
[ ! of a LOCA,the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) mayeet , [ pv k =id +For a SIT to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve .gg_ h{ _M gp,T4 must be fully open,with power removed,and the limits established 4for contained volume, boron concentration and nitrogen cover pressure must be 3 *E 6e met.
$.I gn q9 p.ph m 4 uTj '
APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, and MODES 3 and 4 with RCS pressure 2 {900] psia . c .i[ s' the SIT OPERABILITY requirements are based on+ full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases,the SITS are still - d
.J " required to provide core cooling as long as elevated RCS pressures and -
-l
[ 7{]
, y.r temperatures exist.
i l This LCO is only applicable at pressures 2 [900) psia. Below [900] psia, q the rate of RCS blowdown is such that the SI Pumps can provide adequate , 4.2 ~ injection to ensure that peak clad temperature remains below the 10 CFR L !
.h un 50.46 (Ref. 2) limit of 2200*F. i In MODE 3 and 4 with pressure < [900] psia and in MODESg5 and 6, the l . ] f
}5
-e[d SIT motor. operated isolation valves are closed to isolate the SITS from the l
2 . ~. RCS. His allows RCS cooldown and depressurization without discharging q$j the SITS into the RCS or requiring depressurization of the SITS. , 7M . e I rw9 ! JM ACTIONS Al
'TV 3 \S Wuh the boron concentration of one SIT'not within limits, i M.a W i cc x;;c : c;: must be returned to within the limits within 72 hours." In this condition, ability to maintain suberiticality or minimum boron precipitation )'
time may be reducedw!!;u argb the volume of the SIT is still available for injection.4the boron requirements are based'on the average boron ; be- ' concentration of the total volume of three SITS, the consequences are less -J 72-hours l severe than Qox ad e SIT,not available for injection.. . My would be if an I tJerg ~Ikas, ! (continued) [
.(
SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-5 Amendment Q 16A.8-5 . June 30,1993 j
~l l
.'w-CESSARinuten .
f Safety injection Tanks B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS Al (continued) is alle,JeJ Cc;;;b.eu TU e to return the boron concentration to within limits.ie-ecni:ca' 16 :=;=:= :22 ",-~M ce +: E ;;i;a.d Ed:y Fn. a ta = in %j!:: MODES. _ B.J
$ k f .
Wuh one SIT moperable, for a reason other than boron concentration, the SIT must be retumed to OPERABLE status within ede hour. In this j
/ondition,the required contents of three SITS cannot be assumed to reach the =
core during a LOCA. Due to the severity of the consequences should a I LOCA occur in these conditions, the ese hour Completion Time to open the valve, remove power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or Md nitrogen cover)(pressure ensures # prompt action 4- taken to return the - inoperable SIT to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time minimizes the j-e exposure of the plant to a LOCA in these conditions. t' C.1 and C.2 ' l N e plant must be placed in a MODE in which the ifQJoes not app [the[ be retumed . to OPERABLE status within the associated - - I-To adveue. On k Completion (SIT cannot Time /Thb b de : by ;! t S '--' bt least MODE 3 in- 4-3 dedos , we pbd six bours and by :d: ;; pressurizer pressure $t o < [900} psia within 12 hours. 'Ihe allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating [ rrud be b.u3bl io experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full r,ower3without-challenging plant systems. [_ gg. g m gg rnanner w J D.l .
# [~ 6 tnt go
. With moge tp'ysrs. Therefore, LCOne 3.0.3 SIT must moperable, the plant is in a condition o be entered immediately.
accident anal SURVEILLAhCE . SR 3.5.1.1 - every Qh*rs M enck n Mdon'd-REQUIREMENTS , . 35 L I"Ni "P'" Verification of pcs; vi; g,;a.ee, as indicated in the Control Room,- ensures the SITS are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if - (continued) . SYSTEM 80+ B3.54 Amendment Q 16A,8-6 June 30,1993
^ "'5 ':"
C r'E=
* *GMG=1 CERTIFIC K ATICN b^
3 4. ver dy broa correnirde- if b Y' 6 bil cMetl
;r rdMer recesar is fre s y &c ~IEw5T, lec%e 4Le . der, Ma ocm> i,, 4Le rwsT is wib fLe 97 hor,n concerrreca 3*f1 %wmenh. L is censideaf n.& 4ke. recem w Adiem of Nt.lRw-13u. (Ref. '0. i Safety injection Tanks ;
c ,, 2. B 3.5.I 73 e: E
~3 b g'd -
BASES a 4' 5
%q SURVEILI.ANCE SR 3.5.1.1 (continued) l
,y! REQUIREMENTS a valve should be '- 'prhll{ y "che) fl s c-i the rate of injection to thereduced. RCS"b" . If aan isolation
<>perated valve is not d I j, Although motor 5 valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could h y$ result in not meeting accident analysis assumptions. A 12-hour frequency r To :t ? ensur= ; ni i mat;=d n:h=: de w!" k +;.;My Met.:W! W! -
l limiting 4he4im: 1: ;-h:: :::!d h: 2p. :"' t: : &;nid =:d!% i 5 i SR 3.5.1.2 and 3.5.1.3 and ndroy, coe.r pressure 4,,dJ k j4 2 Mb he -n
. . C 1r -t
'!h.ecid v
3.ed, w,. der
- =rse:!!==w::== y.L.ne n smi
'h : L.ficg:b.aas
- c;= cce:p:e,,m bssL:nsepod min: =d b
{7 p zczer ;c! =: = Sind in i: SU: =: =f".;;=: to ensure adequate injection
}J y v during a LOCA. Due to the static design of the SITS, a 12 hour frequency Jj.3! 'f ;sJ subcM +wac # allows the operatofto identify changes before the limits are reached.and-bas b=2 theu- te he rrep':h!: i:::gh :;uai; =iude..cc. Op od,3 P
-j3 ,$, .-.J y c
6 experience Ls sbwa nis Freq t> be gri,yride Eir ' SR 3.5.1.4 M ' Y M I' ^ d car d n of Jt esM Ws. > j+ ;b }'}i "<l "S de "H
~
i- - Air =reci!!ane: === S!' 5-- - j- limits. On :: 10 :t::!: deign of i: SEs ==h.:sti ; 'frequency is adequate 31-day _i)12 Q t# y 3 to identify changes which could ocgur from mechanisms such as stratification
-i e 13J j hdkted Srr d or in-leakare. Sampling %vithin m hours after a 1% volume increase will
/ identify 4f if!=h ge from the RCS has caused a reduction in boron t
i c g i~ u sek, .dehge -- nc d - / concentratiodbelow the required limit. > 2 s.
$ r. >
dJx4 5 SR 3.5.1.5 r^ L /Y"
~
{ j
. This surveillance ensures that an achve failure could not result in e closure j of a IT motor-operated isolatif valve coinciddt with a LO A. If this q' wer to occur only two SITS would be availabl/for injection suming one 4
SI/ contents ar[ lost. Installation and removalof the breakers is e
! u6 der adminisfrative control /Since this surv illance is a vgrIfication that j reaker is r oved and is elatively easy, e 31-day frequency was c se .
" M WMF3 to provide dditional ass ances that the reakers are rpinoved. 'f l
-~~ .
-.n -
l i (continued) i SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-7 Amendment I ; 16A.8-7 December 21,1990 1
7 - CESSARnahnu r Safety Injection Tanks B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.5 (continued)
~ vj ^ ~ ~ ~
REQUIREMENTS ~~ - (continued) 'This SM is modified y a Note whijb allows power (6 be supplied to t
. .us
/ moto[-operated isol tion valves whfn RCS pressure,Is < [900] psia, allowtng operations flexibility by voiding unneces ry delays to mani late the reakers duri/g plant startup or shutdowns. en with power plied to he valves, in dvertent closu is prevented by e RCS pressure i terlock associated with he valves. W e closure to - r, in spite of the ' terlock,
\ e SIAS si i provided to e valve would pen a closed valv , should a
( LOCA occur _ _. SR 3.5.1.6 This surveillance ensures that an active failure could not result in the opening of a SIT solenoid-operated vent valve coincident with a LOCA. If there were to occur only two SITS would be available for injection assuming one SFT contents are lost. Installation and removal of the breakers is conducted under - administrative control. Since this surveillance is a verification that the breaker is removed and is relatively easy, the 31-day frequency was chosen to provide additional assurances that the breakers are removed. This SR is modified by a Note which allows power to be supplied to the motor-operated isolation valves when RCS pressure is < [900] psia, thus allowing operational flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during plant startups or shutdowns. Even with power supplied to the valves, inadvertent clo a.re is prevented by the RCS pressure interlock,' the SIAS signal provided to the valve would open a closed valve should a LOCA occur. l
- 1. IEEE Std. 279-1971, Criteria For Protection Systems for Nuclear REFERENCES Power Generating Stations.
- 2. 10 CFR 50.46, Acceptance Critena for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants.
- 3. CESSAR-DC Section 6.3, ' Safety injection System." l
- 4. "> Branch Tuhmal-Podh pro rmp _ a,-enached '^ SRP Requirements-omW: - Opa;:cJ Wive +m4hefGGS Axumator Lineer-l
- CEsW2-DC C6p'er Y5, " [A(c4) erd ArJpn."
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-8 l Amendrnent Q 16A.8-8 June 30,1993
g .J g EET W (Fler de pp llk 3- { Verification every 31 days that_ power is removed from each' t SIT isolation valve operator when the pressurizer pressure (9053 ' is **B999 psia ensures that an active failure could not . result in the' undetected closure of an SIT _ motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only.two SITS.would i be available for injection, given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. $1nce installation and removal of power to the SIT isolation valve operators is conducted under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency was , chosen to provide additional assurance that power is removed. l This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor coerated isolation valves when RCS pressure is-< 29994 psia, thus .; allowing operational flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during unit startups or ; shutdowns. Even with power supplied to the valves. _t inadvertent closure is prevented by the RCS pressure interlock associated with the valves. Should closure of a . valve occur in spite of the interlock, the SI signal provided to the valves would open a closed valve in the ev,ent of a LOCA. b T i f 1 I
C E"'c ELG CGMA RD CERTIFICATION DESITN f
. <s-Safety injection Tanks B 3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES 5. Emn;'- Tahnia: Pea. .s a OTP !CSO - lS, attachd :s SIP (continued) Appi cenon of 0.c 'Si.gle F.;Lm C. A. vu iv Manurity-Cuuiiuud -
E!:m:c !!y Op;m::d V:!=
- 6. L-Kr-Gasper 'CEOG) !:"= CEM " '35 'c D: '" E. Mudt'y (Dimiv. I'RRfNRC) J J Omenn ~; ::,1937 *CE" 335, C-C-Oa m . . C v.y R 3;iscn..J TechnisWfn :!cn: %!mr- !
m2 p ppt ;~, na =
<j O n. Draft NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specification Requirements."
ykiditional-Reference 8.--- ---40 CFR-50cAppendix,arr -GDC 35 En. igency Ceic Ca. ling em._ v; . [ 9. 10tFR 50, Ayis.rdir*rCOC 35 -- lnsp; ::c- ' E.w.rmy cere- , J Ce> ling 4ystenw
- 10. IO-GFR-50, Appadin,4rGEM2 Tcsiing uf E1ucrgcavy Curo Catling-System.-
1 fr-lO-CFR 50, ^.ppadit K ECCS E.ak.:.e.. MJcis.
- 12. Gir85-16rHigbBc- , Concentes+ ions, Agas: 23, lS5;
- 13. RG-449,-Pre <WeaFfesting c'Em: g@eling Sy, em;'c-Puuurn4W4:e+ Reactors rRew-OirSeptemberr4475.
14 --S RP-6:3;-Emergency-CwGeoling4ystenwrA prilr40 Bb 15.--NRC memorandum-Rrl=-Bayu to V Stel b rJr., :::c r rd d
-Interim Revisions-to-LCOr,-fw-ECCS-Component, Dr^-+ 1, 1975.-
SYSTEM 80+ H3.5-9 , Amendment I 16A.8-9 December 21,1990 I
I - CESSAR Enfincuim
- y. "Kcri uCItcTmr4 gs7(W bTd 16A.8.2 B 3.5.2 MS - OPERATING SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 Egtrot4Ci CoFC Coourt sisTor (Ecc.d B 3.5 SAFETY NECTfGN g- Ode}y Tnaedon $ siceSYSTEM 3 UT (5:S) d B 3.5.2 EIS - Operatine BASES
, . ~ -
. y ~ c --_ . . - , . - . , - , , . ,
BACKGROUND 'Ihe unction of the SIS is to supply water to remove decay heat from the f co , both ort and long term, in the event that normal cooling systems ( ( eam gene [rators oy' shutdown ho pling) cannot proy
' .\00 S [n C , upply bdrated water to the. reactor core following increaspd heat re val
' events /such as Inge steam line breaks, and to pIovide inventory S/G for x tube npture ev/nt.
-C -
/ ~ ~l. ~ % d C .-
Four mechanically redundant 51 trains are provided. Each train consists of an Si pump and the associated piping and valves. SI flow credited in LOCA analyses is dependent onthe pipe break location. Full flow from two SI pumps and four SITS is credited for a break in an RCP discharge leg. Full flow from one SI pump and three SITS is credited for a break in a DVI line; the flow from the remaining pump (Same emergency power train) and from one SIT is assumed to spill out the break. In MODES 1, 2 and 3, all Si i trains are required to be OPERABLE. This ensures that 100% of the core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event of a RCP discharge leg break or a DVI line break with a failure of DG to start. An independent suction header supplies water from the incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank to each of the safety injection pumps. Each Si pump discharges directly to the reactor vessel downcomer via the Direct Vessel Injection nozzle. The SI pump flow directs sufficient flow to the core to meet the analysis assumptions following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) j in one of the RCS cold legs.
~ - . ~ ~~ " ~~~~ ~ y
/ LCO 3.5.2 helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria established \ ;
by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref.1) for SIS will be met following a LOCA:
! a.
Me lo M ;) y Maximum Fuel element cladding temperature of :c; 2200*F
$ td Pay') \ b. Maximum claddmg oudation of :s; 0.17 times the total cladding M ;
thickness before oxidation. l
)
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-10 Atnendment Q 16A.8-10 June 30,1993
gsmTC - (Mer o Pn3o M~ s1s The function of the EC-C4- is to provide core cooling and negative reactivity to ensure that the reactor core is protected after any of the following accidents:
- a. Loss of coolant accident (LOCA);
- b. Control Element Assembly (CEA) ejection accident;
- c. Loss of secondary coolant accident, including uncontrolled steam release or loss of feedwater; and
- d. Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).
The addition of negative reactivity is designed primarily for the loss of secondary coolant accident where primary cooldown could add enough positive reactivity to achieve criticality and return to significant power. I 4 1 i l l
. J e CESSAR E5n"lCATISN i l
l
' i' !
r M., 7 A. ' m d L Jv 5 t.J - SIS Operating y} d_ % t B 3.5.2
.P2 -,4 2 BASES
~) C-a
-f . [ t, ; BACKGROUND [< % Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium-water reaction of
%)!6 V d
(continued) $ s; 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all . of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel,
/
f N nc4LloM [I excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to o react. '
-; s}4' 7 c)-
&' - t I Re core is maintained in a coolable geo:netry.
( Iq
& -?)M C fW 3(
Adequate long term core cooling capability is maintained.
%p The LCO also limits the potential for a post-trip retum to power following n3 6 ? a$ v a steamline break event and a CEA ejection accident.
6 JN b($d0 Nh 72E ,y y' Bd 1 During a large re A RCS pressure wi I decrease to less than 200 psia in less than 20 seconds. The safety injectiontsystems are actuated upon receipt of+SIAS. He actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in a j5 j fE , s programmed time sequence if offsite power is available the j safeguard loads y [ I~~/j -4 ,,
"T start immediately in the programmed sequence. If offsite power is not I (EJFI 7 available the Engineered Safety Features @uses shed normally operating loads J and are connected to the emergency diesel generators. Safeguardf loads are Y then actuated in the programmed time sequence. The time delay associated j
with diesel starting, sequenced loading and pump starting de:c-$ the time required before pumped flow is available to the core following a LOCA. I > APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES SI pump flow is set during pre-operational testing to ensure that the pump runout flow is not excessive when the RCS is at atmomheric conditions. 'Th s SI system is assumed to be opefable in the large break and small break
. LOCA analyses at full power, CESS AR-DC 6.3 (Ref. 2). The delivered SI pump flow credited in safety analyses for a LOCA is dependent on the pressure conditions that exist as a result of the size of the LOCA. SI delivery curves define the SI performance credited in the large and small ,
break LOCA analyses over the operating range of the SI pumps from pump shutoff head to pump runout flow. The main steam line break event also establishes the flow-bead requirement and in addition establishes the , minimum required response time for actuation of the pumps. The Steam Generator Tube Rupture (STGR)jCEA ejection.and inadvertent opening of an atmospheric dump valve analyses also credit t$e SI Pumps, but do not limit the design. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-I I Amendment Q 16A.8-11 June 30,1993
CESSAR1annema : f SIS - Operating - B 3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE The large break LOCA event with a loss of offsite power and a single failure SAFETY ANALYSES (disabling two SIS trains) establishes the OPERABILITY requirements for j (continued) the SIS. During the blowdown stage of a LOCA, the RCS depressurizes as primary coolant is ejected through the break ~into the containment. The- . nuclear reaction is terminated either by moderator voiding during large breaks '! cLeig d or CEA insertionf8r small breaks. long-term shutdsn is preserved by the gg a bwated-water delivered by the SIS to the core. Following depressurization, emergency cooling water is injected into the direct vessel injection nozzles, flows down the downcomer, fills the lower plenum, and refloods the core. On_ smaller breaks, RCS pressure will stabilize at a value dependent upon y and i@da M*'#" break sizeped heat loadd The smaller the break, the higher this equilibrium pressure and the lower the injection flow rate. In all LOCA analyses, injection flow is not credited until RCS pressure drops below the shutoff head of the SI Pumps. i heil-ob " TheheatLCOboil 4ffensures rates soon an SIStodivision enough willuncovery minimize core deliverfor' sufficient water to match decay a large LOCA. It also ensures that the SI Pump will deliver sufficient water during a small M _r-+LOCA, and provide sufficient boron, in conjunction with the CEA's (assuming that the most reactive CEA does not insert), to maintain the core - suberitical following a SLB. sdid<es N2c-615 -operab3 f h816 div~ em -";t '9 r-" rf Criterion 3 of the4aweie Policy Statement - A7 'd LCO In MODES 1, 2 and 3, four independent (and redundant) SIS trains are l required to ensure sufficient SIS ' flow is available to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA assuming a single failure coincident with a LOOP. Additionally, the SIS divisions may be called upon to L mitigate the - consequences of other transients and accidents. In MODES 1, 2 and 3, an SIS train consists 'of a SI pump, the piping, l instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE' flow path capable of taking suction from the IRWST on a SIAS. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 Amendment Q 16A.8-12 June 30,1993 2
x CESSARini%ui. ,
. SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 -i BASES 4
[f.a p4 -
'I LCO During an event requiring SIS actuation, a &7 h is provided to ensure an ,
abundant supply of water from the IRWST to the RCS via the SI pumps and j (continued) ,. their respective supply lines to each' of the four direct vessel injection ; (W gh l nozzles, la the long term, av.y.L may be switched to supply part of its flow to the RCS hot legs via the hot leg injection nozzles on two of the . trains. l ,
@ pA i The tiewpeth for each train must maintain its designed independence to ensure that no single failure can prevent delivery of the minimum required ,
flow rate.
, bru k APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3'the SIS OPERABILITY requirements for the limiting h nh5 Accdd (DBklarge LOCA, are based on full power operation. Although reduced S
3 power would not require the same level of performance, the accident analysis - does not provide for reduced cooling requirements in the lower MODES. ' Surveillance requirernents for Si pump testing are based on the limiting safety - [ analyses. Surveillance requirements for SI pump performance are specified to ensure that head / flow characteristics, as measured at design conditions, are within the tolerances allowed in developing the Si delivery cunes over the operating range from shutoff head to runout flow. ' of McDC 4 Te, MODE-+ SIS functional requirements e described in LCO 3.5.3.
- A pb.Wy of a 7 In MODES 5 and 6, pkg conditions are such that an event requiring SIS
[ l injection is extremely low.' Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are
' ks LY- MeoL5 1# addressed
.2d C:; ate:= Loops
'9;; MODE- 6 core cooling 1l Filledg and by LCO 3.4.7.h Loops' cNot CocLn:
Filled! LCO 3.4.8,4 < il requirements are addressed by"LCO*3.9.4,'St utdown Cooling &and Coolant' .; CirculationfHigh Water l_evel, LCO 3.9.5, Shutdown thHndand Coolant i Circulatiorglow Water Level,"and LCO 3.10.4hReduced%ventory Operations s - Red Perwah" i j (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 13 Amendment Q j 16A.8-13 June 30,1993 i
-4 ' - - - - - - - ~, , , . . _ , . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ , , _;,
CESSAR'ni h ou . 1 [ SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS Ad TF Am w Wtth-one or more ecmps;=e:: inoperable such-th: !~2" ^' 1: :q:=!=: P.u - o f .o SIS i .ui a ovi hdiy GPI'RAI)EE, the inoperable components l must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. Io do, moda.e , e.: ::nxin' ; OPER ^. ELE S!S ==p::=2 ::: c':q:::: !c pere:- 1: S!S T r, ,,, -, ; m ., i rm, y,, . ,p g ..,v, ..i:aa py:, ..a .mi u-o,. . .: i. c a. .__ i . l SI- .p
/ us,n areb W1
\ n i;....;;is; OPEPJ"LE a ;~ .aL ,e.id. a:;o.7 ^"!'y. The 72-hour (Ref. 4) b;kd on : ria :v; a.:ieg and is a reasonable time feV many l Completion T e A.o repairs. % mout 4 a ,'n An SIS Je mpi is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design
$ flow to the RCS. The individual components are inoperable if they are not l capable of performing their design function, oriupporting systems are not available (except as allowed by their respective LCOs).
T.; L C O :;q :::: ^: OPEP ^ ?!L!"? cf : _
-%- ^' ' tp r h-!
[
=Ey:' r. An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an emergency diesel generator can disable two SIS trains until power is l restored. It is assumed that flow from the third SI pump is discharged through the break. Analysis has shown that flow from one Si pump is sufficient to keep the core covered for a break the size of a DVI nozzle l which is the limiting SBLOCA. Hence, continued operation for 72 hours is justified. In Cvuda.vo :', i: ph,;' a _=:: ' ^' b"q re- ~;":r-'
_ . _. S ' ; ir. ' mm.
- "e. . _:.f '. ' ^ ^ , " $ " " - ^ ~7 ' ' t ^" ' '^ ' ^ ^' '~^
B.1 and B.2
, Me plant 2nust be r4 a MODE in which the LCO does not apply the 4ra,n / [noperable"couidnL cannot be EMED to OPERABLE status within the wassocjAted Comnirtinn Timr/Tois is donc by ph ing i: ;!=: ingt least k !", acL e M dah t, MODE 3 %six hours followed by placing the plant in Mode 4 within 12 g 1 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating 4
dh [4 y s experience, p. greach the required M condi'. ions from full power without challengmg ystems. T wb l . t
- in on rrclerlf mannu J
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 14 Amendment Q 16A.8-14 June 30,1993 _
CESSARin a m,. a i f
. c" e A d Y d E
b *e
+. Q
.,; a cj 5 N E --. p Cm gd >
y S E._ F 6 *9
~ SIS - Operating f d 4. 3 .3 B 3.5.2 E Y} [dU ,
tf %' F jfbASES I
] 52 !.
!* .I E SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 g c_ I t gEQUIREMENTS f6 4 h ,
Verification of proper valve position ensures the Sces & from the SIS. 2h 37 J pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render -
-$]g ]' e$ the associated S1S train inoperable.tThese valves are of the type described-G
\8 .2 d EE s *5 ') in Reference 5 that can disable the function of the associated SIS trains, invalidating the accident analysis. A 12-hour frequency easwes-a i ripc ::! cad;&: . "! bc qu.1@ instiS:d cd.!!;!!au;.;;ic ;.u~ ie y: t reu!d Ec ep:=ted in ; kg. ; &d ;caditionr- h - G~Acce) reasomW m vies d ob adwoMrd.we. c.b.ir , ens.,r g &d a Asp >d%n.J ,
SR 3.5.2.2
*b* '5 ' " ""I' N P'*b' N q j
Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic , Sy 4 J valves in the SIS fidpaths provides assurance that the proper flowpaths will ] 1 exist 12ch SIS p w. His SR does not apply to valves which are locked, - l-sts 9A m sealed,or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing or securing. A valve which receives l an actuation signal ir allowed .to be in a non-accident position provided the valve wiH-automatically E$$:'"! within the proper stroke time. His j h,e;lla --> Ib;u.r:d /.;;.;; does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, ( it involves verification that those valves capable of p&-S!!y being .I mispositionedgare in the correct position. The 31-day frequency is: l appropriate because the valves are operated under procedural control, an l .i improper valve position would only affect a single train, and the probability ')1 of an event requiring SIS actuation during this time period is low. This 3 frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. SR 3.5.2.3 With the exception of Systems in operation, the SIS pumps are normally in gg a standby, non operating mode. As such, Sc%.i piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Maintaining the piping from the SIS pumps to the RCS full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. His will also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of non-condensible gas j j (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel
~
i (continued) j
\-
SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 15 Amendment Q , 16A.8-15 June 30,1993
CESSAR DESIGN CERTIFICATl3N , o fcIl oid j (and comb rmi cperedin (7 hsed on co ndded on ed be des b enciie.m) d A etw. Tk oc6bo hic is ested as
~1 pctct J 4e. yneere %Qy F~eube ALAm sysb (EsrAs) icsbncy, C@prevd per[or, oc e. is roentiera) cg wr d a he-
-- 0 .Lynser ms. 7e s4.iin . pre ra to . SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 "j ~
75-3 BASES gg o . ,-. I M^ %y SURVEILLANCE
-.I e SR 3.5.2.3 ~7y f 'J -
[7 (continued) REQUIREMENTS followmg an S!AS or during shutdown cooling. The 31-day frequency is based on the low probability of an event requiring SIS actuation during this q )~c. V3
~
time, the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the SIS piping, and the g- -tpiocedural controls governing system operation. cdeqwy h 6d t. ~, n w EY s V
--- ~ ' -
~ r '/ r m )
' Flow and' differential head are normal tests of centrifugal ptynp performance P ,/
l
/ required by Section X1'of the ASME Code. The SI ptynps are tested at <
'@j c desi flow by routing the pump discharge through the test flow path back
% IRWST. Teding at the pump' design flow rate'is used to confi l
-.9 C 7 to 3 ;g b ; ad t>. pump perfelrmance over theeentire range of the SI pump curve. l' C P P performan credited in the dafety analysis at the pump design poiny'ir
+d D 'a flow of[ Fpm i gpm] and a i id]. e l
f h{1. t
> pecified Surv illance ent Requirem, of [gpm, gpm]differential and [ psid, i sidi pressure of[
gpm] on total pump flow and [ psid)
"E allows an indrument error ofd /
M* 65 h on measur differential pressure.
/ /
/
/
l c((- ]
$'s Inservicy inspections conf [rm component OPERABILITY, trend ppformance, and detect incipient failures by indicating a6 normal performance.- A quarterly J _,M, ;,-
freq cy for such teits is a Code requirement. r-h' oE7
~ ~
- 4" A0() ger c s SR 3.5.2.JAd SR 3.5.23 #
/ \
l These SRs demonstrate each automatic SIS valve actuates to its required position on an actual or simulated Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and that each SIS Pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SIAS. The 18-month frequency %r d:m!cp:d ecmid;"cp-i: ;; p;.iv 'h:: S :c surveillances edy M prformed during a p!~ eu9p. This-is-d= :c ic plant-eenditionswdd ;c imfu.a. ic SRs ad ic p;catial for aphm.ud plantireestents4f4hc SR arc perfors=d with4hc ;cac:cr : power. -Althe*gh the-actuatier,-legte49-tcsted as part+f-the-ESPAS-fuudmud ics omy 92 - daye, and equipmeat-performance i: =ni;cred as pn of :bc-- lu-.w Tci; Prc; ram Or.ams mmum h.= .hvon-that thex wayoucuu, virtuaHy 1dway s em ihu SR whcu yuivuucd vu ihc 18 muoih Twuy
- which-is wunui nh ihc ufuam3 y Jc.
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5 16 Amendment Q 16A.8-16 June 30,1993
j TNSEET D CPEec fo pop ItA.7-Id
; 5ts -
Periodic surveillance testing of fGGG pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by Section XI of , the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. ' This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of - the eriginal pump baseline performance and that the
-performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the unit safety analysis. SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses Section XI of the ASME Code. Section XI of the ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.
145EK i E' hferho ge I'd - SR 3.5.2.5 _ Discharge head at design flow is a normal test of charging pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code. A quarterly Frequency for such tests is a Code requirement. , Such inservice inspections detect component degradation and i incipient failures. .
)
l i
i CESSAR DESIGN CERTIFICATION { f SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES T SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.i, . REQUIREMENTS " Periodic inspections of ^ "" '" ' the IRWST Holdup Volume (continued) Tank ensures that ibis unrestricted and it stays in proper operating condition.
"'" " O ""
A00 tAstET F J #Y.T....!?:I .s.es_..?..?t_,li,1 m - REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.46, Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Section 6.3,
- Safety Injection System."
- 3. J. K C=pcr (CEOC) lc:tcr CECC S7 735-4c Dr T E. %. q (Dircc:cr FRR#4RC) datcd Dambci !!,1987 "CEN-335, C-C C :.'acrs Cisap-Restmetured Tcdudcal Spccincanons "06.~
(Griterie-Appli= tion).* (
- 4. NRC Memorandum R. L. Bayer to V. Stello, Jr.,oRecommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
- 5. IE Information Notice No. 87-01, RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in PWRs, January 6,1987.
-Ad&. T.cl Rc'; m. m 10 CFR 50, Appendix A GDC 35 - Emergency Core Cooling K System. m p 7 m, -
- , , -, .y
' 7.
[ Cooling Sy 'em.10 CFR 50, Appendix A/ GDC 36 -Ins
, /
8 10 CFRf 50, Appendix A, GDC 37 - Testing of Emergency Core Cooling' System.
, / / (
' 10 CFR 50, Appendi, K - ECCS Evaluziion Models. )
j 9. 10. 85-16, High B/ron Concentrations , August 23,19' / ;
/ -%
/
,\, ,,
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.5-17 Amendment I -l 16A.8-17 December 21,1990 !
C E S S A R EMMnca m u f SIS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ,.e v
, . - ~ . ~ , , - ,
/ 11. GL 85-22, Potential for' lass of Post-LOOA Recirculation REFERENCES Capabifity Due to Ins 01ation Debris Blo$kage.
(continued) [ [ 12. RG .1, Net Pos) e Suction Head or Emergency / Core Cooling ContainmenrHeat Removal Pu'mps, Rev. O, ovember,1980.
\ / /
f 13. jJTP MTEB 6-1. pH for Emergency Coolant . ter for PWRs. k
/
/
' 14. / /NUREG-0869, Containment Emergency Sump Perfo ce, October [985. / [
- 5. RG 9, Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core / Cooling '
Systems for Pressuri Water Reacto , Rev. 01, September 1980. l / l j
~
- 16. RG 1.82, Sumps f r Emergency ore Cooling and' Containment
\. pray Systems, v. 01, Novem r 1985.
- 17. f SRP 6.3, Emeh Cor ing Systems, Apjild 84.
w u -J i I l l l B3.5-18 SYSTEM 80+ Amendment I December 21,1990 16 A.8-18
f
~]35 Err F: (PJer y p3e (LA.7-D)
The 18 month frequency is based on the need to perfom this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during an ' outage, on the need to have access to the location, and on the potential for unplanned transients if the Suneillance This Frequency is were perfomed with the reactor at power. sufficient to detect abnomal degradation and is confimed by operating experience.
TNsket A: CPAer , pge ILA.9-2) The inner steel containment and its penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. Loss.of containment OPERABILITY could cause , site boundary doses, in the event of a DBA, to exceed values given in the licensing basis. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 60, Appendix J (Ref. J), as modified by approved exemptions. 4 Iheisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthe containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier: .
- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: i ,
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
- 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE except.as provided in LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks."
1
'l i
D CESSARnnLm. f l6A.9 B 3.6 CONTAINh1ENT SYSTEMS , 16A.9.1 B 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT l Containment B 3.6.1 i B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Con *sinment l s BASES , BACKGROUND ne containment vessel, including all its penetrations, is a low leakage steel shell which is designed to withstand the postulated less of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).and while limiting the 'l postulated release of radioactive material to within the requirements of 10 ' CFR 100 (Ref.1). Additionally, the containment and shield building provide ; shielding from the fission products which may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions. . The containment vessel is a 200-ft, diameter s iherical steel shell with a wall thickness of approximately one and threcquarter inches. This entmament ' shell ir w;; ported by, but not anchored to, a spherical depression in an intermediate floor of the shield building. The shield building is a reinforced . concrete cylindrical building with a hemi-spherical dome which totally encloses the containment. ; e The internal structure is a group of reinforced concrete structures that enclose the reactor vessel and primary system. The intemal structure provides
. 3 biological shielding for the containment interior. He internal structure concrete base rests inside the lower portion of the containment vessel aphere.
He primary shield wall encloses the reactor vessel and provides protection for the vessel from intemal missiles. He primary shield wall provides i biological shielding and is designed to withstand the temperatures and . < g i pressures following*LOCA. In addition, the primary shield wall provides )' structural support for the reactor vessel, ne primary shield wall is a minimum of six feet thick. He secondary shield wall (crane wall) provides supports for the polar crane and protects the steel containment vessel from intemal missiles. In addition - l to providing biological shielding for the coolant loop and equipment, the crane wall also provides structural support for pipe supports / restraints and :
'l j
1 ( m (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6 Amendment I 16A.9-1 December 21,1990 -
CESSAR EnnnCATION z U % e 6 E etce Oe des @n leke. rMe, Eaf ec~ Containment { qo ]3 - B 3.6.1
'70 a
e 4'n -? BASES ;
+
.g u BACKGROUND platforms at various levels. The crane wall is a right cylinder with an QE g (continued) inside diameter of 130 feet and a height of 118 feet from hs base. The crane wall is a minimum of four feet thick.
-+Q
$f&
__o I $ Containment piping penetration assemblies provide for the passage ofprocess,
;y [ service, sampling and instrumentation pipe lines into the containment vessel P0" OPEVIEi g I while maintaining containment IMegrhy. The shield building provides J ,] biological shielding and controlled release of the annulus atmosphere under jc accident conditions, and environmental missile protection for the containment
-t ; vessel and Nuclear Steam Supply System.
] ') j ICO TrntyT A
,y
~
$ n ~ ~j 7 &-
fT C- APPLICABLE (Th ,containme OPERABLE LCO was derived from the . $quirements r r ated to th control o offsite radiafion doses resufting from mpor m) j/ J SAFETY ANALYSES j ceidents. 's LCO is ntended to en'sure that offsite' dose limits ar/not exceeded, y verifying, at the ac ' containment I d rate does no sceed the valu assumed i e plant saf analysis, w I , uwy - l The Dcsii ;n Bws n,cciL;., (DBAs) which result in a release of radior.ctive l l material within containment are a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), a Main Feedwater Line Break (MFLB), and a Control Element Assembly (CEA) ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis , I of each of these accidents, it is assumed that the containment and containment ! shield building are OPERABLE at event initiation such that the majority of the release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. In addition, for the above accident it is assumed that the containment low purge is operating.
% demnej W A The containment has %n ticcM ts an allowable leakage rate of [0.5] l l percent of the containment volume per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used l
i in the evaluation of offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 i CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 4) as La: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (Pa) following a DBA. The calculated maximum peak containment pressure [48.1] psig was obtained from a [0%] power MSLB DBA. The containment internal design pressure is [53.0] psig. The allowable leakage rate represented by La forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containmentJ.eak rate testingSatisfactory leak test results are a requirement l Q j Q kwdn for th: establishment of containment OPERABILITY. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6 2 Amendment O 16A.9-2 May 1,1993
'_u46EEF3:(Pder bPy (lA 9'3)
Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1). Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that , is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those ' leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2) [, purge valves with resilient seals, and secondary bypass leakage (LCO 3.6.3)] are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix J. l 1 l 4 i l
- . ,..- - . . = .-- - ~
t CESSAR1lnamo j l r 4 4 6 Containment B 3.6.1 BASES :
.I APPLICABLE ne acceptance criteria applied to accidental releases of radioactive material ;
SAFETY ANALYSES to the environment are given in terms of total radiation dose received by a member of the general public who remains at the exclusion area boundary for . I two hours following onset of the postulated fission product release. The limits established in Reference I are a whole body dose of 25 Rem or a 300 Rem dose to the thyreid from iodine exposure, or both. , Criterion - 1 ntainment OPERADLE stisfies the requ;:ance;;; cf Sckc;ba Cac..e 3
% [f othe NRC latene-Policy Statement - '- - - -
' ' " ' - ' E i
LCO He ntainment OP r-LE LCO requires the exi ce of a leak ti con inment structu . i I s /,
' e provisions this LCO are implemented by /suring:
/ j
- ADD Wster B
- 1. Co inment I
/
ge rate are within imits. [ . i
- 2. tructural int rity of the conta' l ent is maintain .
7 He casures imp mented to meet th above requireme provide assuran the contain:ent will perform i designed safety ction to mitigate e , nsequences accidents which uld result in off ' e exposures comp ble APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive g, I material he- containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and .! consequences of Caese events at: reduced because of the Reactor Coolant l System (RCS) pressure and temperature limitations of these MODEssie. ! MOOC 5, Nd hr.ad'hi ; evchuc;; :. c :=da::='. *Re requirements for t containment during MODE 6 refueling operations are addressed in LCO 3.9.3,[otainment Penetrations.# j i rebre. , ConIainmerd S rok 09 ired ho be. OPETA3tL m MoOE 6 fo t bic, I eT raclicacIve, rnderso! Aror, preencordcunenent. p (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-3
]
Amendment I - l' 16A.9-3 December 21,1990
.i
CESSAR nutricmot i
'l
-i i
Containment l B 3.6.1 j i
-t- BASES '}
'b ACTIONS AJ, ., l c
-t-In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored in OPERABLE status within"ene- hour. The efne hour Completion Time . 'I i
-$J ggg provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containmenthluring MODES 1,2,3, and 4. " Ibis - l 7 time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring ' yp containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where containment is "r. j eJ inoperable is minimal. 2 2 rJ j# L1andB.2 i e ,
-1;:;
t Me plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apph gtainment cannot be restored to UPERABLE status in the associatedf ( Cornpletion Timefilds is donc Ly piecbg ic p!=: 5,at least MODE 3 e 4-- - g r-+-sia hours and p MODE 5 M6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are YgI^ reasonable; based on operating experiencej to reach the required MODES from t_ 1,n} .c on,(Hon 3 , full power without challenging t covM.w in om onte plant ds stems.e mnner and SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 g d-. , REQUIREMENTS . . Maintaining containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual
\eday rde ' examinations and ink-test requirements of 10 CFR 50, AppendixxF %,e4R ,
> re!'.cce ic !d re:c n:- .g .muomua -.J. us.na w mer ii wu;-.. . t leakagc gypc ,^ Id ::e), :.nd qu4.nca; ha:ch Idegc (Tjig 0 Is.i 66)
DE C _ and Con:aum. cat-Isolation-Valver-exceptf!44ch] ymse ,elvo (T;ye C is.i tests)-T1;cac ;ericdic 2;tinereetuiremente-verify 1:: Sc ;c;=ba.ca: :d - i;M deco LO: wacul. ;hu kok 1.k muod au das suddem anaiysis.
"ci~m. chock deer sc;l Idage cs:ing i; add.md b ECO 3.0.2. T1.c surveiHance fiqucacy is .qsa Ly Ayysodix-J, - mJo, 3R 3.G.2 (which allows-surveillance 4regscecy cxtensionsNoci, no; .yy j.
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11, " Determination of Exclusion Area, Imw Population Zone, and Population Center Distance.' r
- 2. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Chapter 15, Accident Analysis.
P (continued) I-SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-4 Amendment I , 16A.9-4 December 21,1990 F
-~ +,e,
r Tt4swT C : (Plu E pSe (LA.'t-4)
, is mo~dified by approved
'eiempti 6ns . Failure to meet alr~1ock and purge valve with resilient seal specific leakage limits specified in LCO 3.6.2 and LCO 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis. 5 l l
CESSARnah m t Contamment B 3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES 3. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Section 6.2. Containment Systems. (continued)
- 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, ' Primary Reactor Containment iabge Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.*
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(Director-NRMNRC) dr.:cd -- Omons. 11, 1997 "CEN455, C-E g'. v& b s e r.__.__ n_ . . . . . , . . .
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C-,u.m u. u SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-5 Amendment I 16A.9-5 December 21,1990
CESSAREHi%ma ; e s i htR ,
]
16A.9.2 B 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT PC"SONNEL-LOCKS Air . Containment P;.a..;d Locks l <
'l B 3.6.2' B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AW B 3.6.2 Containment Parr-d locks
- j BASES BACKGROUND Two dontainment ;;d ideks form part of the containment pressure bounIlary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of l operation. -l a.ir .
Each g- " lock is nonunally a right circular cylinder [ ] feet in I Ovh J diameter with a door at4edi end/. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when containment operability is not g )
' requiredf the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors l to 6 OTWfLtf.
to remain open for pxtended periods when frequent containment entry is 1 necessary. Each g?f. .d lock door has been designed and tested to certify -[ .l its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected j pressure following a DBA in containment. As such, closure of a single door l q h cda,M === 1: n.;;. uaa ;; OPEP ' OLE. Each of the doors contains double -! PE9/6dd ;geslN+ seals and local leakage rate testing,, capability to [Shie pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the phand lxk design uses pressure .i
~~
'j*5 seated doors (4%, an increase in containment internal pressure results in increase :1 sealing force on each door).
&r Each personne k is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever ?? 1 md lock door l l l 1
interlock mechanism is defeated.
/
n)V 6k R t 1 The, Containment Pc.-nd)deks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and eie-tightness is essential te4nst i fu cu.rb.ung 1be- oig.: d== 9e : Dwign Sci; .^.xiin: (DBA). Not maintaining personnel-lock integrity or *irgightness may result in eff2fd=: in excess ronbrnd teab 3e g4 g y of these-deseMin the pl=: :=iint analysis.4
* ***' bau y;} Sjef
- a. te L a 14 rek.
~W % .01 koke. (be. Ccquaerebs gr. in e codcc m e wik \o cm Fo , ApperJv 7 (pef.4),
ai rnochfied bf app (,w.c} everh'ans. (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-6 Amendment O 16A.9-6 May 1,1993
}$E2T (: ehr D e The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and y exit to perfom repairs on the affected air lock component.
If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. "If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable because of the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be imediately closed. If ALARA conditions exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock. pemit, entry and A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,. for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. A third Note has been included that requires entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage limit. l l l 1 l i i
i i CESSAR naince j i f l I AV. a- ! Containment "- ' Locks -l ! B 3.6.2 l i
-i BASES :
APPLICABLE ne Containment Personnel Lock LCO is derived from the requirements SAFETY ANALYSES related to the control of off-site radiation doses from major accidents by : verifying that the actual containment leak rate does not exceed the.value j assumed in the accident analysis. The DBAs which result in a release of radioactive material within . i containment are a LOCA, a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), a Main Feed . Line Break (MFLB), and a CEA ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE at event initiation, such tbst release of fission products to the environment is l controlled by the rate of containment leakage. In addition, for the above accidents it is assumed that the containment low purge is operating. He I containment $ 5:: !!-a:o te an allowable leakage rate of [0.5] percent of l . ) i l W w dc5gned containment volume per day (Ref. 3). His leakage rate is defined in 10 i wijk CFR 50, Appendix Jqas La: the maximum allowable containment leakage ! (fd.M ] rate at DBA.the calculated This maximum allowable leakage rate formspeak containment the basis pressure for the acceptance criteria (Pa) follow! (' imposed on the .;a.- c;ilh3%u.....~ associated with the FEE :' lock. , ne acceptance criteria applied to DBA releases of radioactive materi21 to the environment are given in terms of total radiation dose received by a member of the general public who remains at the exclusion area boundary for two ; hours following onset of the postulated fission product release.' The limit .+ established in Reference 1 are a whole body dose of 25 Rem or a 300 Rem dose to the thyroid from iodine exposure, or both. . o cu i Application of single failure criteria to the ;: r::::! locks is not required l because the p:E=:! locks fulfill their design safety function in a passive manner and are not sub door in each p"$x:: lock isject to active sufficient to ensurefailures. OPERABILITY Therefore, following closure l of , postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed,when the pMh:! lock is not being used for normal entry and exit from containment. [ ., The gontainment P =:! Jhks satisfy 0.; .qa.ic m.;. of ScLe;.en-CrMerb 4 nteriir 3 of the NRCletemn-Policy Statement = d sa.s:;,11 Efe.m.. t 4-- i h (continued) ~ SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-7 - Amendment O 16A.9-7 May 1,1993 -
.~. - _. ,_ , ., , - . . ,
- CESSAR Enske Cbsore.da9nhc deer in eacL air lock ss sd b oend do pr.WJe a- leak Mc i 'owerier -followig posblMed everds . bdleh55, Ldk cleors are. hepi closee! Men Ik cWe locb l's ncE E ng used for norrd m4ry mio and eut free cenbomud, L
Containment "--- - ' Imks B 3.6.2 BASES LCO Each ontainment Pc :hk forms part of tne cont =4 ment pressure i boun ry. As part of contamment, the personnel lock safety function is g* C4 Q related to control of $ff:I:: ad!::len :pc=es-resulting from a DBA. Rus, eachi fL_: lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to b'qe rde, the successful mitigation of such an event, Each apa~irand lock is required toRABLE be 4k For e p ; ;c;;d Air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the @Eba mechanism must be OPERABLE, the s.Ob-d lock must be in compliance with the Type B pf$and lock c6r loc M leakage test and bothhloors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one p:$5:nd lock door of ; ,TcE.;d lock to be opened at one time. %is
? provmea-easu=: int : grc= hr;.;;h cf :catin;;;; dee; est crist-when containuan: .; q .rd :s h; 0"C" A"LE. Each door is designed to l withstand the peak containment pressure calculated to occur following a DBA.
n!: LCO ::== 1:: t; Cs;t.n;xa: "c.~m.d Loch ;;; p.fa.m 0,ar ( dedp =fety fr:H :: =I::g;::i::anxqu;acc; of;a;dcou .a;h :d l
==!! : eff:h: ::pc=ca :.cs.p;ahk c i: " f.,a, : : ::_;;.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Herefore, the pntainment Pe*rsonnelfecks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. In MODE 6. fuel handling evolutions are conducted. The requirements for the g'ontainment [ir J'ocks during MODE 6 refueling - operations are addressed in LCO 3.9.3,' Containment Penetrations." In cmcl ' MODES 5%e 6 with reduced RCS inventory conditions, the requirements of the [ontainment fit pks are addressed in LCO 3.10.5. ACTIONS A.I. n.... .
- n. .
... w u n. t .t..
A.2) nnJ A3 ensures MJ - g g- i g. - a3e cur . 1 With one pei~cmd lock door inoperable g or it :: p:rcr:! !=h '-^r an& inter!~t rhr? '7:sth in one or more potainment "cYm l b iryj k m.in.) focks, the OPERABLE door *in each affected hntamment "Emd yock i must b :b=d :.;d main:2ind dead. This esses a. leak tight contamment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE p:EEnnd lock door. This ua.i) (continued) l SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-8 Amendment O 16A.9-8 May 1,1993 -
' N J
i:- _LAsm L_ ' '(Mec -ho g - K A.Si
~ _ _,s lequired Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation' areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically' restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper-position, is small. ~
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1
r T65EETM: Mec 70 ge.ILAS-9 The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls. Containment entry may be required to perform Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities on equipment inside containment that are required'by TS or activities on equipment that- support TS-required equipment. This Note is not intended to preclude performing other activities (i.e., non-TS-required activities) if the containment was entered, using the inoperable air lock, to perfom an allowed activity listed above. .This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is
/ , expected to be open.
l l i 1
h _l NSERT N7 (hriec P geum y The Required Actions ha've been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the : appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and exit from containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one i door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock). Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small. 4
i f_ k @ Q: e er 70 % f NYO 4T~th one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or 8, Required Action C.1 requires action to be initiated imediately to evaluate previous results. combined leakage rates using current air lock test An evaluation is acceptable since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal ; test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g., only one seal per door hasd failed), containment remains OPERABLE, yet only 1 hour (per LCO 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to( OPERABLE status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the i overall containment leakage ' rate can still be within limits. i
~
Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected \ containment air lock must be verified to be closed. This action must be completed within the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to , OPERABLE status within 1 hour. 4 . Additionally, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to - OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable aii lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock. 4 f l b
CESSAR anWicari:n her cylinindrubut cmdrols. e
. C d
E7c 2 hir Contamment ";cnud Locks
- w 9 -_-
9-S_ B 3.6.2 i u* ::' , C. BASES
.2 (' ACTIONS A. I . ,A .2. A. 2.2.1 ;-,5 .^.12.2 A.9, ed A.3 5J g (continued) i
,~
j action must be completed within e{ne hour. This specified time period -l- is _,9 -t consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1 which requires containment to f_g be restored to OPERABLE statusin4e,e hour. jilWn 1 In addition,1; b perak deer cr k pardhht= e e
--? j
! * ': '-d r1:^ %'m " .losea - ;
- affstM g.~2d Ic~k as; k a.:eid :: OPEP, ^. ELE r' ' or the affected *
[d 7<- pirb-lock penetration must be isolated by the-use'of an OPERABLE pef /Innel-lock doory S.: ef Sr r rect Equi-d ^.: k= x r k w ,,L^:f - E within the 24 hour Completion Time. He N ""f Completion Time is 0
! ]- \__ {*g ( considered reasonable fort /;zkg i;;2ck'ud La deer ^ ^"""'"'"
r4 4us.considering the OPERABLE door of the affected p80, .d lock is CTE" t Qd bemg maintained closed =d i: :i=: rai Ird t: ;xts i p wsd ka 7]cr : Q dq d^^r !c OPER?"L" ;ttus. A3 an c.ir Required Action /. 2.2.2 verifies that : p: :::::' lock with an inoperable ( door er -- Me,9- der e- : * '^^ .r ^- r has been isolated by use
~
-TLe. %\ehon " Tire, of a locked and closed OPERABLE p:WS--! lock door. His ensures that .
ey , y an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained n: parbih
; in'.= cd of 31 days is based on engineering judgment.;;c=iderk; i ;is ;f 6e p- rr^' 'rt pr "re: =d i: k p;;,hM:i'y f kad j~ - =_-1 b d 3 :: k2;a spo..;.e d. < A00 trutgr L
, v
@ lfMET fA - J/The Required tions for ndition A are modified by,a note which lows
( ent and exit a perform pairs on the ffected pe nnel lock com nent.
\ If ditions 't, entry exit should via an OPF LE i rsonnel 1. k.
+
B.I. B.2 and B.3 an air With : Frzand lock door interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more f pfind locks, the Required Actions and associated' Completion Times cve, consistent withpodition A =c epp!!:290. p4bese. 5perdied in w - ~~.%
- @equiredTctio'rs or Con ition B fe modified by note which the personne lock when a icated indiv' ual is g gp --f(/ stationefat the pejIntry and/xit throug[llock to e e re only one d r is opened at y time.
%, / , ,m j,)-J (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-9 Amendment I 16A.9-9 December 21,1990
CESSAREnA mu o
\
Containment Pe.bi(:~.. .d Iecks B 3.6.2 BASES
~
ACTIONS C.) ed C.2 . and C.3 . _ . , s L'~' ' (With one/or more/persemiet (continued) y j/ leek (s) inop/ erable for reasons other than J described'in Conditions A'or B, one doorin the Containment personnel Lock f j must b5 verified to be, dosed. This acti5n must be completed within the one hour Completion Time. This speejffed time period is. consistent with the ACTIONS of LCp'3.6.1, Containment, which requireithat containment ber :
,b[ ,/estored to OP RABLE status in'one /
/ hour. j
\
l Additionall , the affected per/sonnel lock (s) mustb restored to OPEpBLE i riod is ! JJ g i status wi in the 24 hou[ Completion Time. consida ed the time required forn restoring,a/The inoperable person el lock specified to time T ce of maintaining ontainment. {c,
~~ h }th t OPE 8BLE status an'd the relative impo
/ / '
39' f Condition are modified by a n
,'7he Required Actions orthe containment to be declared inohrable shou which requires
)
jE [f' lock fail the personnel lock jibor seal leak test, SR 3.6.2.1. W' [
~f .h .
( containm,est integrity may by maintained in this condition (i.e., ov all containment leakage rates within limits), the time required to evaluate 's is j 0 F considered too long to allo $ continued operation. Therefore, conta' ent is ' l c./ h c decfared inoperable in Scordance with LCO 3.6.1.
/ Y
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( j'The Required Actions for Condition C are further modified b a note which i
+
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\[ allows component.entry [and' exit to entry perform reparts on the ALARA conditions pprmit, and exit should be via an ..li affec x OPERABLE' personnel lock. _ _/__
/ -v s
_f 7, 7; _
.- _o p][ D.1 and D.2 $f" j %
g6e plant must be placed ida MODE in which the LCO does not apply H+be __.m_ ---,,1 .< > .. .. __o_ ,, __ -- a: . Ov 4 avu Ti c pi th I t le
'C " 4"* MODE 3Ja six hours andh. MODE 5Ja 36 hours. The allowed Completion O5 l Times are reasonable based on operating experience to reach the required 3
u tb'" +f0BES from full power without challenging plant systems. pbd corMien3 CorJhens m an orderQ Noter oncI (continued) f SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-10 . Amendment I 16A.9-10 Decernber 21,1990
l a f U\ I QC "A c., _
~
The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that ! an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable-since either air lock door is - i capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event , of a DBA. ' Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the. ! results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of - l SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly i accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate.
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C E"C EinG C GAMM D CEC DESIGN 4TIFICATION . e i
. OPECI6tuTV leshng. ;
-o&
1S f8
~$'s Containment "; bb.a;; Locks d B 3.6.2 M]
*e BASES
$,a8 .,
j$ SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 i 6'6 REQUIREMENTS g,. bh o OPERABLE requires compliance
--m Maintaining $ontainment Pencr:! p' cks --
y~! 6 d
. --. J with the leaire rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J*as modified l ,
]_ by approved exempgions. This SR reflects the lealfrate testing requirements I with regard to 7:. 'E ;: lock leakage (Type B leelstests).+ The periodic y-dp testing requirements verify that the pf x; lock leakage cc "'hS; does - ;
g) ? not r= ". i; = ccca;;; ;suus;; idgte in =c:= sila ..a __4 ; i- 6 : a f.:y .: g m. The =ri"s;;)fequency is required by Appendix ' : pl -Y d A e. a b J J;as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows ., y,, g .4k =ren!! ;a [equency extensions) does not apply. oves) conhnd Hi R is modifi by a note to in '/cate an inoperab personnel lock d r . Itb T- not inva ' te the previo succest'ul pe rmance 'of an o 11 I personnel I leakage test. 's is consid reasonable sin either personnel k door is cap le of providing fission product b er in the
,_g g7p event o a DBA.
f _- , ; SR 3.6.2.2 He pair nc=- lock door interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors.in a single p:M=:! lock. Since both the inner and
.-5prtcd outer doors of an p:Ye=:! lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post-accident containment pressure [48.1 psig], closure of either l %
gypggN door willt.:isti; f;!! asth;s' irtgd:y. Hus, the door interlock P ! gg - , feature M the containment i-egd:y ;g.;_;;;d while the % ; s [ lock is being used for personnel transit m and out of 4he ' containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function l as designed, and that simultaneousinner and outer door epenmg will not , inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock.- g and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment - .
% is entered, this test is* performed h entering containment but is not ;
- 4. k every ] required more frequently tharb184 days. ;
I REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11, " Determination of Exclusion Area. Low Population Zone and Population Center Distance.'
- 2. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Chapter 15, Accident Analysis. ;
- (continued) t l ~
! SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-11 Amendment O 16A.9-11 May 1,1993
CESSAR Ennnem. : 1 9 L 6
'h Containment hh.~ir;lLocks B 3.6.2 I l
l-l BASES , 1 REFERENCES 3. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Section 6.2, Containment Systems. (continued) ,
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_.._n---1_.- .., ,e , .c-,,,,, , , , , i ,n.__ _> -u , i w .. . _ . . , . u. n._n m. ,m. ~os, . - -. .. .- , .,.,,,, ! Ownere-Grmp-R= casa.d Tm'mua ";ywL.inuu. - Voiuum i (ChAyy!Linuu).- i ias. <n r. - E iv ss r a i i ts y z s 3 t a w a s % b -7_ 4g 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, " Primary Reactor Containment I enhge Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.* 1 i n..c_ r n, , e n. . .,_, _, _~ ._ r. . _. v. . ~~
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- v. i , gbility r. .
Leakage Rate-TestingA
- 0. 10- CFR-50r-Appendix-ArGDG-53r'."isv.;isas4er-Gontamment
.-Inspection and Testing:'
I
-10. BTP-CSB4-3r *Det. .Lx&n d ",,. ~ L- '- r .d m 04 l.
Cvoammsui. " - i i i l l l i i 1 i f I i-i SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-12 l Amendment I 16A.9-12 December 21,1990
TNSGT of (fder to Pp I@ 'I ~ 13) n - - n_ _- a %nm.,4 W.h.a Achh.n Spl (cAs) The. containment isolation valves form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for fluid penetrations not serving accident consequence limiting systems to be provided with two isolation barriers that are closed onbn ::.:ter: tic i:el:ti:n :f;;;;1. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two ' barriers in series are provided for each penetration ~so that-no single credible failure or malfunction of an active , component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the ::fety analysis. One of these barriers may be a closed system. t- occideni
)
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~-
M INSERT R: (Refertopage16A.9-M) Containment purge valves were designed for intermittent operation. The containment high purge system and low purge system purge the containment atmosphere to the unit vent. The high purge system operates before and during personnel entries to reduce airborne , radioactivity. The low purge system is a pressure relief system that is used to relieve containment pressure during start-up or shutdown. The high purge and low purge supply and exhaust lines are each supplied with inside and outside containment isolation valves. These containment isolation valves (with the exception of check valves used as containment isolation valves) are operated manually from the control room. The valves (except check valves) will close automatically upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS). Air operated valves fail closed upon a loss of instrument air. Because of their large si:::e, the high purge containment isolation valves may not be able to close under DBA conditions. Therefore, the high purge containment isolation valves (supply and exhaust) are normally maintained closed in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to ensure leak tightness. Open high purge valves or failure of the low purge valves to close, following an accident that releases contamination to the atmosphere, would cause a significant increase in the containment leakage rate.
CESSAR1E h o
- t 16A.9.3 B 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 ,
B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS + B 3.6.3 Containment Ie.olation Valves BASES ' BACKGROUND ' 'Ibe containment structure serves to contain radioactive material which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), such that offsite radiation ex sures are maintained within the requirementa . D #" of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. I). yin er minimize contkinment leakage (p aa] - , fa result 'offsite radi6 tion exposu fluid penetra ons not serving ident-( co ence limit' g systems . provided with oisolation barrie which are c osed on a Containment solation Ac ton Signal, (CIA . Two-- 4 ba 'ers in seri are provided y or each penet ion so that no sin e credible l ; fai e or mal crion of an tive componen can result in a lo ofisolation
}( d possibt loss of con ament integrity or leakage that ceeds limi med the accident ysis. One these barriers be a el
( system
- ide containm t (in accordan with the require nts of 10 - R; 50, Ap ndix A, Cri rion 57). barriers (typic ly Contai nt i solati n Valves) up the Con ent Isolation Sys m.
l M " Automatic containment d isolation occurs upon receipt of a high containment Sicy pressure or Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). The CIAS closes , automaticfontainment/solationfalves in fluid penetrations not required for operation of engineered safeguards systems in order to prevent leakage of radioactive material. Other penetrations are isolated by the use of valvea in the closed position or blind flanges. As a result, the fontainment)f,olation d/alves (and blind flanEes) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated in the event of a release of radioactive material to contamment atmosphere from the RCS following a DBA. OPERABILITY of the ! Containment Isolation Valves (and blind flanges) ensures containment integrity is maintained during accident conditions. Redundant ContainmentIsolation Valves are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2.' The valves are leak-tested # periodically to verify acceptability of seat leakage. The OPERABILITY requirements for jintainment Jblation /alves help ensure that containment leak tightness is maintained during and after an i (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-13 Amendment O 16A.9-13 May 1,1993 _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ - ~ - . - - - - - - -
' ~ C {@C C A D DESIGN @ M H - CE4TIFICATI3N r Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 A00 INwRT E. ys BACKGROUND accident by minimizing potential leakage paths to the environment. H erefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that (continued) containment leek-rates assumed in the accident analysis will not be exceeded. 4 APPLICABLE The %ntainmenthlctionfalve LCO was derived from the requirements SAFETY ANALYSIS related to the control of offsite radiation doses resulting from major accidents. As delineated in 10 CFR 100, the determination of exclusion f areas and low population zones surrounding a proposed site must consider a
-E hj fission product release from the core with offsite release based upon the expected demonstrable leak rate from the containment. His LCO is intended a .,f
.) $ to ensure the offsite dose limits are not exceeded (actual contamment leak rate does not exceed the value assumed in the safety analysis). As part of the y
Q h containment boundary, fontainment[ solation jalve OPERABILITY,ic =::S! 'e cent:!=falve M !:rga:y. Therefore, the and fon l { safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of containment l is to this LCO. The DBAs which result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a Imss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), a Main Feedwater Line Break (MFLB), or a Control Element Assembly (CEA) ejection accident. In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed thatfontainment/ solation)/alves are either closed g er or function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential leakage paths to the environment through fontainment[ solation [alves (and fontainment furge /alves)-it- ' minimized. Lincluci g The acceptance criteria applied to accidental releases of radioactive material to the environment are given in terms of total radiation dose received by a member of the general public who remains at the exclusion area boundary for two hours following the onset of a postulated fission product release. The limits established in Reference 1 are a whole body dose of 25 Rem or a 300 Rem dose to the thyroid from iodine exposure, or both. He accident analysis assumes that within [30 seconds] a CIAS, isolation of the containment is complete and leakage terminated, except for the design leak rate, La. The containment isolation total response time of[30 seconds] (continued) . B3.6-14 SYSTEM 80+ Amendment I 1 December 21,1990 16A.9-14 1
CESSAR naincum,. , i F Containment Isolation Valvea B 3.6.3 g BASES APPLICABLE includes signal delay, diesel generator startup (for loss of offsite power), and ; I SAFETY ANALYSES [ontainment/solationfalve stroke times. (continued) g , ne single failure criteria required to be imposed in the conduct of plan 6 ,
/ safety'enelym was considered in the'. design of the gentainment furge' !
ano$pe4 falves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both l' the supply and ex,haust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred. He inboard and outboard isolation valves on each line are , provided with diverse power sources. "Ris arungement was designed to > preclude common mode failures from disabling both valves on a purge line. , fQ diaPara3(y )The high purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the high purge valves is required to remain . _; the single failure criteria ; closed during MODES 1,2,3 and 4. remains applicable to the containment purge cdc: c In this cg? .g;.;;;;; huucc.c, :he !
- . a
- S
- pui;; gig ;f p;.g cac; due to failure in the control circuit associated with each valve. Acain the purce System valve OPERMtud design precludes a single failure from compromising containment ime$gneras I
( locg as the system is operated in accordance with the subject LCO. j 4 l l
'l 1 (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-IS Amendment I 16A.9-15 December 21,1990 :
~
l CESSAR E5]Luia l l r l l l l l l I. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1 l l l l l l I (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-16 Amendment O 16A.9-16 May 1,1993
< 6-uswT 16 (L&c h Pp ILAa-n) The automatic power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation automatic times isolation within limits and to actuate on an signal. The purge valves must be , maintained sealed closed Eer h:v: bl::k: in:teli;d te ! prevent fe!' epering] . [S?::i:d;rg: :!v : .1: ect..te ! en :n :utre ti: :ign:1. The valves covered by this LCO are ' listed with their assoc]iated stroke times in the FSAR
-i
( '#* h system for CESSA2 De. sip Ce:YibcaNon The normally closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in. place, and closed.s pes:iv; iscietion volv;; or d;vi;;ystems ; er; th:::are intact.- ii:t;d in h R:f;r:n:: 2.
;i Purge valves with resilient seals [and secondary containment bypass valves) must meet additional leakage rate requirements. The other containment isolation valve leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," as Type C testing.
I i
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I 1
1 I 1 l
' _lR5EET T: @ek z g e. RA M m
The ACTIONS are mo fied by a Note allowing penetration flow paths,exceptfor[ inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. -Thes :dF -i:trati': ::ntrel: ::n:i;t :f st:ticr ng : d:dic:ted ep:r:ter at th: ele centreh, *nte i i: 4- : ntinuou: : - ;-icatier with-th: ::ntr:! r =. thi: ::y, th: p:::tr:ti:n ::: 5: r:pidly i::!:ted wh;; ; n;;d f:r cent:i ::nt i:01:ti:n i: Indi::ted. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penettt.tions exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable' by an inoperable containment isolation valve. A fourth Note has been added that requires entry into the ' applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1 when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage limit. A.1 and A.2 In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable (except for purge valve leakage and shield building bypass leakage not within limit], the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. i The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.), the valve used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting ' containment OPERABILITY during NODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, I
CESSAR1!n%ma f Contamment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES APPLICABLE ne low purge valves are capable of closing under accident conditions. SAFETY ANALYSES nerefore, they are allowed to be open for limited periods during power (continued) operation. The %ntamment[ solation [alvea rd '5;Cs; .;; P .g " l_ satisfy b. CdW% reqv.r---M cf ?:': -- .; C.W.. 3 of the NRC I:':ix Policy Statement as-doeu. .: .S i; ":fam 4. LCO Contamment gentamment/[solationhves formh solation falve safety function is related ofofthe to control offsitecontamme radiation exposures resulting from a DBA. This LCO addresses [ontainment alve structural integrity, stroke time,and fontainmentFurge falve
)folation[The leakage. other pontammentJsolation falve leakage rat by LCO 3.6.1,* Containment,"under Type C testing.
/ .
I ne ntamment Isoly 'on Valves are nsidered OPE . LE when their _ s isolaf[on times are, within limits and ey isolate on isolation actuation signal. He Cont 4unment Purge V ves have diffe t OPERAB uirements. [24-inch] purge alves must be tained closed an
,_ g @ggi :5 urge valves i resilient seals -ust meet special eak rate require ts.
]
He valves vered by this L are listed with eir associated str e times ' in the Sys m 80+ CESS esign Certifica on (Ref. 2). %is sting also l indicate ose valves ma opened /clo on an intermitte is under admi rative controls. _ f This LCO provides assurance that the Contamment lation /alves and pge/alves will perform their designed safety fu[nction consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposure comparable to the Reference 3 limits. l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to contamment. However, in MODES 5 and 6 the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and ternperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the[ontamment/solationfalves ; are not required to be OPERABLE and thq/ urge /alves are not required to be sealed closed in MODE S. In MODE 6, fuel handling evolutions are (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-17 l Amendment I 16A.9-17 December 21,1990
CESSAR!a h m,. : 3
'A
)
Contamment Isolation Valves i B 3.6.3 - F BASES I APPLICABILITY conducted. Th requirements for gontainment plationfalves and (continued) fontainment rge[lves during MODE 6 retueling operations are addressed in CO 3.9.3," Containment Penetrations.
- i A.2.: i.2.2. ; . J A.. 2.2. m ACTIONS l ms~ \
Am iW T , with onehr more or the con ament Isolation , ves inoperable, except for
/ purge vals leakage, at least one isolation valve must be verified to be ,
! OPERABLL%in each affected o L n penetration. This action may be satisQed j by examming ogs or other info -tion to determi e if the valve is out bf ,
service for ma tenance or other sona. It does a t mean to perform 'i SRs needed to monstrate OPE ILITY of the ve. This Required ; Action is to be co leted within one our in order to provide assurance that { a containment pene ation is not open using a loss of Co'ntainment integrity.
, e one-hour Comp tion Time is cons stent with LCO 3%.1, Containment,
{ is considered a r nable length of ime need to comp ete the Required 'j Ac'on. ( in the vent one or more ntainment Isolati n Valves are inopgrable, except I for pu'rve valve leakage, 'ther the inopers le valve must te restored to , OPERA LE status or the af ted penetration ust be isolated. e method f . of isolati must include the se of at least on isolation barrier hich can , not be adv . ly affected by a 'agle active failu . Isolationbarri which . ' g ' meet this c 'teria are a clo and deactiva automatic Con inment ' isolation Valk, a closed man valve, a blind ge, or a chec valve - uside containmynt with flow thro h the valve secked. One oftwo them R' uired Actionamust be comple within the four hbur Cornpletion 'me. four-hour letion Time is nable considerkg the time requ to late the pe tration and the elative importaAce of maintaini g .2 ; Contahment integri during MODES 1 2,3 and 4. \ ,- - l l w ~ /~ s ; For affected penetrations which cannot be Lestored to OPERABLE status g > within the JiAchour Completion Time and" hat 6 been isolated in accordance 1 AJFwith Required Action *A 444, the affected penetration /rmust be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensurenothat cong= menl penetrations required to be isolated following an accidentp%. . longer capable of being automatically isolatedgwill be in the isolation i i
. i (continued)
I- l SYSTEM 80t B3.6-18 Amendment I 16A.9-18 December 21,1990 ' -{
.._....__,,__,,.._,..L.Wc - , . . . . , , , .
r { C T _,_t This Require'd 5ction does not reqEre any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of %rce per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as
" prior to entering HODE 4 from H0DE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days' is based on engineering judement and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation . device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that th:s Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition C provides appropriate actiens. Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these valves to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access - to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. l
CESSAR HMince,t . t I r f 1 i t f Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 i BASES - A.i and AQ (conh<w)) ! ACTIONS A! ". 2.1 A.2.2.1 .J A.2.2.2 A00 tr45c n L1 ! l (continued) position should an event occur. Th: Ccmitten Tim iv. im. ...ik iwo i;e a in 31 i p fs des - -~f: - - . d y.... ; .mg
? f 00E i f-- "^DE 5, 5 . . . . e':, ^'._ ^2 d ,. f.. . : . _2.,
re ..: _ - - n.. e e _ A. : '_m'r:_ r y a_.7 sy ,L.
.,g. . -....: n r _._: --- :. - .:... _.:s.:. .u 1..w . c .a m.u
'- ' '"nt: _:::.:' xd i: h.. ,.. *. f'::, ;f in; * 'y -- - i:
- .7c53 'I= ;;d:I cf ;-d:: ' rui;; "OOE ' ' e- unge < w., g
- o. ..b 0 ^2 J.,. iv. . 1 , mmd v .. ... . . . - .. . _ .le a- __.m ---. ..
,..susww_aa.wv1.is w e----e a g ussw . a.u.a s .s. ..J U. 4V W 5.
- bese eR uiredr Actions
'f Condition I are modified by a n/ote allowing Contaig,rnent Isolation alves, ex [24-inch] purge valves, to be opened
, inte ttently under control. "Ihese administrative controls
[ cons'st of stationin 'pministrativ a dedicated .rator at the controls of the valve, who is in ntinuous co unication 'th the control room / In this way, the ( ( etration can rapidly iso! 4 when a valid Contaiament Isolation Signal ' ( i indicated. 'e to the si of the containment purge line penetration ; e fact that those penet tions exhaust directly from the contain i ( atmosphere the ' envir ent, these valves may not be opened r f administra ve control. I
/ ,
t Requi Action A. is further modified by a Note stating that Ac on A.1 l
\ s inotj pplicable to/those penetrations with only one Containmen solation 7 Valve. Since thefoote to Condition A excludes penetrations wi only one isolation valve and a closed system, th note to A.1 refers to . netrations with a single isolation valve on a sys which is open insid contamment. ,
[or these syst' ems, if the single isola on valve is inoperabl[the intent is to go directlyJo Action A.2. The fou our Completion Ti is reasonable for ( this situation because such syste typically have very small penetratio (e.g., sadspling or instrumentati n lines). A /
.i .
l [ (continued) , SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-19 Amendment I j 16A.9-19 December 21,1990 l
t CESSARMu%mo ' s i e , f 'l Conta'.nment isolation Valves r B 3.6.3 l
- s. ,
^
~
l BASES
/ / 3- !
ACTIONS B.l . B.2.1 and B42.2 , (" (continued) ,/ / . With one,of more Containment isol on Valve (s) inoperable, the inoperable : valve (s)'must be restored to OP RABLE status or thiaffected penetration 6 of isolation must ihclude the use of at least [ must'be isolated. He me
' Ie isolation barrier whi 1(can not be adverpefy affected by a single active h .
[ ailure. Isolation barriers which meet /this criteria are a clos (d and h %@ , ' ' ' deactivated / e automatic valve, a closed,nianual valve, or a blind
~
A flange. ; check valve may'not be used to isolifte the affected penetratid$. since GDC (.f- A f ~ 57 does not c$nsider the check valve an acceptable automatic isolation valvef t j l One of anese Required A9 tions must be completed'within the four,htIur j i Completion Time. The,s[aified time period isdasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (herIce, reliability) / i J 'act as a ' I
, Aenetration isolatiin boundary. In the event the affected penetration is .-.
I ,,, isolated must be vin fiedacco61ance to be isolated on'a with periodicRequired basis.. This is #ction necessaryB.2.1, to the affe
/ ensure ntainment integrity,is Ilaintained and that c'ontainment penetrations f
'[ reqyirb to be isolated follo' wing an accident are' isolated. Verification that - I eafh affected penetration is ' isolated onci per 31 days is reasonable }= .
[considering the impdrtance of these val (es and the low probability of their - . misabgnment. ; Condition B is modified by a note indicating this cond'ition is only applicable to those penetrations with only one containment is51stion Valve and a closed : f system inside containment. His note is necessary since this condition is written to specifically address those penetrations isolated in accordance with! I 10 CFR 50 Appendia A, General Design' Criteria (GDC) No. 57. GDC 57 i' ! allows lines that enter ACTIONS containment and which are not part of the ! i reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to, containment ~ I atmosphere, to be isolated by means of one Containment Isolation Valve. C. I . C.2.1 and C.2.2 ,
-- / ,/ f
' In the event one or more Containment Purge Valves are not within the purge l valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within li,mits or l j
the affected penetration must be isolated. He method of isolation must.be l s by the use o[4t least one isolation barrier.which cannot be adversely affected -, by a sing)4 active failure. Isolation barrier which meet this criteria are a , N ,/ f' .' ;
- )
/ ..
I (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-20 Amendment O - 16A.9 20 May 1,1993
)
I s igsRT \l' EEFEE TO ?kbE KA.940 L1 With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable (except for purge valve leakage and shield building bypass leakage not within s , limit], the affected penetration flow path must be isolated-within 1 nour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. Condition A of this LCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path. C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The' method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a , blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the [4] hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable, considering the relative stability of i l j
3 i
, s b M D P%G KA 9 35EET hWTWO L,1 and C.2 (continued) the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of and 4.
supporting containment OPERABILITY during M00E '
- t accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flowThis path must be verified.to be isolated on a is necessary to assure leak tightness l periodic basis.of containment and that containment The penetrations requiring i isolation following an accident are isolated.
Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each l affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering.the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. This Note is necessary since this Condition is-written to specifically address those penetration flow paths : in a closed system. l' Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applie allows these devices to be verified closed by use of Allowing verification by administrative means. administrative means is considered acceptable, sincethe Therefore, access , to these areas is typically restricted. probability of misalignment of these valves,- once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. D.d With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not , within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis are not -; met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within : Restoration can be accomplished by ' limit within 4 hours. isolating the penetration (s) that caused the limit lo be l exceeded by use of'one closed and de-activated When a automatic i valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. .t l penetration is isolated the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage _ through the isolation device. -If two isolation devicel , f e ., ---WLy,1- . . '
._ _ 1 T Q~[ Y C'CN1dO@ kfI hM $4M8)
~ Qd (continued) i to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.
The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration (s) and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment _ function. E.1. E.2. and E.3 In the event one or more containment purge valves in one or more penetration flow paths are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits, or the affected penetration must be isolated. ! The method of isolation must be by the use of at least one l isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a ! single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a [ closed and de-activated automatic valve with resilient seals, a closed manual valve with resilient l seals,orablindflange]. A purge valve with resilient seals utilized to satisfy Required Action E.1 must have been demonstrated to meet the leakage requirements of SR 3.6.3.6. i The specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering l that one containment purge valve remains closed so that a ' gross breach of containment does not exist. In accordance with Required Action E.2, this penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic ; basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure ; that containment penetrations required to be isolated l following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position l This Required Action does not should an event occur. Rather, it l require any testing or valve manipulation. 3 involves verification, through a system walkdown.. that those For the being mispositioned are in the correct position. ! isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as ' prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not perfomed within the previous 92 days' is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility, i
_ ~ I k IN%8T V (CCNrTitMED) hFEQ~T5 Pact R49_a, i P E.1. E.2. and E.3 (continued) For the containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action E.1, SR 3.6.3.6 must be performed at least once every (92] days. This assures that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve does not increase during the time the penetration is 4 isolated. The nomal Frequency for SR 3.6.3.6, 184 da s, is based on an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-20 (Ref. . Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perfom the SR more of ten. ' Therefore, a Frequency of once per (92) days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience. 1 F.1 and F.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least H00E 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are ' reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
7mm v4 (Fler 4 page. ll.A.%2h This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those-valves outside containment and capable of being > mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for valves outside containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions. Valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open. The Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during NODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
CESSAR Ennne-Contamment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3. BASES An ACTIONS O ! i (continM osed manual valve .or blind flang ; [ closed and deac ' ated automatic valv One of th Required Actio ust be completed
/ Completi Tims. The spefced time period is reasonable conside '
thin the 24-hour the .
/ Containment Purge Val ~ remain closed suc[that a gross h of L smment integri not exist. For tamment Purgp alves which rdance with Requi etion C.2.1, S '3.6.3.7 must be
( are isolated in ' i nisensures degradation of
/ performed spleast once per 92 da resilient 's is detected confirms thatfi'e leakage rate the Con ment Purge Valves not increase duhng the time the etration is lated. The normai equency of SR 3[. 3.7 is 184 days is based on NRC initiative )[*Contamment Leakage Due to tained in OenerM Deterioration" Issue (GI B-2) hat
- f. 5). Since somew more reliL
- is being plac n a single valve in s condition,it i5 prudent to perform SR more o Therefore, once per 92 days was(hosen. d-
'O
~
-, .,J D 1 and D 2 in a MODE in whic the LCO does not a 1 ifthe Th lant must be .
inoperable Copdnment Isolation Valyycannot be restored or i ted, or ContainmenvPurge Valve leakage p.an not be restored to w limits or isolated ~ the associated Completi(n Time. This is done by, acing the plant' ' (1 ; i inat MODE 3 in six hours and in MODE 5 in 36 durs. He alkied letion Times are reasonable based on operating,ex)perience) uired MODES from/ull power without chall,eng'ing plant sys / SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS } Each [24-inch] Contamment Purge Valve is required to be verified sealed , closed at 31-day intervals. This pdrveillancepsuref that a gross breach of
- gjT*4 4, containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a ,
[ntainment hge falve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to i conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during ~a LOCA in time to ' ) prevent offsite dose limits from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref.1). ; Therefore, these valves are required to be sealed closed position during ) MODES 1,2,3 and 4. Apatainmentptge[alve that is closed must have j .
!l (continued)
SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-21 Amendment I 16A.9-21 December 21,1990
CESSAR nai"ication
--I Ois opp scdien i , Mc e m b M!ed # bqs no connddr.6- 3 of led. hoev;.
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 ; BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS (continued) motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplis l deenergizing the source gf electric power or removing the air supply to the { valve operator.+%e aME@M:M is a result of an NRC initiative, e y peneric Item B-2%related to gontainment pge falve use during tf plant - operations (Ref. . SR 3.6.3.2
~TGe 9 is rd rev.ra:\ -fo he md uken h PM nis SR ensures the [six-inch] purge valves are closed as required, or, if open, open for an allowable reason.We SR b ' : - rot:d by : ::";
inscML ;; Sd en -d= =y b q=x' f= pressure control, ALARA, and air quality considerations for personnel entry, and for/uveillance.,sde that
\ require the @4to be open. The [six-inch] purge valves are capable of '
._ in h emronced closing bd= =cih:: =nl:::::. Therefore, these valgre allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31-day ==....?Mc.x=.! is
; g#,*) ,t.ocA consistent with other fontainment%1ationfalve requirements discussed under SR 3.6.3.3.
i SR 3.6.3.3 p _.
- r
[Thi R verifies that all Containment Isolation ual valves and blind J fl ges which are located outside containment d required to be closed
/ g accident conditions are closed.' The S)(belps to ensure that post-accident leakage elradioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. He 31-day frequency is appropriate sin
- these valves are operated under procedura!' control and the probability of
- [ @ IN W event requiring containment isolation d/ ring this time period is low. 's W frequency 'as been shown to be acce ble through operating experi ce.
t Seve notes have been added this SR. The first note appli . to valves l ind flanges located in hi radiation areas, and allows th/w valves to and[erified closed by use of be v ministrative controls. Allow #g verification l b administrative controls . considered acceptable, sinc access to these ., is typically restric during MODES 1, 2, 3
.( d 4 for ALARA f
\ 'jreasons.
' Herefore, the robability of misalignment of ese have been verified to be in the proper position,is s ,1. A second note
_ _ _ _ _ _ -- - (
/ ,
'/
(continued) B3.6-22 i SYSTEM 80+ Amendment I 16A.9-22 December 21,1990 1
T Mer ro p$e b~ This SR requires verification that each containment isciation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radf oretive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. For valves inside containment, the Frequency of ' prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days' is appropriate, since these valves and flanges are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that they are open. The Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is small.
35EET i. Mer b Py ct M-N (o l
-For containment purge valves wi h resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. , is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days l was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref.'{}.
Additiorally, this SR must be perfomed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened. A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in detemining the overall containment leakage < rate to verify containment OPERABILITY. l l i l
ff D g a (Mebo" (aAs) { Automaticcontalnmengisolatio valves close on a pintainment flotation pignal o prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will aqtuatetoitsisolationpositiononapintainment/kolation gdtuationfignal. The (18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt nomal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. i
)
1 i l l
TR5eL7T M er ' N
~
~
SR 3.6.3I8 This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the safety analysis are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leaka assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (ge path isleakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the solated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. This method of quantifying maximum pathway leakage is only to be used for this SR (i.e., Appendix J maximum pathway. leakage limits are to be quantified in accordance with Appendix J). The [18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be perfomed only during unit outage. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when perfomed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. A Note has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that shield building bypass leakage is properly accounted for in detemining the overall primary containment _ leakage rate.
4.pp=+ % CESSAREnnc-r Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS (continued) m7' / / a added which lows valves to be4pened under administrative controls. ese administr controls of the'y valve, ive whocontrols consist is in ntinuous of stationing communication a dedicat,ed with the control operator a! room. In thif way the penetra ' n can be rapidly isolatedwhen a valid CIAS[ indicated A third note included to clarif7'that valves which are' open er administrative ntrols are not required (o meet the SR durin e < time de valves are ope / g ) 1 SR 3.6.3.4 Wj %- m
/mf/}
nis,5R verifies that alf containment isolation manual valves and blind flanges which are located inside containment and required to be closed during I
,/ pc'cident conditions ar'e closed. He SR helps to ensury'that post-accident i
( leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the confainment boundary is ; ( M within design limits. For valves inside containment, th'e surveillaace interval / l j of prior to ente' ring MODE 4 from MODE 5 but n'ot more often than onc/ per 92 days'is reasonable considering the' relative inaccessibility of these ) [
)(
valves. 7 ,-, j / A nad has been add 51 to this SR whi[h allows valves to pened I
\ intefmittently under, administrative contr'ols. The administrative controls co'nsist of stationing's dedicated operstdr at the controls of the valve, who is g fm continuous co'mmunication withthe control room. In this way the
\ ' penetration can'be rapidly isolated (vhen a valid containment Isolation Signal is indicated / An additional note has been included to clarify that valves /
which are open under administrative controls are not re ired to meet the Sd
~ . -
y x. dunng/. ,_ -the time the valves are open.
~n -
SR 3.6.3.5
'Jecb.py N Ommme a% the isolation time of each power-operated and automatic Containment Isolation Valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. He isolation time and frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice br*4M Testing Programg or % clap.
(continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-23 Amendment O 16A.9-23 May 1,1993
CESSARnah m
)
4 1 9 .** I I I Containment Isolation Valves , B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.6 REQUIREMENTS -.~ W v7 - * (continued) Automatic ntainment Isolat'on Valves actuate on a ntainment Isolation ! Signal prevent leakage o dioactive material fro containment followin .j a DB . This SR ensu each automatic Conta' nt Isolation Valve act te to its isolatio sition on a Contain t Isolation Signal. 18 nth frequency w developed considerin is prudent that this S y be g , s rformed durin a plant outage. This i ue to the plant conditi needed '.1 >
" unplanned plant transi ta if the SR -
to perform th R and the potential __ g irMgT Y is perform with the reactor at powe . Although the actuat' logic is tested t every 92 days, the group relays that i as part o e ESFAS functional actua e system cannot be during normal plan peration. Operatin , ex ence has shown that components virtually ways pass the SR w performed on the 18-moja frequency which is asistent with the ref ling
- e cle.
SR 3.6.3.7 ,_ . (_ or Contaimnen r esilient sea additionalleak rate testing-l I f beyond'the I OF ILABILITY. test requiren>ents Operating experience ha of 10 CFR 50,[Af pendix J is requ s has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal i ypes. The 1 y frequency is e result of an NRC Staff 4nitiative
,, contained in eric Issue (GI B- ) " Containment Leakage Due to Seal :
Deteriorat * (Ref. 5). NU t G 1366 (Ref. 7) docume'nts a recent-reeval of the SR frequp)ey that concluded the 184, Jay;
- g lt M P adeq . Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after ;
y ope g the valve. Ninety-two days was chosen recognizing that cycling the G. v ve could introducejdIditional seal degradation (y' opposed to a valve that / as not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is n' prudent measurep'fter a valve has been opened./ -
~
/ /
A note has n added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated 4 gainst the acce ce criteria of SR 3.6.14. This ensures that e'xcessive j - Conta' ' ment Purge Valve leakag dill not cause the overalf allowable - / ~ co mment leak rate to be e led and the contain ent rendered , i perable. ~/. ,
,_n.
' " +
/
w-
. . ~'.) t
~/
}
A00 Nuser AA ' (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6 24 ; Amendment I , 16A.9-24 December 21,1990 j
CESSAR'in L mw X Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3-BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11, ' Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population - Zone, and Population Center Distance." -
- 2. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Section 6.2, Containment Systems.
- 3. System 80+ CESSAR-DC, Chapter 15, Accident Analysis. .
a - .s.,
~ ~ ~ vv e , -. , u _- ,,, . n, - ,. . _ c u.. .u,.,
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wun .~, leela6on :- (continued) SYSTEM 80+ B3.6-25 Amendment I 16A.9-25 Decembe 21,1990 -
CESSAR Ennneuin i
- Containment Ir.olation Valves '
B 3,6.3 BASES : 10 urn av, appendtrAMDCWCiva 3;.a.o ~;...a. J
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B 3.6.4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE l
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g Containment Pressure l g B 3.6.4 l c B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS P J B 3.6.4 fgon.tainment Pressure C
] BASES I c 1 d BACKGROUND The containment structure serves to contain radioactive material which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA),
_f such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirement . ;
~s of 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1). He containment pressure is limited during normal
;. ~i- operation to preserve the initial ecmditions assumed in the accident analyses .
S for a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). ' 1 Rese limits also prevent the contamment pressure from exceeding the n !f containment design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside - l jh atmosphere in er&: :: Of.=ad a inadvertent actuation of the Containment - Spray System. in lise. etni of
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Containment pressure is a process variable which is monitored and controlled ( , during MODES 1 through 4. He containment pressure limits are derived 0 g}}