ML20113J108
| ML20113J108 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1992 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20113J101 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-920731, NUDOCS 9208070043 | |
| Download: ML20113J108 (11) | |
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SYSTEM 80 +
, s,'};- PROGRAM PLAN
, ALWR-RS-DCTR-32
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July,1992 ABB/ COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR POWER pggeE00ck00000002 A PDR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EECTION IITLE PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS i LIST OF FIGURES 11 LIST OF ACRONYMS iii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 1.1 Purpose 1 1.2 Scope 1 1.J Objectives 1 2.0 PLAN ELEMENTS 2 2.1 Background 2 2.2 PRA Updates by Li' 'cle Phase 2 3.0 INTERFACES ?
3.1 System Design 3.2 Design Reliability Assurance Program 6 3.3 Operational Support Information 7 3.4 Inspections, T2sts, Analyses and Acceptance 7 Criteria
4.0 REFERENCES
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LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE PAGE 2-1 PRt vs Plant Life-Cycle Phase 5 e'
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.. .i LIST OF ACRONYMS ACRONYM DEFINITION i ABB-CE ASEA Brown Boveri - Combustion Engineering ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor B0P Balance of Plant CE Combustion Engineering CESSAR-DC CE Standard Safety Analysis Report - Design Certification CFR Code.of Federal Regulations DOE Department of Energy ,
D-RAP Design Reliability Assurance Program F0AKE First-Of-A-Kind Engineering HRA Human Reliability Analysis -
ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System OSI Orerational Support Information PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment RAP Reliability Assurance Program .
SAMDA Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternative '
SSC Structures, Syst,.as and Components i
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1.0 LNTRODUCTION l
1.1 PURPOSE System 80+ is a jtandard nuclear power plant design that is to bn certified under-10 CFR Part 52" . As such, a Level III Probabihstic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been prepared at the onset of the design, licensing and construction processes to be used in those processes. This PRA will te maintained and updated as the design status evolves and :hanges. The PRA will be delivered to the owner / operator upon completion of plant startup.
This document defines a plan for the long term maintenance and update of the System 80+ PRA and the relationship to the Reliability Assurance Program") (RAP) for the System 80+ Standard Design to assure that the system and equipment reliability assumed in the System _80+ analyses are maintained over the entire plant life-cycle. The plan defined herein is intended to cover the life-cycle of a System 80+ Standard Design Nuclear Power Plant from inception through first-of-a-kind engineering.
1.2 SCOPE This document provides a general plan for the long-term maintenance and update of the System 80+ PRA. It is defined in terms of major plant life-cycle phases.
Specific dates for update of the PRA are not defined.
1.3 OBJECTIVES The System -80+ PRA is intended to be a dynamic PRA which is maintained and -
updated throughout the entire plant life-cycle. The objectives of this plan are to define the relationship between the plant life-cycle phases and the PRA -
maintenance and update activities and to identify the general inforntion requirements for the PRA maintenance and upd;te i.ctivities.
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2.0 PLAN ELEMENTS.
2.1 BACKGROUND
ABB-CE, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), .; working to
? selop and certify a standardized Advanced Light Wster Reactor (ALWR) design,.
A PRA is . ing performed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52 3 This PRA a ;o provides a design evaluation ar.d confirmation tool for use ,
throughout the design process. The System 80+ PRA is intended to be a dynamic PRA which can be naintained and updated throughout the plant life-cycle. Figure 2-1 illustrates the relationship of the PRA update and maintenance activities to the plant life-cycle phases.
2.2 PRA UPDATES BY LIFE-CYCLE PHASE 2.2.1 " Establish Desion R'souirements" Phase The first phase of the System 80+ design life-cycle was to establish the design requirements for the plant. This is represented on figure 2-1 as " Establish Design Requirements. At the inception of the System 80+ desgn process while the design requirements were being developed, a " baseline" PRA wae performed for the System 80 NSSS design with a Balance of Plant (B0P) design representative of those of recent vintage CE plants. This baseline PRA was intended to serve as a design evaluation tool. It is represented as output 1 on figure 2-1.
2.2.2 "Desian Certification Enaineerina" Phase The next phase of the System 80+ plant life-cycle was " Design Certification Engineering". The system design and documentation needed for certification of System 80+ were developed during this phase. The initial System 80+ safety analyses were also performed during this phase. The primary output of this phase was CESSAR-DC(0 As the System 80+ design evolved, the. modcls developed for this PRA were modified to reflect the lat evolved into the initial System 80+ PRA(,est ) system design. The baseline PRA(2) in amendments F, H, and I of CESSAR-DC(0 This PRA was submitted to the NRC l figure 2-1. This is represented as output 2 on Following completion of the NRC review of the initial design FRA, the System 80+
PRA is updated to incorporate NRC review comments and to address system design changes resulting from NRC review of CESSAR-DC(0 This PRA includes the level l
1, II and III analyses for internal events, the initial shutdown risk assessmt.nt, l the initial qualitative screening analyse- for ' internal fires and floods, a quantitative analysis of the tornado strike risk and a seismic risk assessment ir. dependent of the seismic hazards curves. This PRA represents the Certified System 80+ Design. It is presented s output 3 on figure 2-1.
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,. h 2.2.3 "First-of-A-Kind Enaineerina" Phase I
The next phase of the System 80+ life-cycle is First-0f-A-Kind -Engineering (F0AKE). . F0AKE is the non-recurring detailed- engineering which develops the d
certified design to the point of a plant order. The System 80+ PRA will be
. maintained during the F0AKE phase, and an update to the PRA Report will be issued l at the end of this phase (output 4 on figure 2-1). During F0AKE, more detailed l design information will be developed and;the PRA models will be reviewed and 1
modified as appropriate to reflect the greater system der 'gn detail. The PRA models will also be used as tools to evaluate the potenti6 risk impact of any design changes.
During this phase, test, operating and maintenance procedure guidelines will also
, be developed. The procedure related assumptions used-in the System 80+ PRA will be factored into tne procedure guidelines. The PRA models will also be modified as needed to reflect any procedure guidance differing from that assumed in the PRA.
i As part of F0AKE, detailed cable routing and pipe routing will be specified, and
- the fire detection and suppression systems will be designed, This information j will be used to update the fire hazards analysis and the internal flood hazard analysis.
- 2.2.4 _" Construction. Startuo and Turnover" Phase 4
The " Construction, Startup and Turnover" phase of the System 80+ plant life-cycle
- occurs after a plant order is received.- This phase invc1ves manufacture and
! pocurement of equipment, construction of the plant and turnover of the plant to
! the owner / operator. During this phase, the plant specirc operations procedures
! and test and maintenance procedures will be developed.
4 The respom.tdlity for maintenance and update of the System 80+ PRA during.this i phase wii! t.c deoendent on the terms of the plant order. A hardcopy of the PRA i
will be provided to the owner / operator. The owner / operator will also receive all of the PRA models and data as well as the report text in computer format. ABB-CE
- will provide the owner / operator with instruction on how to access and manipulate 4 the delivered models and data. ABB-CE will also provide guidance on the long-term maintenance, use and update of the PRA.
If the owner / operator assumes responsibility for maintenance and update of the-PRA during this phase, ABB-CE will prepare guidance for maintaining and updating
! the System 80+ PRA and will provide this guidance and the PRA as completed during
- i. the F0AKE phase to the owner / operator.
- 2.2.5 " Power Operation" Phase j The " Power Operation" phase is the normal-' power generating life time of the plant. The design life for . System 80+ is 60 years. The owrier/ operator is responsible for the maintenance, update and use of the PRA during this phase of j the plant life.
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i Figure 2-1 i
PRA vs Plant Life - Cycle Phase l l Design Phase Establish ' Design F.O.A.K Construct, Power Design Cert. Eng. Startup and Operation
- Requirements Eng. Turnover l Flu'i Sy
- Ele;t Corain
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N (System
'Desig80n }j ystem 80+T P(Final System 80 Dmp Equip Procure.
sisecif-Q I +
Init. Desirn) Op.
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@l Perform imital f> n PR A Perform Baseline Interactive .halysis Final Report Level ; PRA s / Design %
(Freeze f
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i *, wr er i i Perinrm Final Desien Pra Update FRA for FOAKE o
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} bystem 80+ 05. Guides] >$vstem 80+ Ost GuidelineskQPlant Specif. Procedj i Ea Tech Specs .
l gpo, Tech Specs [
SAMPG Ops,We
!' IMTG SAMP IMTG j Training Owner / Operator ku.ntain and Ret ne Final Desern RA
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r F88-cE Pavym &
j p - le$les- LD Ogg
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3.0 INTERFACES 3.1 SYSTEM DESIGN The System 80+ PRA models provide a tool for evaluating the potential risk impact of system design changes. As discussed in reference 5, the PRA has been used throughout the first two phases of the plant life-cycle to evaluate the plant design to ensure that it met risk ano insestment protection goals.also . The PRAused to evalu i
will continue to be used as a design evaluation tool throughout the remaining plant life cycle phases.
3.2 DESIGN RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM The System 80+ PRA contains assumptions with respect to the design and operation of a System 80+ niant. These assumptions in general fall into the following
, areas:
- a. L, '.; ment reliability;
- b. Normal operation and emergency operation procedures;
- c. Operator training; i
<i . Technical Specification requirements for testing;
- e. Maintenance procedures;
- f. Administrative controls.
A Reliability Assurance Program (RAP) is - implemented to assure consistency.
between the System 80+ plant configuration and the System 80+ PRA. During the l
' design phases of the plar.t life-cycle, this program is designated as the Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) and is the responsibility of the system design organization. This program will ensure - that the procedures, Technical Specifications, and plant configuration (including maintenance) are consistent-with the assumptions and models formulated in the PRA. This program will also identify significant risk-related structures, systems and components (S$ws) so <
' that appropriate surveillance and maintenance plans are established for the owner / operator to use during the operating phase of the plant life , cycle. The RAP is described in the Design Reliability Assurance Program Plan (7 .
The System 80+ PRA will supply two inputs to the D-RAP. First is the set of i
assumptions used in the PRA. The:e assumptions are compiled in the PRA Analysis Assumptions Report (,). This report will be maintained in parallel with the PRA
- report.
The second PRA input to the D-RAP will be the core' damage cutset's. These cutsets will be used to establish and maintain the list of significant risk-related SCCs.
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i j 3.3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT INFORMATION Operational Support Information (OSI) is information, in the form c,f documents, provided to the owner / operator by the plant designer to support operation of the
, plant. OSIisintendedtosupplementthedesign,procurementandconsgruction information provided to build a plant. ABB-CE has formulated a plan' ) .for a i program for developing OSI necessary to insure an orderly progression from design through construction to plant operation. The level of detail for the OSI documents varies over the phases of the plant life-cycle. Earb in the design process, higher level ano less detailed information is required to relate the i design bases to operational requirements. Plan and guide level documents support this requirement. Guidelines are developed during the detallad engineering
! design phase. Detailed procedures are normally prepared in conjunction with the
- owner / operator during the construction and pre-operational phases.
As discussed in section 3.2, the System 80+ PRA Human Reliability Analyses (HRA) contains training. assumptions These assu related to operating and maintenance procedureg)and operator and the PRA i assumptions document, (gptions, are provided as documented in the System to the organization responsible 80+ PRA' for the OSI
,' to ensure that the assumptions are properly reflected in the OSI documents . As the more detailed OSI documents are oeveloped, the System 80+ HRA analyses will
- be reviewed to ensure that they are consisted with the available level of detail l for the operating and maintenance procedures.
3.4 INSPECTIONS, TESTS,-ANALYSES AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 10 CFR Part 52.470) requires that applications for design certification must i
contain sufficient detail for the commission to judge the applicant's proposed
( means of assuring that construction conforms to the design. It also requires that the applicant provide proposed Ir.,pecticw,, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) which are necess&ry - and - sufficient to provide reatonable assurance that the as-built facility is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification.
l The System 80+ IRA (3) and the PRA Assumptions Documentca> l are provided to the ITAAC team. The ITAAC will consider the PRA assumptions, as appropriate, in the
- preparation of the ITAACs.
A cross-reference between the PRA assumptions d and g specific ITAACs which address the assumptions is currently planned .
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4.0 REFERENCES
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! 1. 10 CFR Part 52; Early Site Perm'its: Standard- Desian Certification: and
- Combined Licenses for Nuclear Powcr Reactors; S4FR 15372; April 18,1989.
I l 2. BASE LINE_ LEVEL 1 PROBABILISlic RISK ASSESSMENT FOR- THE SYSTEM 80 NSSS
- DESIGN; Enclosure (1)-P to LD-88-008; Combustion Engineering; January, j 1988.-
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, 3. SYSTEM 80+ STANDARD DESIGN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT; ABB Combustion Engineering; DCTR-RS-02, Rev. 0; January, 1991.
j 4. CE Standard Safety Analysis Report-Desian Certification (CESSAR-DC).
lystem 80+'" Standard Desian; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; December,1990.
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- 5. ADolication of Probabilirtic Misk Assessment for the System 80+ Standard i Desian; ALWR-RS-DCTR-16, Rev, 0; Cor'3urtion Engineering Nuclear, Inc.;
,1 May, 1992.
. 6. Qgilan Alternatives for the System 80+ Nuclear Power Plant; i
ALWR-RS-DCTR-13, Rev, 0; Combustion Engineering Nuclear, Inc. ; April, 1992.
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- 7. Desian Reliability Assurance Program Pl an for the ABB Comoustion i Enaineerina Standard System 80+ Desian (draft); ALWR-RS-DCTR-xx, Rev. 0; j August, 1992.
! 8. Analysis Assumotions for the System [@J 3 " Standard Desian Probabilistic Risk Assessment; DCTR RS-03, Rev. 0; ABB- Combustion Engineering Nuclear i Power; May, 1991.
i j 9. Doerational Suonort informatior. Plan (draft); february,1992.
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- 10. " Guide for Preparation- of Tier 1 Design Description and Associated Inspection, Tests, t.nalysis, and Acceptance Criteria"; ALWR-05, j- Rev 01 (draft); April,1992.
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