ML20059J919
| ML20059J919 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1993 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J906 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-931105-01, NUDOCS 9311150102 | |
| Download: ML20059J919 (70) | |
Text
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. SYSTEM 80+" TITLE. : LOSS 0F 0FFSITE POWER.
RECOVERY GUIDELINE-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES.
Page ' :of 7" Revision "" j
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LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE E
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~ LOOP 9311150102 931105 p 1 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"
PDR. ADDCK 05200002 i A PDR ['j
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1 SYSTEM - 80 + " TITLE LOSS'0F 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE- ;l
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page-2 -of " Revisio: n " j PURPOSE l This guideline provides the' operator actions which should-be accomplished in the event of a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). LOOP is defined asiloss of.' l Preferred Switchyard I and Loss of Preferred Switchyard II and the Main' .
Turbine Generator fails to " runback" and maintain the hotel loads or is not on-line. Included are the actions required-to mitigate the loss of forced f' circulation. The actions in this guideline are necessary to ensure.that_the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition. The goal of this guideline is to ;
safely establish plant conditions allowing implementation of a normal l operating procedure for COLD SHUTDOWN, HOT STANDBY, or HOT SHUTDOWN. This guideline is designed to meet this objective while minimizing any radiological :
release to the environment and maintaining adequate core cooling. This- :
guideline provides technical information to be used by-the utilities in developing a plant specific procedure, j ENTRY CONDITIONS t
- 1. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been performed I
9.E All of the following conditions exist:
- a. Event initiated from MODE 3 or MODE 4 .
a
- b. SIAS has NOT been biccked i
- c. LTOP has NOT been initiated 2.a. Plant conditions indicate that a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred. ;
Any one or more of the following may be present.
i) Transformer alarms ,j i
ii) Breaker alarms iii) Diesel generators' automatically starting ;
iv) RCP trouble aFarms j v) Condenser vacuum alarms !
t vi) Low RCS flow indications ,
J SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER I
RECOVERY GUIDELINE ,
EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS "
GUIDELlNES Page 3 of 7"
- Revision ""
3 9
vii) Alternate AC Source automatically starting Er ,
- b. A station blackout event has occurred, and at least one safety division
[4.16 kV] AC bus has' been restored. i Er ,
- c. Single phase natural circulation is to be utilized for RCS heat removal although at least one [13.8 kV] bus is energized. -
EXIT CONDITIONS ;
- 1. The diagnosis of a Loss of Offsite Power is not confirmed RE
- 2. The diagnosis indicates that in addition to the Loss of Offsite Power, a break in the primary or secondary system, or a loss of all .feedwater has ,
occurred 9E
- 3. No Safety Division [4.16 kV] energized.
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- 4. No Safety Division [125 V] DC energized.
Er
- 5. Any of the loss of Offsite Power Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are not satisfied !
RE
- 6. The Loss of Offsite Power guideline has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:
- a. at least one non-Safety Division [4.16 kV] is energized
- b. all Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.
- c. RCS conditions are being controlled and maintained in HOT STANDBY, t HOT SHUTDOWN, or COLD SHUTDOWN.
- d. an appropriates procedure, which has been approved by the Plant l Technical Support Center or the Plant Operations Review Committee, can be implemented.
SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE: POWER.
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMER'GENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES.
Page ' of 78 Revision " ,
a INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- l. Confirm diagnosis of loss of 1.a. E'no Safety Division-[4.16 Offsite Power (LOOP) and kV] AC buses are energized verify Safety Function' Status then-Check acceptance criteria are Verify at least one permanent non-safety bus is energized
~
satisfied. [
from the AAC and attempt to energize one vit'al AC division from the permanent non-safety bus. g ,
- b. H no Safety Division [4.16) '
c AC division.A mee,non-Safety Division [13.8/4.16 kV) AC buses are energized then Rediaanose event and exit to either appropriate Optimal -
Recovery Guideline or to Functional Recovery Guideline.
- 2. Verify Safety Division [4.16 kV] 2. kk=o .
AC powered components are I 'l available by the following: d bet ^ S'i d
- a. at least one Safety Division T * 'l " * -
[4.16 kV) AC has been D_f.c ***u'dli IO: ' flu 3C h
energized dw,wn AC basa s par-hee and gp n Q oper ecqFtczobu'eb'
- b. Safety Division loads have :)
been properly sequenced onto their respective Safety -
Division [4.16 kV];AC buses.
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 5 of 7" Revision "
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS ;
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- 3. Ensure at least one safety 3. Exit this guideline: and implement Division of [125 VDC]~is the Functional Recovery Guideline.
energized, including both the channelized and the Division load center l and ;
At least one safety Division [120 VAC] is energized, including both j the channelized and the Division load center.
- 4. Ensure that all appropriate 4. Open appropriate breakers, breakers on the de-energized buses
[4.16kV and 13.8kV] are open [they appropriate plant specific breaker list would be placed here when the plant specific E0Ps are written].
Then restore RCP seal cooling' by the following:
- a. RCP controlled bleedoff is unisolated, '
- b. the non-critical CCW loop is ;
unisolated, l
- c. establish RCP seal cooling through one of the following
~
means : ([CCW), [CVCS s.e'al i injection (SI)], [ Dedicated Seal Injection System (DSIS)].
SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OFLOFFSITE POWER.
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page ' of 7' Revision =
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS-
- 6. Ensure at least one steam 6.
generator has the following:
- a. level being restored or maintained in the normal band, and
- b. startup, main or emergency ,
feedwater flow capability, .;
and -
- c. pressure control by one of the following (listed in preferred !
order): ,
i) .te N bypass system ii) atmospheric dump valves iii) main steam safety valves
- 7. Ensure RCS inventory control is 7.
being maintained by the following:
- a. the pressurizer level control system is maintaining or restoring pressurizer level [27 to 78%] ,
and ed
and _
- c. the HJTC RVLMS indicates level above the top of hot leg. ,
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SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER :
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS i GUIDELINES - Page 7 of 7 Revision ""'
6 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY-ACTIONS i
- 8. Ensure the pressurizer heaters and
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- 8. H RCS subcooling greater than P-T spray are maintaining or restoring limits or cooldown rate greater.
pressurizer pressure within the than [100*F/hr],- Then rio the e limits of (Figure 9-1). following as appropriate: ;
- a. stop the cooldown,
- b. depressurize the plant using i Reactor Coolant Gas Vent a System or auxiliary spray to restore and maintain pressurizer pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits of (Figure 9-1),-
- c. attempt,to ma;ntain.the plant in a stable. ,
pressure-temperature configuration or continue to cooldown within the limits of i
(Figure 9-1),
- d. H overpressurization due to' SI/ charging flow, Then throttle or secure flow (refer _ ,
to step 16) and manually control letdown to restore and ,
maintain pressurizer pressure within the limits of (Figure ,
9-1).
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 8 of 7" Revision "^"
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 9. Attempt to restore offsite AC 9. .
potter.
- 10. When offsite power is 10. Continue efforts to restore available, Then restore AC offsite power.
power to plant distribution l andstationloadsper(plant specific operating instructionsj. ,
- 11. If offsite power has NOT been 11.
restored, Then attempt to reenergize the permanent non-safety AC buses from the alternate AC source.
- 12. If offsite power is NOT 12. Continue efforts to restore available and the alternate AC offsite power or_the alternate has been restored, Then AC. ,
restore loads to the permanent ;
non-safety bus per fplant !
specific operating instructionsJ.
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SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF OFFSITE. POWER i REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page ' of 7 Revision " ,
l INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 13. Evaluate the need and 13. Jf RCP operation is NOT desirability of restarting desired, Then go to step' FT.
RCPs. Consider the following: *
- a. adequacy of RCS and core i heat removal using natural circulation,
- b. existing RCS pressure and temperature, ,
- c. the need for main 3 pressurizer spray -l capability, ,
- d. the duration of CCW !
interruption to RCPs,
- e. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures. -
met, Then go to step 16. '
criteria are met by ALL of the following:
- a. electrical power is avail- i able to the RCP bus,
- b. RCP auxiliaries are oper- !
ating to maintain seal cooling, bearing cooling, i and motor cooling, and ,
there are no high tem- >
perature alarms on the selected RCPs, l
- c. at least one steam gen-f erator is available for removing heat from the RCS l (ability for feed and steam fl ow) ,
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f SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE . L LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ,
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page '" of 7"
_ Revision "
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS' ;
- 14 (Continued) i
- d. pressurizer level is ;
greater than (33%] and not decreasing, j
- e. RCS is subcooled based on !
representative CET !
- f. r r t ri sf per(plantspecificRCP +
operatinginstructionsj.
restart criteria satisfied, Then go to step M.
Then do the following: :
- a. start one RCP in each loop,
and NPSH, ,
- c. operate charging (and SI) '
until pressurizer level
- greater than [14.3%) (and SI termination criteria :
met. Refer to step 16).
SYSTEM _80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER' !
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ,
GUIDELINES Page " of 7" Revision " ,
1
.i' INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 16, if SI pumps are operating, 16. ,
Then they may be throttled or l stopped, one pump at a time, if ALL of the following are ,
satisfied: ,
temperature _(Figure 9-1) :
- b. pressurizer level is greater than [14.3%) and ;
not decreasing, >
- c. at least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS ]
(ability for feed and steam ,
flow)
- d. the HJTC RVLMS indicates a minimum level at the top of '
the hot leg nozzles. l
- 17. If criteria of step 16 cannot 17.
be maintained after SI pumps throttled or stopped, Then SI ,
pumps must be restarted.
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LOOP 11 _ABB CE-SYSTEM 80+* :
SYSTEM 80 +"- -TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER- [
RECOVERY GUIDELINE' ;
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS P a g e 22 of 7o Revision ""
GUIDELINES l INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS .
- 18. If no RCPs are operating, Then 18. Ensure proper control of steam :
verify natural circulation generator feeding and steaming- l flow in at least one loop by (refer to step 6) and RCS I ALL of the following: inventory'and pressure control: I
- a. loop AT (Ta - Tc) less than (referj$ steps 7and8). [
normal full power 6T, l
- b. hot and cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing, i
- d. no abnormal difference greater than [10*F] between l
Tn RTDs and representative .
CET temperature.
- 19. Evaluate the need for a plant 19.
cooldown based on:
l
- a. plant status,
- b. auxiliary systems !
availability, .
- c. emergency feedwater inventory (refer to Figures 9-3 and 9-4).
- d. expected time to recover ;
off-site power.
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SYSTEM 80+" TITLE.- . LOSS'0F 0FFSITE POWER-REC 0VERY GUIDELINE ~
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of 7"
' Revision "" :
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS -
- 20. _I_f a plant cooldown is 20.a. Maintain the. plant in a desired, Then continue with stabilized condition, the actions of this guideline. and
- b. Exit to appropriate procedure as directed by Plant Technical Support Center.
- 21.a. Borate the RCS to maintain 21.
shutdown margin in accordance I with Technical Specifications.
and ,
- b. Prevent boron dilution by-pressurizer outsurge by the .
following (listed in ;
preferred order):
i) borate to raise the ,
entire RCS (including <
the mass in the pressurizer) to COLD SHUTDOWN conditions. ;
0._C ii) use main or auxiliary ,
spray to increase and maintain pressurizer boron concentration- ;
within 50 ppm of RCS .,
boron concentration.
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS 0F~0FFSITE POWER ,
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE .,
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS :
GUIDELINES Page " -of 7'
. Revision "" ;
F INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS :
- 22. Perform a controlled cooldown 22.
in accordance with. Technical :
Specifications. Reduce RCS temperatures utilizing:
- a. main, startup or emergency !
feedwater, .,
and
- b. steam generator steaming via (listed in preferred ;
order):
- 1) 1:I E'iE bypass system ii) atmospheric dump val ve.s. l t
f i
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LOOP- 14 ABB CE-SYSTEM 80+"-
SYSTEM 80+" TITLE t0SS OF 0FFSITE' POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCYLOPERATIONS 7" GUIDELINES Page " o f Revision "" -
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 23. Ensure pressurizer pressure is 23. Jf RCS'subcooling greater than-being maintained within the P-T limits or cooldown rate '
limits of Figure 9-1 during greater than [100*F/hr], Then ;
cooldown do the following as ;
appropriate: ,
- a. stop the cooldown
- b. depressurize the plant using Reactor Coolant Gas 3 Vent System or main or auxiliary spray to restore and maintain pressurizer
-pressure within the Post i Accident P-T limits of Figure 9-1.
- c. attempt-to maintain the .
plant in a . stable pressure-temperature configuration or contirde
.to cooldown within the, limits of Figure 9-1.
- d. .I_f. overpressurization 'due to SI/ charging flow, Then throttle or. secure flow (refer to step.16) and manually control letdown to restore and maintain ,
pressurizer pressure within, ,
the limits of Figure 9-1.
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if:i j SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE. l e EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -
GUIDELINES P a g e of a Revision "" 2!
u INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS :
i
- 24. Maintain pressurizer level [2% 24.
to 78%) during cooldown by l operation of:
- a. charging and letdown, !
E
- b. SI pumps i
- 25. Ensure the available emergency 25.
feedwater inventory is ;
adequate per Figures 9-3 and ;
i 9-4. j
- 26. Bypass or lower the automatic 26. l initiation setpoints of MSIS ] '
and SIAS as the cooldown and depressurization proceed.
- 27. When PZR pressure reaches.[740 - 27.
psia), Then reduce SIT-
- pressure to [300 psia]. f'
- 28. When pressurizer pressure 28.
reaches ~[445 psia], Then isolate, vent or drain the _
safety injection tanks (SITS). '!
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE - LOSS0F OFFSITE POWER l RECOVERY GUIDELINE: !
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS a" i
GUIDELINES Page '7 of " Revision l
.I INSTRUCTIONS. CONTINGENCY ACTIONS.
- 29. Initiate low temperature 29. j overpressurization protection l (LTOP) at 1,s [259'F]. -l
- 30. When the following SCS entry '30. If the RCS fails to; I conditions are established: depressurize,.Then a. void- l
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should be suspected. [
a pressurize'r level >[14.3%] a. Voiding in'the RCS may'be f and constant or increasing, indicated by any of the-' ]
- b. RCS is subcooled, following indications, ;
c RCS pressure 5 [450 psia), parameter changes,-or. j
- d. RCS Tg 5 [400*F), Then exit trends:1 .!
this guideline and initiate 1) letdown flow greater _ j SCS operation per [ plant than charging' flow,- i specifit operating .ii) pressurizer _ level }
instructionsl. increasing signi- j ficantly more than l Then exit this guideline and expected _while opera- .;
ting pressurizer spray,: 5 initiate SCS operation per i k specific operating iii) the HJTC RVLMS indi- ]
cates that voiding is instrtctionsJ. -l present=in the reactor -
-l vessel. j iv) HJTC unheated thermo ' j
' couple ~ temperature'in- l dicates saturated con- [
ditions in the reactor' !
-vessel upper head.
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LOOP' 17 'ABB CE~ SYSTEM 80+"
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3 SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER 1 _;
RECOVERY GUIDELINE.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS !
GUIDELINES Page of 7" Revision """ j i i
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS: ;
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- b. Jf voiding inhibits RCSJ
- 3 0.. (continued) depressurization to SCS- ,
entry pressure, Then +
attempt-to eliminate.the ;
voiding by:
i) verify letdown is isolated, j and 1 i
ii) stop the depressurization, and iii) pressurize and I depressurize th'e -;
RCS within the limits of Figure 9-1 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray or SI and charging. -Monitor-pressurizer level' and the HJTC.RVLMS t
'for trending of RCS ,
inventory.
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SYSTEM 80 +" . TITLE - LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER.'
RECOVERY. GUIDELINE !
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " .of
- Revision' ".
i INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY' ACTIONS-'
- c. If depressurization of the
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- 30. (continued) -}
RCS to the SCS entry-pressure..is still not possible, and-voiding ~is ;
suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes,.Then.
attempt to eliminate the. .
voiding by: }
i) . cool the suspected. l steam generator (by steaming and/or:
blowdown, and-feeding) to f condense the steam ;
generator tube f void, and ii) monitor pressurizer i level for trending - .j RCS inventory. a i
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^l LOOP- 19 ABB'CE' SYSTEM 80+" j l
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T SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF_ 0FFSITE. POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE.
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS.
GUIDELINES Page 2" of 7" Revision ""
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 30. (continued) d. Jf depressurization of the -
i RCS to the SCS entry l
^
pressure is still not possible, Then attempt' to , d eliminate the voiding;byi 'i-i) . operate:the' e Reactor Coolant ;
Gas Vent System- l to clear trapped ,
non-condensible l gases,. i and ,
i i) moni tor--
pressurizer level and/or the i HJTC.RVLMS for trending.. of . RCS -
inventory.. .!
- e. Continue attempts to j establish SCS entry j conditions,.or exit this- j Lguideline and initiate.an'-- j ,
appropriate procedure'as- '
directed by Plant Technical; ,
' Support Center. !
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SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE )
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ""
GUIDELINES Page 2' of 7" Rev..ision The Loss of Offsite Power Recovery Guideline has accomplished it purpose if RCS conditions are being controlled in HOT STANDBY, HOT SHUTDOWN, or COLD SHUTDOWN, all of the SFSC acceptance criteria are being satisfied, and the [
entry conditions of an appropriate procedure are satisfied.
END i
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SYSTEM 80+ TITLE LOSS OF'0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE i
. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 22 l
GUIDELINES Page of " Revision "" ;
6 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION !
This .section contains items which should be considered when implementing E0Gs ;
and preparing plant specific E0Ps. The items should be implemented'as' ,
precautions, cautions, notes, or in the E0P training program. !
.i
- 1. Natural circulation flow cannot 'be verified until the RCPs:have stopped i .;
coasting down after being tripped. j
- 2. During natural circulation, verification of an RCS temperature response to a plant change cannot be accomplished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes 1 following the action due to increased loop cycle times. !
- q 1
- 3. TIf possible, interruption of the component cooling water to the reactor i coolant pump seals should not exceed h0 minutes] Extended loss 'of CCW flow may make inspection of the seals necessary{.
- 4. After the required shutdown boron concentration is attained in'the RCS, makeup water added to the RCS during the cooldown should be at least equal- !
to the RCS boron concentration to prevent any dilution of RCS boron j concentration. _
- 5. Once the pressurizer cooldown has begun, pressurizer level' indication - ,
decalibration will occur. The indication on the normal pressurizer _ level j indication _will begin to deviate from the true pressurizer level. -The operator should use. correction curves to find the true pressurizer' water !
level. A cold calibrated pressurizer level indication is also available !
for lower pressurizer temperatures. l l
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF.0FFSITE POWER .
RECOVERY GUIDELINE i EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 1 GUIDELINES Page z$
of 7" Rev..ision "^"
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- 6. Minimize the number of cycles of pressurizer auxiliary spray whenever the i temperature differential between the spray water and the pressurizer is j greater than [200*F] in order to minimize the increase in the spray nozzle. i i
thermal stress accumulation factor.
- 7. If cooling down by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, j an inverted AT (i.e., T, higher than T n) might be observed in the idle j loop. This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the i isolated steam generator and will have no-affect on natural circulation !
flow in the intact steam generator.
- 8. All available indications should be used to aid in evaluating plant 'f conditions since the a cident may cause irregularities in a particular -j instrument reading. Instrument readings should be corroborated when one or more confirmatory indications are available. !
- 9. When a void exists in the reactor vessel and RCPs are not operating, the ,
HJTC RVLMS provides an accurate indication of reactor vessel liquid i ventory. When a void exis+- e the reactor vessel and RCPs are l operating, it is not possible w 'tain an accurate reactor vessel liquid !
level indication due to the effect of the RCP induced pressure head on the. ,j HJTC RVLMS. Information concerning reactor vessel liquid inventory [
trending may still be discerned. The operator is cautioned not to rely i solely on the HJTC RVLMS indication when RCPs-are operating.
l i
- 10. The operator should continuously monitor for the presence of RCS [
voiding and take steps to eliminate voiding any time. voiding causes heat removal or inventory control safety functions to begin to be threatened. Void elimination should be started soon enough to ensure .
heat removal and inventory control are not lost -(Reia ence 15.14y.
)
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~l LOOP 23 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" j l
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1 SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY. GUIDELINE -i EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -
GUIDELINES .Page 25 of . " Revision ""
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i Figure 9-1 TYPICAL POST ACCIDENT PRESSURE TEMPERATURE-LIMITS. )
(TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) ,
s i
b 1
3
-l
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SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS 0F'0FFSITE POWER R
' RECOVERY GUIDELINE' EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of " Flevision "" j 1
i Figure 9-2 .
t TYPICAL ACCEPTABLE SIS FLOW VS RCS PRESSURE ;
h em.
3 l.0 -
-s
" " ~
\ -
N i=-
Ny == on i.ao K N 2
in -
- 'N - s g i.- - \
@ i=1 n=-
\ \ l
=
~ ~
= i- i g - ,
u
~
0.
.._ i --
m-m- ,
a- -
4 DO m _. .
t60 icij1eii m . i r 1. r 1 r [ r. i r\rim-i r 1isoeI r 8~r-im now (GFM)
.I
"""' Ya W. 'Si'"#'.'h"l3Me" ML"?&"if.'a'LWi"J#'."'*- 'l
~
'^' ".(.$'f.((jy m ,rm m-. - _._
(W.WuLmli"hs7A" q
LOOP 25 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+'"- .
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1 SYSTEM 80+" TITLE . LOSS OFl0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE ,
EMERGENCY ' OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 2' of~" Revision "
i Figure 9-3 TYPICAL FEEDWATER CAPACITY VS. TIME REMAINING ;
UNTIL SHUTDOWN COOLING REQUIRED. ,
5 4 10 r i e i a e a i i a i a 6 i 6 i
- f 3.5 10' -
F ,
B 1 E
D , .
I W 3 10' - -
^ .l Time after trip when = 0 lumars ,
R e S aM l 2.5 lE - 4 -
R E ,
Q ,
U 'j 1
R y,gg 5 _ 16 bours -
E D,
.[
3 I- 1.5 10 -
- i i
1 10 5 _
/
)/ Secondary Pressure = 1100 psia g,s g r,
/
// Feedwater Tenperature 1200F 1 5 10< - / -
kiiie O 2 4 6
, , , t t t t ft to 12 14 tG It to 22 24 26 28 30 32 t t t l
, WE amn) From start of Feedwater
.t LOOP 26 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+'"
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. ,e SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE . LOSS OF 0FFSITE'POWEP, j RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS .
Page 27 of ,7e_ Revision *"- l GUIDELINES
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Figure 9-4 TYPICAL FEEDWATER REQUIRED FOR SENSIBLE HEAT REMOVAL Teoto (REQUIRED) VS. Teoto (INITIAL) .
(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)'
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SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK l
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA -
- 1. Reactivity Control 1.a. Reactor power decreasing' and-
- b. Negative Startup Rate i and
- c. Maximum one CEA NOT fully.-
inserted.or hu~d A Pr ThcLni u d rp a . E . M .i a c . ,
- 2. Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries a. . Safety Load Division I-(AC~and DC power) energized, ,
E Safety Load Division II energized. .;
and-h^d b. 1) [125V DC] and [120V AC]
Uts V] Dr_ ,md [17e v3 AC -
Safety Bus A energized and 0;yn.oo I Nus iwrg Erd L_ J N [125V DC] and [120V AC]-
N -Safety Bus-C energized j N E F
ii) . [125V DC] and [120V AC)
Safety Bus B energized and
[125V DC).land [120V-AC]
Safety: Bus D energized '
red g y] O(, a
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LOOP 28 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" j T
SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE i EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of " Revision ""
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK q i
SAFETY FUNCTI0ff ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- 3. -RCS Inventory Control 3 .' a . Charging and letdown are .)
maintaining or restoring .i pressurizer level [2% to 78%] j and i
~I
- c. The HJTC RVLMS indicates the core is covered. ,
t
- 4. RCS Pressure. Control 4. Pressurizer heaters and main or .j auxiliary spray are maintainine or' -;
restoring pressurizer pressure within the limits of. Figure 9-1. ,
.i f
- 5. Core Heat Removal 5.a RCS-is subcooled based'on l representative CET temperature. l and !
b 'The RCS loop AT in the.
operating steam generator.is:-
i) .less than the full-power AT (if all RCPs --
are off)- l E I ii) less than [3*F] (if any ,
- RCPs are. running)- )
i LOOP 29 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" -
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SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- 6. RCS Heat P.emoval 6. At least one steam generator has level: 1;
~
- a. within the normal band with {
main, startup or emergency r feedwater available to: 1 maintain level 9.C
- b. being restored by main, j startup or emergency-feedwater j flow with level increasing. l i
- 7. Containment Isolation 7.a. Containment pressure less than t
[2.0 psig] !
and !
- b. 'No containment area radiation !
monitors. alarming -
and '
- c. . No process radiation alarms ' !
and !
- d. ' No steam l plant' activity monitors. alarming. I and -!
- e. - No nuclear ' annex radiation alarms and
- f. No Reactor Building radiation i i al arms. l
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LOOP 30 ~ABB CE-SYSTEN'80+ '
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- SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER.
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 7" Page " o f. Revision ""
GUIDELINES SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK- ..]
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- 8. Containment Temperature & Pressure 8.a Containment temperature less Control than [Il0*F]
and b Containment pressure less than
[2.0 psig].
- 9. Containment Combustible Gas 9.a Containment _ temperature less Control than [110*F]
and' Containment pressure less than
~
b
[2.0 psig].
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SYSTEM 80+" TITLE: LOSS OF'0FFSITE POWER :
RECOVERY GUIDELINE :
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 22 GUIDELINES Page of
- Revision "" 4 BASES i
The bases section of the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Recovery Guideline- 1 describes the LOOP transient in relation to the actions which the operator- _
takes during a LOOP. The purpose of the bases section is to provide the operators with information which will enable them to understand the reasons ,
for, and the consequences of, the actions they take during a LOOP.- !
i Characterization of a loss of Offsite Power There are many possible causes of a loss of non-Safety [13.8 kV] . AC power. ,
Some examples include: regional grid network failures, AC ' power distribution system failures, weather related damage, and other natural phenomena. This-guideline is designed to provide guidance for a loss of offsite AC-power (LOOP). A partial loss of AC (for instance, loss of one RCP bus) is covered by the Reactor Trip ORG. A total loss of AC (Safety as well as non-Safety .
buses) is covered by the Station Blackout ORG.
A loss of AC power is characterized by a loss of all electrical components-with the exception of instrumentation, emergency DC lighting, control power, :
for electrical breakers, DC powered solenoids for valve actuators, and turbine -
generator emergency lube oil pumps. A reactor and turbine trip will occur, :
and the diesel generators will start and energize the ESF buses. ,
-l' As a result of the loss of non-Safety [13.8 kV] AC power,- electrical. power will be interrupted to 'the CEDM's, reactor coolant pumps, [ main feedwater I pumps], main condensate pumps, main circulating. water pumps,, pressurizer !
pressure and level control systems, feedwater control system, the steam' bypass - l control system, and plant air compre= sors. Under such circumstances, the -
plant will experience a simultaneous reactor trip, loss of load,-[ loss of main
- )
feedwater flow], End loss bf forced reactor coolant flow followed-immediately' by,a turbine and generator trip. Once the diesel generators-start, power will be restored or made available to many components.
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OFLOFFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 33 of 7" Revision "
RCP forced circulation and heat transfer from primary to secondary via the steam generators is the preferred method of residual heat removal whenever plant temperature and pressure are above the shutdown cooling system entry conditions. If the RCPs are unavailable, the natural circulation capability .i of all C-E plants provides a backup means for core cooling using the steam generators. !
Safety Functions Affected While no safety functions are directly challenged by a Loss of Offsite Power, all safety functions must be maintained while establishing and maintaining [
natural circulation RCS flow in HOT STANDBY conditions or during a natural circulation plant cooldown. Particularly important are reactivity control, RCS pressure control, RCS inventory control, core heat removal, and RCS heat f removal. Failure to maintain any one of these safety functions could lead to [
an interruption of adequate natural circulation flow or core cooling. 0nce I the maintenance of these safety functions is ensured, the operators should i attempt to restore a source of non-vital AC power. !
Trending of Kev Parameters !
l The following discussion assu.nes that the turbine trips due to LOOP.
i Reactor Power (Figure 9-5) j The loss of AC power de-energizes the CEDMs, tripping the reactor. The !
reactor trip causes power to decrease. f i
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RCS Temoerature (Figure 9-6)
The loss of the steam generator heat rejection capability on a turbine trip leads to a rapid increase in RCS temperature. The initial rapid increase is '
terminated by the opening of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and the ,
insertion of the control rods. Subsequent RCS temperature responses will'be i influenced by heat removal via the steam generators. .i 1
Pressurizer Pressure (Figure 9-7)
Pressurizer pressure will rapidly increase, then' decrease due to the~ changes ,
in RCS temperature.
+
Pressurizer Level (Figure 9-8) l 1
Pressurizer level will increase, then decrease following the reactor trip. >
This is due to RCS inventory swell and shrink response to the RCS temperature swings and the concurrent pressurizer insurge.and.outsurge.
I Reactor Vessel level f
No reactor vessel voiding is expected to occur during a loss of offsite power :
event if HOT STANDBY conditions are maintained. Reactor vessel voiding may j occur during a natural circulation plant cooldown, but would only be~ a concern !
if the voiding inhibited the plant depressurization.
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLEi ' LOSS OF_0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS i GUIDELINES Page 35 of 7" Revision "^"
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Steam Generator Pressure: (Figure 9-9)
Once the turbine control valves shut following the turbine trip, steam generator pressure increases rapidly. With the turbine control valves' shut, -
steam demand by the turbine ceases. Pressure will-continue to increase until ,
the steam generator pressures increase to the main steam safety valve ,
setpoint. Subsequently, the operators control the steam generator pressures by controlling the atmospheric dump valves. l Steam Generator level (Figure 9-10) l Steam generator-level will begin to decrease rapidly because 'of- the shrinkage ,
t which occurs after the closure' of the turbine stop valves following the turbine trip. If a LOOP has occurred the emerges.cy feedwater system will then be used to maintain or restore the steam generator levels otherwise, the main ;,
feedwater system will ramp down to [5%] flow to refill the steam generators.
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' LOOP. 35 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* -
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF'0FFSITE POWER' 1 REC 0VERY GUIDELINE ~ .
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GUIDELINES r
.g
?
a a
h Figure 9-5 REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE. POWER .y REACTOR POWER q
(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DE. TAILED ENGINEERING) .q 1
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LOOP- 36 ABB.CE SYSTEM 80+" ]
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SYSTEM 80 +"- TITLE LOSS OF:0FFSITE POWER- l RECOVERY. GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS' i
. GUIDELINES Page 57 of 7' Revision " ;
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-i Figure 9-6 j REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER l-i LOOP RCS NARROW RANGE TEMPERATURES i (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) /j j
q
- .1 i
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' LOOP' 37 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" i
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f n SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE ' LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER
. RECOVERY GUIDELINE
^
EMERGENCY-OPERATIONS
. GUIDELINES Page 3'
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. Figure 9-7 REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER PZR NARROW RANGE PRESSURE !
t (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) 1 l
t LOOP 38 -ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" ~ l; 2
s
SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE - . LOSS OF 0FFSITE. POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE-EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS .
Page "- of " Revision "
GUIDELINES 1
4 t
Figure 9-8 REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER :
-PZR LEVEL (TO BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) t LOOP 39 ABB CE-SYSTEM 80+" ,
' SYSTEM ' 80 + " TITLE LOSS'0F.0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE.
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Figure 9-9 l REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE :
(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)- 'l l
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u 1
1
- LOOP 40 .ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" ...
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SYSTEM 80+" : TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE~P'0WER >
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS :
GUIDELINES -
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I t
Figure 9-10 REPRESENTATIVE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL .
(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) !
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LOOP 41 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"' '!
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SYSTEM . 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER j REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page '2 of " Revision "" .
c j Guideline Strateoy .i Figure 9-11 provides a summary of the LOOP Recovery Guideline's strategy. In l the LOOP Recovery Guideline, the operators begin by ensuring that the safety a functions are being maintained. Next, the operators attempt to restore'a.' ;
source of electrical AC power to the Non-Safety [13.8 kV] buses. If power can' !
be restored, the Non-Safety [13.8 kV] AC buses are.re-energized. If the RCP f restart criteria are met, pumps are restarted to restore forced circulation RCS flow. If power has not been restored, or the RCP restart criteria cannot be met, the operators maintain natural circulation RCS flow. The final block of steps allows for a cooldown and depressurization to the shutdown' cooling system entry conditions. '
A more detailed chart is provided in Figure 9-12. This chart illustrates the !
recovery guideline strategy and lists the guideline steps which correspond to ;
each strategy objective. Those steps which are to be performed at any time during the course of the event are shown by asterisks.
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SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
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Figure 9-11 LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER STRATEGY CHART IMTIATED FROM MODE 1 INITIATED FROM OR MODE 2 MODE 3 OR MODE 4 I I STANDARD POST TRIP GN N L W ACTIONS PERFORMED DIAGNOSE LOOP g y
_m 3
ni. . 1
" m Y
.:r -
t mense E
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J E U "..d.'I, E I =.
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a SYSTEM ' 80 + " - TITLE LOSS OF-.0FFSITE POWER- 2 REC 0VERY GUIDELINE-L
- EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of 7" Revision "- j i
t Bases For Operator Actions- j i
The operator actions are direc^ed at achieving three objectives: *
- a. estat,lishing, maintaining and verifying natural circulation-i conditions in the RCS if all RCPs are stopped,
- b. restoring the non-vital [N kV) AC buses,
- c. if necessary, performing a cooldown to the SCS entry conditions. [
i
- 1. The diagnosis of a LOOP event is confirmed by verifying the Safety-I Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied. This action ensures that the proper procedure is being used to mitigate the effects of a LOOP. The contingency actions allow the operator to verify [
~
the alternate AC is energizing the permanent non-safety bus and to'
]
energize at least one safety bus from the permanent non-safety bus. If-i: no safety or non-safety buses are energized, then the ORG is not the !
appropriate-guideline to implement. If another event-is diagnosed, then !
the operator is directed to implement the appropriate Optimal Recovery {
Guideline. If dia . asis of one event is not possible, then the operator' l l
is directed to implement the Functional Recovery Guideline. The Functional Recovery Guideline is based on safety functions and will en:ure that all safety functions are addressed regardless of what event (s) is occurring. 3
- 2. The operators are directed to verify that at least one safety bus. is- ;
energized and that all necessary loads have been properly sequenced onto l their respective buses. [
f
- 3. The operators are directed to verify that at-least one safety division [
is [125 V) DC is energized, including both the channelized and the !
division load center:. In addition, the operator is directed to verify.. [
at least one division of vitalj20 VAC] distribution centers is energized f including both the channelized and the Division load center. Normally .;
i
' LOOP. -44 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+":
1 SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE P0WER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE '!
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these buses would be powered by the battery chargers. A totai, loss of l vital DC indicates that more than a simple loss of Offsite Power has occurred, and the Functional Recovery guideline should be implemented. _;
- 4. Appropriate breakers on the de-energized bus (es) [4.16 kV and 13.8 kV]
should be opened to allow for proper loading when the bus is re-energized. ,
- 5. The operators are directed to verify that RCP Seal cooling is available z!
to all RCPs to be restarted. If seal cooling is not available, the ,
operators must restore sealing cooling by unisolating RCP controlled !
~'
bleedoff if .solated, unisolating the non-critical CCW loop if . isolated, and establishing RCP seal injection. [If possible, one of the following means of seal cooling ([CCW], [CVCS seal injection (SI)], [ Dedicated l Seal In.jection System (DSIS)] should be restored to the RCP seals to prevent overheating and possible damage. to the seals.]
- 6. RCS and core heat remc' al are maintained by feeding and steaming at least one steam generatt . The operators should control the heat removal to maintain constant RCS temperatures unless a cooldown is desired. In raost cases, the NSSS will be maintained at HOT -STANDBY conditions until the non-safety [13.8 kV] AC buses can be restored. If l the LOOP guideline has been implemented following a station blackout j event (after safety [4.16 kV] AC has been restored), the RCS may be at l lower temperature and pressure. In this case, the operators should i maintain the existing NSSS conditions until a decision is made'to either cooldown to shutdown cooling, or return to HOT STANDBY.
If possible, any steaming should be to the condenser (once non-safety AC-
~
is restored). Steaming to the condenser will minimize any possible radiological releases to the atmosphere and will conserve the condensate inventory. ,
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Page " of 7" ' Revision "
GUIDELINES
- 7. The operators should control charging (and when available,' letdown) to maintain RCS inventory control. The Charging pump may have to be manually restarted if- an interruption of electrical power to the charging pump bus has occurred. Inventory control is verified by meeting all of the following criteria:
- a. Pressurizer level is approximately [2% and 78%] of the pressurizer _ '
range. This range ensures that the pressurizer is not' drained and that it has an operable steam bubble.
- b. RCS is subcooled based on representative core exit thermocouple temperature. The RCS being subcooled, coexisting with a -
pressurizer level of [2% to 78%] indicates adequate RCS inventory control is being maintained.
- c. The HJTC RVLMS indicates that the core is covered. An HJTC RVLMS' indication that the core is covered, taken in conjunction with subcooled inventory, is an additional. indication that RCS inventcry control has been established.
Pressurizer level should normally be maintained at the normal shutdown reference level. If letdown is not available, pressurizer level _may be allowed to vary over the full range [2% to 78%] of the pressurizer as long as care is taken not to go solid.
Level should be maintained above [14.2%) if possible to permit pressurizer heater operation. If pressurizer level drops 'below the top of the pressurizer-heaters, then pressurizer heater burnout may occur if the heaters _have not been interlocked off by their control system. .
- 8. The PPCS or manual operation of pressurizer heaters' and spray is verified to be maintaining or restoring RCS pressure within the. limits of Figure-9-1 (Post Accident Pressure-Temperature Limits). I f.
subcooling limits or cooldown rate limits of Figure 9-1-are being-violated,.then the operators should take. actions to restore the RCS to
, LOOPi 46 ABB'CE SYSTEM 80+" 0 m
q SYSTEM 80 +" -TITLE - LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER ~
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -
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l within the P-T limits. Depending on the situation, thu operator should perform the following actions as' appropriate: i i
l
- a. Stop the cooldown. j
- b. Operate auxiliary spray as necessary to restore pressurizer q pressure to within the P-T limits of Figure 9-1.
- c. Attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pressure-temperature !
configuration. The cooldown may be continued, if desired, within ,
the limits of Figure 9-1.
- d. If an overpressure situation exists and is caused by SI and/or j charging flow, then throttle or stop SI (refer to step 16) or -
1 charging pump and manually control letdown to restore and maintain pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits of, Figure 9-1.- .3 t
7
- 9. While the operators are ensuring that all of the safety functions are 'i-being satisfied, the restoration of non-safety [13.8 kV] AC power should :
be continued. The actions necessary to restore power should continue.
until power is restored.
- l
- 10. When offsite power becomes available, electrical AC power is restored to the electrical distribution snd station loads. This step provides a [
mechanism for restoring RCP bus power, non-safety plant loads, and j backup power to the vital plant loads should the emergancy diesel .i generators need to be secured. ,
n;
- 11. While the operators are ensuring that all the safety functions are being .1 satisfied, the restoration of non-iafety [4.16 kV) AC power via the combustion turbine should be continued if offsite power has not been i restored. The actions should be continued until the combustion turbine i is started or until offsite power is restored. f i
- 12. When pewer to the permanent non safety buses becomes available, power to_
}
the desired non-safety equipment should be restored. This, step provides f y
'47 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER : ,
RECOVERY' GUIDELINE-' -!
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a mechanism for restoring power to non-safety loads and for backfeeding - !
power to the safety buses should the diesel generators _ need to' be j secured.
- 13. Plant conditions should be carefully assessed before any RCPs are i restarted. The need for forced circulation operation should be balanced against the risk of damage _to the RCP seals.
T: e need for operation of the RCPs should be evaluated based on:
I
- 1. the adequacy of the RCS and core heat removal under the existing natural circulation conditions,
- 2. the existing RCS pressure and temperatures,
- 3. the need for main pressurizer spray capability. :
?
If the existing natural circulation is providing satisfactory RCS and ,
core heat removal, a transfer to forced circulation operation may not be [
necessary. This would be particularly true if the RCS ha'd already been l cooled and depressurized to SCS entry conditions. If the RCS pressure and temperatures we closer to HOT STANDBY conditions, it may.be' desirable to restart the RCPs in order to allow a normal forced- i circulation cooldown. Consideration should-also be given to the-necessity of having main pressurizer spray capability if_ auxiliary spray is not providing the desired depressurization rate. :
The potential for RCP seal degradation should be evaluated based on: ,
- 2. RCP seal staging pressures and temperatures. ;
The possibility of seal degradation increases if seal cooling has been interrupted for longer than [10 minutes]. The seal staging pressures provide an indication of degraded seal stages (a low pressure drop: , ,
- i SYSTEM 80 +"- TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POW'ER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ;
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across a stage indicates a problem)'. Restart of an RCP with one or more !
degraded seal stages should be avoided if possible.
- 14. With all RCPs stopped, then operation of two RCPs (in opposite loops). f should be considered if the RCP restart criteria can be met. Only one -
reactor coolant pump in each loop needs to be operated to minimize heat ';
input to the RCS. ,
i Determine whether RCP restart criteria are met by the following:
~
- a. Electrical power available to the RCP.
- b. RCP auxiliaries are to maintain seal cooling, bearing cooling, and :i motor cooling. Following automatic or operator initiated .
containment isolation, reinstatement of component cooling water- ,
should be considered to ensure adequate RCP cooling. There should be no high temperature alarms on the RCPs to be operated.
- c. At least one steam generator is available for' removing heat from the RCS. A steam generator having the ability for feed flow and steam flow is available for removing heat from the RCS. ~
- d. Pressurizer level is greater than [33%] and not decreasing. With pressurizer level at the high end of the operating band, the ,
possibility of draining the pressurizer due to loop shrinkage and/or steam void condensation is minimized and there is-a greater l likelihood of keeping the pressurizer heaters covered. This will ,
assist in maintaining positive RCS pressure control. The
, criterion of pressurizer level not decreasing implies that RCS inventory control has been established.
- e. RCS is subcooled. A subcooled condition in combination with (d)~ ;
above indicates that inventory control has been established.
- f. [All plant specific RCP operating criteria are satisfied before the RCPs are restarted to prevent damage to the' RCPs resulting c )
from abnormal operating conditions).
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1 SYSTEM 80 +"- TITLE- LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE j EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS 5"
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A
- 15. Upon restarting two RCPs in opposite loops, pressurizer level and a pressure may decrease due to loop shrinkage and/or void condensation.
It is possible that this action will drain the pressurizer. Steam voids present in the reactor vessel will condense upon restarting RCPs. [The.
HJTC RVLMS should be monitored for the trending of reactor vessel {
liquid level. This trending information may be correlated to l pressurizer level decrease.] RCP operation with a drained pressurizer- ,
may continue provided certain actions are taken and certain criteria are satisfied.
i The following constitute the actions to be taken and the criteria to bc l
satisfied when restarting RCPs: :
l
- a. Start one RCP in each loop. I
- b. [ Ensure proper RCP operation by monitoring RCP amperage and pump i NPSH. NPSH is determined by pressurizer pressure and !
corresponding T, on Figure 9-1].
- c. Operate all available charging (and SI) , umps' until pressurizer ;
level is greater than [33%] (and SI termination criteria are met). i
- 16. If the SI pumps are operating, then they must continue to operate until j SI termination criteria are met. Throttling of SI flow is also !
permissible if termination criteria are met. SI termination criteria j are: i
Figure 9-1). Establishing subcooling ensures the zfluid
, surrounding the core is subcooled. Voids may exist.in some parts !
of the RCS (e.g., reactor vessel head), but are permiissible as l long as core heat removal is maintained. i
- b. Pressurizer level is greater than [14.3%] and not decreasing. A !
pressurizer level greater than [14.3%] and not decreasing, 'in LOOP' 50 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"
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- .I SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 7" GUIDELINES Page " . of Revision ""
conjunction with criterion 1. above, is an indication that RCS inventory control has been established.
- c. At least one steam generator is available for removing heat'from the RCS. A steam generator having the ability for feed flow and steam flow is available for removing heat from the-RCS.
- d. The HJTC RVLMS indicates a minimum level at the' top of the hot -leg nozzles. This'provides an extra margin'of core coverage and, i taken in conjunction with the above, serves as an additional indication that adequate RCS inventory. control has been -
established.
- 17. If the criteria of steps 16 cannot be maintained after the SI pumps are throttled or stopped, then the SI pumps must.be restarted and full-SI flow restored.
- 18. A characteristic of a loss of offsite AC power is the termination of RCP operation. Once the RCPs are tripped, natural circulation RCS_ flow should develop within [5 - 15 minutes]. Natural- circulation flow will .
be ensured by maintaining RCS pressure and inventory control and using' at least one steam generator for RCS heat removal.
When single phase liquid natural circulation flow is established in at least one loop, the RCS should indicate the following conditions:
- a. Loop 6T (Tn - T,) less than normal full power AT,
- b. Hot and cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing,
- d. No abnormal differences between Tg RTD's'and core exit ~
thermocouples. Hot leg RTD temperatures should be consistent with the core exit thermocouples. Adequate natural circulation flow will.be reflected by the core exit thermocouple temperatures being approximately equal to the hot leg RTD temperatures. An abnormal LOOP 51 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"-
1 SYSTEM 80+ TITLE . LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER' ,
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE- ,
a EMERGENCY. OPERATIONS s2
" Page of 7o Revision "
GUIDELINES ]
difference between Tn and the core exit' thermocouples could be any.
difference greater than [10*F].
i Natural circulation is regulated by a combination of factors. Factors which affect natural circulation include decay heat, component i elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer,' loop flow resistance and ;
voiding. The component elevations on C-E plants are such that a :i satisfactory natural circulation decay heat removal is obtained ;
utilizing density differences between the bottom of the core.and the top of the steam generator tube sheet. Natural circulation flow is enhanced .j by the density difference obtained when primary to secondary heat ,
removal th"ough the steam generator U-tubes is utilized. I 1
If the RCS does not indicate natural e,irculation is occurring, the operators should ensure that the systems available to support RCS .
inventory, pressure, and heat removal are being controlled properly.
If possible, any steaming should be to the condenser (once non-safety AC is restored). Steaming to the condenser will minimize any possible _;
radiological releases to the atmosphere and will conserve the condensate ]
inventory.
]
- 19. The ability to nintain the plant in a stable condition is based on plant status, auxiliary systems availability and condensate inventory.
j A major concern of this evaluation is the amount of available emergency inventory. If the available condensate inventory (Figures 9-3 and 9-4) >
appears to be marginally adequate to maintain the plant in a stable _ ;
condition for the expected duration of time, a plant cooldown should be ;
commenced. The cooldown is performed to avoid depleting all available emergency- feedwater prior to establishing RCS heat removal capability _
with t'he shutdown cooling system. The operator shoul'd also consider the - ~!
expected time to recover offsite power. )
1 LOOP 52 ABB CE SYSTEN 80+" ;
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i SYSTEM' 80 + TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER RECOVERY GUIDELINE i
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GUIDELINES Page " of " Revision =
- 20. A decision is made whether to maintain the plant in a' stable condition or cooldown to shutdown cooling entry conditions.- If the plant is to be' ;
maintained in a stable condition, then this guideline can be exited, and I an appropriate, approved procedure should be implemented. If a plant cooldown is to be performed, then the remaining steps of this guideline ,
should be implemented.
{
- 21. The RCS should be borated to Technical Specification concentration for
~
the required shutdown margin prior to starting a controlled cooldown.
Should' letdown not be available, it may not be possible to borate the -
RCS to a cold shutdown RCS boron concentration prior to commencing the cooldown. Boration will be limited to the makeup space available in the pressurizer. If this is the case, the operator should borate the RCS to ;
the minimum shutdown marg;n (per Technical Specifications) corresponding l to T,. During the cooldown, RCS shrinkage will provide more . space in the pressurizer for additional boration. The operator should 'l continuously or periodically borate to maintain the minimum shutdown ;
margin until the COLD SHUTDOWN boron concentration is achieved. {
- 22. An RCS cooldown is to be performed in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations. The cooldown should be performed using one of the following {
methods:
- a. Feed the steam generator using main, startup or emergency feedwater.
- b. Discharge steam via the turbine bypass system (preferred because ,
this method maximizes the amount of emergency feedwater and condensate inventory available to support the cooldown) or via-the atmospheric dump valves. _
- 22. Throughout the cooldown and depressurization, the ope
- ator should. ensure '
that the pressurizer pressure is being maintained uthin the Post Accident P-T limits of Figure 9-1. If subcooling or cooldown limits are !
. +
. . _ ~_ . ._ _ _.
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d SYSTEM .80 + " TITLE LOSS'0F 0FFSITE POWER j REC 0VERY GUIDELINE ,
' J r EMERGENCY OPERATIONS .
l GUIDELINES Page " . of '. ' Rew.sion
.i being violated, then the operators should--take actions' to restore the- ,
RCS to'within the P-T limits. Depending on the situation,.the operator -
should perform the following actions as appropriate:
1
- a. Stop the cooldown,
- b. Operate main or auxi_liary spray as necessary;to restore.
pressurizer pressure to within the P-T limits of Figure 9-1. l
- c. Attempt to maintain the plant in a stable pi eu"re-temperature [
configuration. The cooldown may be continued, desired, within. j the limits of Figure 9-1.
- d. If an overpressure situation exists and is caused by SI and/or ;
charging flow, then throttle or stop SI (refer to step 16) or j charging pump and manually control letdown to restore and maintain-pressure within the Post Accident P-T limits.of Figure 9-1. ,
- 24. Pressurizer level should be maintained in the band [2% to 78%] J throughout the cooldown process. Preferably, pressurizer level should be maintained by control of charging and letdown but use of the SI pumps l can provide an alternative method for maintaining pressurizer. level.
Maintaining RCS subcooling, in conjunction with a pressurizer level of q
[2% to 78%), should prevent' loss of pressure control by ensuring a saturated bubble exists in the pressurizer. It should be noted that if ,
pressurizer level drops below the top of the pressurizer heaters ,
[14.3%), they could burn out. However, the low. level heater cutoff-should actuate first to prevent. I i
- 25. Throughout the cooldown, the available emergency feedwater inventory !
.should be monitored and replenished as required to support the cooldown. -l The required inventory should be determined by referencing Figures 9-3 .;
and 9-4. [Reclenishment from available sources to' sustain the required'_ l inventory may. require inclusion of condensate from non-seismic tanks, ,
fire mains, ultimate cooling water supplies,. potable tanks,letc.].
- . . 1 LOOP. 154 ABB CE SYSTEM 80+"~ ,
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SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS 0F 0FFSITE POWER-REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page 55 of " . Revision "
- 26. During a controlled cooldewn and depressurization, the unnecessary automatic operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable.. The setpoints of SIAS and MSIS must be manually reset (lowered or bypassed) as the cooldown progresses. This ensures that automatic engineered safeguards actuation remains available until the RCS has been cooled down and depressurized.
- 27. If pressurizer pressure reaches [740 psia], which is [100 psi] greater than the maximum safety injection tank (SIT) pressure, then the safety injection tanks (SITS) must be vented, drained, or their discharge valves shut to prevent discharging their nitrogen cover gas into the RCS when RCS pressure is reduced below the SITS pressure during a controlled cooldown. The operators may lower the SIT pressure by venting to ensure the availability of the SITS during lower mode operations.
- 28. When pressurizer pressure decreases to the SIT outlet valve interlock setpoint [445 psia], tne SITS should be isolated to prevent heir undesired injection into the RCS.
- 29. Low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) is initiated at Tc <
[259'F] to protect against subjecting the RCS pressure boundary to a low temperature brittle fracture situation.
- 30. The cooldown and depressurization should continue until_ shutdown cooling system entry conditions are established.
- a. pressurizer level control should be established and verified by a level greater than [33%] and constant or increasing,
- b. RCS should be subcooled,
- c. RCS pressure should be at or below shutdown cooling system entry pressure of [450 psia],
- d. RCS hot leg temperature should be at or below shutdown cooling-entry temperature of [400*F],-
)
)
SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS OF.0FFSITEIPOWER j l
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
- i GUIDELINES Page 5' of 7" Revision i When these criteria are established, the LOOP ORG-should be exited and - !
SCS operation initiated per [ operating plant specific instructions). l; If the operators cannot depressurize the RCS to the SCS conditions, then ;
a void should be suspected. The operators should be monitoring for the-presence of voids using any of the following indications, parameter changes, or trends:
i
- a. letdown flow greater than charging flow, j
- b. pressurizer level increasing significantly greater than expected :
while operating pressurizer spray,
- c. the HJTC RVLMS indicates that voiding is present in'the reactor ;j vessel, ,
- d. HJTC unheated thermocouple temperature indicates saturated: ;
conditions in the reactor vessel upper head, If voiding hinders RCS depressurization to SCS_ entry pressure,'then'an '!
attempt to eliminate voiding should be made. ~ An attempt to eliminate !
the voids is performed as follows: ,
-l t
i
- a. Letdown is isolated or verified to be isolated to ruimize further j inventory loss. l
- b. The depressurization is stopped to prevent further growth of~the ;
void. ,
- c. The RCS is pressurized and depressurized (within the limits of- l Figure 9-1), to condense the void. Pressurizing will'have the ,
effect of filling the voided portion of the RCS with cooler fluid,
- which will remove heat from the region. Repeating the process of_ ,
pressurizing and depressurizing several times will cool and i condense the steam void. With a void in the reactor vessel, the !
pressurizatiod/depressurization cycle will produce a fill andi l drain _effect in the reactor vessel. This cycle may be j accomplished using pressurizer heaters and spray (preferred l
LOOP 56 .ABB CE SYSTEM 80+" i 4 . - . _- -
' SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER J RECOVERY GUIDELINE -I-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS "
GUIDELINES Page 57 of-7 Re. . vision method) or the SIS / charging system (alternative metho_d). The monitoring of pressurizer level and the HJTC RVLMS- for trending >
RCS inventory will assist the operator in assessing the effectiveness of void elimination.
- d. If indications of unacceptable RCS voiding continue, and voiding is suspected to exist in the steam generator tubes, then attempts 1 should be made to cool the steam generator and condense the tube bundle void. Steam generator cooling can be accomplished by steaming and/or blowdown in combination with feeding the steam.
generator. The steam generator cooling will be effective for condensing steam voids but will not have an effect on non-condensible gases trapped in the tube bundle. - However, a buildup of non-condensible gases in the tube bundles.will not hinder natural circulation, even with a large number of-tubes blocked, as only a small amount of heat transfer area is required for the removal of decay heat. The monitoring .of pressurizer =
level.for RCS inventory trending will assist the operator in assessing the effectiveness of void ' elimination.
- e. If indications of unacceptable RCS voiding continue, then voiding -
may be caused by non-condensible gases. Operate Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System to clear trapped noncondensible gases. The monitoring of pressurizer level and/or the HJTC RVLMS for trending-of RCS inventory will assist the operators in assessing the effectiveness of void elimination.
SYSTEM' 80 + " TITLE LOSS'0F 0FFSITE POWER .:
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE !
EMERGENCY ~ OPERATIONS
-GUIDELINES Page " of 7" Rev..ision "" :
SAFETY FUNCTION Status Checks .
R The Safety Function Status Check (SFSC) is used to continually verify the status of-' safety functions. The safety function acceptance criteria are selected from best estimate analysis to reflect the range for each parameter which would be expected following a loss of offsite power or loss of forced i circulation. If all SFSC acceptance criteria are being satisfied, then the adequacy of this guideline for mitigating the event in progress is confirmed '!
and the health and safety of the public is ensured. "
T
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I SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER 1
' REC 0VERY. GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " .of :" Revision "
j 1
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK BASES LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER i
j The safety functions and their respective acceptance criteria listed below are-'
those used to confirm the adequacy of the LOOP Guideline in mitigating the []
event. -l d
l SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES l
- 1. Reactivity Control a. Reactor Power For all emergency I Decreasing events, the reactor musti and be shutdown. Reactor- !
- b. Negative Startup power decreasing, in l Rate conjunction with. 'i and negative startup rate, c .. Maximum of one CEA is a positive indication'. .,
NOT fully inserted that reactivity control-oI RCS borated per is established. The ,
Tech. spec. criterion-that no more than one CEA be not fully inserted or-the ;
RCS borated observes ;
typical Technical :
Specification f
requirements.
P l
a ;
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SYSTEM 80 +" I TITLE- LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE :
EMERGENCY; OPERATIONS l Page a of- " Rev. .ision "
GUIDELINES l
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES ,
- 2. Maintenance of Vital a. Safety Load Division- One vital AC bus -is- '
I energized required to power Auxiliaries (AC and DC power) E ' equipment necessary to Safety Load Division . maintain control of all .
II energized other safety functions.
and One DC division is -
b.i)[125V] DC and required as a minimurn to
[120V] AC Safety. Bus provide monitoring and A energized limited control of the and other safety functions. ,
q
- g i
[125V] DC and [120V]
[zs- 6 DC cwd b7" O E AC Safety Bus C 0,v i s,a n T lo., u s c'W24 energized .
E .j ii)[125V) DC and ,
[120V] AC Safety Bus- :
B energized .
and
[125V] DC and [120V] ;
AC Safety Bus D -
energized twM j
[zs il oc. .-)
-^
Dzs n AC c . ,, ,; ,, rt s~s -yad O
SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE ' LOSS OF 0FFSITE-POWER.
REC 0VERY GUIDELINE.
EMERGENCY- OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of 7" Revision- "" ;
~
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA' - f A'SES -
- 3. RCS Inventory a. Charging and letdown The value of [78%) was Control maintaining or chosen as an upper. limit-restoring to ensure a bubble is- !
pressurizer level maintained _in the pres-surizer considering an
~
[2% to 78%],
and initiation-of auxiliary i
- b. RCS is Subcooled spray. A value of -[2%) ..
based on was chosen as.the lower :
representative CET limit'to ensure the !
temperature. operator can detect some and level.in the pres-
- c. The HJTC RVLMS surizer.
indicates the core is' covered. Subcooling coexisting with a' pressurizer level of [2% to 78%) indicates adequate RCS inventory control via a saturated ;
bubble in the pres-surizer. Representative CET temperature is utilized during natural circulation flow con-ditions. Ts RTDs are utilized for forced circulation flow -
conditions. l t
i LOOP' 61 ABB CE' SYSTEM 8'0+"
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t SYSTEM .80 + " : TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER
. RECOVERY: GUIDELINE 9 EMERGENT Y OPERATIONS p , , .,
. SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ' BASES :
)
- 3. RCS Inventory An HJTC RVLMS indication- 1 Control (Continued) that the core is I covered, taken in
[- conjunction with
'subcooling,'is an j additional , indication l that.RCS. inventory 'i control-has'been .;
established. l
- 4. RCS Pressure Control Pressurizer heaters and For the LOOP event main or auxiliary spray- operation.of.the are maintaining or. pressurizer heaters and -l restoring pressurizer- sprays should be. j pressure within the sufficient to control- i limits of figure 9-1. the RCS pressure.-
l 4
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I SYSTEM 80+" TITLE . . LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS a l
Page of " Revision ""
GUIDELINES i
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA' BASES
- 5. Core Heat Removal a. RCS is subcooled Subcooling assures ;
based on repre-- adequate core cooling.
sentative CET-or Representative core exit temperature. ' thermocouple and temperatures should be ;
- b. The RCS loop AT in used- during natural :
the operating steam circulation flow generator is: conditions and in RTDs; i) leis than full should be used during power 6T (if all forced circulation flow RCPs are off) conditions. Best '
or estimate analysis '
ii) less than [3*F]' demonstrates that loop (if any RCPs are aT will be less than :
running). full power AT in the steaming-loop during: :
natural circulation and ;
less than [3*F] in the steaming loop with at least one RCP operating.
I l
LOOP 63 ABBCESYSTEM80+9 U
I SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER '
RECOVERY GUIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ,
GUIDELINES. Page " of 7"
- Revision "-
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. BASES
- a. within the normal maintained if at least band with main, one steam generator.is startup or available for removing emergency heat (capable of steam feedwater flow and feed flow),
available to maintain level or -;
- b. being restored by main, startup or.
emergency feed-water flow with level increasing.
i LOOP.. 64 ABB CE' SYSTEM 80+*
, , s -. -
1 SYSTEM 80+" TITLE LOSS.0FLOFFSITE POWER l
RECOVERY GUIDELINE" EMERGENCY OPERATIONS'
- GUIDELINES Page '5 of " - . Revision SAFETY' FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASES'
- 7. Containment .a. Containment Pressure' [2,0 psig] is based on-Isolation <[2,0 psig]. the containment high and pressure alarm. ~ It is-
- b. No containment area not: expected for the radiation monitors LOOP event that .,
a alarming containment pressure a an.d~ will increase to the
- c. No process radiation alarm setpoint.
alarms
~
and During a LOOP it is not
- d. No steam plant expected that radiation activity monitors will be detected inside-alarming containment or on the and process radiation;
- e. No nuclear annex monitors. The monitors radiation alarms. should not be alarming.
Steam plant activity is'
'an indication of a SGTR and is_not anticipated for a LOOP. It is also not anticipated-for a LOOP that: nuclear-annex alarms are' received.-
- SYSTEM 80 + " - TITLE - LOSS'0F 0FFSITE: POWER.
RECOVERY. GUIDELINE 6
EMERGENCY' OPERATIONS.
Page " of " Revision
- GUIDELINES SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA- BASES:
- 8. . Containment a. Containment Containment-L temperature :
Temperature and temperature <[110*F] is not expected to Pressure Control and increase to [110'F] for
- b. Containment pressure the LOOP event. .[2.0.
<[2.0 psig]. psig) is based on the containment high
. pressure alarm. -It is not expected that the pressure will reach this value during the LOOP event.
- 9. Containment a. Containment Maintaining these Combustible Gas temperature <[110*F] ' containment conditions Control and provides an indirect
- b. Containment pressure indication that the-
<[2.0 psig]. conditions required'for.
H2 generation do not exist.
-i SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE t0sS OF OFFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " - of - '" Revision " ;
Event Strategy This section contains the detailed LOOP recovery actions strategy chart
'(Figure 9-12). The chart depicts the strategy around which the LOOP guideline- :
is built. It is intended to assist the procedure writer in understanding the intent of_the guideline and can also be used in operator training. Operators'
]
should understand what the. major objectives of the guideline are in order to: .;
facilitate their progress toward the guideline goals.
'l The strategy charts show the recovery guideline strategy in detail. Steps of the guideline which may be performed at any time during the course of an event are shown by asterisks. The boxes above the dashed line indicate the lead-in !
steps performed by the operator prior to entering this recovery guideline. i
?
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. SYSTEM 80 + " TITLE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER REC 0VERY GUIDELINE-R EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page " of " Revision ""
w.
Figure 9-12a STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER (T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAll.ED ENGINEERING) a 3.."
w t
l ',
SYSTEM 80+" TITLE
~
LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER 'l RECOVERY G'JIDELINE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES Page a of " Revision "
s' i
r I
T Figure 9-12b STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER ,
(T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING) 1 i
L SYSTEM 80 +" TITLE: -LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER- l RECOVERY GUIDELINE' EMERGENCY OPERATIONS -l Page "- of " Revision ""
GUIDELINES _
1
?
- \
t f
Figure-9-12c STRATEGY CHART FOR LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER :
5 (T0 BE DEVELOPED DURING DETAILED ENGINEERING)
-i i
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100P '70- ABB CE SYSTEM 80+* ,