ML20116P093
| ML20116P093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1992 |
| From: | Tietz G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GCT-92-44, NUDOCS 9211240320 | |
| Download: ML20116P093 (24) | |
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I Commonwealth Edison d
ouad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22110 206 Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 a
Telephone 309/654 2241 i
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i GCT-92-44 November 4,1992 l
i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:- Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 t
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SUBJECT:
Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed HRC_Dosiet Nos. 50-25 Land _50-265 i
r Enclosed please find a listing of those facility and procedure. changes, tests, and experiments requiring safety evaluations completed during the month of 4
October 1992, for Quad-C1. ties Station Valts 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30.
A suminary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).
Respectfully, CU4MONHEALTH EDISON COMPANY l
Quid-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION
.L4e i
Gerald Tietz Technical Superintendent GCT/dak 1
Enclosure-1 cc: - A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator l
T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector
!n 4
240000 f
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IS 92_
9211240320 921104
$3.,
.V' I-PDR. ADOCK 0 2y4
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i SE-92-178 TDiPORARY ALTERATION 92-1-68 i
DESCRIPTION:
1 This temporary alteration makes 3 changes to the Unit 1 125 VDC system.
3 First, jumpers (2C^ mcm logged cables) are connected between Compt. B04 of j
125 V Bus 1A and Compt. C03 of 125 V Bus 1.
Second, #14 gauge jumpers (lugged cables) are connected between fuses of undervoltage relay at 1
Compt. B04, Bus 1A and fuses at Compt. C01, Bus 1, which are associated with the DC battery undervoltage alarm in the control room.
Third, 400A l
fuses in Compt. B04 of Bus 1A are replaced with 800A fuses.
i SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
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The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is l
l true:
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The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis, i
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly i
assumed to function during or after the accident.
Opuntion or failure of the changed structure, system, or component l
could lead to the accid 3t.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA with Loop UFSAR SECTION: 15.8 l
For each of-these accidents, it has been determined-that the change l
described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or-the l-consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to.
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR-is not created because the temporary l
alteration is installed in order to connect the alternate 125V battery / charger to the 125 VDC system while the normal 125 V battery is being tested and recharged.
Since.both' batteries are located in the same battery room, hydrogen gas generation will-increase-during the time that I
both batteries are-being charged simultaneously.
During the time that-l both batteries are being charged, additional ventilation.will be provided
-by means of opening the battery room door (a non-fire. door) and operating-a portable fan at the battery rcm's entrance.
This piscaution should 4
reduce _the possibility of explosion in the battery room due to increased.
hydrogen gas levels.
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r SE-92-178 CONTD i
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Techt.ical Specification is not reduced because the parameters used to establish the Tech Spec Limits are not changed.
Tech Spec 3.9B requires that two 125V batteries be operable.
By connecting the alternate 125V battery to tha IA S
battery charger through the temporary alteration, the normal 125V battery can be isolated for testing and the 125V systent loads can be supplied by J
the alternate battery.
The normal 125V battery is required to be tested in
-der to satisfy Tech Spec 4.98 (discharge test surveillance).
This Temporary Alteration allows both 3.9B and 4.9B Tech Specs to be satisfied without ; hanging the Tech Spec parameters.
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i SE-92-181 i
AL.*.RA Dose Reduction Sheet 92-109 a
DESCWIPTION:
a l
Radiation Protection requested an evaluation to place ten 1 foot by 6 foot l
1ead blankets on scaffolding near the Chemical Decontamination equipment for Q1R12.
This safety evaluation is being written generically to cover all floor i
loadings that do not exceed the posted live load, due to lead shielding.
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SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
l 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or l
anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is i
true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
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The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
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Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
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None 1
For each of these accidents, it has been' determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment ';oortant to l
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
4 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in'the UFSAR is not created because the plant design bases will not be exceeded;.therefore, the additional load due to the lead blankets will not create an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, i: not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,'therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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4 SE-92-183 DCR 4-91-161 (H-81 Sheet 1)
DESCRIPTION:
Relocate PS-002-1054 from the "B" loop to the "A" loop on the drawing to reflect the as-built condition of the plant.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMIRRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of.the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Turbine Trip UFSAR SECTION:.15.2.3 Inadvertant Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valves UFSAR SECTION: 15.2.4 LOCA Resulting from Piping Breaks Inside Containment UFSSR SECTION: 15.6.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will.not Increase the probability of.an o;eurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no physical' change has been made in the plant to the prersure switch.
3.
The margin of safety, as defthed in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the set point for-the pressure. switch is set at 45 psig which-is 5 psig greater than that required 1.1 the Technical Specifications.
PS-002-1054 is mounted at 558' 5" an-es'into PS-002-1001-74A which is mounted at an elevation of 557' 8".
PS-002-1001-74B is also mounted at the same elevation. -Since both the 74A and 748 pressure switches are at the same elevation, no head correction needs to be considered-in moving dS-002-1054 from the "B" loop to the "A" loop on the drawing.
No change was made to this set point or.the pressure switch therefore there is no change in the' margin of safcly.
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SE-92-185 DCR 4-91-161 (4E-1820C)
DESCRIPTION:
Change to drawing 4E-1820C.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed belcw:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type tho..
any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because nothing has physically changed on the SBGT system.
This drawing change adds wiring details for the SBGT instruments 1/2-7541-2A, 1/2-7541-4A and 1/2-7541-12A. The wiring details have not been shown on the drawing before.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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i-I SE-92-186 i
i TEMPORARY ALTERATION 1
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DESCRIPTION:
e Isolate Differential Pressure Transmitters DPT-1-5741-8318 and DPT-2-5741-8302.
These transmitters monitor differential pressure between the Reactor Building and the Regenerative and Non-Regenerative Heat 1
Exchanger Room for each respective Unit One and Unit Two reactor.
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SAFETY LVALUATICW SUMARY:
I 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis The changed structure,-system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None i
i for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of en occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
j 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction _of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change 3
i will restore accurate Reactor Building to atmosphere DP indication and will have no other affect on plant operation.
The existing transmitters are disfunctional and therefore isolating them will have no effect on function or operations.
The clampers controlled by the DP transmitters will not change position with this temporary alteration.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical j
Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-187 iiARA Dose Reduction Request 92-C47
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DESCRIPTIOP.:
v The Radiation Protection Department is ph;c.; up to 12 - l' x 6' lead blankets on the pipe restraints that surrcun*, the jet pump risers.
Bechtel po Tbrmed the technical evaluatior onder SESR 4-1093.
' EVALUATION SUMARY:
ihe change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or
.nticipated transtent described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structurt, system or component is explicitly or impliculy assemed to function curing or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or compone could lead to the accident.
!y
,y The accidents which meet these crit la are ti. ;d below:
None For e' t
~'wse accidents, it has been determined that the change descr1L-nove will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequenca of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different tvoe than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because tne Reactor Recirculation System Jet Pump Riser supports have been evaluated by Bechtel, under SESR 41093, to safely support 12 - l' x 6' lead blankets.
As long as this maximum load is not exceeded, none of the UFSAR accident analyses will be affected nor will any new accidents be created.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for an!.echnical Specit' cation, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 116
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Unit 1 Degraded Voltage Condition i
DESCRIPTION:
The Nuclear Engineering Department has evaluated the results of the Quad i
Cities Station degraded voltage analyses (Calculation 8913-67-19-1 Rev. O approved July 31, 1992, for Unit 1, Division I,. Calculation-8913-69-19-1 Rev.
O approved May 5,1992, for Unit 1, Division II and Calculation 8913-67-19-3 i
Rev-. O approved July 31, 1992, for Second-level Undervoltage Relay Setpoint for Quad Cities Unit 1, Division I & II) with regard to 10CFR50.59. Our i
conclusion is that the results of these analyses do not involve an Unreviewed i
Safety Question.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUWARY:
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment irportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is-not increased because the CECO i
System Planning Department has studied the expected Quad Cities Station 345 KV switchyard voltages for Summer 199E through Spring 1993.
Their analysis concluded that the 345 KV switchyard voltaga would be 345 KV under a system load of 18,500 MH and emergency conditions.
This considers the worst case double contingency condition (the two failures which result in the lowest voltage) such as the outage of one line and one generator, or one transformer and one generator, or both generators.
The double contingency requirement j
's addressed in System Planing Operating guide (SPOG) No. 2-1.
NED-E/I&C has estimated a 4 KV safety-related bus voltages for the L
above condition.
Data from the Sargent & Lundy ELMS program was used to model the station auxiliary power loading conditions.
The computer program used for the analysis is a highly reliable commercial l
mainframe program called Power System Simulator (PSS/E), which utilizes the Newton-Raphson method-or' performing power flow analysis.
The table-below representsLthe safety bus voltages for various -lant conditions as indicated in the column headings.
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Unit i Degraded Voltage Condition (CONTD)
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i Quad Cities l
Expected Bus Voltage Levels Normal Lineup Post Trip Post LOCA l
Loads Split,-
From 100% Power From 100% Power-UAT/ RAT RAT Only Summer Loading 100% Power Summer Loading RAT Only Summer Loading Switchyard Voltage
Bus 23-1 4178V 4056V' 4009V Bus 24-1 4186V 4054V 4005V
- Hinimum expected switchyard voltage'for the period from Summer 1992 j
through Spring 1993 under double contingency conditions is 345 KV per System Planning Depart m t letter from H.L. Terhune to G.P. Hagner, dated.4/6/92.
As can be-seen from the table above, at the lowest expected switchyard voltage-(345 KV)_, 4 KV safety-related bus voltage will not drop below 4005 volts.
In addition a review of-historical system data from 1/1/89 to 12/31/91 corroborates that the quad Cities 345 KV switchyard voltage-has not dropped below 347 KV.
Hence the probability of losing.
l offsite power.during a LOCA because of degraded voltage on the systen:
l has not significantly increased over the previously evaluated Safety l
Evaluation Report value.
l' The nominal second level undervoltage relay setting is 56 8 volts, or l
107 volts tur.4 the lowest anticipated 4 KV safety-rflated bus voltage (4005 volts). On tht: basis of the nominal relay-sotpoint, the maximum l
possible re by trip actuation voltage, including all potential l-positive error, is 393:' volts (72 volts below 4005-volts) and_the I
maximum possible trip i.eset voltage could be 3953 volts (52 volts l-below 4005 volts).
He"ce no measurable increases in the probability l
of occurrence, or the consequences of-.an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the Safety Evaluation Report is expected.
2.--The possibility for an accidert er malfunction of a different type-a than any previously evaluated-in the Final Safety Analysis Report is l
l not created because the above listed relay setpoint provides for.the automatic actuation or equipment as currently described in Table 3.2.2 of the Technical Specifications.
The new realy setpoint ioes not l
' alter the current automatic actuation of equipment.
Therefore, the new setpoint does not create any different accident, or a malfunction l
of a different type,-than pieviously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.
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Unit 1 Degraded Voltage Condition (CONTD) 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical l
Specification is not reduced because Table 3.2.2 of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications defines the second level undervoltage on 4 KV safety-realted bus relays to be set to 3840 volts (+/- 2% tolerance) 1 after 5 minutes (+/- 5% tolerance) with a 7 second (+/- 20% tolerance) time delay. The new relay setpoint is 3898 volts with a 1.36% total i
negative error and a 0.90% total positive error.
The new setpoint methodology includes relay, potential transformer, calibrati3n and j
test instrument tolerances.
Time delay values werc not changed.
f By increasing the second level undervoltage relay setting, the margin of safety for the protection of rotating equipment has increased.
{
This is because the power source for the equipment will transfer to a i
higher voltage source (the emergency diesel generator) at a higher 4 l
KV safety-related bus voltage-value (approximately 82 volts at a 4 KV; the differenca between the.iew setpoint and the existing setpoint minimum trip voltages, 3898 X 98.64i. - 3840 X 98%).
In contrast, by j
increasing-the second level undervoltage relay setting, the margin of safety as related to the removal of.the safety-related 4 KV-bus from l
the preferred off-site source of power decreased slightly (approximately 16 volts at 4 KV; the difference between the new 4
setpoint and the existing-setpoint maximum trip voltages, -3898 volts X 100.9% - 3840 X 102%),
Considering that this is a relatively e
l insignificant percentage increase, and that the primary purpose of the degraded voltage Ifunction is to protect. Class IE equipment and systems from damage due to sustained degraded voltage of the offsite l
power system..it is con:1uded that the increase in the relay setting i
does not reduce the overall margin of. safety.
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SE-92-173 Temporary Alteration 1-a DESCRIPTION:
Install four 0-1200 psig pressure transducers on existing. pressure taps off of the main steam line low pressure switches,.PS-1-261-30A, B. C, & D-sensing lines.
The pressure transducers will then be connected to a strip i
chart recorder.
Install four accelerometers on the selsmic mounted plates of the main steam line low pressure switches.
The accelerometers will then be connected to a digital audio tape recorder.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLM ERY:-
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly i.
assumed to function during or after the accifant.
Operation or failu,e of the changed structure, system, or component i
could le&d to the accident, The accidents v51ch meet these criterin are listed below:
Steam System Line Break Outside Containment UFSAR SECTION 15.6.4 Increase in Steam Flow UFSAR SECTION 15.1.13 L
For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described-above will not increase the probability of an' occurrence or the
[
consequence of the accident, or malfenction er equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
i 2.
The possibilt y for an accident or malfunction of a different type than i
any previously evaluated in the-UFSAR is not created because a failure of
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.one of the pressure transducers.would depressuriza the associated mainL i-steam line low pressure switch:which would insert a 1/2 Group I Isolation-L signal. A failure is-assumed to be the transducer falling off the test' L
tap allowing a steam path to atmosphere.
The test tap ~1s only-3/4" in-diameter, a-steam leak of this size is consideret negligible and could be isolated if necessary by closing the associated 1: 31ation valve.
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i SE-92-173 CONTD 4
The setpoints of the main steam line low pressure switches are also r maining unchanged with the installation of this temporary alteration, ic.e transducers are being installed on existing test taps, and thus, will not interrupt the flow patn to the main steam line low pressure switches.
The weight of the transd cers is also considered negligible.
Therefore, after installation of this temporhry alteration the four main seam line low pressure switches will function as designed and described by:
1.
UFSAR section 7.3.2.2.5 Low Steam Pressure at Turbine Inlet 2.
UFSAR section 7.3.2.3 Primary Containment Isolation System 4
Instrumentation, section E.
Based upon the above, installation of this temporary alteration will not create the malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, ther9 fore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-184 Hork Request 002700 BLTA Inspection and Reconstitution for UICl3 i
DESCRIPTION:
i Barrier Lead Test Assembly (BLTA) inspection and reconstitution.
The work scope requires the fuel prep machine-stops to be adjusted from the current height of 8' of H2O coverage from the top of the ball handle bundle.to 7' of H2O coverage from ball handle top.
SAFETY EVALUATION Sl4 MARY:
l 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
I The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly
- stumed to function during or after the accident.
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Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents wn!ch meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change F
described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
s I
?. -The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than-any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the BLTA-work i
scope including adjusting the fuel prep machine to allow 7' of H2O coverage from the top of the bundle does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibliity of an accident or malfunction of l
a type di.'ferent from those evaluated in the UFSAR. Tha adjustment allows for adequate H2O coverage, provi
.ig adequate shielding.* The change in no way affects any accident or malfunction mentioned in the UFSAR.
- Section 9.1-57 indicates that when IRRADIATED fuel is raised above the
" NORMAL UP" position, the potential exists for exceeding 100 mR/hr. (The normal up position corresponds-to 8.5.)
In order to assure 100 mr/hr 1s-
~'t exceeded an EC4-3 will be set up next to the fuel prep machine work l
orea. -The alert alarm comes in a T 40 mr/hr and the high alarm at 50 MR/hr.
In the event 50 MR/HR-is exceeded'all work on the fuel prep.
machine shall stop and the bundle shall be lowered to a conservative lower l
. position in the pool, (Per RHP 92-4227).
3.
The margin of safety, is not definet in the basis for any Technical l-Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 116
l SE-92-191 Temporary Alteration i
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DESCRIPTION:
l-This Temporary alteration will connect a strip chart recorder at two locations to monitor and record certain parameters in the HPCI system I
during surveillance testing. -One strip chart recorder will be connected l
at the 901-31 paal, the other recorder will-be connected to the new vacuum breaker l'ne per modification M04-1-91-013.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlDMARY:
l 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR whtre any of the following-ts i
l true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly l
assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead t? the accident.
l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 15.0, 15.5, 15.6, i
15.8-Inadvertent Injection for HPCI UFSAR SECTION 15.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change e
described above will not increase the:orobability of an occurrence or the consequence of the' accident, or malfunction of.-. equipment important to.
t safety as pr'viously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or. malfunction of a differentitype than any previously evaluateo in the UFSAR is not created because HPCI turbine speed and. pressure indicators have no automatic safety system actuations~
associated with them.
They are not considered-.in the.UFSAR single failure criteria.
Because the strip chart re_ corders uses non-safety related power, fuses will also be used to provide isolation between safety and non-safety related power. The flow controller will not be affected due to t-parh11el circuitry and high impedhnce resistor within-the recorders themselves.
Additionally, the chart recorder fallere mode is that of;an "open circuit" assuring no short would occur.throughout'the logic circuits. The pressure-transducers and tubing used for the vacuum breaker line will_ monitor only 'ressure differentials across the vacuum breaker
- The ins' mentation used is sized to' assure the: pressure check valves.
integrity of:the line. maintained.
This'will_not affect.the operation of the check valves.
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,i SE-92-191 CONTD There are no identifi-d failure modes or interactions more severe than a steam line bre.a.k or inadvertent injection.
Therefore, the potential failures are still bounded by.the UFSAR analysis.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-192 Temporary Alteration DESCRIPTION:
The 2-1301-50 testable check valve has a leak in the Pressure Seal Ring area.
To stop the leak, tiie valve body will hava holes drilled into it and leak sealant injected into the pressure seal ring area.
This work with sealant will ren.ain in the valve until Q2R12.
SAFETY EVALUATION SU W RY:
1.
The change described above has 'een analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR vhere any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during er after the ac:1 dent.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Reactor becomes isolated from condenser simultaneou;1y with loss of feedwater UFSAR SECTION 3.6.1, 5.4.6, 6.3, 7.3.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the pcobability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UF3AR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the repair on the 2-1301-50 valve has been evaluated and found not to create an accident different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
This valve is a non-code, non-safety, non-seismic related valve.
The work on this valve follows original construction cods B31.1.
The drilling and installation of adapters has been evaluated for thread engagement, and spacing.
The sealant compound has been evaluated for temperature and pressure design.
Also, the adaptors will be left on the valve for maintenance access.
This work will allow to maintain the pr9ssure integrity of the valve and not affect tt? rperation of the check valve.
The system will, therefore, be i
able to felylil its intended function.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical j
Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
1 TS 116 4
SE-92-193 Temporary Alteration DESCRIPTION:
The A02-2301-7 testable check valve ha; a leak 1* the valve packing area.
To stop the leak, the leak sealant will be injected into the packing area through the packing leak-off line.
SAFETY EVALUATION Sl W ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the chanqed structure,,ystem, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 5.4, 6.3, 7.3, 15.0 For each of these accidents, it has beea determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
4 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the repair for the A02-2301-7 valve has been evaluated and found not to create an accident different from those evaluated in the UFSAR. A sealant inject 1Ga thru the packing leak-off w1:' be utilized.
This will avoid reaching the pressure boundary, thus the siructural integrity of the valve will not be affected.
The seal *it material is similar to packing material, thus provide pressure retention capabilities as before.
Engineering has analyzed the specific concerns and found it acceptable per the directive TID-MS-06. The packing sealant will not cure" per discussions with furmanite, thus, the operator / actuator will not'be affected.
The sealant used is nuclear grade and acceptable per the QA program.
If minimal amounts of sealant intrusion enters the flow stream, the chemistry department has analyzec' the compound.
The operation of the swing check valve will not be affected from this work. therefore HPCI will still meet its intended safety function.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. tnerefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 116
4 SE-92-194 Setpoint Change #156 DESCRIPTION:
Change setpoint of PIC-1/2 5741-333 to allow FCV-1/2-5741-333 to control compressor discharge pres;;re on the "B" Control Room HVAC systein at 225 psig instead of 294 psig.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUDMAP.Y:
1.
the change describt4 above has been anclyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters tha initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during oi after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to tr.e accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not inctease the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important co safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because after the setpoint change is installed, the "B" HVAC compressor and the FCV will operate within their design ranges and have the same operating modes.
Since the eq,tement being affected will be operated within its design constraints anc modes, there is no possibility of creating a failure that was not already evaluated when the system was originally designed and installed.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 116
W l
SE-92-195 Temporary Procedure _#8095 e
i DESCRIPTION:
This proceduto desc ibes the steps to vary Reactor water level with the Reactor vessel defueled and the +8 Low Reactor water level trips bypassed in order to obtain reference data to calibrate the Reactor Level l
Instrumentation.
I SAFETY EVALUATION SUW4ARY:
l 1.
Thc change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is i
true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after_the accident.
l-Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component j
could lead to the accident.
l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For ei;h of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in-the UFSAR.
i 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evalt:ated in the UFSAR is not c: eated because the accidents analyzed in the FSAR pertaining to a loss'of Reactor' Coolant assume that.
fuel is present in-the vessel. Under the present plant conditions the 4
[
Reactor Vessel is defueled. Therefore, no fuel rod overheating and subsequent release of fission products can occur from lowering vessel i
level. With no fuel present the Low Leve! scram is not required to be in effect.
j.
Also, under the present plant conditions 3rimary containment is not i
required to be operable by Techn: cal Sp Ifications and the Group II and Group-III isolations are not required to be in effect.
l-The Reactor Building Vent-isolation SBGTS Auto st and Control Room t
vert isolation protect plant personnel and the pob.
from a release or r&diation due to Fuel damage. With no fuel in the vessel no fuel damage can occur from lowering vessel level.
3.
The margin of safety, as. defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is re-reduced because no fuel is present in the-vessel and-therefore there is no possibility of a maging fuel by lowering Reactor t
Water Level.
TS 116
SE-92-196 Setpoint Change #92-136 DESCRIPTION:
The setpoint for the RVl-1301-31 is set at 150 psig.
The or Ninal design document spec, DCD, refers to this valve to be set at 100 psig.
Therefore, a setpoint change form will be issued to change this setting.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPHARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated trar,sient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is exolicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component tot i le?d to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Reactor isolated from condenser with loss of feedwater.
UFSAR SECTION 15.8, 5.4, 6.3 For each of these a'.cidents, it har r.sen determined that the change described abovc will not increase t.'e probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
lhe possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than l
any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because by chenging the relief valve setpoint from 150 psig to 100 p;ig, the setpoint will be changed to reflect the original design specification and design basis document.
The setpoint is being lowered to provide a better safety margin f
the conservative direction.
In order to do this change, the valve spring will be replaced with a spring having a lower srring source.
The vendor has provided information for the correct type or spring to use.
If the relief valve fails in the closed direction, the piping is still protected because an annunciator alarm will actuate in the control room when the pressure reaches 70 psig.
If the relief valve falls open, the 1" relief valve and 1" relief piping have been sized based on pressura loss considerations.
Therefore, changing the spring will not create any accident worse than complete failure of the relief valve itself.
l 3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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i TS 116
l 4
l Temporary Procedure 8105-8110 i
i DESCRIPTION:
Revise procedure so SBGT Trains are placed in Primary after completion of the survelMance.
A note was also added to the precautions in the event both trains are run simultaneously.
i SAFE 7 EVALUATION SUMARY:
i 1.
The change described above-has been analyzed to determine each accident or l
anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any.of the following is true:
i The change alters the initial. conditions used in the UFSAR analysis, l
i The changed structure, systera or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
l Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
l The accident: whicn meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant UFSAR SECTION 15.6.2, 15.6.5 Fuel liandling UFSAR SECTION 15.7.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probabliity of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or-malfunction'of equipmer,t important to l
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
l 2.
The possibility for an acc~ dent or malfunction of a different type than
(
any previously evaluated in'the UFSAR is not created because the-Standby i
Gas Treatment system is used to mitigate the consequences of an accident i
by reducing radioactive releases.
Therefore, SBGT does not create the l-possibility of an accident. Allowing both trains of SBGT to start.on-an initiation signal ~is-wit'.in tne design basis-'of its design basis and 'will i
i not effect normal operation.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any~. Technical i
Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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'.TS 116 i
.-.-,,_.__-,a,......
M04-1-84-036-D and M04-2-84-036-D Suppression and Detection DESCRIP110ti:
Install fire suppression and detection systems in several areas of the plant.
d SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4 ART:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment impertant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because fire suppression and detection is not classified as Safety Related in the FSAR.
Seismic installation of equipment ensures adequate operatior of existing safety equipment and safety related equi.nent in the immediate area of installation.
2.
The possibility for an acclucnt or malfunct'or of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Saaty Analysis Report is not created because the installation does not interfere with any existing safety systems.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the ;a-is for any Technical Specification is not reduced because st"precsloa and detection is not safety related.
The reliability of the Fire Protection system is increased by providing this additional suppression and detection.
X b
TS 116 I
M4-1/2-b6-ll l
PARTIALS J & K i
DESCRIPTION:
Purpose of modification is to suppress recirculation water oxygen by means of adding hydrogen to the feedwater thus mitigating the effects of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC).
Hydrogen will be added by injection into the condensate s) stem.
To ensure that all excess hydrogen is safety a
recombined in the recombiners, oxygen will be injected into the off-gas system.
Dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant will be mmi tored. Oxygen concentration in the off-gas flow will also be monitored.
Systen. control will be from a self-contained panel to be added in the main control room or from local control panels.
1 l
SAFEM EVAll1ATION StM4ARY:
4 i
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the additional delay introduced into the main steam isolation sequcnce, due to the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM) setpoint increase j
from 7 to 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition will result in a small increase in the consequences of the CRDA. A licensing document for this modification was prepaced and sent to the NRC for review, and war subrequently-approved via a lanuary 19, 1989 SER.
2.
The possibliity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report.ls not created because the hydrogen addition system design does not s
create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The storage areas have been analyzed to be located at a sufficient distance to mitigate the effects of a hydrogen,ftreball or explosion, and to pravent hydrogen or oxygen rich air from entering any-safety-related air pathways into l
the station.
Excess flow check valves are located at the hydrogen and F
oxygen storage areas, and at the_ Turbine Building entrance point for hydrogen to prevent large hydrogen or oxygen releases due to a pipe break. Also,."nydrogen area monitors are interfaced with a hydrogen 4
]
supply isolation valve which wi'i terminate-hydrogen flow into each 5
units' Turbine Building if there is a high area hydrogen concentration for that unit.
In addition to these safety _ features, normal Hydrogen Water Chemistry System shutdown is performed by closure of the active train's flow control valve and each hydrogen injection solenoid-isolation valve, which are located just prior to the injection point to the condensate pump discharge piping.
An electronic interlock 4
between the Hydrogen Injection Solenoid Isolatica Valve and its L
corresponding condensate pump motor also prevents inadvertent hydrogen injection-into a non-operating condensate pump.
These features should prevent spurious hydrogen addition into the condensate system.
j TS-116 i
4 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the MSLRM setpoint is defined in the Tech. Spec.
Bases for the Reactor Protection System (Sec 7.1) and the Protective Instrumentation (Sec. 7.2) as seven times normal full power backg.ound.
This modification will increase the MSLRH setpoint to fifteen times normal full power background.
This change does not reduce the margin of safety for the Reactor Protection System, however, it does promote an increase in the radiological consequences for the CRDA.
This is because the primary purpose of the MSLRM is to mitigate the radiological consequences of a CRDA once the fuel damage has occurred and not to minimize the fuel damage fror the CRDA.
Therefore, a licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for approval. 'he NRC has approved the 2
MSLRM setpoir.t increase to 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition via a January 19, 1989 SER.
1his SER has accepted the required Tech. Spec changes and their insignificant I
affect on the total activity release and resulting dose to the public.
't i
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TS 116
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