Text

Proposed TS 4.7.1 Re Snubber Visual Insp Interval
	ML20114C272
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/24/1992
From:	; DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20114C266	List: ML20114C264; ML20114C271; ML20114C272;
References
	NUDOCS 9209020086
	Download: ML20114C272 (47)
	v • d • e

. _. _ _. _,

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ATTACHMENT =A-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1

--Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 201/68 Revise the Technical Specification as follows:

Remove Paan Insert paac XXIII XXIII 3/4 7-26 3/4 7-26 3/4 7-27 3/4 7/27 3/4 7-28 3/4 7-28 3/4 7-29 3/4'7-29 3/4 7-30 3/4 7/30 j

3/4 7-31 3/4 7/32 B 3/4 7-6 B 3/4 7-6 0

9209020086 920824 PDR ADOCK 05000334

- P PDR

DPR-66 c.

Tablo Indsx (cont.)

TABLE-TITLE EfgGI 3.3-11 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-51

)

4.3-7

-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-52 Surveillence Requirements 3.3-12 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-S4 Instrumentation 4.3-12 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-57 In27 usentation Surveillance Requirements 3.3-13 Radioactive Gaseous-Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-60 Instrumentation 4.3-13 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-65 Instrumentation' Surveillance Requirements 4.4-1 Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be 3/4 4-10c Inspected During Inservice Inspection 4.4-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 3/4 4-10d i

4.4-3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation 3/4 4-14b Valves 3.4-1

= Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-16 4.4-10 Reactor-Coolant Syct m Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-17 Surveillance Requirements 4.4-12 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample 3/4 4-20 and Analysis Program 4.4-5 Reactor-Vessel Material Irradiation 3/4 4-26 Surveillance Schedule 3.6-1 Containment Penetrations 3/4 6-19a

3. 7-l' Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux 3/4 7-2 High Setpoint With Inoperable Steamline Safety Valves During 3 Loop Operation 3.7-2 Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux 3/4 7-3 High Setpoint with Inoperable Steamline Safety Valves During 2 Loop Operation 3.7-31 Steamline Safety Valves Per Loop 3/4 7-4

>4.7-2 Secondary Coolant System Specific Activity 3/4 7-9 Sample and Analysis Program

+ 7-I

.% 46, @ voJ L paz4c~ 3s,n/

3N M BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XXIII EE&BVf<0

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTQig

'3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on non safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,

2, 3 and 4.

(MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems # required OPERABLE in those MODES).

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months replace or restore the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.12.d on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the t,npropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SUr(VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12 Each snubber _ shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program _and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a.

Insoection Tvoes

//

As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b.

Visual Insoections gq 3f7,77 Snubbers are categorized as inaccessibl or accessible during reactor operation.

Each of these r:1;r (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according_ to the i----"d er "'-" ' *------'-

rf :_:5 schedule b't-

"'r firr*

AC4E72' e

or snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 1

~

e on ommencing POWER OPERATION and shall 4

Jg447 s nubbers.

.1

_equ,bbers of each ound OPERABL E p

l -/A//g g #A c uring the first inservi%

"471 1 inspection, the secon d j nservice visual W f that 1 be performed a :

t he.

first

'o.Alng outage.

Otherwise, su visua l i n ns of a

given type shallbeperformedinaccordIncj kith the following schedule:

These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-26 i

FA3Wh!ZD L

DPR-66 io SURVEYLLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-o 4.7.12.

(Continuedi No. of Inoperable Snubbers of Each Type per Subsequent Visual

'N Insoection Period Insoection Period

dT' g1 OEb

~~

1 25%

0 18 mo a

1 1

nths 1 25%

6 months t 25%

3, 4

124 days 1 25%

5, 6,

7 62 days 1 25%

8 or more 31 days t 25%

Early inspectit a those performed be 5% of the current inspection pari as elapsed) may be, used to ew reference surveillance tes for the current inspection period.

ver, the results such early inspections cannot be used to incre the curr inspection period (Pariod may only stay the same or decrea _)

stermined by the table in 4.7.12.b).

c.

Visual Insoection Accentance Criteria visual inspections shall verify that: (1)Vthere tre.: visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILIT1, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component ant to the snubber anchorage are functional.

Snubbers which appear inoperable an a

result of visual inspections cri in det:rnin d for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection

interval, provided that:

(1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; or (2) the affected t

snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f, d

as applicable. /pgcg 7 "g jal/& c/QJJWe*fu OA.ntCC$PYh QWMQV M

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A -. Ige ' inspection interval for each type of snubber shall len re than one step at a time unless problem has been iden

_ _ = mi correcte u event the inspection M6MT6 interval may be len the first time and two steps vu.

thereafter.

erable snubbers o are found.

'fThe rovisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-27 72Ol'CU[F

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) en a

fluid port of a

hydraulic snubber is found Eo~~3

vered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and

T 1 not etermined OPERABLE via functional testing ex in the following ee.

If the fluid port of a hydra snubber is ggg y s found to be vered due to a

leak in tr hydraulic fluid supply line or f1 s

and the snubb asses the functional test criteria after be filled wibM' fluid and vented of air, then the snubber may be deDe

'8 OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next vis.

In tion interval prctided that inspections are perfo p to verify ate remote reservoir fluid supply only )fter the first six (6)

' s ect.on, the cr all snubbers of the e type in six (6) months 25%.

Ta mont oir level is determined to be an inadequ supply as-left re until next refueling outage, perform an additiona

' ual in ion of the remote reservoir fluid lovel only in six (

nths 1 25%.

Snubbers which have been determined to be inoperable as a result of unerpected transients, isolated

damage, or other random

events, and cannot be proven operable by functional testing for the same

reasons, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection period when the provision in 4.7.12.d (that failures are subject to an engineering evaluation of component structural integrity) has been met and equipment has been restored to an operable state via repair and/or replacement as necessary.

d.

Functional Tests At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample (of at least 10 snubbers or at least 10% whichever is less) of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant c

shall

-o functionally tested either in place or in a bench test, g

For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f an additional 10 snubbers or at least 10% whichever is less of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

For each large bore snubber (snubbers greater than 1500 kips) on the reactor coolant system that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.12.e, an engineering evaluation is required to determine the failure mode.

If the failure is determined to be generic, an additional 10%

(for each failure) of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

If the failure is determined to be non-generic, an additional 10% (for each failure) of that type of snubber will be tested during the next functional test period.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-28

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DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) w.

Thu representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments and the range of size and capacity of snubbers.

At least 25% of the snubbers in the representative sample shall include snubbers from the following three categories:

1.

The first snubber away from each reactor vessel nozzle 2.

Snubbers within 5

feet of heavy equipment (valve, pump, turbine, motor, etc.)

3.

Snubbers within to feet of the discharge from a safety relief valve.

Snubbers that are especially difficult to remove or in 1.igh radjation zones during shutdown shall also be included in the representative sample.*

If a

spara snubber has been installed in place of a failed

snubber, the spara snubist shall be ratested.

Test results of this snubber may not be irrluded for the re-sampling.

)

If any snubber rielected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e.,

frozen in place, the cause vill

)

be evaluated and if caused by manufacturer or design deficiaacy all snubbers of the same design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

This testing requirement shall be independent of thn requirements stated above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

For the anubber(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components which are supported by the snubber (s).

The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components supported by the snubber (s) were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber (s) in order to ensure that the supported component remains capablo of mseting the designed service.

Permanent or other exemptions from functional testing for individual snubbars in these categories may be granted by the Commission only if a

justifiable basis for exemption is presented and/or snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for all design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

BEAVER VALLEY ~ UNIT 1 3/4 7-29 PKoih54D l

DPR-G6 PLANT SYSTEMS StTAVETLLANCE REQU2REMENTS (Continued) au-e.

Hydraulle Snubbers Punctional Test Acceotance Criteria The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify that:

1.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.

2.

Cnubber

blood, or release rate, where required, is within the specified range in compression or tension.

For snubbers specifically reqri2.ad to not displace under contiauous

load, the ability of the snubber to withstand loau without displacement shall be verified.

f.

Mechanical Snubbers Punctional Test Accentance Criteria The mechanical snubber functional test shall verify that:

1.

The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum drag force.

2.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compraasion.

3.

Snubber release

rate, where

required, is within the specified range in compression or tension.

For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous

load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.

g.

Snubber Service Life Mocitoring*

The service life cf hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections.

The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established based on engineering information and may be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history.

Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE.

The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.2.

t For purposes of establishing a baseline for the decermination of service life monitoring, this progrcm will be implemented over 3 successive refueling periods.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-30 (New&-page--h-2 / t 3+3 iTWOJC 0

L ON'- GG TABLE 4.f-/

SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTER /AL NUMBER CF UNACCEPTABLE SNUB 6ERS Population lulumn A Column B Culumn C or Category Extend Interval Repeat Interval Reduce Interval (Notes 1 and 2)

(Notes 3 and 6)

(Notes 4 and 6)

(Notes 5 ond 6) 1 0

0 1

80 0

0 2

100 0

1 4

150 0

3 8

200 2

5 13 300 5

12 25 400 8

18 36 500 12 24 48 750 20 40 78 1000 or greater 29 56 109 The next visual inspection interval for#av'e of

-/ nsnubber population or cate-Note 1:

gory size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval. Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categor-ies may be examined separately or jointly. However, the licensee must make and document that decision before any inspection and shall use that decision as the basis upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.

Note 2:

Interpolation between population or category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.

Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by inter-polation.

Note 3:

If the number of unacceptable sn..eers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval but not greater than 48 months.

Note 4:

If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Coluca B but greater that the number in Column A, the next inspecti>n interval shall be the sa ' as the previous interval.

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If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval shall be two-thirds of the previous interval.

However, it the number of unacceptoble snutbers is Ir u than the number in Coluren C but greater than the number % Colo:n B, the next interval shall be reduced croportionally by interpol 4 tion, that is, the previuus interval shall be reduced by factor that is one-third of the ratio of the difference between the d

number of unacceptable snutbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B tu the difference in the numbers in Columns B ond C.

Note 6:

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all inspec-tion intervals up to and including 48 months.

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DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS l

BASES

=

3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a

seismic or other similar event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection-frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or other similar event initiating dynamic loads.

Therefore, the required inspection interval varies _n ;r;:1; cith 6'-

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Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may a new reference point to determine the next inspection.

be used as

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%)

may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval vill overrjde the previous schedule.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be-generically susceptible, or verified operable by inservice functional

testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable.

Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a

specific make or_ model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions auch as temperatura, radiation and vibration.

When a -snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is

-performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of

failure, in_ order to determine if any-safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber.

The engineering evaluation shall determine whether er n>t the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation'on the supported component or system.

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l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-6 i

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I INSliRT " A"

- determined by Table 4.7-1. The visual inspection interval for each type of snubber shall bc

{

determined based spon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-1 and the nrst inspection interval determined using this criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before amendment (*).

NRC will include the number of the license amendment that implements this change.

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INSliRT "B" All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval. A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented tojustify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber.

If continued operation cannot be justi3ed, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirements shall be met.

INSERT "C" based upon the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection, the total population or category size for each type of snubber, and the previous inspection interval. This criteria follows the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 90-09.

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._._.4 ATTACl!!4EliT A-2 Deaver Valley Power Station, Unit lio. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Changa llo. 201/68 Reviso the Technical Specification as follows:

Benove Pace Insert Pang VII VII 3/4 7-24 3/4 7-24 3/4 7-25 3/4 7-2S 3

3/4 7-27 3/4 7-27 j

3/4 7-28 3/4 7-20 3/4 7-29 3/4 7-30 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-6 B 3/4 7-6 I

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-........ -..,.,.. _ _... ~... _..,... _ _ -...., _.,....... -

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NPF-73 INDEX (IMIT13G_t0NDIT10N FOR OPERATION ANQ_1Dggjj,RfCQQgEMffil5 SECTION PAGE Containment Recirculation Spray System.................

3/4 6-12 Chemical Addition System............................

3/4 6-14 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES........................

3/4 6-15 3/4.6.4 COMBUST!BLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Analyzers.........................................

3/4 6-31 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners..............................

3/4 6-32 3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM Steam Jet Air Ejector.....................................

3/4 6-34 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4 7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves...,......................................

3/4 7-1 Auxiliary feedwater System................................

3/4 7-4 Primary Plant Demineralized Water (PPDW)..................

1/4 7-6 Activity..................................................

3/4 7-7 Main Steam Line Isolation Va1ves..........................

3/4 7-9 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR incSSURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITATION...........

3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM....................

3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS).......................

3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER...........................

3/4 7-13 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION.......................

3/4 7-14 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY S'3TEMS...............

3/4 7-15 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL' LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (SLCRS)...

3/4 7-18 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION...............................

3/4 7-20 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS..................................................

3/4 7-24 3/4.7.13 STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWE)........................

3/4 7-p!

30 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES 0perating..............................................

3/4 8-1 Shutdown........................................

3/4 8-6 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 VII E'2OfGfl0

=.

!!PF-73 1

P_LANT SYSTEM 5 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR _0PERAUr#

3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

The cnis snubbers excluoed from this requirement are those installed on non-safety re bted systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on wnich they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY:

H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

(HODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems" required OPERABLE in those MODES).

A_CTION:

g Withoneormoresnubbers/inope.ble,within72hoursreplaceorrestorethe per Specificat.on 4.7.12.+$PERABI status and rarform an engineering evaluation inoperable snubber (s) to on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

j g g1LLANCE RE0UIREMENTS 4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the fol-lowing augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specifi-cation 4.0.5.

a. N ytsual Inspections The t inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be perfor after fo nths but within 10 months of commencing POWER OP ION and shall in de all snubbers.

If less than two (2) sn rs are found inoperaol

' ring the first inservice visual ection. the second inservice v 1 inspection shall be per d 12 months i 25%

Ogg -

from the date of the f inspection.

Ot se, subsequent visual Abd inspections shall be perfo in acc ce with the following schedule:

/MILKr "Ag No. Inoperable Snubbers Subsequent Visual per Inspection Peri Inspection Period. ** #

~

0 8 months 1 25%

1 nths t 25%

2 6 mo s t 25%

3, 4 124 days 25%

5,6,7 6? days t 8 or more 31 days i 25%

l

These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to l

prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.

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REAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-24 l -....

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NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS EURVEIL_ LANCE RE0VljLMENTS (CONTijgD) snubbers may be categorized into two groups:

those accessible and those ina sible during reactor operation.

Each group may be inspected indepe itly in acco ce with the above schedule.

b.

Visua spection Criteria Visual inspe

' ns shall verify (1) that there a no visible indica-tions of da. mage mpaired OPERABILITY, (2) achments to the foundation or suppor

' structure are se

, and (3) in those loca-tions where snubber move can be ma ly induced without discon-necting the snubber, that t nubt as freedom of movement and is not frozen up.

Snubbers which ar inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined RA for the purpose of establishing pgg7f the next visual inspectio terval, pr ing that (1) the cause of the rejection is clear established and re ied for that particular snubber and for oth snubbers that may be gene ally susceptible; or (2) the affee snubber is functionally tested the as-found condition an termined OPERABLE per Specification 4..

. d.

How-ever, whe fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to un-covere the snubber shall be determined inoperable and cannot de ined OPERABLE via functional testing for the purpose of esta hing the next visual inspection interval.

Snubbers which have been determined to be inoperable as a result of unexpected transients, isolated damage, or other random events, and cannot be proven operable by functional testing for the same reasons, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection period when the provision in 4.7.12.

(that failures are subject to an engineering evaluation of compone t structural integrity) has been met and equipment has been restored to an operable state via repair and/or replacement a necessary.

W l

d e, Functional Tests At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample (of at least 10%) of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant'shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test.

For Functional Testing type of snubber shall mean a group or combina-tion of groups by load size and kind (i.e., hydraulic or mechanical) or' any other combination of load size and kind.

For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptanci criteria of Speci-

~

fication4.7.M.J, an additional 10% shall be fur.etionally tested.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-25 l

FKt'i%'LD l

,NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS 1URVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continud)

A Snubber Ft;nctional Test Acceptance Criteria The snu functional test shall verify that:

jyp 1.

Activation (re ing action) is achieved n the specified p

range of velocity or eration in

? ension and compression.

/A/XMT*0 2.

Snubber bleed, or releas

,w equired, is within the specified range in ression cr tensio.

3.

The f at initiates free movement of the snubber n

er tension or compression is less than the specified max.

drag force.

4.

Service Life Monitoring The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections.

The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be deterr.ined and established based on engineering information and may be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history.

Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE.

The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.2.

Service life will be defined to commence at plant startup subsequent to initial fel load.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-27 P4tYh.J[O

kPF -73 TABLE 4.7-/

$1lgBER VISUAL. INSPECTION IN1ERVAL NUMBER OF UNACCEPT'BLE SNUBBERS Population

_ Column A Colurrn B Column C or Category Extend Interval Repeat Interval Reduce Interval (Notes 1 and 2)

(Notes 3 and 6)

(Notes 4 and 6)

(Notes 5 ond 6) 1 0

0 1

80 0

0 2

100 0

1 4

160 0

3 8

200 2

5 13 300 5

12 25 400 8

18 36 500 12 24 48 750 20 40 78 1000 or greater 29 56 109 Note 1:

The next visual inspection interval for nubber population or cate-gory size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval. Snubbers may be categorized, bated upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categor-1es may be examined separately or jointly.

However, the licensee must make and document that decision before any inspection and shall use that decision as the basis upon wnich to determine the next inspection interval for that category.

Note 2:

Interpolation between population or category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.

Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractionci value of unacceptable snutbers as determined by inter-polation.

Note 3:

If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the l

previous interval but not greater than 48 months.

l-If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the Note 4:

number in Column B but greater that the number in Column A, the next inspection interval shall-be the same as the previous interval, i

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If the nurrber of unacceptable ',nubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval snall be two-thirds of the previous interval.

However, if the number of unacceptable snubbers is less than the number in Coluin C but greater than the number in Column B, the next interval shall be reduced proportionally by interpolation, that is, the previous interval shall be reduced by fMtor that is one-third of the ratio of the difference between the d

number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Columns 8 dnd C.

Note 6:

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all inspec-tion intervals up to and including 48 months.

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HPF-73 LPLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 STAND 8Y SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWE)

LIMITING CONDITICN FOR OPERATION 3.7.13.1 At inast one standty service water subsystem shall be OPERA 8Li, APPLICABILITY:

H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With less than one SWE subsystee OPERABLE, restore at least one subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 cays or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next G hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following thirty hours.

,sDRVEILLANCE RFOUIREMENTS h

4.7.15.1 At least one SWE subsystem shall'be demonstrated OPERA 8LE:

At least once per 92 days, by verifying that onch pump develops at a.

1 east 109 psid differential pressure, while pumping through its test flow line.

b.

At least once par 18 months during shutdown by starting a Standby Service Water System Pump, shutting down one Service Water System Pump, ar.d verifying that the Standby Service Water Subsystem provides at least 8584 gpa cooling water to that portion of the Service Water System under test for at laast 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

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. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-)df l

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.hPF-73 1/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.9 SEALED __50_URCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on sealed source renovable contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiatioti does not exceed allowable limits in tho event of ingestion or inhalation of the source material.

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium.

Leakage of sources excluded from the requiremants of this specification represent less than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to thei.* use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group.

Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be'testad more often than those which are not.

Saaled sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considared to be stond and need not be tested uq?ess they are ramved from the shielded mechanism 3/4.7_,.10 and 3/4.7.11 RESIOUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (RHR)

Deleted 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS All snubbers _ are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other sf allar event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the systee on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related' system.

The vi l' inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems.

Therefore, the required inspection A-W interval verfes h;r::!y rie 9: d u ::d :-d,_i r ' '.! r n,.rd *- d:t:--f :d pp (g 9.

-- 2, 4 7 _ %..gg.

.... 2 g.._ ; =,. rg Inspections 7pgay7 performed befor9 that interval has elapsed may be used as 'a new reference point to determine the next. inspection.

When the cause of the rejection of'a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible, or verified OPERABLE by inservice functional testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable.

Generically, susceptible snubbers are thor,e which are of a specific make or model and have the same BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-5 JXbinKO

HPP-73 PLANT SY, STEMS Qbqrt

}

SNUBBE G (Continued) design features directly related to rejection of tne snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation and vibrat. ion.

When a snubber is fcund inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety related component or system has been adversely af fected by the inoperability of the snubber.

The engineering evaluation shall determine f-whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported comoonent or system.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will ba functionally tested during plant shutdowns at refueling or 18 month intervals not to exceed two (2) years.

Observed failures of these sample tnubbers shall require functional testing-of additional units.

/K/d*7 '2? "-t The service life of a snubber is evaluated via manufacturer input ano information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associatedinstallationandmaintenancerecords(newlyinstalledsnebher, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc...).

The requirement to monitor tha snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions.

These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

The requirements for tha maintenance of records and the snubber life review are not intended to r

K7 affect plant operation, t a

! d, 3/4.7.13 STANDBY SERVICE W/.TER SYSTEM (SWE)

The OPERABILITY of the SWE ensures that suf ficient cooling capacity is available to bring the reactor to a cold shutanwn condition in the event that a barge explosion at-the station's intake structure or any other extremely remote event would render all of the normal Service Water System st? ply pumps inoperable, BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-6 JXbiblu~'

~

S INE7T "A",

l a.

Itunection Tvots I

As used in this specincation, " type of snubber" shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b.

Visuallnsp.tcilons Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule determined by Tabic 4.71. The visual inspection :r.terval for each type of snubber shall be determined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-1 and the first inspection interval determined using this criteria shall be baseu upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before arnendment (*).

NRC will include the number of the license amendmerit that implements this change.

c.

Xig!allnSDCfliDadCCCElance Criteria -

hal inspections shall verify that (1) the snubber has no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or st.pporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for the attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of the visual inspections shall be classified as unacceptable and may be reclassified

. acceptable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly establi;hed and remedied for that particular snubber and for other scubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; or (2) the affected sciubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specincation 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f, as applicable. All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval. A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber. If continued operation cannot bejustified, thc wbber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION icquirements shall be met.

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INSERT "B" c.

ligniul.ic 'inubbni.Bmetional Test Acceptance Criteria The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify that:

1.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.

2.

Snubber bleed, or release rate, where required, is within the specified range in compression or tension. Far snubbers specifically required to not displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.

f.

hicchanical Snubbers Funclignal Test Acceptance Criteria The mechanical snubber functional test shall verify that:

1.

The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum drag force.

2.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity

[

or acceleration in bon tension and compression.

3.

Snubber release rate, were required, is within the specified range in compression or tension. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be

verified, INSERT "C" o

~

based upon the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection,.the total population ~or category size for each type of snubber, and the previous inspection interval. This criteria follows the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-09, 7

INSERT "D" ---

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2 kip,10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers fiom cither manufacturer.

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ATTACHMENT H Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. I and 2 Proposed Technical Spec 12ication Change No. 201/68 REVISION OF SPECIFICATION 3.7.12 A.

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The propocod amendm9nt would revice Specification 3.7.12 for both units to replace the exinting snubber visua' inspection schedu]cs and surveillance requirements with the chatjes provided by NRC Generic Letter 90-09 " Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and corrective Actions'. The functional test acceptance criteria in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) specification will also be changed to be identical to the Beaver Valley Unit 1 (BV-1) specification. The page number for BV-1 Specification 3.7.13.1 will be revised to reflect a new page

)

numbur. BV-1 and BV-2 Bases 3/4.7.12 will be revised to reference and reflect the guidance provided by Generic Letter 90-09. BV-2 Basns 3/4.7.12 will also be revised to add a description of " type i

of snubber".

The proposed amendment will be implemented in the following manner. The first visual inspection for each type of snubber will i

be based on the previous inspection interval and the results of that inspection for each type of snubber. This guidance is being provided since the proposed specification groups anubber inspections based on type of snubber, which js not defined in the existing BV-2 specification.

B.

BACKGROUND Technical Specifications (TS) impose surveillance requirements for visual inspection and functional testing of all safety-related snubbers. A visual inspection is the observation of the condition of installed snubbers to identify those that are damaged, degraded, or inoperable as caused by physical means, leakage, corrosion, or environmental exposure. To verify that a snubber can operate within specific performance limits, functional testing is performed that typically involves removing the snubber and testing it on a specially-designed test stand.

Functional testing provides a 95 percent confidence level that 90 percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within the specified acceptance limits. The performance of visual examinations is a separate process het complements the functional testing program ano provides additional confidence in snubber operability.

The snubber visu=1 examination schedule in the existing TS is baaed on the permissible number of inoperable snubbers fornd during the visual examination. Because the existing snubber visual examination schedule is only based on the absolute number of. inoperable snubbers found during the visual examinations irrespective of the total population of snubbers, plante with a large snubber population find the visual inspection schedule excessively restrictive. The purpose of the alternative examination schedule provided by Generic Letter 90-09 is to allow l

t I

a ATTAcilMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 201/68 Page 2 visual examinations and corrective actions to be performed during plant outages without reducing the confidence level provided by the existing examination schedule.

C.

JUSTIFICATION The following is an excerpt from Generic Letter 90-09:

Tho TS_crocifies a schedule for snubber visual inspections that is~ based on the number of inoperable snubbers found during the previous visual inspection. The schedules-for a

visual inspections and for the functional testing assume that refueling intervals will not exceed 18 months. Because the current schedule for snubber visual inspections is based only on the number of inoperable snubbers found during the previous visual inspection, irrespective of the size of the snubber population, licensees having a large number-of unubbers find that the "isual inopoction schedule is excessively restrictive. Some licensees have spent-a significant amount of resources and have subjected plant personnel to unnecessary radiological exposure to comply with the //isual examination requirements. -

To alleviats this situation, the staff has developed an alternate schedule.for visual inspections that maintains the same confidence level as the existing schedule and generally will allow the licensee to perform visual inspections and corrective actions during plant outages.-Because this line-item TS 1mprovement will reduce future occupational radiation exposure and is highly cost effectiva, the alternative inspection schedule is consistent with the l

-Commission's poljcy statement on TS improvements.

Beaver Valley 5as-revieved Generic letter 90-09 and agrees with the NRC Staff's conclusions that the alternate schedule for snubber visual inspections will reduce future occupational radiation exposure and is highly cost effective while maintaining the same confidence level as the existing schedule.

The functional test acceptance criteria in BV-2 Specification p

3.7.32 is also being revised to ba identica.. to the BV-1 specification. This change provides more specific acceptance criteria for hydraulic and mechanical snubbers and provides tho' r

added benefit-of allowing tluz snubber functional test acceptance.

criteria to be totally-consistent between the units.

D.

SAFETY ANALYSIS Specification 3.7.12 for boch units has been revised to replace l

the existing snubber visual inspection schedules and surveillance requirements with the changes provided by NRC Generic Letter 90-09 " Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective-Actions". BV-1 and BV 2 Bases 3/4.7.12 has also been revised to reference and reflect the guidanca

\\_

ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specificatien Change No. 201/68 Page 3 provided by Generic Letter 90-09. A section has been added to BV-2 Bases 3/4.7.12 to describe " type of snubber", which is identical to Standard Technical Specification wording. All of the above changes are being made to be consistent with the guidance provided in Concric Letter 90-09.

Snubbers are inscalled in the plant te maintain the structural integrity of systems and components which mitigate.he consequences of accidents previously analycod. The proposed changes do not alter the design, function, or operation of the snubbers or the systems in which they are installed. The proposed change does not alter the configuration of the plant, plant

' operations or any accident analysis assumptions. No new mode of failure is being created because this change does not degrade the

. design, operation or maintenance of the plant.

The alternate schedule for visual inspections of snubbers in Generic Letter 90-09 was developed by the HRC Staff to generally allow snubber visual inspections and corrective actions to be performed during plant refueling outages and therefore reduce occupational radiation exposure. Since the alternate schedulo maintains the same confidence lovel as the existing schedulo and the Limiting condition cf Operation (LCO) and snubber functional test requirements remain the samo, these changes do not reduce the margin of sa_oty or affect the UFSAR.

.The functional test acceptance critoria in BV-2 Specification 3.7.12 is being revised to be identical to the BV-1 specification. This change provides specific acceptance critoria for hydraulic and mechanical snubbers that more accurately reflects the testing done on.the different snubber types. This change: improves the' functional test acceptance criteria, and does not reduce the margin of safety or affect the UFSAR.

BV-2 Specification 3.7.13.1 is being revised to reflect a new i

page number. This is an administrative change.only and therefore, does not reduce the margin of safety or 'ffect the UFSAR.

Based-on the-above considerations, the proposed changes do not l

reduce the level of snubber protection, therefore, the proposed changes are considered to be safe and w!11 not reduce the safety of:the plant.

i E.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION 1

The no significant hazard' considerations involve with the

)

propost amendment have been ovaluated,-focusing on the threa i

standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c) as quoted below:

The Come 3 ion may make a final determination, pursuant to the prot tres in paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration,- if operation of the fucility in accordance

. ith the proposed amendment would not:

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' ATTACll.?ENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 201/68 EPage 4 l

v (1)

Involvo a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)

Create the possibility of a now or different find of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

Involve a algnificant reduction in the margin of safety.

The following evaluation De provided for the no significant l

hazards consideration standards, 1.

Does the change involve a significant increase in the

' probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Specification 3.7.12 for both units has boon revised to replace the existing snubber visual inspection schedules and surveillance requirements with the changea provided by NRC

'Genoric Letter 90-09 "Alternativo Requiroments for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions". RV-1 and BV-2 Basos 3/4.7.12: has also been revised to refacence and reflect the guidanco provided by Generic Lottor 90-09. A section has been added to DV-2 Bases 3/4.7.12 to describe

" type of snubber", which is identical to Standard Technical Specification wording. All of tho above changes are being mado.ta) be consistent with the guidanco provided in Generic Letter 90-09.

Snubbers are installed in the plant to maintain the structural integrity of systems and components which mitigate the consequences of previously analyzed accidents.

LThis proposed amendment does not alter-the design, function, or operation of_the snubbers or the systems.in which they are-installed.'The alternate schedule for visual inspections of snubbers in' Generic Letter 90-09 was developed by the NRC Staff to generally allow snubber visual inspections and corrective actions.to be performed during plant refueling outages and therefore reduce occupational radiation exposure. In addition, the alternC;9 schedule maintains the samerconfidence level as the existing schedule.-The. proposed amendment doostnot change tha Limiting condition of Operation (LCO) oor the snubber functional test requirements.

This'chango;will not affect the UFSAR, therefore, this change:will not involve a significant increase-in--the

-probability or consequences of an accident previously-evaluated.

The functional' test acceptance criteria in BV-2 Specification 3.7.12 is being revised to be identical to the BV-1 specification. This change provides specific acceptance critoria for hydraulic and mechanical. snubbers that more accurately reflects the testing done on the different snubber types.-This change improves the functional test acceptance-criteria, and does not affect the UFSAR.

~-:

.~.

ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 201/68

Pago 5 Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

BV-2 Specification 3.7.13.1 is being revised to reflect a new page number. This is an administrativo change only and l

therefore, this chango will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Tne proposed change does not alter the configuration of the facility,- plant operation, or the accident analysis assumptions. No no" modo of failure is being created because this change does not degrade the design, operation, or maintenance of the plant. The proposed.changos are consistent with the alternate inspection criteria provided in Generic Letter 90-09 and therefore, maintains the same confidence level as the existing schedule. The change to the BV-2 functional test e7ceptance criteria improves the criteria by more accurately reflecting the testing done on the:different types of snuhbers. Since the LCo and functional test requirements remain the same, these changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the change involve a.significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The alternate inspection schedule proposed in the change vill maintain the same confidence level as the existing schedule.-The revised BV-2 functional test criteria will be identica1'to the BV-1-specification and provide more specific acceptanco criteria for hydraulic and mechanical snubbers. The LCO and functional test requirements remain the_same as the existing specification. The proposed amendment does not reduce the level of snubber protection, therefore, the proposed changes do not.involvo a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

F.

NO'SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

-Based on the considerations-expressed above, it is concluded that activities associated with this licenso amendment request-E satisfies the no1significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideratiori-finding is justi fied.

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ATTACllMENT C-1 Beaver Va13cy Power Station, Unit llo, 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 201/68 Typed Page:

XXIII 3/4 7-26 3/4 7-27 3/4 7-28 3/4 7-29 3/4 7-30 3/4 7-31 3/4 7-32 B 3/4 7-6 i.a--

-DPR-66 Table Index (cont.)

' TABLE TITLE PAGE 3.3-11

-Accident Monitoring 1 Instrumentation 3/4 3-51 4.3-7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-52 Survei-11ance Requirements 3.3-12 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-54 Instrumentation 4.3-12 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-57 Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 3.3-13 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3 '

Instrumentation

4.3-13 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring 3/4 3-65 Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 4.4-1 Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be

'3/4 4-10c Inspected During Inservice Inspection 3

4.4 Steam' Generator Tube Inspection 3/4 4-10d 4.4-3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation 3/4 4-14b Valves-3.4-1 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-16 4.4-10 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 1-17 Surveillance Requirements

=4.4-12 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample 3/4 4-20 and Analysis Program 4.4-5; Reactor Vessel Material-Irradiation 3/4 4-26 Surveillance Schedule 3.6 LContainment. Penetrations 3/4 6-19a 3.7-1 Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux 3/4 7-2

High-Setpoint With Inoperable Steamline Safety Valves Curing 3 Loop Operation 3.7-2 Maximum Allowab q 1iwer Range Neutron Flux 3/4 7 i High-Setpoint wita.noperablo Steamline Safety Valves During 27 Loop Operation 3 '. 7 - 3 Steamline Safety Valves Per Loop 3/4 7-4 4.7-1

. Snubber Visual Inspection Interval-3/4 7-31 l.

4.7-2 Secondary Coolant.Systcm Specific Activity 3/4 7-9 Sample and Analysis Program BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XXIII AmendmentL No.

PROPOSED

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DPR-66 PLAL1LSJliTMiS 2L&1.h 12-JiLWDDEE 1 LIMIT 111G CollDITIOff 1 OR OPERATIOli c==.======

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3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on non safety-related systems and then only if their failt're or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

AEELICADJ.LLU:

MODES 1,

2, 3 and 4.

(MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems # required OPERABLE in those MODES).

Ag1LOH; With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months replace or restore the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.12.d on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTIO11 statement for that system.

SURVEILLA!1CE REQUIREME!1TS c=___.-,

._ m m

4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requircraents of Specification 4.0.5.

a.

D1spRct i orLTynen As used in this specification,

" type of snubber" shall mean l

snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of

~

capacity.

b.

ylsual Inspections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation.

Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedulo determined by Table 4

7-1.

The visual inspection interval f or each type of snubber shall be dnt ermined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-1 and 1^1rst inspection interval determined using this criteria shal. be based upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before amendment (*)

These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.

liRC will include the number of the license amend ~ent that l

implements this change.

BEAVER VALLEY - UlllT 1 3/4 7-26 Amendment fl o.

PROPOSED

DPR-66 11AILT_G1STBiS SURVElLLAUCE REQUIREME!;TS (Continued)

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c.

Y.i nunLincnect io n_Attepl a Iw rn_ tjintin C

Visual inspections shall verify that:

(1) the snubber has no I

visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the enubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional.

Snubbers which appvar inoperable as a

result of visual inspections shall be classified as u,icceptable and may be

'f establishing the next reclassified acceptable ior the purpose i

vicual inspection interval, provided that:

(1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular onubber and for other snubberc irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; or (2) the affected snubber in functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.12.c or 4.7.12.f, as applicable.

All s.iubbers found connected to an inoperable l

common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval.

A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber.

If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirements shall be met.

Snubbers which have been determined to be inoperable as a result of unexpected transients, isolated

damage, or other random

events, and cannot be proven operable by functional testir for the same

reasons, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection period when the provision in 4.7.12.d (that

~

failures are subject to an engineering evaluation of component structural integrity) has been met and equipment has been

~

restored to an operable state via repair and/or replacement as necescary, d.

BlDRtjona1 Tnatfl At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample got at least 10 snubbers or at least lot whichever is less) of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test.

For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f an additional 10 snubbers or at least 10% whichever is less of that type of cnubber shall be functionally tested.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 1/4 7-27 Amenbaent No.

PROPOSED

DPR-66 I?L Mll_ M H dis SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) m.___ _ ___

For each large bore snubber (snubbers greater than 1500 kips) on the reactor coolant system that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of specification 4.7.12.e, an engineering evaluation is required to determine the failure mode.

If the failure is determined to be generic, an additional 10%

(for each failure) of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

If the failure is determined to be rion-generic, an additional 10% (for each failure) of that type of snubber will be tested during the next functional test period.

The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments and the range of size and capacity of snubbers.

At least 25% of the snubbert in the representative sample shall include snubbers from the following three categories:

1.

The first snubber away from each reactor vessel nozzle 2.

Snubbers within 5

feet of heavy equipment (valve, pump, turbiac, motor, etc.)

3.

Snubbers within 10 feet of the discharge from a safety relief valvo.

Snubbers that are especially difficult to remove or in high radiation zones during shutdown shall also be included in the representative sample.*-

If a

spare snubber has been installed in place of a failed

snubber, the spare snubber shall be retested.

Test results of this snubber may not be included for the re-sampling.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e.,

frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency all snubbers of the same design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

Permanent or other exemptions from functional testing for individual snubbers in ese categories may be granted by the Commission only if a

justifiable basis for exemption is presented and/or snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for all design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-28 Amendment No.

PROPOSED n

DDR-66 ELANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE hcQUIREMENTS (Continued) w,

For the snubber (s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation l(

~

shall be performed r.

the components -Sich are supported U the snubber (s).

The pu)py a of this engineering evaluation shall be t-e to determine if the camponents suppcrted by the snubber (s) were p A; adversely affected oy the inor arability of the snubber (s) in order to ensure that the suppon.d component remains capable of

(.g %*

reeting the dcsigned servica.

3

.~

C

=y e.

liydrn1]j c Snubbers Functional Test Aq^eptlulce Criteria

?

The hfdraulic snubber functional test caali verify that:

{

et 1.

Activation (restraining act,)

is achieved within the spsciited range of veloci' celeration in both tension and comprescion.

2.

Snubber

bloed, or

.e, where required, is within i

compression or tenaion.

For the specified ran

_a snubbers specifica1_y required to not displace under continuous

load, the abi; i ty of the snubber to withstant load without displaccment ahal' be verified.

Mechanical Snubbers Funct onpl,T m t Acceptance Criteria j

f.

TL aechanical snubber furictional test shall verify that:

The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in alther tension or compression is less than che specifled maximum drag force.

2.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the

~

specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and comoression.

3.

Snubber release

rate, waere

required, is within the specified range in compression or tension.

For snubbers specifically required not to displace under csntinuous

load, the ability of the snubber t-withstand load Jithout displacement shall be verified.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-29 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

DPR-66 ELANT SYSTr:MS SURVEILLA!!CE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

I g.

Smubber Service Life Monitorin.g*

The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snuboers shall be monitored t,;

ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections.

The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established ba

-A on engineering information and may be extended or shortened stoed on monitored test results and failure history.

Critical pr.rts shall be replaced so that k

tne maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE.

lhe parts replacements shall be documented and the documentativn shall be retained in accoraance with Specification 6.10.2.

i purposes of establishing a baseline for the determination of l

For service life monitoring, this program will be implemented over 3 successive refueling periods.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-30 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

DPR-66 TABLE 4.7-1 StiUDjiER VIFUAL fMSPECTION LNTERVAL NijliDER OF UNACCEPTABLE SNUDDJBS Population Column A Column B Column C or Category Extend Iriterval Repeat Interval Reduce Interval (Notes 1 allcL2]

( Noj;_e s 3 and_61_

(Notes 4 add 6)

(.llotfer 5 and 61 1

0 0

1 80 0

0 2

100 0

1 4

I 150 0

3 8

0 2 10 2

5 13 300 5

12 25 400 8

18 36 500 12 24 48 750 20 40 78 1^^? or gruter 29 56 109 Note 1:

T? 2

iext visual inspection interval for a type of snubber i

population or category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval.

Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible.

These categories may be examined separately or jointly.

However, the licenseo must make and document that cecision before any 1

inspection and shall use that decision as the basis upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.

Note 2:

Interpolation between population and category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.

Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B,

or C

if that integer includes a

fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.

BEAVER VALIY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-31 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

DPR-66 TABLE 4.7-1 (CONT'D)

SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTIOP INTERVAL Note 3:

If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval but not greater than 48 months.

Note 4:

If the number of unacceptable snubbers as equal to or less than the number in Column B but greater than the number in Column the next inspection interval shall be the same as the previous interval.

Note 5:

If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval

shal, be two-thirds of tbc previous interval.

However, if the numbec of unacceptable snubbers is less than the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B,

the next interval shall be reduced proportionally by interpolation, that is, the previous interval shall be reduced by a

f act or that is one-third of the ratio of the 9

difference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Columns B and C.

Note 6:

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.

t BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 '/-32 Amendment No.

(Next Page is 3/4 7-34)

PROPOSED

_.-_7_.

m_.-

_ m _ m_

m.__

i e'

DPR )

PLANT 1 YSTEMS S

BASES 3/4.'7.12 SJJUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity ~ of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a _ seismic or other similar event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers excluded from this inspection. program are those installed cn nensafety-related systems and then only.

if their failure or failure of_the system on which i

they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level Lof snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or other similar event initiating dynamic loads.

Therefore, the required inspection interval varies based upon the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection, the total. population or category size for each type of

snubber, and the previous inspection interval.

This criteria follows the

_ guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 90-09.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a _new reference point to determine :he next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original

. required time interval has elapsed (nominal _ time less 25%) may not be -used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results' require a

shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clea-ly established and _ remedied _for_that snubber _and for any other snubbers that may be n

generically-susceptible, or verified operable by inservice

- functional _ testing, that snubber may bc exempted'from being counted as inoperable. ' Gene-" ~='ly susceptible snubbers are those which are of a; csecific make model and have the same design features L

. directlyL related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or.are similarly. located or e:: posed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation and vibration.

When

-a

snubber is found _ inoperable, an engineering evaluation is i-performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of

' failure,- in order to Ldetermine if any-safety-related component or l

system has.been adversely affected by the inoperability of the

- snabber.

The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not Lthe. snubber mode of failure has im arted-a significant effect or

~

c degradation on the supported component c system.

l BEAVER-VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-6 Amendment No.

PROPOSED I

b c...

.,~ - -

s ATTACHMENT C-2 Beaver Valley ?ower Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification ~ Change No. 201/68--

~

=

Typed Page:

VII 3/4 7-24 3/4 7-25 3/4 7-27 3/4 7-28 3/4 7-29 3/4 7-30 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-6 l

L

C

NPF '

a (IJ1ITING CONDITIO,jiS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEIL _ LANCE RPQUIREMENTS EECTIQU PAGE Containment Recirculation Spray System 3/4 6-12 Chemical Addition System 3/4-6-14

'-3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 3/4 6...

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Analyzers

.. 3/4 6...........

Electric Hydrogen Recori.biners '

3/4 6-32 3/4.6.5

'SUBATMOSPHERIC-PRESSURE ?ONTROL SYSTEM Steam-Jet Air Ejector.

3/4 6-34

-J/4.7 PLANT ElSSTJ213 -

l 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4 7-1 Safety: Valves Auxiliary Feedwater System 3/4 7-4 Prim?xy Plant Demineralized - Wa+.t.r (PPDW) 3/4 7-6

~

-Activity-3/4 7-7.

Main-Steam Line Isolation Valves 3/4 7....

3/4.7.2-

-STEAM' GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION 3/4'7-10 3/4.7.3-PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING' WATER SYSTEM 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMf(SWS).

3/4 7-12 3/4 7-13

=3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER.

~3/_4.7.6 FLODD PROTECTION 3/4 7-14

_3/.4.'7.7-.

CONTROL-ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS 3/4 7-15 3/4.7.8-

-SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM

(SLCRS) 3/4 7-18 J3/4.7.9L: SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

.3/4'7-20 3/4.7.12-SNUBBERS '

3/4 7-24 13/4.7'~13 ' STANDBY-: SERVICE WATER ~ SYSTEM (SWE) 3/4 7-30 l

T3/4.-8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS L-3/4.8.1 A. C. _' SOURCES -

p L

. Operating.

3/4_8-1 Shutdown-3/4 8-6 I.

l-l l

0 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 VII Amendment Nc.

--PROPOSED

a..=

v.

HPF E ANT SYSTFES 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS-

-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION r

=

3.7.12 All snubbers shall be_ OPERABLE.

The only snubbers excluded

-from this requirement are those installed on non-safety-related systems -and--_then only if their failure or failure of the systen on which. they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICAR.ILITY.:

MODES _

1, 2, 3 and 4._(MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems

required ODERABLE in those MODES).

Ag1 ION:

With-one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months replace or restore: the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluatior.

per Specification 4.7.12.d on the supported l

component or declare _the supported system inoperable and follow'the

+

appropriate-AC110N. statement for~that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS m.___

4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of_ Specification 4.0<5.

I a.

'Insnection Tynes As used-in this specification,

" type. of snubber" shall mean snubbers of the -same design and manufacturer, irrespective of

capacity, b.

Visual-Inspections 1

Snubbers _ are categorized--as inaccessible or accessible during.

reactor operation.

Each'of.these categories (inaccessible and 1 accessible). may be inspected independently according to the l

schedule determined by Table 4.7-1.

The-visual inspection-

' interval _ for each type of snubber shall be determined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-1 and the first inspection interval determined using thisz criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval as estallished by the requirements

-in effect1before amendment-(**).

These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems j

required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.

l NRC will include the number of the license amendment that L

implements this change.

1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-24 Amendment No.

PROPOSED r

i

n.

NPF-73 E[MITSYSTEMS

~ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) c.

MigualEInspection Acceptanco Critcria Visual inspections shall verify that:

(1) the snubber has no visible indications of damage or_

impaired. OPERABILITY, (2) attachments

-to the foundation or supporting structure are functi and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the

(

mnt-and to the snubber anchorage are functional.

Snubbo 4hich appear inoperable as a

result of the visual inspections shall be classified as unacceptable and may be reclassified-acceptable for the purpose of establishing the aext visual inspection interval, provided that:

(1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied-for that particular sr.abber -and for other snubbers irrespective of. type that may.bei ~ generically _ succeptible; or (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and I

determined-OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f, as applicable.

All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be

_ counted as unacceptable' for determining the next inspection interval.

A review and evaluation _shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber.

If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirement = shall be met.

Snubbers; which have been cetermined to be inoperable as a result of unexpected transients, isolated

damage, or other random

events, and cannot be proven operable by functional testing for the same

reasons,

.shall not-be' counted in determining the next visual inspection period when. the provision in 4.7.12.d (that l

failures are subject to_an engineering evaluation of component structural integrity) has been met and equipment has Laen restored to an operable state via repair and/or replacement as necessary.

d.

Functional Tests l

At.least once -per 18 months durin'g shutdown, a representative sample (of at least 10%) of the-total of each type of snubber in L

usef in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or

. in a-bench test.

For Functional Testing type of snubber shall mean a

group or combination of groups-by load size and kind

-(i.e.,

_ hydraulic or mechanical) or any other combination of_ load t-

. size-and kind.

For each snubber that.does not meet the functional. test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12'.f, an additional-10% shall be functionally tested.

i f

BEAVEli VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-25 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

.~

~

14 NPF-73 i

PLANT SYSIEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e.-;11ydraulic-Srubbers Functional Test Acce.ptance Criteria The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify that:

1.

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in bcth tension and compression.

2.

Snubber-bleed, 'or release rate, where required, is within j

the specified range in compression -or tension.

=For snubbers

-specjfically required to not displace' under continuous. load, -the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.

f._

techanical Snubbers Functional Test Acceplance-Criteria The nochanical snubber functior.al test shall verify that:

1.

The. force that initiates free r.avement of the snubbar rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum drag force.

2.

Autivation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.

3.

Snuther release-

rate, where

required, is within the ospicified range in compression or tension.

For snubbers specifically -required not to displace under continuous load,- the ability of the snubber to withstand load withcut displacement-shall be. verified.

L

.g..

Service Life Monitorinct t

The service life of' hydraulic and mechanical snubbers:shall be monitored to ensure.that the service life is not exceeded

.between surveillance inspectione.

The maximum expected service life-for various-scals,. springs, and other critical parts shall

.1xa determined and established based on engineering information L-and may be extended. er shortened based on monitored test results-l-

-and failure history.

Critical parts shall be replaced so that-Lthe maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period

'when the snubber'- is ' required. to be-OPERABLE.

The parts rac'u:ements shall be documented and the documentation shall be rera!.ned in' accordance with Specification 6.10.2.

Service life 4

-will be defined to commence at plant startup subsequent to initial fuel load.

-BEAVER-VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-27 Amendment Pa.

PROPOSED 4

+

'v--r m w

,n

~ - - - - - - -. - - - - -

L e-NPF-73 TABLE 4.7-1 SJ1U_DDER VISUAL INSECCTION ItEERVAL MURB_ER OF UNAQRFJ) TABLE SNUBliERS r

1 Population Column A Column B Column C or Categcry Extend Interval Repeat Interval Reduce Interval n DS. 6 )

(Notes 4 a_nd 6)

(Notes 5 and 61 I

1Ro(ps 1 and_Zl__(flotej 3 f

1 0

0 1

80 0

0 2

100 0

1 4

150 0

3 8

200 2

5 13 300 5

12 25 40L 8

13 36 I

500 12 24 48 750 20 40 78 1000 or greater 29 66 109 Note 1:

The next visual inspection interval for a type of snubber population or category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval.

Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operatior as accessible or inaccessible.

These categorir.s mq be examined separately or jointly _

However, the

?iconsee must uake and document that decision befera any inspection and shall use that decision as the basir upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.

Note 2:

Interpolation between population and category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.

Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Calumns A, B,

or C

if that integer includes a

fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-28 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

m._-

.,1 NPF TABLE 4.7-1-(CONT'D)

SNUB'3ER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL a.

Noto'3:

If the number-of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than thei number-in Column A, the next inspection interval may be -twice-the--previous interval but not greater than 48

- months.

~ Note 4:

- If the_ number of-unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than. th e-number-it. Column B but greater than the number in Column

'A, the next inspection-ir.terval'shall be the same as

- the-previous interval.

LNote 5:-

If the number of unacceptable snubbers is. equal to or

- greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval sha_t be two-thirds of the previous interval.

However, if the number of' unacceptable snubbers is less.than-the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B,

the inext-interval shall be reduced proportionally by L

Jinterpolation,. that is, the previous interval shall-be reduced by a

factor that is-one-third of_the ratio of the difference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to tho' dit'ference in the numbers in Columns B and C.

Note 6:

The - provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all

- inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.

L BEAVER VALLEY

-UNIT:2 3/4 7-29 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

-w-

--w--

f_,

m_

~.

,-l

l

.~

NPF-73

-=

EbNTSYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 JTANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTJM (SWll LIMITI!1G CONDITION FOR OPERATIOF

-u m -

w _.

3.7.13.1 At least one standby service water subsystem shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABII TTY :

MODES 1, 2,

3, and 4.

1 ILCTIQLI:

With less than one SWE eubsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one subsystem t,

OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT

~

STAllDb Y within the next 6

hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following thirty hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.13.1 At least one SWE subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 92

days, L

verifying that each pump a

develops at least 109 psid differential pressure, while pumping through its test flow line.

b.

At least once per 18 mot.ths during shutdown by starting m Standby Service Water System

Pump, shutting down one Service Water System Pump, and verifying that the Standby Service Water Subsystem provides at least 3584 gpm cooling water to that portion of the Service Water System under test for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

BEAVER VALLET - UNIT 2

'/4 7-10 Amandment No.

PROPOSED

t v

NPP-73~

3A4.7 PLANT SYSTEES BASES 3 /4.L 9 SEALED SOURCE CONTN11 NATION l

Tha limitations on 3caled source contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits in 'the event-of ingestion or inhalation of the source matcrial.

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium.

,eakage of sources cccluded from the requirements of this specification represent less than one maximum permissible body-burden for total body irrauiation if the source material-is inhaled or ingestad.

Scaled. sources are classified into three groups according to their

use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with-the probability of damage to a

source in that group.

Those sources which 'are frequently handled are required to be tested more'often than those -which are not.

Sealed sources which are continuously enclosedL within a

shielded meenanism (i.e.,

sealed sources within radiat an monitoring or boron measuring devicer.) are considered to ime s* red and need not be tested unless they are removed from the

-shielded mechanism.

'3/4.7.10 and 3/4.7.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (RHRL Deleted j/4.7.12 SNUBBERS i

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity -of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and - following a

seismic or other similar event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers excluded from this

? inspection program are thoae installed on nonsafety-related systems and then. only it their failure or reilure of the system on_which they are

. installed,

'would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

-The visual inspection-frequency is based upon maintaining a l;

constant-level of snubber protection to systems.

_Therefore, the required inspection interval varies based upon the number or l

unacceptable snubbers-found during the previous inspection, the F

total _ populnt ion.or category size for each type of snubber, and the F

previous inspection interval.

This criteria follows the guidance provided

-in-NRC Generic Letter 90-09.

Inspections performed before that intersal-has elapased may be used as a new reference coint to

determine the next inspection.

When the cause of the rejection of a

snubber is clearly established a nd remedied for that snubber and for any other enubbers -

that may be generically susceptible, or verified OPERABLE by BEAVEP 7 ALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment No.

PROPOSED e

-,n,

,e..

x, -

T*.

NPF-72 PJM10'JYSTElW

BASES-SNUB 3ERS (Continued _),

inservice functional

testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable.

Generically susceptible snubbers are

~those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inmpection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation and

-vibration.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of

failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system tuus been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. _

The engineering evaluation shall determine whetner or not the snubber mode of failtara has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, a

representative sample of the installed snubbers vill be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at refue'ing or 18 month intervals not to exceed two (2) years.

Observed failures of these sample snubbers shall. require functional testing of additional units.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manu"acturer but not by size.

For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type.

The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B"

for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

The service life of a

snubber is evaluated via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records b

(newly installed

snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc... ).

The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure-that the j

snubbers periodically undergo a

performance evaluation in view of l

-their age and operating conditions.

These records wi]l provide p

statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

The -requirements for the maintenance: of records and the snubber service life. review are not intended to affect plant operation.

l' 3/4.7.13 STANQDY SERVICE WATEP SYSTEM (SWE)

L The OPERABILITY of the SWE ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown I

condition in-the event that a

barge explosion at the station's intake structure or any other extremely remote event would render l

all_of the normal Service Water System supply pumps inoperable-l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-6 Amendment No.

E PROPOSED l

,

ML20114C272

Text

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