ML20113C598

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Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Extension of Sdg Allowed Outage Time to 14 Days & Extension of Essential Cooling Water Loop & Essential Chilled Water Loop to 7 Days
ML20113C598
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/27/1996
From:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20113C592 List:
References
NUDOCS 9607010368
Download: ML20113C598 (15)


Text

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Attachment 3 l ., . ST-liL-AE-5411 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least three independent essential cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two essential cooling water loops OPERABLE, restore at least three loops to OPERABLE status within 72 Sc= 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least three essential cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;
b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:
1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety injection, ECW pump start, screen wash booster pump start and essential chiller start test signals, as applicable,
2) Each Essential Cooling Water pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection or a Loss of Offsite Power test signal, and
3) Each screen wash booster pump and the traveling screen start automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-13 ,

1 9607010368 960627 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P PDR

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Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 2 of 16 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.L6 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM RFLIEF VALVES The atmospheric steam relief valves are required for decay heat removal and safe cooldown in accordance with Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1. In the safety analyses, operation of the atmospheric steam relief valves is assumed in accident analyses for mitigation of small break LOCA, feedwater line break, loss of normal feedwater and loss-of-offsite power.

3/4.7.1.7 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES l The OPERABILITY of the feedwater isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down the pressure rise within containment. The OPERABILITY of the feedwater isolation valves within the closure [ times 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSUREfrEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of l 1

70 F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RTwor o f 10 F and are sumcient to prevent brittle fracture. i l

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sumcient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in  ;

the safety analyse::.

3/4.7.4 ErSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM l

The OPERABILITY of the Essential Cooling Water System ensures that sumcient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

When a risk-important system or component (for exansple Essential Cooling Water) is taken out ofservice, it is ingportant to assure that the ingpact on plant risk ofthis and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact on plant risk of  ;

equipment out ofservice. A briefdescription ofthe Configuration Risk Management Program is in section 6.8.3 (administration section) ofthe TechnicalSpecification 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sumcient cooling capacity is available either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.  !

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B3/47-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9

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' ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 3 of 16 j PLANT SYSTEMS

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3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.14 At least three independent Essential Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3 and 4.

ACTION: I With only two Essential Chilled Water System loops OPERABLE, restore three loops to OPERABLE status within 72 h=s 7 days or be in at least liOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4,7.14 The Essential Chilled Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of surveillance as required by Specification 4.0.5, and 1
b. At least once per 18 months by demonstrating that the system starts automatically on a Safety Injecti I test signal.

SOUTil TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-33

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  • Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 4 of16 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING The area temperature limitations ensure that safety related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss ofits OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error ofi 3 F maximum.

3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILI ED WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Chilled Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

When a risk-important system or component (for example Essential Chilled Water) is taken out ofservice, it is important to assaire hat the impact on plant risk ofthis and other equipment simultaneously taken out ofservice can be assess ed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact on plant risk ofequipment om ofservice. A briefdescription ofthe Configuration RiskManagement Program is in section 6.8.3 (admindtration section) ofthe TechnicalSpecification.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 44

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Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 I Page 5 of 16

! 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES l

l OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

j 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System *, and l
b. Three separate and independent standby diesel generators, each with a separate fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 60,500 gallons of fuel.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. With a standby diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above-required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. If the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2) for each such standby diesel generator separately within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it can be demonstrated there is no common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator (s). Restore the inoperable standby diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hc= 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SilUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c. With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources and one standby diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.la. within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; and if the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive i

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/48-1 l

, Attachm:nt 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 6 of16 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by pedorming Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.2) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it can be demonstrated there is no common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator (s); restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in at least IlOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore at least two offsite circuits OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and three standby diesel generators OPERABLE status within 72 hc= 14 days from the time ofinitial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

d. With one standby diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION b. or c. above, verify that:
1. All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and
2. When in MODE 1,2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

e. With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least ilOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time ofinitial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
f. With two or three of the above required standby diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.1a. within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least two standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore at least three standby diesel generators to CPERABLE status within 42 hews 14 days from time ofinitial loss or be in least HOT ST ANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hau s.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/48-2

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  • Attachment 3

." ST-HL AE-5411 Page 7 of16 El ECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class IE Distribution System shall be:

a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and
b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring the unit power supply from the normal circuit to each of the alternate circuits.

4.8.1.1.2 Each standby diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:(2m

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
1) Verifying the fuel level in its associated fuel tank,
2) Verifying the diesel starts from standby condition and accelerates to 600 rpm (nominal) in less than e equal to 10 seconds!') The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160
  • 416 volts and 60 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds m after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

a) Manual, or b) Simulated loss-of-offsite power by itself, or c) Simulated loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a safety Injection test signal, or d) A Safety Injection test signal by itself.

3) Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded te 5000 to 5500 kW, and operates with a load of 5000 to 5500 kW for at least 60 minutes," and
4) Verifying the standby diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.
b. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to I hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from its associated fuel tank;
c. Maintain properties of new and stored fuel oil in accordance with the Fuel Oil Monitoring Program.

SOUTli TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-3

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i Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 i Page 8 of16 El FCTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 1

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. Deleted
e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

l 1)"* Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service;

2) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 785.3
kW while maintaining voltage at 4160
  • 416 volts and frequency at 60 4.5 Hz;('XU i

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! 3) Verifying the generator capability to reject a lead of 5500 kW without tripping. The

! generator voltage shall not exceed 5262 volts during and following the load

} rejection;"X3 i

4) Simulating a loss-of-offsite power by itself, and:

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a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses, and b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and

operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and l frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160
  • 416 volts and 60 *  !

j l.2 Hz during this test. i

5) Verifying that on a Safety injection test signal, wiiout loss-of-offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than i or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160
  • 416 volts j and 60 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test;
6) Simulating a loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a Safety Injection test signal, and:

a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses; b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected ESF (accident) loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-4

AttIchment 3 1

. ,' ST-HL-AE-5411 l Page 9 of16 FI FCTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) I l

l is loaded with the ESF loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160

  • 416 volts and 60
  • 1.2 Hr during this test; and c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, I generator differential, and low lube oil pressure are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the ESF bus concurrent with a Safety Injection i Actuation signal. i 7)U) Verifying the standby diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Durin the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 5700 to 6050 k
  • and l during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 5000 to 5500 kW.W The steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160
  • 416 volts and 60
  • 1.2 Hz during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform a fast start per Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.2 W;
8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each standby diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5935 kW;
9) Verifying the standby diesel generator's capability to:

a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its ESF loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and c) Be restored to its standby status.

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10) Verifying that with the standby diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected '

to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation, and (2) automatically energizing the ESF loads with offsite power;W

11) Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the first sequenced load verified to be loaded between 1.0 second and 1.6 seconds, and all other load blocks within
  • 10% ofits design interval;
12) Verifying that the standby diesel generator emergency stop lock-out feature prevents diesel generator starting; and

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/48-5

Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 10 of 16 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

13) Demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the automatic load shed bypass and the manual load shed reinstatement features of the load sequencer.
f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect standby diesel generator interdependence by starting all standby diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that all standby diesel generators accelerate to at least 600 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds; and
g. At least once per 10 years by:
1) Draining each fuel tank, removing the accumulated sediment and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution, or equivalent, and
2) Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section Ill, subsection ND of the ASME Code at a test pressure equal to 110% of the system design pressure.

4.8.i.l.3 Reports - All standby diesel generator failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to the Cor omission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. Reports of standby diesel genstator failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests (on a per nuclear unit basis) is greater than or equal to 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

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SOUTil TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-6

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  • Attachment 3

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, ST-HL-AE-5411 i TABLE 4.1-1

! DIFMEL GENERATOR TEST SCHFDULE l

i NUMBER OF FAILURES IN NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 20 VAI in TESTSW LAST 100 VAI ID TESTSW TEST FREOUENCY j <1 <4 Once per 31 days j >2* >5 Once per 7 days i SPECIFICATION NOTATIONS l

W Loss of one 13.8 kV Standby Bus to 4.16 kV ESF bus line constitutes loss of one offsite source. less of two 13.8 kV Standby busses to 4.16 kV ESF bus lines constitutes loss of two offsite sources.

  • All diesel generator starts for the purpose of these surveillances may be preceded by a prelube period.

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  • A diesel generator start in less than or equal to 10 seconds (fast start) shall be performed every 184 days. All other diesel generator starts for the purpose of this surveillance may be modified starts involving reduced fuel (load limit) and/or idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed.

! W Generator loading may be accomplished in accordance with vendor recommendations, including e warmup period prior to loading.

  • The diesel generator start for this surveillance may be a modified su t (see SR 4.8.1.1.2a.2).

. Momentary transients outside this load range due to changing canditions on the grid shall not j invalidate the test.

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  • If Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.2 is not satisfactorily ::ompleted, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding
24-hour test. Instead, the standby diesel generator may be opereted at 5000-5500 kW for a minimum j of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or until operating temperature has stabilized.

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  • Criteria for determining number of failures and mmiber of valid tests shall be in accordance with j Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guida 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis.

For the purpose of determining tbc required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be

reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new condition is completed, provided that the t

overhaul, including appiopriate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer and if acceptable reliability has been demonstrated. The reliability criterion shall be

! the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in 1

accordance with the routine Surveillance Requirements 4

c SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/48-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57

Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-5411 Page 12 of16 SPECIFICATION NOTATIONS (Continued) l 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 and four tests in accordance with the 184-day testing requirement of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.3. If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

M The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.

0) l This test may be performed during power operation provided that the other two diesel generators are operable.

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! Credit may be takenfor events that satisfy any ofthese Surveillance Requirements.

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 & 2 3/48-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,81

! Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57,70

Attachment 3 i

,' ST H1 AE 5411

, Page 13 of16

\ ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l

PROCEDURFR AND PROGRAMS (Continued) l

}) Configuration Risk Managenwnt Program (CRMP)

A program to assess changes in core damagefrequency and cumulative core damage probability resultingfrom applicableplant configurations. Theprogram shouldinclude thefollowing:

1) training ofpersonnel,
2) proceduresfor le stifying plant configurations, the generation  ;

ofrisk profiles and the evaluation ofrisk ogpinst established thresholds; and

, 3) provisionsfor evaluating changes in risk resultingfrom l unplannedmaintenance activities. '

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 6-15a l

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Attachment 3

,, . ST-Hi-AE-5411 Page 14 of 16 FI FCTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) manually transferred to the unit's auxiliary transformer or to the standby transformers.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DB A) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Ratings for Train A, Train B, and Train C DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108. The continuous service rating of each DG is 5500 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

Refer to UFSAR Chapter 8 for a more complete description.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES ne initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15, assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. He AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least two trains of the onsite or one train of the offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of NRC Policy Statement.

A single train onsite A C source can effectively mitigate all but the most severe events with operator action in some cases. The events that cannot be mitigated by a single train onsite A Csource are highly unlikely.

When a risk-Insportant system or congponent (for example a Standby Diesel Generator) is taken out of service, it is ingportant to assure that the ingpact on plant riu ofthis and other equipment simultaneously taken out ofservice can be assessed. The Configurathn RiskManagement Program evaluates the impact on plant risk ofequipment out ofservice. A briefdescription ofs.%e Configuration Risk Management Program is in section 6.8.3 (administration section) ofthe TechnicalSpecification.

LCD Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class I E Electrical Power Syste n and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a po:,tulated DBA.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57

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l Attachment 3 l

. ST-HL-AE-5411 l Page 15 of16 l El ECTRICAL . OWER SYSTEMS i BASES I

A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) l TS 3.8.1.1 Action e.

Operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level ofdegradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources. With both of the ,

required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe l

shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient, l TS 3.8.1.1 Action f.

With two or three of the standby diesel generators inoperable, there is insufficient or no remaining standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss ofoffsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. A single train onsite AC source can effectively mitigate all but the most severe events with operator action in some cases.

The events that cannot be mitigated by a single train onsite ACsource are highly unlikely. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an j immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a l total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC l power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level ofdegradation.

Surveillance Reauirements The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those *. hat have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18. Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accide tt conditions). The Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the standby diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Regulatory Guide 1.137, as addressed in the FSAR and NUREG-1431.

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3744 is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1, allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors with minimum operating voltage specified as 90% or 3600 V. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4576 V is less l

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS I & 2 B 3/4 8-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57

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Attachment 3

,' ST-HL-AE-5411 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES l

A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

SR 4.8.1.1.2.b l

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means ofcontrolling microbiological fouling, in addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137. This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of the SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.c The requirements will be controlled and administered by the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program located in section 6.8.3 of Administrative Controls.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.1 This inspection is conducted onceper cycle to ensure unexpected degradation is discover ed.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load (785.3 kW) without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

l This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 4 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include

! gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 5 allows the diesel start for this surveillance to be a modified start as stated in SR i 4.8.1.1.2.a.2.

l SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS I & 2 B 3/4 8-8 Unit I- Amendment No. 68 i Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57 l 1

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