Text

Forwards Emergency Plan Re N Farms Contention 3 & Rorem Contention 1,per ALAB-143.Related Correspondence
	ML20112B223
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	03/13/1985
From:	Gallo J; ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:	Brenner L, Callihan A, Cole R; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	CON-#185-091, CON-#185-91 ALAB-143, OL, NUDOCS 8503190085
	Download: ML20112B223 (81)
	v • d • e

r-Og @TEDCORRESPONDD80E ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE '

COUNSELORS AT LAW aav,gg.E

( g TED it20 CONNECTICUT AVENUE. N W

SUITF 840 E DVARO S. ISHAM, 1872 1902 202 833 9 30 CHICAGO OFFICE "Yu'AI/o's"EAS w IE E '""E"c5Yu'EsoYeo C

0FFICr OF SECRGARY $NN 00CMETING & SERVICF.

March 13, 1985 CPANCH Lawrence Brenner,.Esq., Chairman Dr. Ric.hard F. Cole Administrative Law Judge Administrative Law Judge Atomic' Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and, Licensing Board Board U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Administrative Law Judge Union Carbide Corporation P. O. Box "Y" Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Re: In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company n Units 1 and 2 (Braidwood Docket Nos. Nuclear 50-456 and Power 50-457Statio/,dC f

Dear Administrative Judges:

In 'accordance with the disclosure requirements of the McGuire decision, Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1& 2) ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623 (1973), Commonwealth Edison. Company hereby serves on the Licensing Board and all parties the enclosed copy of the Braidwood Station Annex to the Commonwealth Edison' Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). Inasmuch 3 this document may be relevant- to Neiner Farms Contention 3 and Rorem Contention 1, this disclosure is being made.

Very truly-yours, Joseph Gallo JG/mg cc: Service List 8503190085 850313 PDR ADOCK 05000456 9 PDR _

Dse

' ?*

Commonwe:lth Edison f

on) First N"tional 01328. Chicago liknois Address Reply to Post Office Box 767 CNeago, lihnois 60690 January 21, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Annex to GSEP NRC Docket Nos. 50-456/457 Reference (a): E. D. Swartz letter to H. R. Denton dated May 15, 1984

Dear Mr. Denton:

The enclosure to this letter provides a copy of our Braidwood Station Annex to the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) for your review. NRC Staff review of this information should allow for partial closure of Outstanding Part A Item No. 6 in the Braidwood SER.

This Annex has been incorporated into controlled copies of the Commonwealth Edison GSEP. It includes Emergency Action Levels (Table BWA 5-1) and Evacuation Time Estimates (Figure BWA 6-2) which were not part of the Draft Annex submitted with Reference (a).

, Please address any comments or concerns that you or your l staff may have regerfing the enclosure to this office.

I Dne (1) signed original and fifteen (15) copies of this letter with the Enclosure are provided for your use.

efy truly yours, f

l David H. {'mith S

l ,

Nuclear Licensing Administrator cc: Monte P. Phillips - RIII RIII Inspector - Braidwood

, 9665N l

I

I October, 1984 Revision 0 BRAIDWOOD GSEP ANNEX REVISION IIIDEX PAGE x

BWA PAGE REVISION BWA PAGE REVISION i 0 6-1 0 6-2 0 1-1 0 6-3 0 1-2 0 6-4 0 1-3 0 6-5 0 1-4 0 6-6 0 i 1-5 0, 6-7 0 1-6 0 6-8 0 1-7 0 6-9 0 1-8 0 1-9 0 1-10 0 I

2-1 0 7-1 0

. 7-2 0 7-3 0 7-4 0 3-1 0 7-5 0 7-6 0 4-1 0 7-7 0 4-2 0 7-8 0 4-3 0 7-9 0 4-4 0 7-10 0 4-5 0 7-11 0 7-12 0 5-1 0 7-13 0 5-2 0 7-14 0 5-3 0 7-15 0 5-4 0 7-16 0 5 0 7-17 0 5-6 0 7-18 0 5-7 0 7-19 0 5-8 0 7-20 0 5-9 0 7-21 0 5-10 0 7-22 0 ,

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5-13 0 7-25 0 5-14 0 7-26 0 5-15 0 7-27 0 5-16 0 7-28 0 '

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Octabor, 1984 Revision 0 BRAIDWOOD STATION EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX TABLE OF CONTENTS This annex generally follows the same format as the generic section of the GSEP. However, an exact section by section correspondence is not intended.

1.0 Introduction 2.0 Definitions 3.0 Summary of Emergency Plan 4.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies 4.1 Normal Plant organization 4.2 Non-Commonwealth support Groups 4.3 Coordination with Governmental Agencies 5.0 Classification of Emergency Conditions 6.0 Emergency Measures 6.1 Activation of the Emergency Organization 6.2 Assessment Actions 6.3 Protective Actions for Of fsite Personnel 6.4 Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel 7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 7.1 Emergency Control Centers 7.2 Communications Systems 7.3 Assessment Facilities (

7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment 7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities 8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.1 General 8.2 Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures i

s Cetobe r, 198 4 Revision 0 BRAIDWOOD STATION EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This Commonwealth Generating Stations Emergency Plan Annex addresses site specific emergency planning for the Braidwood Nuclear Station.

Planning efforts common to all Commonwealth nuclear generating stations are encompassed within the generic GSEP. Written station procedures implement the requirements and guidance given in this plan.

The Braidwood Station Emergency Plan Annex is not independent of the generic Commonwealth GSEP. Emergency planning information common to all Commonwealth Nuclear Stations is not necessarily repeated in this annex, but may be in some cases in the interest of continuity and clarification.

The content of this annex conforms to Section 9.1 of the generic GSEP.

1.1 Facility Description The Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 (Braidwood Station) is located in northern Illinois, approximately 20.0 miles south-southwest of the City of Joliet and 3.0 miles west of the Kankakee River, in Will County. The site is situated in an area composed of flat agricultural farmland that has been scarred from coal strip mining.

The station site is roughly rectangular in shape, with the plant structures occupying the northwest portion of the site. The following coordinates of the centers of the containments in the Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate System are given below to the nearest 100 meters. Latitude and longitude are given to the nearest second.

BWA 1-1

e . .

t Octcb2r, 1984 Revisign 0 Nuclear Unit Latitude and Longtiude UTM Coordinates 1 41 14' 38'N X 88 13' 42'W 4,565,300 N 397,000 E 2 41 14' 36'N X 88 13' 42'W 4,565,200 N 397,000 E e

e f

4 BWA 1-2

October, 1984 Revision 0 At its closest approach, the Kankakee River is approximately 3.0 miles east of the northeastern site boundary.

Braidwood Station occupies approximately 4454 acres of land. This area ir.cludes the main site area and the cooling lake. The main site area occupies approximately 1917 acres, and the cooling lake occupies the remaining 2357 acres. Figure BWA 1-1 shows the general location of Braidwood Station.

The plant consists of two identical pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) and turbine-generators furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Each nuclear steam supply system is designed for a power output of 3425 MWT. The equivalent warranted gross and approximate net electrical outputs of each unit are 1175 MWe and 1120 MWe, respectively. Cooling for the plant is provided by a cooling lake of 2537 acres with an average depth of approximately 10 feet.

Braidwood Station has two release points for gaseous radioactive effluents, the two Auxiliary Building ventilation stacks. The top of each stack rises 200 feet above the grade elevation. Braidwood station has one release point fer liquid radioactive effluents, the Kankakee River'. Liquid radioactive wastes are stored and sampled prior to release to the Kankakee River. A radiation monitor in the discharge line will automatically terminate releases if radioactivity levels exceed predetermined values.

BWA 1-3

. - . _ _ _ _ - . __. - - = _ - . ___

Octobe r , 1984

Revision 0 1.2 Plant Exclusion Area The Braidwood Station Exclusion Area as defined in 10 CFR 100 is located entirely within the site boundary, as shown in Figure BWA 1-2. Since Commonwealth Edison owns all properties within the site boundary, it also owns the Exclusion Area and has the authority to determine and control all activities occuring within the Exclusion Area, including removal and exclusion of personnel or-property f rom the site. Commonwealth Edison owns all mineral rights and easements for the Exclusion Area, as well as for the remainder of the site property.

For accident releases, the minimum Exclusion Area Boundary distance is 485 meters, measured f rom the outer containment wall.

1.3 Low Population Zone (LPZ)

The Low Population Zone (LP2) as defined in 10 CFR 100.3(b) is 'the area immediately surrounding the Exclusion Area which contains residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective i measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident." The 10 CFR 100.11(2) also lists numerical criteria to be met by the LP2, namely that the LP2 is 'of such size that an individual located at any point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of passage) would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the i

thyroid from iodine exposure.'

BWA 1-4 1

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ._ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ ___ . ~ , _ _

- _ _ . _ . ~ _. - _ _ _ . . . - . .- - - - _ _ _ _

October, 1984 Revision 0 The Low Population Ione that was chosen for the Braidwood Station consists of that area within a 1810 meter radius (messured from.the midpoint between the two reactors) of the site. Tre Low Population 3

2one for the r,raidwood Station is based on dose considerations as delineated in 10 CFR 100 and the population distribution around the station. Figure BWA 1-3 depicts the transportation route and public fac'ilities withing the LPZ.

1.4 Population Centers A population center distance as defined in 10 CFR 100 means the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than 25,000 residents.

Additionally, there must be 'a population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population sone." The closest such center is Joliet, Illinois. Its nearest boundary is located approximately 20 miles north northeast of the reactors, Joliet had a 1970 population of 80,367 and a 1980 population of 77,956.

Refer to Table BWA 1-1 which lists the population distribution within a fifty mile radius of Braidwood Station.

1.5 Emeroency Planning zone The plume exposure Emergency Planning tone (EPZ) for Braidwood Station shall be an area surrounding the station with a radius of about ten miles. See Figure BWA 1-1.

The ingestion exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EP1) for Braidwood Station shall be an area surrounding the Station with a radius of 50 miles. See Figure BWA 1-4.

BWA 1-5

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TA8LE BMA l-1 SECTORS Ale 20NE DESleeATORS AND CdCULATED 1980 POPULATION DISTR 18Uil0N WITHIN 50 MILES & THE 8AAIDWOOD STATION SECTOR CENTERLIIE IN DE0REES FROM TRUE 22-l/2' MILES FROM FEILITY SECTOR NORTH FROM FACILITY SECTOR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 10-20 20-3 30-40 40-50 TOTAL 0 + 360 A 34 690 389 15 2 309 18.818 21,607 159,852 1 % ,800 397,896 22-l/2 8 75 823 960 294 70 234 18,014 140,555 210,493 806,860 1,878,378 '

45 C 0 107 103 0 400 4.735 4,170 35,037 328,860 1,831.653 2,20I 145 67-l/2 0 4 12 22 0 291 1,900 1,2'52 7,008 135,725 25:,879 398,195 90 E O O 13 28 22 1,027 1,875 7,055 6,972 16,999 33,991 112-1/2 F 0 0 17 18 50 236 25,876 45,742 9.524 3,854 85,317 l

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202-l/2 K 0 8 17 29 173 849 833 1,395 6,401 2,418 12,123 Y

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270 N 0 34 179 3 11 794 1,075 2,083 8,987 31,459 44,555 292-l/2 P 8 0 8 37 13 251 1,970 9,491 19,667 4,206 35.671 315 0 4 25 42 I,499 I,340 928 18,138 3,675 12.042 4,979 35,672 337-l/2 R 6 256 119 1,692 526 920 1,840 6,195 29,119 11,818 52,491 RADIAL 201E TOTAL. 615 2,469 2,147 3,714 3,527 15,010 98.431 290.277 974,862 3,159,569 4,500,641 l

e Notes: 1. The u-IO mile population estimates were based on a house count, 1981 - 1982 serial photographs and e 1961 field survery. := c ;

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2. The 10-50 mile population dets represent the Incorporated erees for which 1980 Conses 8uroeu inforeetion was ovellable end do!

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Cctcbar, 1984 Revision 0 2.0 DEFINITIONS Terms used in this annex have the same meaning as those provided in Section 2.0 of the generic portion of the Commonwealth GSEP.

Abbreviations used in this annex that are site specific are as follows:

ANSI - American National Standards Institute ARM - Area Radiation Monitor BWPS - Braidwood Nuclear Power Station BTR - Boron Thermal Regeneration SWA - Braidwood Annex CASP - Containment Air Sample Panel CVCS - Chemical Volume and Control System DEG - Division of Emergency Government DNBR - Departure fs.m Nucleate Boiling Ratio ISF - Engineered Safety Feature FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report ERSS - Eigh Radiation Sampling System HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning NSL - Nean Sea Level NFPA - National Fire Protection Association RCC - Rod Cluster Control RMS - Radiation Monitoring System RHR - Residual Heat Removal VCT - Volume Control Tank BWA 2-1 P

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October, 1984 Revision 0 3.0 SUMM ARY OF EMERGENCY PLAN The Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) addresses Commonwealth's planning efforts for emergency situations at each of its nuclear generating stations. Both the generic GSEP and this site specific annex were prepared utilizing guidance provided by Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, and NUREG 0654, Revision 1. The Plan addresses:

1) organizational control of emergenciess

2) Classification of emergency conditions:

3) Emergency response measures

4) Emergency facilities and equipments and

5) Maintaining emergency preparedness.

This GsEP annex provides specific planning information that was deemed inappropriate for inclusion into 9 generic plan but yet ca -toered necessary for a full understanding and representation of the E. A.aon's emergency response capabilities.

This annes does not specifically address efforts for protecting the public from the effects of an accident. The state of Illinois has developed an ' Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents' and will coordinate implementation of all necessary protective actions for the public in Illinois. The Illinois Emergency services and Disaster Agency i

will notify and coordinate with Indiana's Department of Civil Defense and Emergency Planning to implement all necessary protective actions in Braidwood Station's Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone.

state cmargency responses increase commensurate with the reported eme r gen cy.

BWA 3 1

Octobor, 1984 Revision 0 4.0 CRGANIZ ATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES The GSEP organization consists of two major groups. First, there is the rtation Group, consisting of the directors and their associated staffs. Secondly, there is an offsite GSEP organization.' For a full response situation, this group consists of twenty-nine directers and staff personnel. A detailed description of the total GSEP organizatien appearn in Section 4.0 of the generic GSEP.

The purpose of this section is to provide specific information with regard to the Braidwood Station organization and governmental su*pport agencies.

4.1 Normal Plant Organization The normal plant organization is basically the same for all Commonwealth nuclear stations. (Refer to Section 4.1 of the generic plan.)

4.1.1 Station superintendent Braidwood Station is managed by a Station Superintendent who is responsible for direct management of the station including industrial relations, planning, coordination and direction of the operation, maintenance, refueling, and technical activities.

During an emergency condition, the Station Superintendent is normally the GSEP Station Director.

His specific responsibilities and duties are outlined in Table 4.2-1 of the generic GSEP. Those responsibilities of the Station Director that may not be delegated are as follows:

BWA 4-1

October, 1984 Revision 0

1) Declaration that an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, or General Emergency Condition exists.

General categorization of emergencies may be done by other plant personnel in accordance with approved Station procedures. But the final decision to declare the emergency condition rests with the Station Directors and

2) Decision to notify and recommend procective actions to offsite authorities in the case where a site Emergency or General Emergency condition exists and the Recovery Manager or Corporate Command Center Director have not been contacted or are not prepared

. to make an informed decision. In all other casds, the decision to notify and recommend protective actions to offsite authorities shall be made by the Recovery Manager or Corporate Command Center Director. This responsibility may not be delegated. Actual notification and transmittal of these recommendations may be delegated.

4.1.2 Shift Engineer The Shift Engineer on duty is responsible for operating the plant in compliance with the station I operating license and procedures. During his shift, the Shift Engineer is in charge of operating the entire plant in a safe and reliable condition.

A shift Engineer is on duty 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day and is normally the initial GSEP Station Group Director and as such has the authority for declaring an emergency and recommending protective actions to local authorities.

Qualifications of Plant Personnel 4.1.3 The guidelines of ANSI N18.1-1971 are generally followed by Braidwood station management for personnel selection and training. For some positions, alternate qualifications are utilized based upon operating ex pe rience .

BWA 4-2 i

4

Octobor, 1984 Revision 0 4.1.4 Contractor Performance Ultimate responsibility for contractor performance from support contractors rests with the Station Superintendent.

4.1.5 Minimum shift Manning The minimum staffing required at Braidwood Station is the same as is required at other Commonwealth two-unit nuclear stations. Refer to Figure 4.2-2 of the Generic GSEP.

4.1.6 sealth Physics Organization The Station Rad / Chem Supervisor is responsible for 1

the health physics program and for handling and monitoring of radioactive materials. Normally reporting to the Rad / Chem Supervisor are health physicists, chemists, foremen and technicians.

During an emergency situation, the Rad / Chem Supervisor normally acts as the GSEP Rad / Chem Director.

4.1.7 Augmentation of Plant Staffino During An Emergency Braidwood Station is committed to augment its onsite organization under emergency conditions. The station uses, as guidance, Figure 4.2-3 of the generic GSEP in planning for its augmentation of plant staf fing during an emergency.

"To f acilitate the augmentation of plant staffing, Braidwood Station has established a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months duty call individual who would be notified first af ter a station emergency is ceclared.

This individual would initiate a prioritized notification (call-list) procedure.

BWA 4-3

October, 1934 Revision 0 4.2 Non-Commonwealth Support Groups Agreements exist on file at Braidwood Station with several support agencies. These agencies and their support roles are as follows:

1) The Will County Sheriff's office provides services of law enforcement.

2) Braidwood Fire and Rescue provides fire protection and arculance services.

3) St. Joseph Hospital in Joliet will serve as the supporting medical facility for BWPS.

4) The Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) on the State, County, and municipal levels will implement protective actions for the public. Note: The agreement with the Illinois 4 agencies that have a role in the Illinois Plan for Radiological l Accidents.

5. The Department of Energy, Chicago Operations Office, will respond to requests for radiological assistance. This assistance will normally be limited to advice and emergency action essential for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.

6. Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials (INPO) provide voluntary assistance in sitigating l

the consequences of nuclear transportation accidents.

Additionally, Commonwealth Edison Company has contractural agreements with several companies whose services would be available in the event of an emergency. These agencies and their available services are as follows:

1) Teledyne Isotopes Midwest Laboratories provides environmental radiological monitoring services and radiochemical analysis.

l

2) Radiation Management Corporation provides services of medical.and health physics support.

3) Murray & Trettel, Inc. provides meteorological monitoring services.

4) Landauer, Inc. provides personnel dosimetry services.

BWA 4-4 l

1

s October, 1984 Revision 0 4.3 Coordination with Governmental Agencies As stated in the generic plan, the State of Illinois has the statutory responsibility and authority for protecting the health and safety of the public in Illinois. Within the State of Illinois authority is delegated as follows:

1) The Governor has overall offsite command authority for the protection of the public. .

2) The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA)-

exercises command and coordination and has programmatic responsibility for the implementation of protective actions as recommended for the public by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (DNS) and the Governor.

3) The Department of Nuclear Safety has both the command authority for radiological aspects of a nuclear accident and the responsibility for performing various radiological functions. During an accident situation, the IDNS will make protective action recommendations to the Governor and the Illinois ESDA. -

The State of Illinois will develop an annex to its State plan which specifically addresses protective action for the Illinois portion of the Braidwood Station Emergency Planning Zones.

The State of Indiana is a continguocs state affected by the e,

Braidwood Station Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone. Within the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Civil Defense and Emergency Management will coordinate and provide liaison with the Illinois ESDA and supporting Federal agencies to ens'ure effective responses and aid in emergencies involving Braidwooy Station which affect Indiana.

s BWA 4-5 5

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October, 1984 Kevicion 0 5.0 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

.The generic section of the GSEP provides for classification of emergencies into six (6) categ ories. The first category, Transportation Accident, concerns an emergency involving the transportation of radioactive or other hazardous material from a nuclear generating station. The next four (4) categories: Unusual Event: Alert; Site (Area) Emergency; and General Emergency address emergencies of increasing severity. The sixth category of emergencies is the Recovery Phase. It is the responsibility of the Recovery Manager to consider the criteria in Table 5.0-6 of the Generic GSEP and determine when the Recovery Phase can be established.

Table SWA 5-1 includes the specific initiating conditions for each s :rgency class at Braidwood Station. Where possible, these intiating conditions are related to plant instrumentation readings.

In the' event of equipment installation or other requirements, it may be necessary to quickly change the GSEP Emergency Action Levels at Braidwood Station. This may be done by first changing the Station Emergency Procedure for EALs and then, as soon as practical, by changing Table BWA 5-1 of this annex.

In an emergency situation, if more than one distinctive EAL of different classification levels is reached, e.g., an EAL for Alert and an EAL for Site Emergency, the highest classification level reached shall be declared.

l Similarly, if more than one distinctive EAL of the same classification level is reached, e.g., two EALs f or Site Emergency, l

consideration shall be given for declaration of a higher classification.

s BWA 5-1

,__ _ _ . - . ,7 .-. - - --- . , _ _ _ - _ , _ . , , _

TACLE BWA 5-1 BRAIDWOOD ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY i

Class Description Events in progress -Events in progress Events in progress Events in. progress or have occurred or have occurred or have occurred or have occurred which indicate a which involve an which involve actual which involve actual potential degrada- actual or potential or likely ma jor or imminent substan-tion of the level substantial degrada- failures of plant tial core degradation of safety of the tion of the level functions needed or melting with poten-plant. of safet- 2 of the for protection of tial for loss of con-plant. the public. tainment integrity.

4

1) Aircraft crash Impacted on-site. Impacted on-site and A) Impacted on-site i or missiles has degraded equip- and has degraded from whatever ment described in equipment described source. the Technical Speci- in the Technical fications such that Specifications beyond 1

a limiting condition the limiting condition for operation for operation that a

requires a shutdown. requires a shutdowns or B) has exceeded a Tech-nical Specification

safety limit.

1 2) Control Room when 10CFR20 Due to exceeding Evacuation exposure limits IDCFR20 exposure are expected to limits, evacuation is

be exceeded. required and control is not established from Local Control Stations or from j Remote Shutdown Panel j within 15 minutes.

BWA 5-2 i

9 TABLE n=a 5-1 (cont'd)

BRAIDNOOD ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i

CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL ENERGENCY l 3) Earthquake seismic equipment .At a level greater At a level greater 1 (activation of is activated. than Operating than Safe Shutdown'

! seismic monitor- (at level of 0.02g) Basis Earthquake (7 0.21g)

! ing alarm with ( > 0.095g )

l level verifica-i tion, not i spurious, or testing)

4) Unplanned onsite but not Explosion onsite has A) Explosion has Explosion affecting plant degraded equipment degraded equip-operations. described in the ment described in Technical Specifi- the Technical j cat ons such that Specifications a limiting condition' beyond the condition i for operation for operation that j requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown;

ST.

! B) has exceeded a '

Technical Specifica-tion safety limit.

i j

5) Fire (ongoing A) Fire requires Fire requires off- A) Fire requires off-j as described NRC notification site assistance and site assistance and by observation if not identifed has degraded equip- has degraded equip-j! or alarm, and within 10 mins.: ment described in ment described in verified by the or the Technical Spect- Technical Specifica-

}

fire brigade) B) Fire requiring fications such tbat tions beyond the i

offsite assis- a limiting condition Itmiting condition i ,

for operation that'

~

l tance but not for operation I affecting plant requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown; operation. or l

I B) has exce'ed'ed a Technical Specifi- -

cation safety limit.

) BNA 5-3

5 TABLE BWA 5-1 (cont'd)

BR,TIDMOOD EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 4

CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

6) Flood Cooling pond dike Water at level of Water level at plant on failure affecting Probable Paximum grade elevation i Low water Level offsite property. Flood (Cooling Pond ( ) 601 feet MSL) . eg.

water level at l> rainfall in excess of 2 598.17 feet MSL). eg. Probable Maximum l preciptation 3 the Precipitation i Probable Maximum Precipitation of' 31.9 inches in 48 hrs ER. O. R i

4 Cooling Pond water Cooling Pond water

) level f'590 feet level 6 584 feet i MSL with coincident MSL with coincident j cooling pond dike cooling pond dike

failure. failure.

j 7) Security Threat The following events An ongoing security An ongoing security An ongoing security

Definition: Acts as described in the threat (event) of threat (event) in- threat (event) involving I

which threaten Security Plan: increasing severity volving an imminent a loss of physical the safety of ~(1) Obvious attempt that persists for loss of physical control of the

station personnel to sabotage. more than 60 min. control of the facility.

or the security (2) Internal facility.

A of the nuclear disturbance f units or special (disturbance j nuclear material. which is not i This includes short lived or i crowd disturb- is not a barmless

! ances or acts of outburst involving sabotage. one or more l individuals j

within the pro-

! tected area).

I i

l sWA 5-4

(

. =

TABLE BWA 5-1 (cont'd)

BRAIDWOOD ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL ENERGENCY

7) Security Threat (3) Bomb device Definition: discovered. ,

)

(cont'd) (4) Mostage.

(5) Civil disturbance (spontaneous collective group gathering which disrupts normal operations).

(6) Armed or forced protected area .

Intrusion.

(7) Armed or forced vital area in-trusion.

i BWA- 5-5

d TABLE BNA 5-1 (cont'd)

~

BRAIDNOOD EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

~

l 8) Tornado or A) Tornado near A) Tornado strikes sustained winds

! severe winds Facility Facility or_ > 85 mph and j

being experi- (1) Contre 1 Room B) Sustained winds either unit not enced (Wind informed by >75 mph in cold shutdown.

speed as Imad Dispatcher i indicated in fMt_

, Control Room is (2) Station personnel g

! used to classify have made visual

] condition.) sighting:

or l B) Sustained winds

> 60 mph.

I 9) Toxic Gas Uncontrolled Entry of Toxic gas Entry of Toxic Gas

release of Toxic into the protected gas into vital areas gas at life area, affecting the safe threatening levels, shutdown of the near or onsite. ' plant.

j _

I i

i 10) Loss of AC Loss of all offsite Loss of all offsite noth ESF 4KV bussrg Ongoing loss of power

] Power AC power jy( loss of AC power and loss per unit deenergized and total loss of i all onsite AC power of all onsite AC for > 15 minutes. feedwater makeup l ', required per unit. power required capability.

per unit.

} .

l i

\

i w\

DNA 5-6

~

l "\g

.g --- . . ..- .- -. . _ .

Ss, TABLE BNA 5-1 (cont'd) ,.

BRAIDNOOD

' \ '

FwritGENCY ACTION LEVELS I

CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALEltT ~ SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL ENERGENCY

11) Loss of DC Loss of DC Power Loss of all ESF Busses 111 (211) l Power. sources has degraded DC power, per and 112 (212) are

~e quipment described unit. both deenergized in the Technical for 15 minutes.

I Specifications such that a limitisiy~

condition for operation requires

. a shutdown. .

12) Plant Shutdown A) Complete loss of A) Complete loss of Transient requiring i functions. any function any function operation of shutdown j needed to maintain needed to main- systems with failure q cold shutdown tain hot shut down. to trip and core damage (Both RH trains, (If you do nct is evident.

Cgt both CC trains, have at least one j C@t both SK trains.)

operable S/G with I wide fange level) l OR 65% AND ability to i control steam

B) Failure of the release either by i Reactor Protection S/G PORV, OR j System instrumen- steam dump capabi-tation to initiate 11ty to the conden-

$) and complete a ser.)

j reactor trip, ogt j khich brings the B) Transient requiring reactor sub- operation of shutdown

{'

critical once systems with failure i a limiting safety to trip. (Power

} system setpoint generation continues, 1 i has been exceeded. but no core damage I evident.)

i i BNA 5-7 i.

TABLE BWA 5-1 (cont'd)

BRAIDWOOD EMEDGENCY ACTION LEVELS ,

CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

13) Loss of most or In the Main Control In the Main Control all alarm Room. Room and a plant capability of transient in progress, annunciators.

14) Conditions or Equipment described A) Equipment described systems required in the Technical in the Technical by Technical Specifications is Specifications is Specifications degraded such that degraded beyond the d

(i.e. ECCS, a limiting condition limiting condition i fire protection, f or operation for operation that

{ etc.) requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown:

SEL B) Has exceeded a Tech-nical Specification safety limit.

15) Inadequate > 6500F in average Braidwood Status Braidwood Status

Core Coolant of 10 highest incore Tree's (BWST's) Tree's ( BWST's) thermocouple readings require entry into require entry

~

BWFR-C.2 into BWFR-C.1

' OR Response to Response to Degraded Core Inadequate Core cooling Subcooling( 250F Cooling, based on based on sub-

, for 15 minutes. subcooling, number cooling, number l of RCP's running, of RCP's running, vessel level, and vessel level, and core exit thermo- and core exit thermo-couples. couples.

1 CDD a Q ._ - -. _- ~

4 TABLE b 5-1 (cont'd)

BRAIDWOOD ENE..OENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERCENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY l 16) Loss of Primary A) Failure of a A > 50 gpa leakage Primary system leak- And Failure to coolant primary system increase in a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months age.is beyond activate ECCS safety or relief period as indicated makeup capabilities valve to close, by either leak rate of charging pumps.

{Mt a primary calculations,

+

PORV failure to charging pump flow

! close, and its or VCT level j block valve will changes.

! not isolate.

' B) Exceeding Reactor

! coolant system l leak rate as

) specified in q

Technical Spect-j fications.

i 1

17) Main Steam Line with zero or small with I gpm primary Ten (10) gpm primary Break / Feed line primary to secondary to secondary leakage to secondary leakage Break leakage and/or small and with 14 failed And significant fuel l percentage of failed fuel. damage.

fuel, a

I I 18) Loss of Heat Braidwood Status Alert condition is Alert condition is Sink Tree's (BWST's) on going for 15 on going for 45 require entry into minutes. (Loss of minutes. (Loss of j BWFR-H.1 Response all feedwater and all feedwater and i to Loss of Secondary all auxiliary feed all auxiliary feed

Heat Sink, based on water, and the water and the residual

! total feedwater flow residual heat heat removal system is to the steam gene- removal system is not in operation. )

]

rators. not in operation.)

BWA 5-9 i

e

TABLE BWA 5-3 (cont'f) ,,

30tAIDWOOD EMERGENCY ACTIOff LEVELS CONDITIONS UIOUSUAL EVEIt? ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL ENERGENCY

19) Steam Generator Exceeding primary Entry into BWEP-3 Same conditions as

Tube Rupture to secondary leakage Steam Generator Tube Alert and loss of rates as specified Rupture with the offsite power in Technical follow.1g: g Specifications. Reactor Trip / Safety Tube (s) rupture is

{

Injection beyond the capability AND of the charging pumps.

1. High radiation in 4

the condenser air removal system. .

98_

, 2. High radiation in

] steam generator blow-down.

E

3. Unexplained increase in any steam generator i l evel.

~

a

20) Inadvertent A. Inadvertent positive dilution such that: -

reactivity 1) Technical Speci- ,

insertions due fication shutdown i to rods or margin requirements 1 dilution. are violated.

S I 2) The control bank i Iow low insertion limit is reached.

B. Uncontrolled rod I withdrawal from i- suberiticality or power operation.

l BWA 5-10 i

i

__ .. = -.

~r a

TABLE SMA 5-1 (cont'd)

NRAIDWOOG i EMF ' CY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL FMERGENCY i'

21) Feedwater Any feeduster Malfunction malfunction resulting in a j sustained decrease in Feedwater temperature to the steam generators 4 by >60 0 F.

i 221 ECCS Actuatton ECCS initlatfon.

(Non-Spurious) with flow into reactor coolant system.

23) Turbine-Generator A turbine generator A turbine generator accident in failure in which fatture in which which missiles missiles are gene- missiles are generated

, are generated. rated and no pene- and penetration of the tration of the casing casing does occurs all occurs and normel possible inpset areas i reactor shutdown containing essential follows. equipment are protected

,i and normal reactor shut-j down follows.

3' i

l DNA'5 - 11 !

. o 1

TABLE ENA 5-1 (cont'd) .,

BRAIDMOOD r

ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNOSOAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL ENERGENCY

{

l

24) Loss of Fission A.) 2 x 10 2R/hr A. > 4 x IO 2R/hr '.>2 x 10 3R/hr A

Product Barriers Primary Containment Primary Containment Primary Containment a

i Radiation, OR, Radiation, m Radiation, ANO l t Primary contain- B. Loss of I of the B. Loss of 2 of the B. Loss of 2 of the I ment Radiation following 3_ fission following 3_ fission following 3_ fission is observed on product barriers: product barriers: product barriers j

the RN-11 display, with an inninent loss j

console for: of the third barrier:

1) Cladding: 1) Cladding: 1) Cladding:-

i li2)RE-AR920 or ,

li2)RE-AR021 grab sample results grab sample results grab sample results l 7308 uCi/cc > 300 uCi/cc 7300 uC1/cc

' equivalent of I-131 equivalent of I-131 equivalent of I-131

2) Reactor Coolant 2) Reactor Coolant 2) Reactor Coolant 1

System: System: System:

a) Containment a) Containment al containment 3

press.) 5 poig and press. > 5 poig and press. > 5 poig and j

l b) Containment b) containment b) Containment toep. > 1580F and temp. > 1500F and temp. > 158 4 and

]' c) Containment c) Containment c) Containment humidity >50% humidity 250% humidity >50t

3) Primary 3) Primary 3) Primary Containment Containment Containment a) Containment a) Containment a) Containment press. >58 yeig. g press. > 58 peig. E press. > 50 peig. y b) Containment b) Containment b) Containment toep. >2es*F, E teep. >2000Fg temp. >2000F or c) Loos of contain- c) Loss of contain- c) Loos of contain-ment integrity when ment integrity when ment integrity when containment integrity containment integrity containment integrity is required. is required. is required.

gNA 5-12

TAsia sNA 5-1 (cont'd) -e anAlmunna ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CDWDITIONS tWAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

25) Fuel Wandling Fuel Band!!ag A) Radiation levels Accident Building eshaust in the Fuel Mandling (Direct infor- has been diverted Building are motion from fuel through the charcoal > 100 mR/hr as handling person- filters. observed on the RN-ll nel indicating display console for that an irradi- ORE-AR055 or

, ated fuel assembly ORE-AR056, has been damaged.) OR B) Fuel Handling Building exhaust charcoal filters are depleted OR, inoperable and radioactivity is being released to the atmosphere.

26) Elevated Area Unplanned increase Unplanned increase Rad Monitor by factor of 29 in (Resulting free readings any ARN. degradation in the control of radioactive material and confirmed by servey or redundant lastrumentation) by a factor of 190 in any ARN.

ENA 5-13

ThaLE suk 5-1 (cont'd) -

BRAIDWOOO EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERCENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

'l l 27) Caseous

, Radiation Releases **

A. Core Damage No core damage event Instantaneous release Release rate averaged Instantaneous release Suspected is postulated at the rate exceeds for 2 minutes exceeds rate exceeds level

Unusual Event level. 1.8 x 106 uCi/see > 500 mR/hr whole corresponding to

{ body a't the site > l ren/hr whole body boundar at the site boundary (8.9:10 uC1/sec) under actual meteorology OR This condition exists Release 7 ate averaged when Q> 7x106x U where for 30 minutes ex- 0 = release rate in I ceeds > 50 mR/hr wh'o le uCi/sec body at the site U= mean wind speed boundary in meters /sec

' (8.9 x105 uCi/sec)

8. NO Core .

Instantaneous release Instantaneous release Release rate averaged Instantaneous release Damage rate exceeds rate exceeds for 2 minutes exceeds rate exceeds level i Suspected 1.8 x106 uC1/sec 1.8x10 7 uC1/sec > 500 mR/hr whole corresponding to Noble gas Noble gas body at the site > l rem /hr whole body OR Om at the site boundary 30 uC1/see Iodine 300 uCL/sec Iodine boundarg (1.6x10 uC i/sec) under actual meteor-OR on OR ology. This condition 10 CFR 20.105 10 times 10CFR20.105 Release rate exists when: ,

averaged f or 30 min. Q> 1.3x108xu where i

instantaneous instantaneous release limits release limits exceeds > 50,mR/hr Q = release rate in i are exceeded. are exceeded. whole body at the uC1/sec site boundary U = mean wind speed (1.6x197 uci/sec) in meters /sec j

l

- Monitored releases can be measured by effluent monitoring or counting instrumentation. For noble gases, ef fluent monitor 1(2)RE-PROO30, channel 4, displays the release rate in uCi/sec on the RM-11 display console.

For lodines, ef fluent monitor 1(2)RE-PRO 28 displa 1 a concentration in uCi/cc that must be corrected for stack flow rate to obtain a release rate in uCi/sec.

BwA 5-14

TABLE BWA 5-1 (cont'd) .-

BItAIDWOOO EMERGENCY ACTION LL'VELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMEltGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

28) Liquid 1) Gross Beta 1) Gross Beta 1) Gross Beta 1) Gross Beta Radiation >l x 10-7 uC1/ml ?! x 10-6uC1/mi 3 2,000 Ci total 3 2 x 104 C1 total Releases from or or in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months the Plant as 2) Tritium > 40 Ci total or or measured by > 3 x 10-3 uC1/m1 in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 2) Tritium 2) Tritium counting or 3 2 x 104 Ci ?2 x 105 C1 instrumentation 2) Tritium total in 24 hrs. total in 24 hrs, or effluent ) 3 x 10-2 uC1/ml monitoring inst- or rumentation. ) 500 C1 total (Radiation re- in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

leases are cb-served on the RN-11 display console for ORE-PRO 10.)

29) Personnel- Transportation of a Injury radioactivity con-taminated injured person to hospital

30) Hazardous As a direct result of Materials hazardous materials a person is killed or hospitalized or estimated property damage exceeds $50,000.

BWA 5-15

TABLE ENA 5-1 (cont'C) ..

BRAIDMOOO ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

31) Any other Warrants increased Warrants activation Warrants activation Ismainent Core Melt Conditions of awareness on the of Technical Support of the Emergency 4

equivalent part of the state Center operations Facility magnitude to and/or local off- and monitoring teams

the criteria site officials.. warrants notification used to define of the public by State the accident and local agencies.

I category as determined by the Station

! Director.*

'l I

Conditions that may or may not warrant classification under GSEP include:

]

a. Incident reporting per 18CPR58.72.

j b. Incident reporting per 18CFR28.483 or Illinois mules and Regulations, Part D.403.

c. Discharges of oil or hasardous swbstances into waterways per 33CFR153.

d. Security contingency events per the Station Security Plan.

1 The Station Director may, at his discretion, categorise the above situations as GSEP emergencies, depending upon i

the seriousness of the situation. (Refer to Section 9.3 of the generic plan for additional information.)

i BNA 5-16 4

1 N

TABLE BNA 5-1 (cont'd!

3RAlDN000 ENERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT i

A. A vehicle transporting radioactive materials or~non-radioactive Hazardous j materials from a Commonwealth Edison generating st,ation is involved in a situation in which:

' ~

1. Fire, breakage or suspected radioactive contamination occurs involving a shipment of radioactive material org

2. As a direct result of Nazardous materials,

! (a) A person is killed or

) (b) A person receives injuries requiring hospitalizations or i (c) Estimated carrier or other property damage exceeds $50,000 i

] B. Any other condition involving Hazardous material transportation and equivalent to the criteria in Item A. .

l i

i I

i l

l .

t l l BMA 5-17 j

I FINAL

- . ~ .

Octooer, 1984 Revision 0 6.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES Commonwealth Edison emergency response actions are basically the same for all nuclear stations and are thus covered by Section 6.1 of the generic plan.

6.1 Activation of the Emergency Orcanization If the conditions at Braidwood Station indicate that one of the Emergency Action Levels in Table SWA 5-1 1,s exceeded, the Station Director declares and classifies the emergency. A Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form is completed and the information contained on this form.is conveyed to the System Power Dispatcher.

In addition, the NRC Operations Center is notified of the emergency in accordance with 10 CFR $0.72. For the General Emergency, the Station Director is responsible for notifying the following Illinois Agencies of the emergency condition, as well as recommending initial protective actions for the offsite publics o Illinois ESDA in Springfield o Will County Sheriff's Office When State and local agencies are notified of the emergency condition, they will take action in accordance with State and local emergency plans.

BWA 6-1

October, 1984 Revision 0 Figure 4.2-3 of the generic GSEP will be used by traidwood Station in augmenting the Braidwood onsite emergency organization for declared GSEP emergencies. In addition, Braidwood Station has established an Onsite Technical Support center and an onsite Operational Support Center. These centers are activated (manned) for an Alert, site Emergency, and General Emergency. Augmentation of plant staffing is achieved by implementing a prioritized not}fication procedure as described in Section 4.1.7. . .

6.2 Assessment Actions Throughout each emergency situation, continuing assessment will occur. Assessment actions at Braidwood Station may include an evaluation of plant conditions inplant, onsite, and initial offsite radiological measurements and initial estimates of of fsite doses. To aid emergency personnel in an assessment of core damage during an emergency condition, a figure has been prepared which represents a plot of activity (C1) versus containment radiation readings. Figure SWA 4-1 is simplistic in nature and is intended only to provide a preliminary estimate of primary containment activity, based on containment radiation readings.

4.3 Protective Actions for the offsite Publie Protective actions for the off site public will be recommended and coordinated by the Illinois ESDA and Indiana Department of Civil Defense and Emergency Management in cooperation with local officials. The initial recommendation of protective actions will be issued to ESDA by Commonwealth Edison based on conditions at Braidwood Station. A notification capability to the population within the 10-mile IFZ BWA 6-2

October, 1984 Revision 0 is available for the purpose of alerting the population of recommended protective actions. ThJ notification system consists of three parts:

1) A permanently installed outdoor notification system within the o to 5 mile radius around the station. The O to 5 mile radius around the station is primarily an agricultural. area with a population density well below 2000 persons per square mile. The installed notification system will essentially cover all inhabited areas with a minimum noise level of 60 db using an attenuation factor of 10 db loss per distance doubled. For the possibility of a dwelling not being exposed to a 60 db minimum noise level, a local coverage siren or an in-house warning rec,eiver will be utilized.

2) A permanently installed outdoor notification system coverine the heavily populated areas within the 5 to 10 miles radius.

The area outside the five mile radius and inside the ten mile radius contains a nuseer of communities that will be covered by installed notification systems. These systems will utilise existing sirens plus additional strens to ensure complete coverage with either a 60 db minimum or.10 db above daytime background.

3) A mobile notification system for the remainder of the area within the 5 to 10 mile radius. The total 1980 population of the area outside the five mile radius and inside the ten mile radius is approximately 15,000. Of this total, that population residing in communities within the 5 to 10 mile radius will be covered by the installed notification system mentioned in part 2 above. The remaining population live in rural residences or farm steads and will be alerted by a mobile system including sirens and public address. The plan for a mobile notification system includes the use of law enforcement vehicles with siren and portable announcing syste ms. Contained in the Emergency Plans of each of the counties associated with staidwood station, will be the general guidance for early notification of the population within the county. The routing of law enforcement vehicles through the S to 10 mile EPs will be accomplished by the County sheriff Dispatcher aided by the state Police Dispatcher if needed. The purpose of the prompt notification system is to advise citizens either take shelter or evacuate and to instruct them to tune to designated emergency information radio s ta tions.

Once the public has tuned to designated radio stations in an emergency, detailed instructional messages will be given to the public. state and local procedures provide for these messages.

SWA 6-3

4 .

October, 1984 Revision 0 Protective actions for the public may includes o Sheltering by remaining inside buildings or homes.

o Evacuation from a potentially affected area and relocation to a preestablished registration / evacuation center.

o Food, water and milk control by sampling, testing and restricting the consumption of these potentially affected items. .

o Access control by roadblocks and barriers to prevent entrance to potentially affected areas.

sector evacuation times may be a factor in the recommended protective actions. Refer to Figure BWA 6-2 for a summary of evacuation time estimates for the ten-mile area surrounding Braidvced Nuclear Power Station.

6.4 Pre e,2 "e Actions for Onsite Personnel 8

araidwood Station has a siren system to warn onsito personnel of emergency conditions. Upon hearing a continuous two (2) minute siren all personnel within the protected area have been instructed to report to designated locations / assembly areas. Station GSEP directors initially report to the Onsite operational Support Center. Personnel not having emergency assignments report to either one of two designated assembly areas. Permanent station personnel should normally report to the Service Building Machine Shop area. Contractors should normally assemble in the Unit 42 Turbine Building Trackway. (Note: While Unit 2 is under construction, the Unit 1 Turbine Building Trackway shall be utilized as an assembly area.) Refer to Figure NWA 4-3.

Accountability of site personnel will be the responsibility of the Braidwood Station Security Director using the computerised security control system.

SWA 6-4

Octtber, 1984 Revision 0 If a site evacuation is considered necessary by the station Director, personnel will be relocated and monitored at one or more of the following locations:

1) Dresden Nuclear Generating station, Morris, Illinois

2) La salle Nuclear Generating station, near Marseilles, Illinois

3) Joliet Generating station, Joliet, Illinois (with support coming f rom either Dresden station or Lasalle station)

Traffic control for onsite areas during an evacuation will be the responsibility of the Braidwood station security force.

As necessary, equipment and personnel will be furnished by traidwood station to the relocation site (s) for monitoring, decontamination, and bioassay. Refer to , Figure BWA 4-4 for evacuation routes to the relocation sites.

Other emergency measures are common to all nuclear station and are thus discussed in the generic plan.

SWA 6-5

._- . . . - _ ~ - . - - _ - - . - . - . . _ - . - _ --- _ - - . - -

1 uccoper, m j

FIGURE BWA 6-1 J

CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 3 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 61 a #2 OO

! 9 10~

.,L~

~

~ ~ ' '

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. . . n.

[

p . y .

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~

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~

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==J 3 = l 1 g ,, = .

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- - = , =;

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. _ _ d =555 - iE=5 = "-*EEEE555N5^ ~EEE 5 5$5555c1 l f - - - _ _.

107 l ,--

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8. .

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s. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ________m l

_ -:=. _ . = =--

_ =-

i, _ !

l I

r F -

2C a e eatoe a s e e e f se a e 4 e e vee 6 7 a S to 10 to 10 I

Radiation Level in Containment (Rao/hr)

I Curve @ represents estir.ated activity levels in the containment fo11o=1ng releases in wnich the ratto of the "% noele esses releaseo to sne core" to the "% tooines released from the core" is equal to 4. Curve @ represents estimated activity levels in the containment foliosing releases in wnich tne above mentioned ratio is equal to one(1). Specifically, the following points i are plotted on the curvest l l

Point 1 - 100% notle gases released, 2f,,6 of todines releases j l

' Point 2 - 1C% noble pases released, 10. of toaines released Point 3 - a nocle rases releassa, 2a of todines releasea l t

'

Total coolant activity (!odines plus noble easts) is 7CC curies. If tnis l

activity becomes sirborne in the containment, the rasiation level woulo ce 1ess than one rad /hr and thus is too low of an activity to te plottee on taas eraph.

BWA 6-6 t

a' 6 r

i i i 1

, l

Revisstn U

',* . BRAIDWOOD STATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES nlo hf , . , . .: -

yyb.>

p & W:;r:... .

W..

/

,2,. A 3

.- g. j;g.

m..i_h,g ky%\gjp :1 m _

L

__.~ %w.=. ' ,

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g l' 'Y r

(..) Di"g ,/,, L*** g p '! ****#'=*

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Ca* C ' 'g r 4 " ;

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October, 1984 Revision 0 7.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 7.1 Emergency Control Centers 7.1.1 Station Control Room The Braidwood Station Control Room is the initial onsite center of emergency control and is located on the 451-foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building. Refer to Figure SWA 7-1 for the relative location of the Control Room within the station. Figure BWA 7-2 provides an approximate layout.

7.1.2 Onsite Technical support Center (TsC)

Braidwood Station has designated an Onsite Technical support Center which will. exist at the north end of the Turbine suilding, as shown in Figure BWA 7-1. The Onsite Tsc will fully meet the requirements of Section 7.1.2 of the generic plan. Refer to Figure BWA 7-3 for an 'as built' diagram of the Onsite TSC.

7.1.3 Onsite Operations! Support Center (CSC)

Braidwood Station has designated a primary Onsite Operational support Center. The Primary Onsite OSC is Meeting Room fl on elevation 451' of the service Building, as shown in Figure SWA 7-1. The Onsite OSC will conform to the requirements of Section 7.1.3 of the generic plan and will be the location to which operations support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments in support of emergency operations.

BWA 7-1

October, 1984 Revision 0 Refer to Figure BWA 7-4 for an "as built' diagram of the Onsite OSC. The backup Onsite OSC is the Shif t Engineer's office on Elevation 451 of the Auxiliary i

Building. ,

714 Corporate C'ommand Center (CCC)

The Corporate Command Center (CCC), located in the t

~

Edison Building, downtown ChiEago, is the location f rom which the CCC Director will normally direct a staff in evaluating, coordinating, and directing company activities involved in coping with an emergency.

7.1.5 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Braidwood Station has designated a keergency Operations Facility. The BOF will be located at Mason, Illinois, approximately 14 miles WNW of the Station. The BOF is the location where the GSEP Recovery Group would be activated, primarily for a Site

)

or General Emergency. Refer oto Figure 7-5 for an i *as-built" drawing of the BOF. The designated EOF is greater than 10 miles f rom the Onsite TSC and therefore i is exempt f rom habitsbility criteria.

7.2 Communications Systers l

! Dedicated communications systems at Braidwood Station allow ef fective coordination of any emergency tresponse. These systems j

include:

1) A Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) which links the Control Room, the Corporate Command Center, the Onsite TSC, the System Power Supply Of fice, the EOF, the Illinois ESDA (in Spr ing field ), the IDNS (in Springfield), and selected local government agencies.

l

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- October, 1984 Revision 0 2 A microwave voice channel between the CCC and the Shift Engineer's Office, the Onsite TSC, and the EOF.

3) A telephone link that enables communication between the 3

CCC, the Onsite TSC, and the EOF.

4) A telephone link that enables communication between the Control Room and the Onsite TSC.

5) A telephone link that enables communication between the Control Room and the Onsite OSC.

6) A telephone link that enables communication between the Onsite TSC and the Onsite OSC.

7) A radio voice channel between the CCO, the Shif t Engineer's Office, the Onsite TSC, the EOF, mobile vehicles, and handi-talkies in the field.

8) An Emergency Notification System and a Health Physics Network that allow communications between the Station and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The Braidwood Station dedicated communications systems comply with the requirements of Section 7.2 in the generic GSEP.

Following a GSEP declaration, Braidwood Station makes initial notifications in accordance with Section 6.1 of the generic GSEP and this annex. In addition, the Control Room shall establish a communications link with the Onsite TSC and the Onsite OSC when

! activated. As soon as the Onsite TSC is activated and manned, the control Room shall be relieved of the responsibility for maintaining an open communications link with the NRC Operations Center. The control Room will then maintain communications with only the Onsite TSC and the Ons'te OSC. The Onsite TSC shall maintain communications with the NRC Operations Center, the Control Room, the CCC, and/or the EOF. Communications links that are not required to 1

l l be maintained open shall be terminated as quickly as prudence l a dictates. Termination is acecmplished to minimize the BWA 7-3 l

l l

October, 1984 Revision 0 nurber of personnel needed as communicators, to minimize conf usion in control centers and to reduce the probability for promulgation of erroneous information. Communications initiated by interested outside parties, not specifically addressed in the GSEP, shall be i referred to the Corporate Of fice. Such communications shall never be allowed to interfere with response to an emergency condition not with the implementat' ion of the GSEP.

4 In addition to the dedicated GSEP communications described in this section, Braidwood Station has other reliable intraplant and plant-to-offsite communications. These communications include:

o A public address system o A commercial phone system o Security / Operations radio consoles and handi-talkies o System Power Dispatcher microwave communications o Sound-powered phones o Vehicle radios o Microwave communications The Station's communications systems will be further described in an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure.

7.3 Assessment Facilities 7.3.1 onsite seismic Monitorinc Instrumentation A central recording time-history accelerograph unit with strip chart recorder, indicator lights, and playback system is provided.

The lights indicate whether the system is triggered and whether the operating basis or safe shutdown maximum 4

accelerations are exceeded in any one of the three SWA 7-4

October, 1984 Revision 0 orthogonal directions in the basement of the containment structures. An acceleration of .02g in any direction activates the seismic switch which turns on the seismic monitors and lights up the seismic alarm lights at the central station panel.

7.3.2 onsite Meterorological Monitoring Instrumentation A 320-foot meterorological tower is located approximately 1880 feet northeast of the Braidwood Station containment Buildings.

1 The Braidwood Station meteorological monitoring system is equipped to monitor the following parameters:

1) Temperature (at 30 feet) i 2) Differential Temperature (between 30 and 199 f t)

3) Dew point (at 30 and 199 feet)

4) Wind speed and direction (at 34 and 203 feet)

5) Precipitation (ground level)

In addition to the above, sigma-sub-theta, a derived meteorological parameter, is computed and is 1

available to the CCC Environmental Director.

Information gathered from the tower is recorded on chart recorders located in a building at the tower base.

These meteorological parameters will be provided as input to the station's process computer and will be available as up-to-the-minute data in the control room.

l BWA 7-5

October, 1984 Revision 0 The meteorological program at Braidwood Station provides. information sufficient to assess local weather conditions and to determine the degree of atmospheric dispersion of airborne radioactive effluents from the station.

The Commonwealth Edison meteorological contractor maintains a comprehensive field program. Routine visits are made to each tower once a week to, retrieve analog data and inspect equipment. These visits are directed towards ground based equipment, although a visual inspection of the tower sensing equipment is also made.

Those instruments equipped with internal calibration ,

capabilities are checked also. A log of the week's activities is filled out and kept on file both with the contractor and at the general office.

Besides the routine meteorological maintenance pro-gram, several independent methods are used to verify quality data transmissions and recovery from each meteorological tower. The corporate computer polls each meteorological tower throughout the day. Each day's data are screened by a validation program which flags l

all missing and/or suspect values. The meteorological contractor is notified of persistent outages and the proper restoration procedure is followed. .

BWA 7-6

i 4

October, 1984 Revision D As an independent method of data retrieval, the meteorological contractor also interrogates each meteorological tower during the day. Data are passed through a validation procedure, and suspect data closely examined. Field teams are then assigned for restoration of the system. ,

Cooperation between the :orporate office and the meteorological contractor assures that a timely restoration of any outage can be made. Emergency field visits to the meteorological sites are made as quickly as possible af ter detection of a failure.

Should an event of sufficient magnitude occur to t

destroy the tower structure, a contract is maintained to have a temporary tower erected within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , weather, conditions permitting. Further, the meteorological contractor maintains two levels of sensors (wind speed, wind direction and temperature) in a state of readiness for use on the temporary tower.

i t

BWA 7-7 l

1- .. ,-

Octobe r ,.1984 Revision 0 7.3.3 Onsite Radiation Monitoring Equipment

,The onsite radiation monitoring capability includes an installed process, effluent, and area radiation monitoring system; portable survey instrumentations counting equipment for radiochemical analysis; and a personnel dosimetry program to record integrated exposure. Some onsite equipment is particu'larly

~"

valuable for accident situations and is described in the following subsections.

7.3.3.1 Radiation Monitorine system Chapters 11 and 12 of the Braidwood FSAR describe the radiation monitoring system (RMS) in detail. The installed RMS is designed to 4 continuously monitor the containment atmosphere plant effluents, and various in-plant w

locations.

The system includes Control Room readouts and i

recorders for each parameter that is monitored and an audible Control Room alarm when predetermined setpoints are exceeded. The

- system can be subdivided into process / effluent l

instrumentation and an area monitoring system.

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BWA 7-6 l

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October, 1984 s

Revision 0 o The process /ef fluent instrumentation consists of pumps, filter samplers, detectors, and associated electronics to determine noble gas,

- - iodine, and particulate concentrations in plant cubicles or liquid and gaseous effluents. Several monitored effluent pathways have control functions which will terminate the release at a predetermined setpoint. These setpoints are premised on compliance with federal regulations.

o The area monitoring system provides information of existing radiation levels in various areas of the plant to ensure safe occupancy. It is equipped with control Room and local readout and audible alarms to warn personnel of an increased radiation level.

Some onsite equipment is particulary valuable for accident situations and is described in j the following sections.

BWA 7-9 1

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October, 1984 Fevision 0 7.3.3.2 Post Accident Sampling Capability

. The capability to obtain and perform radioisotopic and chemical analyses of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples is provided by the high radiation sampling system (HRSS), the design of which is outlined in the following paragraphs.

The system is install'ed in the auxiliary building and consists of a liquid sampling subsystem and an air sampling subsystem. The major components of the system are:

a. ERSS liquid sample panel,

b. Liquid sample cooler rack,

c. Chemical analysis panel,

d. Chemical analysis monitor panel,

e. MRSS auxiliaries control panel (liquid subsystem only),

f. Waste drain tank and pumps,

g. Containment air sample panel (CASP),

l h.

CASP control panel, and

i. Valves and piping for the system.

a The liquid sampling subsystem is installed at elevation 401 feet in the auxiliary building except for the waste drain tank and pumps which are installed at elevation 383 feet. The air sampling subsystem is installed in the auxiliary building in proximity to the 5 containment.

l i

BWA 7-10 d v. - - - -- ---- - w --c .- e,--- *- 3v--.-. -a- - - - - --

October , 1984 Revision 0 The HRSS liquid sampling is capable of sampling:

a. Pressurizer steam space,

b. Pressuriser liquid space,

c. Each accumulator (emergency core cooling system),

d. Reactor coolant hot leg loops 1 and 3,

e. Reactor coolant cold leg loops 1 through 4,

f. RER heat exchangers A and 8 outlets,

g. Reactor coolant letdown heat exchanger outlet,

h. CVCS domineralizer outlet,

i. BTR domineralizer outlet,

j. Reactor coolant filter outlet,

k. Auxiliary building floor drain tank A (B on Unit 2 panel),

1. Auxiliary building equipment drain tank A (B on Unit 2 panel),

j m. Recycle holdup tank A (B on Unit 2 panel),

~

n. BRSS waste drain tank,

o. Containment floor drain sump,

p. Chemical drain tank (Unit 1 panel only),

q. Steam generator blowdown sample line, and,

r. Regeneration waste drain tank (Unit 1 panel only).

BWA 7-11 l

October, 1984 Revision 0 In addition to taking the above samples for onsite and/or off site analysis, the HRSS liquid sampling panel is capable of routing the reactor coolant samples to the chemical analysis panel. The chemical analysis panel is capable of performing the on-line analysis of pH, dissolved oxygen, specific conductivity, chloride, and hydrogen. For boron and isotopic analysis, samples diluted by a factor of 1000 to one will be transferred to the onsite laboratory. Excessive exposure to the system operator is limited by:

a. Lead shielding in the liquid sampling panel and the chemical analysis panels

b. Concrete shielding above, below, and around the sides of the panels to prevent radiation from scattering around the steel shielding

c. The optimized design and reduced amount of piping in the panels containing reactor coolants

d. A special cart equipped with a sheilding cask to transport the radioactive sample to its destination ands

e. A ventilation system drawing air out of the sampling panels and discharging into a remote HVAC train.

The containment air sampling panel is capable of sampling the primary containment atomosphere. The sample is drawn from the containment through a dedicated penetration.

BWA 7-12

October, 1984 Revision 0

, once the interfacing valves are arranged and the the sampling programmer is initiated, the containment air sampling panel utilizes automatically sequenced sampling to trap the designated sample in a shielded cart. The air sample will then be analyzed onsite.

Excessive exposure to the operator is limited by:

a. Steel shielding in the containment air

, sampling.panelt

b. Concrete shielding above, below, and around the sides of the panel to prevent radiation from scattering around the steel shielding;

c. Automatic sampling;

d. Special carts each equipped with a shielding cask to transport the radioactive sample to its destinations and,

e. A ventilation system drawing air out of the sampling panels and discharging into a remote HVAC train.

Actual frequency of sampling shall be determined by station managements however, as a minimum the first sample can be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from the time a decision is made to take a sample, continuing with at least one sample per day for the next 7 days and at least one sample per werk thereaf ter. The time interval between taking a sample and receipt by plant management of the results of the analysis is estimated to be less that 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

BWA 7-13

October, 1984 Revision 0 7.3.3.3 Radiological Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring Two General Atomic Company wide-range monitors will be installed on the auxiliary building vent' stacks (final release points), one monitor per stack. The monitor has a range for

~

radioactive gas concentration of 1 x 10 uci/cc to 1 x 10 uCi/cc. The monitor includes the following: two isokinetic nozzles, one for normal conditions operating at 2 f t / min. and one for 'high range conditions 3

operating at 0.06 ft / mins sampling racks sample conditioner, operating only at high range conditions to filter out large concentrations of radiciodine and particulates and the wide-range gas detectors assembly, consisting of three radioactive gas detectors, a low-range detector, a high-range detector, and a wide-range detector. Each monitor system has a microprocessor which utilizes digital processing techniques to analyse data and control monitor functions. Control Room readouts include a chart recorder and an RM-23 remote disp 1'ay module for all monitored parameters.

BWA 7-14

October, 1984 Revision 0 Four General Atomic Company RD-12 detectors will be provided for each of the four main steamlines upstream of the safety and relief valves. The range of the monitor is 1 mr/hr to 5

10 mr/hr. .The monitors will be mounted external to the main steamline piping and corrections made for the loss of low energy gammas. Readouts in the control room will include strip chart recorders.

7.3.3.4 Radioiodine and Particulate Effluent Monitoring The General Atomic Company wide range gas monitor includes a sampling rack for collection of the auxiliary building vent stack particulate and radioiodine samples. Filter holders and valves are provided to allow grab sample collection for isotopic analyses in the station's counting rooms. The sampling rack is shielded to minimize personnel exposure. The sampling media will be analyzed by a gamma ray spectrometer which utilizes a Ge(Li) detecto'r.

l The iodine cartridges are reverse blown for at least ten minutes to reduce the level of entrapped noble gases. In addition, silver i

zeolite cartridges are available to further reduce the interference of noble gases.

BWA 7-15

. o- ,

October, 1984 Revision 0 7.3.3.5 Rich-Range Containment Radiation Monitors Two high range containment radiation monitors are installed for each operating reactor. The monitors will detect and measure the radiation level within the reactor containment during and following an accident.

0 The range of the monitors is 1 rad /hr to 10 rads /hr (beta-gamma) or alternatively, IR/hr to 10 R/hr for gamma only.

7.3.3.6 In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation Effective monitoring of increasing iodine levels in buildings under accident conditions will include the use of portable instruments using silver zeolite as a sample media.

Braidwood Station has a Transportable Data Acquisition and Analysis system for analyzing samples that cannot be counted and anlayzed in the normal station counting room because of background problems. Auxiliary counting room locations have been identified within the Turbine Building. It is expected that a sample can be obtained, purged, and anlyzed for iodine content within a two-hour time frame, l

i l BWA 7-16 l

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October, 1984 Revision 0 7.3.3.7 station survey and counting Equipment The Station maintains portable survey instrumentation to assess contamination levels, exposure rates, and gaseous, iodine, and particulate airborne radioactivity concentrations.

This ' equipment included G-M's, ion chambers, and air samplers. The equipment is operated and calibrated by Station personnel.

The Station counting room contains GeLi gamma spectrometer systems, gas-flow proportional counters for alpha and beta / gamma analysis, and liquid scintillators for tritium analysis.

The Station uses various combinations of film badges, TLDs, direct reading pocket ion chambers, and electronic dosimeters to monitor personnel exposures. In addition, a whole body counting system for bioassay determinations is located onsite.

7.3.4 Monitoring for Vital Plant Parameters Adequate monitoring capability exists to properly assess the plant status for all modes e f operation and is .

described in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR. Instrumentation is installed to ensure monitoring of the following vital l pa rameters :

BWA 7-17

i October, 1984 Revision 0

.l INSTRUMENT

1. Containment Pressure

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2. Reactor Coolant Out'let Temperature - T HOT Wide range

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3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T COLD Wide range

4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range

5. Pressurizer Water Level

6. Steamline Pressure

7. Steam Generator Water Level . Narrow Range

8. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level

9. Boric Acid Storage Tank Level A Braidwood Station Emergency Operating Procedure will aid personnel in recognizing inadequate core cooling. This procedure relies upon core exit thermocouples to indicate an inadequate core cooling condition.

7.3.5 Site Hydrological Characteristics The hydrological characteristics of the Braidwood Station vicinity are described in section 2.4 of the Braidwood l

FSAR. The river screen house is the only structure that could be affected by flooding on the Kankakee River. The controlling event for flooding at the site is the probable maximum flood for the cooling pond, resulting in a short term maximum water surf ace elevation of 600.6 f t in the immediate plant area.

BWA 7-18 l

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_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . ~ , _ _ . _ . _ . _ , _ . _ __ __._..,__ _ ...__ ._ ____ ___ . _ _ _ _ -

October, 1984 Revision 0

- Although the plant grade elevation is 600 f t, the safety related facilities are situated at elevation 601 ft: 0.4 ft above the estimated maximum water surface elevation.

e SWA 7-19

1

. 6 j I

Octobe r ,19 8 4 i Revision 0 .

l Low flows in the Kankakee River cannot affect safety i

related facilities of the plant. In the unlikely event that emergency make-up water requirements cannot be satisfied by surface water withdrawals from the Kankakee River, the Cooling Lake will operate under a closed cycle system. Emergency shut down water is available from the cooling lake.

Because of the site hydrological characteristics given above, plant operation should not be affected by Kankakee River water level conditions and therefore,

- hydrological monitors have not been installed. The Kankakee River is not used for any public water supply, within 50 miles downstream of this site. There are no recorded plans for any future public water supply usage from the Kankakee River. The nearest surface water users downstream from Braidwood Station is Peoria, over 86 miles sway. This allows for suf ficient mixing that makes permanently installed hydrological monitors unnecessary.

Provisions have been made for grab samples to establish release rates. In performing dose calculations from liquid releases, Braidwood station uses a historical average river flow value, FW, as a parameter in the liquid i

release model.

SWA 7-20

+

October, 1984 Revision 0 7.3.6 Onsite Fire Detection Instrumentation The fire detection system is designed in accordance with applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards. The System is equipped with electric-ally supervised ionization smoke and heat detectors to quickly detect any fires and the instrumentation to provide local indication and Control Room annunciation.

t In addition to the smoke and heat detection systems, each fire protection carbon dioxide, halon, or water system is instrumented to inform the Control Room of its actuation or of system trouble.

! In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, an increased frequency of fire watches in affected areas is required.

7.3.7 Pac!11 ties and Ecuipment for Offsite Environmental Monitorino As described in the generic GSEP, Commonwealth has contracted with a company to conduct an offsite environmental monitoring program at each nucler station.

Figure BWA 7-6 shows the locations of the fixed continuous

' air samplers. Figure SWA 7-7 shows the inner ring of TLD's in a 5-mile radius and Figure BWA 7-8 shows the outer ring I

of TLD's in a 5-mile radius.

Braidwood Station maintains a supply of emergency equipment and supplies for off site monitoring and sampling.

The supply includes the minimum requirements delineated by Figure 7.7-1 of the generic GSEP.

BWA 7-21

m _

October, 1984 Revision 0 7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment The principal onsite assembly areas for Braidwood station are the Machine Shop on the 401-foot elevation of the service Building and the Unit #2 Turbine Building trackway. These areas are suitable because:

1) They are large open areas suitabic for assembling a large number of people in a short times

2) They are relatively close to the security Gatehouse; and

3) They have a low probability of being affected by a serious accident involving the NSSS.

The offsite evacuation / relocation a'reas for Braidwood Station are discussed in Section 6.0 of this annex. All three locations are suitable, depending on the emergency condition, with personnel, supplies and communications readily available.

7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities Braidwood Station has an in-plant first aid / decontamination room on the ,426 foot elevation of the auxiliary building near the station laboratory complex. This room is provided with a sink, a shower, a portable leaded glass shield, and a supply cabinet.

First aid kits, stretchers, sinks, eyewashes and emergency showers have been placed in strategic locations throughout the station.

BWA 7-22

l Octsbar, 1984 Revision 0 l As mentioned in the generic plan, medical treatment given to injured persons at the station is of a 'first aid' nature. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local hospital or clinic. st. Joseph Hospital in Joliet, Illinois is the designated hospital for handling contaminated injured personnel.

i i

BWA 7-23 c

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4 October, 1984 Revision 0 8.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8.1 General As required by the generic GSEP, appropriate initial and annual retraining must be given to all Commonwealth Edison emergency personnel. The Commonwealth Production Training Department is responsible for ensuring that necessary training is given. As a matter of practice, the Station Training ,

Department will actually perform the training of onsite emergency personnel, under the guidance of the Production Training Department. Station personnel who are assigned postions in the offsite GSEP organization will receive appropriate additional training from staff members of the Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations.

Section 8.3 of the generic GSEP outlines the required schedule for exercises and drills. The Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations and his staff are responsible for ensuring that the required exercises and drills are scheduled and conducted.

(For the monthly NARS test and periodic fire drills, however, the Station is entirely responsible for completion.) The required exercises and drills include: -

1) Annual erarcises

2) Annual Communication Drills

3) Monthly NARS tests

4) Annual Environmental Monitoring drills

5) Semiannual Health Physics drills

6) Annual Medical drills

7) Annual Assembly and Accountability drills BWA 8-1

! d. . .

1 October, 1984 Revision 0

8) Annual operator Response drills

. 9) Semi-annual Off shif t Augmentation drills

10) Periodic Fire drills (in accordance with technical specification requirements.)

The augmentation drills are unannounced and involve implementation of the Station call-list procedure and docymentation of the times when persons are notified. These -

' drills will serve to demonstrate the capability to augment the onshif t staf f within a short period following an emergency declaration.

Communications with the NRC Region III office and the NRC Operations Center will be tested monthly f rom the TSC, EOF, and Control Room. During all scheduled exercises and drills, the Station is responsible for supplying requested equipment, facilities and participants: the station is also responsible for providing assistance in choosing exercise and drill dates that are suitable for all involved parties.

Commonwealth Edison is committed to offer and provide educational information to the local populatiqn, news media, and local support agencies. With regard to annual dissemination of information to the populace within the ten mile EPI, the Commonwealth Public Af fairs Department is responsible for mailing this information to city halls, gas stations, state parks, campgrounds, and other areas where a transient population may obtain a copy. The Commonw(31th News Information Department will offer annual information BWA 8-2

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4

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October, 1984 Revision 0 programs to local news media surrounding each nuclear station. The Station Superintendent is responsible for offering training to local support organizations as described in Section 8.1.2 of the generic GSEP.

8.2 Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures This Annex shall receive an annual review by Braidwood Station and shall be updated as required in order to keep it consistent with the generic plan and to incorporate significant changes in site specific equipment, procedures, local agencies, etc. Refer to the generic plan for other aspects of document control for the GSEP.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures shall be developed consistent with the GSEP, shall be reviewed

(

annually,* and shall address items discussed in Section 9.2 of the generic plan.

References Braidwood FSAR Paragraph 13.3.16, Responsibility for Planning Effort, Paragraph 13.3.-10 and Paragraph 13.3.-11.

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l BWA 8-3 l

- - - - --

ML20112B223

Contents

Text

Dear Administrative Judges:

Subject:

Dear Mr. Denton:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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ML20112B223

Text

Dear Administrative Judges:

Subject:

Dear Mr. Denton:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Navigation menu

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