ML20105B813
| ML20105B813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1992 |
| From: | Capra R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20105B816 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9209210206 | |
| Download: ML20105B813 (18) | |
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'j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINoToN D C YE5 v.'
jr POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK DOCKET NO. 50-333 JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PL ANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.1&3 License No. DPR-59 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated June 22, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act o' 1954, as amended (the Act) and
'e Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I:
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Prrt 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Acccrdingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Fecility Operating License No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9209210206 920909 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
PDR I
_ (2)
Technical Spfcifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.1C3, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the. Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate 1-1 Divieion of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Offt of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
kottrte 9,1992 9
__---w---
T (2) Ig-hn;<:al Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.183, are hereby incorporated in the licer The licensee shall rperate the facility in accordance with the..chnical Specifications.
3.
.r,_ license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be irc.pt emcrt ed within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGi'LWiORY COMMISSION 4
YY $<
Robert A. Capra, Director (i
Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachmem Changes 'o ths 'echa: cal Speci+icetior.
st Date
.,f Issuance:
Septa h
'E92
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0.183 FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-59 (LO.CKET NO. 50-333 Revise Appendix A as follows.
Remove Pages jnsert Pages i
i V
V 2
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3 30f 30f 38 38 39 39 40 40 43a 46 46 47 47 L
49 49 8
50 50 61 61 L
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JAFNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENT _S fagg 1.0 Definitions 1
UMITING SAFETY SAFETY UMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity 2.1 7
1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 I
SURVEILLANCE UMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.0 Gene al 4.0 30 i
3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 3 01 3.2 instrumentation
- .2 49 A.
Primary Containment isolation Functions A.
49 i
B.
Cora nd Containment Cooling Systems -Initiation and B.
50 Control C.
Control Rod Block Actuation C.
50 D.
Rad;ation Monitoring Systems - Iso!at.be, and initiation D.
50 Functions E.
Drywell Leak Detection E.
54 i
F.
Surveillance Information Readouts F.
54 5
G.
Recirculation Pump Trip G.
54 F
Accident Monitoring Instrumentation H.
54 l.
4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip 54 3.3 Reactivity Control 4.3 88 l
A.
Reactivity Umitations A.
88 B.
Control RoJ1 B.
91 i
C.
Scram insertion Times C.
d D.
Reactivity Anomai:;
D.
96 3.4 Standby Uquid Control System 4.4 105 A.
Normal Operation A.
105 i
B.
Operation With inoperable Comoonents B.
106 C.
Sodium Pentaborate Solution C.
107 i
3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systems 4.5 112 A.
Core Spray and LPCI Systems A.
112 B.
Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System B.
115
(
C.
HPCI System C.
117 D.
Automat;c Depressurization System (ADS)
D.
119 E.
Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) System E.
121 l
l Amendment No. Jd,141X 183 i
i
)
i JAFNPP LIST OF TABLES j
Table Title Pg 3.1 1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirement 41 l
l 3.1 2 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Response Times 43a l
4.1 1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Functional Tests 44 4.1-2 Reactor Protection System (Scram) instrument Calibration 46 f.
3.2 1 Instrumentation that initiates Primary Containment isolation 64 4
3.2 2 Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment 66 j
Cooling Systems 3.2 3 Instrumentation that i.iitiates Control Rod Blocks 72 3.2-4 (DELETED) 74 i
3.2-5 Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Detection ins de the Drywell 75 3.2-6 (DELETED) 76 3.2-7 Instrumentation that initiates Recirculation Pump Lip 77 3.2-8 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 77a 3.2 9 Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation insiicmentst;vn 77e Response Times 4.2-1 Minimum Test and Calibratior Frequency for PCIS 78 4.2 2 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core and Containment 79 Cooling System 4.2 3 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Control Rod Blocks 81 Actuation 4.2-4 (DELETED) 82 4.2 5 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection 83 4.2-6 (DELETED) j 4.2 7 Minimur - ' and Calibration Frequency for Recirculation Pump Trip L4 l
l l
Amendment No. 7J, j( 1/3,1g,183 i
V
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JAFtd 'P 1.0 (cont'd) 4.
Instrument Check - An instrement check is a qualitative C.
Cold Condition - Reactor coolant temperature < 212^F.
deterrsation of accep%ble operability by observation of D.
Hot Standby Condition - Hot Standby condition means operation instr, ttr.nl behavior during operation. This determination with coolant tempcrature >212"F, the Mode Switch in S?crt-shall include, where possibio, comparison of the up/ Hot Standby and reactor pressure < 1,005 psig.
instrument with other independent instruments measuring the same variable, E.
Immediate - immediate means that the required action will be initiated as soon as practicable considering the safe operation of 5.
Instrument Channel Funct;onal Test - An instrument the unit and the importance of the required action.
channel functional test means the injection of a simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor where possible F.
Instrumentation to verify the proper instrument channel response, afarm aWm inWaW doa 1.
Functional Test - A functional test is the manual operation or initiation of a system, subsystem, or component to 6.
Primary Containment Isolation Actuation Instrumentation ver fy that it functions within design tolerances (e.g., the Response Time for Main Steam Une isolation is the time manual start of a core spray pump to verify that it runs and interval which begins when the monitored parameter that it pumps the reqtrired volume of water).
exceeds the isolation actuation set point at the channel sensor and ends when the Main Steam Isolation Valve 2.
Instrument Channel Calibration - An instrument channel s len ds are de-energized (16A-K14. K16, K51, & K52 calibration means the djustment of an instrument signal pilot solenoid relay contacts open). The response time output so that it corrt ; ands, within acceptable range, and may be measured in one continuous step or,in overlapping accuracy, to a know t alus(3) of the parametcr which the segments, with verification that all cuTiporifas are tested.
instrument monitors. Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument chnnel including actuation, alarm or trip.
7.
Logic System Function Test - A logic system functional test l
means a test of miays aM We d a Wc M fran 3.
Instrument Channel - An instrument channel means an sensor to activated device to ensure components are arrangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment requimd oper ble per design intent. Where practicable, Ettor will to generate and transmit to e trip system a sing'e trip go to completion: f.o., pumps will be started and valves signs! related to the plant parameter monitored by that opsated.
instrument channel.
8.
Protective Action - An action initiated by the Protection l
System when limiting safety system setting is reached. A protective action can be at a channel or system level.
Amendment No. 7 tp(, 183 2
l l
JAFNPP i
1.0 (cont'd) l 9.
Protective Function - A system protective action which
- 13. Sensor - A sensor is that part of a channel used to detect l' results from the protective action of the channels variations in a monitored variable and to provide a suitable monitoring a particular plant condition.
signal to logic.
- 10. Reactor Protection System Response Time is the time interval which begins when the monitored parameter G.
Limitina Conditions for Ooeratton (LCO) exceeda the reactor protection trip set point at the channel sensor and ends when the scram pilot velvo so*enoids are The limiting conditions for operation specify the minimum de-ener0 zed (05A-K14 scram contactors open).
The acceptable levels of system performance necessary to assure response time may be measured in one continuous step or safe startup and operation of the facility. When these canditions in overlapping segments, with verification that all are met, the plant can be operated safely and abnormal situations components are tested.
can be safely controlled.
l
- 11. Simulated Automatic Actuation - Simulated automatic actuation means applying a simulated signal to the sensor H.
Ltmitina Safety System Settina (LSSS) to actuate the circuit in question.
The limiting safety system settings are settings on l
- 12. Trip System - A trip system means an arrangement of instrumentation which initiate the automatic protective action at instrument channel trip signals and auxiliary equipment a level such that the safety limits will not be exceeded. The required to initiate action to accomplish a protective region between the ssfety limit and these settings represent function.
A trip system may require one or more margin with normal operation lying below these settings. The instrument channel trip signals related to one or more plant margin has been established so that with proper operation of the parameters n order to initiate trip system action. Initiation instrumentation safety limits will never be exceeded.
Of protective action may require the tripping of a single trip system or the coincident of two trip systems.
l.
Modes of Operation (Ocerational Model Mode - The reactor mode is established by the Mode Selector Switch.
The modes include shutdown, refuel, startup/ hot standby, and run which are defined as follows:
Amendment No.
183 3
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a JAFNPP 3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.1 SURVEILLANCE hEOUIREMENTS 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM Applicability:
Applicability:
Applies to the instrumentation and assu iated c'evices which initiate Applies to the surveillance of the instrumentation and associated the ree ?or scram.
devices which initiate reactor scram.
Objective:
Objective:
To assure 'he operability of the Reactor Protection System.
To specify the type of frequency of surveillance to be applied to the protection instrumentation.
Specification:
Specification:
A.
The setpoints, minimum numt 3r of trip sys' ems, and # timum A.
Instrumentation systems shall be functionally tested and number of instrument channels that r%i be operable fu each calibrated as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 respectively.
position of the reactor mode switch, shall be as shown in g
Table 3.1-1. The reactor protection system instrumentation The response time for each reactor protection system trip function listed in Table 3.1-2 shall be demonstrated to be within l
response time shall be wtthin the limits in Table 3.1-2.
the limits in the tabla during each 18 month test interval. Each test shall include at least one channel in each trip system. All channels in both trip systerr.s shall be tested within two test intervals.
B.
Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)
B.
Maximum Fraction of Umiting Power Density (MFLPD)
During reactor po,ver operation, the MCPR operating limit shail The MFLPD shall be determined oaily during reactor power not be less than that shown in the Core Operating Umits Report.
operatio7 at >25% rated thermal power arx1 the APRM high flux scram and Rod Block trip settings adjusted if necessary as 1.
During Reactor power operation with core flow less than specified in the Core Operating Umits Report 100% of rated, the MCPR operating limit shall be m sttiplied by the appropriate K as specified in the Core Ope #ng g
Umits Report.
AmeNment No. 96,94,96,199,185, 183 3 01 w
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JAFNPP 4.1 BASES (cont'd)
The bi stable trip circuit which is a part of the Group (B)
The frequency of calibration of the APRM flow biasing network devices can sustain unsafe failures which are revealed only on has been established as each refueling outage. The flow test. Therefore, it is necessary to test them periodically.
biasing network is functionally tested at least once/rrnnth and, in addition, cross calibraCon checks of the flow input to the flow A study was conducted of the instrumentation channels bi sing network can be made during the functional test by included in the Grote (B) devices to calculate their t:nsafe direct meter reading. There are several instruments which failure rates. The non ATTS (Analog Transmitter Trip System) mus cabaN W R M tah smal days to Wmm h anafoq' safe tailure rate of less than 20x10 devices (sensors and ampfifiers)4are predicted to have cabadon of the Wre neh % h Wahon Mng is an un failures /hr. The non-p a mo kw ssgM M M M to M of h ANs ATTS bi-stable trip circt;its are predicted to have unsafe failure 4
resulting in a h !! scram and rod block condition. Thus, if the rate of less than 2x10 failures /hr. The ATTS analog devices calibration were performed during operation, flux shaping (sensors), bi-stable devices (master and slave trip units) and w old not be possible. Based on experience at other power supplies have been evaluated for reliability by Mean gener ting stationc drift of instruments, such as those,n the e
Time Between Failure analysis or state-of-the-art qualification flow biasing network, is not significant and therefore, to avoid type testing meeting the requirements of IEEE 323-1974.
spu ws scrams, a cahabon frequency d each refueUng Considering the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> monitoring interval for analog devices as assumed above, the instrument cliecks and functional tests wtage is estabHshed.
as well as the analyses and/or qdalification t(pe testing of the The measurement of response time within the specified devices, the design reliability goal for system reliability of intervals provides -assurance that the Reactor Protection 0.9999 will be attained with ample margin.
System trip functions are completed within the time limits assumed in the transient and accident analyses.
The bi-stable devices'are monitored during plant operation to record their failure history and establish a test interval using the The Reactor Protection System trip functions in Tabio 3.1-2 are curve of Figure 4.1-1. There are rumerous identical bi-stable those fuctions for which the transient and accident analyses devices used throughout the Plant's instrumentation system.
described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR take credit for the Therefore, significant data on the failure rates for the bi-stable rerponse time of instrument channels, devices should be accumulated rapidly.
Amendment No. Mi p#,183 i
38
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JAFNPP 4.1 BASES (cont'd)
In terms of the transient analysis, the Standard Technical Low Reactor Water Level sensor 1000 ms Specifications define individual trip function response time as Main Steam isolation Valve Closure 10 ms the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds and Turbine Stop Valve Closure switches its top setpcint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids." The individual sensor response Turbine Control Valva Fast Closure 30 ms time defined as " operating time in General Electric (GE) design from the first movement of the main turbine control specification data sheet 22A3083AJ, note (8), is "the maximum valves until actuation of pressure switches which allowchte time from when the variable being measured just detect the loss of hydraulic control oil pressure.
exceeds the trip setpoint to opening of the trip channel sensor The 10 ms limit for the MSIV and TSV position switch response contact during a transient." A transient is defined in note (4) of time is oefined by GE design specification data sheet the same data sheet as "the maximum expected rate of change 22A3083AJ.11 requires that after MRV or TSV moves to the set of the variable for the accident or the abnormal operating point corresponding to 10% closure from full open, the position condition which is postulated in the safety analysis report.
switch contacts should open in less than or equal to 10 ms.
The individual sensor re3ponse time may be measured by When the correct set point is verified by surveillance testing for simulating a step change of the particular parameter. This the position switch, the response time requirement is considered method provides a conservative value for the sensor response to be satisfied. The maximum permissible TCV fast closure time, and confirms that the instrument has retained its specified channel, logic, and scram contactor response tirne is 70 ms electromechanical characteristics. When sensor response time rather than the sum of TCV fast closure logic (30 ms) and the trip is measu ed independently, it is necessary to also measure the logic and scram contactor response time (50 ms). This provides remaining portion of the rerpense time in the logic train up to the a 10 ms margin to akow for uncertairny in the test method.
time at which the scram pilot valve solenoids de-energize; The
.The maximum permissible APRM channel, logic, and scram channel response time must include all compor' eat delays in the contactor response time is 90 ms rather than the sum of the response chain to the ATTS output relay plus the 50 ms design allowance for RPS logic system response time. A response time APRM channel response time (60 ms) and the trip logic and scram contactor response time (50 ms). ' (GE design for the RPS logic relays in excess of 50 ms is acceptable specification data sheet 22A3083AJ), note (12).
This provided the overall response time does 'not exceed the measuremen' is upplicable to both the APRM fixed high neutron response time limits of Table 3.1-2 which mcludes allowances for flux and the flow referenced simulated thermal power channels sensors, relays, and switches as follows:
and requires measuring the time delay through the LPRM cards.
The latter caso does not include the time constant of High Reactor Pressure sensor 500 ms approximately six seconds which is cslibrated separately. The High Drywell Pressure sensor 550 ms basis for excluding the neutron detectors from response time testing is provided by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.118. Revision 2, sect on C.S.
Amendment No. pd,.183 39
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JAFNPP 4.1 BASES (cont'd)
The 18 month response time testing interval is based on NRC For the APRM System, drift of electronic apparatus is not tne NUREG-0123 Revision 3, " Standard Technical Specifications,'
only consideration in determining a calibration frequency.
surveillance requirement 4.3.1.3.
Change in power distribution and loss of chambc: sensitivity aM a cabahon m Nays.
Group (C) devices are active only during a given portinn of the operational cycle. For example, the IRM is active during start-Calibration on this frequency assures plant operation at or up and inactive during full power operation. Thus fne only test below thermallimits.
l
. hat is meaningful is the one performed just prior to shutdown A comparison of Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 indicates that two r4 start-up; s.c., th9 tests that are performed just prior to use of instrument channels have not been included in the latter table.
nie instrument.
These are: modo switch in shutdown and manual scram. All of Calibration frequency of the instrumeni channel is divided into the devices or sensors associated with these scram functions two groups. These are as follows:
are simple on-off switches and, hence, calibration during operation is r.ot applicable.
1.
Passive type indicating devices that can be compared with like units on a continuous basis B.
The MFLPD is checked once per day to determine if the APRM 2.
Vacurm tube or semiconductor devices and detectors scram requires adjustmant. Only a small number of control that dri*t or lose sensitivity.
rods are moved daily and thus the MFLPD is not expected to change significantly and thus a dai'y check of the MFLPD is dequate.
Experience with passive type instruments in generating stations and substations indicates that the specified calibrations are The sensitivity of LPRM detectors decreases with exposure to adcquate. For those devices which employ amplifiers, etc.,
neutron flux si a slow and approximately constant rate. This is drift specifications call for drift to be less than 0.4 compensated for in the APRM system by calibrating twice a percent / month; i.e., in the period of a month a maximum drift week using heat balance data and by calibrating individual of 0.4 percer-t could occur, thus providing for adequate marotn.
LPRM's every 1000 effective full power hours, using TIP traverse data.
Amendment No. y', M,193 40
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i JAFNPP t
TABLE 3.1-2
~
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES i
i i
TRIP FUNCTION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSETIME (Seconds)
.y 1)
Reactor Vessel Pressure - High 1 550 0
(02-3PT-55A, B, C, D) 2)
. Drywell Pressure - High
< 0.000
' (05PT-12A, B, C, D) 3)
Reactor Water Levd - Low (L3) 1
- (02-3LT-101 A, B, C, D)
-< 1.050 t
. < 0.060
[
4)
- Main Stearn' isolation Valve Closure (29PNS-80A2, B2, CT. D2)
(29PNS-86A2,82, C2, D2) 5)
Turbine Stop Valve Closure
< 0.060
'(34PNS-101,102,' 103,104) 1
' 6)
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure:
< 0.070 i
i-
. (94PS-200A, B, C, D) '
I I
- 7)
APRM Fixed (120%) High Neutron Flux
< 0.090 (2) j.
8)
APRM Flow Referenced Simulated Thermal Power
< 0.090 (1) (2) t i
Notes for Table 3.1-2:
l
'1.
- Trip system response time does not include the simulated thermal power time constant of approximately six seconds which is calibrated separately.
a
' 2.
' Trip system response time is the measured time interval fr6n trip signal ir.put to the first electronic c,wiipo6ent in the cJ.e.u sei after the
' LPRM detector until the scram pilot valve solenoids de-energize (05A-K14 scram contactors open).-
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Amendment No ' 183 43a
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JAFNPP TABLE 4.1-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENT CAllBRATION MINIM 81M CAllBRATION FREQUENCIES FOR REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENT CHANNELS 4
Instrument Channel Group (1)
Cafibration Minimum Frequency (2) l IRM High Flux
'C Comparison to APRM on Maximum frequency once/ week Controlled Shutdowns APRM High Flux Ot'out Signal B
Heat Balance Daily Flow Bias Signal B
intemal Power and Flow Test Every refueling outage with Standard Pressure Source LFRM Signal B
TIP System Traverse Every 1000 effective full power hours
' High Reactor Pressure B
Standard Pressure Source Nota (6) l High Drywell Pressure B
Standard Pressure Source' Note (6)
Reactor Low Water Level B
Standard Pressure Source Note (6)
High Water Levelin Scram A
Water Column Note (5)
Once/ operating cycle, Note (5) l Discharge instrument Volume
'High Water Levelin Scram '
B Standard Pressure Soorce Every 3 nxmths
. Discharge Instrument Volume Main Steam Une Isolation A
Note (4)
Note (4) l-Valve Closurc Main Steam Line High Radiation R
Standard Current Source (3)
Every 3 months l
Turbine First Stage Pressure B
Standard Pressure Source Note (6) l
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Amendment No. W. % W. M OlF. 13 6, 183 46
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JAFNPP TABLE 4.1-2 (Cont'd)
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENT Call 3 RAT 10N
- M!NIMUM CAllBRATION FREOUENCIES FOR REACTOR PROFCTION INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Instrument Channel Grono (1)
Cahbration Minimum Frequency (2)
Turbine Cortrol Valve Fast A
Standard Pressure Sourco Once/ operating cycle Closure Oil Pressure Trip l
Turbine Stop Valve Closure A
' Note (4)
Note (4)
NOTES FOR TABLE 4.1-2 1.
A description of three groups is included in the Bases of this Specificaiion.
2.
Calibration test is not required on the part of the system that is not required to be opemble, or is tripped, but is required prior to return to sennce.
' 3.
The current source provides an instrument channel alignment. Calibration using a radiation source shall be performed each refueling outage.
' 4.
Actuaiien of these switches by rarmal means will be performed during the refuel.ng outages..
5.
Calibration shall be performed utilizing a water column or similar device to provide assurance that damage to a float or other portions of the float assembly will be detected.
l 6.
Sensor ca!ibretion once per operating cycle. Master / slave trip unit calibration once per 6 months.
t c
3-1 Amendment No. 46, 5, % 176, 183 47 4
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i JAFNPP 42 NEWNCE REWREMS
' 32 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4
42 INSTRIJMENTATION 32 INSTRUMENTATION i
Applicability:
Applicability:
Applies to the surveillance requirement of the instrumentation which' Applies to the plant instrumentatiort which either (1) initiates and controls a protective function, or (2) provides information to aid the either (1) initiates and controls protective function, or (2) provides
. formation to a.d the operator.in monitoring and assessing plant status in i
operator la monitoring and assessing plant status during normal and accident conditions.
during normal and accident conditims.
Objective:
Objective:
To assure the operability of the aforeraentioned instrumentation.
SPUC"Y.the tp and frequency of sumemanm to % Wied to N aforementtoned %trumentation.
Specifications:
. i Specifications:
.T.
Primary Containment Isolation Functions A.
Primary Containment Iso'ation Functions instrumentation shail be functionally tested and calibrated as When primary containment integn.ty is required, the limit,ng i
indicated in Table 42-1~
conditions of operation for the instrumentation that initiates.
primary containment isolation are given in Table 3.2-1.
System logic shall be functimally tested as indicated in Table 42-1.
When primary containment integrity is required, the primary containment isolation actuation instrumentG:n response time The response time of each primary containment isolation
{
for MSIV closure shall t.e within the limits in iabic 3.2 9.
actuation instrumentation isolation trip function listed in Table 3.2-9 shall be denicnstrated to be within the limits in the table during each 18 month test interval. Each test shat! include at
! cast one channel in each trip system. All channels in both trip systems shall be tested within two test in ewals.
4 I
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' Amendment No.1p6,183 49
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JAFNPP 3.2 (cont'd) 4.2 (cont'd)
B.
Core and Containment Cooling Systems - Initiation and Controi B.
Core and Containmer't Cooling Systems - Initiation and Control The limiting conditiorn for operation for the instrurnentation that lostmmertation shall be functionally tested, calibrated, and checked as tr'dicated in Table 4.2 2.
initiates or controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems are given in Tabic 3.2-2. This instrumentation must be operable System Ngic shani be functionally tested as ind:cated in when the system (s) it initiates or controls are required to be Table 4.7-2.
operable as specified in Specification 3.5.
C.
Control Rod Block Actuatio,n C.
Control Rod Block Actb stion Instrumentation si.oll be functionally tested, calibrated, and 1.
The limiting conditions of operation for the instrumentation ecW as McaM in We (24.
that initiates control rod block are given in Table 3.2-3.
2.
The minimum number of operable instrument channels Ta e specified in Tabio 3.2-3 for the rod block monitor may be reduced by one in one of the trip systems for maintenance and/or testing, provided that this condition does not last longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 30 day period.
D.
Radiation Monharing Systems - Isolation and initiation Functions D.
Padiation Mt.htoring Systems - Isolation and initidion Functions Refer to the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (Appendix B).
Refer to the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (Appcndix B).
Amendment No. jiNT, t83 50
JAFNPP 42 BASES The instrumentation listed in 'iables 4.2-1 through 4.2-8 will be
' " y/ 2t functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled r
intervals. The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Where:
Protection System is generally applied. Sensors, trip devices i=
the optimum intervt vetween tests.
and power supplies are tested, calibrated and checked at the same frequency as comparabic devices in the Reactor t=
the time the trip contacts are disabled from Protection System.
performing their function while the test is in pmgress.
The response times for MSIV isolation in Table 3.2-9 include the the expected failure rate of the relays.
primary sensor and all components of tbc logic which must r --
function to de-energize the MSIV pilot valve solenoids.
To test the trip relays requires that the channel be bypassed, Electrolytic filter capacitors are ir: stalled on the input to the the test made, and the system retumed to its initial state. It is main steam line flow ATTS tnp units. General Elecinc analysis assumed this tasle requires an estimated 30 minutes to (MDE-278-1285 December 1985) accounts for the delay complete in a thoregh and workmanlike manner and ! hat the crused by the capacitors at;d justifies the increase in remonse 4
relays have a failure rate of 10 failures per hour. Us;ng this time to 2.5 seconds for the main steam line high flow act:Wion data and the above operation, the optimum test interval is:
signal. With the exception of the MSIVs, response time 1o9. q is not required for any othar primary containment isolation actuation instrumentation. The safety analyses results aie not i=
M S =1x10'hr.
sensitive to individual sensor response times of the logic l@
systems to which the sensors are connected for isolation
= 40 days actuation instrumentation.
For additional margin a test interval of once/ month will be Those instrumants which, when tripped, result in a rod block used initiany.
have their coinocts arranged in a 1 out of n logic, and all are The sensors and electronic apparatus have not been included capable of being bypassed. For such a tripping arengement here as these are analog devices with readouts in the control with bypass capability provided, there'is an optimum test room and the sensors and electronic apparatus can be intc val that should be maintained in order to maximize the checked by comparison with other like instruments. The reliability of a given channel (7). This takes account of the fact checks which are made on a daily basis are adequate to assure i
that testing degrades reliability and the optimum interval operability of the sensors and electronic apparatus, ard the between tests is approximately given by:
test interval given above provides for optimum testing of the relay circuits.
Amenument No. 99, Uf4,1)d,183 j
61 1
4
_ _. ~. _ _ _ _ _. _ _._. _. _... _ _.. _..__._..
I i
JAFNPP l
TABLE 3.2-9 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Sv9 TEM ACTUATION !NSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES o
TRIP FUNCTION -
RESPONSE TIME (Seconds) s I
1)
MS V Closure - Reactor Low Water Level (L1) 1.0 (02-3LT-57A, B and 02-3tT-58A, B) 2)
MSIV Closure - Low Steam Une Pressure (02PT-134A, B, C, D) 1.0 i
3)
MSIV Closure - High Steam Une Row 2.5 I-(02DPT-1 16A-D, 1 17A-D, 1 18A-D, 1 19A-D) i Note for Table 3.2-9:
The measurement of the response time interval begins when the monitored parameter exceeds the isolation actuation set point at the channel sensor 4
- and ends when the Main 7 team isolation Valve pilot solenoid relay contacts open. The pilot scienoid relay contacts to be used for determination of the end point of the response time me6surement are:
I l
For the Inboard MSIV pilot solenoid relays:
16A-K14 (ac solenoids)
- 16A-K51. (dc solenoids) 1 l
For the Outboard M3IV pilot solenoid relays:
16A-K16 (acsolenoids) l 16A-K52 (dc solenoids) i 3
4 4
4 1
i Amendment No. 183 77e 1
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