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Vice Presadent - Projects. Engsneerrug .md Construction oeneros offices; 1945 West Parnest Roacs Jackson MI 49201 + ($17) 7sS o453 December 15, 1981 Harold R Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 MIDLAND PROJECT MIDLAND DOCKET NOS 50-329, 50-330 UNDERGROUND PIPING CONCERNS FILE 0485.16 SERIAL 15093 ENCLOSURE: ANALYSIS OF BURIED PIPING FOR MIDLAND PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 On October 6,1981, we held a meeting with the NRC Staff to present to them a demonstration-type solution to resolve the Staff concerns on underground piping. As a result of our discussions it became clear that the Staff needed ^ additional and more detailed background information to support our solution. Since the October 6,1981 meeting, we have continued to work with the Staff on resolving the open issues on underground piping. The enclosure entitled " Analysis of Buried Piping for Midland Plant Units 1 and 2" provides background infonnation to support our proposed demonstration solution and additional engineering information. Included in this report is the following information: 1. Southwest Research Institute pipe profile and ovality measurements. 2. Seismic calculation results for the service water system (SWS). 3. Proposed future monitoring program for the SWS. 4. Inservice inspection plans for the SWS. 5. Proposed resolution for the borated water storage tank pipelines and small diameter safety grade piping. 6. Answers to general concerns regarding the underground piping. We believe that this report demonstrates that the piping will be capable of performing its safety function throughout the lifetime of the plant. We are oc1281-0500a100 8400030064 840718 PDR FOIA RICE 84-96 PDR
2 hopeful that a meeting can be held the first part of January 1982 to discuss the report. a7 JWC/WJC/dsb 'p ' CC Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, w/o CBechhoefer, ASLB, w/a JBrammer, ETEC, w/a { ACappucci, NRC, w/a MMCherry, Esq, w/o FPCowan, ASLB, w/a RJCook, Midland Resident Inspector, w/o RSDecker, ASLB, w/a J1(arbour, ASLB, w/a DSHood, NRC, w/h (2) DFJudd, B&W, w/o 4% FJKelley, Esq, w/o RBLandsman, NRC Region III, w/a WHMarshall, Esq, w/o W0tto, Army Corps of Engineers, w/a WDPaton, Esq w/o. I HSingh, Army Corps of Engineers, w/a l BStamiris, w/o l oc1281-05004100
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.. - - ~... - - - - -. -,c ' TABLE OF CONTENTS ANALYSIS OF BURIED SAFETY-GRADE PIPING POR NIDLAND PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 Page I. SCOPE 1 II.
SUMMARY
2 A. BACKGROUND 2 8. FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY - PROPOSED SOLUTION 3 C. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION DIFFICULTIES 5 III. DETAILED DISCUSSION 7 A. SERVICE WATER SYSTEN 7 1. Profile and Ovality 7 2 Ovality / Buckling 9 3. Future Settlement 15 a) Predicted values 15 b) Nonitoring program 17 4 Seismic 18 a) Seismic analysis 18 b) Variable soil properties 20 c) Effect of pipe deformation 21 on seismic forces d) Code requirements 24 5 11 12/10/81 1
Page -5., Rebe5 ding 25 a) Size verification of 8-inch lines 25 b)- Rebedding' of 8-and 10-inch 25 4 ' service. water lines <\\ '6.. Verification 1 26 a) 'Preservice 26 b) Inservice 27 B. DIESEL FUEL OIL' LINES 28 1. Profile' 28 2. ' Future Settlement 29 C. BORATED WATER STORAGE ~ TANK LINES 30 1. Rebedding 30 2. Future Settlement 30 ~ D. MISCELLANEOUS' GENERIC SUBJECTS 31 l.. Anchor and Component Loads 31 s 2. II"Under I 32 3. Overburden Loads 33 . IV.. LIST OF REFERENCES EV-1 V. LIST OF TABLES V-1 l VI. LIST OF FIGURES VI-l VII. APPENDIXES VII-l I M I t 4 \\ c iii 12/10/81 ~ .-. =.
N 5= 6 30e h n c.., e d eg,ce,d .p n) Jrc Q. M } Q 4 5 7 This document addresses the open i g (identified in the draft Safety Evaluation Report SER) that are related to Seismic Category I piping buried in the plant fill. These items were identified in Section 3.7.3 (Page 3-7, Items 4 and 5), and Section 3.9.3 (Page 3-13, Items l 1 ~ through 6) of the draft SER. The discussion of the items identified in Section 3.9.3 will provide the information needed to resolve the items identified in Section 3.7.3. ^ The seismic category I buried piping systems included in this document are: a. Service water system lines b. Diesel fuel oil lines c. Borated water storage tank lines A complete list of the included pipe line numbers is included in Table I-l and their location is shown in Figure I-1. The control room pressurization lines are also seismic Category I lines buried in the plant fill. They are not addressed in this document because they have recently been installed (May 1981) and theTefore flave not been subjected to settlement. luh humu s,k i MtM4 C Mi 'h' 'h IT Ed L M 0es b J L.p'ncn M M L necJ3kss h4 b asa st\\\\ shh4nyn usp b Ci4dLp AJA.h- %. 1 0 i 1 12/10/81 1
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II.
SUMMARY
II.A BACKGROUND The NRC staff has expressed concerns for the adequacy of buried safety-related piping at the Midland nuclear plant due to - settlement. Theseconcernswereoriggily expressed in' the NRC Requests Regarding Plant Fill Questions 16 through 20. These requests will hereinafter be referred.to as "50.54(f) Question (s) The concerns have been discussed by Consumers Power Company and the NRC staff throughout 1981; in January, May, and October meetings, and in numerous telephone conversations. To resolve the NRC concerns, extensive measurements have been taken on piping location, elevation, and ovality, so that the ~ current condition of the piping is well-defined. The as-built condition was, however, generally less well-defined. This has made it difficult to establish how much of the current profile was caused by settlement since installation and how much of it is due to as-built condition. Discussions have been continuigg on methods for establishing the current stress condition } in this piping. As an alternative, a " demonstration j solution" has been proposed to establish that the pipe / has sufficient dimensional stability to maintain. itsf' functional capability. 7-[ t m.L..,3a m..,< A pa m u u A u b m e s u ss"cc 4 6,'. Ib Mes O ukNihkk dem: 4hc.bo 7d.Ib. Oh E k 8 <dbO.e 36 4 A.Nuu sh" o.,alg.s ? 2 12/10/81 l '^~ I.'i. . r. C~." 7 'J "
i l II.B FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY - PROPOSED SOLUTION In a telephone conference on August 25, 1981, the NRC concern for maintenance of functional capability was expressed. The telephone conference was to provide the NRC staff response to the demonstration solution approach proposed by consumers Power Company in an August 10, 1981, telephone conference. The demonstration solution as proposed August 10, 1981, and changed and supplemented in the October 6, 1981, meeting consists of: 1. Passing a device through the-pipelines to a) Establish that the pipe has not buckled, or b) Manually obtain ovality measurements in large lines 2. Performing periodic hydrostatic testing, including leakage measurement, to ensure pipe integrity 3. Performing periodic flow verification test-ing to ensure functional capability The program is to demonstrate whether the pipe has re-tained sufficient dimensional stability to maintain the system's g etional capability. Standard Review Plan SRP 3.9.3 recognizes the validity of this approach and provides guidance. This guidance includes, in part, the statement that, "Since. . the treatment of' functional capability, including collapse and deflec-tion limits, is not adequataly treated by the Code for all situations, :such factors must be evaluated by designers and appropriate information developed. (code requirements are discussed in more detail in Section III.A.4.d). This guidance indicates that an alternative to determining stresses is to demonstrate that the areas of discontinuity retain sufficient dimensional stability. Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) stated in a letter to Consumers Power Company, " Retaining sufficient dimensional stability is, in fact, the only basic question to be answered and is directly related to assuring functional capability of the piping" (see Appendix A). 3 12/10/81 . _. - -.. - -. -, - ~ =. - = -
The program has demonstrated acceptable current dimen-sional stability by inspecting the pipe to determine cross-sectional shape (ovality) which is directly related to stability. These results are discussed in Section III.A.l. Continued functional capability will + be demonstrated by flow verification tests to be con-ducted.during plant operations. An additional check of functional capability will' be provided by the inservice inspection (ISI) program (see Section.III.A.6). This type of. testing will not explicitly show that no pipe deformation is occurring; rather, it demonstrates that deformation sufficient to reduce the flow below minimum requirements has not occurred. To ensure that the system contains sufficient margin to prevent-loss of functional capability, conservative - acceptance limits have been established _ using code guidelines and standards for buried pipe in Amer {gyn Water Works Association (AWWA) Specification Mll ' We have also based our acceptance limits on the general piping standards for bending nuclear pipe according to ASME Section III codes. Our confidence in these limits is supported by the results of various pipe experiments reported by E.C. Rodabaugh and S.E. Moore in NUREG/CR-0261(5) The introduction to NUREG/CR-0261, under " Relevance to Functional Capability," states, "We do not have any . test data in which large enough displacements were applied to produce significant reductions in flow area; e.g., 50% reduction of flow area. We would guess that to produce such a condition in - straight pipe by appli-cation of a moment load, a rotation of 30' or more over a length of about 2 pipe diameters would be necessary." The NUREG discussion then states, "The moment-to produce this 'hink' in the -pipe might not be much greater than the ' limit moment'; the displacement would be far in excess of any normally-used criterion for defining a ' limit moment.' It is important to note that exceeding the deflection corresponding to a limit moment does not necessarily mean that functional capability will be significantly impaired." These conclusions indicate that it would take far more deflection than can con-ceivably occur in buried pipe due to settlement to significantly impair the pipe's functional capability. The AWWA conclusions are discussed in Section III.A.2. 9 4 e J 4 4 12/10/81 ..- _ _ _ _ _. _. - _, _ _n _ _ m..== ~ ~_ I i l II.C ANALYTICAL SOLUTION DIFFICULTIES The difficulty with analytical solution is separating the as-built condition of the piping (i.e., the local installation discontinuities) from the deflections due to settlement. The misalignments and discontinuities reflected in the field data are inherent in the fab-rication process. Project quality records indicate that the pipin standards?67as fabricated and installed within acceptable 1(15/32 inch, local mismatch; +3/32 inch, T K1-c. t% overall mismatch; ~+2 inches, overall location). 1)'5:,tc.c% The calculated stresses based on field deflection measurements cannot be relied upon because the measure-ments include installation discontinuities as well as soil settlement.. For' example, allowable angular mis-matches of weld joints are magnified over a long length-} of pipe and can appear as " knees" along a straight line (see Figure II-1). Assuming that these knees are /. due to soil settlement results in concentrating the curvature at the knees, thereby significantly overesti-mating the stress le:vels. Deflections of this magnitude resulting from settlement would result in gross local deformations that would have been apparent during y examination. Using the calculated stresses, these \\ \\ deflections would produce ovality well beyond 8%. \\N. The analytical solution using empirical data is further complicated by the measuring tolekance. Measurement inaccuracles can cause apparent pipe oscillations to be overemphasized. In 1979 profiling was done to approximately 11/4-inch accuracy, with measurements every 10 feet. A parametric study over a 20-foot span using worst case measurement errors (1/2-inch deflec-tion) yielded a calculated elastic stress of 55 kai. This stress alone is greater than the allowable stress. The latest reprofiling has been done to a tolerance of il/16-inch, but the number of survey points has also been increased, thus decreasing the flexibility and increasing the sensitivity to the measurement toler-ances. To develop a computer model of the piping, a rigid restraint in the vertical plane forces the pipe into the measured profile configuration at the survey locations along the pipelines. This does not allow the .gr pipe to flex according to its geometric and material. y properties. These abrupt changes (knees) at the 1 5 12/10/81 m.- <-v.--r- -m--,-, .m---. -D-,-..-
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survey locations-concentrate the pipe curvature near these local discontinuities, resulting in artificially high local stresses. Thus, fitup and installation differences (discontinuities), assumed to be settle-ment, will result in erroneous, very high calculated j stresses. Structural Mechanics Associates (7) performed calcula-I l tions by modeling the pipe as a beam on elastic foun-dation to determine the soil loading necessary to cause the measured. deformations. This study showed that soil loadings as much as three times the conser-vative estimate of the soil capacity would have been needed (see Figure II-2). The limited information available about presettlement as-built conditions proves that we have an unrealistic calculational sol-ution. The modeling technique was further refined to include nonlinear aspects of the pipe and soil para-meters. The computer results would not converge on the measured pipe configuration. This demonstrates again .that, in certain locations, the measured pipe profiles could not occur due to soil settlement alone. i The problem of developing an accurate analytical model is complicated by the presence of the soil around the pipe and the soil / pipe interaction. The soil character-istics such as friction and soil support mechanisms are very difficult to approximate. As the pipe tries to deform (ovalize), pressure devtlops between the pipe and the soil which counteracts the ovalization and maintains the pipe geometry and, thus, functional capability. The basic analytical problem is how to separate the as-built condition of the piping from the deflections due purely to settlement. We have concluded that the profile data cannot be used in a traditional flexi-bility analysis unless an agreement can be reached on a method to accomplish this separation. 1 undtvsh M 5Cc. igd!dI C'-MG" %d
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1 III. DETAILED DISCUSSION A. SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 1. Profile and Ovality In 1979, a profile of one line.in each trench was done. The profiling was done to approxi-I mately + 1/4-inch accuracy with measurements .,3 p%Q\\ wies)h % every 10 feet. L. In August 1981 new profil and ovality measure-ments were started izr'alliservice water system piping. This M to obtain more accurate information and to profile the condition of all lines which had not been measured. Reprofiling and ovality measure-ments of the service water supply and return lines were completed in October 1981 (see results in Appendix B). ~ The 1981 profiles involved cleaning the interior surface and marking it at a minimum of S-foot increments for measurement. Measure-ments at some locations, particularly in elbows, were as close as 1.5 feet apart. Measurements were also taken 2-1/2 inches on either side of pipe welds. The tolerance on the measurements was estimated to be +1/16 inch. (See Section II.C for discussion of tee effect of these tolerances.) To do the 1981 profiles, a unique apparatus was developed by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI). The pipe elevation profile measure-ment system developed by SwRI for this effort is shown in Figure III-1. The device uses a pressure transducer moved within the pipe and positioned on the pipe bottom (as determined using a bubble level on the transducer). It measures the differential pressure between a reference water column and a water column ending at the transducer. The system used in 1979 was similar, but involved a visual measurement-rather than sensed differential pressure. 1 7 12/10/81 l l
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~' Ovality is measured at the same locations as elevation with another SwRI instrument (See Figure III-2). The device uses rotating arms to obtain.both maximum and minimum diam-eters. Their azimuth orientation is recorded with the azimuth location of the longitudinal fabrication weld. Fittings were measured using the same measurement arm; however, this -required removing it from the rolling platform (dolly) which was used in straight pipe sections for accurate positioning. The ovality measurements for both straight . pipe and fittings have been plotted and are shown along with the profile data in Appen-dix B.- They generally were less than 2% as compared to the manufacturing tolerances of 1% for straight pipe (ASME SA155) and 1.76% for fittings (ANSI B16.9). Some piping fabricator catalogs (NAVCO, in particular) include a note that ovality may change due to handling. They indicate that for pipe manufactured to a 1% tolerance, experience shows that 2% or more ovality is normal for pipe installed in a trench ready 2 for backfill. For the ovalities measured at Midland, there is no way to determine how much is due to settlement, but in any case the ovalities measured are within the range considered normal for newly installed pipe. l i 1 8 12/10/81 .. = = -.-. =: =:. .. a
~ III.A.2 Ovality / Buckling The bending stresses induced in the buried pipe by settlement are similar to fabrication bending stresses because the support provided by.the surrounding soil is similar to the radial support provided by a bending mandrel. The acceptance criteria for ovality that we propose to use is 8% as stated in ASME Section III codes (NC-4223.2 and NC-3642.1) as the tolerance for installation and fabricated bends.- Most codes that discuss ovality relate it to the fabrication of bends. Most of the codes limit. the ovality in the bend area to be a maximum of 8% (ovality defined by (D -D The bending / forming requiremeEN in EM)/D ).S8ction III, ANSI B31.1, B31.3, and PFI ES-3 all incorporate this limit. Some of these codes imply that this limit is a " good practice" tolerance rather than a. limitation imposed because of material ductility considerations. For example, ASME SA155 fabrication requires forming to a cylinder-and joining with a full penetration weld. This indicates the pipe material can take a permanent set in a manufacturing procecs substantially in excess of the 8% limit without sustaining damage. Likewise', ASME SA106 requires flattening a section of pipe between parallel r?ates to a diameter approximately one third of the original diameter without any evidence of damage. ANSI B31.1, Paragraph 104.2.1.c and ASME III, NB-4223.2, provide for flattening greater than 8%. It is evident from the above discussion thdt the codes' indicate that considerable deformation can be sustained without damaging the integrity of the pipe, and that restricting the ovality to 8%- is conservative when the actual ductility of the pipe is considered. It should be noted that the existence of ovality does not in itself imply a structural failure of the pipe. I l i. 9 12/10/81 i -.= =-=- - - - = -. ~
It should also be noted that the codes, and hence the code considerations of bending and ovality, are based on an assumed failure where the moment carrying capability of the pipe is a maximum. This presumes that after the instability point is reached, the conditions which caused the instability continue to prevail as in a load-controlled situation and that deformation will increase without limit. Settlement, however, is a deflection-controlled condition where the settlement induced secondary stresses may cause localized yielding, but are not self-driving to failure. In the letter from TES-(Appendix A), the appli-cability of the current ASME III Code require-ments were discussed in the following manner. For the piping systems we are addressing here it is important to recognize that the entire buried pipe was subjected to soil settlement. This is really a different situation than that addressed in current Section III criteria (NC-3611.2(f)) for non-repeated anchor movements. Many of l the reasons for this differ-ence have been discusseti above and demonstrate the important variations between non-repeated anchor motions (building settlement for a non-buried pipe) and general' soil settlement. NUREG/CR-0261(5) provides an experimental relationship between moment and ovality just before buckling. The experimental results of Reference 12 of the NUREG defines flattening as the decrease in the diameter in the plane of the moment divided by the original diameter (D -D This formula hasbeenverifiedbytele$b8n)/D.e 2onference between J.F. Sorensen, author of Reference 12, and W.J. Cloutier of Consumers Power Company. 1 This definition of flattening is different from the definition of ovality used throughout this document, which is based on ASME (D -D ThedifferenceresultsintheflattEMngcBASr)/D.ising 4 i 10 12/10/81 L . -.. - - = u.= --.
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\\ l half of the ovality. The NUREG states that the flattening is a function of the diameter-thickness ratio (D/t), and is shown to be 4.5% for D/t = 100 for small-scale tests and 5.5% for large-scale tests. This represents the flattening at the 4 maximum load just before bucklin. ,g, ggfs M The underground service wate/ system piping D/t fi l varies between 69 and 96.x Considering the calculation 4 method of Reference 12,'"the ovality reported in k the experiment would be 9 to 11%. 1 All analyses / experiments discussed thus far reflect analytical models or experimental conditions which conservatively neglect stabilizing influences present under actual site conditions.- These influences include the following. a) The assumption of an infinitely long pipe neglects the restraint provided by adjacent cross sections' undergoing a smaller degree of ovalization. b) The minimum specified yield stress values used in the analyses / experiments neglect the extra capacity indicated by the stress-strain data from the actual pipe material used at Midland. c) The increase in the predicted buckling resistance of the pipe due to the service pressure was neglected. d) The confinement and cross-sectional support provided by compacted fill surrounding the pipe was neglected. The cumulative conservatism-represented by these four stabilizing influences is sufficient to i-raise our confidence about the appropriateness of the 8% acceptance criteria established to determine a pipe's worthiness as safety-grade piping. Thecodemostdirectlyappgabletosteelpipe buried in fill is AWWA Mll In Chapter 8, Earth Loads on Steel Pipe, the following excerpts discuss the mechanism by which buried steel pipe support loads. 11 12/10/81 1 _.,-._--_.-__._,.~~-..,P-~ ~ Z,_ C.. . - - ~,.,_,;_, _ i,--,-_. _.L.,..
'Although the maximum load-carrying capacity of flexible-pipe depends to - some extent on the wall thickness and its section modulus, the pipe, by deflecting, is able to make full use of the load-carrying ability of the earth surrounding it. As the pipe may change shape without failure, it transfers part of the vertical load into a horizontal or radial thrust which is resisted by the passive pressure of the earth at its sides as these move outward. When the wall itself is rigid, this movement may not occur. It follows that.the rigid pipe must carry the.whole load itself, - whereas the flexible pipe divides the load with the earth enclosing it. Therein lies the inherent difference between rigid and flexible behavior and the explanation of why the classical bending-moment formulas apply to the ,~ analysis of rigid pipe but not to the analysis of flexible pipe. At this point, when deflection is mentioned, the engineer accustomed to thin 1 ring in terms of flex ure or bending-moment formulas.in rigid construction is likely 7.o contend that permanent deflection can ocmtr only after the yield point has been passed and that, therefore, a pipe so stressed has failed structurally and is dangerous. The simplest rebuttal to this argument is to recognize that the steel in a finished pipe has, in the manu-facturing process, been cold coiled, uncoiled, bent, curved, or twisted a number of times and has been stressed beyond the yield point each time; yet, after all these operations have been completed, the finished steel pipe is used for all i manner of high-pressure work without fear or hesitation. t d l l 12 12/10/81 i
d If the engineer still is hesitant to restress a part of the finished pipe wall beyond the yield point by slightly i. deflecting it underground, let him consider what happens to the test speci-non by.which the pipe strength is measured according to specification. Usually it is sliced as a ring from.the and of a finished pipe, cut at one side, uncurled from the circle into a flat piece, and then put in a tensile-testing machine which proceeds to show that after once more passing the elastic limit, the steel still possesses the specified strength. In a way,.the deflection underground is simply a finished forming operation. Therefore, where steel pipe such as is here discussed is concerned, the word " failure" must define a state of falling short of satisfactory performance and not a state in which localized stresses appear to pass the yield point of the material as judged ~by the results of . bending-moment formula analysis. These excerpts support the provision in SRP 3.9.3 that the pipe is acceptable hs lon*g as it retains 1 sufficient dimensional stability to ensure functional j capability. More specific to ovality tolerance, AWA Mll, Sec-tion 8.23.1 states, " Deflection of unlined pipe, or of pipe lined after installation, may safely reach 5 per cent of nominal diameter." This deflection is nominally equivalent to 10% by the formula (D -D used by ASME and is based on failure"8f TEE"c)/Doa?.ing, not any limitation of 1 the pipe. AWA Mll, Chapter -8 also states, "Real collapse failure of steel pipe does not occur under earth loads until a condition is reached where the 4 vertical diameter has been decreased about 20 per cent of the nominal diameter and the horizontal i { diameter has been increased a similar amount." ? I i l l 13 12/10/81 i _____.___-_,,_.-.._m._ ___._.-..__.,_-,._,__--,___.4_-L....__;-_
From the foregoing guidance based on research, experimental results, and 2. ears of experience, we feel that applying the 8% ovality criteria recommended by ASME is a very conversative acceptance criteria for ovality due to settlement. k , e g 4 4 4 l i 14 12/10/81 s -. = =...:..=
1 III.A.3 Future Settlement a) Predicted values The responses to 50.54(f) Questions (2) 4 and 27 contain a discussion of the methods used to estimate future settlement. The response to ' ~ Question 27 includes the following description of the two settlement components (Figure 27-1 is attached as Figure III-3): 1 The distinction between [ primary] consolidation and secondary compression settlement is made on the basis of the physical processes which control the time rate of settlement. In primary consolidation settlement, the time rate of settlement is controlled by the rate at which water can be expelled from the voids. In the case of secondary compression settlement, the speed of settlement is controlled largely by the rate at which the soil skeleton itself yields and compresses. The transition time between these two processes is conveniently identified as that time when excess pore water pressure becomes essentially zero. This time, denoted as t is shown in Figure 27-1. + 100 It has been observed in l many laboratory and field measurements that the relationship between the magnitude of secondary compression and time is 3 approximately a straight line on a semilogarithmic plot after the primary 15 12/10/81 --em ---n s ,,-e, e.-- ,.-w-,+em e-e,-- ,we----------,-w,s ,-,,---,w,--a,-ve-,~,,--_,m,,,, ,,,_,--wwn,--,ew,--
t consolidation has been completed, as shown in Figure.27-1. Thus, the settlement AH can be l expressed approximately as:- AH = -C, log t /t 2 y where t and are two specifib time eriods on the extrapolated secondary compression line and c is the settlement per a log cycle of time during secondary compression. The response to Question 27 contains a much more extensive discussion of settlement, prediction method, and the basis for conservatism p:7 and accuracy than is presented here in these a c d g">y k qt y excerpts. Supplemental Figures 27-51 through 27-198 show settlement vs log time plots for d( O-the diesel generator building. They show / jf yv)* that the fill is in the secondary compression h g ha 8 settlement phase. pgbdi i p In March 1980 a preliminary settlement estimate was provided for calculating future pipe stresses. The estimated settlement envelope was determined based on measured time-settlement data from Borros anchors buried in the plant ek# -fill. This estimate resulted in a settlement N( ] Cburied in the plant fill. p ', envelope of 0 to 3 inches for the 40-year plant life to be used in analyzing the piping gJ '3 %l'- )e i not include settlement that occurred prior to This estimate did r h M h March 5, 1980, nor has settlement since C a g March 5, 1980, been used to adjust the predicted c., value of future settlement. .j'l 4 i 16 12/10/81 ~_ _-_,.w .__,_,_..._..m. .__y._,,.__,,_,,___,,,_.,.._,_,,..___ym,, m..-, ,,y
_.-----w- -- ~l III.A.3.b) . Monitoring program g.- 9dE. SE'TTLOYh7 AW.%%-%;n
- The service water system (SWS) future settle-ment shall be monitored at the terminal ends, before the first anchor point of each pipe as it enters the buildings.
The first pipe i anchor inside the building is the most rigid anchor in the system, compared to the soil bedding outside the building. Therefore, it is most susceptible to high stress. The settlement to be monitored will be the differential settlement between the pipe anchor and the underground piping. This settlement limit shall be established from i the amount of settlement (Ay) the piping can f * #Q8 tolerate before it reaches the ASME III code [fy [p/ : criteria for nonrepeated anchor movements l o*g #) 7 (3S ). A representative cantilevered 7ength 6 1 of hiping shall be used to calculate this
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i limit. The settlement limit must be corrected for any settlement which has already occurred and has induced anchor stress because sett e-ment occurring before the piping was fitted p .e r to the pipe anchor does not cause pipe stress A M a i at this location. (h. v. d e The technical specifica,tions shall require a report to the NRC when the settlement reaches 75% of the maximum allowable settlement limit. Upon reaching the 75% settlement point, the monitoring frequency shall be monthly, and engineering evaluations will begin. The monitoring frequency for the monitoring points sha.11 be similar to the monitoring i frequency established and implemented for monitoring of structure settlement points throughout the plant. The monitoring points shall be surveyed at 90-day intervals for the first 5 years of operation, and on a yearly basis for the remainder of operating life. The anchor points as well as a point on the piping as it enters the wall penetration shall be monitored. If the differential settlement between the anchor and the desig-nated piping point reaches the 75% reporting limit, we would decrease the official moni-toring interval to 30 days, to better assess the settlement rate and severity. l l l_ 17 12/10/81 f i t .L.. -. :---.3--.-.--....-..:2 2 :-.- - -- -. - ---. -.-'z:
+0 = 4 III.A.4 Seismic a) Seismic. analysis The seismic analysis performed on the buried pipe - uses the theory and techn{gye presented in Section 6.0 of BC-TOP-4A to calculate forces and. stresses at connections, tees, and bends in buried pipe. These stresses are summarized in Table III-1. The analysis is based on the equations for beams on elastic. foundation. The soil subgrade modulus for each case is calculated based on the soil and pipe properties. The method considers the _effect of soil strain. on the subgrade modulus and uses the vari i ation of shear modulus with shear strain for sand as developed by Seed and Idriss i (Reference 8, Figure 2-5). The analysis calculates forces and the corresponding stresses due to seismic movements of the surrounding soil and connecting structures. It is a static analysis based on the maximum soil strain which is, in turn, based cn the magnitude of the earthquake and the propagation velc.mities of the various seismic waves. i The flenibility and stress intensification factors for welded elbows or pipe bends and j welded tees are determined in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vecsel Coda, Section III, Division 1, Subaection NC, Table NC-3f?3.2(b)-1. For each case with a bend, eloow, or tee, the analysis considers earthquake motion in two directions (i.e., parallel to each leg). For each case with a connection to a building or component, the analysis consi-ders earthquake motion in three directions. In the case of a bend, the transverse leg is assumed to deform as a beam on an elastic foundation due to the axial force in the longitudinal leg (parallel to the earth-quake motion). The displacement of the 18 12/10/81 ' ~ L. L -.=:
<~~ bend is defined by the overall spring constant at the bend. The spring constant of the bend depends on the stiffness of the longitudinal and transverse legs as well as the degree of fixity at the bend and at the far ends of the legs. Tees and connections are analyzed in a similar manner. v l l 19 12/10/81
=
III.A.4.b) Variable soil properties The' analysis considers the following soil properties: Poisson's ratio Unit weight coefficient of friction (soil / structure) Shear modulus Shear wave velocity compression wave velocity Surface wave velocity-Maximum particle velocity Maximum particle acceleration Maximum soil strain The soil subgrade modulus is calculated for each case, based on the soil and pipe pro-perties. The values used for these soil properties were those determined from the investigation work at the jobsite. The soil modulus of elasticity was varied +50%. The l maximum particle acceleration was increased i 50% above the SSE value as a margin for the i site-spacific response spectra. i e i 20 12/10/81 - - - =. _,.... =. - - -
III.A.4.c) Effect of pipe deformation on seismic forces The pipe deformation will affect the seismic forces in two ways. The pipe settlement will cause the idealized straight pipe to bend in the vertical direction, and the bending will cause the pipe cross-section to deform from the idealized circular cross-section to an ovalled cross-section. To analyze the difference in the seismic loads on the idealized straight pipe and the actual settled pipe with a curved profile, a series of analyses was done on 26-inch dia-meter pipe configurations which varied from straight to a 5-degree bend. The bend ra-dius was varied from 1 pipe diameter to 100 pipe diameters (2,600 inches). Figures III-4 and III-5 were used to deter-mine what degree of bend and radius are re-presentative of the existing condition of pipe at the Midland jobsite. Figure III-4 shows the measured profile for line 20"-2HCD-169 and focuses on the segment of greatest bend. Figure III-5 shows the method used to deter-mine the bend radius and degree of bend. This uethod establishes that the cross-aection of this profiled line wcul'd be a sag with ap-proximately 4 degrees of bend and a radiuc of 1,800 inches (90 pipe diameters). 4 The analyses showed that, for a straight pipe, the axial strecs was approximately 5.5 kai. Ecr a 5-degree bend, the axial stress de-l creased to 5.3 kai and 5.4 kai for 1-and j .100-pipe diameter bends respectively, For a straight pipe the bending stress is zero. i For a 5-degree bend the bending stress was 5.5 kai and 1.3 kai for 1-and 100-pipe dia-meter bends respectively. With the configuration established in Fig-ures III-4 and III-5 (4-degree bend, 90 dia-meter bend radius) considered representative of existing conditions, both the axial stress (5.4 kai) and the bending stress (1.1 kai) were found to vary insignificant 1y from the straight pipe analysis. 21 12/10/81 = = - - -.
[ ~, The seismic forces transverse to the axis of the pipe are so small that to distinguish between the forces on the theoretical cross-section and the forces on the ovalled cross-section is beyond the sensitivity of the methods used in the seismic analysis. An indication of the effect of deformation. on the transverse seismic forces can be obtained from determining the change in ' ovality resulting from seismic strains.. ' Assuming 2.5% ovality to be conservatively representative of pipe at the Midland job-site, the deformation resulting from a 2.5% ovality in a 36-inch diameter pipe is: % ovality = 100.x (D,,, - Dain)/D, i-2.5.= 100 x (D,,, - Dain)/36 D,, - Dmin = 0.9 inches i
- D,,,- D
=D -Dein = 0.45 inches o o 1 1 The additional deformation due to seismic ] j strain transverse to the pipe axis is: j Maximum scil strain = 0.000185 in/in' I Assume soil strain results directly in equal strain in the pipe. i i Therefore, the seismic strain induced in the pipe (e,g ), is: ESSE = 36 x 0.000185 = 0.00666 in ~ 0.007 in. Assume this strain reduces the minimum diameter and increases the maximum di-ameter by the same amount. r D,,,- Dain = 2(D,,, - D ) n = 2(D -Dain) o i i 22 12/10/81 i. 'n' .___,..._._.....~....__..~,,_.-...,,,_.__.mn
4 Adding the seismic strain results in: D,, - Dmin = 2(D, .Dmin) + ESSE = 2(0.45 + 0.007) = 0.914 % ovality = 100 x (D,,- Dmin)No = 100 x (0.914)/36 = 2.539% Thus, the effect of the seismic loads on an ovalled pipe would be to increase the ovality from 2.5% to 2.539%, which is still within allowable limita.. The preceding discussions indicate that the seismic analysis of the deformed piping, considering the deformation of the piping, would result in axial and bending stresses virtually unchanged from those for a straight pipe, and an increase in ovality from 2.5 to 3 2.539%. i i f 4 P 1 t 23 12/10/81 n --, -,,,,~,- -. -. -- - -, -,.r.-- ,.,-c
, MOW'$ &? $^ itwrwe. III.A.4.d) Code requirements There has been discussion with the staff on the treatment of seismic stresses and settlement stresses. The staff's ccncern is that if our settlement' stress calculacions do not meet the 3S 1 Lait as specified for single-anchor point mo$ements in ASME Code Section III, these stresses-must be combined with the primary stresses in Equation 10 of; Paragraph NC 3652.2. The stress effect of any single nonrepeated anchor movement is compared to-a separate allowable (35 ) in c Equation 12 of Paragraph NC 3652.3. Our position, based on settlement. stress 4 calculations, is that most of the piping is not overstressed above the code allowable (3S and in the local areas 'where analysis indic)a;tes an apparent overstress, it is mainly due to the analytical difficulties in treating the profile data. These difficulties were discussed in Sec-tion II.C. Furthermore, if we do combine 1 settlement' stress with seismic stress, it I would not be clear from an ASME code view-point which code allowable to use for com-parison with the calculated stress. I j-4 l a l l-24 12/10/81
.III.A.5 Rebedding a) Size verification of 8-inch lines i On October 28, 1981, diameter verification pigging operations were conducted on four 8-inch diameter piplines. The specific lines were 8"-lHBC-310, 8"-lHBC-311, 8"-2HBC-81, and 8"-2HBC-82. The results indicated that each pipeline was greater than 7.781 inches in diameter and was not obstructed. This indicates that none of the pipes has been flattened due to bending or heavy loads and they currently meet the 8% acceptance criteria for ovality. The pigging operation was conducted in accordance with Appendix C and provided a go, no-go test to check ovality. The re-sults are described in Appendix C. b) Rebedding of 8-and 10-inch service water lines Lines 8"-lHBC-81, 8"-lHBC-82, and 10"-OHBC-28 were previously rebedded. Service water lines 8"-2HBC-311, 8"-2HBC-310, and 10"-OHBC-27, near the east side' of the diesel generator building, which have not previously been rebedded, will be rebedded to conform to a straight unstressed condition. These lines are identified in the detail section of j Drawing SK-C-745 (shown as Figure I-1). l 25 12/10/81
~:-,.< - b /- ,I e z. III.A.6-j- Verification As discussed in Section II.B and briefly mentioned e in Section III.A.2.b,':it is necessary to demonstrate that the pipe has sufficient dimensional stability to maintain its' functional capability. This will be accomplished by a program of preservice and in' service checks, tests, and inspections. -[ a ), Preservice ), Carrent dimensional stability has been established by inspecting the pipe to , determine cross-sectional shape (ovality). -Section III.A.1 discusses the equipment and ~ e r' technique _for determining ovality, and , provides the results of these surveys. ~ ' ~ ~ ,. f A consticuction hydrostatic test (ASME III. ~. NC-6221, NC-6129) will be done as follows: j 4.' / rest pressure of 125 x system design / ,o pressure 1-- o Hold interval of 1 hour to test inacces-sible weld joints f', o Monitoring test pump leakage to estab-lich future lhakaga criteria s
- .oo
/ n f f . s-r i 1, i i e y l l s j c, 'rj l ^ t, i f / s / 1'l ,// l h' l
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s / / y s' s - 8I, { f a 'I 12/10/81 / 26 0 i j i s (
i i III.A.6.b) Inservice, Inservice inspection will be performed in accor-dance with ASME.Section XI as committed in Midland Preservice and First Ten Year Interval Inspection Plan for NDE and System Pressure Tests - Volume II. The ISI program consists of inservice tests and hydrostatic tests to ensure pressure boundary integrity. The inservice tests are described in Figure III-6 and the hydrostatic tests are des-cribed in Figure III-7. The leakage. acceptance criteria for these tests are shown in Figure III-8. The ISI will be done with one unit at power during the test. The remaining SWS train will supply cooling water to both units by crossover piping in the auxiliary building and turbine building. Rapid restoration of the tested SWS train is possible because normal isolation valves will be used during these tests. The flow verification tests to be conducted during plant operations are outlined in Fig-ure III-9, and Tables III-2 and III-3 show mini-num required flows and the number and location of flow measurement elements. The requirements are proposed for inclusion in the technical 4 specifications. The monitoring program performs a trendiiig cvaluation of the test data t.) detect I any decrease in ficw, a'lthough acceptance cri-teria are met. l J 27 12/10/81 1 i t.
' i ;- l ~ ~ ,4 4 - III.' RESOLUTION l B. DIESEL FUEL OIL LINES 1. Profile The' diesel. fuel. oil lines were installed in June 1980 a Ner-the diesel generator building surcharge program was completed. The as-built elevations of those lines were surveyed approximately every 20 feet. These ele rations are shown in Drawing MPY-138Q-(Figure III-10). This drawing also showd piping support details. It is mounted on Unistrut sections embedded in concrete at intervals along ?.he pipe length. The piping was-then covered by cpproximately 2 feet s of compacted soil.. I k i s 28 12/10/81 .. =..
III.B.2 Future Settlement. 50.54(f) Questions (2) 17 and 20 discuss the stresses induced in buried pipe due to~ settlement. Both. responses (Table 17-1, Note 6 and Page 20-2, third paragraph) indicate that the fuel oil lines are of such small diameter -(1-1/2" and 2") that they have enough flexibility to withstand the predicted settle-ment.without exceeding allowable stresses or affecting their structural integrity. To substantiate this judgment, an analysis was done to evaluate stresses in the following diesel fuel oil lines due to predicted future settlement: 1-1/2"-lHBC-3, 1-1/2"-2HBC-3, 1-1/2"-lHBC-4, 1-1/2"-2HBC-4, 2"-lHBC-497, 2"-2HBC-497, 2"-lHBC-498, 2"-2HBC-498 This analysis assumed: 1. Three inches of settlement was proportioned over a 40-foot pipe span with the 3 inches occurring at midspan. 2. Simplified beam equations were used for.. buried piping continuou, sly supported by soil. The analysis indicated the highest stress value, including stress intensification factors, was 18 kai in a 2-inch diameter line. This is well within the allowable stress of 45 ksi (3S ) for these lines and substantiates the claim of fleEibility made in the responses to 50.54(f) Questions 17 and 20. l 29 12/10/81
\\ -III. RESOLUTION C. BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK LINES 1. Rebedding In the October 6 and 7, 1981, meeting with the NRC staff, Consumers Power Company committed to rebed the 18-inch BWST line from the tank valve pit to the tank farm. dike. .These pipelines are identified as 18"-1HBC-1, 18"-1HBC-2, 18"-2HBC-1, and 18"-2HBC-2. This commitment was made be-cause this piping is in the area to be sur-charged as part of the remedial fixes on the tank foundations. The measured profile data taken in 1979,on pipelines 18"-2HBC and 18"-1HBC-2 show maximum deflections of 1.92 inches and 0.96 inch, respectively. These measurements are within the construc-tion tolerance of +2 inches for installation of piping and it may be assumed that soils i settlement has not adversely affected this piping. 2. Future Settlement Borated water storage tank lines have been cut loose at the valve pit to isolate them from the settlement caused by the surcharge of the valve pit. The existing program which monitors the settle-ment of the BWST and the auxiliary building will provide data on the future settlement of these lines. These monitoring points will indicate whether the piping is overstressed due to settle-ment. i i l' l. \\ L 30 12/10/81 l ~-. --
6 4 III. RESOLUTION D. MISCELLANEOUS GENERIC SUBJECTS There are several subjects. pertinent to most of the buried pipe. -Rather than discuss each subject several_ times as it relates to.each piping system, this section willLdiscuss each subject, including how it affects each piping system. The subjects considered generic to.all buried pipe and which are discussed in this section are: o Anchor'and component loads o Effects of rupture of nonsafety-related piping on safety-related piping, components, and structures (referred to herein as "II under I") o overburden loads 1. Anchor and Component Loads The loads induced into anchors and compo-nents by settlement of the underground piping are being analyzed to determine acceptable ) i settlement used limits. These limits will be in conjunction with the monitoring program discussed in Section II*I.A.3.6. The settlement limit shall be established from the amount of settlement (ay) the piping can tolerate before it reaches the ASME Code Section III criteria for nonrepeated anchor movements (3S ). The limit will be the lesser of the seEtlement which causes the limiting stress or the settlement which causes contact with-the penetration through 3 the building. The settlement limit will be corrected for any settlement which has already occurred and has induced pipe stress at the anchor point. l l i l t l l ( 31 12/10/81 1 ~ : - = -. . -. =. =.. ....-.:.=.===:.-+-
III.D.2 -II Under I -In the draft SERI1) the NRC expressed a concern for the effects of the rupture of nonsafety-related piping on safety-related piping, components, and structures. This concern is referred to herein as "II under I." This concern is a classic-II/I question, brought up during a discussion of underground piping settlement at Midland, but not peculiar to the Midland soils issue and not unique to Midland. Pipe break encompasses not only whip and jet impingement, but also the related. hazards of steam and liquid flooding, excess pressure, differential pressure, and temperature. Of the foregoing effects of a pipe break, liquid flooding is the single item requiring evaluation for buried piping. Analysis of flooding is treated on a case-by-case and individual system basis. The possible result of flooding would be i a washout / loss of support. A review was done to ic'.entify where non-Seismic Category I pipe passes beneath a Seismic Category I pipe or structure. A break in the non-Seismic Category I pipe was as.sumed to cause a washout extending to the surface, thus causing a loss of. support for any Seismic Category I system above it. The unsupported length was determined using a side slope of 45 degrees, the vertical'separa-tion, and the angle of crossing of the two systems. The review indicated that for all non-Seismic Category I pipes passing beneath a Seismic cate-gory I pipe, the maximum stress induced in the overlying Seismic category I pipe was approxi-i mately 3 kai for line 1-1/2"-2HBC-498. The effect of a non-Seismic Category I pipe break 3 on structures is considered to be encompassed by ~ the break d ssed in the Response to 50.54(f) Question 49 Part c2. The pertinent portion of this response is included as Appendix D. I l. 32 12/10/81 i 1'
i II.D.3 Overburden Loads This section discusses the effects of overburden loads such as soil dead weight, heavy equipment, etc onthebpgjedpiping. The Response to 50.54(f) Question 34 addressed this question. The Response to Question 34 is attached as Appendix E. The Response to Question 34 refers to the effect, at a depth of 6 feet,oof a Cooper E-80 railroad load. A review of the depth of cover (distance below ground surface) of all Seismic Category I lines indicated that 6 feet is the approximate depth of cover on all lines except the diesel fuel oil lines. The results, indicated in Appendix E, concluded that.the 26-inch and 36-inch buried Seismic Category I pipes are adequate to withstand external loads, and stresses in pipes smaller than 26-inch diameter will be relatively low and are not critical. Thedieselfueloillineshaveayj9mumcoverof i approximately 2.2 feet. AWWA Mll includes a graph (see Figure III-11) showing the relationship between load (expressed as height of cover) and the diameter of steel pipe. This graph shows that for diameters less than 20 inches, the amount of load needed to cause a 1K deflection increases almost infinitely. According to this graph, a 1-1/2 inch to 2 inch diameter pipe would be virtually uncrushable when buried in the fill. 1 l 33 12/10/81 i 1
IV. LIST OF REFERENCES Re ferenced 1. Safety Evaluation Report (draft), Sections 1, 32 3.6.2, 3.7.3, and 3.9, transmitted by R.L. Tedesco's September 23, 1981, letter 2. NRC Requests Regarding Plant Fill 2, 15, 29, (referred to as 50.54(f) Questions) 32, 33 3. Standard Review Plan SRP 3.9.3, ASME Code 3 Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Component Supports, and Core Support Structures, Rev. 1, July 1981 4. AWWA Manual Mll, Steel Pipe Design and 4, 11, 33 Installation, American Water Works Asso-ciation, 1964 5. NUREG/CR-0261, Evaluation of the Plastic 4, 10 Characteristics of Piping Products in Relation to ASME Code Criteria, July 1978 6. Specification 7220-M-214, Piping System 5 Erection Fitup Control Requirements 7. Evaluation of Pipe Behavior Dueito Soil 6 Settlement for a Typical Buried Line for the Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Struc-tural Mechanics Associates, May 1981 8. BC-TOP-4A, Seismic Analyses of Structures 18 and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 4 9. ICS Civil Engineer's Handbook, page 136, Fig. III-5 edited by Archibald DeGroot, International Textbook Company, 1956 IV-1 12/10/81
' V. LIST OF TABLES Referenced I-1 Seismic Category I Lines to be Addressed 1 III-1 Stress Summary for Buried SW Piping 18 III-2 Minimum Required Flows 27 III-3 Flow Measurement 27 P O 6 V-1 12/10/81 r - ~ ' ' - - " "'9 m ew --e
{ : he,hemenT i(ohde Irovdd hC?C E An mbuce or 4 thglu SEISMIC CATEGORY I LINES TO BE ADDRESSED A. Service Water System (SWS) N ~, h, E 1"-lHBC-310 -f.eqc.kA.t's. T 26"-OHBC-53 8"-2HBC-81 -6'ycp.n,;dt. 26"-OHBC-54 .__T8"-lHBC-81-4 6,w.gd %,- dwJg.i 26"-OHBC-55 -0,tykd % u y,, 8"-2HBC-310 % nW44 \\e~l.h,_ 26 "-OHBC-5 6 9 9 ad H,e ' J t P 8 "-lHBC-311 -i.n.QwA t.igi 26"-OHBC-15 9 8"-2HBC-8 2 -fWpe.h g't, P 26"-OHBC-16 , 8 "-lHBC-8 2 -k%@c)R4 P. 26"-OHBC-19}Pr.' kJ,M Wi W M G. y 8"-2HBC-311Tokud P 26"-OHBC-20)\\owdh E.kb Cl-P 10"-OHBC-27.-%. <6% E 36"-OHBC-15 P 36"-OHBC-16 10 "-OHBC-28-Wh opd P 36"-OHBC-191?sfM h O h Maa P.. 36"-OHBC-20)icwid %AR 14.7. 3 f B. Diesel Fuel Oil Lines (Fuel Oil) 1-1/2"-lHBC-3 / bl tyA I A-,,h 2"-lHBC-497 ' 3 l-1/2"-lHBC-4 / M b "(Ul*# /2"-lHBC-498 ' l-1/2"-2HBC-3 / / 2"-2HBC-497' 1-1/2 "-2HB C-4 / / 2"-2HBC-498e C. Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) 18"-lHBC-1 18"-lHBC-2 N g, h k a,b g q 18"-2HBC-1 18"-2HBC-2 y 2o'- inc.9- \\b9 9 2.b"- 2.3D-i 9 s - \\no -2 l TABLE I-l 12/10/81
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- 2. : -. = -
,i .i .o t i MINIMUM REQUIRED PLOWS i Required Line Description Flow (Opm) [ 8"-1HBC-310 DG 1 A Supply 1,600 I 8"-2HBC-81 DG 2A Supply 1,600 8"-1HBC-81 DG 18 Supply 1,600 8"-2HBC-310 DG 28 Supply 1,600 8"-1HBC-311 DG 1 A Rotwn 1,600 ] 8"-2HBC 82 DG 2A Return 1,600 8"-1HBC42 DG 1B Return 1,800 s ] 8"-2HBC-311 DG 28 Return 1,600 10"-0HBC-27 DG 1Bl2B Supply 3,200 [. e l' h 10"-OHBC-28 DG 18128 Return 3,200 j. 26"-OHBC-53 DG 1 Al2A+TB Supply 9,225 i H 26"-0HBC-54 DG 1 Al2A+TB Return 9,225 H E 26"-0HBC-55 DG 18128 +TB Supply 9,225 26"-OHBC-56 DG 1812B+TB Return 9,225 i 26"-0HBC-15 Aux Bldg A Supply 15,894 l l 26"-OHBC-16 Aux Bldg A Return 15,894 j 26" OHBC 19 Aux Bidg B Supply 15,894 26"-0HBC-20 Aux Bldg B Return 15,894 } 36"-0HBC-15 A Supply 25,119 36"-0HBC-16 A Return 25,119 36"-OHBC-19 8 Supply 25,119 j 36"-0HBC-20 B Return 25,119 Required flows are based on FSAR tables 9.2-1 and 0.2-2. Worst case values for each line were deterneined fross the six i operation neodos and the ESF niede in those tables. Turbine building flows are based on potential Row under accident j conditions SAnde 8). I-t4DLAND UNrTS 1 AND 2 ); NRCPRESENTATION 10/2/81 G-186842 h l! l' J'
t o i FLOW RAEAmaammeesney l l' une Descripeton Floos Element Lacealen I 8"-1HBC410 DG 1 A Supp6y 1 FE 1841 Cooler Ouest e"-2 hec 41 DG 2A Supply 2FE ISSI Caster Ouest 8"1HBC41 DG 18 Supply IFE 1848 Cooler Ouelos 8"-2MBC-218 DG 28 Supply 2FE 1864 Cosier Ouset 8"-lHSC-211 001 A Return IFE 1841 Caster Ouelet 8"-3HBC42 DG 2A noeurn 2FE 1861 Cooler Outlet l 8"-1HBC42 DG 1s Aetwa 1FE 1446 Caster Ouest 8"-20eC411 DG 2s Asturn 3FE 1865 Canter Ouelet te"4 Hec 27 DG eras Supply IFE 1844 + Ceeder Ouelet 2FE te6s Ceaser Ouset ie"4 hec 3s DG seras neeurn 1FE 1846 + Cooler Outlet 2FE 1865 Center Ouelet M"-eH3C43 DG 1 Al2A + Tel Supply 1FE 18FS ' Supply uns Genesting Pit 3 26"40eC44 DG IATJA+ Tat Assurn IFE 1878 Supply une testering pet 28"4MBC48 DG 1Gf248 + 782 Supply 2FE 1876 Supply Une Metering Pit 8 28"40eC48 DG IStae + TS2 Return 2FE 1878 Suppe une Isotering pet r h 24"-eHSC-16 Aus Sede A Supply 0FE 1996A + Aus Olds A - Supply une 1FE 1914A + Smaster Pump Olocharge 1 IFE 1000A + CIdeer Outist i 2FE 1908A C8dger Ouelot N 28"-SMBC 16 Aus Side A Assure GFE 1806A + Aus Olde A-Supply Une pg IFE 1914A + aseeeer Pump Diocemage i 1FE 1 essa + Canner Oustet l w 2FE teseA Cedner Ouest as"4 hec-se Aus aidea Suppsy oFE1se6s Aus sede -nesen une a i as m 2e Aus sede a neewn eFE 10ese Auseue neeurn une a j 3e"4 Hoc 1s A Supply IFE1876+ Supply Une - tessering Pit 3 0FE 10e6A + Ama 50d3 A-Supply une SFE 1984A + Boesser Pump Diesenerge l 2FE 1900A C8duer Ouest 3FE 1000A Camer Ouest d as"4eeeC 1s A noeurn 1FE 1878 + Supply uno - teetering Pit SFE 1906A + Aus Side A Supply une j SFE 1914A + Seasser Punap Dioasterge i SFE 190eA + Caduer Ouelet j 2FE 190eA Clear Ouset i 2s"4MBC 19 8 S6pply 2FE 1876 + Supply une - 80esering Pit ers seess Aun utdo e nesen une as"4 hec 3e a meetwa 2FE 1876 + Supply Une - teetering Pts 0FE 1986s Aus Nds 5 Return une 4Thee met centree sepobety to mesews eene in tweed semise esem eyseus peptoe seing tomtened i ha some asess, enconomi - - esaseno tre enseased Ihet may be '- ^ potentiesemessese) unmasemess e a.e a SeC PUt3143 AIENE  del g gggg g3 i i a 4 l t
VI.- LIST OF FIGURES Referenced I-l Plan of Buried Q-Listed Pipe Locations, 1, 25 Bechtel Drawing SK-C-745 II-1 Initial Discontinuities in Installed 5 ~ Pipe, Figure 6 from Southwest Research Institute Report, " Structural Analysis of Buried Pipeline," October 16, 1981 II-2 Linear Elastic Analysis Results for 6 Upper Bound Soil Properties, Figure 4-2 from Structural Mechanics Associates report, Evaluation of Pipe Behavior Due to Soil Settlement for a Typical Buried Line for the Midland Nuclear Power Plant, SMA 13701.02, May 1981 III-1 Schematic-Pipe Elevation Profile 7 Measurement System, Page 8 of South-west Research Institute Report No.1, Pipe Profile Measurements at Midland, August 1981 III-2 Sketch-SwRI Out-of-Roundness Measurement, 8 Instrument III-3 Typica1 ' Laboratory Time-Settlement Behavior 15 Under Constant Pressure III-4 Marked-Up Copy of Figure II-2 21 III-5 Determination of Bend Radius and Degree 21 of Bend III-6 Inservice Tests - Leakage ' rests 27 III-7 Hydrostatic Tests - Leakage Tests 27 III-8 Leakage Test Acceptance Criteria 27 III-9 Plow Verification 27 III-10 Top Line Elevations of Diesel Fuel Lines, 28 4 J Bechtel Drawing 7220-FSK-MPY-138 III-11 Relationship Between Calculated Height of 33 Cover and Diameter of 1/4-Inch Steel Pipe O VI-l 12/10/81 t n-,------- --n--,,-n-,v-.. - --.,,,-.--,v,,,v-r
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i 4 i l j P GROUND REFERENCE PLAtlE g ..s t .l ,,\\.\\;\\ ..I. B ill l i3 ' i l ' * '.. .i. .I l g i yig- ...*I u \\ 1 M s f i g I g WELD OFFSET 'HQ KlHKS WELD KlHK s HQ OFFSET y r i 0FFSET + OFFSET + KlHK KlHK j l l 4 -l 4 INITIAL DISCONTINUITIES IN INSTALLED PIPE
y,g,_ t' DISTANCE FROM READOUF POINT (PT) j 20 40 6.0 R0 100 120 140 160 100 FO deaf h u d dakfd' / \\ + (-116. 0) l 252 K/ft / I As + 7'~. E -2.0 215 K/ft** ~,_' i_7 k 9 A _._ I g-( 1) -47.0). s, ,c) D (10.0 17.0) OT l-L ' ~ ~ ~ .oy u (-25 ,Q.0 (1 2 0) V "'bo # 6 29.0 (-27.0) (-18. O ~ T -4.0 4t< I -5 a g, gg7 g (51.0) (1.0) MO'l f 295 W 1 .1.r.sGrA1ouz'd m w p ui: y, M ~ eg i H e Indicates Pipe Position at Survey Points Copservative Soil Capacity Estimates gc Pipe Displacement Profile Uplift = 10 K/Ft ,7-H - Soil settlement Profile Bearing = 75 K/Pt /
- Pipe bending stress in kai at measurement point (typicga frial = 28 K/
dg.sI,. $ g-d4 31Md I / ..- 7
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~ g.2o j' Nah4 f IN.16 M8t .._.a 1.b%h:- S W~ 33n% coco) i 3bi Soicco_1,,5151[ 4 LINEAR ELAST!c ANALYSIS EESULTS FOR UPPER 8OUND SOIL PROPERTIES I,, J I 2.\\i.,c.b* 4A'l ** ur \\3s 2.\\ Q . k4 7. md. m as s 'ur. 5U/g
PRESSURE TR ANSOuCER REAOCUT METER ~' y REFERENCE WATER COLUMN WATER LEVEL N ULTRASONIC TRANSDUCER / CONOUCTORN WATER COLUMN I p.g [ stOSE CA / WONITOHINSTfhjMENT I WATER COLuare AOJU3T/ LgygLGAUGE og J un p_ d ~^ MAGNET 'kl Pf4 ESSURE a 3 THANSOuCER H i o ( pa salles la pipe ) g ( 3.A.f,...- ,.y. H H H h MAGNET na. 2 20000 sr4 e_ ~2 ) ~I .N.b. N
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ll i ( $$$15> S O _z 5 i b 7 s r 1 P F I GU R ( E B ) I T I I M T E. I I ( M A T I ) 3 S E M E L E ( T L T O q, D O O ( A L L G t' E o G H M S o C E A S IS C N 2 T E8zo x E.?<N o88a o P5 T A L E O L / U 9 d C C ) 8 M O U 8 $:a h $ R E ) Y 0 U T I R n Sy DN V ,I l l I Ll, dep LS 1 E eti AU rtc NM la DE P Cel R o i om PS H g neL L = u sna A P r ttb NO .C o a o nBr TW lo 2 t e.a g 7 ht UE Pao N R 2' .i I 1 1 I ft I R 1 rvr TC 3 e iy SO v so i srT 1M c u i P i r m &A o e e N n 2Y 5 ^
t DISTANCE FROM READOUF POINT (PT) 20 40 60 to 100 120 140 160 180 j W W w g 5 4 j 6.0) -l i / 2T2'K/ft f in l 2.0 215 N/ftea 5 \\ This area detailed j / { 1) -47.0) on Figure III-5 @p,oT f-i5 (10.0 17.0) C g,,) .oj i u 0T \\g ~ (1 2 0) / 29.0 (-27.0) (-la, i 1 -4.0.. (s1.0) (1 *o} V Tg (-21.0) 2Ts*s 'f l s 1 - s I l ~ l l3 -6.0 l l e-1 54 I i o i e Indicates Pipe /bs/d o at Survey Points C servative Soil capacity Estimates g Pipe Displacement Profile Uplift = 10 K/Pt 'i' soil Settlement Profile Bearing = 75 K/Ft j
- Pipe banding stress in kai at measurement point (typi,grial = 28 K/Pt a,
- soil spring forces (typical) i j
i l l 1 LINEAR ELASTIC ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR UPPER BOUND S0IL PROPERTIES l a j !o l
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.a i l INSERVICE TESTS - LEAKAGE TESTS e EACH INSPECTION PERIOD: 3,7,10,13, l 17... YEARS i s e NOMINAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE: 57 t i PSIG E a e ISOLATE BURIED PIPING e PRESSURIZE WITH T$ST PUMP e MAINTAIN PRESSURE 4 HOURS e MEASURE FLOW =*= L.,
l l HYDROSTATIC TESTS - LEAKAGE TESTS i l o EACH INSPECTION INTERVAL: ONCE EACH 10 l YEARS t l e 1.10 x DESIGN PRESSURE: 115.5 PSIG i M t = e ISOLATE BURIED PIPING l 7 i l e PRESSURIZE WITH TEST PUMP l 1 i i l e MAINTAIN PRESSURE 4 HOURS e MEASURE FLOW i
i l LEAKAGE TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA i ? e SMALL ENOUGH TO DETECT PRESSURE i BOUNDARY FAILURE ~ e LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE [ ANTICIPATED BOUNDARY VALVE LEAKAGE ? ~ e 0-5 GPM i e RESULTS IN INSIGNIFICANT FLOW LOSS e TO BE REVIEWED FOLLOWING PRESERVICE TESTS %"J'=L., i.
lI .' j ~ ~ i FLOW VERIFICATION e ENSURE ABILITY OF BURIED PIPING TO i MAINTAIN FLOWS REQUIRED FOR SAFETY I FUNCTIONS e ESTABLISH PUMP AND SYSTEM LINEUPS TO OBTAIN KNOWN CONFIGURATION THAT PROVIDE REQUIRED FLOWS i E e UTILIZE INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION TO a VERIFY REQUIRED FLOW IN EACH BURIED LINE e ONCE PER YEAR e TO BE INCLUDED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS L""J* '4*L.,
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VII. APPENDIXES Referenced A. Teledyne Engineering-Services letter, 3,110 D.F. Landers to.W.J. Cloutier of Consumers Power Company, November 11, 1981 B. Southwest 'Research Institute, four~ reports 7, 8 on pipe profile measurements at Midland C. Procedures and Drawit i for Diameter 25 Verification Pigging Proce' dure D. Partial Copy of Response to Question 49 of' 32 NRC Requests Regarding Plant Fill E. Response to Questicn 34 of NRC Requests 33 Regarding Plant Fill VII-l 12/10/81 ._____4
a ma. APPENDIX C Procedures and Drawing for Diameter Verification Pigging Procedure Midland Units 1 and 2 Pipe Sizing Operating o Procedure Effectivity and Approval, Rev 0, dated October 26, 1981 o Diameter Verification Pigging Procedure, from Northwood's Cons tructor's, Inc. Drawing for Diameter Verification Pigging o Operation, from Mears Engineering, Inc. ee 9 12/10/81
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~ t o PAGE No 1 0F 6 REY NO O DATE 10/26/81' MIDLAND IDIITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE ZFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL Revision 0 of this procedure became effective on 10/27/81. This procedure consists of the pages and changes listed below: i Pane No channe Date Effective 1 Rev 0 10/26/81 2 Rev 0 10/26/81 3 Rev 0 10/26/81 l 4 Rev 0 10/26/81 j 5 Rev 0 10/26/81 Approvals 37lff Written Date 0 $ ll Technical Review Date ll Of l (( QA. iew Date MO\\'13 Y .,..'O - J $I to e hoe eBIIW" *[y'T pr1081-0884a100
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~ I b. = II PAGE NO 2 0F 6 REV NO O i DATE 10/26/81 MIDLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE EFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides a description of the activities necessary to verify minimum acceptable diameter of the designated (8") piping at the Midland Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plant. 2.0 SCOPE AND APPLICATION 2.1 This procedure is limited to the acquisition of relative out-of-roundness tolerances which may be used to determine the minimum acceptable pipe diameter of 8" piping systems located at the Midland Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plants. 2.2 This procedure is limited to the verification of acceptable tolerances of pipes at those designated locations. The work will be performed under the supervision of CP Co designated personnel. 2.3 Applicable Docur.ents The following documents are considered to form a part of this procedure as applicable: 4 1. Midland Project Quality Assurance Department Procedure F-8M, F-11M, E-1M, F-12M and F-2M 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY 1. The Manager,-Midland Project Quality Assurance Department (MPQAD) shall be responsible for review and approval of this procedure. pr1081-0884a100 ~ - ~ - - - ---- '
1 PAGE NO 3 OF 6 REV NO O DATE 10/26/81 MIDLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE EFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL 2. The Site Manager, Midland Project shall be responsible for the implementation of this procedure in accordance with the Midland Project QA Program. 3. The out-of-roundness tolerances shall be verified by an outside 1 contractor. He will be technically qualified to perform this activity under supervision of CP Co designated personnel. 4.0 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS Personnel performing verification of out-of-roundness tolerances shall -demonstrate adequate proficiency in their assigned tasks as determined by ) Site Manager, Midland Project. 1 5.0 PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS l 1. This procedure shall be controlled in accordance with MPQAD I l Procedure F-11M and F-12M. 2. Deviations and nonconformances shall be reported in accordance with MPQAD Procedure F-2M. Cc,apliance with 10 CFR 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e) shall also be in accordance with MPQAD Procedure F-8M. 6.0 TEST CONDUCT 6.1 Witness The Contractor shall keep the CP Co designated personnel informed of the approximate testing dates and times to the best of his ability. pe1081-0884a100 4
l PAGE NO 4 0F 6 ~ REV NO O DATE 10/26/81 MIDI.AND UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE EFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL It shall be the responsibility of the CP Co designated personnel to notify any test witnesses and to establish hold points, if any. The Contractor shall abide by all hold points. 6.2 Test Environment The inside area of the pipes are to be free of water puddles and any significant. amount of rust or debris that may have accumulated in the bottom of the pipe. 6.3 Instruments The out-of-roundness verification equipment to be used by the Contractor shall be used to measure the pipe tolerances. A description of the instrument used to make the measurements shall be included in the test data. 6.4 Calibration Diameter Percent (inches) Decrease in ID 7.781 2.5% 7.582 5.0% 7.343 8.0% 1. Verification Sizing Disk Check the sizing disk diameters and mark each disk with the a. percentage decrease from nominal ID according to the table l given above. pr1081-0884a100 -O
PAGE NO 5 0F 6 REV NO O DATE 10/26/81 MIDLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE EFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL b. Markings shall be done with an -indelible marker. Mark one disk of each size (2.5%, 5.0%, 8.0%) with a c. pipeline designation number as follows: 8-1HBC-310 8-1HBC-311 8-2HBC-81 l 8-2HBC-82 6.5 Test Procedure 1. Sizing Assembly Assemble the sizing assembly with either single or multiple a. sizing disk according to the technical representatives' recommendation. j b. Check the sizing disks markings in Section 6.4C to match the pipeline to be tested. 2. Receiver Cushion At the branch connections into 26"-OHBC-53 or 26"-OHBC-54, a. place a sof t material receiving cushion to catch the sizing pig as it exi ts from the tested 8" pipelice. 3. Assembly Mounting Flange Place the sizing assembly into the mounting flange. a. pr1081-0884a100
PAGE NO 6 0F 6 REV NO O DATE 10/26/81 JM DLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE SIZING OPERATING PROCEDURE a EFFECTIVITY AND APPROVAL b. Cover this mounting flange with a blind flange and connect the compressed air supply. 4. Sizing Assembly Propulsion Throttle the air supply valve.to force the sizing assembly a. through the pipeline. b. Retrieve the sizing assembly from the receiver cushion. Mark each target disk used with a "T" to indicate it as a c. tested disk. S. Recording Results Sususarize the results by examining each disk for dented a. indications. All results shall be documented. 7.0 ACCEPTABILITY OF MEASUREMENTS 1. The Contractor or the CP Co designated personnel may void or repeat any set of tests which has doubtful validity. 8.0 TEST RESULT.5 1. The test results shall be susumarized as described in Section 6.5.5 or repeat any set of tests which has doubtful validity. 2. Permanent documents generated in accordance with this procedure shall be stored and retained by the utility. { pr1081-0884a100 m -s, .r-- w-a _,y.., _.m..__,,,y m.___ m-
..-..~ j ~ DIAMETER VERIFICATION PIGGING PROCEDURE j FOR CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY AT NUCLEAR FACILITY - MIDLAND, MICHIGAN On October 28, 1981, Mr. J. W. Fluharty, Northwood's Constructors, and Mr. H. L. Fluharty, Mears Engineering, conducted diameter verification ,igging operations on four (4) 8.00" I.D. pipelines at the above mention-i ed facility..The purpose of.the test was to determine that the four pipelines had not been flattened due to heavy loads transported across the ground surface above them. The pipelines were equipped with 150# ANSI flanges at one and and connected to a large diameter pipeline at the other end. Two (2) of the pipelines each had two (2) - 90* elbows and the other two (2) each had one (1) - 90* elbow and one (1) - 45' elbow. A sizing pig constructed as shown on the attached drawing was run throu3h each pipeline equipped with aluminua sizing discs as shown. The pro-cedure followed for each pipeline is as follows: 1. Pig launcher (as shown on attached drawing)is bolted to the pipeline flange utilizing 4 bolts only. 2. Lubricant is applied to the wide opening of the pig launcher for ease of installing sizing pig. 3. Sizing pig is placed in launcher and driven into 8" pipeline past the face of flange. 4. Launcher is removed and Pressure Assembly is securely bolted to pipeline flange utilizing all eight (8) bolts. 5. Pressure was applied to pig by means of com-1 pressed air fed through a 3/4" MUELLER LOCK 1 WING valve and monitored by a pressure gauge on and of pressure assembly. 6. Each pipeline was pigged with less than 20 psi of pressure applied for a duration of 3 minutes to 13 minutes. The results indicated that each pipeline was of a diameter greater than 7.781 inches and had no obstructions. Upon observation of each disc it was noted that the edge of the discs were slightly beveled. This is attributed to the lead edge of each disc coming in contact with the elbows when forced.through the radius. There were no other markings that would indicate an area of diameter change. Respectfully submitted NORTHWOOD'S CONSTRUCTOR'S, INC. v . W. Fluharty, President JWF/ mis f ,.~,,_-.,,,,,..,,.,,,,__,.,,,.,,._._.-_,__,,_,.-,,,w,..r,_,,,_._.a-,,. ...,,,.,.,,_,_,,,,,y, _.y,_
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Jb- -- ~~ RcJdinius, APPENDIX E Response to Question 34 of NRC Requests Regarding Plant Fill k a 12/10/81
,1 QUESTION 34 Supplement'your response to question 16 to address how underground seismic Category I piping and conduit are protected from excessive stress due to railroad tracks, construction cranes, and other such heavy vehicles during construction and operation.
RESPONSE
The' Seismic Category I piping (conduit) systems are pro-tected.against excessive stresses due to construction _vehi-cular traffic, railroad traffic, etc, by using appropriate design and installation techniques. Select granular bedding material is placed and compacted all around the pipe to an elevation approximately 1 foot above the top of the pipe. In areas where it is impractical to use granular bedding material, concrete with a minimum strength of 2,000 psi is -substituted. The buried Seismic Category I piping in the yard includes service ' water lines, borated water lines, and diesel oil 1 fuel lines. The wall thicknesses for -these pipes are 5 primarily based on internal pressure to meet the appropriate ASME code requirements and are considered sound and conser-vative'". \\ The buried pipes re also checked for ring deflection (ovalling) caused by earth loads and superimposed loads such as construction vehicular traffic, railroads, cranes, etc. A ring deflection of 5% of the pipe diameter for externally coated _ pipes is considered an acceptable limit b3 Ring i deflection calculations are performed using a soil density of 120 lb/cu f t for dead loads and Cooper's E-80* railroad loads for live loads. A soil modulus value of 1,900 psi was used in the calculations and resulted in a ring deflection of less than 2% of the pipe diameter. A soil modulus of 1,900 psi corresponds to 85%** compaction determined in accordance with AASHO T-99 specification ". Ring deflec-i tions for bare steel pipes up to 10% are considered safe L* I The amount of deflection to cause collapse of flexible pipe is about 20% of the nominal diameteri* The ring deflection calculations are based on Spangler's methodi" The soil. modulus was treated as a selective constant. The soil modulus is a measure of the passive resistance of the earth at the sides of the pipe on an elastic basis. i i l l l 1 34-1 Revision 5 2/80 ) I.
--.q-."l"I 4b: S"4 bi Rl 1._. The bending resistance of pipes under an external load is relatively unimportant m. Reference 4 discusses the design ( of buried piping and states, in part: Satisfactory performances of steel pipe for over a century have proven that the principal function of a structure is to resist loads and that apparent bending stresses based on elastic theory are not of importance in.themselves when the ductility of the material in the shell permits deformation without service failure. Structural calculations have been performed to determine the stresses in the bipe wall for illustrative purposes. The calculations considered Spangler's method for determining the lateral soil pressures on the pipes using a soil modulus of 1,900 psit2al The results of this analysis are indicated on Table 34-1. This table shows the stresses in 36-inch and 26-inch diameter service water lines. It should be noted that the stresses in pipes smaller than 26-inch diameter will be relatively low and are not critical. Since the stresses due to internal pressure are minimal (about 8% and 5% for 36-inch and 26-inch diameter, respectively), the wall thicknesses of the buried Category I pipes are adequate 5 to withstand the external loads. Seismic Category I conduit used for electrical cables is embedded in concrete duct banks. These duct banks behave differently from buried pipes. The dead load from soil and liye load from vehicular traffic (e.g., railroad, construction cranes, etc) are transferred directly to the subsoil below the duct bank. These loadings only impose insignificant compressive stresses on the concrete. NOTES
- Cooper's E-80 railroad load, with an impact factor of 1.5, produces a load of approximately 2,000 lb/sq ft at a depth of 6 feet below grade.
This is the maximum vehicle load, enveloping the spent fuel cask, the heaviest construction crane (Manitowac-4100W load of about 1,000 lb/sq ft), and the HS-20 truck loadings (200 lb/sq ft) at 6 feet below the grade.
- 85% compaction in accordance with AASHO T-99 corresponds to 82% compaction according to ASTM D-1557-66T modified to obtain 20,000 foot-pounds of compactive energy per cubic foot of soil.
f Revision 5 34-2 2/80
~ l l REFERENCES l 1. Steel Plate Engineering Data, Volume 3, American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), 1977 2. Steel Pipe Design and Installation, American Waterworks Association, Manual M-11, 1964 5 3. Spangler,-Merlin G. and Richard L. Handy, Soil Engineering, 1973 4. " Design and Deflection Control of Buried Steel Pipe Supporting Earth Loads and Live Loads," Proceedings, American Society for Testing and Materials ( ASTM), 57:1233, 1957 e 34-3 ^ " " -+ ~,,
~ ( TABLE 34-1 STRESS IN BURIED PIPES DUE TO DEAD LOAD OF SOIL AND LIVE LOAD FROM COOPER'S E-80 RAILROAD LOADING Soil Modulus - E'=1,900 psi (85% Compaction AASHO T-99 Specification) Pipe Diameter 36 in. 26 in. Wall Thickness 3/8 in. 3/8 in. 5 Yield Stress (ksi) 38 38 Stress (ksi) Internal +3.1 +2.2 pressure (uniform) External -0.7 -0.4 loads (maximum) g Ring Bending +26.9 +20.5 Vertical Displacement l'. 4 % 1.1% (% of Diameter) n 4 s 1 34-4 ^ ~
j,(g__ ~ j '. bJdht%1b APPENDIX D Response to Question 49 of NRC Requests Regarding Plant Fill The portion of the response which addresses -Question 49, Part c2 (Pages 49-3 to 49-7) is included 4 4 12/10/81 j
c Reponse (Question 49, Part c) The measured distance (x) is 325 feet as shown in Figures 24-1 and 24-5, not 240 feet as stated in the Question. Tne 325 feet is the shortest distance between the critical structures and the recharge source. Response (Question 49, Part cl) The analysis given in response to Question 24(a) is based on actual observations of the groundwater level rise in piezo- ~ meters l located at the diesel generator building as compared to records of filling the cooling pond from el 621.8' to 627.4' (Figures 24-3 and 24-4). The calculated apparent per-meability of 11 feet per day was confirmed as a represen- -tative value by long-term aquifer pumping tests PD-SC, PD-15A, and PD-20-[see response to Question 24(b)]. In summary, it is not necessary to revise the recharge. analysis presented in Question 24(a) because the values used are correct. This i analysis will be verified by the full-scale construction de-watering test discussed in the response to Question 47(lc). It should be noted that the permeability values presented and discussed in this response, and the response to Ques-tion 24, are expressed in units of feet per_ day. Feet per second, as cited in the above question, were not used in any calculations or presentations. Response (Question 49, Part c'2) 10 The response to Question 24(c) discussed failure of a dewatering system header line, the concrete pipe pond blowdown line, or the concrete pipe cooling tower line. 4 To respond to this question, we have postulated a nonmechan-istic failure of a Unit 2 circulating water discharge pipe near.the diesel generator building because it is the largest pipe near a critical structure (Figure 49-1). Potential haz-ards resulting from this failure were assessed by determining the length of time necessary for the rise in water level to activate a permanent area dewatering well, and the height which the water level would attain at the edge of the criti' cal struc-ture at that time. It was determined that groundwater levels would be significantly below the critical elevation (el 610') l when the permanent area dewatering wells would be activated. Analysis of the water level rise along the eastern side of the diesel generator building assumes the following. 1. The high-level switch in the permanent dewatering well would be activated due to a water level rise of 0.10 feet above el 595'. l l Revision 10 49-3 11/80 l
~ e f 2. The change in water -level (caused by the pipe f ailure) to ~ initiate flow to the well is.1.0 foot and is applied instantaneously. 3.- The effective porosity of the backfill is 0.30 (Davis -l and DeWeist, 1966). 4. The failure would occur at the location closest to the structure, yet at the farthest distance from any perma-nent dewatering well (60 feet). 5. The average depth of flow is 5.5 feet. This depth is-the average of the saturated thickness of sand at the well (5 feet) and the saturated thickness at the f ail-ure (6 feet). 6. The permeability of the backfill is 11 f t/ day. (Refer to PD-20 pumping test, Table 24-1.) The length of time before the high-level switch on the per-manent area dewatering well would be activated due to a water level rise of 0.10 foot can be calculated from the solution to the linearized' form of the Boussinesq equation (adapted from Bear, 1972). When the difference in head is small with respect to the average depth of flow, the equation may be solved for the boundary conditions: I h=H X=0 t>0 h=0 X>0 t=0 The solution adapted from Bear, 1972, is: h=H 1-erf ( 4Khg/n, j g where h = water level rise at x (L) H = water level rise at x = 0 (L) n, = effective porosity t = time since initial water level rise at x = 0 (T) x = distance (L) I h = average depth of flow (L) K = permeability (L/T) erf = error function Revision 10 49-4 11/80 1.
~ l i ( Solving the equation for time shows that it would take 3.3 days before a water level rise of 0.10 feet above el 595' would be detected at the closest permanent area dewatering well. At that time, the area dewatering well pump would be actuated and begin-to lower the water level (see response to Question 51). The height of the' groundwater mound along the eastern edge of the structurc can lue calculated using the following. 1. The pipe consists of welded carbon steel having an internal coating for corrosion protection. 2. The pipe is low pressure. (10 psi). 3. The pipe is located 5 feet east of the diesel generator building. 4. The top of the pipe is at el 610' and the bottom at el 602'. i 5. The entire cross-sectional area of the pipe is open to the backfill sand (96-inch diameter). 6. The bottom of natural sand is at el 590' (Figure 24-12). 7. The groundwater-level at the time of the pipe break is 10 at el 595'. i 8. The length of the flowpath from the pipe break to the groundwater table is 7 feet. 9. The maximum allowable height of water beneath the Seismic Category I structure is el 610'. o The quantity of water flowing from the pipe into the backfill sand (assuming steady-state conditions occur instantaneously) can be calculated using Darcy's law: Q ='KA where 3 Q = flowrate from pipe (L /T) K = permeablity of backfill sand (L/T) A = area of flow (cross-sectional area of pipe) (L2) h = total head drop between the pipe and the water table (L) L = distance from pipe bottom to water table (L) i Revision 10 49-5 11/80 ..2.-
e ~ The total head drop between the pipe and the water table is composed of the pressure head (23.1 feet) and elevation head (15 feet) for a total head of 38.1 feet. The calculagion shows a total inflow to the backfill sand of 3,011 ft / day. The water level rise along the eastern side of the diesel generator building, 3.3 days after the failure, can be calculated for a vertically downward uniform rate of recharge from an assumed rectangular area, as developed by Walton (1970) from Hantush (1967): W'Et S S-(b,+x)$d,1.37(a,+y) h, -h W* 1.37 = 1 S S +W* 1.37 (b, + x) 1.37 (a, - y)gd r-r. +W* 1.37 (b - x) Y Y 1.37 (a + y)\\ E- \\E, S S +W* 1.37 (b,- x) y,1.37 (a, - y) ~* where 7 initial height of water table'above bottom of natural 10 h i = sand (L) h = height of water table with recharge above bottom of natural sand (L) 3 W,= recharge rate (L /T/L ) E = 0.5 (hg + h,) (L) t = time after recharge starts (T) S = specific yield of aquifer y famI f 8m i i W* ( a, S ) = I erf ( h jl erfl dT i b,=one-halfwidthofrechargea[ ream j(L) ( \\ x, y = coordinates at observation point in relation to center. of recharge area (L) 3 T = coefficient of transmissibility (L /T/L) a,= one-half length of recharge area (L) l Revision 10 49-6 11/80 l l
To solve for h,, the following values were used: D hg = 5 feet W = 351.9 gallons per day per square foot 3 3 3,011 ft / day x 7.48 gal /ft x 8 ft x 8 f t m = 0.5 (5 + h,) t = 3.3 days S = 0.30 (S ssn,) y y lW"...} = 0. 09 4 b,= 4 feet x = 9 feet y = 0 feet T = 411.4 gallons per day per foot (11 ft/ day x 5 ft x 7.48 gal /ft3) a, = 4 f ee t 10 Substituting these values into the equation and solving I quadratically, the height of water level rise (h is 12.1 along the eastern s$de of the dTe)sel gener-feet (el 607.1') ator building 3.3 days after the failure. Therefore, in the unlikely event of a nonmechanistic failure of a circulating water discharge pipe, there is sufficient time for the permanent area dewatering wells in the diesel generator building area to detect and begin renoving water before the levels would rise above el 610' beneath the structure. Response (Question 49, Part c3) In the unlikely event that the interceptor wells and the backup interceptor wells cannot be repaired, sufficient time exists to replace the system before groundwater levels exceed el 610' beneath critical structures. To demonstrate that sufficient time exists to install a replacement system, a full-scale test will be conducted with the construction dewatering system (se,e response to Question 47(le)]. Revision 10 49-7 11/80 ~ - + - - - e-W g w,--- , -, - - ---- --,- --=- mi-y y, re--y*werec.m,---,e---w---- ,-.w-,-- ..w.,, ,w w w.ve -yec, wyyy--}}