ML20087A141

Proposed Tech Specs Page 3.13-4 Re Containment High Range Radiation Monitors

ML20087A141
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/20/1991
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
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ML20087A140	List: ML20087A136 ML20087A141
References
NUDOCS 9201080209
Download: ML20087A141 (1)

Text

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As the safety valves present distinctly different concerns than those related to relief valves. the technical specifications are separated as to the actions taken upon inoperability. Clearly, the actuation of a safety valve will be irranediately detectaMe by observed increase in drywell pressure. Further confirmation can be gained by observing reactor pressure and water level.

Operator action in asponse to these symptoms would be taken regardless of the acoustic monitoring system status. Acoustic monitors act only to confirm the reseating of the safety valve. In actuality, the operator actions in response to the lifting of a safety val e will not change whether or not the safety valve reseats. Therefore, the actions taken for inoperable acoustic monitors on safety valves are significantly less stringent than that taken for those monitors associated with relief valves.

Should an acoustic monitor on a safety valve become inoperable, setpoints on adjacent monitors will be reduced to assure alarm actuation should the safety valve lift, since it is of no importance to the operator as to which valves lift but only that one has lifted. Analyses, using very conservative blowdown forces and attenuation factors, show that reducing the alarm setpoint on adjacent monitors to less than 1.4g will assure alarm actuation should tha adjacent safety valve lift. Minimeim blowdown force considered was 309 with a maximum attenuation

, of 27dB. In actuality, a safety valve lift would result in considerably larger I

blowdown force. The maximum attenuation of 27dB was determined based on actual testing of a similar monitoring system installed in a similar configuration.

The operability of tha accident ronitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. The capability is consistent with NUREGs 0578 and 0737.

The capabi :s provided to detect and measure concentrat:ons of noble gas fission prt  ;., in (1) plant gaseous effluents and (2) in contain nent during and following ai, accident. For the plant gaseous effluent capability, two Radioactive ,

Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (RAGEMS) are installed at Oyster Creek. One system monitors releases at the main stack (RAGEMS I) and the other monitors the

, turbine building vents (RAGEMS II). For the in containment post-accident l capability, two high range radiation monitors are installed in the drywell. These l

monitors augment the capabilities provided by the Post Accident Sampling System (Technical Specification 6.17'and FSAR Section 11.5) and the Offsite Thermoluminescent 00simeter Program (Emergency Plan Section 7.5.2.2b). The Post Accident Sampling System represents a preplanned alternate method to the high I

range radiation monitors capable of being implemented to provide an estimate of radioactive material in containment under accident conditions.

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