ML20086J746
| ML20086J746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1991 |
| From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086J745 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9112120071 | |
| Download: ML20086J746 (14) | |
Text
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'. _ t..,
'3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING S1 STEMS 3/4.5.1 ECCS - OPERATING tIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
The core spray system (CSS) consisting of two subsystems with each subsystem comprised of:
1.
Two OPERABLE CSS pumps, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable' of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel.
i b.
The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system of the residual heat removal system consisting of two subsystems with each subsystem-comprised of:
1.
Two OPERABLE LPCI (RHR) pumps, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the-suppression chamber and transferring the water to the reactor Vessel.***
c.
The high pressure cooling injection (HPCI) system consisting of:
1.
One OPERABLE HPCI pump, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.
d.
The automatic depressurization system (ADS) with at least five OPERABLE ADS valves.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2* ** # and 3* **.
- The HPCI system is not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is_less than or equal to 150 psig.
- Upon receipt of an LPCI initiation signal, operator action is required to manually open the torus suction valves to facilitate LPCI' operation if the LPCI system is in the_RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation per
- pecification 3.4.9.1.
S See Special Test Exception 3.10.6.
9112120071 Y1120d
- POR ADOCK 05000341
- P PDR FLKf11 - UNIi z 3/4 5-1 i
v i.,
DiLRGENCY CORE COOLINGiSYSTEMS
[]'MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
ACIl0N:
a.
For.the core spray system:
1.
WithoneCSSsubsysteminopgrable,providedthatatleastoneLPCI pump in each LPCI subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable 1
CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7-days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4 b.
For the LPCI system:
- 1. -
With one LPCI pump in either or both LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump (s) to OPERABLE status within-7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
WithoneLPCIsubsystemothgrwiseinoperable,providedthatboth CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI j
subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next-12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.
With a LPCI ~ system cross-tie valve closed, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24-hours.
4.
With both LPCI subsystems otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.*
5.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the purpose of establishing the RHR system in the LPCI made once the reactor vessel pressure is greater than the RHR cut-in permissive setpoint.
c.
For the HPCI system, provided the CSS, the LPCI system #, the ADS and l
the RCIC system are OPERABLE:
1.
With the HPCI system inoperable, restore the-HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUIDOWN-within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam' dome pressure to s 150 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Whenever two or more RHR subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this liCTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature
- as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.
Except one CSS subsystem and one LPCI subsystem may be inoperable due to a lack of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of Specification 3.7.1.2 are taken.
i FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. E,
'. t PLANT SYSTFES EMERGENCY E0VIPtiGT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 Two independent emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
a.
One OPERABLE EECW pump, and b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of removing heat from the associated safety-related equipmat.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
ACTION:
a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, with one EECW system subsystem I
inoperable:
1.
Within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:
a)
Verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, I
components and devices that depend upon the remaining I
OPERABLE EECW system subsystem are also OPERABLE, and b)
Verify that the ADS
- is OPERABLE.
Otherwise**, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I
and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
l I
2.
Declare the associated safety-related equipment inoperable and take the ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications.
3.
Restore the inoperable EECW system subsystem to OPERABLE I
status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within I
I the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24
- hours, b.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5, determine the OPERABILITY of the I
safety-related equipment associated with an inoperable EECW system I
I subsystem and take any ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications.
I l
l l
~
I
- ADS is not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 150 PSIG.
I
- Except for an inoperable Drywell Cooling Ur.it, required by Specification I
3.7.11, that depends on the remaining OPERABLE EECW system subsystem.
In this case, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.11 for the inoperability of both required Drywell Cooling Units.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. S,
PLANT SYSTEMS SVRVElltANCE REUVIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The emergency equipment cooling water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At-least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipment. actuates to its isolation position and the associated EECW pump automatically starts on an automatic actuation test signal.
l-FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-3a Amendment No. A9, l
',t.=,
PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY E0VIPMENT SERVICE WATER SYSTEB LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 Two-independent emergency equipment = service water (EESW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
a.
One OPERABLE emergency equipment service water pump, and b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the associated ultimate heat sink and transferring the water through the associated EECW heat exchanger.
APPLICABillTY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
6LIJDJi:
With one EESW system subsystem inoperable, declare the associated EECW system i
subsystem inoperable tnd take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2.
SUjlVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3 The emergency equipment service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying the EESW pump automatically starts upon receipt of an actuation test signal.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. ES, 1
o.,
EllC_TRICAL POWER SYSTEMS-
~3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES D.C. SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
-3.8.2.1 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Division I, consisting of:
1.
130 VDC Battery 2A-1.
2.
130 VDC Battery 2A-2, 3.
Two 130 VDC full capacity chargers, b.
Division-II, consisting of:
1.
130 VDC Battery 28-1.
2.
130 VDC Battery 2B-2.
3.
Two 130 VDC full capacity chargers.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With a battery charger in eiuier Division I or Division II of the above D.C. electrical power sources inoperable, restore the inoperable battery charger to OPERABLE status or replace with the spare battery charger within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b.
With either Division I or Division II of the above required D.C.
electrical power sources otherwise inoperable, restore the inoperable division to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN withinthgnext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, j
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1 Each of the above required 130-volt batteries and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
1.
The parameters 11 Table 4.8.2.1-1 meet the Category A limits, and 2.
Total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 130 volts on float' charge, b.
At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 105 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 150 volts, by 1
verifying that:
1.
The parameters in Table 4.8.2.1-1 meet the Category B limits,
- This ACTION may be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for Division II battery chargers I
and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for Division I battery chargers made inoperable due to loss of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of Specification 3.7.1.2 are taken.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No.
i.,
ELECTRICAL P0';!G SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION S1SJ1M_ji plSTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 The following power distribution system divisions and busses shall be energized with tie breakers open between redundant busses within the unit:
a.
A.C. power distribution:
1.
Division 1, consisting of:
a) 4160V RHR Complex Busses llEA and 12EB.
b) 4160V Reactor Building Busses 64B and 640.
c) 480V RHR Complex Busses 72EA and 72EB.
d) 480V Reactor Building Busses 72B and 720.
c) 120V Division I 1&C Power Supply Unit, MPU l.
2.
Division II, consisting of:
a) 4160V RHR Complex Bust.es 13EC and 14ED.
b) 4160V Reactor Building Busses 65E and 65F.
c) 480V RHR Complex Busses 72EC and 72ED.
d) 480V Reactor Building Busses 72E and 72F.
e) 120V Division 11 I&C Power Supply Unit, MPU 2.
3.
Swing Bus, consisting of:
a) 480V MCC 72CF.
b.
D.C. power distribution:
1.
Division 1, consisting of:
a) 130-volt D.C. Distribution Cabinet 2PA-2.
2.
Division II, consisting of:
a) 130-volt D.C. Distribution Cabinet 2PB-2.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With one of the above required A.C. distribution system divisions not energized, reenergize the division within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at withinthefollowing24 hours,gext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWN j
least HOT SHUTDOWN within the b.
With one of the above required D.C. distribution system divisions not energized, reenergize the division within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
With the swing bus not energized or the swing bus automatic throwover scheme inoperable, declare both low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system subsystems inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.1.
"This ACTION may be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for Division II A.C. distribution j
system components and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for Division I A.C. distribution components
'I made inoperable due to loss of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of Specification 3.7.1.2 are taken.
I FERMI - UNii 2 3/4 8-14 Amendment No. U,
', t 3/4.5 EMERCENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEtj BASES JL4 4 1 an_d 3/4.5.2 ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOW 4
The core spray system (CSS), together with the LPCI mode of the RHR system, is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss of-coolant accident and provides adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the ADS.
The CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized and a source for flooding of the core in case of accidental draining.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functiona: test requires reactor shutdown The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
If LPCI injection is required when the LPCI system is in the RHR shutdown cooling-mode of operation, the motor-operateo torus suction valves will require manual operator realignment to facilitate thi; ECCC operation.
All other LPCI components will automatically realign or st.irt as necessary.
The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is provided to assure that the core is adequately-cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two subsystems, each with two pumps, provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI system will be OPERABLE when equired. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor
(
shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water j
hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel.
The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized.
The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the pressure at which CSS system operation or LPCI mode of the RHR system operation maintains core cooling.
l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1
',s, D1[RGENCY_ CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued)
The capacity of the system is selected to provide the required core cool ing.
The HPCI pump is designed to deliver greater than or equal to 5000 gpm at differential pressures between 1120 and 150 psid.
Initially, water from the condensate storage tank is used instead of injecting water frcm the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank water.
With the HPCI tystem inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems.
In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pre;sures on a reactor low water level condition.
The HPCI out-of-service pected of '.4 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system.
The surveill;nce requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all actit,. components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown.
The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and t. provide cooling at the earliest moment.
Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can er.ter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less _than 2200*F.
ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig.
This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.
ADS automatically controls five selected safety / relief valves although the safety analysis only takes credit for four valves.
It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve 's be out of service for up to 14 days without materially reducing system re)
- i;ty.
The Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system provides necessary support to all ECCS equipment except the ADS. When a divisional EECW I
subsystem is inoperable, the affected ECCS systems are all located ir. the same I
division.
This situation is addressed ty a footnote which makes the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I
I ACTION time of Specification 3.7.1.2 limiting if no other equipment is inoperable.
This is acceptable since the unaffected ECCS division contains I
f, sufficient capability to safely soutdown the plant. The check of opposite division equipment required by Specification 3.7.1.2 and the ACTIONS of this F'RMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.
?
- ne
,3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES ECCS - OPERATING and 5HUTDOWN (Continued)
Specification assure that a loss of safety function does not go undetected.
l 3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA.
This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core.
The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.
Repair work might require mt !ing the suppression chamber inoperable.
This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200'F, since pressure suppression is not required below 212'F.
The minimum water volume is based on NPSH recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus a 2.4' safety margin for conservatism, iERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.
, h 'o, 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1-SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptab'io limits.
The Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system supports a wide range of safety-related equipment.
To assure the proper ACTIONS are promptly I
taken the ACTION requires that the associated safety-related equipment made I
inoperable by the loss of EECW support be immediately declared inoperable and I
the ACTIONS of the applicable Specifications be taken, it is not intended I
that equipment associated with the EECW subsystem which is not made inoperable by the loss of EECW be declared inoperable.
When one EECW subsystem is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION I
requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, I
components and-devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE EECW subsystem.
I are also OPERABLE. The ADS is also verified to be OPERABLE due to its close I
association with EECW supported systems.
These requirements are intended to I
provide assurance that a complete loss of safety function of critical systems I
does not exist during the period one of the EECW subsystems is inoperable.
I I
'The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components sre I
out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons.
It does not mean to perform I
.the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the I
component.
l The tiltimate Heat Sink consist of two 50% capacity Residual Heat Removal (RHR) reservoirs _which must be capable of being cross-connected.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.5.b.2 assures that the ability to cross-connect the two reservoirs is not compromised in the event of a failure of a single electrical power source.
3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency filtration system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design basis accident conditions.
l Continuous operation of the system with heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with l
control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to pers nnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its I
equivalent.
This limitation is consistant with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.
1 FERMI - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. EJ, l
- 4 PLANT SYSTEMS-pASES 124.7.3 SHORE BARRIER PROTECTION The purpose of the shore barrier is to protect the site backfill from wave erosion.
Category 1 structures are designed to withstand the impact of waves up to 5.4 feet.
So long as the backfill is in place, waves greater than 5.4 feet cannot impact Category 1 structures because of the lack of sufficient depth of water to sustain such waves.
The shore barrier can sustain a high degree of damage and still perform its function, protecting the site backfill from erosion.
Thus the operability condition for operation of the shore barrier has been written to ensure that severe damage to the structure will not gc ut. detected for a substantial period of time and provide for prompt NRC notification and corrective action.
3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISQLATION COOLING SYSTRj The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is_provided to assure adequate core cooling-in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment.
The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig.
This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system.
The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.1, 2, and_3 when reactor vcssel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS saurce of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.
FERMI - UNIT 2-B 3/4 7-la Amendment No. 51 l
--. - ~ ---
- e Ws, s
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS M.SJS 3/4.8,1. 3/4.8 Land _,3/4.8.3 A.C SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER 211LPltM11ON SY5_TJJiS T
The OPERABILITY uf tie A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipaent required for (1) the safe shutdown of the facility and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility.
The minimum specified independer.t and redundant A.C. ard D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 of Appendix "A" to -10 CFR 50.
The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation.
The OPERABILITY of the power-sources is consistent with the initial conditi a assumptions of the safety analyses and is based upon maintaining at least one of the onsite A.C. and the corresponding D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. or D.C. source.
The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Power Sources", December 1974. When one diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE.
This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power event will not result in La complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is inoperable.
The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by' examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for
-maintenance or other reasons.
It does not mehn to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.
.The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C..and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that (1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the
- diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies", December 1979; Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 1, August 1977; and Regulatory Guide 1.137, " Fuel-0il Systems for Standby Diesel Generators", Revision 1, October 1979.
FERMI - UNIT 2 8 3/4 8-1
i top,
l ELECTRICAL POWLR SYSTDiS fLASES m.2@(ES. D.C. SOURCES. and ANSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)
Ar s
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the unit batteries are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129 " Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storago Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1972, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.
Table 4.8.2.1-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for elet.trolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity.
The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific
)
Cravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the ranufacturer's full l
charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity.
The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.
Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8.2.1-1 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7-day period:
(1) the allowable values for electrolytc level ensures no physi al damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (i) the a;10wable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.020 below the manufacturer s full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.
The battery chargers and A.C. distribution systems rely on the Emergency i
I Equipment Cooling Water (EEC'J) system to cool the associated rooms where this I
equipment is located. These components retain substantial capability without I
cooling following an accident.
Based upon this capability, provisions have been made to delay the ACTION requirements for the inoperability of these l
components if caused by the lack of EECW cooling.
l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 2,
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