Text

Proposed Tech Spec 2.7 Re Availability of Electric Power
	ML20086C925
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	11/11/1991
From:	; OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20086C915	List: ML20086C911; ML20086C921; ML20086C925;
References
	NUDOCS 9111250162
	Download: ML20086C925 (25)
	v • d • e

._,

2.0 '

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 9

'2.7 Electrical Systems Apolicability Applies to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant components.

Objective To define those conditions of electrical pcwer availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and the continuing availability of engineered safety features.

Soeci6 cations (1)

Minimum Recuirements The reactor coolant shall not be heated up or maintained at temperatures above 300*F unless the following electrical systems are operable:

a.

Unit auxiliary power transformers TilA-l or -2 (4,160 V).

b.

House service transformers TilA-3 and 4 (4,160 V).

c.

4,160 V engineered safety feature buses l A3 and 1 A4.

d.

4,160 V/480 V Transformers TilB-3A, TI1B-38, T11B-3C, TI1B-4A, TI1B-4B, TI1B-4C.

e.

480 V distribution buses IB3A, IB3 A-4A, IB4 A, IB3B, IB3B-4B, l'84B, IB3C, IB3C-4C,1B4C.

l f.

MCC No. 3A1,3B1, 3A2,3Cl, 3C2,4Al,4A2,4Cl and 4C2.

g.

125 V d-c buses No. I and 2 (Panels EE-8F and EE-8G).

h.

125 V d< distribution panels A41-41 A and A41-41B.

i.

120V a-c Four instrument a-e buses A, B, C, and D (Panels Al-40A.B.C.

and D).

j.

120V a-c instrument Danela Al-42A and AI-428.

k.

Two Station batteries Nc. I and 2 (EE-8A and EE-8B) including at4 east one battery charger on each 125V Sq IAG-bus No. I and 2 (EE-8F and EE-80).

1.

Both diesel generators, with a full engine base day tank and a minimum of 16,000 gallons of fuel-in the underground storage tank.

l 2-32 011: r.ot62 911111 FDR ADOCK 03000285 P

PDR

' 2,0 '

LIMrl'ING CONDIJ10NS FORDEERATION

,7 Electrical Systems (Continued) 2 (2)

Modification of Minimum Requirements The minimum requirements may be modified to the extent that one of the following conditions will be allowed after the reactor coolant has been heated above 300 F made critical.1103rver. the reactor shall not be made critical unless all. minimum requirements are met. If any of the provisions of these exceptions are violated, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within its following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If the violation is not corrected within an additional 12 24 houu, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

a.

Both unit auxiliary power transformers T11A-1 and -2 (4.16 kV) may be inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the operability of both diesel generators is demonstrated immediately, b.

House +ervice-transformers-TIA-3-or-T4A 4-(4.-16kV)-may-be-inoperabk--

for-Sp -toene-weeki--House +ervice-t7ansformers--TI A4end 4-(4r16-kV)--

may-in-inope rable-for -up - to--24-hou rs--provided-4 he-operabili ty-of-botiv-die 3el-generators--is<lemonstrated-immediately,-end-the-NRG-is-notified--

immediattdyend -a-report-is-submitted 40-th e-NRG es-speeified-in-S eetion--

5.4-with-an-outline of-theplans-for-prompt-restoratiorvef-off-site-powee-and-the-add itionalprecautions-tabe-taken-while-the-transformers-areeut-obervicer Either house service transformer TI A-3 or TI A-4 _(4.16kV) may be inoperable for up to 7 days orovided the operability of the d_incLgwerator associated with the inoperable transformer is immediately verifici Notification by telephone shall be made to the Regional AdministrainI within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Continued operation beyond 7 days is permissible provided a report is sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the plans for prompt restoration of the transformer and the additional precautions te be taken while the transformer is out of service. and until notified differently by the NRC.

c.

Both hone service traqs[prmers TI A-3 and Tl A-4 (4.16kV) may be inocerable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months provided the opeability of both diesel generators is immediately verified. The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders both transformers inonerable. Notification by teleph.one shall be made to the Regional Administrator within 4 hourL

. Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is permissible provided a report is sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the olans for prompt restoration of the transformers and the additional crecautions to be taken while the transformers are out of service. and until notified differently by the NRC.

l 2-33 Amendment No. 25

1 i

2.0 '

LIMITIN.G CONDITIONS FOR OP}lMllON 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued) e.

d.

Either one of the 4.16 kV engineered safeguards buss, l A3 or I A4 may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the operability of the diesel generator associated with the operabic bus is demonstrated immediately and there are no inoperable engir-~ed safeguards components associated with the operable bus, d:

e.

One of each group of 4160 V/480 V Transformers (T11B-3A or 4A),

(TilB-3B or 4B), and (TI1B-3C or 4c) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated--with-4he--epemble-4ransformers-wHch are redundant to L

components on the inoperable transformer.

e.

f.

One of the 480 V distribution buses connected to bus l A3 or connected to bes l A4 may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components associated-with4he-operable-bus, which are redundant to comoonents on the inoperable bus.

f:

g, Either Group of MCC No,'s (3A1, 381, 3 A2, 3C1, 3C2,) or (4 Al, 4 A2, 4C1,4C2) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components associated-with-4he-operable-MGC47 which are redundant to comoonems on the inoperable MCC. b1CS 3Cl may be inoperable in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if battery chargers No. I and No.

2 are operable.

g:

h.

One of the four J2QV a-c instrument buses M. B. C or DJ may be inoperable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the reactor protective and engineered safeguards systems instrcment channels supplied by the remaining three buses are all operable.

h:

L Two battery chargers may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided battery charger No.1 (EE-8C) or No. 2 FED 8DJ is operable, i:

L Either one of the emprtency diesel generators [PG-1 or DG4) may be inoperable for up to seven days (total for both) during any month, provided the other diesel gencIalgt is started to verify operability, shutdown and controls are left in the automatic mode and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable diesel generator, b

k.

Island buso IB3 A-4A, IB3B-4B, and 1B3C-4C may be inoperable for up i

to 8 hou. provided there are no inoperable safeguards components awoeiated-with-the-opemble4us which are redundant to components on the inoperable busles).

k-L Either one of the 125V d-c DG buses No. I or ~2 (Panels EE-8F gr and EE-8G) may be inoperahle for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

2-34 Amendment No. 60 l

M7 IMO I 'M I, ELE

2.0 '

IJhllTlEG CONRITIONS IT)R OPERATION 2.7 Electrical SysteJns (Continued) h m.

Either one of the 125V d-c DG distribution panels Al-41 A at and Al-41B may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

nw n.

]iilher one of the 120y.Lc AG instrument panels AI-42A or AI-42B may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

tw h%+kV-transmission 4 int'may-beouter-service-and unit-opeunonmay--

contimie+Hhe4esotor-may-be-restarted 4 rome-hot-shutdown condition 4f-(i)-operebility-of-the-remaining-source-is-4mmediatelywerified-and--(ii)--

immediatemotification-is-made by-telephoneer-telegraph-t&4he-Director--

of-the4RG-RegimaWFfice-in--Arlington,--Texas-of-the 'oss-and-of-the--

plans-to-restere4he-electrie-power-wstem a>-itsfulkapabilityr-lluis The electrical system eqripment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards to jeopardize the plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.16 kV safeguads are supplied from two buses.

The vonnal source of auxiliary power with the plant at power for the safeguards buses is from the house service power transfonners being fed f rom the 161 kV incoming line with on-site emergency power from either one of two diesel generators and off-site standby power via the unit auxiliary transformers.m The loss of tbn_lblky_jacomingitRC rgnd. cts,thg_hquse service transformers (TI A-3 and Tl A-4) inoperable in that the transforulgts_.cnnnot supply oower to the 4.16kV safegyntdi_hmps 1 A3 and 1M.

The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require outside power for start up or operation.

Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 kV buses I A3 and 1 A4 are energized from the diesel generators. Sus load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out automatically.*

When the turbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can

- be isolated by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-Tl in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main transformer and the unit auxiliary power tmnsformers Cri A-1 and Tl A-2) to be returned to service.* The auxikgy_ post trans[ormers are not considered inonerable durine these none'1LpjanLslartun/ shutdown ItallInUtents, d

1 2-35 Amendment No M U

E

n

i.

l 2.0 '

LIMITINGXQNDLTIONS FOR OPEBAILON 2.7 I?cctrical Systems (Lontinued)

Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that loss of an cutire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DBA conditions. For example, if 4.16 kV bus l A3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, one in high pressure safety injection pumps one auxiliary feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, two a containment spray pamps and two containment air fans alc lost. This leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, two a high pressure safety injection pumps, one component cooling water pump, one le containment spray pumps and two contaimnent air fans which is more than sufficient to control containment pressme below the design value during the DBA.

The total fue' oil engine base tank capacity of 550 gallons on each diesel is considered more than adequate since approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months running time (worst case loading) is available before transfer of fuel oil from the 18,000 gallon underground storage tar.ks is mandatory. Two 13 gpm diesel oil transfer pumps per diesel, with each being fed from the diesel it is associa*.ed with, are available for transferring fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tanks. Tl:e 16,000 gallons in the storage tank, in addition to the day tanks will provide diesel operation under the required loading conditions for a minimum period of 7 days shou'd only one diesel be in operhtion. It is considered incredible not to be able to secure fuel oil from one of several sources in the vicinity of Omaha in less than three days under the worst of weather conditions.

One battery charger on each battery shall be operating sa that the batteries will always be at ful! charge; this ensures that adequate d-c power will be avilible available for all emergency uses. Each battery has one battery charger permanently connected with a third charger capable of being connected to either battery bus. The chargers are cach rated.for 200 4.00 amperet at 130 volts. Except4cr4he4irsominute Following a DBA during-which the batteries anct the charger aceommodate uR4heted,4he<apacityof the-battery-cherger will handle all required loads. Each of the reactor protective system channels instrumentation channels is sapplied by one of the a-c 'mstrument ouses. The removal of one of the a-c 4.wrument buses is permitted as the 2-of-4 logic may be manually changed to a 2-of-3 logic without compromising safety.

The engineered safeguards instrument channels use a-c instrument huses (one redundant bus for each channel) and d-c buses (cac redundant bus for each logic circuit). The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the two of four logic a'itomatically becomes a two of three logic.

References (1) FSAR, USAR Section 8.3.1.2 (2) FSAR, ILSAR Section 8.4.1 (3) FSAR, USAE Section 3.2.2 2-36 B

8 3'

3 m

g T

I&llLE A-10

]X)ST-ACCIDENT h10NIIQ10EG INSTRUMENTAllON OPERATING I FilIS Minimum Operable 1119tittttcal Clutttilch AC11011 1.

C.utainment Wide Range Radiation 2

(a) hionitors (RM-091 A & B) 2.

Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

(

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM 0631{ (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a) 3.

Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 1

(a)

(RM-064) 4 Containment flydrogen Monitor (VA 81 A & B) 2 (b)(c) 5.

Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 52 & LT-600) 1 (d)

Wide Range (LT-387 & LT 388) 2 (b)(c) 6.

Containment Wide Range Pressure 2

(b)(c) 7.

Reactor Coolant Systen, Subcooled Margin Monitor 2

(c)(f) 8.

Core Exit Thermocouples (i) 2/ Core Quadra.,

(g)(h) 9.

Reactor Vessel Level (llJTC) (j) 2 (k)(1)

(a)

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and 1.

cither restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or 2.

prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

(b)

With one channelinoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least 110T SIIUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2-98 Amendment No. 84,82,83,87,4-10

i IAlllE 2-10 (Continutdl 11)ST-ACCIDENTMONilORING 1NSIRGil3IM10N_01'12ATINGilMIIS (c)

With hot both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERAllLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least ilOT SilUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(d)

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.

(c)

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either 1.

restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERAllLE status within 7 days, or 2.

initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or 3.

be in at least liOT SliUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(f)

With both channels inoperable, 1.

restore the inoperabic channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or 2.

initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or 3.

be in at least ilOT S11UTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(g)

With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocepples ocr core quadiani channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, eithen restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least IIOT SliUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(h)

With alLCOLe Exit Thermocouples within a core quadrant bothwhannels inoperable, either restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple 15) channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least IlOT SilUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(i)

With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples less than the four per_ core Quadraal required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least four OPERABLE channels Core Exit Thermocouples ocr core quadrant witnin seven days of discovery of loss of operability, or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days, outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans for restoring the inoperable Core Exit Tncimocouplcls) channel to OPERABLE status.

(j)

A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPTRABl.E.

2-98a Amendment No. 440

?.0' Llh101NG CONDITIONS FOR OPEl(AllDE

'2.7 Electrical Systems ApJilicatslity Applies to the availability of electrical pnwer for the operation of plant components.

Oldec11rc To def' e those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe m

reactor operation and the continuing avaibbility of engineered safety features.

Sredrications (1)

Minimum ReQukemcD15 The reactor coolant shall not be heated or maintained at temperatures above 300"F l

unless the followinF clectrical systems are operable:

a.

Unit auxiliary power transformers TI A-1 or -2 (4,160 V).

I b.

1 louse service transformers TI A 3 and 4 (4,160 V).

I c.

4,160 V engineered safety feature buses l A3 and 1 A4.

d.

4,160 V/480 V Transformers TIB-3A, Till 311, Till 3C, Till-4A, TIB-l 48, TlB-4C.

l e.

480 V distribution buses IB3A, iB3 A-4A, IB4A, IB3B,111311-411,1841),

1B3C,1B3C-4C, iB4C.

f.

MCC No, 3Al,3B1, 3A2,3Cl, 3C2,4Al,4A2,4C1 and 4C2.

g.

125 V d-e buses No. I and 2 (Panels EE-8F and EE 8G).

h.

125 V d-e distribution panels Al 41 A and Al 41B.

I i.

120V a-c instrument buses A, B, C, and D (Panels Al-40A,11, C and D).

l j.

120V a-c instrument panels Al-42A and Al-428.

I k.

Station batteries No. I and 2 (EE-8A and EE 811) including one battery I

charger on each 125V d-e bus No. I and 2 (EE-8F and EE-8G).

l 1.

Both diesel generators, with a full engine base day tank and a minimum of 16,000 gallons of fuel in the underground storage tank.

2-32 l

l

2.0 '

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

(2)

Modification of Minimum Requittmcals The minimum requirements may be modifit<l to the extent that one of the following conditions will be allowed after the reactor coolant has been heated above 300"F.

I llowever, the reactor shall not be made critical unless all minimum requirements are I

met. if any of the provisions of these exceptions are violated, the reactor shall be placed I

in a hot shutdown condition within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If the violation is not I

corrected within an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown l

condition within an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

I a.

Both unit auxiliary power transformers TI A 1 and -2 (4.16 kV) may be I

i inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the operability of both diesel generators is demonstrated immediately, b.

Either house sen> ice transformer TI A-3 or TI A-4 (4.16kV) may be l

inoperable for up to 7 days provided the operability of the diesel generator I

associated with the inoperable transformer is immediately verified.

I Notification by telephone shall be made to the Regional Administrator l

within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

I Continues aperation beyond 7 days is permissible provided a report is sent I

to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the plans for prompt restoration of I

the transformer and the additional precautions to be taken while tri i

transformer is out of service, and until notified differently by the NRC.

I c.

Both house service transformers TI A 3 and TI A-4 (4.16kV) may be I

inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months provided the operability of both diesel I

generators is immediately verified. The loss of the 161kV incoming line I

renders both transformers inoperable. Notification by telephone shall be l

made to the Regional Administrator within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

l l

Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is permissible provided a report is I

sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the plans for prompt restoration I

of the transformers and the additional precautions to be taken while the l

transformers are out of service, and until notified differently by the NRC.

l l

2-33 Amendment No. 25 l

' 2,0

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued) d.

Either one of the 4.16 kV engineered safeguards buses,1 A3 or I A4 may l

be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the operability of the diesel generator associated with the operable bus is demonstrated immediately and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable bus.

e.

One of each group of 4160 V/480 V Transformers (TlB-3A or 4A),

I (TlB 3B or 4B), and (TIB-3C or 4C) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l

provided there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components which l

are redundant to components on the inoperable transformer.

I f.

One of the 480 V distribution buses connected to bus l A3 or connected I

to bus l A4 may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components which are redundant to components on l

the inoperable bus.

g.

Either Group of MCC No.'s (3A1, 3B1, 3A2, 3Cl, 3C2,) or (4 Al,4 A2, 4C1,4C2) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no l

inoperable safeguards components which are redundant to components on i

the inoperable MCC. MCC 3Cl may be inoperable in exces, of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l

if batter i :hargers No. I and No. 2 are operable.

I h.

One of the four 120V a c instrument buses (A, B, C or D) may be I

inoperable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the reactor protective and engineered safeguards systems instrument channels supplied by the remaining three buses are all operable.

i.

Two battery chargers may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided I

battery charger No.1 (EE-8C) or No. 2 (EE-8D) is operable.

l j.

Either one of the emergency diesel generators (DG-1 or DG-2) may be I

inoperable for up to seven days (total for both) during any month, provided the other diesel generator is started to verify operability, l

shutdown and controls are left in the automatic mode and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable diesel generator.

k.

Island buses IB3A-4 A,183B-48, and IB3C-4C may be inoperable for up l

. to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components which I

are redundant to components on the inoperable bus (es).

I 1.

Either one of the 125V d-c buses No.1 or 2 (Panels EE-8F or EE-8m i

may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

2-34 Amendment No. 60

l 2.0' l.IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Sysicm3 (Continued) m.

Either one of the 125V d e distribution panels Al-41 A or Al-4111 may bc l

inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , n.

Either one of the 120V a-c instrument panels Al-42A or Al-42Il may be 1

inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

lluis The electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards tojeopardLt da plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.4 kV s. Nguard Tre supplied from two buses.

The normal source of auxil!ary power w.9h de p1v> at power for the safeguards buses is from the house service power transformco J.g fed from the 161 kV incoming line with on-site emergency power fron: either oro of two diesel generators ar.d off site standby power via the unit auxiliary transfonners.m The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders the house semice transformers (TI A 3 and TI A-4) inoperable in that the l

transformers cannot supply power to the 4.16kV safeguards buses I A3 and 1 A4.

l The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require outside power for start up or operation.

Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 kV buses l A3 and 1 A4 are energized from the diesel generators.13us load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out automatically

When the turbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can be isolated by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-Tl in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main transformer and the unit auxiliary power transformers (Tl A-1 and TI A-2) to be returned to service." The auxiliary power l

transformers are not considered inoperable during these normal plant startup/ shutdown l

realignments.

I i

l 2-35 Amendment No. 76

2.0 '

LIMITIEG CONDITIONS FOILOIERAIKhN 2.7 Electrical Sy.skms (Continued)

Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that loss of an entire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DilA conditions. For example, if 4.16 kV bus I A3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, two high pressure safety injection pumps, one auxiliary I

feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, one containment spray pump and I

two containment air fans are lost. This leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, one high pressure safety injection pump, one component cooling I

watir pump, two containment spray pumps and two containment air fans which is more l

than tufficient to control containment pressure below the design value during the DilA.

The total fuel oil engine base tank capacity of 550 gallons on each diesel is considered more than adequate since approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months running time (worse case loading) is available befere transfer of fuel oil from the 18,000 gallon underground storage tank is mandatory. Two 13 gpm diesel oil transfer pumps per diesel, with each being fed from the diesel it is associated with, are available for transferring fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tanks. The 16,000 gallons in the storage tank in addition to the day tanks will provide diesel operation under the required loading conditions for a minimum of 7 days should only one diesel be in operation. It is considered incredible not to be able to secure fuel oil from one of several sources in the vicinity of the Omaha in less than three days under the worst of weather conditions.

One battery charger on each battery shall be operating so that the batteries will always be at full charge; this ensures that adequate d-c power wi!! be available for all emergency I

uses. Each battery has one battery charger permanently connected with a third charger capable of being connected to either battery bus. The chargers are each rated for 400 t

amperes at 130 volts. Following a DBA the batteries and the charger will handle all l

required loads.

Each of the reactor protective system instrumentation channels is I

supplied by one of the a-c instrument buses. The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the 2-of-4 logic may be manually changed to a 2-of-3 logic without coa. promising safety.

The engineered safeguards instrument channels use a-c instrument buses (one redundant bus for each channel) and d-c buses (one redundant bus for each logic circuit). The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the two of four logic automatically becomes a two of thrce logic.

Referenen

'i 1 5 AR Section 8.3.1.2 1

(2) USAR Section 8.4.1 1

(3) USAR Section 8.2.2 l

2-36

T TABLE 3e10 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING LIMITS Minimum Operable Instrument

. Channels Arthn i

1.

Containment Wide Range Radiation 2

(a)

Monitors (RM-091 A & B)

. 2.

Wide Range Noble Gas Stad Monitor RM 063L (Noble Gas cortion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a) 3.

Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 1

(a)

(RM-064) 4.

Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81 A & B) 2 (b)(c) 5.

Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d) l Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c) 6.

Containment Wide Range Pressure 2

(b)(c) l l

7.

Reactor Coolant System Subcooled Margin Monitor 2

(c)(f) 8.

Core Exit Thermocouples (i) -

.2/ Core Quadrant (g)(h) 9.

Reactor Vessel Level (HJTC) (j) 2 (k)(1)

(a)

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, initiate-the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and 1

1.

cither restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or :

2.

prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

.(b)~

With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERA'BLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2 98 Amendment No, 81,82,83,87,4-10 p

4...,

.,_-.m..,

_m,.,m4,._,,,,-..,,

TABLE 2-10 (Conthtutt" POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING LIMITS (c)

With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE r.tatus within l 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(d)

With the number of OPERABLE channels ! css than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, opemtion may continue unti! the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.

(c)

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either i

1.

restore the inoperabic channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or 2.

initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or 3.

be in at least HOT SilUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(f)

With both channels inoperable, 1.

restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or 2.

initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or j

l 3,

be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(g)

With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples per core quadrant one less than the minimum operable requirement, either restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) to - OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

I (h)

With all Core Exit Thermocouples within a core quadrant inoperable, either restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

^(i)

With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples less than the four per core quadrant required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least four OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples per core quadrant within seven days of discovery of loss of operability, or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5,9.3 within 30 days, outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans i L for restoring the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) to OPERABLE status.

l L

. (j)

- A channelis eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPERABLE.

2-98a Amendment No.140 t

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i ATTACHMENT B 1

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DISCUSSION, JUS 11 FICA 110N, AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

'0maha Public Power District (OPPD) is proposing to change Specification 2.7,

" Electrical Systems," to correct inconsistencies and to provide further guidance on equi) ment necessary for the 161kV power supply.

Additionally, administrative c1anges are proposed for Specification 2.7 and Table 2-10.

Following is the discussion ard justification for the proposed changes.

i Specification 2.7 Electrical Systems Specification 2.7(1)

Minimum Requirements As currently written this specification applies above 300 degrees F; however, the modification to minimum requirements only applies after the reactor is critical.

If the reactor is above 300 degrees but not yet critical, and a listed system is declared inoperable, Specification 2.0.1 is invoked which requires the unit to be placed in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

If the same system is declared inoperable at full power the l

modification to minimum requirements apply which contain an allowed outage time for the specific system and additionally allow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to place the j.

unit in hot shutdown if the system outage tin,e cannot be met.

The proposed revision to Specification 2.7(2) as it applies to 2.7(1),

would allow the same modifications to minimum requirements above 300 degrees F as alloed after criticality.

However, it would not allow the reactor to be made critical unless all of the listed systems are operable.

The statement concerning minimum requirements is being revised to add the word " coolant" and delete the word "up" to be more consistant with Specification 2.5.

Administrative Changes Specifications 2.7(1)a.,2.7(1)b.,and2.7(1)d.containtypographical j

errors.

The equipment designation for transformers is identified as "T!"

and is being corrected to read "T1."

Specification 2.7(1)i,j, and k are being revised to include the specific equipment designations.

Specification 2.7(1)h.containstypographicalerrors.

The equipment designation for electrical panels is identified as "Al" and is being corrected to read "Al."

1

Specification 2.7(2)

Modification of Minimum Requirements j

The proposed revision would allow the modification of minimum requirements to apply after the reactor is above 300 degrees f or after the reactor has been made critical.

This revision will not allow the reactor to be made critical unless all systems listed in 2.7(1) are operable.

Additional clarification is also proposed for the time limits contained in the action statement. This proposed change is consistent with the present specification and does not change the allowed outage time.

The action statement allows a total of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to reach the cold shutdown condition.

Specification 2.0.1, which would be invoked if systems in excess of the modification to minimum requirements are inoperable, allows a total of 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months to reach the cold shutdown condition.

Proposed Specifications Concerning Inoperability of Ilouse Service Transfoi ers l

l 0 PPD has reviewed Technical Specification 2.7(2)b house service transformers TIA-3 and TIA-4 and 2.7(2)n 161kV off-site power supply Limiting Conditions for Operation for that equipment using the guideline provided by the NRC in a Safety Evaluation Report dated January 30, 1990. (ACN No. 9002070242) The proposed Technical Specification will delete the present specification 2.7(2)n in its entirety and modify 2.7(2)b to provide direction on the 161kV supply.

The proposed specification will define time limits and reporting requirements.

Proposed Specification 2.7(2)b OnellouseServiceTransformer(T1A-3orTIA-4) Inoperable This specification would allow operation for seven (7) days with one house service transformer out of service and is consistent with the present specifications.

Verbal notification of the transformer inoperability will be made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Added to this aortion of the specification is a clause which >ermits operation beyond tie seven days provided OPPD submits a report to t1e NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months detailing restoration plans and measures taken to prevent a plant trip and diesel generator inoperability while the transformer is out of service.

Continued operation beyond 7 days would also require NRC concurrence.

Continued operation is considered desirable in that a unit shutdown would result in the loss of one of the 4.16kV safeguards buses resulting in challenges to the diesel safety system and primary system transients.

The proposed specification also directs the operability verification of the diesel generator associated with the inoperable House Service Transformer to be completed.

This provides additional assurance that the plant can be safely shutdown, if required.

Verification is defined as a reverification of the last monthly surveillance test.

Demonstrating operability of the diesel generator by conducting the surveillance test is not desirable.

Conducting the surveillance test requires that the diesel be taken out of the automatic mode.

This would create a situation wnereby one division of safeguards equipment would be without any emergency power for the duration of the test.

2

1 I

Pro)osed Specification 2.7(2)c.

Bot 1 House Service Transformers (TIA-3 and TIA-4) Inoperable The proposed specification would allow operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with both house service transformers out of service.

The specification has been clarified to indicate that the loss of the 161kV off-site power is considered to render both House Service Transformers inoperable.

Demonstrating operability of the diesel generators by conducting the surveil'ance test is not desirable.

Consistent with the present s>ecification, the operability of both diesel generators is to be verified, w11ch is defined as a reverification of the last monthly surveillance test. Conducting the surveillance test requires that the diesel be taken out of the automatic mode.

This would create a situation whereby one division of safeguards equipment would be without any emergency power for the duration of the test.

The reporting requirement specifies that a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months verbal notification be made to the NRC.

If operation is to be continued beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months a report must be sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months detailing restoration plans and additional measures to be taken while the transformers are out of service.

l Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months would also require NRC concurrence.

L Continued operation is a preferred course of action rather than shutdown because a turbine generator trip would result in a loss of off-site power.

I This loss of off-site power would cause the following:

1.

Diesel generator start and energizing of the safety busses.

2.

Natural circulation cooling of fuel to remove decay heat.

3.

Decay heat removal from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves due to loss of the condenser.

4.

A challengc to the automatic auxiliary feedwater system.

The plant cannot establish _the normal hot shutdown configuration until 345kV backfeed has been established after the turbine generator trip.

Condenser operations can then be reestablished and the reactor coolant pumps restarted.

Specification 2.7(2)n This specification is to be deleted.

The loss of the 161kV off-site supply will be specified in Technical Specification 2.7(2)c.

The specification which permits reactor startup with the 161kV out of service will be deleted.

The present Technical Specification is incorrect in that although the reactor could be taken to hot standby (critical),

the generator could not be synchronized to-the power grid or even supply house loads.

This is because the disconnect switch 0$-11, is a manual / motor switch with no synchronization capability. The 345kV bus must be de-energized before closing DS 11._ Removal of the 345kV bus would de-energize all four Reactor Coolant Pumps and this would scram the reactor.

3

~. -

+

Adainistrative Changes Specification 2.7(2)d. is being revised to provide consistent wording and to clarify that either bus IA3 g 1A4 may be inoperable.

Specification 2.7(2)e. contains a typographical error.

1he equipment designation for transformers is identified as "TI" and is being corrected to read "11."

This specification is also being clarified to indicate what components may be inoperable. Redundant components are not necessarily powered by the corresponding " redundant" transformer in the other electrical division. For exam)le if transformer TIB-3A is inoperable charging pump CH-1A is inopera)le.

The corresponding transformer on the other electrical divisOn TIB-4A does not supply power to any charging pumps.

This revision clarifies that there cannot be inoperable compon?nts redundant to those components powered by the inoperable transformer.

Specification 2.7(2)f. is being revised to clarify that only one of the 480 V buses may be inoperable at any given time and to clarify that there cannot be inoperable components redundant to those components powered by the inoperable bus.

Specification 2.7(2)g. is being revised to clarify that either group of i

Motor Control Centers (MCC) may be inoperable at the same time.

This is consistent with the wording of the present specification.

The specification maintains the additional requirement that redundant i

components be operable.

Specification 2.7(2)h, i, and j are being revised to add equipment designations.

Specification 2.7(2)k. is being revised to add equipment designations and clarify that there cannot be inoperable components redundant to those components powered by the inoperable buses.

Specification 2.7(2)l. and 2.7(2)m are being revised to add equipment designations and to indicate that either one,o1 its redundant system may be inoperable.

The inclusion of the word "and" in this specification is incorrect and is being deleted.

l Specification 2.7(2)m. is being revised to indicate that either one system E its redundant system may be inoperable.

The inclusion of the word "and" i

L in this specification is incorrect and is being deleted.

Specification 2.7(2)n.isbeingrevisedtoprovideconsistentwordingand to clarify that either AC instrument panel AI-42A o_t Al-42B may be inoperable.

4

Dasis of Specification 2.7 Changes to Discussions Concerning the 161kV Power Supply Contained in the Basis Clarification concerning the loss of the 161kV line has been added to the basis of Specification 2.7.

This clarification indicates that the loss of the incoming 161kV line renders the house transformers inoperable due to their inability to supply the 4.16kV safeguards buses IA3 and 1A4.

In order to restore off-site )ower to the safeguards buses upon loss of the 161kV line, 345cv backfeed must be manually established.

Therefore, upon the loss of the 161kV line, the house tervice transformers are considered inoperable.

Additional clarification has also been added concerning the o)erability of the auxiliary transformers.

Normal alant startup and slutdown requires manually transferring the 4.16kV auses IA1, IA2, 1A3, and 1A4 between the 345/22kV and the 161kV power sup)1y.

During the actual realignment manipulations, off-site power, altlough available, cannot power the transformers until completion of the manipulations.

This clarification states that the transformers are not considered inoperable during these startup and shutdown realignments.

During normal power operations should the 161kV incoming line be lost, the auxiliary power transformers supply the 4.16kV buses IA1, 1A2, 1A3, and 1A4 from the 345/22kV system after automatic fast transfer occurs.

Administrative Changes to the Basis A correction has been made to the example contained in the basis which discusses the results of losing bus 1A3.

In the normal electrical lineup bus IA3 (4.16kV) powers bus 183A (480 V) and island bus 183A-4A (480 V).

This lineup would cause the loss of two high pressure safety injection (HpSI) pumps and one containment spray (CS) pump and leave one HPSI and two CS pumps available upon loss of bus 1A3.

This correction does not affect the number of pumps assumed to be available in a Design Basis Accident.

The rating of the battery chargers is being revised from "200" to "400" amperes to reflect an increase in rating as a result of modification MR-FC-84-119.

The word "avilible" is misspelled and is being corrected to read "available."

l 5

l l

1he discussion concerning the ability of the batterys to handle all loads following a DBA is being generalized to reflect the requirements of the batterys and chargers as discussed in USAR Section 8.4.2.

The batterys are rcted for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and cannot handle all loads indefinitely as might be implied by this statement.

The word " channel" is being deleted as it is unnecessarily stated twice.

References 1, 2, and 3 are being revised from FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report) to reflect the updated version of this document which is designated the USAR. (Updated Safety Analysis Report)

Specification 2.21, Tabic 2-10 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Administrative Changes Page 2-98 Table 2-10 Item 5, Containment Water Level Harrow Range (LT-559 &

LT-600), contains a typographical error.

The equipment identification for level transmitter "LT-559" is incorrect and is being corrected to read "LT-599."

Page 2-98a Table 2-10 Note (c) contains a typographical error.

Note (c) incorrectly states, "With hot channels inoperable,.." and is being corrected to read "With both channels inoperable,.."

Table 2-10 Note (i) is being revised to add the words "per core quadrant" to clarify that the number of Core Exit Thermocouples required by NUREG-0737 are four per core quadrant and not a total of four in the entire core.

In addition, the word " channels" is revised to read " Core Exit Thermocouples." These proposed changes are consistent with an interpretation of this specification from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in a memorar um to NRC Region IV d

dated December 11, 1990. (TAC No. 75596)

Table 2-10 Notes (g) and (h) are being revised to reflect the guidance discussed on Note (i) for consistent wording.

6

[rasis for No Significant flazards Consideration The proposed changes do not involve significant 'nazards consideration because operation of Fort Calhoun Station in accoNance with this change would not; 1.

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Moditication to the Minimum Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements and modification to minimum requirements do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor is at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F but not critical.

The consequences of an accident at full power are sig>ificantly greater than when the reactor is not critical.

By not allt ving the unit to be made critical unless all of the systems listed in 1se minimum requirements are operable ensures that the consequences wouti not be increased.

Changes Loncerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment The proposed changes concerning the operation of the 161kV off-site power line and associated equipment does not adversely affect the consequences or probability of an accident or event previously evaluated.

This change clarifies the operability requirements of the remaining power sources during times when the House Service Transformers are out-of-service, requires reporting of actions to restore the transformer (s) and other precautions to be taken while the transformer is out-of-service, and removes the permissive to restart with the 161kV line out-of-service.

The present Specifications allow the 161kV line, and therefore the transformers, to be out-of-service for an indefinite time period.

This change defines a consistent allowed outage time for both the 161kV line and the associated transformers, and requires NRC concurrence to continue to operate beyond the specified time.

Changes to Table 2-10 The proposed changes to Table 2-10 are administrative only.

These changes consist of correcting typographical errors and providing clarification which is consistent with an interpretation from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Therefore, the changes to Table 2-10 does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

7

l a

2.

Create thm possibility of a new or differcnt kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Modification to the Minimum l

Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements and modification to minimum requirements do not create the possibility of a new of different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor is at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F, but not critical.

Changes Concerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment It has been determined that no new or different type of accident is created because no new or different modes of operation are piaposed for the plant.

The proposed requirements to verify the operability of the remaining emergency power supply provides a higher level of assurance that alternative power sources are operable.

Removal of the permissive to restart the plant when the 161kV line is out-of-service eliminates the possibility of an accident in a higher mode than that existing at the time the 161kV service was lost.

There will be no electrical system configuration changes as a result of this change.

Plant response to transients will be the same as currently analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Changes to Table 2-10 The proposed changes to Table 2-10 are administrative only.

These changa consist of correcting typographical errors and providing clarif nation which is consistent with an interpretation from the 0"'ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Therefore, the changes to Table u0 cannot create the possibility of a new or different kii.d of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Involve a sign ficant reduction in the margin of safety.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Modification to the Minimum Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements and modification to minimum requirements does not reduce the margin of safety.

This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor is at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F, but not critical.

Equipment necessary to be operable above 300 degrees F is specifici in additional Specifications.

This proposed change would not alter the number of pumps or valves which are required to be operable.

8

Changes Concerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment This change results in an increase in the margin of safety associated with the normal source of auxiliary power by eliminating the permissive to restart with the 161kV line out-of-service.

Changes to Table 2-10 The proposed changes to Table 2-10 are administrative only.

These changes consist of correcting typogra>hical errors and providing clarification which is consistent witi an interpretation from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Therefore, the changes to Table r

2-10 do net re6 ice any margin of safety.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant haza-ds consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Example (i) concerns-a purely administrative change; for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

Example (ii) concerns a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications; for example, a more restrictive surveillance requirement.

Example (vi) concerns a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within acceptable criteria with respect to the system.-

The proposed changes to S3ecification 2.7(1) and Table 2-10 are similar to example (i) in that the clanges correct typographical errors and provide clarification only.

The proposed changes concernin the 161kV power supply are similar to examples (i) g the availability of and (ii in that the changedeletesinconsistenciesbetweenSpecification2.7(2b.and2.7(2)n.,

and that additional restrictions are being proposed upon a loss of the 161kV off-site power supply.

Therefore, based on the above considerations, OPPD does not believe that-this proposed amendment involves a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92 and the proposed changes will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the Station on the environment.

Thus, the proposed change meets the eli categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)gibility criteria for and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental assessment need be prepared.

9 l

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ML20086C925

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